Warm change about hot topics: The role of motivation and emotion in attitude and conceptual change about controversial science topics

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18
Warm
Change
about
Hot
Topics
The
Role
of
Motivation
and
Emotion
in
Attitude and
Conceptual
Change about
Controversial
Science
Topics
GALE
M.
SINATRA
University
of
Southern
California
Vi
ViA
NE
SEYRANIAN
California
State
Polytechnic
University,
Pomona
Students
and
the
general
public
often
consider
current
sci
entific
topics
such
as biological
evolution, climate
change,
stem
cell
research,
vaccinations,
and
genetically
modified
fbod
controversial.
However,
the
degree
of
controversy
is
in
the
eye
of
the beholder.
Science
is
conducted
at
the
edge
of
the
known,
thus
cutting-edge
science
can
be
controversial
even
among those
engaged
in
the
research
directly.
However,
many
issues within
afield
of
study
are
largely
resolved
from
a
scientific
standpoint,
but
are
still
considered
controver
sial
from
the
public’s perception.
As
an
example,
98%
of
climate
scientists concur
that we
are
in
a
period
of
warm
tag
and
Iwmans
are coner
uttag
stgni&antly
to
this
trend
(Intergovernmental Panel
on
Climate
Change,
2007).
Thus,
this
point
is
not
controversial
within the
climate
science
community.
However,
the
projections
for
future
average
temperatures
still
have
a
degree
of
uncertainty—somewhere
between
2
and
60
is
the
best
estimate ([ntergovernmenta(
Panel
on
Climate Change,
2007).
The
degree
of
uncertainty
in
projections
may
contribute
to the
public’s perception
that
climate
change
is
more
controversial
than
scientists
perceive
it
to
be.
Siniiariy,
there
is
a
high level
of
certainty
within
the
scientific
community
that
vaccines
are
not linked
to
autism,
and
yet
the
causes
of
autism
are
still
uncertain,
leading
some
members
of
the
public
to
resist
vaccinating their
children
(Sinatra,
Kienhues,
&
Hofer,
2014).
Topics
perceived
as
contmrsiat
present
unique
chat
lenges
for
teachers,
students, and
members
of
the
public
who
must
weigh
these
issues in learning,
reasoning,
and
decision
making.
These
challenges
include
many factors,
such
as
understanding
uncertainty
(Lindley,
2006)
and
appreciating
complexity
(Hmelo-Silver
&
Azevedo,
2006),
both inherent
to
understanding
controversial
topics
(Sinatra
et
al.,
20
14a).
A
trend
in
media
and
popular
outlets,
school
boards,
and
more
recently
in
textbooks
is
to
present
“both
sides”
of
every
science
topic
in
the
interest
of
“fir
and
balanced”
presenta
tion.
This
is
misleading,
as
it
gives
the
impression
of
a
greater
degree
of
controversy
than
actually
exists
among
members
of
the
scientific
community.
Students
in
classrooms,
learners
in
out-of-school environments,
and
members
of
the
general
public
hold
both
attitudes and
conceptual
knowledge
about
controversial science
topics that
impact
their
learning,
engage
ment,
and
acceptance
of
scientific
ideas
(Sinatra
et
al,
20144
Further,
recent
research
on
the
warming
trend
(Sinatra,
2005),
and
on motivated
reasoning
(Jost,
Glaser,
Kruglanski,
&
Sulloway,
2003),
shows
that
the
processes
of
attitude
change
and
conceptual change
are
significantly
impacted
by
motiva
tion
and
emotion,
and are
not
likefy
to
be
overcome
by simpfy
filling
in
gaps
in
knowledge
(Sinatra
et
al.,
2014a).
Our
purpose
for
this
chapter
is
to
present
a view
of
the
challenges
of
fostering
attitude
and conceptual
change
on
controversial
topics
in
science
that
will
inform
research
and
teaching.
We
begin
by
drawing distinctions between
atti
tudes,
beliefs,
and
conceptual
knowledge.
We
argue that
these
distinctions
are
necessary
for
a
more
complete
under
standing
of
the
change
process.
Then,
we
provide
an
over
view
of
Cwo
titeracures
that
until
recently
were
considered
in
isolation:
attitude
change
and
conceptual change.
In
these
literature
reviews,
we
pay
particular
attention
to the
role
motivation
and
emotion
play
in
understanding
and
accept
ance
of
controversial
science
topics. Next, we
consider
the

246
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and
Viviane
Seyranian
intersection
of
conceptual
change
and
attitude
change
by
proposing
a
framework
for
exploring
change.
Next,
we
dis
cuss
the
methodological challenges facing
this
field
of
study.
Finally,
we
conclude
with
directions
for
future
research.
Attitude
Change
and
Conceptual
Change:
Important
Distinctions
What
do
you know
about
stem
cell research? What
is
your
attitude towards
stem
cell
research?
As
researchers, when
we
pose
these
two
questions,
are
we
asking about
two
fun
damentally
different
constructs?
Can
we
empirically
and
theoretically
distinguish between these
constructs?
If
these
differences
exist,
are
they
relevant
and important
to
edu
cators and
researchers? Over
ten
years
ago,
Southerland,
Sinatra,
and
Matthews argued that
such
questions
“are
at
the
very
heart
of
science teaching
and
research”
(2001,
p.
327).
Yet,
in
the
last
decade,
rather
than
more
conceptual
clarity,
we
perceive
that
there
has been
a
greater blurring
of
the
constructs
of
attitude change
and conceptual change
in
academic
and
public discourse.
Attitudes
are
related
to
beliefs, and
here
is
where
the
lines
begin
to
blur.
Murphy
and
Mason
note that,
most
educational psychology researchers
seem
to
avoid
dif
ferentiating
between
knowledge
and
be1ieI
by
either
using
the
terms interchangeably
or
by
only referring
to
knowledge
or
beIiet.
In
this
way,
researchers
avoid
the
issue
of
the
rela
tions
among
these
constructS.
(2006,
p.
306)
Southerland et
al.
(2001)
argued that
there
are
impor
tant
differences
between
knowledge, beliefs,
attitudes, and
acceptance
that
matter
for
how
we
conceptualize
research
in
science education. For
controversial topics,
we
argue
that
the
distinctions
are
not
only
important,
but
are
critical
for
research
and
teaching.
Therefore,
we
propose
a
framework
for
conceptualizing attitude
and
knowledge
change
that
we
feel
may
contribute
to
productive
research
on
the
intersection
of
these important
constructs.
Attitude
Change
and
Conceptual
Change
about
Controversial
Topics
Before
we can
consider
attitudes
and
conceptual
change,
we
must
first
consider
the
conceptual distinctions between
atti
tudes
and concepts
as
well
as
the
distinction between
knowl
edge
and
belief.
Then,
we
discuss
relevant
models
of
attitude
change
and
conceptual
change.
Attitudes
and
Attitude
Change
The
study
of
attitudes
has
been
fundamental
to
the
field
of
social
psychology
since
its
inception
(Allport,
1935;
McGuire,
1985;
Prislin
&
Crano,
2008).
Despite
the
central
ity
of
the
attitude concept
in
social
psychology, surprisingly,
the
definition
of
attitudes
still
remains
elusive
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz,
2010),
with
hundreds
of
definitions
prevalent
in
the
literature (AlbarracIn, Johnson,
Zanna,
&Kumale,
2005).
Various
attitude
scholars
(e.g.,
Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1993)
have
noted
that the
common thread running through
the
majority
of
these
definitions
is
that
an
attitude
consists
of
an
evaluation
of
a
person,
object,
or
entity.
That
is,
an
attitude
describes
the
valence (e.g.,
like—dislike,
favor
or disfavor)
evoked
by
an
attitude
object.
This
idea
is
also
echoed
in
the
most
widely
cited
definition
of
atiiuiides
by
Eagly
and Chaiken
(1993),
who
defined
an
attitude
as
“a
psychological
tendency
that
is
expressed
by
evaluating
a
particular
entity
with some
degree
of
favor
or
disfavor”
(p.
1).
Attitudinal
components.
When
conceptualized
as
evalua
tive
judgments,
attitudes
are
described
as
consisting
of
three
components
related
to
the
attitude object:
(a) behaviors;
(b) affect,
and
(c)
cognition.
The
behavioral
intention
or
response
is
interpreted
to
relay
a
positive
or
negative
eval
uation
of
the
attitude object. For
example,
attitude
theorists
would
argue
that
the
act
of
wishing
a
friend
“happy
birthday”
on
Facebook
might
express
a
positive
evaluation
of
the
friend.
The
affective
component
of
attitudes consists
of
the
feel
ings,
emotions,
or
moods
evoked
by,
and
associated
with,
the
attitude
object.
Affective
reactions
are
usually
positive
(e.g.,
joy)
or
negative
(e.g.,
sadness)
and
contribute
to
evalu
ative responding.
In
recent
years, there
has
been
an
increased
emphasis
on
the
affective
component
of
attitudes
as these
are
more
readily accessible
and may
contribute
more
to
behav
ioral
outcomes
than
the
cognitive
component
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz, 2010; Forgas, 2010).
Attitude theorists
often
describe
the
cognitive
compo
nent
of
attitudes
as
an
evaluative
reaction
to beliefs about
an
attitude
object.
In
this
context,
beliefs
are
defined
as
associ
ations
formed
between
an
attitude
object
and
some
related
attribute
(Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1998).
We
propose
that
a
more
fine-grained definition
of
beliefs
is
called
for,
particularly
when
considering
attitudes
from the
vantage point
of
con
troversial
science
topics
and
attitude
or
conceptual
change.
The
cognitive component
of
attitudes entails
an
evaluative
reaction to
one
of
the
following
types
of
belief:
(a)
unjusti
fied
beliefs,
which
are
associations
between
an attitude
object
and
a
related attribute
that
has
emerged
from
experience
(by
“unjustified,”
we
mean
to
suggest
that
the
belief
is
held
with
insufficient
justification
or
warrant
to
be
called
knowledge),
or
(b)
jusufied
true
beliefs
(knowledge),
which
are
associa
tions
between
an
attitude
object
and
a
related attribute
that
has
sufficient
justifications
and
warrants
to
be
called
knowl
edge. For
example,
a
scientist’s hypothesis
may
be
construed
as
a
belief
until
substantial
scientific evidence
supporting
the
hypothesis
is
gathered
to
justify
calling
the
belief
knowledge.
As
such,
attitudes can
consist
of
valenced
evaluative
reactions
to
unjustified beliefs
(e.g., the
Holocaust
never
happened)
or
justified
true
beliefs
(e.g.,
the
earth
rotates
around
the
sun).
Note
that
this
is
consistent
with
a
defini
tion
of
conceptual knowledge
as
justified
true
belief
Even
though
conceptual knowledge
is
by
definition
not
valenced
in
and
of
itself,
it
can
conjure
up
evaluative
reactions
in
peo
ple
in
a
similar
manner
as
unjustified
beliefs.
For
example,
a
person
may
have conceptual
knowledge
about stem
cells.
That
is,
he
may
understand
what
a
stem
cell
is
and
hold
jus
tified
knowledge
about
stem cell
research. At
an
evaluative

Warm
Change about
Hot
Topics
247
level,
however,
he
may
react
negatively
to
this
knowledge.
In
other
words,
this
reaction
may
contribute evaluative
information that
may
inform his
attitudes
about
stem
cell
research.
Therefore,
one
can
hold
attitudes about
both
types
of
beliefs,
the
unjustified
and
the
justified
(or
knowledge).
In
the
same
vein,
attitudes
can
also
be
changed
about
both
types
of
beliefs
(see
Attitude
Change
and Persuasion
sec
tion,
below).
This idea suggests
a
novel
way
of
considering
the
link
between
conceptual knowledge and
attitudes. We
will
return
to
this point
later
and
elaborate
more
on the
rela
tionship
between
attitudes
and conceptual
knowledge
when
considering
the
attitude—conceptual
change framework. For
now,
it
is
important
to
highlight
the
idea.that attitudes
can
be
informed
by
one
or two types
of
beliefs, unjustified
and
jus
tilled
true
beliefs,
which
can
operate alone
or
simultaneously
to
inform
evaluations.
Attitudes
may
be
primarily
based
on
behavioral,
affec
tive,
or
cognitive components or
they may
consist
of
eval
uative
responses
that
integrate
these
aspects. For
instance,
a
student’s
positive evaluation
of
physical education
class
may
stem
from
her
belief
that
exercise
leads
to
good health
(cognitive),
that
she
feels
happy during exercise
(affective),
engages
in
it
often
(behavior),
or
a
combination
of
one
or
more
of
these components.
Attitude
scholars
also
consider
the
relative
consistency
of
the
evaluative
information
across
the
behavioral,
affective,
or cognitive
components.
For
example,
a
person
might believe
that
bungee
jumping
is
safe
(positive
cognitive evaluation) but experience
fear
and
panic
when
considering
the
prospect
of
taking
the
plunge (negative
affective
evaluation).
In
this
example,
there
is
an
inconsist
ency
across
components,
which
contributes disparate
evalua
tive
information
to
the overall
attitude.
It
is
also
possible
to
have
inconsistencies
within
evaluative
components—for instance,
within
the
cognitive
component.
Consider
attitudes
about
controversial
topics.
For
controver
sea)
science
topics,
there
ae
usuaiJy
different camps
(pro
or
con).
Each
camp
presents
its
own
set
of
information,
statis
tics,
beliefs,
and
rationales
to
substantiate
its
position.
As
such,
individuals may
be
exposed
to
disparate
and
potentially
conflicting
information
from
each
side and
their attitudes
will
contain
evaluative
judgments
regarding
beliefs
from
both
camps.
Along
these lines,
Pratkanis
(1989)
noted that
%ttitudes
about
controversial
issues
are
more
likely
to
con
th’
bq,olar
structures,
that
is,
inftwmation
from
both
sides
of
an
issue
is
represented
in
memory.
Non-controversial
issues
are
more
likely
to
be
represented
with
a
unipolar structure
that
predominantly contains information
that
is
in
line
with
the
attitude.
Eagly
and
Chaiken
(1998)
argue
that
“it
may
be
mainly
in
the
face
of
clear-cut
social
conflict
on
an
issue
that
people’s
attitudes
become
bipolar
in
the
sense
that
they
divide
their
knowledge
icuo
clusters
of
congenial
and
uncon
genial
ideas”
(p.
274).
Expanding
on
this idea,
we
propose that
an
attitude
about
a
controversial
issue
may
become
bipolar
particularly when
it
is
associated with one’s
collective
self
or
social identity
(‘tajfel
&
Turner,
1986)
and
there
is
some
type
of
tension
that
relations between
the
ingroup
and outgroup.
In
circumstance,
attitudes
may become
bipolar
because
different
attitudinal
poles help
to
distinguish
the ingroup
from
the
outgroup.
For
example,
negative attitudes
towards
whaling
may
be
associated
with
a
social identity
such
as an
anti-whaling
Greenpeace
activist,
yet the
activist
will
also
possess
considerable
information about
the
beliefs
of
the
out-
group (whalers).
An
attitude
may have
either
a
bipolar
or
unipolar
struc
ture,
and
at
the
same
time,
it
may
be
related
to
another
atti
tiide
or
sets
of
attitudes,
which
may
be
embedded
within
more
global
structures (Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1998).
Related
attitudes
tend
to
cluster together
in
a
constellation,
not
unlike
related
conceptual
knowledge. For instance, attitudes
about
gun
control and gays
in
the
military are
associated
(Alvaro
&
Crano,
1997;
Crano,
2012).
Attitudes
that are
highly
inte
grated
with
values
are
termed
ideologies
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz,
2010).
Similar
to
individual attitudes, ideologies
may
also
have
bipolar
structures,
as
a
person
may
possess
information
about
both
sides
of
the
ideoLogical
spectrum.
Take,
for
exam
ple,
the
liberal—conservative
ideology.
Conservatives
and
liberaLs
may
hold
considerable
information
about
the
other
side’s
position
on
social
and political
issues.
That
is
not
to
say
the
beliefs and
information
concerning
the
positions
of
the
“other side”
are
always
accurate.
For instance,
a
conserv
ative
from the
United
States
may have
some
understanding
about
communism
or
socialism,
but
also hold
a
variety
of
misconceptions,
and aliberal
may
have
some
understanding
of
nuclear power
but
may
also
hold
some
misconceptions.
When
attitudes
are
based
on
misconceptions,
they
may
be
particularly resistant
to
change
unless the
misconception
is
corrected.
In
this
case,
attitudinal
change
may
be
dependent
on
conceptual
change.
Prior
to
developing
this
idea,
let
us
first
consider attitude
change
and persuasion.
Attitude
Change
and
Persuasion
AflthiJe
change
occnrs
when
ai
evaluation
about
ajus.tifed
or
unjustified
belief
is
moved
in
a
different direction.
An
atti
tude
can
move
in
a
direction
that
is
in
line
with
the
original
evaluation
(polarize)
or
it
can
move
in
the
opposite
direction
or
towards
neutrality
compared
to
the original evaluation
(depolarize). Until
the
1950s,
there
was
little
understanding
of
attitude
change
and
the
processes
that
encourage
it
(per
suasion). The
pioneering
efforts
of
the
Yale
group,
a
team
of
31)
scholars
led
by
Carl
Ho4’)and,
spurred
the
field
of
athtude
change
and
persuasion
(Johnson,
Miao,
&
Smith-McLalLen,
2005). More
contemporary
research
and
theories
of
persua
sion
stand
on
the
shoulders
of
this
earlier
work
and
extend
it
by proposing
a
dual process
of
persuasion
(Chaiken,
1980;
Petty
&
Cacioppo,
1986a).
The
Elaboration
Likelihood
Model
(ELM).
The
ELM
(Petty
&
Cacioppo,
I
986b)
is
a
model
of
how
persuasion
may
occur
through
one
of
two
processes. When
one
encoun
ters a
persuasive
message,
the
extent
to
which
the
message
is
processed
depends
on
one’s
motivation
and
ability
to process
the
message,
The
motivation
and
ability
to
process
a
message
depend
on
a
confluence
of
situational
and
individual
differ
ence
variables;
however, people
tend
to
be
most
motivated
to

248
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and
Viviane
Seyranian
elaborate
on
information
when
it
ispersonaJly
relevant(Petty&
Cacioppo,
1979).
When one
is
sufficiently
motivated
and
able
to
process
a
message,
ELM
would predict that
central
route
processing
is
employed
to
carefully scrutinize
and
comb
through
all
of
the
available
information
concerning
th
attts& olect.
suc.i,
w
ccpac
tht
sage
with
their
previous
knowledge
and
belie1
and
evaluate
its
merit.
If
the
quality
of
the
message
is
strong, this
type
of
intense
and
eifortfId
message
consideration
will
likely
elicit
attitude
change.
If
message
quality
is
weak, effortful
message
consideration
will
reduce
the
likelihood
of
attitude change
as
there
is
little
merit
to
the
message.
Attitudes changed
as
a
result
of
effortfiil
consideration
(or
high
elaboration)
and
strong
message
quality
tend
to
be
strong,
resistant
to
sub
sequent
persuasion
efforts,
and
more
predictive
of’
behavior
(Petty, Haugtvedt,
&Smith,
1995).
When
one
is
insufficiently
motivated
or
unable
to
process
a
message,
ELM
predicts
that
peripheral
route
processing
is
more likely
to be
employed,
whereby
itidivicluals
are
less
likely
to
carefully
process
a
message. Since
message
content
is
not
closely
attended
to
during peripheral
route
processing,
message
quality
is
not
a
factor
that
influences
attitude change.
Instead,
peripheral
cues
play
a
pivotal
role.
Peripheral cues
ae
factors
that
are
peripheral
to
the
logic
of
the
argument,
which may
comprise
of
variables
such
as
source
credibil
ity
or attractiveness.
Peripheral
cues
could
also
comprise
of
heuristics
(Chaiken,
1980)
or
simple decision
rules such
as
“experts tend
to be
correct”
in
making
judgments.
When
people
use
the
peripheral
route
processing,
they
are
more
likely
to
form
weaker
attitudes
that
may be
fleeting
(Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
The
ELM
assumes
that
elaboration
is
objective
when
a
particular
judgment
is
not
preferred
prior
to
message
expo
sure.
However, biased
message
processing
is
also
possible
when
individuals hold afavored
attitudinal
position
or
have
relatively one-sided knowledge
prior
to
message
exposure.
In
particular,
Petty
and
Wegener
(1998)
argue
that
individu
als
with
a
biased store
of
knowledge
have
more
information
to
draw
on
to
bolster their
own
side
and
they
can
better see
the
flaws
of
opposing arguments.
As
a
result,
their
attitudes
can
become even
more polarized
due
to
counterattitudinal
message
exposure
(Lord,
Ross,
&
Lepper,
1979).
Source
credibility. Source
credibility
usually
refers
to
the
level
‘of
expertise
(i.e.,
knowledge
and
ability
to
provide
accurate
information)
and
trusiworthiness
(i.e.,
honesty)
associated
with
a
source (Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
Research
has
widely
corroborated
the
power
of
highly
credible
sources
to
influence attitude
change,
particularly
when
messages
are
of
low
personal
relevance
(for
a
review,
see
Pornpitakpan,
2004).
Research
shows
that
source
credibility
can have
dif
ferential impacts.
It
can
act
as
a
peripheral
cue
when
individu
als are
not
processing
the
message deeply
(Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
When individuals do
engage
deeply
with
the
message,
the
quality
of
message
arguments
is
more
important
than
source
credibility
in
influencing
attitudes
(Petty,
Cacioppo,
&
Goldman,
1981).
However,
when
a
message
is
personally
relevant,
source
credibility
may
take
on
alternative
roles.
It
can
spur
message-relevant thoughts
(Heesacker,
Petty,
&
Cacioppo,
1983),
bias
processing
(Chaiken
&
Maheswaran4
1994),
or could
act
as
an
argument
that
bolsters
message.
quality
(Kaufirian,
Stasson,
&
Hart,
1999).
Group
membership:
ingroup
am!
outgroup.
Another
important
source
variable
that may
influence
consideration
4
of
controversial
issues
is
ingroup
and
outgroup
status.
An
ingroup
is
a
group
of
people
with
whom
a
person
shares
common
group
membership
(e.g.,
ethnicity,
religion).
Not
all
group
memberships
are
important
to
individuals.
For
the
ingroup
to
become
psychologically
meaningful,
individuals
must
attach
emotional
significance
or
identify
with
the
group
such
that
the
group
becomes
a
part
of
their
social
identity
(Tajfel
&
Turner,
1986).
In
this
case, the
individual
is
said
to
highly
identify
with
the
group.
An
outgroup
is
a
group
of
people
with whom
an
individual does
not
share
common
%TOi
besip,
WI1
iocs
t
ify.
9
Research suggests that
a
message associated
with
an
ingroup
member
holds
more
persuasive
power
than
the
same message from
an
outgroup member
(see
Turner,
1991).
These
findings may
be
explained
by
social
categorizationj
theory,
which
suggests
that individuals
tend
to
conform
to
the
attitudes,
norms, and behaviors
(prototypes)
of
ingroups,
particularly
those
with
which
they
highly
identify
(Turner,
1991).
For
example,
a
faculty
member
may
be
more
per-’!
suaded
by
a
message
to
change
tenure review
guidelines
if
the
source
of
the
message
is
from
another
faculty
member’
(ingroup)
than
a
student (outgroup).
If
the
individual
does
not
have
the
motivation
or
ability
to
process
the
message,
ingroup
or outgroup
status
may
serve
as
a
peripheral
cue
in
influencing
attitude
change
(Wood,
2000).
Recent
research
suggests
that
ingroup
sources
may
be
more
persuasive
in
altering
attitudes
about
justified
beliefs
than
in
changing
justified
beliefs
themselves.
Seyranian,
Lombardi,
and
Sinatra
(in
submission)
recently
provided.’
experimental
evidence showing that
attitudes
about
scien
tific
views
on
climate
change
(justified
by
evidence)
were
more
amenable
to
persuasion
by
an
ingroup source
than
an
outgroup
source.
On
the
other
hand,
the
plausibility
of
climate
change
(more
subjective
and thus
could
be
consid-”
ered
to
have
weaker
justification)
was
more
likely
to
be
influenced
by
an
outgroup
source than an ingroup
source.
The
rationale
for
this
discrepancy
is
that
individuals
tend
to
consult
with
similar
others
(i.e.,
ingroups)
on
attitudinal
judgments
because
they
are
more
likely
to
share
their
own
worldviews, beliefs,
and
values. Ingroup
members
are
also
likely
to
share
similar
biases,
which may
interfere
with
objective
judgments
(e.g.,
groupthink).
Dissimilar
sources
(i.e.,
outgroups) are
more
likely
to
be
consulted
for
knowl
edge-based
judgments
that
are
verifiably
right
or
wrong
because outgroups
are
less
likely
to
share
the
same
biases
and
will
likely
possess
different strengths
and weaknesses
than the
ingroup.
As
such, they
may have
worthwhile
perspective
to
share
for
knowledge
judgments
(Crano
Sc
Seyranian,
2009).

Warm
Change
about
Hot
Topics
249
Conceptual Knowledge
and
Conceptual Change
sConceptual
change describes
a
special
case
of
learning when
the
to-be-learned information conflicts
with
the
learner’s
background
knowledge and
is
often
referred
to
as
a
pro
cess
of
knowledge
restructuring
(see,
for
example,
Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998;
Murphy
&
Mason,
2006).
Much
of
the
infor
mation
we learn
is
new,
or
only
vaguely
familiar.
While
we
may
hold some
fragmented pieces
of
knowledge about
the
topic
(Smith,
diSessa,
&
Roschelle,
1993),
we
may
not have
a
rich,
developed, interconnected representation
of
the
con
cept
in
memory. From
our
point
of
view,
conceptual change
describes
the
scenario
when
the
learner
holds
a
conception
Jhat
is
connected
to
other
concepts
in
background
knowl
edge,
can
be
used
in
reasoning or
problem-solving
tasks
(likely
ineffectually,
since
it
is
rnisconceived),
and
it
is
in
conflict
with
the
new information.
En
the
parlance
of
attitudes and
attitude
change
discussed
above,
one would
say that
knowledge
that
is
misconceived
is
not
well
justified
and
therefore
is
technically
a
belief
It
is
important
to
note that,
in
the
conceptual
change
literature,
this
terminology
is
not
typically
used.
If
the
term
“belief”
is
used,
it
is
used
in
a
variety
of
ways,
as
there
is
no
common
defini
tion
of
belief
or
belief
change.
Conceptual
change
research
ers
typically describe
concepts
as
consistent
or
inconsistent
with
scientific
understanding.
In
our review
below,
we use
the
terms
used
in
the
conceptual change literature
to
avoid
confusion,
and
we
note
where
differences
lie.
Many
perspectives exist
on
the
nature
of
conceptual
change
learning
(for
a
review
of
several
perspectives,
see
Vosniadou, 2008).
Major perspectives that have
signifi
cantly
influenced
our
understanding
of
the
change
process
when
confronted
with
controversial topics
include
those
from
developmental psychology
(Carey,
2009;
Vosniadou,
2008),
cognitive
science
(Chi,
1992;
Ohlssori,
2009),
sci
r
ence
education
(Posner,
Strike,
1-lewson,
&
Gertzog,
1982;
Strike
&
Posner,
1992),
and
educational psychology
(Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998;
Murphy
&
Mason,
2006;
Sinatra,
2005).
Next,
we
briefly
review each
of
these
perspectives
with
an
eye
towards
how they
inform
our current
view.
Developmental
perspectives.
The origin and
development
of
conceptual
knowledge
are
of
deep
and
central
concern
to
all
of
psychology,
but
are
foundational
to
any
understanding
of
conceptual
change.
Most
researchers describe
conceptual
knowledge
as
categorical
in
nature. That
is,
“a
concept
can
be
viewed
as
belonging
to
some
category”
(Chi,
2008,
p.
62).
We
view
concepts
as
rich,
interconnected
representations
of
categorical knowledge
in
memory.
A
key
aspect
of
the
type
of
conceptual knowledge
relative
to
learning
is
that
it
is
generative.
It
allows
the
knower
to
draw inferences, make
predictions,
and think and
reason
with
that
conceptual
know
I-
edge,
which
can
be
small units
of
thought, mental models,
or
schemata.
The
developmental
perspective describes
how,
through
the
process
of
conceptual
change,
young
children
acquire
new
conceptual
representations
that
are
qualitatively
differ
ent
than
their
prior conceptions. These
new
representations
afford new
ways
of
thinking
and
reasoning
about
not only
the
new
concept,
but
about
other
concepts.
Developmentalists
trace
the
origins
and
restructuring
of
core
concepts
such
as
the
concept
of
“number,”
“agency,”
and
“living
thing,”
that
are
undamenta
to
thinking
and
reasoning
in
a
variety
of
domains
(Carey,
2009).
Carey
described
these
changes
as
so
fundamental
that
the
new
representations
are
incommensu
rate
with
prior
ones,
meaning
that
the
prior
representation
is
forever
lost
to
the
individual.,
(For
an
alternative
perspec
tive
on
the
persistence
of
prior
conceptions
post
conceptual
change,
see
Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2012.)
Developmental
conceptual change
of
this
sort
is
viewed
as
driven
primarily
by
maturational
processes
as
the
child
interacts
with
her
environment.
It
should
be
contrasted
with
the
restructuring
of
concepts
that
is
triggered
by
instruc
tion.
A
quintessential example
of
instructionally
induced
conceptual
change
(Enagaki &
Katano,
2008)
is
the
well-
documented shift
in
young children’s knowledge
of
the shape
of
the
earth
(Vosniadou
&
Brewer,
1992).
A
major difference
in
maturationally
versus
instruction
ally
induced
conceptual
change
is
that
the
first may
occur
without
deliberate
instruction
to
bring
about change,
but
the
second
is
unlikely
to
do
so.
That
is,
young
children
are
unlikely
to
adopt
a
spherical
view
of
the
earth
on
their
own,
since
the
notion
is
counterintuitive
and
belies
their
everyday
experience.
Even
direct instruction
on the
shape
of
the
earth
often
results
in
synthetic
conceptions
(Vosniadou,
1999),
or
the
blending
of
the
original
flat-earth
concept
with
the
round
concept
to
form
the
conception
that
the
earth
is
shaped
like
a
pancake.
Once
a
child
has
shifted her conception
of
the
shape
of
the
earth,
the
new
spherical
earth
conception
affords
(but
by
no
means
assures)
the
acquisition
of
scientifically
cor
rect
conceptions
of
the
day/night
cycle
and
seasonal change.
And
yet,
these
conceptions
are
themselves
often
resistant
to
instruction
designed
to
overcome
misconceptions (Posner
et
al.,
1982).
Thus,
we
learn
several
key
points
from
developmental
perspectives
on
conceptual change
that
pertain
to
our
interest
in
controversial
topics:
(a)
conceptual
knowledge
is
categori
cal
in
nature; (b)
conceptual knowledge
is
constructed
in
part
from
everyday
experiences
that often
conflict
with
scientific
understandings
(thus,
it
could
be
characterized
as
unjustified
beliefs);
(c)
conceptual
knowledge
relevant
to
learning
in
academic
domains,
whether
scientifically
accurate
or
inac
curate,
is
highly
interconnected
with
other knowledge
and
is
generative
in
that
it
impacts
thinking
and
reasoning
about
other
concepts
and
domains;
and
(d)
change
in
one
concept
affords,
but
does
not
necessarily
bring about,
change
in
a
related
concept.
7-
Cognitive
Science
Perspective.
Two perspectives
from
cognitive
science
have
influenced
our
thinking
on
concep
tual
change
regarding controversial
topics.
The
first
is
that
of
Chi and
her
work
on
conceptual change
as
a
process
of
oniological
shfls
(Chi,
1992).
According
to
Ch,
since
con
ceptual knowledge
is
categorical
in
nature, the
learner
can
mistakenly miscategorize
concepts, leading
to
reasoning
and

250
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and Viviane
Seyranian
problem-solving
difficulties.
According
to
Chi, the
process
of
conceptual change
is
one
of
restructuring miscategorized
knowledge
to
a
new
or
different
ontological
category
(Chi,
1992).
Onto
logical
categories
are
distinguished
by
different
properties.
According
to
this view,
the
category
plocess
can
be
described
as
taking
place over
time,
but
cannot have
the
property
of
color,
whereas
an
entity
can
have
the property
of
color,
but
cannot
be
described
as
taking
place
over
time.
So,
a
baseball
game
or
baking
a
cake could
be
described
as
a
process, but not
an entity
(Chi,
2008).
According
to
this
view,
conceptual change
is
described
as a
shift
from
thinking
about
a
concept
such as heat
as
belonging
to
one
ontological
category (entity)
to
thinking about
heat
as
belonging
to
a
dif
ferent
ontological category
(process)
(Chi,
1992).
An
alternative cognitive
science perspective that
informs
our
thinking
is
that
of
Ohlsson
(2009,
2011).
O1dsson
rejects
the
notion
that conceptual change
is
about transforming
or
restructuring knowledge.
Rather,
he
views the
change
pro
cess
as
one
of
seeing
a
phenomenon
from
a
new
theoretical
lens,
a
process
he
calls
resubsumption
(Ohlsson,
2009).
So,
according
to
this
perspective,
conceptual change occurs
when
a
learner
discovers
that
there are
two
ways
of
thinking
about
a
phenomenon.
Ohlsson
(2009)
calls
the
process by
which
experiences
with
the
phenomenon
activate
both
theories
bisociation.
Bisociation
is
an
insight
but
does
not
necessarily
cause the
cognitive
conflict, disequilibrium,
or
restructur
ing
of
categorical knowledge theorized
by
other
conceptual
change
researchers. Ultimately,
the
choice
to
think
about
the
phenomenon
through the
lens
of
the
alternative
theory
is
driven
by cognitive
utility
according
to
this
view.
A
key
difference
among
these perspectives
is
the
degree
to
which
prior
knowledge
undergoes
radical
restructuring
(Chi,
1992),
is
lost
to the individual
(Carey,
2009),
or
if
the
indi
vidual
merely thinks
about
the
concept
from
a
new
perspec
tive,
thereby
leaving
the
original knowledge
intact (Ohisson,
2009).
A
recent study
by
Shtulman
and Valcarcel
(2012)
was
designed
to
explore precisely
this
issue.
They
asked: when
conceptual change
occurs,
“what
happens
to
the
earlier
theo
ries?
Are
they
overwritten
or
merely
suppressed?” (Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2012,
p.
209).
In
this
study,
college students
were
asked
to
verify information
under
speeded
condi
tions.
Some
statements
were
consistent
with
both
scientific
and naïve
theories
(such
as
the
“moon revolves around
the
sun”) and some
statements