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Content uploaded by Gale M. Sinatra
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Gale M. Sinatra on Jun 17, 2016
Content may be subject to copyright.
18
Warm
Change
about
Hot
Topics
The
Role
of
Motivation
and
Emotion
in
Attitude and
Conceptual
Change about
Controversial
Science
Topics
GALE
M.
SINATRA
University
of
Southern
California
Vi
ViA
NE
SEYRANIAN
California
State
Polytechnic
University,
Pomona
Students
and
the
general
public
often
consider
current
sci
entific
topics
such
as biological
evolution, climate
change,
stem
cell
research,
vaccinations,
and
genetically
modified
fbod
controversial.
However,
the
degree
of
controversy
is
in
the
eye
of
the beholder.
Science
is
conducted
at
the
edge
of
the
known,
thus
cutting-edge
science
can
be
controversial
even
among those
engaged
in
the
research
directly.
However,
many
issues within
afield
of
study
are
largely
resolved
from
a
scientific
standpoint,
but
are
still
considered
controver
sial
from
the
public’s perception.
As
an
example,
98%
of
climate
scientists concur
that we
are
in
a
period
of
warm
tag
and
Iwmans
are coner
uttag
stgni&antly
to
this
trend
(Intergovernmental Panel
on
Climate
Change,
2007).
Thus,
this
point
is
not
controversial
within the
climate
science
community.
However,
the
projections
for
future
average
temperatures
still
have
a
degree
of
uncertainty—somewhere
between
2
and
60
is
the
best
estimate ([ntergovernmenta(
Panel
on
Climate Change,
2007).
The
degree
of
uncertainty
in
projections
may
contribute
to the
public’s perception
that
climate
change
is
more
controversial
than
scientists
perceive
it
to
be.
Siniiariy,
there
is
a
high level
of
certainty
within
the
scientific
community
that
vaccines
are
not linked
to
autism,
and
yet
the
causes
of
autism
are
still
uncertain,
leading
some
members
of
the
public
to
resist
vaccinating their
children
(Sinatra,
Kienhues,
&
Hofer,
2014).
Topics
perceived
as
contmrsiat
present
unique
chat
lenges
for
teachers,
students, and
members
of
the
public
who
must
weigh
these
issues in learning,
reasoning,
and
decision
making.
These
challenges
include
many factors,
such
as
understanding
uncertainty
(Lindley,
2006)
and
appreciating
complexity
(Hmelo-Silver
&
Azevedo,
2006),
both inherent
to
understanding
controversial
topics
(Sinatra
et
al.,
20
14a).
A
trend
in
media
and
popular
outlets,
school
boards,
and
more
recently
in
textbooks
is
to
present
“both
sides”
of
every
science
topic
in
the
interest
of
“fir
and
balanced”
presenta
tion.
This
is
misleading,
as
it
gives
the
impression
of
a
greater
degree
of
controversy
than
actually
exists
among
members
of
the
scientific
community.
Students
in
classrooms,
learners
in
out-of-school environments,
and
members
of
the
general
public
hold
both
attitudes and
conceptual
knowledge
about
controversial science
topics that
impact
their
learning,
engage
ment,
and
acceptance
of
scientific
ideas
(Sinatra
et
al,
20144
Further,
recent
research
on
the
warming
trend
(Sinatra,
2005),
and
on motivated
reasoning
(Jost,
Glaser,
Kruglanski,
&
Sulloway,
2003),
shows
that
the
processes
of
attitude
change
and
conceptual change
are
significantly
impacted
by
motiva
tion
and
emotion,
and are
not
likefy
to
be
overcome
by simpfy
filling
in
gaps
in
knowledge
(Sinatra
et
al.,
2014a).
Our
purpose
for
this
chapter
is
to
present
a view
of
the
challenges
of
fostering
attitude
and conceptual
change
on
controversial
topics
in
science
that
will
inform
research
and
teaching.
We
begin
by
drawing distinctions between
atti
tudes,
beliefs,
and
conceptual
knowledge.
We
argue that
these
distinctions
are
necessary
for
a
more
complete
under
standing
of
the
change
process.
Then,
we
provide
an
over
view
of
Cwo
titeracures
that
until
recently
were
considered
in
isolation:
attitude
change
and
conceptual change.
In
these
literature
reviews,
we
pay
particular
attention
to the
role
motivation
and
emotion
play
in
understanding
and
accept
ance
of
controversial
science
topics. Next, we
consider
the
246
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and
Viviane
Seyranian
intersection
of
conceptual
change
and
attitude
change
by
proposing
a
framework
for
exploring
change.
Next,
we
dis
cuss
the
methodological challenges facing
this
field
of
study.
Finally,
we
conclude
with
directions
for
future
research.
Attitude
Change
and
Conceptual
Change:
Important
Distinctions
What
do
you know
about
stem
cell research? What
is
your
attitude towards
stem
cell
research?
As
researchers, when
we
pose
these
two
questions,
are
we
asking about
two
fun
damentally
different
constructs?
Can
we
empirically
and
theoretically
distinguish between these
constructs?
If
these
differences
exist,
are
they
relevant
and important
to
edu
cators and
researchers? Over
ten
years
ago,
Southerland,
Sinatra,
and
Matthews argued that
such
questions
“are
at
the
very
heart
of
science teaching
and
research”
(2001,
p.
327).
Yet,
in
the
last
decade,
rather
than
more
conceptual
clarity,
we
perceive
that
there
has been
a
greater blurring
of
the
constructs
of
attitude change
and conceptual change
in
academic
and
public discourse.
Attitudes
are
related
to
beliefs, and
here
is
where
the
lines
begin
to
blur.
Murphy
and
Mason
note that,
most
educational psychology researchers
seem
to
avoid
dif
ferentiating
between
knowledge
and
be1ieI
by
either
using
the
terms interchangeably
or
by
only referring
to
knowledge
or
beIiet.
In
this
way,
researchers
avoid
the
issue
of
the
rela
tions
among
these
constructS.
(2006,
p.
306)
Southerland et
al.
(2001)
argued that
there
are
impor
tant
differences
between
knowledge, beliefs,
attitudes, and
acceptance
that
matter
for
how
we
conceptualize
research
in
science education. For
controversial topics,
we
argue
that
the
distinctions
are
not
only
important,
but
are
critical
for
research
and
teaching.
Therefore,
we
propose
a
framework
for
conceptualizing attitude
and
knowledge
change
that
we
feel
may
contribute
to
productive
research
on
the
intersection
of
these important
constructs.
Attitude
Change
and
Conceptual
Change
about
Controversial
Topics
Before
we can
consider
attitudes
and
conceptual
change,
we
must
first
consider
the
conceptual distinctions between
atti
tudes
and concepts
as
well
as
the
distinction between
knowl
edge
and
belief.
Then,
we
discuss
relevant
models
of
attitude
change
and
conceptual
change.
Attitudes
and
Attitude
Change
The
study
of
attitudes
has
been
fundamental
to
the
field
of
social
psychology
since
its
inception
(Allport,
1935;
McGuire,
1985;
Prislin
&
Crano,
2008).
Despite
the
central
ity
of
the
attitude concept
in
social
psychology, surprisingly,
the
definition
of
attitudes
still
remains
elusive
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz,
2010),
with
hundreds
of
definitions
prevalent
in
the
literature (AlbarracIn, Johnson,
Zanna,
&Kumale,
2005).
Various
attitude
scholars
(e.g.,
Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1993)
have
noted
that the
common thread running through
the
majority
of
these
definitions
is
that
an
attitude
consists
of
an
evaluation
of
a
person,
object,
or
entity.
That
is,
an
attitude
describes
the
valence (e.g.,
like—dislike,
favor
or disfavor)
evoked
by
an
attitude
object.
This
idea
is
also
echoed
in
the
most
widely
cited
definition
of
atiiuiides
by
Eagly
and Chaiken
(1993),
who
defined
an
attitude
as
“a
psychological
tendency
that
is
expressed
by
evaluating
a
particular
entity
with some
degree
of
favor
or
disfavor”
(p.
1).
Attitudinal
components.
When
conceptualized
as
evalua
tive
judgments,
attitudes
are
described
as
consisting
of
three
components
related
to
the
attitude object:
(a) behaviors;
(b) affect,
and
(c)
cognition.
The
behavioral
intention
or
response
is
interpreted
to
relay
a
positive
or
negative
eval
uation
of
the
attitude object. For
example,
attitude
theorists
would
argue
that
the
act
of
wishing
a
friend
“happy
birthday”
on
Facebook
might
express
a
positive
evaluation
of
the
friend.
The
affective
component
of
attitudes consists
of
the
feel
ings,
emotions,
or
moods
evoked
by,
and
associated
with,
the
attitude
object.
Affective
reactions
are
usually
positive
(e.g.,
joy)
or
negative
(e.g.,
sadness)
and
contribute
to
evalu
ative responding.
In
recent
years, there
has
been
an
increased
emphasis
on
the
affective
component
of
attitudes
as these
are
more
readily accessible
and may
contribute
more
to
behav
ioral
outcomes
than
the
cognitive
component
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz, 2010; Forgas, 2010).
Attitude theorists
often
describe
the
cognitive
compo
nent
of
attitudes
as
an
evaluative
reaction
to beliefs about
an
attitude
object.
In
this
context,
beliefs
are
defined
as
associ
ations
formed
between
an
attitude
object
and
some
related
attribute
(Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1998).
We
propose
that
a
more
fine-grained definition
of
beliefs
is
called
for,
particularly
when
considering
attitudes
from the
vantage point
of
con
troversial
science
topics
and
attitude
or
conceptual
change.
The
cognitive component
of
attitudes entails
an
evaluative
reaction to
one
of
the
following
types
of
belief:
(a)
unjusti
fied
beliefs,
which
are
associations
between
an attitude
object
and
a
related attribute
that
has
emerged
from
experience
(by
“unjustified,”
we
mean
to
suggest
that
the
belief
is
held
with
insufficient
justification
or
warrant
to
be
called
knowledge),
or
(b)
jusufied
true
beliefs
(knowledge),
which
are
associa
tions
between
an
attitude
object
and
a
related attribute
that
has
sufficient
justifications
and
warrants
to
be
called
knowl
edge. For
example,
a
scientist’s hypothesis
may
be
construed
as
a
belief
until
substantial
scientific evidence
supporting
the
hypothesis
is
gathered
to
justify
calling
the
belief
knowledge.
As
such,
attitudes can
consist
of
valenced
evaluative
reactions
to
unjustified beliefs
(e.g., the
Holocaust
never
happened)
or
justified
true
beliefs
(e.g.,
the
earth
rotates
around
the
sun).
Note
that
this
is
consistent
with
a
defini
tion
of
conceptual knowledge
as
justified
true
belief
Even
though
conceptual knowledge
is
by
definition
not
valenced
in
and
of
itself,
it
can
conjure
up
evaluative
reactions
in
peo
ple
in
a
similar
manner
as
unjustified
beliefs.
For
example,
a
person
may
have conceptual
knowledge
about stem
cells.
That
is,
he
may
understand
what
a
stem
cell
is
and
hold
jus
tified
knowledge
about
stem cell
research. At
an
evaluative
Warm
Change about
Hot
Topics
247
level,
however,
he
may
react
negatively
to
this
knowledge.
In
other
words,
this
reaction
may
contribute evaluative
information that
may
inform his
attitudes
about
stem
cell
research.
Therefore,
one
can
hold
attitudes about
both
types
of
beliefs,
the
unjustified
and
the
justified
(or
knowledge).
In
the
same
vein,
attitudes
can
also
be
changed
about
both
types
of
beliefs
(see
Attitude
Change
and Persuasion
sec
tion,
below).
This idea suggests
a
novel
way
of
considering
the
link
between
conceptual knowledge and
attitudes. We
will
return
to
this point
later
and
elaborate
more
on the
rela
tionship
between
attitudes
and conceptual
knowledge
when
considering
the
attitude—conceptual
change framework. For
now,
it
is
important
to
highlight
the
idea.that attitudes
can
be
informed
by
one
or two types
of
beliefs, unjustified
and
jus
tilled
true
beliefs,
which
can
operate alone
or
simultaneously
to
inform
evaluations.
Attitudes
may
be
primarily
based
on
behavioral,
affec
tive,
or
cognitive components or
they may
consist
of
eval
uative
responses
that
integrate
these
aspects. For
instance,
a
student’s
positive evaluation
of
physical education
class
may
stem
from
her
belief
that
exercise
leads
to
good health
(cognitive),
that
she
feels
happy during exercise
(affective),
engages
in
it
often
(behavior),
or
a
combination
of
one
or
more
of
these components.
Attitude
scholars
also
consider
the
relative
consistency
of
the
evaluative
information
across
the
behavioral,
affective,
or cognitive
components.
For
example,
a
person
might believe
that
bungee
jumping
is
safe
(positive
cognitive evaluation) but experience
fear
and
panic
when
considering
the
prospect
of
taking
the
plunge (negative
affective
evaluation).
In
this
example,
there
is
an
inconsist
ency
across
components,
which
contributes disparate
evalua
tive
information
to
the overall
attitude.
It
is
also
possible
to
have
inconsistencies
within
evaluative
components—for instance,
within
the
cognitive
component.
Consider
attitudes
about
controversial
topics.
For
controver
sea)
science
topics,
there
ae
usuaiJy
different camps
(pro
or
con).
Each
camp
presents
its
own
set
of
information,
statis
tics,
beliefs,
and
rationales
to
substantiate
its
position.
As
such,
individuals may
be
exposed
to
disparate
and
potentially
conflicting
information
from
each
side and
their attitudes
will
contain
evaluative
judgments
regarding
beliefs
from
both
camps.
Along
these lines,
Pratkanis
(1989)
noted that
%ttitudes
about
controversial
issues
are
more
likely
to
con
th’
bq,olar
structures,
that
is,
inftwmation
from
both
sides
of
an
issue
is
represented
in
memory.
Non-controversial
issues
are
more
likely
to
be
represented
with
a
unipolar structure
that
predominantly contains information
that
is
in
line
with
the
attitude.
Eagly
and
Chaiken
(1998)
argue
that
“it
may
be
mainly
in
the
face
of
clear-cut
social
conflict
on
an
issue
that
people’s
attitudes
become
bipolar
in
the
sense
that
they
divide
their
knowledge
icuo
clusters
of
congenial
and
uncon
genial
ideas”
(p.
274).
Expanding
on
this idea,
we
propose that
an
attitude
about
a
controversial
issue
may
become
bipolar
particularly when
it
is
associated with one’s
collective
self
or
social identity
(‘tajfel
&
Turner,
1986)
and
there
is
some
type
of
tension
that
relations between
the
ingroup
and outgroup.
In
circumstance,
attitudes
may become
bipolar
because
different
attitudinal
poles help
to
distinguish
the ingroup
from
the
outgroup.
For
example,
negative attitudes
towards
whaling
may
be
associated
with
a
social identity
such
as an
anti-whaling
Greenpeace
activist,
yet the
activist
will
also
possess
considerable
information about
the
beliefs
of
the
out-
group (whalers).
An
attitude
may have
either
a
bipolar
or
unipolar
struc
ture,
and
at
the
same
time,
it
may
be
related
to
another
atti
tiide
or
sets
of
attitudes,
which
may
be
embedded
within
more
global
structures (Eagly
&
Chaiken,
1998).
Related
attitudes
tend
to
cluster together
in
a
constellation,
not
unlike
related
conceptual
knowledge. For instance, attitudes
about
gun
control and gays
in
the
military are
associated
(Alvaro
&
Crano,
1997;
Crano,
2012).
Attitudes
that are
highly
inte
grated
with
values
are
termed
ideologies
(Banaji
&
Heiphetz,
2010).
Similar
to
individual attitudes, ideologies
may
also
have
bipolar
structures,
as
a
person
may
possess
information
about
both
sides
of
the
ideoLogical
spectrum.
Take,
for
exam
ple,
the
liberal—conservative
ideology.
Conservatives
and
liberaLs
may
hold
considerable
information
about
the
other
side’s
position
on
social
and political
issues.
That
is
not
to
say
the
beliefs and
information
concerning
the
positions
of
the
“other side”
are
always
accurate.
For instance,
a
conserv
ative
from the
United
States
may have
some
understanding
about
communism
or
socialism,
but
also hold
a
variety
of
misconceptions,
and aliberal
may
have
some
understanding
of
nuclear power
but
may
also
hold
some
misconceptions.
When
attitudes
are
based
on
misconceptions,
they
may
be
particularly resistant
to
change
unless the
misconception
is
corrected.
In
this
case,
attitudinal
change
may
be
dependent
on
conceptual
change.
Prior
to
developing
this
idea,
let
us
first
consider attitude
change
and persuasion.
Attitude
Change
and
Persuasion
AflthiJe
change
occnrs
when
ai
evaluation
about
ajus.tifed
or
unjustified
belief
is
moved
in
a
different direction.
An
atti
tude
can
move
in
a
direction
that
is
in
line
with
the
original
evaluation
(polarize)
or
it
can
move
in
the
opposite
direction
or
towards
neutrality
compared
to
the original evaluation
(depolarize). Until
the
1950s,
there
was
little
understanding
of
attitude
change
and
the
processes
that
encourage
it
(per
suasion). The
pioneering
efforts
of
the
Yale
group,
a
team
of
31)
scholars
led
by
Carl
Ho4’)and,
spurred
the
field
of
athtude
change
and
persuasion
(Johnson,
Miao,
&
Smith-McLalLen,
2005). More
contemporary
research
and
theories
of
persua
sion
stand
on
the
shoulders
of
this
earlier
work
and
extend
it
by proposing
a
dual process
of
persuasion
(Chaiken,
1980;
Petty
&
Cacioppo,
1986a).
The
Elaboration
Likelihood
Model
(ELM).
The
ELM
(Petty
&
Cacioppo,
I
986b)
is
a
model
of
how
persuasion
may
occur
through
one
of
two
processes. When
one
encoun
ters a
persuasive
message,
the
extent
to
which
the
message
is
processed
depends
on
one’s
motivation
and
ability
to process
the
message,
The
motivation
and
ability
to
process
a
message
depend
on
a
confluence
of
situational
and
individual
differ
ence
variables;
however, people
tend
to
be
most
motivated
to
248
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and
Viviane
Seyranian
elaborate
on
information
when
it
ispersonaJly
relevant(Petty&
Cacioppo,
1979).
When one
is
sufficiently
motivated
and
able
to
process
a
message,
ELM
would predict that
central
route
processing
is
employed
to
carefully scrutinize
and
comb
through
all
of
the
available
information
concerning
th
attts& olect.
suc.i,
w
ccpac
tht
sage
with
their
previous
knowledge
and
belie1
and
evaluate
its
merit.
If
the
quality
of
the
message
is
strong, this
type
of
intense
and
eifortfId
message
consideration
will
likely
elicit
attitude
change.
If
message
quality
is
weak, effortful
message
consideration
will
reduce
the
likelihood
of
attitude change
as
there
is
little
merit
to
the
message.
Attitudes changed
as
a
result
of
effortfiil
consideration
(or
high
elaboration)
and
strong
message
quality
tend
to
be
strong,
resistant
to
sub
sequent
persuasion
efforts,
and
more
predictive
of’
behavior
(Petty, Haugtvedt,
&Smith,
1995).
When
one
is
insufficiently
motivated
or
unable
to
process
a
message,
ELM
predicts
that
peripheral
route
processing
is
more likely
to be
employed,
whereby
itidivicluals
are
less
likely
to
carefully
process
a
message. Since
message
content
is
not
closely
attended
to
during peripheral
route
processing,
message
quality
is
not
a
factor
that
influences
attitude change.
Instead,
peripheral
cues
play
a
pivotal
role.
Peripheral cues
ae
factors
that
are
peripheral
to
the
logic
of
the
argument,
which may
comprise
of
variables
such
as
source
credibil
ity
or attractiveness.
Peripheral
cues
could
also
comprise
of
heuristics
(Chaiken,
1980)
or
simple decision
rules such
as
“experts tend
to be
correct”
in
making
judgments.
When
people
use
the
peripheral
route
processing,
they
are
more
likely
to
form
weaker
attitudes
that
may be
fleeting
(Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
The
ELM
assumes
that
elaboration
is
objective
when
a
particular
judgment
is
not
preferred
prior
to
message
expo
sure.
However, biased
message
processing
is
also
possible
when
individuals hold afavored
attitudinal
position
or
have
relatively one-sided knowledge
prior
to
message
exposure.
In
particular,
Petty
and
Wegener
(1998)
argue
that
individu
als
with
a
biased store
of
knowledge
have
more
information
to
draw
on
to
bolster their
own
side
and
they
can
better see
the
flaws
of
opposing arguments.
As
a
result,
their
attitudes
can
become even
more polarized
due
to
counterattitudinal
message
exposure
(Lord,
Ross,
&
Lepper,
1979).
Source
credibility. Source
credibility
usually
refers
to
the
level
‘of
expertise
(i.e.,
knowledge
and
ability
to
provide
accurate
information)
and
trusiworthiness
(i.e.,
honesty)
associated
with
a
source (Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
Research
has
widely
corroborated
the
power
of
highly
credible
sources
to
influence attitude
change,
particularly
when
messages
are
of
low
personal
relevance
(for
a
review,
see
Pornpitakpan,
2004).
Research
shows
that
source
credibility
can have
dif
ferential impacts.
It
can
act
as
a
peripheral
cue
when
individu
als are
not
processing
the
message deeply
(Petty
&
Wegener,
1998).
When individuals do
engage
deeply
with
the
message,
the
quality
of
message
arguments
is
more
important
than
source
credibility
in
influencing
attitudes
(Petty,
Cacioppo,
&
Goldman,
1981).
However,
when
a
message
is
personally
relevant,
source
credibility
may
take
on
alternative
roles.
It
can
spur
message-relevant thoughts
(Heesacker,
Petty,
&
Cacioppo,
1983),
bias
processing
(Chaiken
&
Maheswaran4
1994),
or could
act
as
an
argument
that
bolsters
message.
quality
(Kaufirian,
Stasson,
&
Hart,
1999).
Group
membership:
ingroup
am!
outgroup.
Another
important
source
variable
that may
influence
consideration
4
of
controversial
issues
is
ingroup
and
outgroup
status.
An
ingroup
is
a
group
of
people
with
whom
a
person
shares
common
group
membership
(e.g.,
ethnicity,
religion).
Not
all
group
memberships
are
important
to
individuals.
For
the
ingroup
to
become
psychologically
meaningful,
individuals
must
attach
emotional
significance
or
identify
with
the
group
such
that
the
group
becomes
a
part
of
their
social
identity
(Tajfel
&
Turner,
1986).
In
this
case, the
individual
is
said
to
highly
identify
with
the
group.
An
outgroup
is
a
group
of
people
with whom
an
individual does
not
share
common
%TOi
besip,
WI1
iocs
t
ify.
9
Research suggests that
a
message associated
with
an
ingroup
member
holds
more
persuasive
power
than
the
same message from
an
outgroup member
(see
Turner,
1991).
These
findings may
be
explained
by
social
categorizationj
theory,
which
suggests
that individuals
tend
to
conform
to
the
attitudes,
norms, and behaviors
(prototypes)
of
ingroups,
particularly
those
with
which
they
highly
identify
(Turner,
1991).
For
example,
a
faculty
member
may
be
more
per-’!
suaded
by
a
message
to
change
tenure review
guidelines
if
the
source
of
the
message
is
from
another
faculty
member’
(ingroup)
than
a
student (outgroup).
If
the
individual
does
not
have
the
motivation
or
ability
to
process
the
message,
ingroup
or outgroup
status
may
serve
as
a
peripheral
cue
in
influencing
attitude
change
(Wood,
2000).
Recent
research
suggests
that
ingroup
sources
may
be
more
persuasive
in
altering
attitudes
about
justified
beliefs
than
in
changing
justified
beliefs
themselves.
Seyranian,
Lombardi,
and
Sinatra
(in
submission)
recently
provided.’
experimental
evidence showing that
attitudes
about
scien
tific
views
on
climate
change
(justified
by
evidence)
were
more
amenable
to
persuasion
by
an
ingroup source
than
an
outgroup
source.
On
the
other
hand,
the
plausibility
of
climate
change
(more
subjective
and thus
could
be
consid-”
ered
to
have
weaker
justification)
was
more
likely
to
be
influenced
by
an
outgroup
source than an ingroup
source.
The
rationale
for
this
discrepancy
is
that
individuals
tend
to
consult
with
similar
others
(i.e.,
ingroups)
on
attitudinal
judgments
because
they
are
more
likely
to
share
their
own
worldviews, beliefs,
and
values. Ingroup
members
are
also
likely
to
share
similar
biases,
which may
interfere
with
objective
judgments
(e.g.,
groupthink).
Dissimilar
sources
(i.e.,
outgroups) are
more
likely
to
be
consulted
for
knowl
edge-based
judgments
that
are
verifiably
right
or
wrong
because outgroups
are
less
likely
to
share
the
same
biases
and
will
likely
possess
different strengths
and weaknesses
than the
ingroup.
As
such, they
may have
worthwhile
perspective
to
share
for
knowledge
judgments
(Crano
Sc
Seyranian,
2009).
Warm
Change
about
Hot
Topics
249
Conceptual Knowledge
and
Conceptual Change
sConceptual
change describes
a
special
case
of
learning when
the
to-be-learned information conflicts
with
the
learner’s
background
knowledge and
is
often
referred
to
as
a
pro
cess
of
knowledge
restructuring
(see,
for
example,
Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998;
Murphy
&
Mason,
2006).
Much
of
the
infor
mation
we learn
is
new,
or
only
vaguely
familiar.
While
we
may
hold some
fragmented pieces
of
knowledge about
the
topic
(Smith,
diSessa,
&
Roschelle,
1993),
we
may
not have
a
rich,
developed, interconnected representation
of
the
con
cept
in
memory. From
our
point
of
view,
conceptual change
describes
the
scenario
when
the
learner
holds
a
conception
Jhat
is
connected
to
other
concepts
in
background
knowl
edge,
can
be
used
in
reasoning or
problem-solving
tasks
(likely
ineffectually,
since
it
is
rnisconceived),
and
it
is
in
conflict
with
the
new information.
En
the
parlance
of
attitudes and
attitude
change
discussed
above,
one would
say that
knowledge
that
is
misconceived
is
not
well
justified
and
therefore
is
technically
a
belief
It
is
important
to
note that,
in
the
conceptual
change
literature,
this
terminology
is
not
typically
used.
If
the
term
“belief”
is
used,
it
is
used
in
a
variety
of
ways,
as
there
is
no
common
defini
tion
of
belief
or
belief
change.
Conceptual
change
research
ers
typically describe
concepts
as
consistent
or
inconsistent
with
scientific
understanding.
In
our review
below,
we use
the
terms
used
in
the
conceptual change literature
to
avoid
confusion,
and
we
note
where
differences
lie.
Many
perspectives exist
on
the
nature
of
conceptual
change
learning
(for
a
review
of
several
perspectives,
see
Vosniadou, 2008).
Major perspectives that have
signifi
cantly
influenced
our
understanding
of
the
change
process
when
confronted
with
controversial topics
include
those
from
developmental psychology
(Carey,
2009;
Vosniadou,
2008),
cognitive
science
(Chi,
1992;
Ohlssori,
2009),
sci
r
ence
education
(Posner,
Strike,
1-lewson,
&
Gertzog,
1982;
Strike
&
Posner,
1992),
and
educational psychology
(Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998;
Murphy
&
Mason,
2006;
Sinatra,
2005).
Next,
we
briefly
review each
of
these
perspectives
with
an
eye
towards
how they
inform
our current
view.
Developmental
perspectives.
The origin and
development
of
conceptual
knowledge
are
of
deep
and
central
concern
to
all
of
psychology,
but
are
foundational
to
any
understanding
of
conceptual
change.
Most
researchers describe
conceptual
knowledge
as
categorical
in
nature. That
is,
“a
concept
can
be
viewed
as
belonging
to
some
category”
(Chi,
2008,
p.
62).
We
view
concepts
as
rich,
interconnected
representations
of
categorical knowledge
in
memory.
A
key
aspect
of
the
type
of
conceptual knowledge
relative
to
learning
is
that
it
is
generative.
It
allows
the
knower
to
draw inferences, make
predictions,
and think and
reason
with
that
conceptual
know
I-
edge,
which
can
be
small units
of
thought, mental models,
or
schemata.
The
developmental
perspective describes
how,
through
the
process
of
conceptual
change,
young
children
acquire
new
conceptual
representations
that
are
qualitatively
differ
ent
than
their
prior conceptions. These
new
representations
afford new
ways
of
thinking
and
reasoning
about
not only
the
new
concept,
but
about
other
concepts.
Developmentalists
trace
the
origins
and
restructuring
of
core
concepts
such
as
the
concept
of
“number,”
“agency,”
and
“living
thing,”
that
are
undamenta
to
thinking
and
reasoning
in
a
variety
of
domains
(Carey,
2009).
Carey
described
these
changes
as
so
fundamental
that
the
new
representations
are
incommensu
rate
with
prior
ones,
meaning
that
the
prior
representation
is
forever
lost
to
the
individual.,
(For
an
alternative
perspec
tive
on
the
persistence
of
prior
conceptions
post
conceptual
change,
see
Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2012.)
Developmental
conceptual change
of
this
sort
is
viewed
as
driven
primarily
by
maturational
processes
as
the
child
interacts
with
her
environment.
It
should
be
contrasted
with
the
restructuring
of
concepts
that
is
triggered
by
instruc
tion.
A
quintessential example
of
instructionally
induced
conceptual
change
(Enagaki &
Katano,
2008)
is
the
well-
documented shift
in
young children’s knowledge
of
the shape
of
the
earth
(Vosniadou
&
Brewer,
1992).
A
major difference
in
maturationally
versus
instruction
ally
induced
conceptual
change
is
that
the
first may
occur
without
deliberate
instruction
to
bring
about change,
but
the
second
is
unlikely
to
do
so.
That
is,
young
children
are
unlikely
to
adopt
a
spherical
view
of
the
earth
on
their
own,
since
the
notion
is
counterintuitive
and
belies
their
everyday
experience.
Even
direct instruction
on the
shape
of
the
earth
often
results
in
synthetic
conceptions
(Vosniadou,
1999),
or
the
blending
of
the
original
flat-earth
concept
with
the
round
concept
to
form
the
conception
that
the
earth
is
shaped
like
a
pancake.
Once
a
child
has
shifted her conception
of
the
shape
of
the
earth,
the
new
spherical
earth
conception
affords
(but
by
no
means
assures)
the
acquisition
of
scientifically
cor
rect
conceptions
of
the
day/night
cycle
and
seasonal change.
And
yet,
these
conceptions
are
themselves
often
resistant
to
instruction
designed
to
overcome
misconceptions (Posner
et
al.,
1982).
Thus,
we
learn
several
key
points
from
developmental
perspectives
on
conceptual change
that
pertain
to
our
interest
in
controversial
topics:
(a)
conceptual
knowledge
is
categori
cal
in
nature; (b)
conceptual knowledge
is
constructed
in
part
from
everyday
experiences
that often
conflict
with
scientific
understandings
(thus,
it
could
be
characterized
as
unjustified
beliefs);
(c)
conceptual
knowledge
relevant
to
learning
in
academic
domains,
whether
scientifically
accurate
or
inac
curate,
is
highly
interconnected
with
other knowledge
and
is
generative
in
that
it
impacts
thinking
and
reasoning
about
other
concepts
and
domains;
and
(d)
change
in
one
concept
affords,
but
does
not
necessarily
bring about,
change
in
a
related
concept.
7-
Cognitive
Science
Perspective.
Two perspectives
from
cognitive
science
have
influenced
our
thinking
on
concep
tual
change
regarding controversial
topics.
The
first
is
that
of
Chi and
her
work
on
conceptual change
as
a
process
of
oniological
shfls
(Chi,
1992).
According
to
Ch,
since
con
ceptual knowledge
is
categorical
in
nature, the
learner
can
mistakenly miscategorize
concepts, leading
to
reasoning
and
250
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and Viviane
Seyranian
problem-solving
difficulties.
According
to
Chi, the
process
of
conceptual change
is
one
of
restructuring miscategorized
knowledge
to
a
new
or
different
ontological
category
(Chi,
1992).
Onto
logical
categories
are
distinguished
by
different
properties.
According
to
this view,
the
category
plocess
can
be
described
as
taking
place over
time,
but
cannot have
the
property
of
color,
whereas
an
entity
can
have
the property
of
color,
but
cannot
be
described
as
taking
place
over
time.
So,
a
baseball
game
or
baking
a
cake could
be
described
as
a
process, but not
an entity
(Chi,
2008).
According
to
this
view,
conceptual change
is
described
as a
shift
from
thinking
about
a
concept
such as heat
as
belonging
to
one
ontological
category (entity)
to
thinking about
heat
as
belonging
to
a
dif
ferent
ontological category
(process)
(Chi,
1992).
An
alternative cognitive
science perspective that
informs
our
thinking
is
that
of
Ohlsson
(2009,
2011).
O1dsson
rejects
the
notion
that conceptual change
is
about transforming
or
restructuring knowledge.
Rather,
he
views the
change
pro
cess
as
one
of
seeing
a
phenomenon
from
a
new
theoretical
lens,
a
process
he
calls
resubsumption
(Ohlsson,
2009).
So,
according
to
this
perspective,
conceptual change occurs
when
a
learner
discovers
that
there are
two
ways
of
thinking
about
a
phenomenon.
Ohlsson
(2009)
calls
the
process by
which
experiences
with
the
phenomenon
activate
both
theories
bisociation.
Bisociation
is
an
insight
but
does
not
necessarily
cause the
cognitive
conflict, disequilibrium,
or
restructur
ing
of
categorical knowledge theorized
by
other
conceptual
change
researchers. Ultimately,
the
choice
to
think
about
the
phenomenon
through the
lens
of
the
alternative
theory
is
driven
by cognitive
utility
according
to
this
view.
A
key
difference
among
these perspectives
is
the
degree
to
which
prior
knowledge
undergoes
radical
restructuring
(Chi,
1992),
is
lost
to the individual
(Carey,
2009),
or
if
the
indi
vidual
merely thinks
about
the
concept
from
a
new
perspec
tive,
thereby
leaving
the
original knowledge
intact (Ohisson,
2009).
A
recent study
by
Shtulman
and Valcarcel
(2012)
was
designed
to
explore precisely
this
issue.
They
asked: when
conceptual change
occurs,
“what
happens
to
the
earlier
theo
ries?
Are
they
overwritten
or
merely
suppressed?” (Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2012,
p.
209).
In
this
study,
college students
were
asked
to
verify information
under
speeded
condi
tions.
Some
statements
were
consistent
with
both
scientific
and naïve
theories
(such
as
the
“moon revolves around
the
sun”) and some
statements
were consistent
with
scientific
but not
naïve
theories
(such
as the
“Earth
revolves
around
the sun”;
Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2012,
p.
209).
Participants
were slower
and
less
accurate
to
verify
information
from
ten
different domains when
the
statement was inconsistent
with
prior
naïve beliefs.
In
addition,
it
was
domains that
individ
uals
learn
earlier
in
childhood
(astronomy),
rather
than later
in
adolescence
(genetics)
that showed
the
greatest
degree
of
cognitive
conflict.
Shtulman
and
Valcarcel
concluded
that
their
“findings suggest
that
naïve theories
are
suppressed
by
scientific theories
but
not
supplanted
by
them” (Shtulman
&
Valcarcel,
2
O12,p.
213).
What
we
take
away
from
these
scholars’
contributions
is
that:
(a)
consistent
with the
developmental
perspective,
con
ceptual knowledge
is
categorical
and
concepts
are
embedded
within
a
hierarchy
of
rich,
interconnected
conceptual
knowl
edge;
(b)
individuals
confer characteristics
to
their
concep
tual
knowledge
based
on
characteristics
of
the
superordinate
conceptual
knowledge;
and
(c)
non-scientific
knowledge
may persist
even
after conceptual
change
and
may
be
evoked
in
reasoning under
certain
conditions.
Science
education
perspectives.
Science
education
researchers
have
been
influential
to
our
thinking
about
con
ceptual change and
productive
for
the
conceptual change
field
more
broadly.
This
work began
as an
attempt
to
explain
the
apparent
resistance
to
instruction
that
science
educators encountered
in
classrooms
(White
&
Gunstone,
2008).
Science instruction
designed
to
promote
scientific
understanding
often
failed
to surmount
students’
naïve
con
ceptions,
even when those
concepts
were
targeted.
In
what
some
refer
to
as
the
4
’classic
approacW
to
conceptual
change
(Vosniadou,
2008),
science educators likened
conceptual
change
to
paradigmatic shifts
in
science
because
students
exhibited
ideas
that
were
consistent
with
earlier
scientific
theories
(e.g.,
the
flat
earth)
(Posner et
al., 1982).
Also,
sci
ence
education researchers
initially
viewed
individual
and
paradigmatic
change
processes
as
analogous.
Posner
and his
colleagues
(Posner
et
al.,
1982;
Strike
&
Posner,
1992)
described
the
conditions
they
viewed
as
nec
essary
for
instruction
to
overcome
students’
misconceptions.
First,
students
must
be
put
in
a
situation that promotes
dis
satisfaction
with
existing conceptions. For
example,
dissat
isfaction
may
occur
when
individuals are
confronted
with
anomalous
data
(Chinn
&
Brewer,
1993).
Then,
students
must
find the
new
conception intelligible,
plausible,
and
fruitful
(Posner
et
al., 1982).
In
other words,
instruction
must
be
designed
to
assure
that
the students
find
the new
infor
mation
comprehensible,
and
judge
it
as
having
higher
plau
sibility
than
their
original
conception
(Lombardi,
Sinatra,
&
Nussbaum,
2013).
Finally,
the
new
idea
must
be
generative,
in
that
it
must
explain
other
phenomena.
We
have
learned
from
science
educators
that:
(a)
alter
native
conceptions
can
be resistant
to
instruction, even
with
instruction designed
to
promote
change;
(b)
comprehen
sibility
is
a
key
factor
for
the
design
of
conceptual
change
pedagogy;
and
(c)
plausibility
reappraisal
is
important
for
promoting
conceptual
change
on
controversial
topics
(Lombardi,
Nussbaum,
&
Sinatra,
in
submission;
Lombardi
et
al.,
2013).
Educational
psychology perspectives.
Educational
psy
chology perspectives
on
conceptual
change
research
are
fairly
recent
compared
to
the
long
and
rich
history
of
developmental,
cognitive
science,
and
science
education
perspectives. Significant contributions
from
educational
psy
chologists
begin
with
Chinn
and
Brewer’s
account
of
stu
dents’
difficulty accommodating
anomalous
data
(Chinn
&
Brewer,
1993)
and
extend
to
recent
efforts
to
integrate
moti
vation
into
conceptual
change
(Sinatra, 2005).
From
our
perspective,
educational
psychologists’
recent
contributions
have
been
the
integration
of
cognition,
affect,
and
motivation
(often
referred
to
as
“hot” constructs)
Warm
Change about
Hot
Topics
251
to
advance
our
understanding
of
motivated change.
Understanding
how beliefs,
emotions,
and
motivation
con
tribute
to
the
change
process
has
been
the
focus
of
research
on
what
Sinatra
(2005)
called
the
“warming
trend”
inspired
by
the
influential article,
“Beyond
cold conceptual
change”
(Pintrich,
Marx,
&
Boyle,
1993).
There have
been
several
recent
reviews
of
Pintrich et
aL’s
contributions,
and
the
bour
geoning
body
of
empirical
work
that
has
come
out
of
their
call
for
a
view
of
conceptual
change
that
begins
to
take
into
account
hot
constructs.
Therefore,
we
do
not
overview
the
“next
generation”
of
conceptual
change
models here
(for
reviews,
see
Murphy
&
Alexander,
2008;
Murphy
&
Mason,
2006;
Sinatra,
2005;
Sinatra
&
Mason, 2008).
The
influence
of
attitude change
and
persuasion research
on
this
conceptualization
of
conceptual change
is
evident.
Each
model
blends
attitude change
and
conceptual change
research
(e.g.,
Dole &
Sinatra,
1998;
Gregoire,
2003;
Murphy,
2007;
Murphy
&
Mason, 2006),
drawing
on
the
ELM
(Petty
&
Cacioppo,
1986b).
As
we
have
described,
the
ELM
is
a
dual-process
model
of
attitude change
and
persuasion
in
that
it
proposes
there
are two
routes
to
change,
a
central
and
a
peripheral route.
It
is
the
central
route
(the
systematic
or
deep
processing
route)
that
is
more likely to
produce
change
than
the
superficial, low-engagement, or peripheral
route.
These
accounts
of
conceptual
change
also draw
directly
or
indirectly
on
the
notion
of
levels
of
processing
from
cogni
tive
psychology
(Craik
&
Lockhart,
1972)
or
what
has
more
recently
come
to
be
understood
as
System
I
versus
System
2
processing
(Kahneman,
2011;
Stanovich,
2010).
Cognitive
psychologists
have
described
the
architecture
of
cognition
as
differentiated
in
Iwo
distinct
forms
of
processing
to
provide
a
“work
around”
for
the
limited
capacity constraints
imposed
by
working
memory:
System
I
operates
automatically
and
quickly,
with little
or
no
effort
and
no
sense
of
voluntary
control.
System
2
aLlo
cates
attention
to
the
effortful
mental
activities
that
demand
it,
including
complex computations.
The
operations
of
System
2
are often
associated
with
the
subjective experience
of
agency, choice, and
concentration.
(Kahneman,
20
Li,
pp.
20—21)
Educational
psychologists have
also
drawn
on
multiple
domains
(most
notably,
cognitive
psychology,
social
psy
chology,
and
philosophy)
to
provide
an
account
of
epis
lemic
conceptual
change
(Sinatra
&
Chinn,
2011).
Sinatra
and
Chinn
describe
epistemic
conceptual
change
as
a
change
in
thinking
about
the
nature
of
knowledge
itself,
not
just
in
conceptual
understanding.
For
example,
if
a
student
views
scientific
knowledge
as
certain,
she
might
need to
change
her
views
about scientific
uncertainty before
she
could
accept
that
the
level
of
uncertainty
in
climate
models does
not
undermine
the
warranted conclusion
that
the
climate
is
warming. This type
of
change requires deep
processing,
motivated
engagement, or
efforttI.il
thinking and reasoning.
In
sum,
our
perspective
on
conceptual change
draws
on
research
from
developmental psychology, cognitive
sci
ence,
science education, and educational
psychology.
In
the
next
section,
we
dexnbe
a
new
framework
fr
altitude
and
conceptual
change
we
hope
will inform
research
on
contro
versial
science
topics
that
calls
for
attitude
change
and
con
ceptual
change
to
be
distinguished.
Attitude
Change/Conceptual Change
Framework
As
described
in
our
review, for
over
15
years,
conceptual
change researchers
have integrated
persuasion
into
concep
tual
change
research. This
has
brought significant
progress
to
our
field.
However, our
work
on
controversial
science
topics
has
led
us
to
posit
that
the field
would
be
well served
by
recognizing
that
a
degree
of
distinction between
attitude
change
and
conceptual
change
should
be
maintained.
In
this
section,
we
posit that
it
is
both
theoretically
and
empirically
possible
to
describe
a
2
2
framework
of
attitudes
and
con
ceptual
knowledge
about
a
particular
topic
(Figure
18.1)
which
distinguishes
these two constructs.
According
to
this
framework,
an
individual
can
be
either
in
favor
of
an
idea
or
against
it
while
at the
same
time
either
holding
miscon
ceptions
about
the
topic or having
an
accurate
conception
of
the
topic.
This creates
four profiles,
which
we
label, only
for
the
purposes
of
discussion,
Profile
A,
B,
C,
and
D.
Next,
we
describe
each
in
turn.
Profile
A
describes
an
individual who
has
accurate
(jus
tified)
knowledge
about
a
topic
and
holds
a
favorable
atti
tude
towards that
topic.
Thus
we
call
this
first
profile,
Pro-Justified.
A
stem cell
researcher
might
fit
Profile
A
in
that she may
favor
stem
cell
research
for
the
treatment
of
Alzheimer’s
disease
and
hold
an
accurate conception
of
stem
cells’ role
in
the
treatment
of
that
disease.
Another
example
could
be
a
college
astronomy
student
who
understands
the
International Astronomical
Union’s (IAU)
redefinition
of
the
concept
“planet”
that
caused
them
to
reclassif’
Pluto
to
dwarf
planetary
status
(International
Astronomical
Union
Press
Release, 2006,
August
24).
At
the
same
time,
he
accepts
the
IAU’s
decision
to
demote
Pluto,
and
favors
Pluto’s
new
clas
sification. Thus,
he
holds
both
a
positive attitude
about
the
new
definition
of
planet
and
Pluto’s
reclassification
as
well
as
an
accurate
conception
of
the
concept
of
planet.
FIgure
18.1
knowie4gn.
Conceptual
Knowledge
Accurate Conception
Misconception
Pro
Con
Hypothesized
relationship
between
attitudes
and
conceptual
252
Gale
M.
Sinatra
and
Viviane
Seyranian
Profile
B
describes
an
individual
with
favorable
attitudes
about
a
topic
but who holds
misconceptions about
that
topic;
thus
this
knowledge
is
not well
justified
and
should
be
con
sidered
a
beieI
Pro-Unjustified).
To
return
to the
stem
ccl)
topic,
consider
a
parent
who
holds
out
hope
for
a
stem
cell
treatment
for
her
child’s
autism.
Here,
the
parent
would
hold
a
positive attitude
towards
the
use
of
stem
cells
in
the
treatment
of
disorders,
but
likely
holds
a
number
of
mis
conceptions
about
the
nature
of
stem
cells
and their
poten
tial
w.
treatment.
She
mey
also
hoLd
related
nsconceptions
about
the
nature
of
autism
and
the
utility
of
stem
cells for
the
treatment
of
autism. Thus,
her
beliefs
about
the
relation
between
autism
and
stem
cell
treatments
are
not
well
jus
tified.
Consider
a
second
example
of
a
middle-school
stu
dent
learning
about climate
change.
The
student
may
hold
a
positive attitude
about
human-induced
climate
change.
This
student
accepts
that climate change
is
occurring, accepts
that
humans
have
a
role,
and
is
favorably disposed towards
tak
ing
mitigative
actions
to
curb
climate change effects
through
both
his own
actions
and
through policy
change.
However,
his
conceptual knowledge
is
flawed
in
that
he
thinks
that
pol..
lution
is
causing
the
greenhouse
effect
and
thus
pollution
is
n%imaleiry
1espons*ie
for
cYirnate
c’natige.
n
i.’rns
case,
cor
recting
the
misconception
may
also
influence
the
attitude
and
perhaps
even
attitudinal
valence.
In
a
science classroom,
correcting
these types
of
student
misconceptions
via
a
con
ceptual
change pedagogical
approach
may
or
may
not
impact
students’
attitudes.
An
individual
with
accurate
conceptual knowledge
who
holds
unfavorable attitudes (Con-Justified)
would
charac
terize
Profile
C.
An
example
here
could
be
a
policy
analyst
who
understands
that
humans
are
impacting the
climate,
but
who
is
not favorably
disposed towards
talcing
either
per
sonal
steps to
mitigate climate change
or
recommending
policy changes.
A
variety
of
reasons
could contribute
to
the
negative
attitude toward mitigation
strategies. Perhaps
this
individual feels
that
one person’s
behaviors
are
not
that
important
in
the
grand
scheme
of
things;
thus,
she
does
not
believe
her
actions alone
would
make
a
difference. Perhaps
she
is
opposed
to
climate
change
policy
initiatives
because
she
feeLs
they
will
be
too
costly
and
create
too
much
of
a
negative
impact
on
national
debt.
A
second
example
could
be an
investment
banker
who
holds an
accurate
conception
of
the
role
repackaged
junk
mortgages
had
in
the
financial
cr1-
sis,
but
is
opposed
to
regulatory
actions
that
would
limit
this
practice.
We
could speculate
that
his
motives
here
could
be
related
to
personal
interest,
but
other
motives or
beliefs
could
impact
this
perspective.
It
is
a
matter
of
debate
whether
it
is
in
the
domain
of
education
to
attempt
to
influence students
who
ho[d
justified
beliefs
but
motivated
attitudes
(Crano
&
Prislin,
2006;
Sinatra
&
Kardash,
2004).
Finally,
the
Last
profile,
Profile
D,
is
the
one
Likely
to be
very
familiar
to
change researchers (Con-Unjustified).
These
are
individuals
who
have
a
negative attitude
towards
a
topic
and
simultaneously hold misconceptions
about that
topic.
An
example
could
be
a
person
who
is
opposed
to
emergency
contraception
and
believes
that
“morning-after
pills”
cause
an
abortion.
Another
example
could
be
a
parent
who
opposes
evolution education
and
believes
that
students
would
be
taught
that humans
evolved
from
modem-day
apes.
This
sit
uation
is
likely
very
common
in
science education.
Perhaps
due
to
the
misconception,
the
student
has
formed
a
negative
attitude
that
may
bias
processing
of
subsequent
informa
tion regarding
scientific perspectives
on
climate
change
or
evolution.
In
this way,
the
attitude
itself
becomes
an
obsta
cle
to
knowledge
change
as well as
to
the
development
of
accurate
scientific understanding.
In
this
particular
case,
correcting
the
sccnttic
ntis
weon
thrcv*
conceWat
change
efforts
may
also
influence
subsequent
attitudes
(see
for
example,
Heddy,
Sinatra,
&
Danielson,
2014).
In
terms
of
prominence, Profile
D
(Con-Unjustified)
might
in
fact
be
the
most
common
of
our
four
profiles
if
we
consider
only controversial
topics.
That
is,
since
controversial science
topics are
at
once complex
and
difficult
to
understand, and
at
the
same
time
have
significant
impact
for
policy
and practice,
the
profile
of
negative
attitudes
and misconceptions
co-occur
ring might
be
the
most
prevalent. We
would predict
that
Profile
B
might
be
next
in
prevalence—those
with
positive
attitudes
and
misconceptions
(Pro-Unjustified). Again, this would
be
due
to
the
prevalence
of
misconceptions about
controversial
cmence
topics.
?er’naps
?ioWie
k
‘moid
‘oc
next
in
pwva’tence
(Pro-Justified),
followed
by
Profile
C
(Con-Justified)
as
least
common,
although these
last two
conjectures
are
highly
spec
ulative
and
all
of
these
predications warrant
empirical
inves
tigation.
It
is
safer
to
predict
that
the
likely
distribution
of
individuals
across
the four
profiles would
differ
substantially
if
non-controversial
topics
were
considered.
Profile
A
(Pro-
Justified)
or
Profile
B
(Pro-Unjustified) may
be
the
more
prev
alent
for
non-controversial
topics.
Again,
these
predictions
warrant
empirical
investigation.
Altitude
and
Conceptual
Change
on
Controversial
Topics
Whereas
a
large
body
of
literature exists
in
both
attitude
change
and
conceptual
change,
few
studies
have
explored
both
constructs
in
the
same study. Even
fewer
have
explored
both
attitude and conceptual change
on
controversial
topics.
A
recent
study
conducted
by
Heddy
et
al.
(2014)
exam
ined
the
attitude
change
and
conceptual change
framework
by
asking
undergraduate
students
enrolled
in
psychology
courses
to
read
a
text
designed
to
refute
misconceptions
about
genetically
modified
organisms
(GMOs).
The
topic
of
GMOs
is
interesting
because, unlike
evolution
and
climate
change
(which
are
rejected
more
often
by
conservatives),
both
liberals
and
conservatives
vary widely
in
their
knowl
edge
and
attitudes
about GMOs.
The
results
showed
that,
for
individuals
who
held
negative
attitudes
and
misconceptions
(con-unjustified)
about
GMOs,
reading
a
refutation
text
pro
moted conceptual
change and
a
shift
in
attitudes
towards
more positive evaluations. Similarly, participants
who
held
a
positive
attitude
and
misconceptions (pro-unjustified)
prior
to
reading
the
refutation
text
also
changed their
conceptions,
but
their
attitudes
remained positive.
These
findings
were
interpreted
as
providing
some
sup-
1
port
for
the
hypotheses
of
the
attitudes
and
knowledge
Warm
Change
about
Hot
Topics
253
profiles
and
suggest
that
overcoming misconceptions
can
shift
attitudes
in
some
instances.
Further,
the
results
highlight
the
importance
of
drawing
distinctions
among knowledge.
attitudes,
and
beliefs.
That
is,
when participants
experienced
change
in
the
knowledge
of
GMOs,
it
affected their
belief
systems,
and
shifted
their
attitudes
in
a
positive
direction
(if
they
were
originally
leaning negative).
We
posit that these
more
positive
attitudes
would
likely
influence
subsequent
learning
about
GMOs.
From
the
research
in
both
areas,
we
do
know
that
a
num
ber
of
motivational
and
affective
variables
influence,
if
not
determine,
the
likelihood
of
change.
Several
motivational
and
affective constructs
have been
explored
in
conceptual
change,
including
epistemic
beliet
(Sinatra,
Southerland,
McConaughy,
&
Demastes,
2003),
interest (Andre
&
Windschitl,
2003),
achievement
goals
(Linnenbrink
&
Pintrich,
2003),
emotions
(Pugh,
Linnenbrink-Garcia,
Koskey,
Stewart,
&
Manzey, 2010),
and
task
values (Johnson
&
Sinatra,
2012).
Much
of
this
work
has
been
extensively
reviewed
elsewhere
(Sinatra
&
Cbinn,
2011;
Sinatra
&
Mason,
2008).
Therefore,
we focus
primarily
on
two
con
structs
that
are
particularly relevant
to
controversial science
topics
here—emotions
and
plausibility.
One
area
that
has
been
of
increasing
interest
is
the
role
of
emotions
in
science learning
in
general and
in
conceptual
change
in
particular
(for
a
review,
see
Sinatra,
Broughton,
‘&
Lombardi,
20
14b).
Emotions are related
to
individuals’
acceptance
or
rejection
of
scientific perspectives
as
well
as
their
willingness
to
engage
with
specific controversial
topics.
Specifically,
positive
emotions
are
related to
greater
accept
ance,
engagement,
and
conceptual change whereas
negative
emotions
are
associated
with
lack
of
engagement
and
resist
ance
to
change
(see
Sinatra
et
al.,
20L4a).
Engagement
is
critical
to
both
attitude
change
(Petty
&
Cacioppo,
1986b)
and
conceptual
change
(Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998).
Therefore,
promoting
positive emotions
is
seen
as
one means
of
bol
stering
engagement
and
promoting
attitude
and
conceptual
l
change
(Broughton,
Sinatra,
&
Nussbaum,
2011; Heddy
&
Sinatra,
2013).
The
relation
among these variables
was
demonstrated
in
a
recent
study
by
Broughton
et
al.
(2011),
who
explored
students’
topic
emotions
as
they
learned
that
Pluto
had
been
reclassified
to
a
dwarf
planet.
Negative
emotions
were
related
to
negative
attitudes about
the
reclassification. After
reading
and
discussing
the
scientific
rationale
behind
the
reclassification, fifth-
and
sixth-grade
students changed
both
their
attitudes
towards
the
reclassification
and
their
concep
tual
understanding
about
the
definition
of
planet
toward
the
scientifically
accepted
view.
In
addition,
after
instruction,
students
showed a dampening
of
the
negative emotions they
had
reported when
they
first
learned
of
the
demotion.
This
study
suggests
that
attitude change
and
conceptual
change
are
related
and
may
be
associated
with
strong
emotions
when
the
topic
is
controversial.
This
study
also
supports our
con
tention
that,
in
some cases,
conceptual
change
may foster
attitude
change.
In
this study,
the
intervention
was
designed
to
promote
a
change
in
students’
conceptual understanding
of
the
redefinition
of
planet,
yet
it
ultimately
shifted
attitudes
in
favor
of
the
IAU
decision
to
reclassify
Pluto.
This
may
be
because
the
conception
formed
the
basis
of
the
attitude.
Therefore,
shifting
the
conception simultaneously
shifted
the
attitude.
Heddy
and Sinatra
(2013)
also
found
that
students’
emo
tions
about
a
controversial topic
can
shift
with
instruction.
They employed
the
Teaching
for
Transformative
Experience
in
Science
(TTES)
pedagogical approach
to
teach
university
students
enrolled
in
education
classes
about biological
evo
lution.
TTES
promotes
engagement
with
course
content
in
out-of-school
settings
(Pugh
et
at.,
2010).
Results
showed
that
students
who learned through the TTES
method showed
greater
enjoyment
for
learning
about biological
evolution
compared
to
students
who
experienced
a
more
traditional
lecture,
reading,
and
discussion-based
pedagogical approach.
They
also increased
their understanding
of
the
topic and
evi
denced a
reduction
of
topic-related
misconceptions.
Thus,
in
both
studies,
the
interventions
designed
to
promote attitude
andlor
conceptual change
also
fostered
change
in
emotions,
suggesting
that
the
relationship between
emotions
and
atti
tude
or conceptual
change
may
be
reciprocal.
The
types
of
emotion,
as
well as
emotional valence
and
intensity,
are
important
to
consider
when
exploring
contro
versial
topics.
Broughton,
Pekrun, and
Sinatra(2012)
demon
strated that
both
positive (interest)
and
negative (anxiety)
emotions were associated
with
misconceptions.
However,
emotions
such
as
curiosity,
interest,
and
anxiety
were
more
intense
for
topics
when
individuals held more
misconcep
tions
(about
climate
change
and
genetically
modified
foods)
compared
to
topics
where
they
exhibited
fewer
misconcep
tions
(airport
body scanners).
This
again
suggests
that,
in
sit
uations
that
call
for
attitude and/or conceptual
change,
a
key
aspect
of
the
change
process may
entail
overcoming
strong
emotions.
Another
construct
that
may
be
particularLy
important
in
attitude
and
conceptual
change about
controversial
topics
is
plausibility.
Plausibility
figures
prominently
in
several
perspectives
on
conceptual change
(Chinn
&
Brewer,
1993;
Dole
&
Sinatra,
1998;
Posner
et
al.,
1982).
It
may
be
even
more
critical
when there
is
a
plausibility
gap
(Lombardi
et
al.,
in
submission)
between
individual
and
scientific
concep
tions
of
aphenomenon,
as
there often
is
with
controversial
topics.
Recently,
Lombardi,
Sinatra,
and
Nussbaum
(2013)
showed
that
when students
considered
two
competing
mod
els,
the
model
they
considered
more
plausible
was more
likely
to be
considered
correct.
They
also
demonstrated
that,
through
critical evaluation,
middle-school
students could
reconsider their plausibility
judgments.
Previously, Lombardi
and
Sinatra (2012)
found
that
shifts
in
plausibility
perceptions
about climate change
accounted
for
a change
in
college
students’
conceptions about weather
and climate distinctions, but
they
did not
attempt
to
shift
those
perceptions
directly.
Rather,
students were enrolled
in
a
geoscience course
on
climate
change,
and
their
perceptions
shifted
with
content
instruction
over
the
course
of
the
semes
ter.
In
the
study
with
middle-school
students,
plausibility
per
ceptions
of
human-induced
climate
change
were
increased
through
the
use
of
critical
evaluation
of
model-link-evidence
diagrams
(Chinn
&
Buckland,
2012).
Students
viewed
the
scientific
concept
of
human impacts
on
climate
as
more
plau
sibLe
than
the
skeptic
model
of
increased
solar
activity
after
this
instruction.
They
also
experienced
sustained
conceptual
change
regarding their
understanding
of
climate
change
mea
sured
at
a
6-month
delay.
Finally,
a
study
with
teachers
shows
that
plausibility
is
reiaied
to
emotions.
Lombardi
and Sinatra (2013)
showed
that
pre-service
elementary and
in-service
secondary science
teachers
1
emotions
about
climate
change
(including anger
and
hopelessness) significantly
predicted
plausibility
per
ceptions,
with
more
anger
associated
with
lesser plausibility
and
greater
hopelessness
associated
with
higher
plausibil
ity.
Those who
do
not
currently
teach
about climate change
exhibited
greater anger
than those
who
do.
Teachers
with
negative
emotions and
views
of
climate change
as
imp
lausi
ble
may impart
a
negative
stance
towards
controversial
sci
ence
topics
to
their
students.
Like
emotions, we view
plausibility
as
contributing
to
a
profile
of
attitude and
conceptual
change.
That
is,
we
believe
this
research
suggests that plausibility
and
emotions, along
with
the
previously reviewed
motivational
constructs
(self-
efficacy,
task
value,
interest, epistemic motives) serve
as
lev
erage
points for shifting negative attitudes
and
misconceptions
about
complex and
controversial science
topics.
Specifically,
if
pLausibility
judgments
can be
increased
and
negative
emo
tions
tempered,
then
motivational interventions may
be
able
to
promote
a
value
for
the
content,
or interest
in
the
topic, and
help
to
shift
attitudes and
conceptual knowledge.
A
Research Agenda
on
Warm
Change
on
Hot
Topics:
Next
Steps
Controversial
topics
present
unique
challenges
for
educa
tors,
scientists,
researchers,
writers,
and even
politicians
interested
in
promoting
attitude
and/or
conceptual change.
Arguably,
there
is
much
commonality
in
the
change
pro
cess
whether
one
hopes
to
impact attitudes
or
conceptual
knowledge.
Motivations
and
emotions
are
implicated
in
the
change
process
for
both attitudes
and
knowledge.
Both
are
embedded
in
a
rich
psychological, social,
and
cultural
con
text
that steers
the
change
process
in
new
directions at
every
turn.
However,
we believe
much can
be
learned
from
look
ing
at
attitude
change
and
conceptual change
as
unique,
but
related, processes.
We
have
tried
to
provide
a
“primer”
on
two
rich
and complex
bodies
of
literature
for those
who wish
to
explore
these interconnections.
Finally,
we
have
provided
a
framework
for
examining
the
combined
influences
of
both
types
of
change,
which
we
hope
inspires
researchers
to
test,
confirm,
or
challenge
our
hypotheses.
Much
work
has
yet
to
be done
and
many
challenges
must
be
confronted
as
we
move
forward along
this
conceptual
landscape.
There
are
theoretical, methodological,
and
meas
urement
challenges
that
must
be
confronted.
Definitions
of
attitudes, beliefs,
and
concepts
are
often
murky,
if
not
absent
from
much
of
the
published
work
on
these
constructs.
Defining
terms,
as
Alexander
and
her
colleagues
have often
called
for
(see, for
example, Alexander,
Shallert,
&
Hare,
1991),
is
much
needed
as
we
move
forward. There
are
unique
methodological
challenges for researchers
exploring
i
controversial
topics.
Researchers might
be
met
with
resist
ance by
students,
teachers,
family
members,
or
members
of
the
community
when
a
controversial
topic
is
the
basis
of
the
research.
Both
of
us
have
been
confronted
with
those
who
wish
to
shut
down our
research
efforts
when
exploring
a
con
troversial
science
topic. We
advise
those
who
endeavor
to
n
explore
such topics
to
take
extra
steps
beyond
those
required
by
Institutional
Review
Boards,
or others
in
oversight
of
research,
by
reaching out carefully
and
cautiously
to
corn-
1
munity members
to
engage
with
them
as
collaborators
in
the
research effort
to
the
extent
possible.
Measurement challenges abound
in
research
exarnin
ing
both
conceptual
change
and
attitude
change.
Of
para
mount
importance
is
distinguishing
among
attitudes,
beliefs,
and
knowledge
in
order
to
operationalize
these
concepts
for
research. Then,
considerable
attention
must
be
paid
to
devel-’
oping appropriate
measures
of
knowledge
and
attitudes.
We
suggest
using
self-report measures
such
as
Liken-type
scale
or
semantic
differential scales
to
measure
attitudes.
Conceptual
knowledge
can
be
measured
in
any
number
of
ways,
includ
ing
tradition
test
item
types
(such
as
multiple-choice,
short-
answer,
essays),
concept
maps,
or
even
self-reported
knowl
edge
(for
an array
of
techniques,
see
Vosniadou,
2013).
Beliefs
are
often
measured using self-reported
Likert
scales
(see,
for
example,
Buehl,
Alexander,
&
Murphy,
2002).
The challenges
of
studying motivation
and affect
in
edu
cational
settings
are also
well
documented
and
include
con
struct
definition,
the
accuracy
of
self-report
measures,
and
the
challenges
of
triangulating
data
(see,
for
example,
Buehl
et
al.,
2002).
Particularly
challenging
is
conducting
class
room-based research
on
controversial science
topics,
which
can meet with
resistance
from
students,
parents,
teachers,
and
administrators. There
is
naturally
a
desire
to
resist
con
troversial topics
in
science
instruction,
yet
the
outcome
of
such
resistance
is
to
risk
portraying science
as
a
cold
and
rational
endeavor
consisting
of
a
set
of
reified
facts.
The
sci
ence
that
is
interesting
and
engaging
for
scientists,
science
enthusiasts,
students,
and teachers
is
at
the
cutting
edge
of
the
known,
where
controversies
abound. However,
we
would
argue,
it
is
also
at
this
edge
where
interest
in
science
can
be
most
successfully
fostered.
Much
work
is
needed
to
capitalize
on such intriguing
controversial
topics,
while
optimizing
affective
and
moti
vational
reactions towards
promoting
learning,
not
resist
ance.
Additional controversial
topics
must
be
explored.
Topics
are
unique
in
the emotions
that
they invoke (Pekrun
&
Linnenbrink-Garcia,
2014),
so
as
we
explore
more
topics,
we
can
promote
understanding
of
the
complex
interplay
of
emotions
and
motivation
in
attitude
and
conceptual
change.
Much more
research
is
also
needed
on
teachers’
emotions,
motives,
and
attitudes towards controversial topics,
and
how
these
reactions
impact
their
teaching. Finding
ways
to
temper
teachers’ negative
emotions and
even possible
bias
in
teach
ing
controversial
science
topics
is
a
topic
little
explored.
We need
to
put what
we
have learned
to
work
in
creating
powerful
learning
environments
that
capitalize
on
adaptive
254
Gale
M.
Sinatra and
Viviane
Seyranian
Warm
Change about
Hot
Topics
255
emotions
and motives,
and
take
into
account
attitudes
and
conceptual
knowledge
in
the
service
of
learning
both
science
content
and
epistemic
practices
of
science.
In
sum,
we
argue
for
the
importance
of
understanding
the
roles
of
both
attitudes
and
conceptual knowledge,
in
order
to
promote change
in
both
when
learning
about complex, controversial
science
topics.
Finally,
the
work
on
attitude
and conceptual
change
about
hot
topics
needs
to
extend
to
other
domains. Despite
the
recent
surge
of
conceptual change work
in
domains
outside
of
science
(see,
for
example,
Limón, 2002),
little
work
has
been
done
to
explore
attitudes
and
conceptual understandings
ofcontrover
sies
in
domains
such
as
history.
We
have
begun
to
extend
our
work
into
the
domain
of
history,
and
we
call for
others
to
do
the
same. As
the
research
on
warm
change
about
hot
topics
progresses,
we
hope
to
see researchers
consider
both
attitudes
and
conceptual
knowledge
about
controversial
topics.
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