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Strategic Dilemmas of WMD Operators
Abstract
The increase in nuclear clients appears to be forthcoming, and with it a possible increase for nuclear use. Deterrence must focus on targeting nuclear decision makers and tailoring a strategy toward all levels of nuclear command and control, including tactical levels of decision making. What can be learned from historical examples of WMD dilemmas and the consequential role of a WMD operator in nuclear decision-making? Namely, that operators are in fact decision makers and not simply executers. The article analyzes the role of WMD operators as such decision makers by reflecting on three case studies that demonstrate operator dilemmas in light of standard operating procedures at critical moments of WMD engagement, and their results. It concludes by laying out an effective base on which to include operators in tailored deterrence efforts, as well as filling a need for creative and practical nuclear strategy efforts.
Mutual assured destruction is a key deterrent against the use of the most powerful weapons. The threat of it successfully prevented the deployment of a nuclear weapon during and since the United States versus Soviet Union Cold War. It has also prevented the escalation to total warfare scenarios (where countries fully deploy their arsenals and capabilities against each other). Cyber weapons are poised to potentially create more havoc, death and destruction than a single nuclear weapon would and there has been significant contemporary use of information and influence warfare. Given the foregoing, this paper investigates whether mutual assured destruction scenarios may exist which are (or could be) responsible for keeping the use of these warfare methods in check. Further, the paper considers whether the three types of warfare might be effective in holding the others in check.
This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.
A recently published collection of captured Iraqi records offers an opportunity to better understand Saddam Hussein's perception of US and Israeli deterrence signals, affording innovative insights into the reasons behind Iraq's restraint from using weapons of mass destruction against Israeli targets during the 1991 Gulf War. This article tests a wide range of suggested hypotheses, and suggests that US and Israeli deterrence played only a minimal role in dissuading Iraqi use of WMD. The article concludes with some thoughts on the practical implications, particularly on the effectiveness of a “no-first-use” nuclear policy.
This article seeks to elucidate the concept of nuclear learning. It explores both the “nuclear” and the “learning” aspects of the concept. On the nuclear side, it distinguishes between learning basic facts about nuclear arms and drawing inferences about the larger implications of those facts. On the learning side, it discusses three issues: whether to use the term in a normative or value-neutral manner; the difference between learning that leads to a change in means versus learning that leads to a re-evaluation of ends; and whether learning only takes place at the level of individuals or whether there can also be learning by collective entities. The article argues there is no universal best answer to these questions and that the particular concept of learning that should be employed depends on the goals of the analyst. If the goal is to reduce the chances of nuclear war, however, one type of learning that will be important to consider is whether there is shared, cross-national learning.
The causes and effects of the use of force raise crucial questions of substance and method. Issues are multiple and often are confused with each other. Thus, while many case-study findings contradict “second-wave” deterrence theory, they are consistent with some rational deterrence theories. Many findings, however, cannot be squared with the assumptions of rationality. Policies are suboptimal and behavior is often inconsistent. Furthermore, the actor's values, beliefs, and calculations are exogenous to rational theories and can only be supplied by empirical analysis.
A probe of various regional power nuclear postures reveals that such postures, rather than simply the acquisition of nuclear weapons, can have differential effects on deterrence and stability dynamics. The India-Pakistan dyad is a useful candidate for exploring these various effects because the three regional power nuclear posturescatalytic, assured retaliation, and asymmetric escalationhave interacted with each other in South Asia. In particular, Pakistan's shift from a catalytic posture to an asymmetric escalation posture in 1998 against a continuous Indian assured retaliation posture allows the effects of nuclear posture to be isolated in an enduring rivalry in which many variables can be held constant. The asymmetric escalation posture may be deterrence optimal for Pakistan, suggesting that nuclear postures do have different effects on conflict dynamics, but it has also enabled Pakistan to more aggressively pursue longstanding revisionist preferences in India, triggering more frequent and intense crises on the subcontinent. Furthermore, the command and control procedures that Pakistan undertakes to make its asymmetric escalation posture credible amplify this instability. These procedures generate risks to the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear assets, both at present and as India and Pakistan continue to dynamically evolve nuclear and conventional postures. The conclusions for South Asian and international security of this reality are grim.
Does Israel have the ability to conduct a military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities similar to its 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor? The Israeli Air Force has significantly upgraded its equipment since the early 1980s, but the Iranian nuclear complex is a much harder target than was the Osirak reactor. Iran has three facilities that are critical for nuclear weapons production: a uranium conversion facility, an enrichment facility, and a heavy-water production plant and associated plutonium production reactor. This article analyzes possible interactions of Israel's improved air force, including the addition of F-15I aircraft and U.S.-supplied conventional "bunker-buster" precision-guided munitions, with the Iranian target set and air defense systems. It concludes that Israel has the capability to attack Iran's nuclear infrastructure with at least as much confidence as it had in the 1981 Osirak strike. Beyond the case of Iran, this finding has implications for the use of precision-guided weapons as a counterproliferation tool. Precision-guided weapons confer the ability to reliably attack hard and deeply buried targets with conventional, rather than nuclear, weapons. Intelligence on the location of nuclear sites is thus the primary limiting factor of military counterproliferation.
Command and control of nuclear weapons was the edifice upon which great power nuclear strategy was based. Empirical Cold War research later proved that this edifice was, in fact, only a power keg. Therefore, US non-proliferation-minded analysts propounded logical reasons for their claim that new nuclear nations will be unable to demonstrate prudence in nuclear weapons management. The unique Indian case, pronounced from the organisation theory perspective, proves to the contrary. India's nuclear organisation is not a static entity; its unique strategic culture together with a political standard operating procedure for nuclear weapons management reduces the exaggerated possibility of any catastrophe.
The effects of nuclear weapons acquisition on deterrence will depend on the nature of the state, leadership, or even organization that obtains the weapons; the types of actions to be deterred; the purpose and strategy the weapons serve; the consequences for the military situation between the acquiring state and its adversaries; and the ways in which those adversaries respond to the opposing nuclear threat. The implications of nuclear acquisition for deterrence are likely to change over time as nuclear capabilities move from a nascent state and gain, among other qualities, increased size, longer range, more diversity, better survivability, and greater destructive power. Deterrence is not only a matter of who is being deterred, from what action, by whom, for what reason, by what threats, and in what circumstances, but also when in the extended process of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities a deterrence challenge occurs.
This article discusses the influence of religion on deterrence. Faith may increase risk propensity and lower the legitimacy of being deterred. Anticipation of divine intervention, reward or punishment, adherence to an apocalyptic ideology, or (in the Shiite world) to believe in the imminent advent of the Hidden Imam reduces susceptibility to deterrent threats. Religious motivation can, however, be potentially exploited to enhance deterrence. Superstitions can induce courage and self sacrifice but may also induce fear and mass hysteria. Prophecies too are a two-edged sword; believers, who receive divine guarantees that a certain event will not happen, may lose faith in the face of the occurrence of that event.
The problem of accidental or inadvertent nuclear war has been couched largely in terms of superpower confrontations during a crisis. Whether the focus is on the major powers, or on developing nations with ballistic missiles and probable nuclear weapons capability, stability in those who handle weapons and effective safeguards on use are essential preventive measures.The United States and the USSR have been careful to guard against unauthorized launch. All nuclear nations have been concerned with retaining ultimate control of nuclear weapons in civilian hands; with monitoring the reliability and stability of the forces that handle the weapons; and with preventing weapons from coming into the possession of outsiders.In 1986, an analysis of the sources of human instability in those who handle nuclear weapons concluded that thousands of unstable individuals were involved in “minding our missiles.” The present paper serves as an update on the problem and links it to potential areas of increasing risk as the world changes.
The question of whether a dietary supply of docosahexaenoic acid (DHA) and arachidonic acid (ARA) imparts advantages to visual or cognitive development in term infants has been debated for many years. DHA and ARA are present in human milk, and nursing infants consume these fatty acids needed for rapid synthesis of cell membranes, particularly neural cells. The reported mean DHA and ARA levels of human milk worldwide are 0.32% and 0.47% of total fatty acids, respectively. Prior to 2002 in the US, formula-fed infants did not receive these fatty acids and relied solely on endogenous conversion of the dietary essential omega-3 (n-3) and omega-6 (n-6) fatty acids, alpha-linolenic and linoleic acids, to DHA and ARA, respectively. Formula-fed infants were found to have significantly less accretion of DHA in brain cortex after death than breastfed infants. Numerous studies have found positive correlations between blood DHA levels and improvements in cognitive or visual function outcomes of breastfed and formula-fed infants. Results of randomized controlled clinical trials of term formula-fed infants evaluating functional benefits of dietary DHA and ARA have been mixed, likely due to study design heterogeneity. A comparison of visual and cognitive outcomes in these trials suggests that dietary DHA level is particularly relevant. Trials with formulas providing close to the worldwide human milk mean of 0.32% DHA were more likely to yield functional benefits attributable to DHA. We agree with several expert groups in recommending that infants receive at least 0.3% DHA, with at least 0.3% ARA, in infant feedings; in addition, some clinical evidence suggests that an ARA:DHA ratio greater than 1:1 is associated with improved cognitive outcomes.