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Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power
Abstract
The foreign policies of the Central Asian republics are widely qualified as "multivector." Ye t this concept remains vague in terms of both its underlying causal mechanism and the goals this policy can serve. Departing from received wisdom, this article recasts the notion both conceptually, in terms of co-alignment, and theoretically, by integrating it into a neoclassical realist framework that emphasizes how the geopolitical characteristics of the Eurasian region interact with the nature of the domestic political regimes to explain multivector foreign policy as a form of statecraft beyond the popular catchphrase.
... This project is part of the preliminary research for a larger PhD project on China's relations with Uzbekistan, hence the questions discussed in the article arise from enhancing the relevance of the Asian vector in Uzbekistani foreign policy, and therefore the research attempts to critique the existing literature in hindsight considering new developments. The analysis will start from drawing a timeline of events in Uzbekistani foreign policy, to then underline the main analytical concepts used in the literature to explain them, such as 'multivectorism', discussed in two of its conceptualisations, as balancing and as co-alignment (Contessi 2015), and defensive self-reliance as theorised by Fazendeiro (2015a;2015b;. This research investigates whether these concepts are useful to explain Uzbekistani foreign policy throughout the years by testing them against the country's reaction to changing international, regional and domestic environments in the context of the United Nations. ...
... Eurasiatica 19 167 Armenia, Caucaso e Asia Centrale, ises this proclivity to change as part of the 'multivectoral' essence of Karimov's policy, a predisposition often attributed to Central Asian leaders. Contessi (2015) provides an excellent discussion of the concept of multivectorism and characterises it as 'co-alignment'. After critiquing the ideas of multivectorism as simple balancing between different foreign powers, the author starts from Blank's (2010) definition of the concept as aiming "explicitly to play major powers against one another and raise the price of cooperation" (Contessi 2015, 301) and expands it into four different policy areas: autonomy from great powers, mitigating normative postures, diversifying route for natural resources and integration into global markets. ...
... Uzbekistan's fluctuations between the US and Russia hardly looked like pragmatic balancing, where supposedly multivectoral Uzbekistan kept losing vectors (USA and Russia as the best examples). Yet, if we define multivectorism in the way Contessi (2015) conceptualised it, then these fluctuations might be part of the strategy to play great powers against each other in a bid to pursue Uzbekistan's own set of interests. Fazendeiro's (2015b;) discussion on self-reliance follows up from an economic-centred vision connected to Islam Karimov's early policies of self-sufficiency to avoid overreliance on foreign partners. ...
Consistently with a consolidated tradition within the series Eurasiatica , the volume aims to intercept and represent the main research trends in the academic debate about the region across the Caucasus and Central Asia unfolding in the Italian academic environment and involving both national and international scholars. In this perspective, the volume presents a series of essays that draw inspiration from papers presented in the context of the main annual conferences and conventions focused on Caucasian and Central Asian studies. Accordingly, the volume hosts contributions shaped by different disciplinary matrices, ranging from historical and philological to linguistic, literary and political studies.
... This project is part of the preliminary research for a larger PhD project on China's relations with Uzbekistan, hence the questions discussed in the article arise from enhancing the relevance of the Asian vector in Uzbekistani foreign policy, and therefore the research attempts to critique the existing literature in hindsight considering new developments. The analysis will start from drawing a timeline of events in Uzbekistani foreign policy, to then underline the main analytical concepts used in the literature to explain them, such as 'multivectorism', discussed in two of its conceptualisations, as balancing and as co-alignment (Contessi 2015), and defensive self-reliance as theorised by Fazendeiro (2015a;2015b;. This research investigates whether these concepts are useful to explain Uzbekistani foreign policy throughout the years by testing them against the country's reaction to changing international, regional and domestic environments in the context of the United Nations. ...
... Asiryan (2019) instead character-ises this proclivity to change as part of the 'multivectoral' essence of Karimov's policy, a predisposition often attributed to Central Asian leaders. Contessi (2015) provides an excellent discussion of the concept of multivectorism and characterises it as 'co-alignment'. After critiquing the ideas of multivectorism as simple balancing between different foreign powers, the author starts from Blank's (2010) definition of the concept as aiming "explicitly to play major powers against one another and raise the price of cooperation" (Contessi 2015, 301) and expands it into four different policy areas: autonomy from great powers, mitigating normative postures, diversifying route for natural resources and integration into global markets. ...
... Uzbekistan's fluctuations between the US and Russia hardly looked like pragmatic balancing, where supposedly multivectoral Uzbekistan kept losing vectors (USA and Russia as the best examples). Yet, if we define multivectorism in the way Contessi (2015) conceptualised it, then these fluctuations might be part of the strategy to play great powers against each other in a bid to pursue Uzbekistan's own set of interests. Fazendeiro's (2015b; 2017) discussion on self-reliance follows up from an economic-centred vision connected to Islam Karimov's early policies of self-sufficiency to avoid overreliance on foreign partners. ...
Consistently with a consolidated tradition within the series Eurasiatica , the volume aims to intercept and represent the main research trends in the academic debate about the region across the Caucasus and Central Asia unfolding in the Italian academic environment and involving both national and international scholars. In this perspective, the volume presents a series of essays that draw inspiration from papers presented in the context of the main annual conferences and conventions focused on Caucasian and Central Asian studies. Accordingly, the volume hosts contributions shaped by different disciplinary matrices, ranging from historical and philological to linguistic, literary and political studies.
... Hiding, shelter seeking, hedging and multivectorism, and offensive pragmatism are all parts of the small state strategic menu (Contessi, 2015;Wivel, 2021). Small state strategies have to be pragmatic, responsive and adaptive as "smallness is related to constant concerns over international political change" (Rostoks, 2010: 99). ...
... According to Goh, it "is a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality" (Goh, 2007: 825). The notion of multivectorism has been employed by both academics and practitioners to describe the co-alignment practices of small states in the post-Soviet space (Blank, 2008;Contessi, 2015;Pedi, 2020). According to Contessi, "multivectorism represents a form of relational power allowing a weaker state to mitigate the dilemmas of dependence while engaging in an asymmetrical relationship" (Contessi, 2015: 301). ...
... Small states maintain or intensify diplomatic, economic and military relations with one or more major actors in order to reduce dependence on a stronger neighbour with whom they also hold diplomatic and economic relations. The motives behind such a behaviour can be both systemic and/or domestic (Contessi, 2015;Jones & Jenne, 2021;Kuik, 2008;Pedi, 2020). Yet, different types of polarity allow for more or less restricted foreign policy action spaces when choosing hedging or multivectorism. ...
After three decades of US unipolarity, the international system may be on the brink of transformation. Although the combined capabilities of the United States remain stronger than those of any other state in the international system and the United States remains unrivalled in defence spending and research and development, the American superpower no longer has the same ability to set agendas and impose preferences as in the immediate post-Cold War era. This chapter provides an overview of existing knowledge of links between different types of polarity and the challenges and opportunities of small states. We use this overview of existing knowledge as starting point for a comparative discussion of small state strategy under continued (weakened) unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity and non-polarity. We argue that in a world dominated by US- and China-led bounded orders, small states must choose their battles wisely, prioritize their resources and build networks with like-minded small states.
... The country adopted this policy as the basis of foreign policy. A multivector policy helps establish relationships with governments and benefits from it (Contessi, 2015;Vanderhill et al., 2020). In its definition, the multi-vector policy of Kazakhstan is primarily stable and balanced relations with countries. ...
... Furthermore, this strategy is aimed at socio-economic development. Since transportation costs account for 50% of trade, the country needs to improve infrastructure and ensure integration in transportation (Contessi, 2015). Vanderhill et al. (2020) also noted the importance of getting out of Russia's dependence since this policy was to preserve sovereignty and use a balanced policy, having good relations with everyone. ...
... The route is shorter by Page | 7 1000 kilometers from the Trans-Siberian Railway of Russia. Kazakhstan is also introducing railway connections with China (Contessi, 2015). ...
This work reveals Kazakhstan's foreign policy strategies, successes, and failures, which are essential to the country's energy industry. Literature review shows that the multi-vector policy allows the government to receive investments from various countries to develop its industry and energy sector. However, a foreign policy problem can lead to fierce competition between the Great Powers and have consequences for the country's energy diversification.
... A further conceptual reference for small state and weak state behavior is that of the "multi-vector" foreign policy. Arguing that small powers represent a unique type of state different from the calculations of a great power and with unique alignment decisions (Contessi 2015), scholars of post-Soviet politics in the recent decades have identified and used the concept of "multi-vectorism" to describe a common feature of foreign policies in post-Soviet states. In the context of the smaller powers of Eurasia, they identify a distinct foreign policy strand where, diverging from the standard forms of both bandwagoning and balancing, and sharing similarities with the strategies of the "third world" countries during the cold war, these smaller Eurasian states seeks to pursue close relations with different foreign powers without committing wholly to any specific partner, in order to achieve a foreign policy diversification of not becoming dependent on any single foreign power and to balance the competing interests of various foreign powers (Contessi 2015(Contessi , 2018Gnedina 2015;Clarke 2015). ...
... Arguing that small powers represent a unique type of state different from the calculations of a great power and with unique alignment decisions (Contessi 2015), scholars of post-Soviet politics in the recent decades have identified and used the concept of "multi-vectorism" to describe a common feature of foreign policies in post-Soviet states. In the context of the smaller powers of Eurasia, they identify a distinct foreign policy strand where, diverging from the standard forms of both bandwagoning and balancing, and sharing similarities with the strategies of the "third world" countries during the cold war, these smaller Eurasian states seeks to pursue close relations with different foreign powers without committing wholly to any specific partner, in order to achieve a foreign policy diversification of not becoming dependent on any single foreign power and to balance the competing interests of various foreign powers (Contessi 2015(Contessi , 2018Gnedina 2015;Clarke 2015). In such scenarios, small states engage in a "multi-vector" diplomacy, calling for the simultaneous co-alignment with different great powers, whom can represent both opportunities (sources of assistance, patronage, or prestige) and threats (dependence, dominance) in order to guarantee its national sovereignty and/ or regime survival (Contessi 2015). ...
... In the context of the smaller powers of Eurasia, they identify a distinct foreign policy strand where, diverging from the standard forms of both bandwagoning and balancing, and sharing similarities with the strategies of the "third world" countries during the cold war, these smaller Eurasian states seeks to pursue close relations with different foreign powers without committing wholly to any specific partner, in order to achieve a foreign policy diversification of not becoming dependent on any single foreign power and to balance the competing interests of various foreign powers (Contessi 2015(Contessi , 2018Gnedina 2015;Clarke 2015). In such scenarios, small states engage in a "multi-vector" diplomacy, calling for the simultaneous co-alignment with different great powers, whom can represent both opportunities (sources of assistance, patronage, or prestige) and threats (dependence, dominance) in order to guarantee its national sovereignty and/ or regime survival (Contessi 2015). Such a stratagem is thus conceptually distinct from the traditional alignment notions of either bandwagoning or balancing, as it seeks to allow the weaker state to generate relational power in order to preserve autonomy while engaging in asymmetric relationships (Contessi 2018, p.763), and represents not a series of one-time transactions but a permanent, strategic approach to statecraft to ensure economic development and state security, an "organizing principle" for foreign policy as well as a domestic political tool of identity building, sovereignty consolidation, and regime legitimacy (Clarke 2015;Contessi 2018). ...
This article provides an analysis of Mongolia’s foreign relations with the post-Soviet Central Asian states, particularly with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and their prospects going forward. It provides an overview of relations and analysis of why, despite shared geocultural identities and geopolitical imperatives, their relationship remains more distant than Mongolia’s relations with its other neighbors of East Asia. It then assesses the changes brought by the dynamics of a rising Chinese power projection as manifested through its Belt and Road Initiative in the region, and, using the IR theories on rising powers and weak state behavior, examines the impetus of these shifting dynamics for future Mongolia–Central Asia relations.
... First, China is the largest investor for Kazakhstan, inking nearly US $50 billion in contracts in 2015 (see Han & Ghobadian, 2020, this volume;Kambarov, 2015). In fact, China is Kazakhstan's most important partner in security (Contessi, 2015;Kembayev, 2018;Zhang & Belgibayev, 2014), energy projects (Heim, 2017;Hydrocarbons Technology, 2018;Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, LLC, 2018), infrastructural investment (Feng & Foy, 2017;Kenderdine, 2017;Uatkhanov, 2017) and finance and financial market development (Jenkins & Perzadayeva, 2018;Selmier, 2018;Voloshin, 2017). Second, China needs Kazakhstan for many reasons, and, realizing these reasons, Kazakh leaders seek to bind China and the Chinese industry to Kazakhstan while balancing Kazakh interests elsewhere. ...
... Diplomatically skilled Kazakhstan sits between China and Russia with critical border crossings to each while providing key pathways to Europe. China will seek to bolster this stable, neutral-butfriendly partner; Kazakhstan will continue to embrace this role, as discussed below (Contessi, 2015;Kirişci & Le Corre, 2015;Nixey, 2012). ...
... And interposed between Russia and China, significant land traffic simply has to pass through it. Russian political influences remained in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Contessi, 2016;Nixey, 2012;Zhang & Belgibayev, 2014), and so Kazakhstan must finely balance its interests between China and Russia (Aubakirova et al., 2017;Contessi, 2015;Kembayev, 2018). Table 7.1 provides comparisons between these three counties, and here we note four important points: Kazakhstan has a younger and much smaller population than Russia or China, with roughly half living in cities. ...
Between China and Russia and East Asia and Europe, Kazakhstan’s strategic position on the New Silk Road empowers it as a logistics linchpin. Combining Kazakhstan’s geographic position, political stability, relatively high per capita income, highly developed energy sector and the fact that the old Silk Road ran along Kazakhstan’s southern border has catalyzed development of an integrated transport complex where logistics, air transportation and financial and business services come together to promote establishment of regional headquarter hubs. Integration would expand and develop facilities which encompass “The Four Rs” of transportation: road, rail, runway and river/sea. While this outcome may be part of Kazakhstan’s destiny, sophisticated planning and development is necessary, and this will require integration and coordination between Khorgos, Almaty, Nur-Sultan and ongoing Chinese investment.
... First, China is the largest investor for Kazakhstan, inking nearly $US 50 billion in contracts during in 2015 (Kambarov, 2015;Han, this volume). In fact, China is Kazakhstan's most important partner in security (Contessi, 2015;Kembayev, 2018;Zhang and Belgibayev, 2014), energy projects (Heim, 2017;Hydrocarbons Technology, 2018;Kazakhstan-China Pipeline, LLC, 2018), infrastructural investment (Feng & Foy, 2017;Kenderdine. 2017;Uatkhanov, 2017) and finance and financial market development (Jenkins and Perzadayeva, 2018;Selmier, 2018;Voloshin, 2017). ...
... Diplomatically-skilled Kazakhstan sits between China and Russia with critical border crossings to each, while providing key pathways to Europe. China will seek to bolster this stable, neutralbut-friendly partner; Kazakhstan will continue to embrace this role, as discussed below (Contessi, 2015;Kirişci and & Le Corre, 2015;Nixey, J. 2012). ...
... And interposed between Russia and China, significant land traffic simply has to pass through it. Russian political influences remained in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Contessi, 2016;Nixey, J. 2012;Zhang and Belgibayev, 2014), and so Kazakhstan must finely balance its interests between China and Russia (Aubakirova, et al, 2017;Contessi, 2015;Kembayev, 2018). Table 1 provides comparisons between these three counties, and here we note four important points: Kazakhstan has a younger and much smaller population than Russia or China, with roughly half living in cities. ...
Between China and Russia, East Asia and Europe, Kazakhstan’s strategic position on the New Silk Road empowers it as a logistics linchpin. Kazakhstan’s logistical position is cemented by its political stability in Central Asia, its relatively higher per capita income, sophisticated service economy, highly developed energy sector, and the fact that the old Silk Road ran along Kazakhstan’s southern border and the old Steppe Road through its very heart. Each of these attributes catalyzes the development of an integrated transport complex [what logistics experts call a modern free port] where logistics, air transportation and financial and business services come together to promote establishment of regional headquarter hubs. Integration would expand and develop facilities which encompass “The Four Rs” of transportation: Road, Rail, Runway and River/Sea. While this chapter argues this outcome is part of Kazakhstan’s destiny, sophisticated planning and development is necessary, and this will require integration and coordination between Khorgos, Almaty, Astana and ongoing Chinese investment.
... Since the 'Great Recession', Kazakhstan has increasingly looked East (Contessi, 2015 (Bader, 2015). However, Beijing is endorsing and promoting international norms -in particular, a 'hard' concept of sovereignty (Contessi, 2015) and non-interference in other states' politics -which better fit with an authoritarian political frame. ...
... Since the 'Great Recession', Kazakhstan has increasingly looked East (Contessi, 2015 (Bader, 2015). However, Beijing is endorsing and promoting international norms -in particular, a 'hard' concept of sovereignty (Contessi, 2015) and non-interference in other states' politics -which better fit with an authoritarian political frame. It seems fair to say that Beijing's influence is certainly not playing in favour of democracy. ...
Neoliberalism and authoritarianism are intimately connected, as is demonstrated by the existence of a growing body of literature on ‘authoritarian neoliberalism’. This article provides a taxonomy of authoritarian neoliberalism and claims that it appears in three varieties – technocracy, populist nationalism, and traditional authoritarianism. Also, it proposes both an overview of the varieties and an analysis of three states as case studies. States are investigated as actors which strongly contribute to the neoliberal project amidst a more complex process of multilocalized and variegated neoliberalizations, which have to be incorporated into the comparative research. First, Italy is studied as a consolidated Western democracy which has been often governed by technocrats, independent, non-party professionals who have recurrently been in power since the 1990s, and within the frame of an increasingly technocratic European Union. Second, the paper concentrates on Hungary, a semi-peripheral Central European country which has become an epitome of a populist nationalism with increasingly authoritarian traits. Third, the paper focuses on Kazakhstan, a former Soviet Union republic with no significant experience of liberal democracy before independence, and a key example of the ‘traditional authoritarian’ variety. The three varieties, however, are sometimes combined and coexisting, and their evolution will be decisive for the future of capitalism and liberal democracy.
... A middle power possesses a greater capacity to attain its interests, to make autonomous decisions and to "maintain overall independence in the affairs of the state" (McInnis 1960). Such a posture implies a "rational strategic behavior" (Ungerer 2007, 540) dictating a degree of equidistance vis-à-vis the extant power poles, and the pursuit of an "all-azimuth" foreign policy in a logic of diversification (see Contessi 2015). Such attitude underscores a perspective on "the international environment as a source of opportunities for action rather than 1997,166). ...
... Over the years, this approach has taken the meaning at once of an "organizing principle" in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, and of a "powerful domestic political symbol" of Kazakhstan's recent national independence (Clarke 2015). But more aptly, it has come to describe an approach to statecraft driven by the search for "strategic dividends" (Aris 2010;Indeo 2010), through the "diversification" of partnerships enabling the regime in power to pursue both national interest and political survival, while eschewing great power control (Contessi 2015). This represents not only a response to the concern for preserving sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis the great powers, but also to the requirements of economic development. ...
The series Eurasiatica. Quaderni di Studi su Balcani, Anatolia, Iran, Caucaso e Asia Centrale was born to deal specifically with a wide area, composite but interrelated that, in addition to the traditional historical and cultural significance, is taking on an increasing political and economic value. The placement of this series within Edizioni Ca’ Foscari originates at the same time from a strong tradition of studies on the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia in our University, where the main languages of these regions are taught - Albanian, Bulgarian, modern Greek, Romanian, Serbian-Croatian, Russian, Persian, Turkish, Armenian and Georgian. The studies published in this series are intended to provide a tool for high scientific and multidisciplinary research in different fields (archaeology, art, anthropology, ethnology and ethnomusicology, linguistics, philology, folklore, religion, history, geopolitics).
... A middle power possesses a greater capacity to attain its interests, to make autonomous decisions and to "maintain overall independence in the affairs of the state" (McInnis 1960). Such a posture implies a "rational strategic behavior" (Ungerer 2007, 540) dictating a degree of equidistance vis-à-vis the extant power poles, and the pursuit of an "all-azimuth" foreign policy in a logic of diversification (see Contessi 2015). Such attitude underscores a perspective on "the international environment as a source of opportunities for action rather than 1997,166). ...
... Over the years, this approach has taken the meaning at once of an "organizing principle" in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy, and of a "powerful domestic political symbol" of Kazakhstan's recent national independence (Clarke 2015). But more aptly, it has come to describe an approach to statecraft driven by the search for "strategic dividends" (Aris 2010; Indeo 2010), through the "diversification" of partnerships enabling the regime in power to pursue both national interest and political survival, while eschewing great power control (Contessi 2015). This represents not only a response to the concern for preserving sovereignty and independence vis-à-vis the great powers, but also to the requirements of economic development. ...
The series Eurasiatica. Quaderni di Studi su Balcani, Anatolia, Iran, Caucaso e Asia Centrale was born to deal specifically with a wide area, composite but interrelated that, in addition to the traditional historical and cultural significance, is taking on an increasing political and economic value. The placement of this series within Edizioni Ca’ Foscari originates at the same time from a strong tradition of studies on the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia in our University, where the main languages of these regions are taught - Albanian, Bulgarian, modern Greek, Romanian, Serbian-Croatian, Russian, Persian, Turkish, Armenian and Georgian. The studies published in this series are intended to provide a tool for high scientific and multidisciplinary research in different fields (archaeology, art, anthropology, ethnology and ethnomusicology, linguistics, philology, folklore, religion, history, geopolitics).
... Evacuating heavy industry plants from the Ukraine and areas of Russia vulnerable to German invasion, then shipping and reassembling them in southern Central Asia created a huge industrial base in a few years, which necessitated immediate investment in railroads, mines and mineral processing facilities, more industrial plants and power plants (Matley 1994;d'Encausse 1994d). While some Russian political influences remained in Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Nixey 2012;Zhang and Belgibayev 2014;Contessi 2015Contessi , 2016Kembayev 2018), cultural diversity combined with a century and a half of enforced Islamic secularism have created a pragmatic approach to Islamic economics quite different from what is seen in Pakistan, for instance. ...
... If Pakistan's prospects for the Initiative from a Chinese perspective are potentially problematic, complex and complicated by Islamic economic considerations, Kazakhstan's prospects are simpler, secular and conditioned by pragmatic foreign policy. Kazakhstan's foreign relations have been following a 'balancing' strategy through a well-engineered portfolio of foreign policy tactics (Contessi 2015(Contessi , 2016, and China is the key partner in Kazakhstan's efforts. These efforts are clearly demonstrated by the Khorgos Gateway project. ...
While the name ‘Silk Road’ connotes significant Chinese influence, in fact since the eighth century the old land route ran mostly through Islamic countries and areas, from present-day Xinjiang to Istanbul, and the old sea route passed through Islamic trading principalities for centuries. Modern Islamic economies, and concepts of Islamic economics, will exert considerable impact on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, also known as OBOR) development programmes. Although a non-Muslim majority country, China has a longer, deeper and more influential history of cultural interaction with Islam than any other large country or major culture, save perhaps India and Indian culture. The new ‘West’ for China consists of countries with great variety of Islamic economies, and so I argue that China has certain unique advantages to engage with Islamic economies and utilise Islamic banking and finance. Using Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Iran as examples, this paper argues that variation across modern views of ‘Islamic economics’ not only results in challenges but also holds promise for BRI development strategies in countries with Muslim majorities.
... What is more, Norway's status seeking has targeted mainly one receiver, the United States (US) and at times the Great Britain, which is also oriented towards the US. Thus, it would be useful to explore more complex cases and investigate the relevance of the small state status seeking approach (Neumann and de Carvalho 2015; Wohlforth et al. 2017) in connection with other recent contributions to small state studies the "multivector foreign policy" approach-a practice of co-alignment- (Contessi 2015) and/or that of the alliance 'shelter' theory (Bailes et al. 2016). In this context, we suggest that the case of Cyprus, which is a much younger than Norway state in the international system, an EU member but non aligned state, that holds an enviable position in the Eastern Mediterranean, has been invaded and is still occupied by a more powerful neighbour, and that was hit and recently recovered by the global economic crisis, constitutes an interesting case of a small state seeking status. ...
... In this context, the most valuable Cyprus' assets have been the balanced approach towards the big powers, its EU membership and its initiative to form a series of trilateral mechanisms that have changed the dynamics of cooperation in the region. Its partnerships with lesser powers in the area are of particular interest, as recent research contributions on small state alignment choices have mainly focused on the relationship between small states and great powers (Contessi 2015;Bailes et al. 2016). Cyprus has created networks of cooperation and in this way it has become an important node in the changing Eastern Mediterranean. ...
This chapter looks at Cyprus as a status seeker in the Eastern Mediterranean and sheds some new light on Cyprus’ role in the region as well as on the study of small state status in the discipline of the International Relations. The authors investigate Cyprus’ status seeking strategy, assess its effectiveness and discuss its impact, by exploring its relationships with the great powers, the EU and with its neighbours in the region. Their findings indicate that Cyprus’ status seeking strategy has been successful. The Republic of Cyprus is being recognized as a key player in the region, as a “good power” and a useful partner. Moreover, the authors suggest that Cyprus status seeking strategy has laid the foundations for changes in the Eastern Mediterranean. In addition, they argue that in the case of Cyprus status seeking is not an end in itself. Cyprus seeks to better its position and harness the gains from that improvement. Thus, this chapter shows that even a small, occupied, peripheral small state can succeed in status seeking and improve not only its status, but also enhance conditions for cooperation, peace, stability, security in a region. That said, the authors underline that changes in the Eastern Mediterranean are at an embryonic stage and Cyprus’ advanced status in the region remains fluid and vulnerable.
... Desde el punto de vista de las relaciones internacionales se trata de un enfoque pragmático y no ideológico de la política exterior (Hanks, 2009), y cuya finalidad es desarrollar unas relaciones amistosas y previsibles con todos los Estados que desempeñan un papel importante en los asuntos mundiales y que tienen un interés práctico para el país (Vanderhill et al., 2020). En última instancia, la política exterior multivectorial constituye una estrategia dirigida a permitir que un Estado más débil mitigue los dilemas de la dependencia mientras mantiene una relación asimétrica con Estados más poderosos (Contessi, 2015). En el caso de Ucrania este planteamiento implicó un acercamiento a Occidente sin romper los vínculos con Rusia para, así, acomodar los intereses de esta potencia. ...
Este artículo aborda las causas de la invasión rusa de Ucrania. El realismo neoclásico es el marco teórico para esta tarea, y la geopolítica es el instrumento de análisis. La investigación se centra en las percepciones de la élite dirigente rusa, y más concretamente en su mapa mental geográfico para examinar cómo interpretaron el acercamiento de Ucrania a Occidente. De este modo, pretende analizar las razones que llevaron a los gobernantes rusos a invadir Ucrania. Para ello explica la evolución de la política exterior ucraniana en las últimas décadas. Asimismo, aborda las ambiciones de Rusia de alcanzar el estatus de gran potencia y cómo este objetivo se plasma en un mapa mental geográfico específico que constituye el marco que los dirigentes rusos utilizan para procesar los acontecimientos internacionales. Con el fin de aclarar el mapa mental de la élite rusa el artículo se basa en fuentes en lengua rusa, para lo que aborda las declaraciones públicas de los miembros del gobierno ruso, los análisis de los asesores del gobierno y la política exterior rusa. Esto ayuda a comprender cómo los responsables de la política exterior rusa perciben la política exterior ucraniana y su orientación occidental.
... One way of achieving this is "balancing regionalism, " where weaker states build horizontal ties among themselves and diversify external partnerships as a means of reducing reliance on single patrons (Tskhay and Buranelli, 2020). In doing so, they build off a substantial literature on "multi-vectorism, " attempts to maintain ties with multiple external powers, in Central Asia (see Fumagalli 2007;Cooley 2012;Nourzhanov 2012;Contessi 2015;Teles Fazendeiro 2018;Dadabaev 2019;Vanderhill et al. 2020). These vertical relations of hierarchy and horizontal networks of balancing regionalism are present in China's relations with Central Asia. ...
This chapter examines labor protests in the oil sector of Western Kazakhstan, seeking to understand why workers, despite numerous protests, have been unable to form a cohesive social movement. Drawing on Eli Friedman's concept of "appropriated representation," it explores the role of trade unions, arguing that the absence of independent trade unions in Kazakhstan significantly hampers workers' ability to organize effectively. This limitation is closely tied to the prevailing form of neoliberalism in the country, referred to here as "authoritarian neoliberalism." This system relies on a range of disciplinary measures to suppress workers' efforts to build collective power and mobilize into a unified social movement.
... One way of achieving this is "balancing regionalism, " where weaker states build horizontal ties among themselves and diversify external partnerships as a means of reducing reliance on single patrons (Tskhay and Buranelli, 2020). In doing so, they build off a substantial literature on "multi-vectorism, " attempts to maintain ties with multiple external powers, in Central Asia (see Fumagalli 2007;Cooley 2012;Nourzhanov 2012;Contessi 2015;Teles Fazendeiro 2018;Dadabaev 2019;Vanderhill et al. 2020). These vertical relations of hierarchy and horizontal networks of balancing regionalism are present in China's relations with Central Asia. ...
This book provides an up-to-date overview of contemporary Central Eurasian politics, identifies key issues, trends and transformation paths in this respect, and analyses the conceptual foundations of security and power in the region. Key topics include autocratic proliferation and regime security in Central Asia, the strategic situation in Afghanistan, China's changing role in Central Asian security, governance problems in Kyrgyzstan as a rentier state and the destructive role of internal security services in the context of democratic transition in Armenia, e-justice and cyber security in Kyrgyzstan, and the politics of authoritarian neoliberalism and labour resistance in Kazakhstan. With contributions by Serik Beimenbetov | Marie-Sophie Borchelt Camêlo | Shalva Dzebisashvili | Aziz Elmuradov | Bradley Jardine | Edward Lemon | Aliia Maralbaeva | Zumrat Sanakulova | Aijan Sharshenova | Farkhod Tolipov | Akram Umarov | Aitbay Zhansaya
... Although the relationship between a middle/small and great power is naturally asymmetrical, with this switching, the former could "mitigate the dilemmas of dependence. " 13 Due to such practicability, although multi-vectorism has been conceptually used to define the post-Soviet Central Asian states, it has been rationally utilized by many other middle and small powers. Yet, the literature used different concepts to define this utilization. ...
This study aims to illustrate that multi-vectorial approaches in foreign policy could not only be practical but also productive for middle powers. With this aim, the study conceptualizes Turkish foreign policy in Asia with multi-vectorism, a foreign policy behavioral pattern that has been mainly utilized for post-Soviet countries’ concurrent interactions with the West (the EU, the U.S.) and the non-West (Russia). The study, firstly, argues that Asian international relations require a more composite re-definition of multi-vectorism, since in Asia, due to the intra-regional fragmentations and diversions, there are more than the conventional two vectors, the West and the non-West. By considering this argument the study applies multi-vectorism to Türkiye’s foreign policy in Asia by comparing the practicability of different interaction patterns, e.g., multilateralism, minilateralism, and bilateralism. The study, secondly, argues that Türkiye’s multi-vectorial foreign policy in Asia is particularly successful in its bilateral relations and less so in its multilateral and minilateral interactions.
... The "Belt and Road" Initiative challenges the neoliberal international political and economic order as a concept of a shared future for humankind. It creates a new window of strategic opportunity for China's development and creates a new and better political and economic order for the world [10]. ...
China’s “Belt and Road” Initiative is the most ambitious megaproject of the current international political economy. With this plan, China pursues economic growth goals, especially energy security, expanding its influence in various regions, accessing global markets, and creating more cost-effective communication and transportation systems. The idea of the project is to facilitate the supply of energy, goods and bring multiple parts of the globe closer to China. This article deals with the opportunities and challenges of cooperation between Iran, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, and China by relying on qualitative research methods such as document observation and analysis. In this regard, the main research question is what opportunities and challenges do the “Belt and Road” Initiative as China’s foreign policy strategy bring to Iran, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan? In response, the hypothesis raised to this research question is that this initiative, in addition to influencing the future of these three countries, could have positive geoeconomic consequences for them. This research notes that it can contribute to developing and deepening these countries’ relations with China by capacity building for regional dominance, simultaneously facilitating interaction with both East and West, diversifying the onshore and offshore routes and energy import bases, while also ensuring, facilitating, and enhancing energy transmission security for suppliers and consumers. Concerning the consequences for the region, it may assert China’s dominance over the geoeconomic structure of Iran, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan and intensify competition between Russia, India, and the U.S. in the region.
... Geopolitics is the study of how geography and politics interact, while geo-economics is the study of how economic activity is shaped by geographic factors. While both disciplines are important in understanding the world around us, geopolitics has been gaining more attention in recent years due to the increasing importance of globalization (Contessi, 2015). In this paper, we will analyze the significance of geopolitics and geo-economics in our current political and economic climate. ...
Purpose
The present study examines the direct effect of change-oriented leadership on change-oriented OCB. Furthermore, this study investigates the mediating role of change self-efficacy between the change-oriented leadership and change-oriented OCB relationship. This study also examines the moderating role of felt obligation between change self-efficacy and change-oriented OCB.
Methodology
Using the simple random sampling technique with time-lagged data collection, 394 permanent employees (269 male and 125 female) working in service sector organizations (207 from banking and 187 from telecom) voluntarily joined the survey process. To test the proposed hypotheses of the current study, data was analyzed using SPSS v.25 through different statistical techniques.
Findings
The present study's findings reveal that change-oriented leadership predicts change-oriented OCB and change self-efficacy positively and partially mediates the relationship between change-oriented leadership and change-oriented OCB. Furthermore, felt-obligation moderates the relationship between change self-efficacy and change-oriented OCB.
Research Implications for practice
The present study highlights the importance of leadership and extra-role (OCB) behaviors of employees for the successful implementation of change policies, procedures, and methods. Moreover, this study also shows that employees' higher level of self-confidence for the acceptance of organizational change also increases the change-oriented OCB. Finally, this study explains the importance of felt obligation, which becomes beneficial with higher self-efficacy for a higher level of change-oriented OCB.
Originality/value of the results
The findings of this study will be beneficial for policymakers and practitioners, especially during the planning, execution, and implementation of organizational change policies, procedures, and practices. This study explains that role of leadership is much imperative not only for the demonstration of extra-role behaviors (OCB); also, good leadership plays a vital role in the enhancement of self-efficacy in the workforce. This study also highlights the importance of the felt obligation of employees for the organizations, especially during the change process. Furthermore, this study adds to the literature on leadership, change management, and positive psychology.
Keywords Change-Oriented Leadership (COL), Change Self-Efficacy (CSE), Felt-Obligation (FO), Change-Oriented Organizational Citizenship Behavior (CO-OCB), Social Schema Theory (SST), Social Cognitive Theory (SCT)
... In the past 30 years, Kazakhstan has adopted a multi-vector foreign policy to sustain its independent sovereign identity (Clarke 2015;Vanderhill, Joireman, and Tulepbayeva 2020). Specifically, Kazakhstan engages with different great powers by dividing issues into smaller parts, co-aligning the respective interests with different countries, and mitigating the risk of over-dependence on any single partner (Contessi 2015). Based on such a 'pragmatic, non-ideological foundation' (Hanks 2009, 259), Kazakhstan has been oscillating between balancing (against) and bandwagoning (with) great powers such as China, Russia, the United States and the European Union, to minimise loss and maximise gains, and to maintain its identity and autonomy. ...
Since its independence, Kazakhstan has adopted a multi-vectorism approach to balance between various great powers, especially between Russia and China. Despite extensive theorisation of such foreign policy, scholarly research has rarely investigated the topic beyond diplomatic power dynamics. Based on a systematic search of China’s joint projects in Kazakhstan in the past 30 years, this paper illuminates several unexpected developmental intricacies based on Kazakhstan’s multi-vectorism, its geo-strategic location, the availability of oil-driven sovereign wealth funds, and the public pressure for more responsible industrial policies: (1) China’s ambition to connect to the West has unintentionally amplified Kazakhstan’s multi-vector bargaining power; (2) Kazakhstan’s industrial policies, supported by various financial tools backed by its oil-driven sovereign wealth funds, are integral to its multi-sector economic development and diversification of exports to include more high-value intermediate and consumer goods; and (3) shown via a case study on Kazakhstan’s agricultural development, initial state-level negotiation and sub-national implementation, coupled with a mix of Sinophobic and Sinophilic sentiments, have led to a nuanced path of economic diversification. Given the authoritarian legacy in both China and Kazakhstan, empirical research to compare industry-specific development variations would be enlightening for developing economies to design optimal paths to leverage China’s rising dream and capital.
Open access available at:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2022.2027237
... It included maintaining Kazakhstan's historic ties to Russia while simultaneously engaging in close security cooperation with China and the United States (see also Cummings, 2003). Many other Central Asian states followed suit, using multivectorism to preserve good relations with Russia without committing to it and retaining the benefits of alignment with other powers (Strakes, 2013, p. 46;Contessi, 2015). More generally, multivectorism has been "reflective of the classical understanding of non-alignment as a series of constructive engagements that avoid formal alliance commitments, while deriving payoffs from economic and military affiliations or partnerships" (Strakes, 2013, p. 47). ...
Russia led a key Cold War alliance and is now at the forefront of debates about major power realignments. Yet Russia’s own conceptualization of alliances in the post-Soviet era has received scant attention. How do Russian policymakers and academics view Russia’s post-Cold War alliances: Are they obsolete, or are they still used for cultivating strategic relationships? We examine the Russian conceptualization of alliances through a systematic study of Russian policy documents and academic debates between 1991 and 2019. We find that traditional alliances are considered ineffective and defense commitments have declined. However, we challenge claims that alliances are obsolete and that alignments/multivectorism have replaced them. Russian regional alliances are cultivated for new purposes and coexist with various other institutional forms. We conceptually map Russia’s close relationships and argue that alliance scholarship needs to move away from a single entity focus toward conceptualizations based on institutional choices.
... Since 2004 arrangement with Tajikistan, Russia has established its biggest army installation outside its fringes, where it stationed the 201st equipped division (Hedenskog, & Holmquist and Norberg, Op.cit). In October 2012 a two-sided understanding was finished up among Dushanbe and Moscow, which accommodates lease freebasing rights for Russian powers until 2042 (Contessi, N. P.;. In the Kyrgyz region, Russia has its Kant base available to it, which operated in 2003 and has as of late declared designs to open another one in the south part of Kyrgyzstan. ...
Russia and the Central Asian region have a long history of engagements, based on Russian interests and the regional dynamics that were changed from time to time. After a terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre, America had started operations against Taliban Govt. in Afghanistan in the name of the War on Terror and established military bases in Central Asia. The Heads of Central Asian countries and Russia condemned these attacks and initially, Russia supported the American campaign in this region. Later, with the Color revolutions and protests in regional states, Russia felt threatening and increased American influence in the region. The key points of the Russian
... Small state choices -like those of 'balancing', 'bandwagoning' and 'neutrality' -have been complemented by new theories, such as those of "alliance shelter" (Bailes et. al., 2016) and "multi-vector foreign policy" (Contessi, 2015;Gnedina, 2015). The conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the annexation of Crimea and the increasing competition between Russia and the West, have revived concepts like that of 'the buffer state' (Buras, 2014;Graham et al., 2017;Mearsheimer, 2014; and 'finlandization' (Mouritzen, 2017), which had been considered redundant. ...
This chapter investigates whether the often misused and misunderstood concept of the buffer state remains significant in the post-Cold War era. With this in mind, we focus on the case of Ukraine and its relations with Russia and the West. We suggest that, as the conditions of cooperation and competition between Russia and the West have been significantly different from those of the past, both of them do not perceive small states between them as buffers. Nudged in between great powers, small states that in the past could have played the role of buffer, have now become objects of the competition between great powers and their integration projects. We conclude that small states lying uncomfortably in-between great powers remain vulnerable to pressures from their more powerful neighbours; their domestic politics and policies and their external relations are invariably influenced by their geography. However, their own decisions at home and abroad still matter.
... Thus, for them smallness is not necessar-ily a synonym of weakness or impotence. That an increasing number of small state scholars draw on neoclassical realism for their analysis (Contessi, 2015;Mouritzen and Wivel, 2005;Neumann and de Carvalho, 2015) gives strength to the view that neoclassical realism constitutes a helpful paradigm for researching the international relations of small states (Pedi, 2016). ...
New Perspectives Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations, Vol. 27.1/2019 Download here: http://perspectives.iir.cz/download/revecca-pedi-the-small-state-of-the-union-assessing-the-eus-ability-to-implement-its-global-strategy/
The European Global Strategy (EUGS) is a significant document that came out at a critical time. Decision makers and scholars need to identify and assess the challenges the EU is facing in its effort to pursue its new Strategy. This paper addresses the lack of a tool for identifying those challenges and assessing the EU’s ability to respond to them by introducing a new analytical framework based on the conceptualization of the EU as a small power in the international system, and the literature about the international relations of small states. The framework combines the factors that impact upon a small state’s behaviour and performance in the international system and consists of the following elements: a) the EU’s relations with the great powers in the system, b) developments in the EU’s neighbourhood, c) the EU’s politics, and d) the EU’s reputation. After discussing each one of them, the paper contributes a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s ability to implement its Strategy. It concludes that in order to implement its Strategy, the EU should respond to specific challenges. Therefore, the framework this paper introduces can improve our understand- ing of both the EUGS and the Union’s strengths and weaknesses, shed some light on what measures should be taken for the Union to respond to challenges that lie ahead and be used as a yardstick to assess the Union’s progress. Moreover, the framework can be applied to other areas of the EU’s external action and contribute to both drafting better informed strategic documents and supporting their implementation.
... From the moment of its independence, the Kazakhstani officials have made a national priority to integrate their country into global markets. 423 The country holds the world's ninth-largest petroleum reserves, and the government has stated that petroleum production, most of which will be exported to global markets, will expand threefold over the next decade. 424 Kazakhstan is fast becoming a key energy producer -behind the Gulf States and Russia but on par with North Sea producers. ...
... However, the research of the region has shown that foreign policy labels can be imbued with different meanings and dictate various policy options. While in the dimension of foreign policy this trend has been acknowledged (Contessi, 2015), similar policy options may be traced in the foreign economic dimension of these countries. ...
The research of Eurasian regionalism mostly focuses on the Eurasian core, for example, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, which have been pursuing a more exclusive and closer form of integration – Customs Union/Eurasian Economic Union. Other countries of the post-Soviet space are often described as post-Soviet ‘escapists’ or ‘isolationists’ and mostly discounted in the analyses of the Eurasian regionalism. The paper looks at six post-Soviet states, who opted out from the Eurasian Economic Union, and analyse their interaction with the EEU. The paper argues that despite tensions in relations with Russia, most of these countries are reluctant to entirely disrupt their economic relations with the post-Soviet Eurasia. The paper argues that six countries of the post-Soviet Eurasian periphery effectively pursue policies of a looser form association with the Eurasian core. This finding allows to argue that Eurasian regionalism, similarly to its European model, consists of the core and outer circle. The outer circle is featured by overlapping regional arrangements and growing presence of external powers and growing number of transit and trade flows linking this Eurasian periphery with the West and Asia.
... On the other hand, Central Asian states have developed a tradition of foreign and security policy diversification (Contessi, 2015). At a time when Russia, under strain in the Post-Soviet space, has been tightening its grip on its "near abroad", Asian countries represent a further and previously under-explored vector to mitigate these new pressures. ...
As the so-called ‘Asian Century’ unfolds, Central Asian countries are increasingly directing their foreign relations eastward. Meanwhile, Asian states are equally turning to Central Asia in their search for energy resources and new markets. This dual dynamic has given rise to closer and deeper ties in three core areas. As far as infrastructures are concerned, various pivotal states of Asia pursue Silk Road policies that see Central Asia as a fundamental transit route for disparate long-haul connectivity projects. In the field of trade, Central Asia's exchanges with other Asian countries have been growing steadily since the 1990s, in some cases even coming to rival, in relative terms, exchanges with the West. In terms of multilateralism, Central Asia is increasingly enmeshed in a web of overlapping institutions with a strong Asian identity, overshadowing the region's Western institutional references. The paper then problematizes this emerging pattern by sketching out some of the potential ramifications that could stem from the sustainment and consolidation of these trends for the international order and the global balance of power.
Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza polityki zagranicznej Kazachstanu, zakładając jej multiwektorowy charakter. Zdaniem Autora, wielowektorowość stanowi fundament kazachstańskiej aktywności międzynarodowej, jak i państwowości. W artykule przedstawiono problematykę zagadnienia wielowektorowej polityki zagranicznej z perspektywy teoretycznej oraz próbę przedstawienia definicji omawianego zjawiska. W dalszej części pracy Autor skupia się na przekrojowej charakterystyce polityki zagranicznej Kazachstanu od czasu uzyskania niepodległości w 1991 roku, w tym jej priorytetów, które uwypuklają wielowektorowy charakter kazachskiej dyplomacji. Dalej Autor podkreśla fakt, że od 2022 roku, tj. od momentu wybuchu wojny na Ukrainie, multiwektoryzm Astany przybrał na sile, tym samym napędzając „nową wielką grę” mocarstw o wpływy zarówno w Kazachstanie, jak i całym regionie Azji Centralnej. W finalnej konkluzji Autor prezentuje czytelnikowi pytanie, które ma niejako sprowokować do myślenia o przyszłości wielowektorowej polityki w wydaniu Kazachstanu. Autor w celu zbadania omawianego tematu wykorzystuje różne metody badawcze, takie jak analiza treści i dokumentów, analiza instytucjonalno-prawna oraz metoda decyzyjna.
The purpose of this scientific work is to assess the developing directions of Kazakhstan’s interaction with other states in various spheres. Different methods of scientific research were used in the study, namely analysis and synthesis, comparison, deduction, abstraction, formal legal method etc. Since independence, Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy has to some extent contributed to maintaining the balance of power in the region. Having chosen the professional diplomat Tokayev as his successor, Nazarbayev resigned on March 19, 2019, ushering in a new, unanalysed phase of the multi-vector foreign policy that has developed over the past 30 years. A theoretical analysis of the development of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy during the transition of power was carried out. It is concluded that during the transition of power, the multi-vector foreign policy develops in a new direction and in accordance with the priority of geo-economic values. The practical value of this research lies in the contribution to the literature of understanding the concept of multi-vector foreign policy or balance-based foreign policy during power transitions.
Multi-vectorism as a principle of foreign policy has been implemented by the CIS countries since the mid-1990s. Over 30 years, experience has been accumulated that allows us to judge the basis of real policy and multi-vectorism as a discourse in the information field. The attitude towards multi-vectorism in the foreign policy of the post-Soviet countries is very different, ranging from purely positive (mainly from the country’s political experts) to extremely skeptical (the Russian political science school). The article presents the results of the expert session of the Center for Research of International Humanitarian Communications of the Patrice Lumumba RUDN University “Multi-vectorism in Foreign Policy: Current Problems”, which took place on October 8, 2024 and discussed the problems of multi-vectorism: what are the limits of multi-vectorism as a means of maneuvering of post-Soviet political elites in the context of the emerging multipolar model of international relations, are common rules of the game possible for countries of different economic importance, what is the significance of situational alliances and temporary coalitions in the context of multi-vectorism. Based on the results of the discussion, the researchers came to the conclusion that multi-vectorism is an effective tactical resource of major playersmoderators, leaders of integration associations and military blocs, used to achieve strategic objectives in the areas of memorial policy, macro-regional security, humanitarian and economic cooperation. With such a balance of forces, middle-level countries risk becoming led and controlled objects of foreign policy ambitions of third countries.
Aotearoa New Zealand and the European Union (EU) have a strong and friendly relationship, recently bolstered by the signing of a Free Trade Agreement in 2022. However, when it comes to the Indo-Pacific, the EU has largely been absent in New Zealand’s strategizing to date, other than a brief acknowledgment of the importance of the ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) initiative. New Zealand, like other smaller powers, has sought a middle-ground position in the Indo-Pacific—a kind of asymmetrical alignment in which New Zealand has strong security relations with the US but at the same time has increased trade relations with China. New Zealand’s inherent multivectorism suggests a natural openness to a greater EU presence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly as it could help pacify the threat of a new Cold War emerging (something New Zealand seems keen to avoid). Furthermore, there is a significant overlap between New Zealand’s Indo-Pacific strategizing and that of the EU, especially a strongly aligned interest in maintaining a rules-based Indo-Pacific. Regarding specific domains for security cooperation, New Zealand and the EU have issued joint statements mentioning a desire to cooperate on “ocean governance and maritime security” as well as the areas of counter-terrorism, violent extremism, and foreign interference and disinformation. However, the appropriate conclusion is that for New Zealand, the EU is not currently a particularly relevant security actor in the Indo-Pacific. Importantly, though, this is not a fixed conclusion and given the strong underlying relationship and the compatibility of their Indo-Pacific strategies, it is plausible that greater EU-New Zealand security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific could develop in the coming years.
An Overview of Central Asian Trade Growth and Economic Integration
This chapter explores the complex geopolitical transformations occurring in Central Asia against the backdrop of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. It critically assesses Moscow’s declining influence juxtaposed with the growing clout of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the region. The intricate balancing act of Central Asian states is examined through the concept of multi-vectorism, a strategy used by these nations to diversify foreign alliances and resist domination by any single power. The key argument is that the crisis in Ukraine presents a unique window for Beijing to reinforce its position in Central Asia, a claim supported by the region’s reticence to endorse Russia’s intervention and its progressive alignment with the Chinese leadership. The broader implications of these power shifts on the global stage, including potential challenges to the US and its allies, are also scrutinized. The chapter is structured to provide an overview of China’s evolving relations with Central Asia post-1991, a detailed appraisal of each Central Asian republic’s ties with the PRC, an exploration of the consequent US national security and foreign policy challenges, and concludes with strategic recommendations for the US and its allies in navigating this shifting geopolitical landscape.
The book discusses the issues which are vital to Central Asian Republics and to India, including the threats they face, such as terrorism, fundamentalism and its consequences. It touches upon the China's regional aspirations and objectives, including the massive BRI initiative (Belt and Road), discusses the challenges of (lack of) territorial connectivity between India and Central Asian Republics, the interests of other great powers, etc. This publication analyses various aspects of historical background, presents some literary discourses, while thoroughly referring to the contemporary strategic, socio-political and economic dynamics of the region.
This paper focuses upon alignment behaviour in the post-Soviet space and seeks to explain why balancing Russia by certain post-Soviet states, despite their numerous efforts to form alliances, has failed. Whereas this failure lies within the explanatory realm of the classical alignment theories, it is more puzzling why some of these post-Soviet states understood the limitations of balancing well and acted accordingly, while others failed to do so at detrimental costs. Trying to explain the failure of balancing Russia, the paper introduces a new theoretical concept that complements the existing alignment theories, and subsequently moves to explain the empirical puzzle of variations in post-Soviet states’ assessment of alignment options. In doing so, the paper focuses upon three case studies, namely Georgia and Ukraine on the one hand, that increased their efforts to balance Russia in the last decade and ended up detrimentally, and Azerbaijan on the other hand that refrained from doing so. Unit level variables such as the elites’ mis-perceptions/miscalculations of their alignment options as well as distribution of material capabilities, domestic politics and different strategic cultures are employed to explain the variation. The theoretical concept offered in the paper allows for an accurate understanding of alignment behavior in the post-Soviet space.
After the emergence of independent Central Asian republics, which remained under the rule of Tsarist Russian and successor Soviet empire for several decades, Central Asia has become an arena for great power rivalry. It was a rational choice for newly-independent Kyrgyzstan, as a small country, neighbor to giant China, and whose dependency on Russia continued to a certain degree for security reasons and economic considerations, to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy in order to decrease its dependency on the former overlord and to counterbalance its giant neighbor which pursued expansionist policy in trade and the other projects in the region. In accordance with such a rationality, Kyrgyzstan, while keeping its relations with Russia and opened its borders for goods from China, also developed its relations with the US, Canada, EU, Germany, Turkey, Japan, etc., and became member of several global or regional governmental organizations to integrate into global political and economic system. Though its relatively weaker role and influence in Central Asia compared to the other great powers, India, which never pursued an imperialist policy in the region in history, might be an important alternative option with regard to its huge demographic, economic, and technological capacity, geographical proximity, and historical-cultural links for foreign policy orientation of Kyrgyzstan. India, with its huge potential to be a great counterweight, can make multi-vector foreign policy of Kyrgyzstan more successful, sustainable, and well-balanced, by providing it with a new direction and dimension and more room for maneuvering; so that, Kyrgyzstan will be able to create a more favorable, freer, safer, and less-restraining external setting to conduct its foreign policy as an independent and sovereign country.
В представленной монографии рассматриваются вопросы теории перехо-да мирового сообщества к полицентризму, вскрываются причины привер-женности англо-саксонской идеологической концепции мирового порядка монополярности; анализируются перспективы развития глобализации как процесса интернационализации мирового воспроизводственного процесса и как политики переформатирования мирового сообщества под аугменти-ровааную сетевую систему управления; рассмотрены причины сохранения национальной идентичности и государства как института обеспечения без-опасности и развития социума в условиях полицентризма.
Հոդվածում վերլուծվում և ըստ վերջնարդյունքի՝ պետության անվտանգության և ինքնուրույնության վրա ազդեցության, խմբավորվում են մեծ տերությունների նկատմամբ փոքր պետությունների անվտանգության մի շարք ռազմավարություններ։ Առաջարկվում է փոքր պետությունների արտաքին անվտանգության բոլոր ռազմավարությունները բաժանել չորս խմբի՝ համադրման, հակադրման, ինքնաբացառման և կցորդման։ Մասնավորապես,
քննվում են առաջին երկու խմբերում դասվող ռազմավարությունների շարքերն ու դրանց հիմնական բնութագրիչները, վեր են հանվում այդ ռազմավարությունների կիրառման հիմնապայմանները։ Եզրակացության մեջ ներկայացվում են այդ երկու խումբ ռազմավարությունների հիմնական տարբերություններն ու ընդհանրությունները։
This article reflects on how the concept of regionalism has been used to explain and interpret Central Asian politics since independence. It argues that regionalism, often a norm-laden analytical category based on Eurocentric assumptions, tends to paint the region as “failed” and regional states as incapable of institutionalizing multilateral relations. In its place, the article suggests the concept of order, which is more neutral and—through its focus on the operation of sovereignty, diplomacy, international law, authoritarianism, and great power management—is able to incorporate elements of both the conflict and cooperation that have marked the region’s politics since 1991.
Despite Nursultan Nazarbayev’s oft-proclaimed ‘multivector’ foreign policy—maintaining positive relations with Russia, the West, China, and the Islamic World without firmly committing to any one ‘vector’—Kazakhstan has, instead, pursued a steady policy of aligning itself with Moscow through multilateral and bilateral security agreements. While these do not prevent engagement with other powers within the security realm, they do effectively foreclose Nur-Sultan from seeking other substantive arrangements, reinforce Russia’s regional sphere of influence, and place the country on one side of an increasingly contentious geopolitical environment. The presidential transition in 2019 invites a fresh look at the current state of Kazakhstan’s security relationships and its likely future. This chapter does this by first exploring the concepts of multivectorism, security hedging, and alignment before examining Kazakhstan’s security arrangements under Nazarbayev and the still-emerging Kassym-Jomart Tokayev era to determine whether this new period will be marked by continuity or change.
The Central Asian states face the challenge of containing Russia’s revisionism in the post-Soviet space while maintaining cooperative relations with it and integrating diplomatically and economically into the international system. This essay argues that the Central Asian states are managing this revisionism through a strategy we refer to as ‘balancing regionalism’: cooperating among themselves and with multiple actors to insulate themselves from great power revisionist power politics and from the establishment of an exclusive sphere of influence in their region. This balancing regionalism operates through the following three mechanisms: bridging, dovetailing, and branding.
Հոդվածը նվիրված է ՀՀ արտաքին քաղաքականության պաշտոնական հայեցակարգի և պրակտիկայի՝ բազմավեկտորության գիտական բնորոշմանը համապատասխանության քննությանը։ Եզրակացվում է, որ այդ քաղաքականության պաշտոնական հայեցակարգը և պրակտիկան համապատասխանում են ոչ թե բազմավեկտորության, այլ միավեկտոր ենթադաշնակցման բնորոշմանը։ Ներկայացված են առաջարկություններ այդ քաղաքականությունը բազմավեկտորության հիմնասկզբունքներին համապատասխան կառուցելու վերաբերյալ։
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Статья посвящена анализу соответствия официальной концепции и практики внешней политики РА научному определению многовекторности. Заключается, что практика внешней политики Армении соответствует ее официальной концепции, а они оба соответствуют научному определению не многовекторности, а одновекторного примыкания. Также представлены предложения по построению внешней политики РА в соответствии с основными принципами многовекторности.
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The article aims at studying the compliance of Armenia’s foreign policy’s official concept and its practice with the scientific definition of a multi-vector foreign policy. It is concluded that Armenia’s foreign policy practice and its official concept correspond to the scientific definition not of a multi-vector, but of a univector/bandwagoning foreign policy. Also, some recommendations for building a multi-vector foreign policy of Armenia are given.
In diesem Artikel wird von der Prämisse ausgegangen, dass, erstens, Kleinstaaten wie Armenien ein besonderes außenpolitisches Verhalten haben und, zweitens, die wichtigsten Herausforderungen für ihre Sicherheit aus dem internationalen (insbesondere, aus dem regionalen) System kommen. Dementsprechend sollen die Theorie Regionaler Sicherheitskomplexe (RSK) und das Konzept der Kleinstaaten die konzeptionelle Grundlage für das methodische Vorgehen bilden. Im weiteren Verlauf des Artikels soll geklärt werden, welche Merkmale des außenpolitischen Verhaltens für Kleinstaaten charakteristisch sind und welche dieser Strategien in Armeniens Außenpolitik verwendet werden.
This book discusses and analyses the dimensions of Turkey’s strategic rapprochement with the Eurasian states and institutions since the deterioration of Ankara’s relations with its traditional NATO allies.
Do these developments signify a major strategic reorientation in Turkish foreign policy? Is Eurasia becoming an alternative geopolitical concept to Europe or the West? Or is this ‘pivot to Eurasia’ an instrument of the current Turkish government to obtain greater diplomatic leverage? Engaging with these key questions, the contributors explore the geographical, political, economic, military and social dynamics that influence this process, while addressing the questions that arise from the difficulties in reconciling Ankara’s strategic priorities with those of other Eurasian countries like Russia, China, Iran and India. Chapters focus on the different aspects of Turkey’s improving bilateral relations with the Eurasian states and institutions and consider the possibility of developing a convincing Eurasian alternative for Turkish foreign policy.
The book will be useful for researchers in the fields of politics and IR more broadly, and particularly relevant for scholars and students researching Turkish foreign policy and the geopolitics of Eurasia.
Building on recent scholarship, this essay contributes to further developing a conceptual understanding of multivector foreign policy, a term that, despite its frequent use, is still in need of additional refinement. I use the two-pronged concept of diversification as hinging, first, on simultaneous co-alignment with multiple major power providers and, second, as resulting from the interaction of variables at both system and unit levels. The essay then models a causal mechanism to explain Kazakhstan’s approach to international infrastructure connectivity, an oft neglected issue-area of interstate collaboration.
During the last two decades, one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU) has been the development of a strong presence in its neighbourhood. The 2003 Security Strategy and the recent 2016 Global Strategy highlighted the need to show that the EU can play a major role in the international arena by first establishing a strong presence in the neighbourhood and proving the union’s effectiveness in the region. In this context, the aim of the essay is to explore the way the EU’s ‘ideal self’ is constructed and perceived in the post-Soviet space.
The rise of China troubles the taken-for-granted epistemological and ontological constitution of International Relations (IR) theory. The Greek term 'theoria' implied travelling to foreign locales with the aim of gaining illumination that can then simultaneously inform and transform the 'home' of the traveler. Yet, instead of travelling, IR theory engages in silencing. This paper undertakes an interpretative journey of China's IR concepts. In particular, it looks at the notion of guanxi - one of the two terms that goes into the Chinese phrase for International Relations (guoji guanxi). The contention is that 'relationality' renders a more accurate translation of guanxi in English. In the process, the paper uncovers the practices of 'international relationality' as an opportunity to redefine the 'international' as a co-dependent space where two or more actors (despite their divergences) can interface into a dialogical community.
Since the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran, social scientists, including international relations (IR) scholars, have been called to develop endogenous/ indigenous theories to reflect Iranian/Islamic points of view. This theorizing has led some Iranian scholars to develop ideas about international life on the basis of Islamic texts and teachings. Furthermore, due to an increasing awareness of the Eurocentric nature of IR theories over the last few years, the international community of IR scholars has become open to non-Western IR theories. This opening has made homegrown theorizing more attractive to Iranian IR scholars, and debates about it have become more vivid. This article seeks to examine the attempts by the Iranian IR community to conceptualize and theorize IR from Iranian/Islamic points of view and to show how contextual factors have limited such attempts. The first part of the article reviews the IR scholarship in Iran to give a portrait of Iranians' achievements in this regard. The second part examines contextual factors that may have affected homegrown theorizing in Iran, including international agency, sources of inspiration, the dynamism of the IR community, the relationship between academia and government, and intellectual autonomy. An evaluation of this structural context suggests that even if theorizing IR from an Iranian point of view is both possible and preferable, this cannot be done unless certain structural constraints are overcome.
This article looks at the “New Great Game” as the most widely used metaphor for the geopolitical dynamics of Central Asia. Its focus is on Kazakhstan and Europe with particular reference to energy policies. The European approach to Kazakhstan is conditioned by its energy security priorities with issues of democracy and human rights relegated to the margins. For Kazakhstan, the article suggests that the game is played with an eye to regime legitimacy, territorial integrity, and international recognition. Relations between Kazakhstan, China and Russia are also examined. Some of the limitations and strengths of the Great Game metaphor are analysed.
In 1989 NATO initiated a cooperative approach towards the Warsaw Pact. The Atlantic Alliance considered that democracy and the free market had defeated communism, although the Soviet Union stayed afloat. Just two years later the Soviet Union collapsed, and the Alliance declared its supremacy over the whole Soviet space. Russia started a process in which weakness and confusion were the driving forces of its foreign relations. NATO and Russia cooperated in some important issues, although the Alliance was perceived as a threat by Moscow. The Kremlin was too weak to exert a solid influence in Eurasia and NATO could offer whatever Russia could not do. Russia’s subsequent strategy was very simple: if Moscow promoted instability in the post-Soviet space, as they did in Georgia (August 2008), NATO would never consider the Eurasian space attractive enough to launch cooperative programmes or to enlarge the organisation.
Armenia's foreign policy is unique among the foreign policies of the post-Soviet states because it tries to balance the interests of all the great powers through a process of complementarism. Although similar to multi-vectorism, Armenia's complementarism draws on several unique resources in pursuing its foreign policy, including its diaspora around the world.
This article first introduces the recent theoretical advances achieved through the concept of neopatrimonalism. Next, it links neopatrimonialism to the concept of patronal presidentialism, which has been used in the Eurasian space. It then analyzes the societal and economic mechanisms of these patronal regimes, deconstructs the links between patronage and " clan politics, " and insists on the hybrid character of the norms and legitimacies of these regimes, thereby asserting that there is room for change and innovation. It concludes by discussing the cumulative knowledge offered by this special issue examining Central Asia. The concept of patrimonialism is both multidimensional and multidisciplinary. Its origins lie in Max Weber's sociology of domination and legitimacy, which defines three types of authority: traditional, charismatic, and legal-rational bureaucratic. According to Weber, institutions are the impersonal source of individual bonds in Western democracies, while the
This article analyses the effectiveness of the EU's promotion of democratic governance through functional co-operation in the European neighbourhood. In a comparative study of three policy sectors in three countries (Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine), we show that the EU is capable of inducing neighbouring countries to adopt policy-specific democratic governance provisions in the absence of accession conditionality. In line with the institutionalist hypotheses, we find that effective rule adoption can be secured by strong legal specification of democratic governance elements in the EU sectoral acquis and international conventions. However, successful rule adoption does not necessarily lead to rule application.
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All academic disciplines periodically appraise their effectiveness, evaluating the progress of previous scholarship and judging which approaches are useful and which are not. Although no field could survive if it did nothing but appraise its progress, occasional appraisals are important and if done well can help advance the field. This book investigates how international relations theorists can better equip themselves to determine the state of scholarly work in their field. It takes as its starting point Imre Lakatos's influential theory of scientific change, and in particular his methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP). It uses MSRP to organize its analysis of major research programs over the last several decades and uses MSRP's criteria for theoretical progress to evaluate these programs. The contributors appraise the progress of institutional theory, varieties of realist and liberal theory, operational code analysis, and other research programs in international relations. Their analyses reveal the strengths and limits of Lakatosian criteria and the need for metatheoretical metrics for evaluating scientific progress.
Introduction Russia in Eurasia: External Players and Regional Dynamics M.R.Freire & R.E.Kanet PART I: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND THE GREATER CASPIAN BASIAN Russia and the CIS Region: The Russian Regional Security Complex B.Nygren International Rivalries in Eurasia S.Blank Eurasia at the Heart of Russian Politics: Dynamics of (In)Dependence in a Complex Setting M.R.Freire PART II: EXTERNAL POWERS, RUSSIA AND EURASIA Russia and the Greater Caspian Basin: Withstanding the U.S. Challenge R.E.Kanet Competing for Eurasia: Russian and European Union Perspectives S.Fernandes & L.Simao Russia and China in Eurasia: The Wary Partnership J.Berryman India and Central Asia A.D.Gupta Eurasia between Russia, Turkey and Iran M.Mesbahi PART III: INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NON-STATE ACTORS, RUSSIA AND EURASIA Senseless Dreams and Small Steps: The CIS and CSTO Between Integration and Cooperation R.Sakwa The Atlantic Alliance in Eurasia: A Different Player? A.Priego Intergovernmental Organisations and Non-State Actors, Russia and Eurasia: The OSCE P.T.Hopmann Strategic Resources, Strategic Players: The Role of National versus International Oil Companies in Post-Soviet Eurasia H.Kjaernet Conclusion M.R.Freire
‘Marg bar Roosyieh!’ (‘Death to Russia!’), ‘Roosyeh, Roosyeh hayaa kon keshvar-e mano rahaa kon!’ (‘Russia, Russia shame on you! Let go of my country!’), so shouted thousands of demonstrators in the tumultuous aftermath of the controversial Iranian elections in June 2009. Burning the Russian flag, calling Putin a dictator, invoking analogies of Russian brutality in Chechnya and the techniques used by the Iranian riot control police, and widely held beliefs that Russian intelligence collaborated closely with their Iranian counterparts to suppress the Green Movement, have ironically been complemented by official expressions of displeasure over a range of recent Russian policies, broken promises, and inconsistencies. All this points to the critical and complex relations between Tehran and Moscow that are embedded in centuries of competition, dominance, territorial acquisition, and loss, despite the imperatives of mutual needs, cooperation, accommodation, and even ‘strategic’ partnership.
The pursuit of integration in post-Soviet Eurasia (PSE) concerns institutions, but it is also about ideas: the vision that the region at some level remains some sort of political community. While the dream of unity remains an active project, the object remains as elusive as ever. Initiative is piled upon declaration, yet there appears to be little substantive progress. The lack of large-scale achievement in integration, however, belies some small advances at the level of cooperation, especially at the subregional level. The ambition to recreate some sort of pan-Eurasian body covering the greater part of the former Soviet Union is clearly for the present a hopeless dream. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) lacks an internal dynamic for development, and while its routine gatherings of heads of state and other officials continues to provide a forum for negotiation and a sphere to solve certain practical problems, the CIS has not developed into anything like an analogue of the European Union (EU). However, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO; in Russian Organizatsiya dogovora o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti, ODKB) does show certain cohesive qualities, and although it is a relatively small organisation with a restricted mandate, its continued development suggests that the cooperative drive in PSE is not altogether exhausted. It represents a small and partial step, but perhaps more importantly indicates the way that genuine integration projects can be achieved. Indeed, soon after his inauguration on 7 May 2008 Dmitry Medvedev stated that strengthening Russia’s ties with other former Soviet republics would be the priority for his presidency, and his first foreign visit as president was to Kazakhstan (Moscow Times, 23 May 2008). This was in contrast with Vladimir Putin, who began his presidency by stressing the importance of ties with the EU. However, war in the Caucasus within months of Medvedev’s inauguration demonstrated just how complex the combination of internal pressures and external influence had become. Conflicting internal imperatives and outside interests rendered the former Soviet space the focus of a new era of confrontation.
Neoclassical realism is an important new approach to international relations. Focusing on the interaction of the international system and the internal dynamics of states, neoclassical realism seeks to explain the grand strategies of individual states as opposed to recurrent patterns of international outcomes. This book offers the first systematic survey of the neoclassical realist approach. The editors lead a group of senior and emerging scholars in presenting a variety of neoclassical realist approaches to states' grand strategies. They examine the central role of the 'state' and seek to explain why, how, and under what conditions the internal characteristics of states intervene between their leaders' assessments of international threats and opportunities, and the actual diplomatic, military, and foreign economic policies those leaders are likely to pursue.
Despite important differences between the chapters, most of the contributors to this volume have expressed strong preferences for an approach to international politics that stresses the primacy of the international system, but that also acknowledges the importance of domestic political arrangements and the perceptions of leaders in the selection and implementation of foreign policy responses to the international environment. The question remains, however, how important this enterprise of neoclassical realism is as a research agenda and whether, in practical terms, it truly represents an improvement on existing theoretical approaches. In order to place our discussion in a broader context, therefore, our purpose in this chapter is threefold: (1) to map out the scope of neoclassical realism as understood in this volume; (2) to compare its performance in the cases covered in this volume to other popular approaches to international politics and foreign policy (principally neorealism, liberal theory, and other Innenpolitik approaches); and (3) to identify directions for future research. The scope of neoclassical realism A central theme of this volume has been that neoclassical realism is a more coherent approach to foreign policy than has been previously appreciated. In particular, we have articulated a common conception of the state that underlies disparate neoclassical realist theories, uniting them into a single, coherent body of theory. For neoclassical realists, the state exists as a potentially autonomous actor that is distinct from any societal group.
How do states perceive international threats? Which domestic actors are the most important in threat definition? What happens when domestic actors and interests disagree on the nature of threats? As we state in chapter 1, these are central questions to the neoclassical realist agenda and require a theory of the state to answer. In this chapter I will develop a neoclassical realist theory of threat assessment to fill this gap and illustrate it with reference to the British experience between the two world wars. Neorealist theories are theories of international outcomes. They highlight the role of polarity and international structure, black box the state, and focus on shifts in aggregate military power or threat. Debates include whether bipolar or multipolar distributions of power are more war-prone; whether anarchy encourages states to maximize relative power or security; whether equal or unequal distributions of power contribute to war; and the prevalence of buck-passing or balancing against threats. Proponents of balance of power theory and balance of threat theory would argue that prior to World War I Britain balanced against the rising power (or threat) of Wilhelmine Germany in the form of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, the Triple Entente, and the naval arms buildup. Granted, prior to 1914, balancing may not have happened in an optimal fashion. Balance of power theory and balance of threat theory, at least in their current forms, predict a general tendency toward balancing and do not expect an efficient or quick balancing process under all circumstances.
This book examines traditional balance of power theory from a political-economic perspective, using historical examples, to draw out distinctions between the liberal and realist approach and how this affects grand strategy. The realist view of the balance of power theory includes implicit assumptions that economic assets can be turned quickly into power, and that states always respond to threats quickly and only with a view to the 'short-run'. These assumptions drive many of the expectations generated from traditional balance-of-power theory, discouraging realists from looking at domestic sources of power, which in turn undermined their ability to frame strategic decisions properly. By thinking about how power must be managed over time, however, we can model the choices policy-makers confront when determining expenditures on defense, while keeping an eye on the impact of those costs on the economy. By emphasizing the role of the state, identifying different causal patterns in domestic politics, and demonstrating the importance of systemic competition, this book aims to establish why a neo-classical realist approach is not only different from a liberal approach, but also superior when addressing questions on grand strategy. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, international political economy, grand strategy and IR theory in general.
In the past two decades, many have posited a correlation between the spread of globalization and the decline of the nation-state. In the realm of national security, advocates of the globalization thesis have argued that states' power has diminished relative to transnational governmental institutions, NGOs, and transnational capitalism. Initially, they pointed to declines in both global military spending (which has risen dramatically in recent years) and interstate war. But are these trends really indicative of the decline of nation-state's role as a guarantor of national security? This book tests the proposition against the available evidence and finds that the globalization school has largely got it wrong. The decline in interstate warfare can largely be attributed to the end of the Cold War, not globalization. Moreover, great powers (the US, China, and Russia) continue to pursue traditional nation-state strategies. Regional security arrangements like the EU and ASEAN have not achieved much, and weak states - the ones most impacted by the turmoil generated by globalization - are far more traditional in their approaches to national security, preferring to rely on their own resources rather than those of regional and transnational institutions.
This article first introduces the recent theoretical advances achieved through the concept of neopatrimonalism. Next, it links neopatrimonialism to the concept of patronal presidentialism, which has been used in the Eurasian space. It then analyzes the societal and economic mechanisms of these patronal regimes, deconstructs the links between patronage and clan politics and insists on the hybrid character of the norms and legitimacies of these regimes, thereby asserting that there is room for change and innovation. It concludes by discussing the cumulative knowledge offered by this special issue examining Central Asia.
At the heart of the Central Asian Republics' (CAR) foreign policies lies a tension. Owing to a lack of capacity, all CAR regimes acknowledge the need to collaborate with other states to address the varied transnational threats in the region. However, this need jars with a desire to maintain sovereign control over all policy areas. Therefore, the CARs try to manage a balancing act between seeking international collaboration and ensuring sovereign control, as seen in their approaches to the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Western military bases on the issue of Afghanistan.
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The brewing conflict over the division of resources located in the Caspian Sea has long been cited as a driver of the growth in naval capabilities of the five littoral states. However, to focus on this aspect would be to neglect the political and diplomatic advances of recent years, as well as other local and global geopolitical factors that have contributed to increased tension. Nicola Contessi explores the intricate dynamics at play in the region and the ongoing efforts to unpick them, arguing that while the 2014 Astrakhan Summit did not herald the breakthrough hailed by the five participants, it did mark a step towards resolution.
This paper probes the process by which the foreign policy orientation of weak nations comes to reflect the preferences of more powerful nations. Two general conceptions of the nature of this process are identified. The most common view, that of the bargaining model, regards the policymaking process of weak states as relatively autonomous though influenced by reward/punishment actions of a more powerful nation which condition the weaker partner. By contrast, the dependency model stresses the long-term character of the influence and the indirect path by which it occurs. It regards the decisionmaking process as imbedded in a social/political structure which is itself distorted by the dependency relationship. Both a cross-sectional and a longitudinal analysis relying upon UN voting data and measures of the relations between the United States and 88 less-developed nations indicate that the explanatory power of the bargaining model is relatively limited and that the dependency model is a more appropriate conception. Though cross-sectionally, both reward behavior (various forms of aid) and dependency-indicating transactions (e.g. treaties, trade, arms sales, IGO member-ships, consultations, etc.) exhibit correlations with voting behavior, those of the latter are generally considerably stronger. Further, longitudinal analysis exposes much greater stability in voting behavior over time--and much less correlation with aid-giving--than one would expect if bargaining were present. This stable pro-American behavior is precisely that which would be predicted by a theory resting upon long-term distortions implicit in an enduring and penetrating structural relationship.
During the last two decades, Central Asian states have witnessed an intense revival of Islamic faith. Along with its moderate and traditional forms, radical and militant Islam has infiltrated communities of Muslims in Central Asia. Alarmed by the border incursions, sporadic terrorist violence and religious anti-governmental campaigns, the leadership of all Central Asian states adopted extensive measures against radical Islam and intensified counterterrorism policies.
This book examines the dangerous tendency of counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states to grow more alike amid propensities for divergence and attributes this trend to the impact of the social context in which these states operate. It underscores the importance of international setting that shapes governments’ perceptions of terrorism and their counterterrorism policies. Applying a comprehensive theoretical framework, which integrates different mechanisms of international influences on state behaviour, the author explains the Central Asian states’ perceptions of terrorist threat and their counterterrorism responses. The book analyses the counterterrorism policies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the two Central Asian states that have been least affected by terrorist violence and Islamism but chose to combat those threats vigorously. Using materials derived from a wide range of sources, including legal documents, officials’ memoirs and fieldwork, this research will contribute to studies in Asian politics and national security, and international relations.
This piece combines parts of Chapter 1 (Introduction) with Chapter 2 (theoretical framework) of an early draft of our book manuscript. The chapters that will eventually follow cover each of five regions: the Americas, Central Europe, former Soviet Union, East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Fareed Zakaria is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Government, and a fellow at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, at Harvard University. He is writing a dissertation entitled, "The Rise of a Great Power: National Strength, State Structure, and American Foreign Policy, 1865-1917."
I would like to thank Thomas Christensen, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Jonathan Mercer, Joseph Nye, the anonymous reviewers for International Security, and especially, Gideon Rose, and Andrew Moravcsik for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. See for example, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "International Security Studies," International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 25-27; Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), pp. 173-174; Benjamin Cohen, "The Political Economy of International Trade," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 268-270; and especially Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 79-101.
2. While the international relations literature of the last decade was dominated by debates about the international system, exceptions exist, the most prominent of which include Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of the Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs: Parts I and II," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12, No. 3 and 4 (Summer, Fall 1983), pp. 205-235, 323-353; and Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460. For a review of recent work, see Levy, "Domestic Politics and War."
3. See, for example, three modern classics in the field: William Langer, European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1950); Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London: Macmillan, 1961); and A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961).
4. An important critique of traditional diplomatic history is Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956: A Research Assignment," Journal of Modern History, Vol. 41 (September 1969), pp. 291-303. For an overview that details the best "new" diplomatic history, see Charles Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, ed., The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980), pp. 366-387; and for reactions from other diplomatic historians, see "Responses to Charles Maier's 'Marking Time'," Diplomatic History, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Fall 1981), pp. 353-373. Also see Gordon Craig, "Political History," Daedalus, Vol. 100, No. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 323-339; and Ernest May, "The Decline of Diplomatic History," in George Billias and Gerald Grob, eds., American History: Retrospect and Prospect (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 399-430.
5. See Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," Daedalus, Vol. 106, No. 1 (Summer 1977), pp. 41-60.
6. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). Subsequent references to Myths of Empire appear in parentheses in the text.
7. Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 183.
8. See Ranke, "A Dialogue on Politics," reprinted in Thedore H. von Laue, Leopold Ranke: The Formative Years (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 152-180, esp. pp. 167-168; also see pp. 98-99.
9. Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-making," in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," International Organization, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn 1978), pp. 881-911, which contains a literature review. Important work since then includes Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1985); and Brian M...
Three significant events took place in Central Asia in 2005. The March Tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan led to the overthrow of former President Askar Akayev; the May Andijan upheaval in Uzbekistan led President Islam Karimov to break ties with the West; an election in Kazakhstan reinstated incumbent President Nursultan Nazarbayev in December. The main beneficiary of these political developments is China which managed to further consolidate its influence in the region as a result. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan The sudden and unforeseen change of power in Kyrgyzstan on March 24, 2005 resulted in the ousting of President Askar Akayev, who had good relations with China. For a period of more than a decade, Akayev's regime fruitfully cooperated with Beijing on issues of border delimitation, military training, the fight against the three evils of terrorism, separatism, extremism, and trade. However, the so-called 'Tulip revolution' brought uncertainty as to how the new post-Akayev government, made up of opposition party members, would regard China. Reacting swiftly, China closed its borders with Kyrgyzstan right after March 24 and evacuated many Chinese businessmen on special charter flights as there were reports of looting incidents that threatened their security and business interests. With Kyrgyzstan bordering China's problematic Xinjiang region, concern over a quick stabilization of the situation in Kyrgyzstan was clearly observable in the official statements of the Chinese Ministry of * Zamir Chargynov studies at Boğaziçi University in Turkey. He had previously worked as a research intern in the China-Eurasia Forum and China and Regional Cooperation Center at the International Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The landlocked location of several post-Soviet states has significantly constrained their foreign policy options, helping shape their foreign policy orientations. This article asks how lack of sea access has influenced foreign policy patterns of these states. Three case studies, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, are detailed. Based on field research, including interviews with policy makers, the case studies are used to look at maneuverability in foreign policy as well as how geographic proximity to the sea seems to be an important dividing line, distinguishing the foreign policy orientations of the new states, especially in terms of integration and cooperation with Europe and the United States, and relationships with Russia.
Many argue that balance of power theory is as applicable to the Third World as it is to other states. Without substantial modification, however, balance of power theory cannot explain Third World alignments, because it ignores key characteristics of Third World states that determine alignment. The author develops a theory, “omnibalancing,” that is relevant to the Third World and that repairs these defects. Rather than balance of power's emphasis on states seeking to resist threats from other states, omnibalancing explains Third World alignments as a consequence of leaders seeking to counter internal and external threats to their rule. The superiority of omnibalancing over balance of power in making Third World alignments understandable is related to the Third World in general and to the alignment decisions of two key Third World states in particular. The author concludes by discussing why an understanding of the Third World, including Third World alignment, is central to the study of international relations.
International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201
During the late 1630s, Charles I concentrated his energies on the construction of a new royal palace at Whitehall. Designed in the classical style by John Webb, the new Whitehall was to be the fulfillment of the king's lifelong dream to replace the sprawling and obsolete palace that he had inherited from the Tudors with one that would match the splendor and majesty of the Louvre or the Escorial. Charles I desired nothing else than that his surroundings should reflect the magnificence of his rule: "Here, at last, would be a seat of government appropriate to the system of 'Personal Rule' Charles I had established since dispensing with Parliament in 1629. At least until 1639, it was from here that Charles could expect to govern his realms, resplendent amid Webb's Baroque courtyards and colonnades, during the next decade and beyond."
In making such ambitious plans, Charles I displayed supreme confidence that his regime would not only survive but thrive well into the future. Unfortunately for the king, his reign did not last out the 1630s. If the conventional historical wisdom that "the collapse of Charles I's regime during the 1630s appeared 'inevitable'" is correct, then Charles obviously suffered from self- delusion—an unreality all too characteristic of remote and isolated rulers.
International politics, too, has seen many instances of this type of folly, where threatened countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways. This behavior, which I call "underbalancing," runs directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist theory, namely, that threatened states will balance against dangerous accumulations of power by forming alliances or building arms or both. Indeed, even the most cursory glance at the historical record reveals many important cases of underbalancing. Consider, for instance, that none of the great powers except Britain consistently balanced against Napoleonic France, and none emulated its nation-in-arms innovation. Later in the century, Britain watched passively in splendid isolation as the North defeated the South in the American Civil War and as Prussia defeated Austria in 1866, and then France in 1871, establishing German hegemony over Europe. Bismarck then defied balance of power logic by cleverly creating an extensive "hub-and-spoke" alliance system that effectively isolated France and avoided a counterbalancing coalition against Germany. The Franco-Russian alliance of 1893 emerged only after Bismarck's successor, Leo von Caprivi, refused to renew the 1887 Reinsurance Treaty with Russia for domestic political reasons and despite the czar's pleadings to do otherwise. Thus, more than twenty years after the creation of the new German state, a balancing coalition had finally been forged by the dubious decision of the new German chancellor combined with the kaiser's soaring ambitions and truculent diplomacy.
Likewise, during the 1930s, none of the great powers (i.e., Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan) balanced with any sense of urgency against Nazi Germany. Instead, they bandwagoned, buck-passed, appeased, or adopted ineffective half measures in response to the growing German threat. A similar reluctance to check unbalanced power characterizes most interstate relations since 1945. With the exception of the U.S.-Soviet bipolar rivalry, a survey of state behavior during the Cold War yields few instances of balancing behavior. As K.J. Holsti asserts: "Alliances, such a common feature of the European diplomatic landscape since the seventeenth century, are notable by their absence in most areas of the Third World. So are balances of power." Holsti further notes: "The search for continental hegemony is rare in the Third World, but was a common feature of European diplomacy under the Habsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Wilhelmine Germany, Hitler, and Soviet Union and, arguably, the United States." In a continuation of this pattern, no peer competitor has yet emerged more than a decade after the end of U.S.- Soviet bipolarity to balance against the United States. Contrary to realist predictions, unipolarity has not provoked global alarm to restore a balance of power.
If most states inside and outside...
Randall L. Schweller is a John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow in National Security at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. In August 1994 he will join the faculty of the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University.
The author is grateful to Richard Betts, Marc Busch, Thomas Christensen, Dale Copeland, Michael Desch, Richard Herrmann, Robert Jervis, Ethan Kapstein, James McAllister, Gideon Rose, David Schweller, Jack Snyder, Kimberly Marten Zisk, and the members of the Olin National Security Group at Harvard's CFIA for their comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. A leading proponent of the "balancing predominates" view, Kenneth N. Waltz, remarks: "In international politics, success leads to failure. The excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others." Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 49.
2. The bandwagoning image of international politics pictures the global order as a complex machine of wheels within wheels. In this highly interconnected world, small local disruptions quickly grow into large disturbances as their effects cascade and reverberate throughout the system. In contrast, the balancing image sees a world composed of many discrete, self-regulating balance-of-power systems. Because balancing is the prevailing tendency among states, prudent powers should limit their commitments to places where their core interests are at stake.
3. Jack Snyder, "Introduction," to Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3.
4. Quoted in Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagoning Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" in ibid., p. 95.
5. Quoted in J.H. Elliott, "Managing Decline: Olivares and the Grand Strategy of Imperial Spain," in Paul Kennedy, ed., Grand Strategies in War and Peace (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 97.
6. Quoted in Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 133. Napoleon often spoke in terms of bandwagoning dynamics. In 1794, he said: "It is necessary to overwhelm Germany; that done, Spain and Italy fall of themselves"; in 1797: "Let us concentrate all our activity on the side of the navy, and destroy England; this done, Europe is at our feet"; and in 1811, "In five years, I shall be the master of the world; there only remains Russia, but I shall crush it." Quoted in R.B. Mowat, The Diplomacy of Napoleon (New York: Russell & Russell, [1924] 1971), pp. 22, 53, 243. Not all French strategists of the period viewed the world in these terms, however. After his remarkable victory over the First Coalition in 1794, Carnot feared that France might become drunk with victory: "The rapidity of our military successes . . . do not permit us to doubt that we could . . . reunite to France all the ancient territory of the Gauls. But however seductive this system may be, it will be found perhaps that it is wise to renounce it, and that France would only enfeeble herself and prepare an interminable war by aggrandizement of this kind." Quoted in ibid., p. 11.
7. Adolf Hitler in a speech to Gauleiters on May 8, 1943. Quoted in J. Noakes and G. Pridham, eds., Nazism, 1919-1945: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, Vol. II: Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination (New York: Schocken Books, 1988), p. 857.
8. For his most comprehensive statement on the subject, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
9. See Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Spring 1992), pp. 417-447; and Paul W. Schroeder, "Neo-Realist Theory and International History: An Historian's View," paper presented at the War and Peace Institute, Columbia University, June 11, 1993.
10. The domestic-sources school of alliance formation includes Deborah Welch Larson, Stephen R. David, and Jack S. Levy and Michael M. Barnett...
Stephen M. Walt is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University.
I would like to thank Robert Art, George Breslauer, Lynn Eden, Charles Glaser, Lori Gronich, Fen Hampson, John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Oye, Glenn Snyder, Jack Snyder, Marc Trachtenberg, and Kenneth Waltz for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1. For representative examples of typical scholarly efforts, consult: Robert Rood and Patrick McGowan, "Alliance Behavior in Balance of Power Systems," American Political Science Review, Vol. 69, No. 3 (September 1975); George T. Duncan and Randolph Siverson, "Flexibility of Alliance Partner Choice in Multipolar Systems," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4 (December 1982); R.P.Y. Li and W.R. Thompson, "The Stochastic Process of Alliance Formation Behavior," American Political Science Review, Vol. 72, No. 3 (December 1978). More traditional works on alliances are: George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), and Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). Useful summaries of the literature on alliances may be found in: Ole Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1973), Chapter 1 and Appendix C; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and J. David Singer...
A political scientist examines Russia's attempts to control Kazakhstan's oil, investigating both the authorities' definitions of Russia's state interests and individual profit motives. Kazakhstan's domestic politics and pipeline infrastructure are highlighted. A case-study of the strategically located Kumkol oilfield is presented, focusing on relations between the PetroKazakhstan company, LUKoil, and Chinese and Kazakhstani state-owned oil firms. The article is based on interviews conducted by the author in Kazakhstan and the United States, but interviewees were granted anonymity because of the story's sensitivity; hence only published sources are cited.