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Anatomy of violence: Understanding the systems of conflict and violence in Africa
Abstract
Violence connects people – whether directly or indirectly financing violence or by fighting the war against terror. Violent incidents are often deeply rooted in structures and systems. With a focus on Africa, this study examines three structurally interdependent conflict systems to highlight the complexities of transboundary and transregional conflict systems. The systemic approach to studying violence is highly suitable for courses on security, peace and conflict, political sociology and African politics. You will come away from the book with a better understanding of the underlying currents of violent conflicts and thus a clearer idea of how they might be handled.
... The electoral graph of political intolerance in most authoritarian postcolonial states in Southern Africa like Zimbabwe has been on the high constant with an addiction towards violence. Tools of coercion as governance system have become a synonym of hegemony and state collapse which both have made countries like Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Somalia and Sudan the "worst performing" states in Southern Africa according to The Failed States Index table of 2008 (Gebrewold, 2009). Zimbabwe's post-colonial personalisation of state security has morphed into coercion and brazen violence. ...
... Principal scholars in politics and power relations (Gebrewold, 2009;Praeg, 2007;Žižek, 2008) have painted a picture of Southern African states' generative hegemony through the abuse of state apparatuses for political expediency. For Gukurume (2017), Willems (2016) and Mare (2015), one of the machineries that perpetuate this hegemonic tendency is the mainstream media which is often gagged by the states' interference to shrink democratic spaces. ...
Zimbabwe has been in deep political and economic crises for the past three decades, a scenario that has persisted even after the demise of the late president Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The political terrain in Zimbabwe has been characterised by political conflicts, political violence, alleged elections rigging, abuse of human rights, lawlessness, among other undesirable traits which are detrimental to development. The international community had to intervene to bring sanity and peace to Zimbabwe. The imposed sanctions by Britain and its allies came as a punitive measure to force the Zimbabwean government to observe human rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, this move instigated untold suffering of the generality of the people of Zimbabwe. The chapter interrogates the protracted and nuanced political conflict and sanctions in Zimbabwe in the context of development in the post-coup society.The chapter explores the essentials of Ubuntu/Unhu philosophy as an ethical framework which helps to frame arguments for a possible ‘rebirth’ of the nation after the demise of the late president Mugabe in order to pave way for the national development. Thus, the virtues of Ubuntu/Unhu/ Vumunhu are utilised in this study in the context of transition politics and the reconstruction process in post-Mugabe society vis-à-vis the effects of the imposed sanctions. The chapter argues that political conflict and sanctions should be carefully examined to unpack the complex dynamics of present-day Zimbabwean politics. It can be concluded that political stasis and sanctions require immediate solutions to pave way for national development in post-coup Zimbabwe. It is also recommended that the use of sanctions as a punitive measure should be revised by the international bodies because it is not the intended people who are punished but the generality of innocent Zimbabweans.KeywordsSanctionsPolitical conflictUbuntu/Unhu/Vumunhu philosophyDevelopmentPost-coup Zimbabwe
... Understanding why the MDGs were not fully achieved in many countries especially in SSA by its deadline remains critical to the success of the SDGs. For instance, Gebreworld (2009) (Gebreworld, 2009). Similar considerations regarding the limited success of the MDGs and prospect of the SDGs have gained tractions among scholars and policy makers alike since 2015 (Chasek, Wagner, Leone, Lebada, & Risse, 2016;Dziedzic, 2015;Nyabuga, Nyakundi, & Yambo, 2017;Wahyuningsih, 2017). ...
... Understanding why the MDGs were not fully achieved in many countries especially in SSA by its deadline remains critical to the success of the SDGs. For instance, Gebreworld (2009) (Gebreworld, 2009). Similar considerations regarding the limited success of the MDGs and prospect of the SDGs have gained tractions among scholars and policy makers alike since 2015 (Chasek, Wagner, Leone, Lebada, & Risse, 2016;Dziedzic, 2015;Nyabuga, Nyakundi, & Yambo, 2017;Wahyuningsih, 2017). ...
... Their presence makes it difficult for cheating practices to occur during elections as well as instil confidence among public [34]. Civil societies also help by educating voters and monitoring polls besides pushing for amendments [35]. International observers present during voting periods played an important role in exposing instances where votes were rigged leading to pressure being put on the government for change by these observers' urging [36]. ...
... These changes show that democracy has become the foremost form of government around the world (Diamond, 2005). These changes have successfully led to the moving away from a single-party to a multi-party democratic political system since the 1990s, ending single-party political systems and military dictatorships in some countries like Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1991 and even Mobutu appealed to stepping towards democratization process in 1992, ending Apartheid in 1994, Liberal democratic constitutions of Benin (1990), Mali (1992), South Africa (1994), Ghana (1993), Malawi (1994), Nigeria 3 rd and 4 th republics (1993 and 1999 respectively), Ethiopia (1995) and Eritrea (1997) has begun to reshape the democratic face of the African countries, (Gebrewold, 2009;Ronke & Devid 2012). ...
... Dalam hal ini, diplomasi angkatan laut dapat memfasilitasi kerjasama internasional dan membangun kepercayaan antara negara-negara melalui latihan militer bersama, pertukaran informasi intelijen, dan penegakan hukum maritim (Murphy, 2009). Sebagai contoh, operasi Atalanta Uni Eropa telah menggabungkan angkatan laut dari berbagai negara untuk melawan pembajakan di lepas pantai Somalia, menghasilkan penurunan signifikan dalam insiden pembajakan sejak 2011 (Gebrewold, 2016). ...
The naval diplomacy is an important instrument in foreign policy to maintain maritime security and protect national interests at sea. This problematic focuses on actual matters that influence the behavior of other countries through naval presence, actions and communications. Maritime security includes protection against non-traditional threats such as piracy, terrorism, smuggling, as well as enforcement of maritime law and international agreements. Cooperation between countries in naval diplomacy is very important to overcome cross-border maritime security threats. Cooperation mechanisms include joint military exercises, intelligence information sharing, and maritime law enforcement. The navy plays an important role in ensuring maritime security through security patrols, search and rescue operations, and diplomatic support. In the context of maritime security, naval diplomacy emphasizes the importance of cooperation between countries and the efforts made by navies to counter threats at sea. This cooperation includes joint military exercises, sharing intelligence information, and maritime law enforcement. Therefore, this is an effective instrument in maintaining maritime security and stability in the world's maritime strategic areas. The research methodology used includes a literature review accompanied by a survey to collect qualitative data on perceptions and related practices. It is hoped that this research can provide alternative actual decisions on how to identify opportunities and challenges faced in the sea sector in facing increasingly complex and dynamic maritime threats, as well as provide relevant recommendations for policy makers and practitioners. Diplomasi angkatan laut sebagai instrumen penting dalam kebijakan luar negeri untuk menjaga keamanan maritim dan melindungi kepentingan nasional di laut. Problematika ini berfokus pada hal-hal aktual yang mempengaruhi perilaku negara lain melalui kehadiran, tindakan, dan komunikasi angkatan laut. Keamanan maritim mencakup perlindungan terhadap ancaman non-tradisional seperti pembajakan, terorisme, penyelundupan, serta penegakan hukum maritim dan perjanjian internasional. Kerja sama antar negara dalam diplomasi angkatan laut sangat penting untuk mengatasi ancaman keamanan maritim lintas batas. Mekanisme kerja sama termasuk latihan militer bersama, berbagi informasi intelijen, dan penegakan hukum maritim. Angkatan laut memainkan peran penting dalam memastikan keamanan maritim melalui patroli keamanan, operasi pencarian dan penyelamatan, dan dukungan diplomatik. Dalam konteks keamanan maritim, diplomasi angkatan laut menekankan pentingnya kerjasama antar negara dan upaya yang dilakukan angkatan laut untuk melawan ancaman di laut. Kerja sama ini meliputi latihan militer bersama, berbagi informasi intelijen, dan penegakan hukum maritim. Oleh karena itu, hal ini menjadi instrumen yang efektif dalam menjaga keamanan dan stabilitas maritim di kawasan strategis maritim dunia. Metodologi penelitian yang digunakan meliputi tinjauan pustaka disertai survei untuk mengumpulkan data kualitatif pada persepsi dan praktik terkait. Penelitian ini diharapkan dapat memberikan alternatif keputusan aktual tentang bagaimana mengidentifikasi peluang dan tantangan yang dihadapi di matra laut dalam menghadapi ancaman maritim yang semakin kompleks dan dinamis, serta memberikan rekomendasi yang relevan bagi pembuat kebijakan dan praktisi.
... Deconstructing the civilizing process of African countries like Cameroon in this case study aims to draw our attention to the phenomenon of cultural violence against the marginalized African majority. Belachew Gebrewold (2009), argued that since most African countries like Cameroon are economically the least achieving in the world, discussions about taking seriously various African cultural richness are usually considered as useless nostalgia and romanticism. This section attempts to deconstruct a myriad of negative hegemony images that denigrate the educational leadership of Cameroon and the different countries in the African continent as dark and seeks to place into proper context distortions of the original African creative intellect twisted by Western hegemony. ...
This study reviewed literature from a comprehensive leadership development conference "Exploring Complexities and Paradoxes in Effective School and System Leadership in Cameroon. The paper, therefore, explored vividly the factors that reflect the ideas and experiences of school and system leadership development from both research and practice perspectives in Cameroon through documental analysis. Indispensable work is provided for those who wish to be up-to-date about hegemony is crucial for the study of school and educational system management and for global leadership politics though the concept is not widely contested in most developing countries like Cameroon and requires clarification. This study gives valuable new insights from recent research findings and the implications of educational policy in Cameroon as it relates to the development of school leaders. This study provides a bird's eye view of assessment for effective leadership and draws special attention to the growing structural limitation of implementing ICT in school and the different Cameroon educational systems. The existing literature review clearly indicates that 360-degree feedback process is a significantly valuable tool for organizations, in assessing both teachers and education leaders' performance appraisal and development purposes. These subtopics have in common an inbuilt tension between structure and agency; between the compounding centrifugal forces that seek to legitimate and institutionalise, and the internal persuasive discourse of every learner to their personal understanding of effective school and system leadership that best fit their context at a given time.
... Clapham argued that externally intervening states like superpowers were concerned "not only with the immediate consequences of intervention, but with maintaining a coalition of friendly client states, and this placed pressure on them to act in accordance with the conventions of [African] regional system" (Clapham, 1996: 109). (Abegunrin, 2009;Gebrewold, 2016;Kieh, 2008). Simultaneously, the insistence of the U.S. on its liberal norms and the predatory and exploitative SAPs and PRSPs led to further marginalization and underdevelopment of the weakening African states. ...
Since 2000, both emerging powers like China and India and established powers like the EU and the US were voraciously seeking close relations with Africa, and the African Union was playing a coordinating role in managing the ensuing relationships. However, the role of the AU as a collective African norm entrepreneur has not been recognized due to the theoretical limitations imposed by the mainstream theories of IR. This study used ‘Subsidiarity Norm Theory’ to find out collective African agency in the progressively evolving relations using data collected from treaties, policy statements, press releases, other relevant documents, and policy actions. This study found that the AU was emerging as the premier norm entrepreneur in international politics of Africa despite the difficult challenges posed by factors such as limited organizational capacity, the opportunistic actions of some of its members, and interventions by external powers that encroach on its coordinating role. Actions of the AU and consequent intersubjectively evolving relations with emerging powers like China also reveal that the AU was both responding to emerging powers' policy initiatives and constituting the terms of the engagements.
... Attempts at defining and understanding terrorism and insurgency have ended up raising more questions than they set out to solve. Many studies (e.g., Hentz and Solomon 2017;Gebrewold 2009, amongst others) have used them interchangeably and thus have complicated their meanings. de Montclos' (2014) scintillating title: "Boko Haram and Politics: From Insurgency to Terrorism", for instance, neither explains the concepts nor demonstrates in clear terms how the transition from insurgency to terrorism took place. ...
Since July 2009, when the popular founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf, was extrajudicially killed by the police, the group has become radicalised. Boko Haram started by terrorising the country, particularly the northeastern zone, which extends to Cameroon, Niger, and Lake Chad. Several works on the group, mostly by foreign commentators and scholars, have mainly attributed its rise to political and economic factors. Many of those works have not also recognised the metamorphosis from terrorism to insurgency, wherein the group is now replacing the secular status of Nigeria’s configuration with a monolithic Islamic caliphal rule in the swathes of land that it has captured. Even though the Nigerian government has adopted the factors canvassed by those scholars and also denies the group an ideological anchorage, I argue that Boko Haram’s ideological scaffolding is hinged on ultra-jihadi Salafism. Relying on qualitative sources, I employ a historical and interpretive framework in explicating the origin of Boko Haram and in content analysing President Muhammad Buhari’s 2015 inaugural speech, which denies the group of any ideological leaning on Islam. I then contend that such a denial has made counter-insurgency measures of the government counter-productive, as efforts at meeting political and economic factors are difficult to achieve in the present circumstance. I, therefore, recommend counter-insurgency measures, which include, amongst others, Western education, Islamic de-radicalisation processes, and counter-insurgency narratives, as well as ideas to cut off the recruitment of youth into the group and military engagement, as both short- and long-term strategies.
... Another major change was that increasing numbers of black African mercenaries came to be employed by these firms post 1997-1998 providing a greater degree of deniability as well reduced visibility. This situation would continue till 2006, when Russia would begin to emerge from its selfimposed isolation from Africa since the collapse of the USSR (Gebrewold-Tochalo, 2009). ...
... Maroodi Jeex is an administrative region and the most populous region in Somaliland, with Hargeisa its capital city. With a population of 1,242,003 [46], it is mainly inhabited by people from the Somali ethnic group of the Isaaq clan [47] and is a very strategic region, with rich farmlands and large ports [48]. The Awdal region is the most westerly province of Somaliland. ...
Background:
Female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) negatively impacts the wellbeing of girls and women throughout their lifecycle. In Somalia, FGM/C prevalence is nearly universal (98%) among females aged 15-49 years, with infibulation prevalence at 77%. Whilst there is need to engage healthcare workers in the prevention and management of FGM/C, minimal information exists indicating healthcare systems' capacity to fulfil this role. This study explored factors impacting the capacity of the Somaliland healthcare system to prevent the medicalization, and manage the complications of, FGM/C.
Methods:
A cross-sectional qualitative study using semi-structured key informant interviews, conducted in the Somali language, was undertaken in the Maroodi Jeex and Awdal regions of Somaliland, in rural and urban Borama and Hargeisa districts in December 2016. A total of 20 interviews were conducted with healthcare workers comprised of medical doctors, nurses, midwives and system administrators. Transcribed and translated interview data were analysed using the template analysis approach.
Results:
Healthcare workers reported understanding the adverse impact of FGM/C on the health of girls and women. However, they faced multiple contextual challenges in their preventative and management roles at the individual level, e.g., they lacked specific formal training on the prevention and management of FGM/C complications and its medicalization; institutional level, e.g., many facilities lacked funding and equipment for effective FGM/C management; and policy level, e.g., no national policies exist on the management of FGM/C complications and against its medicalization.
Conclusion:
Healthcare systems in urban and rural Somaliland have limited capacity to prevent, diagnose and manage FGM/C. There is a need to strengthen healthcare workers' skill deficits through training and address gaps in the health system by incorporating the care of girls and women with FGM-related complications into primary healthcare services through multi-sectoral collaboration and coordination, establishing clinical guidelines for FGM/C management, providing related equipment, and enacting policies to prevent the medicalization of the practice.
... Zondi's approach can be faulted on the grounds that he suggests that a decolonial peace will entail building national unity, regional cohesion and continental integration. 27 These objectives bare striking resemblance to Richmond's description of peace within the context of liberal peacebuilding as a 'peace that is stable and consensual, but within a cosmopolitan framework of governance which is both a representation of 24 Ibidem 25 Tony Leon, "The State of Liberal Democracy in Africa: Resurgence of Retreat" in Centre for Global Liberty and Prosperity Institute, no. 12, 2010, p. 8. 26 Zondi, 2017, op. cit. ...
There is a growing consensus in International Relations that the sovereign nation state, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is a ‘myth’ because of the several nations that can be found within one sovereign entity, made so by the Berlin conference of 1885 that partitioned Africa. Regardless of this consensus, international peacebuilding theory and practice is biased towards maintaining these sovereign arrangements. Through a decolonial lens, peacebuilding in Somalia is explored as an example of how these biases affect peace in a multiethnic, multiclan, and diverse society.
... Even children are not immune from the destructive acumen of trans-generational memories of victimhood and trauma remembered and represented bourgeoning violent symbolism in time and space. The dangerousness of this remembering is associated with 'the simultaneously collective forgetting […] (of) its historical recency,[…] (so does of) forgetting the violence which brought them into existence […]' (Gebrewold, 2009) that keeps hostage the present (Nowhere) and future (Arrivant) to the dark images of memory. To further elucidate this point in Issa-Afar history of violence, major collective and individual memories of victimization embedded in Issa-Afar historical episodes of direct violence are discussed in historical chronology. ...
Issa-Afar violence has often been viewed from instrumentalist and positivist perspective focusing on its use for a specific end and on its visible and agentive war violence per se. The dominate explanation has been resource oriented; specifically, conflict over scarce pastoralist resources and territory. However, this article contends that Issa-Afar violence has moved far away from substantive and originating issues that instrumentalist and positivist explanation and interventions informed by the same no longer explain the dynamics of violence. Because critical analysis of the anatomy of Issa-Afar violence reveals that the continuity of violence is owing to structural and cultural violence than substantive issues.
... Même si, à cause de la mondialisation justement, les sorties de territoire sont envisageables du fait de la souveraineté relative face à des réalités de parenté ethnique transfrontalière (Mamdani, 2002). De la même manière que l'irrédentisme, la sanctuarisation (Salehyan, 2007 ; et d'autres quêtes de ressources naturelles autorisent des guerres par procuration, des interventions et des externalisations (Clark, 2002 ;Gebrewold, 2009). Ces éléments, qui font dire à Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan et Kenneth Schultz (2008) que la guerre civile peut constituer une cause de guerre internationale (Graeme, 2002), ne permettent pas d'affirmer qu'une guerre civile qui a des épanchements extraterritoriaux est une guerre civile transfrontalière. ...
La litterature consacree a la guerre a souvent clive les types de guerres entre celles dites classiques et celles dites civiles. Cette derniere categorie se fonde sur son theâtre qui est le territoire d’un Etat et l’opposition entre un gouvernement et un groupe rebelle. Quoique consacree, cette dichotomie ne resiste plus a l’epreuve des types de menaces nouvelles qui voient le jour ; notamment en Afrique ou des groupes rebelles, encourages par les solidarites transfrontalieres claniques, ethniques, culturelles et autres, en font une ressource dans la guerre contre plusieurs gouvernements a la fois. L’insurrection de Boko Haram a la frontiere camerouno-nigeriane rend raison de cette logique. Cette reflexion vise a remettre en question la pertinence de la categorie guerre civile souvent fortement liee au territoire d’un Etat, et a inviter a une analyse des fortunes contemporaines de la guerre civile.
... (of) its historical recency, . . . (so does of) forgetting the violence which brought them into existence…' (Gebrewold, 2009) that keeps hostage the present (Nowhere) and future (Arrivant) to the dark images of memory. To further elucidate this point in Issa-Afar history of violence, major collective and individual memories of victimization embedded in Issa-Afar historical episodes of direct violence are discussed in historical chronology. ...
... Social Conflict as a result of competition, difference, contradictory communication (Luhmann, 1995) over material and immaterial resources will generate a new transformed community based on its responses to negative and positive impact of conflict. In Denpasar street setting with various actors and activity, conflict will move further than the competition over territorial gain, but it also recreates community identity as well as redefinition of the community opponents (Gebrewold-Tochalo, 2009), as indicated by transformation of resident acceptance from Hindus-Balinese people that moderately accepted another resident with different character. Community is transformed followed by the dynamic dimension of community conflict, which requires complex understanding and integration from many factors, especially in Indonesia that Indonesia consists of 656 tribes with six main religions (Sopandi, 2012). ...
Nowadays, the city is challenged by more complex problems in the economic, social, cultural and political sector. One of the problems reflected on scarcity of urban space in correlation with unbalanced population growth, uncontrolled urban street vendor, limited resources, and environmental degradation. The top-down governance approach often encounter difficulties in directing social movement in accordance with recent policies by rejection or inability to manage communities then the social conflict is potentially arisen. It is reflected in the increased tension of space contestation on street space following its economic value. A Street has been commodified or commercialized as a privatized rental space for parking, street vendor and other individual activities. Thus, who has the authority to exploit economical gain towards the street as public space? Is it private sector, community, or municipality? Who will manage the actors who control a certain segment of the street? Who will gain the lost and advantage and guarantee that its justice? It will definitely need an active actor who capable to apply good governance and justice in street space contestation, when the local municipality with its fix, passive and procedural administrative difficult to manage street activities. In this paper, the role of Bali’s indigenous community is evaluated in relation with its unique capability to control street space in their territory. With its local wisdom, active communication and cooperation to all urban actors, coordination and leadership can contribute a positive result in street activity management and minimizing horizontal conflict.
DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2013.v4n9p56
Africa is blessed with a young population that is energetic and within the cycle of productive engagement. Most African states have more than half of their population between 15 and 24 years and the youth bulge is projected to double in the next 20 years while in some countries, it will triple. Unfortunately, the young population in Africa is not adequately catered for by the policymakers. Africa is facing misrule and the squandering of endowed resources resulting in deprivation, impoverishment, and infrastructure deficits. The implications are joblessness, poverty, diseases, hunger, and other socio-economic malaises of backwardness. The African young population, in despair, resort to crimes and violence leading to armed conflicts. The proliferation of armed groups has eased the movement and transaction in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) further escalating violence across the continent. This chapter critically examines the youth bulge, proliferation of SALW, and the nexus with conflict in Africa. The chapter utilized documented sources for data collection while a qualitative content analysis was used for discussion. The chapter reports that Africa is facing the looming danger of a youth population explosion without commensurate economic and political development that will accommodate and engage them in productive ventures. The repercussions are tantamount to armed group violence orchestrated by the spread of SALW, which is perpetrating conflict and insecurity on the continent. The chapter suggests among other recommendations that African leaders must adopt honest, aggressive policies that will engage the youth in productive ventures which will prevent violence and crimes.
This is an open-access work published under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC BY-SA 4.0), which allows reusers to distribute, remix, adapt, and build upon the material in any medium or format, so long as attribution is given to the creator. The license allows for commercial use (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/) Abstract 2 A conflict can involve anything from a personal disagreement between two people to the emergence of a world war. When a conflict arises, a combination of the main components of geopolitics (geography, politics and power) plays a role in its formation. Thus, the roots of the conflict can be explained in the frame of the principles of geopolitics. Most of the conflicts in Africa occur in 0-15 degrees north. The current study is a work of "basic research". In terms of nature and method, it is "descriptive" and in terms of attitude, it falls in the category of "descriptive-analytic" research. Data gathering was done by a documentary method and through consulting library resources. The data analysis method was qualitative. The research set out to find an answer to the following question: "From a geopolitical point of view, which factors affect interstate and intrastate conflicts in circle 0 to 15th parallel north of Africa?" The current study has explained the roots of the conflicts from a geopolitical perspective through studying the conflicts in circle 0 to 15th parallel north of Africa. This study led to the presentation and introduction of 26 geopolitical root causes for conflicts.
In Agenda 2063 the African Union (AU) prioritised the utilisation of the resources in oceans as the new frontier of its blue economy. Africa’s ”inland waterways” were added to the scope of the blue economy in the 2050 AIM Strategy. Most of Africa’s marine ecosystems and large water spaces are shared by different countries which requires the transcendence of national interests, the harmonisation of national and regional policies and multi stakeholder participation in strong institutions guided by a legal framework. The protection, securitisation and sustainable utilisation of blue spaces are key pillars for the governance of the blue economy. The first part focuses on the contribution of Africa’s blue spaces to the development of the continent, the growing challenges to these spaces in the twenty-first century and UNCLOS’ legal zoning of oceans to manage their protection and utilisation. The second part focuses on the governance of Africa’s blue economy and the security challenges to Africa’s oceans. The last part focuses on the Benguela Current Large Marine Ecosystem (BCLME) and finds the Benguela Current Commission (BCC) to be legitimate, accountable and its policies adaptive and guided by human needs, ecosystem sustainability, and long-term economic growth.
The article analyzes the different trajectories of former combatants of the Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) in southern Senegal, focusing on the political prosecution of the armed struggle. If the independence demand is often present in their speech, it takes different forms and allows them to enter the local political life or become agents of the peace process. It is about trying to understand the motivations of actors and contextualize them in order to identify the mechanisms that lead to long-term dialogue and conflict resolution.
This article introduces PA-X, a peace agreement database designed to improve understanding of negotiated pathways out of conflict. PA-X enables scholars, mediators, conflict parties and civil society actors to systematically compare how peace and transition processes formalize negotiated commitments in an attempt to move towards peace. PA-X provides an archive and comprehensive census of peace agreements using a broad definition to capture agreements at all phases of peace processes in both intrastate and interstate conflict, from 1990 to 2016. These comprise ceasefire, pre-negotiation, substantive (partial and comprehensive), and implementation agreements, disaggregated by country/entity, region, conflict type, agreement type and stage of agreement totalling over 1,500 agreements in more than 140 peace and transition processes. PA-X provides the full text of agreements, and qualitative and quantitative coding of 225 categories relating to politics, law, security, development and implementation. Data can be aggregated or merged with conflict datasets, effectively providing many datasets within one database. PA-X supports new comparative research on peace agreements, but also on peace processes – enabling tracing of how actors and issues change over time – to inform understandings of conflict termination. We illustrate PA-X applications by showing that an intricate peace process history correlates with reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence, and that cumulative provisions addressing elections see the quality of subsequent post-conflict elections improve.
This chapter expresses that African religions south of the Sahara bring power and meaning to African social life, offering African strategies for adapting to a globalized world and creative approaches to the universal challenges of being human. It explores the concept of religion, taking the field of religious studies as vital to the anthropology of religion. The chapter focuses on six themes: theories and methods for studying religion; the religious character of state politics and military conflict; personhood, including the gendered, sexual, and health‐related implications of African religions; the patterns of exchange and political economy evident in ritual and magical practices, including funeral rites; Islam; Christianity; and other so‐called “world religions” in Africa, including Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Baha'i. The chapter also explores how people create and relate to them at funerals and how people use magic to pursue personal interests.
This research is conducted to understand how Rwanda is able to achieve their economic interest in Congo War,using national interest and resource wars as main concept . The result of research shows that Rwanda is able to achieve their economy interest because either Democratic Republic of Congo was unable to grasp political, security and also economy control. The emergences of mineral world market during Congo War also contribute to Rwanda‟s economy interest during Congo War. Although Rwanda‟s economic interest in DRC could be categorized as form of illegal economy, Rwanda able to convince international community and Rwanda‟s people because security threat that come from inside Zaire or DRC.
Keyword : Rwanda, Congo War, economy interest, resource wars, mineral exploitation
In divided societies that endure intrastate violence, ethnonational groups harness memory to support claims for territorial sovereignty and victimhood. Yet, in peace processes, rather than seek to deal with the legacy of the past, the state often enacts a culture 10 of amnesia to support the logic of political transition, while at the communal level the rival ethnic groups proliferate commemorative practices as part of memorywars. These twin forces-amnesia and ethnicized memory-are also often embedded into post-conflict urban reconstruction, particularly the city centres of the 15 municipal capitals. In this paper, I explore how non-sectarian movements imprint memory into city centre space to challenge the paradoxical forces of forgetting and ethnic communal remembrance. Towards this, I explore the memorywork of non-sectarian groups whose politics transcend established ethnic cleavages, 20 such as trade unionists, movements resisting the privatization of public space and activists mobilizing to protect public services. In this paper I draw on a range of theoretical frameworks, including reflective nostalgia and ghosts and hauntings. Using fieldwork data, I look at non-sectarian memorywork in Beirut and Belfast 25 city centres. These city centres generate contrasting uses and meanings for the local population.
Studies of ethno-nationalist conflict have repeatedly underlined the significance of policy interventions that seek to de-territorialise contested space after armed conflict and create more plural societies. Creating 'shared’ space in divided societies is often critically important and inextricably linked to peacebuilding. However much of this scholarship has tended to focus on the relative success or failure of such policies. This paper conversely explores the ‘unintended consequences’ (Merton, 1936) of legislating around fragile public space in Northern Ireland and considers its potential to undermine, rather than reinforce efforts to transition to peace. Drawing on a body of work around unintended consequences, territorial socialisation and peacebuilding, we argue that such legislation in ethno-nationalist societies emerging from conflict is a double-edged sword which can be utilised both explicitly and implicitly to reactivate tribal spatial politics and exacerbate divisions in deeply divided societies.
Afrika in seiner Gesamtheit zerfällt in fünf Teile. Mit leichtem Augenzwinkern leihe ich mir den Kapitelanfang von einem Klassiker imperialistischer Geschichtsschreibung. Das ist insofern angemessen, als die Unterscheidung dieser fünf Teile: Nord-, West-, Zentral-, Ost- und Süd-Afrika nicht nur geografische Fakten widerspiegelt, sondern auch die koloniale Geschichte des Kontinents. Zu den geografischen Fakten gehört die trennende Rolle, welche von der Wüste Sahara ausgeht – ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass sie über Karawanentransporte auch ein Jahrhunderte alter Verbindungsraum ist (Austen 2010).
In causing civilian atrocities on such a massive scale, has the Sudanese government adopted a policy of cultural annihilation, or has it decided to crush a rebellion to protect its dominance?
Introduction: The analysis of territory as a changing focus for political power has moved beyond the exclusive confines of the geographic discipline during the past decade. The study of territory and borders now constitutes a multidisciplinary research focus, drawing in political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and legal experts, as they seek to understand the role of territory in the contemporary globalized world (Coakley 1993; Diehl 1999b; Dijkink and Knippenberg 2001). The globalist position argues that we are moving into a deterritorialized and borderless world. At the same time, the existence of ethnoterritorial conflicts reminds us that many groups continue to lay claim to specific pieces of territory in what could be described as a primordial, pre-modern, fashion. This raises questions concerning the functions and role of territory as part of the changing world political map. This chapter seeks to examine this resilience of territory as a factor of major political and functional significance, focusing on such contemporary cases as Israel–Palestine and the Balkans. The territorial discourse within political geography has experienced a renaissance during the past two decades (Agnew 2000; Paasi 2002). An important framework for understanding the role of territory as a key factor in the political organization of space, and as a basis for the re-emergence of political geography as a bona fide discipline after three decades of shunning due to its “guilt by association” with the German school of Geopolitik (Newman 2002a), was provided by Edward Soja in what proved to be a seminal paper published by the Association of American Geographers in 1971 (Soja 1971).
This article examines processes of identity formation in Darfur, now part of the Republic of Sudan, over the last four centuries. The basic story is of four overlapping processes of identity formation, each of them primarily associated with a different period in the region's history: namely, the `Sudanic identities'associated with the Dar Fur sultanate, Islamic identities, the administrative tribalism associated with the twentieth-century Sudanese state, and the recent polarization of `Arab'and `African'identities, associated with new forms of external intrusion and internal violence. It is a story that emphasizes the much-neglected east-west axis of Sudanese identity, arguably as important as the north-south axis, and redeems the neglect of Darfur as a separate and important locus for state formation in northern Sudan, paralleling and competing with the Nile Valley states. It focuses on the incapacity of both the modern Sudanese state and international actors to comprehend the singularities of Darfur, accusing much Sudanese historiography of `Nilocentrism', namely, the use of analytical terms derived from the experience of the Nile Valley to apply to Darfur.
This article demonstrates how concepts and notions such as ‘warlordism’ and ‘terrorism’, supposedly framed to enable an understanding of complex crises, can have exactly the opposite effect. It exposes their conceptual ambiguity, a factor contributing to their success, and comments on their practical application in the Somali context. The article seeks to analyse how these two ‘categories’ have contributed to building a specific ‘regime of truth’—vocabulary, assumptions of meaning, labels and narratives that function to select and interpret events, emphasizing some and disregarding many others. The article presents the argument that the recurrent mobilization of these particular expressions has resulted not in deepening analysis, but rather in sifting information and providing moral condemnation and political prescription that are highly debatable.
This article explores how New Labour has attempted to implement its ideas about a ‘third way’ foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa. Through an examination of British foreign policy practices, we explore whether New Labour has succeeded in finding a ‘third way’ between traditional views of socialism and capitalism in Africa. In particular, the article focuses on New Labour's attempts to build peace, prosperity and democracy on the African continent. We conclude that although New Labour's claims to add an ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy have succeeded in giving Britain a higher profile in the international arena, the implementation of such a policy is intrinsically difficult. These difficulties in turn arise from the antinomies embodied in New Labour's policy, or more specifically from the tension between the liberal internationalism of the third way and traditional concerns for the national interest, as well as the contradictions inherent in a commitment to both political and economic liberalism.
In the first half of the twentieth century the study of territory and its role in international politics was very much in fashion among political scientists. Since then, however, the study of territory has lost much of its appeal among political scientists and has largely (but not completely) been left to political geographers. In the last decade or so, however, territory and territoriality have received renewed attention among political scientists. It should not be surprising that scholars in international relations have been at the forefront of this renewed attention to territory and territoriality. The importance of territory has long been recognized in the origins and escalation of disputes between states. Nonetheless, only recently have scholars who put territory front and center in their study of international conflict revealed that disputes over territory are more likely to escalate to war than any other type of dispute (Huth 1996; Diehl 1999b). The importance of territoriality – exclusion by area (Sack 1986) – is less well understood among political scientists, but it seems that some scholars have begun to recognize that territoriality is a, if not the, fundamental ordering principle of the modern state system (see Spruyt 1994; Wagner 2004). The third main concept discussed in this volume, “globalization,” has received much attention in recent years precisely because it seems to challenge this fundamental ordering principle of the modern state system. Globalization proposes that exclusion by area loses its importance in “a world of flows.”
One of the surprises in our increasingly globalized world is that the attachments to territory of individuals, ethnic groups, and governments have not appeared to weaken significantly. Governments have remained vigilant about the exact demarcation of their territorial boundaries even as goods and people move ever more seamlessly across these borders. Governments have also continued to fight for territory even as their wealth and security have become increasingly disconnected from it. Indonesia, for example, spent millions of dollars fighting to retain East Timor even though this was more than they could ever hope to recoup from any offshore oil reserves. And emigrants from places like Eritrea and Ireland continue to maintain close political and economic ties with their homelands even though many of them know they will never return. Territorial boundaries may have become more permeable, and the material and strategic value of land may have become less significant, but people's attachment to particular pieces of territory does not seem to have declined. This paradox has been the focus of this volume. In the book, we have attempted to explain how territorial attachments are constructed, why they have remained so powerful in the face of an increasingly globalized world, and what effect continuing strong attachments may have on conflict. Each of the chapters has examined a different element of the inter-relationship between territoriality, globalization, and conflict, yet one common conclusion stands out.
In recent years there has been a renewal of interest in the liberal tradition in international thought, with particular attention being paid to liberal conceptions of international distributive justice. This article describes and criticizes three different approaches to international distributive justice represented in the recent literature: (1) social liberalism, which takes the nation-state as basic and argues for international transfers to the extent necessary to sustain just domestic institutions; (2) laisser-faire liberalism, which, in its redistributivist variant, aims to rectify injustices arising from the unequal appropriation of natural resources; and (3) cosmopolitan liberalism, which takes each individual's interests as equally deserving of concern in the design of global (and sectional) institutions.
The world of the early twenty-first century displays both persistent attachments to territory and violent conflict over those territorial stakes. Even as interstate conflict has declined, many costly internal conflicts have taken on a territorial dimension. The persistence of territoriality and the conflict that it inspires run counter to one popular view of the consequences of growing globalization: capital, goods, and populations display increased mobility, and their detachment from territory should reduce the importance of conventional territorial boundaries. Globalization has produced changes in territoriality and the functions of borders, but it has eliminated neither. We do not live in a “borderless world” or one that has seen the “end of geography” (Ohmae 1990; O'Brien 1992). Conflict over territory continues in an increasingly integrated world.
Spanning the social sciences, the authors in this volume present converging investigations into the complex causal relations among territoriality, conflict, and globalization. The study of globalization and the persistence of ethnic conflict have stimulated an interest in borders of all kinds, questioning their permanence and defining the consequences when social and cultural identities do not coincide with political boundaries and territorial claims. The contributors display skepticism toward both an unreconstructed view of the sovereign territorial state and the competing claim that globalization has completely transformed the existing territorial regime. The modern territorial state is seen as one historically bounded exemplar of territoriality, rather than the defining expression of territorial rule.
Defining postmodernism In the last quarter of the twentieth century the concept of postmodernism, and the associated notion of postmodernity, became a principal focus of discussion in philosophy, cultural analysis, and social and political theory. The notion of ‘postmodernism’ had originally emerged in an aesthetic context, at least as long ago as the 1930s, but the term was only used sporadically until the boom in its scope and currency from the mid-1970s onwards.1 This popularisation began in the domain of architecture, where the adjective ‘postmodern’ was employed to characterise the rebellion against the technocratic functionalism of the ‘international style’ which was then under way (Jencks 1991 [1978]). But from here its use spread rapidly, first to describe new developments in literature, painting and other artistic media, and then to characterise a whole range of social and cultural developments which were assumed to represent a break with the defining practices and styles of thought of the modern era. Indeed, for some of its more enthusiastic proponents, the emergence of postmodernism signalled nothing less than the transition to a new historical epoch, beyond modernity. This epochal significance of the postmodern was given an influential pioneering formulation by the French philosopher Jean-Franc¸ois Lyotard in his book, La condition postmoderne (The Postmodern Condition), first published in 1979. Part of the success of this work, which presented a series of provocative and fertile ideas rather than a carefully constructed argument, was due to the compactness with which Lyotard defined his key term. For Lyotard, the postmodern condition was characterised by the delegitimation of ‘grand narratives’, or ‘incredulity toward meta-narratives’ (Lyotard 1984, pp. 37-41, xxiv). On his account, the grand schemata of historical progress and social development stemming from the Enlightenment, whether liberal or Marxist in inspiration, had finally lost all credibility.
Predictions that globalization would undermine territorial attachments and weaken the sources of territorial conflict have not been realized in recent decades. Globalization may have produced changes in territoriality and the functions of borders, but it has not eliminated them. The contributors to this volume examine this relationship, arguing that much of the change can be attributed to sources other than economic globalization. Bringing the perspectives of law, political science, anthropology, and geography to bear on the complex causal relations among territoriality, conflict, and globalization, leading contributors examine how territorial attachments are constructed, why they have remained so powerful in the face of an increasingly globalized world, and what effect continuing strong attachments may have on conflict. They argue that territorial attachments and people’s willingness to fight for territory appear to have much less to do with the material value of land than they have to do with the important symbolic role it plays in constituting people’s identities, and producing a sense of security and belonging in an increasingly globalized world.
During the war on terrorism, George W. Bush has shown a split personality on the promotion of democracy abroad. Bush the realist seeks warm ties with dictators who may help in the fight against al Qaeda, while Bush the neo-Reaganite proclaims that democracy is the only true solution to terror. How the administration resolves this tension will define the future of U.S. foreign policy.
The Bush administration has focused on destroying al Qaeda in East Africa, but it has been slow to address less-visible terrorist threats elsewhere on the continent, such as Islamist extremism in Nigeria and criminal syndicates in West Africa's failed states. This indifference could be costly--for Africans and Americans both.
The war on terrorism is not just about security or military tactics. It is a battle of values, and one that can only be won by the triumph of tolerance and liberty. Afghanistan and Iraq have been the necessary starting points of this battle. Success there, however, must be coupled with a bolder, more consistent, and more thorough application of global values, with Washington leading the way.
"POSTCONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION'' has become the foreign policy issue du jour in Washington. Multiple think-tank studies, a new State Department office, and no fewer than ten proposed congressional bills all tackle the subject. This flurry of activity to rectify a long-ignored deficiency is a welcome development: recent U.S.-led endeavors in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated that the planning, financing, coordination, and execution of U.S. programs for rebuilding war-torn states are woefully inadequate.
The article discusses two main approaches to explaining violence in contemporary global society. Theories based on the culture of societies, among which the theory of the clash of civilizations is the most influential, attempt to explain violence by referring to antagonisms between collective identities. Theories of the political economy of power and inequality seek the sole cause of violence in economic factors. While each approach has some plausibility, both are inadequate on their own. When applied as sufficient explanations, they may distort our understanding in a way that undermines the possibility for both alleviating poverty and reducing conflict. The causal mechanisms are more complex than economic reductionism is capable of accounting for. Poverty and inequality are importantly linked to violence, but must be seen together with divisions between factors such as nationality, culture and religion. In turn, these factors must not be based on a false image of solitary identities and unavoidable antagonisms between cultural groups. The article suggests that the coupling between cultural identities and poverty increases the significance of inequality and may contribute to violence. Approaches to explaining violence should avoid isolationist programmes that explain violence solely in terms of social inequality and depriv- ation or in terms of identity and cultural factors.
SAIS Review 22.1 (2002) 103-118
The current war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has brought unspeakable devastation upon its people. With approximately 73,000 people dying monthly , the death toll is rapidly approaching four million in three years of war. The conflict has created a population so ravaged that women in some villages "have simply stopped taking their children to the health centers because they no longer posses simple items of clothing to preserve their dignity." Congolese in the eastern region of the country are faced with a lack of available hospitals and health clinics, most have been destroyed during the war, leaving at least 18.5 million people without access to health care. Preventable disease and starvation have caused the majority of deaths, overwhelmingly suffered by civilians. Women and children account for approximately 40% of war casualties. In Mobia and Kalemie in Katanga, 75 percent of children born during the war have died or will die before their second birthday.
The international community has distanced itself from the war in the DRC. Despite the mounting death toll, the country receives only a trickle of aid and even less media attention. Internationally, it is recognized that the war has produced a catastrophic humanitarian crisis, yet rebel movements have been able to successfully sustain their war efforts by plundering and looting the economic wealth of the country's mineral-rich eastern region. The Uganda People's Defense Forces (UPDF) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), as well as the Congolese rebels they each support-- the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) and Congolese Liberation Front (CLF)--have ruthlessly exploited the mineral wealth from territories under their respective control. The occupying armies and their rebel clients have extended their jurisdiction miles west of the Ugandan and Rwandan borders, over Oriental Province, North Kivu, South Kivu, Kasi, and Katanga (Shaba).
This essay attempts to explain the connection between economic exploitation and conflict in Africa beyond a simplistic post-Cold War analysis of conflict based upon tribalism, primitiveness, and chaos. International competition for scarce resources in general, and for coltan in particular, is a key factor in the lack of state stability and the continuation of war in the DRC. Coltan is but one of many resources illegally mined and sold onto western markets to profit invading armies and rebel forces. Trade in diamonds, timber, copper, gold, and cobalt also helped finance invading armies and rebel movements. Coltan happened to be the most lucrative raw material, and, more than any other mineral resource, it attracted the invading forces and lured them into establishing full-fledged commercial operations. Although ethnic tensions existed prior to the war, the heightened ethnic conflict and the dismantling of civil society currently underway are a by-product of international trade in this region. This essay critiques international economic investment in illegitimate rebel movements. In this case, investment, far from encouraging strong state structures, has helped to create weak states based upon kleptocracy and corruption. The contribution of international investment to the destabilization of the DRC is significant and must be addressed if sustainable peace is ever to take root in this devastated region.
A Recent UN Security Council study entitled The Report of the Panel of Experts on theIllegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo exposed the "systematic and systemic" exploitation of the natural resources of the DRC by foreign armies. These natural resources were sold onto international markets. The sale of a mineral combination called coltan has been particularly significant.
Columbium (also known as niobium) and tantalum together compose what is commonly known as coltan, an essential but rare mineral. Coltan in its raw form simply looks like black mud or sand. Columbium and tantalum almost always occur together, but columbium is found in greater abundance than tantalum. Although the oxides of columbium and tantalum are chemically similar, tantalum is twice as heavy as columbium and is much more conducive to high-tech needs of the electronics industry. Once processed into capacitors, it conducts the electric charge in high-tech equipment ranging from cellular phones and...
This Paper has a fairly clear overall argument: that the relationship between State and Society in large-scale societies changed dramatically with the advent of industrial capitalism. Prior to that development, the State and the state bureaucracy played a substantially autonomous role vis-à-vis the class structure of civil society. After that its autonomy has been negligible: indeed, for most analytic purposes the State can be reduced to class structure. Such an argument is by no means original. For example, its outlines were commonplace among eighteenth and nineteenth-century theorists. In this paper I draw somewhat on Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer. For one particular argument I am indebted to the contemporary sinologist Owen Lattimore. The idea of such a dramatic shift in the history of society is nowadays extremely unfashionable, however. Today theorists usually present essentially the same view of state-society relations throughout human history. Most Marxists reduce the state to being contingent upon the ‘determining’ categories of ‘mode of production’ and ‘class struggle’. Functionalists present a theory of structural differentiation which occurs so early in human evolution that in all recorded history the relationship between, and relative autonomy of, economy and polity are essentially unchanging. Weberians, in arguing for the autonomy of each element of ‘the structure of social action’, also give a picture of the mutual independence of state and economy throughout history. In all three cases, the caution and specificity of the theory of the ‘founding fathers’—Marx, Spencer and Weber—is thrown to the wind.
This analysis illustrates the perennial tension between continuity and change in Franco-African relations. While officially proclaiming support for democratisation and human rights, France continues in reality to back the regimes and leaders of what are the core countries in terms of her economic and politico-strategic interests in Africa. On the other hand, two recent events of great symbolic significance point towards profound change - and even possibly a new era - in Franco-African relations. The first was the death (in December 1993) of President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire. His close personal ties with several generations of French leaders were reflected in the level and size of the French delegation to the funeral. The second event was the 50% devaluation of the CFA franc on 12 January 1994 that signalled the demise of the Franco-African preferential monetary and trading area known as la zone franc. The devaluation of the CFA franc is likely to result in France's gradual (but substantial) loss of political, diplomatic, and economic power and influence in the francophone African states. -from Author
Nation-building by foreign powers can rarely be accomplished and tends to be very costly, not merely in economic resources and those of political capital, but also in human lives. Foreign powers often attempt to tackle numerous tasks with little discernible effect. Therefore, whatever resources foreign powers are willing and able to commit should be focused on a modest agenda—what is termed in this article a ‘restrained approach‘. A restrained approach focuses first and foremost on pacification and security, it deals with whoever is in power initially and it requires local people to overcome some challenges by themselves. Greatly curtailing foreign ambitions and promises will lead to much greater credibility of drives for democratization; will provide stronger domestic support for such efforts among the taxpayers and donors who have to foot the bills; and will pay off by focusing more resources on the few facets of society that are relatively easy to change.
Recent moves towards greater political liberalization in Africa, with the widespread introduction of multi-party elections in many states since 1989, do not necessarily constitute evidence of successful democratization. In particular, the focus on elections to the exclusion of other essential features of a properly functioning democracy has vitiated much recent analysis of the ‘democratic transition’ in Africa. By examining in turn the roots, meaning and limits of democratization in Africa, the author shows that a focus on accountability rather than on democracy per se would be more appropriate.
Much attention has been given in recent years to the paradoxical fact that huge flows of money from petroleum appear not to have brought prosperity to the African countries that produce it, but may instead have helped cause poverty, economic decline and conflict. Issues such as human rights abuses near oil installations and environmental damage have often captured the headlines, but these, while important, are peripheral to the main problems: the Dutch Disease, whereby an influx of oil money causes real exchange rates to appreciate, making local industry and agriculture uncompetitive; the damage that petroleum money causes to institutions, incentives and overall governance; and the volatility of oil prices and revenues. This article will look at the volatility problem, and how oil contracts tend to make matters even worse. They are like this for long-established technical, political and historical reasons, and there is consequently a widespread belief in the industry that change is not possible. This defeatist attitude needs to be vigorously challenged.
Light weapons proliferation is a serious problem in West Africa. A regional moratorium on imports of small arms and light weapons has not worked and UN arms embargoes on Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire have had limited impact. The Economic Community of West African States is currently drafting a new binding legal instrument aimed at controlling flows in West Africa but this will only succeed if the heads of state and government seriously adopt it. This needs to include greater compliance of UN sanctions, international reform of the End User Certificate system, mapping the spread of artisan production and an examination of ammunition imports to West Africa. Better control of ammunition imports in particular may assist the combat of light weapons proliferation as well as the comprehensive destruction of weapons from disarmament efforts. The illicit weapons trade in West Africa is increasingly transnational and it requires regional and international cooperation and support to combat it.
France’s Africa policy has undergone significant change in recent years, particularly in its military aspects. In practical terms troop numbers have fallen; bases have closed; and financial and military resources have been reallocated or redirected. Politically, the will for forceful, unilateral French action in Africa seems largely to have dissipated. However, this does not mean that France seeks to disengage from the African continent. Rather, multilateral initiatives for maintaining influence are sought, including the possibility of diplomatic and potentially military action alongside the United Kingdom. However, it remains to be seen whether these policy reorientations will suffice to fulfil Prime Minister Lionel Jospin’s dictum: ‘not to do less but to do better’.
This article reviews western donor support for building African peace and security architecture, specifically in relation to G8 efforts to engage in the capacity-building process in line with commitments made in the Joint Africa/G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Operations (the Joint Plan)—agreed between G8 and key African leaders at the G8 Summit in Evian in 2003. It describes a project by the New Security Issues Programme at Chatham House, carried out jointly with the Peace and Security Programme at the United Nations Association-UK and the Institute for Security Studies in Pretoria, to provide strategic input into implementing the Joint Plan. The article outlines the background to western involvement in peace and security capacity-building in Africa, the nature and current status of the African peace and security architecture and some key challenges to the G8/Africa capacitybuilding process—particularly African institutional human resource capacity and coordination among the various players involved. Finally, it maps out potential priorities for future progress in taking the capacity-building process forward.
Chancellor Gordon Brown has declared that 2005 will be a milestone in the United Kingdom's campaign to meet the UN Millennium Goals. Owing to Britain's chairmanship of both the G8 and the European Union in 2005, Brown believes that an opportunity to raise the continent's star in global politics presents itself. This comes after the launch in 2004 of the Blair Commission for Africa and a recent spate of high profile interventions by assorted politicians and famous musicians. It also follows a trend begun at the G8 meetings where Africa is placed on the G8 agenda. Such an interest in the continent is to be welcomed. Yet this article contends that Gordon Brown's assumptions regarding Africa's troubles, and the ingredients found within his proposals, are mistaken and need rethinking. The article argues that Brown's approach to Africa's problems is based on incomplete information or a misreading of the situation, and by default may serve to prolong Africa's crises rather than alleviate them.
One frequently hears statements about the damage done to the 'international community' by disagreements about the invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is clear from the general nature and frequency of its use that the term 'inter-national community' has an important political function in generating legiti-macy for those who act in its name. It is also clear from its popular usage that 'international community' means very different, and often quite opposed, things to different people. Why is the strong term 'community' chosen when 'inter-national society' might be more useful? Longstanding debates within political theory and the English school provide helpful insights into why people use this term in the ways that they do. This article will argue that international community implies a deep and robust sharing of identity, and that in relation to the Iraq war, the most important meaning of it equates broadly with the West. The authors look at the effect of the war on the western international com-munity through its impact on NATO, the EU, the UN, the WTO and public opinion. They further argue that the evidence from these sources does not yet suggest that the western international community has been fatally damaged.
British government policy in Africa under Labour has been motivated by a combination of humanitarianism and self-interest. The policy has been shaped principally by the Department for International Development (DFID), but also by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and by Prime Minister Tony Blair himself, as he has become more interested in Africa issues. The main focus of the policy has been on poverty reduction and development. The approach has been multi-dimensional, aiming to tackle the principal obstacles to development such as conflict, HIV, debt, governance and trade barriers. The UK has sought to increase its leverage in Africa by working multilaterally with its allies and through the UN, the World Bank and the EU. But the policy has been hampered by the inherent difficulty of promoting sound development policies in weak states, by a lack of UK leverage to affect change, and by a UK preference for statist solutions. Strategic and commercial objectives pursued by the FCO and the prime minister have sometimes appeared as being at odds with the developmental objectives of DFID. Post-9/11 concerns have reinforced the UK's motivation for dealing with Africa's problems, particularly the problems of weak and failed states. But western policies related to the war on terror may give rise to new contradictions and complicate the UK's developmental efforts in Africa.
The war on terror and the war in Iraq pose three challenges for foreign aid. The first concern is that donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than development and the alleviation of poverty. The second concern is that the costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wider war on terror will gobble up aid budgets. The third concern is that major donors are continuing to impose competing and sometimes clashing priorities on aid recipients and this erodes rather than builds the capacity of some of the world's neediest governments. This article assesses the emerging aid policies of the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom and the European Union and proposes practical measures that could bolster an effective development-led foreign aid system.
In May 2005, the government of Zimbabwe launched Operation Murambatsvina (OM), a state-sponsored campaign to stifle independent economic and political activity in the country’s urban areas. This article employs a national probability sample survey to analyse the popular reactions of ordinary Zimbabweans to this landmark event. It shows that the application of state repression succeeds at some goals, fails at others, and has powerful unintended effects. We report that the scope of OM was wide and that the main victims of OM were younger, unemployed families whom state security agents saw as potential recruits for social unrest. Whereas OM undoubtedly disrupted the informal economy, we show that it did not succeed in banishing urban dwellers to rural areas or permanently shutting down illicit trade. Moreover, the crackdown thoroughly discredited the police and other state institutions. We also demonstrate that state repression emboldened its victims, deepening polarisation between political parties and fortifying the ranks of Zimbabwe’s opposition movement.