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Gabriel Ferreira da Silva
“The Philosophical Thesis of the Identity
of Thinking and Being is Just the Opposite
of What it seems to be.”Kierkegaardon
the Relations between Being and Thought
Abstract: Kierkegaard is often regarded as an opponent of metaphysics per se.
However,henot onlyimplicitlyespouses metaphysical positions, but also his
understanding of existence rests upon an explicit metaphysical differentiation
between being qua actuality and being qua thought,which results in adifference
between actuality (Virkelighed)and reality (Realitet). Ibegin by analyzingan
apparent contradiction between two of Kierkegaard’sstatements on the relations
between being and thought, which leadsmeboth to inquire into that distinction
and to retrace the roots of Kierkegaard’saccount.Finally, Ipresent Kierkegaard’s
final positions and point out some of their existential consequences.
There is no doubt that relations between being and thoughtunderlie the whole
domainofmetaphysics.Explicitlyorimplicitly,positively or negatively,one can-
not intend to saysomething about the realm of “thingsthat are”without binding
oneself to some position concerning the relation of our cognitivefaculties and
the object one would want to know or,inother words, without assuminga
position regarding the interactions—or lack of them—between being and
thought. However,ifwhat wassaid is evident,itisnot clear that this sphere
of problems is in the scope of Kierkegaard‘sissues or themes; after all, approach-
ing this universe of philosophicalproblems would seem like aflirt with the sub
specie æterni wayofthinking that, in turn, is in the sights of Kierkegaard’scri-
tique.¹
Despitethe fact that ontologyisnot one of the major themes in Kierkegaardsecondary
literature, there aresome remarkable works dedicated to it; see John W. Elrod, Being and
Existence in Kierkegaard’sPseudonymous Works,Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press 1975;
HeikoSchulz, “Philosophie als Existenzwissenschaft.Empirismuskritik und Wissen-
schaftsklassifikation bei SörenKierkegaard,”in his Aneignung und Reflexion, vol. II:Studien zur
Philosophie und Theologie Sören Kierkegaards,Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter2014, pp. 39–61;Klaus
Schäfer, HermeneutischeOntologie in den Climacus-Schriften Sören Kierkegaards,Munich: Kösel
Gabriel Ferreira da Silva,Unisinos University, Av.Unisinos, 950,Bairro CristoRei –São
Leopoldo/RS, CEP: 93022-000, Brazil, gabriel@gabrielferreira.com.br
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Nevertheless,sometimesone does not payattention to the fact that,nomat-
ter what emphasis or focus we could put on Kierkegaard’sexistential turn, every
account of existenceinitself must consider at least two dimensions: (a) what
type (or mode) of being is existenceand (b)how can we know it,i.e., its onto-
logical and epistemologicalfaces.Now,Kierkegaard not onlydoes not ignore
these two dimensions, but his most original contributions to existential issues
are dependentupon his answers to these two essentiallyinterconnected ques-
tions. Therefore, we cannot lose track of them if we are to grasp adeeper mean-
ing of some developments of Kierkegaard’sthought.
One 1842–43 entry from the papers plainlyexposes one of his views on the
relationship between thinking and being:
On the Concepts Esse and Inter-Esse
AMethodological Attempt
The different sciences oughttobeorderedaccording to the different ways in which they
accent beingand how the relationship to beingprovides reciprocal advantage.
Ontology }The certainty of these is absolute—here thought and being are one
Mathematics but by the same tokenthese sciences arehypothetical.
Existential-science/knowledge[Existentiel-Videnskab]²
Among several importantpoints of this entry,Iwould liketostress especially
three that are moresignificant for my purposes here. First,what Kierkegaard
is doing here is, surprisingly,presentingamethodological principle or postulate
for orderingknowledge or sciences(Videnskaber).³Thispostulate is based pre-
ciselyonthe relation between knowledge or sciences and being;that is, the cri-
teria used for the analysis of thosetwo examples giveninthe fragment.When
taking mathematics and ontology as instancesofsciences,the offered parameter
for groupingthem is the similar accent or focus (accentuere)—asomehow vague
term, it is true⁴—on being in its relation to thought. The second feature to under-
1968;Poul Lübcke, “Det ontologiske program hos Poul Møller og SørenKierkegaard,”Filosofiske
Studier,vol. 6, 1983, pp. 127–147; Dario González, Essai Sur L’ontologie Kierkegaardienne: Idéalité
et Détermination,Paris:Éd. L’Harmattan 1998.
SKS 27,271,Papir 281/JP 1, 80.
Noticethat “Videnskab”means “science”and “knowledge,”but also “scholarship”in the
sense of alearned and erudite, and sometimesacademic,knowledge.Kierkegaardplays with
this duplicity in the title of the Postscript: the book is said to be “uvidenskabelig,”unscientific,
but also nonacademic.
The word accentuere is not rare in Kierkegaard’swritings.Usuallyitmeans “emphasis,”
“stress,”“strength,”“intensity”(see, for instance, SKS 7, 483/CUP1,531; SKS 7, 518/CUP1,
570). In the kind of examples giveninthe entry quoted above, the emphasis can be understood
both as focus or intensity and strength, sincethey are—at least for Kierkegaard—sciences which
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line is the very existenceofdiverse ways of approaching thatrelation. In the very
beginning of the entry,Kierkegaardstates thatthere are different ways to order
sciences,and once this orderingisdone from the different ways of accentuating
being,wecan conclude, likewise, that thereare various ways of doing it.Math-
ematics and ontology instantiate one of these possibleways, namely,the relation
of identity between being and thought,inwhich they are one and the same. As a
consequenceor, in Kierkegaard’swords, as reciprocal advantage (reciprok For-
deel), they are hypotheticalsciences.
If we take abreak here for amoment and comparewhat is said in papers to a
statement from Postscript that we use in this article’stitle, i.e., that “the philo-
sophical thesis of the identity of thinking and being is just the opposite of
what it seems to be,”⁵then it seems Kierkegaard either makes amistake or con-
tradicts himself. After all, mathematics and ontology are sciences,inwhich the
relationship between being and thoughtispreciselyarelation of identity.Thus, if
we intend to denythat Kierkegaardiscommitting amistake or making acontra-
diction, we must follow the consequenceshown aboveregardingthe existenceof
different ways of relating, and assume that at least one of those terms—either
being or thought—is not univocal or does not have the same meaninginboth
quotations. Andthis takes us to the next point.
The third aspect of the entry is that, outside the bracket that groups “ontol-
ogy”and “mathematics,”Kierkegaardadds athird knowledge or science under
those two and in the samecolumn without anyfurther explanations. It is only
announced as “Existential-Science”(Existentiel-Videnskab). Like the rest of the
fragment,there are manypossibilities to explore here. However,Iwould like
to follow just one of them. If we consider what Kierkegaard stated in the begin-
ning about the different possibleapproaches to the interactions between being
and thought, and that “Existential-Science”is not included in the bracket that
gathers the other two sciences, then it seems legitimate to infer that (1) “Existen-
tial-Science”givesadifferent accent to the relationship between being and
thoughtcompared to the one givenbythoseother two sciences, which means
(2)inthat “Existential-Science”this relationship is not of identity.Thus, the quo-
tation from the Postscript that states the error about the philosophical thesis of
identity refers to aspecific understandingofthat relation, which presupposes, as
we said, an equivocal meaningof “being,”“thought”or both terms of the equa-
deal onlywith intra-mental entities.Itisadifferent framework, when we aredealingwith actual
entities,for which Kierkegaardperemptorilyrejects anygraduationofbeing, as we will see fur-
ther,and accentuationmust be seen exclusively as focus.
SKS 7, 302/CUP1,331.
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tion, and consequentlypresents other “reciprocal advantages.”Thisunderstand-
ing happens in the ambit of that specific “existential”science.
The road to the dissolution of the apparent contradiction between those two
statements is in the Postscript,morespecificallyinaconceptual distinction that
appears at first glancetobedifficult to express.This distinction is nevertheless
absolutelyfundamental for manytheoretical positions assumedbyKierkegaard
in his works,namely,the differentiation between being qua thought and being
qua actual or,inother words, between Realitet and Virkelighed. It would not
be an overstatement to saythat this distinction is acornerstone that sets the con-
ditionsofpossibility for the particularlyKierkegaardianapproach to the concept
of existence. Thus, notwithstanding that differentiation finds its most sophisti-
cated and definitive form in the work publishedinFebruary 1846,thatdistinc-
tion appears in several places throughout Kierkegaard’scorpus.
I. “What is lacking hereisadistinction”:
faktiskVæren and ideel Væren
In an extensive footnote in Philosophical Fragments,within the context of the dis-
cussion on the existenceofGod, Kierkegaard states:
Forexample, Spinoza, who, by immersinghimself in the concept of God, aims to bring
beingout of it by means of thought, but,please note, not as an accidental quality but
as aqualification of essence….But to go on, what is lacking hereisadistinction between
factual beingand ideal being[faktiskVæren og ideel Væren]. The intrinsicallyunclear
use of language—speakingofmoreorless being, consequentlyofdegrees of being
[Grads-Forskjel iVæren]—becomes even moreconfusingwhen that distinction is not
made….With regardtofactual being, to speak of moreorless beingismeaningless. Afly,
when it is, has just as much beingasthe god; with regardtofactual being, the stupid com-
ment Iwriteherehas just as much beingasSpinoza’sprofundity,for the Hamlet dialectic,
to be or not to be applies to factual being. Factual beingisindifferent to the differentiation
of all essence-determinants,and everythingthat exists participates without petty jealousy
in beingand participates just as much. It is quitetrue that ideallythe situation is different.
Butassoon as Ispeak ideally about being,Iam speakingnolonger about being but about
essence.⁶
SKS 4, 246n/PF,41–42n. Kierkegaard’srejection of gradation in factual beingaligns him
against anysort of analogical solution concerning it.This is avery important aspect considering
the broader rangeofthe question, sincethis dismissal is based upon the negation of athesis
which asserts that existence qua actuality (Virkelighed)could be an attributeorfeatureofessen-
ces(i.e., Realitas). Notice that,nonetheless Helène Bouchilloux (Kierkegaardetlafiction du
christianisme dans les Miettes Philosophiques,Paris: Hermann 2014)isinthe right about the
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The previouslymentioned distinction is expressed here as adifference between
“factual being”and “ideal being.”The stress on the differentiation is in order to
affirm twomain points: (a) the irreducibility of being qua factual to being qua
ideal and (b)the rejection of anysort of gradation regarding the being qua fac-
tual.⁷These two aspectscannot be neglected, as we willsee later.
In another entry,now from 1849 –50—so, several years after the publication
of Postscript—Kierkegaardcomes back to the subject,now using adifferent ter-
minology, statingthe very same contrast:
closeness,and even some dependence, of the “Interlude”to Leibniz’sideas,Kierkegaardradi-
callydiffers fromLeibniz preciselybecause the latter admits that existenceisapredicatewhich
accepts some kind of degree: “It is clear,also, that existenceisaperfection or increases reality,
that is: when Aisthoughtasexisting, morereality is thoughtofthan when Aisconceivedas
possible”(G.W.Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters,ed. and trans. by Leroy E. Loemker,
Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989,p.177). See also G.W. Leibniz, New Essays
on Human Understanding,ed. and trans. by Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2000,Part IV,1,§7. On actuality as “contained”in essenceasa
part of “primary forces,”as wellas“fullness”of it,see G.W. Leibniz, “New System of the Nature
of the Substances,”in Leibniz’s‘New System’and Associated Contemporary Texts,ed. by Roger S.
Woolhouse and RichardFrancks,New York: OxfordUniversity Press 1997, p. 12. Forasummary
of Leibniz’sconcept of existence, see Stephen A. Erickson, “Leibniz on Essence, Existenceand
Creation,”Review of Metaphysics,vol. 18, 1965, pp. 476 –487. On Kierkegaard’suse of Leibniz, see
Arild Waaler, “Aristotle, Leibniz and the Modal Categories in the Interlude of Fragments,”
KierkegaardStudies Yearbook,1998, pp. 276–291;Arild Waaler and HåvardLøkke, “Traces of
Kierkegaard’sReadingofthe Theodicy,”in Kierkegaard and the Renaissance and Modern Tradi-
tions,Tome I, Philosophy,ed. by JonStewart,Aldershot: Ashgate2009 (Kierkegaard Research:
Sources,Reception and Resources,vol. 5), pp. 77–112.
We can see the same argumentative movement,still in the same footnoteofFragments,in
Kierkegaard’scommentary on an explanatory notebySpinoza. There, the Dutch philosopher
says “Sed per perfectionem intelligotantum realitatem sive esse”(Benedictus de Spinoza,
OperaPhilosophica Omnia,ed. by August Gfroerer, Stuttgart: J.B. Mezler 1830,p.15, n. II), to
which Kierkegaard adds: “He explains perfectio by realitas,esse [perfection…reality,being].
Consequently, the moreperfect the thing is, the moreitis; but its perfectionisthat it has
more esse in itself, which means that the moreitis, the moreitis.—So much for the tautology”
(SKS 4, 246n/PF,41–42n). It is not possible to know for sure, if Kierkegaardatthat time was
alreadyawareofthe extent of Spinoza’sconceptual maneuverregarding the concept of realitas,
as he probablywas later in the Postscript. However,eventhough he does not use the pair
“Realitet/Virkelighed”here, it is clear that Kierkegaardwas alreadyopposingthe inclusion of
esse—meaningthe factual being—in the set of distinctive conceptual marks of aconcept,i.e.,
in the realm of realitas. Spinoza’s“realitas sive esse”onlycan be understood as true by Kierke-
gaard, if esse means “ideal being,”which would makethe whole statement a “tautology.”Oth-
erwise, Spinozawould be makingamovethat Kierkegaard radicallyforbids,namely, deriving
actual beingfromessence.
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What confuses the whole idea of “essence”in logic is that attention is not giventothe fact
that one continuallyfunctionswith the “concept,”existence[Existents]. But the concept,
existence, is an ideality,and the difficulty is preciselywhether existenceisabsorbed in
the concept.Then Spinoza mayberight: essentia involvit existentiam, namely, the
concept-existence, i.e., existenceinideality.From another point of view,Kant is right in
saying, “Existence brings no new content determination [Indholdsbestemmelse]toacon-
cept.”ObviouslyKant honestlythinks of existenceasnot beingabsorbed into the concept,
empiricalexistence. In all the relationships of ideality it holds true that essentia is existen-
tia,ifthe use of the concept existentia is otherwise justified here.The Leibnizian statement:
If God is possible, he is necessary—is entirelycorrect. Nothingisadded to aconcept wheth-
er it has existenceornot; it is amatter of complete indifference; it indeed has existence,
i.e., concept-existence, ideal existence.⁸
It is interesting to notice that in this entry Kierkegaardisusing adifferent lexicon
and some otherbackground references.Instead of “being”(factual/ideal), he
uses amore specific term—“empirical”and “concept”existence(Existents)—
and, in additiontothe reappearance of Spinoza and Leibniz,thereisanother
character who givesanother approach. The presenceofKant here not onlypro-
vides amoredetailed view of the radical split between thosetwo understandings
of “existence,”since the distinction between them is rooted in aprohibition of
regarding “empirical existence”as a(possible) conceptual determination con-
tained in essence, but by explicitlymentioningKant’sposition—and agreeing
with it—Kierkegaard also bringsthe whole needed background to adeeper com-
prehension of his own position.⁹Now,itisworth taking acloser look at what
Kant says about this topic.
The coreofKant’sthesis is preciselythe differentiation between, on the one
hand, judgmentsthataffirm or denyconceptual marks (what Kant calls Merk-
male)that compose aconcept,and on the other,judgments thatonlyposit the
concept,with the whole set of its defining predicates, in relation to asubject.
Thus, Kant argues against the statement thatexistencecould be one of those
SKS 22, 433 –435, NB14:150 / JP 1, 460.
KierkegaardmentionsKant quiteoften when dealingwith amoremetaphysical dimension of
existence. Compare, for instance, the argument regarding the coming into existenceofaplan in
SKS 4, 273/PF,73, with Kant’sexample in Critique of Pure Reason,ed. and trans. by Paul Guyer
and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 2000,A600/B 628. See also SKS 7,
300 / CUP1,328.InSKS 7, 530/ CUP1,583,Kierkegaardexplicitlyquotes Kant’sformulation that
existencecan be consideredapredicate, yetone that does not add anynew determination (be-
stemmende Prædikat), but is, rather,aform of all definingpredicates. Nevertheless,inthe same
passage Kierkegaardturns the Kantian sentence upside down by sayingthat “now”becomingan
existent means becoming asinner,which pavesthe wayfor his own specific understanding of it.
However,for the present purpose onlythe first part of the excerpt is of interest.
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defining predicates, especially in thecaseofabeingthat, perdefinitionem,has the
totality of positivepredicates, as in theontological argument.InKant’swords:
Now if Itake the subject together all his predicates (amongomnipotencebelongs),and say
God is, or thereisaGod, then Iadd no new predicatetothe concept of God, but onlyposit
the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit the object in relation to my con-
cept…Thus the actual contains nothingmorethan the merelypossible. Ahundredactual
dollars do not contain the least bit morethan ahundred possible ones….But in my financial
condition thereismorewith ahundred actual dollars than with the mereconcept of them
(i.e., their possibility).For with actuality the object is not merelyincluded in my concept
analytically, but adds syntheticallytomyconcept (which is adetermination of my state)
….Thus when Ithink athing, through whichever and manypredicates Ilike(even in its thor-
oughgoing determination), not the least bit gets added to the thing when Iposit in addition
that this thingis. Forotherwise whatwould exist would not be the same as what Ihad
thought in my concept,but morethan that,and Icould not saythat the very object of
my concept exists.EvenifIthink in athingevery reality [einem Dingealle Realität]except
one, then the missingreality does not getadded when Isay the thingexists [die fehlende
Realität nicht hinzu], but it exists encumberedwith just the same defect as Ihavethoughtin
it….Now if Ithink of abeingasthe highest reality [höchste Realität](without defect),the
question still remains whether it exists or not.¹⁰
Beyond the fact that bothKierkegaard and Kant make explicit theirthoughts on
existenceinthe context of proofsfor God’sexistence, what mainlyinterests me
now is the conceptual-terminological question. Alreadyinthe presentation of
the table of categories,¹¹ it is possibletosee that Kant distinguishes reality (Real-
ität)and existence/actuality (Dasein/Wirklichkeit). Reality is one of the catego-
ries of quality,while existence/actuality is on the list of categories of modality.
Once again, in the context of the critique of the ontological argument,the dis-
tinction between Realität and Wirklichkeit is centraltounderstandwhatKant’s
argument is.The German philosopherisusing theLeibnizian-Wolffianconceptual
framework—developed out of the established Scholastic vocabulary—which con-
ceivesthe set of properties or attributes of athing—res—its realitas. Hence, when
Kant mentionsthinking “in athing every reality except one,”or thinking a “miss-
ing reality,”he is referringtowhat can be affirmed or deniedofsomething and
that has as its opposite in the table of categories the category of negation [Neg-
ation].¹² Therefore, realities can be either affirmedordenied about athing,but
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,A599 –600/B 627–628.
Ibid., A80/B106.
As Heideggerexplains, “The concept of reality and the real in Kant does not have the mean-
ing most often intended nowadays when we speak of the reality of the external world or of epis-
temological realism. Reality is not equivalenttoactuality,existence, or extantness….When Kant
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also are susceptible to different gradationswhich can be expressed numerically,
as Kant exemplifies by saying that the Sunis200,000 times brighter than the
Moon.¹³ Now it is possible to put the Kantian thesis, with which Kierkegaard
agrees, straightforwardly: existence qua factual, or Wirklichkeit,cannot be count-
ed among the realitiesorrealitates that compose aconcept.Consequently, it is
neither susceptible to gradation—it is meaningless to talk about more or less
actuality (Wirklichkeit)—nor it can be absorbed in or derivedfrom aconcept.
Well, are these not preciselythe samepoints stated by Kierkegaard in the
quotations from Fragments and journals made above, namely, that existence
qua actuality (a) cannot be among the attributes of aconcept and,accordingly,
(b)isnot susceptible of gradation or degrees?These are also the results Kierke-
gaardderivesfrom the central thesis of the section “Cominginto Existence,”in
the “Interlude”in Philosophical Fragments,since he once more makesthatdis-
tinctionbysaying the changeofcominginto existence “is not in essence [Væsen]
but in being [Væren]”¹⁴and that, in aword, “the changeofcominginto existence
is actuality [Virkelighed].”¹⁵
In fact,Kierkegaard’sconcerns about the concept of Virkelighed date backto
his deepestand oldest philosophicalconcerns. Among these, the well-known
account of Schelling’slecturesin1841isvery interesting:
I’msoglad to have heardSchelling’s2nd lecture—indescribable. Ihavebeen sighingand
the thoughts within me have been groaning long enough;when he mentioned the word
“actuality”[Virkelighed]concerning philosophy’srelation to the actual, the child of thought
leaped for joy within me….After that Iremember almost every word he said. Perhapshere
therecan be clarity.This one word, it reminded me of all my philosophical pains and ago-
nies.¹⁶
Nevertheless,evenbefore his first stayinBerlin,the question of the deepest
meaning of Virkelighed and its relation with thought wasalreadyonthe horizon
talks about the omnitudo realitatis,the totality of all realities,hemeans not the whole of all
beings actuallyextant but,just the reverse, the whole of all possible thing-determinations,
the whole of all thing-contents or real-contents,essences, possible things.Accordingly, realitas
is synonymous with Leibniz’term possibilitas,possibility.”Martin Heidegger, TheBasic Problems
of Phenomenology,trans. by Albert Hofstadter,Bloomington and Indianapolis:Indiana Univer-
sity Press 1982, p. 34.Onthe concept of realitas in Leibniz see Albert Heinekamp, “Losconceptos
de Realitas,Perfectio yBonum Metaphysicum en Leibniz,”Revista de Filosofía yTeoría Política,
vol. 33,1999,pp. 65 –85.
See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,A179 /B221.
SKS 4, 273/PF,73.
SKS 4, 275/PF,75.
SKS 19,235,Not8:33/JP 5, 181–182.
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of his own thinking.Invited to give his testimonyabout his former student,F.C.
Sibberndescribes one of their encounters duringthat period: “Idoremember,
however,that once during his Hegelian period, he met me at Gammeltorv and
asked me what relationship obtainedbetween philosophyand actuality [Virke-
lighed], which astonished me, because the gist of the whole of my philosophy
was the studyoflife and actuality [Virkelighed].”¹⁷
As we alreadycan see, Kierkegaard’sview regarding the relationship
between being and thought restsupon his position concerning the metaphysical
understanding of “being”and the distinctions within this concept.Starting with
two opposite statements,I’ve been showing how Kierkegaard’sclaims about the
relationship between being and thought are not superficial or detached from his
more central topics.Rather,they are rooted in amoreorless sophisticateddis-
tinctionprofoundlyakintohis more fundamental philosophical and theological
concerns.¹⁸We can proceed now to the Postscript which is whereIthink he
develops that distinction and,consequently, states his most refined account of
that relation.¹⁹
Here quoted after Encounterswith Kierkegaard: ALife as Seen by His Contemporaries,trans.
and ed. by BruceH.Kirmmse, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996,p.217.Kirmmse ren-
ders the first occurrence of Virkelighed as “actual life,”the second as “reality.”Cf. Stewart’scor-
rections in JonStewart, “The Notion of Actuality in Kierkegaardand Schelling’sInfluence,”Ars
Brevis,vol. 17,2011,pp. 237–253.
One can easilysee that Kierkegaard’spositions regarding the radical distinctionbetween
essenceand existencealignhim, historicallyspeaking, with the debateabout the distinction
realis;fromthe point of view of the problem itself they open up an interesting path to confront
Kierkegaard’smetaphysical thoughts trans-historically.
It maybeuseful at this point to keep in mind that Kierkegaard worked on the drafts that
would become the Postscript under the provisory title “Logical Problems”(“Logiske Problemer,”
see SKS 27,325,Papir 317/ JP 5,272). In the list of the eightmain problems of the book, beside
“What is Existence[Existents]?,”thereare two questions regarding fundamentalproblem of cat-
egories,namely “No. 1. What is acategory and what does it mean to saythat beingisacategory”
and “No 2. On the historical significanceofthe category”(Pap. VI B13). Not onlyproblems
related to categories are, since Aristotle, one of the main theoretical loci for the discussion of
the relations between thinkingand being, but 19th-century philosophyingeneral, precisely
after Hegel’sdeath, discussed manyvariants of this set of questions.For an overview cf. Aristote
au XIXe Sie
`cle,ed. by Denis Thouard, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Pressesuniversitaires du septentrion
2004,pp. 37–104;Risto Vilkko, “The Logic Question Duringthe First Half of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury,”in TheDevelopment of Modern Logic,ed. by Leila Haaparanta, Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press 2009,pp. 203 –221. Therefore,itismorethan acoincidencethat Kierkegaardtook note in
his journals that “Trendelenburghas written twotreatises on the doctrine of categories,which I
am reading with the greatest interest,”SKS 20,93, NB:132 / JP 5, 367–368. Concerningthe rela-
tion between Kierkegaardand Trendelenburgsee, e.g., Arnold B. Come, Trendelenburg’sInflu-
ence on Kierkegaard’sModal Categories,Montreal: Inter Editions1991;Dario González, “Trende-
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II. “Laughableand lamentable”:the Relations
between Being andThoughtinthe Postscript
The basis for understandingwhat Kierkegaard thinksabout the relationship
between being and thought is, as Ihavepointed out,his very radical idea of Vir-
kelighed and its subsequent differentiation from anyother meaning of being.
However,itshould be noticed that,although Virkelighed is not the onlycharac-
teristic of Kierkegaard’sunderstanding of existence, his effort to delineate and
specify what kind of being is existing assumesactuality as anecessary,although
not sufficient,condition of it.Such delimitation is accomplished in three moves:
(1) adistinction between Virkelighed and Realitet,(2) an affirmationofthe
impossibility of theoretical apprehension of Virkelighed in itself and,finally,
(3) the conclusion that (actual) existenceprohibits the identity of being (qua
actual) and thought.
A. The Distinction between Virkelighed and Realitet
In the Postscript the distinctionthat appeared in other places as thatbetween
“factual being”and “ideal being,”or between “empirical existence”and “con-
ceptual”or “ideal existence,”plainlytakes the traditionalform of the difference
between actualitas and realitas,Virkelighed and Realitet.²⁰Thesplit is clear in
Climacus’words:
lenburg: an Allyagainst Speculation,”in Kierkegaard and his German Contemporaries, Tome I,
Philosophy,ed. by JonStewart,Aldershot: Ashgate1997(Kierkegaard Research:Sources,Recep-
tion and Resources,vol. 6), pp. 309 –334; RichardPurkarthofer, “TracesofaProfound and Sober
Thinker in Kierkegaard’sPostscript,”Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook,2005,pp. 192–207; Gabriel
Ferreira, “KierkegaardDescends to the Underworld: Some Remarks on the Kierkegaardian
Appropriation of an Argument by F. A. Trendelenburg,”Cognitio,vol. 14,2014, pp. 235–246.
Following SKS-e thereare 12 occurrences of “Realitet”to be found in the Concluding Unsci-
entific Postscript. Apart fromcases when it is used in expressions like “Tanke-Realitet”or in quo-
tations likethe one Icite, Kierkegaardtalks about, for instance, “the reality of the world-
historical development…for God”(SKS 7, 148/CUP1,159); the “infinite reality”earned by the
tragic hero (cf. SKS 7, 153 / CUP1,165); moreover,hequestions whether the “contention [of
immortality] has anyreality”(SKS 7, 158 / CUP1,171); in afootnoteherefers to his account on
“Ideality and Reality”in Chapter3(SKS 7, 507n / CUP1,558n); moreover,herefers to the reality
of childhood, in the sense of the latter’suniverse or context (cf. SKS 7, 544 / CUP1,599). In all of
these cases one can see, without adoubt,that “Realitet”means either reality in abroad or ana-
logical sense, or else is explicitlyidentified with actuality qua thought-reality.
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This triumphofpurethinking(that in it thinkingand beingare one) is both laughable and
lamentable, because in pure thinkingtherecan reallybenoquestion at all of the differ-
ence. –Greek philosophyassumed as amatter of course that thinkinghas reality[Realitet].
In reflectingupon it,one must come to the same result, but whyisthought-reality [Tanke-
Realitet]confused with actuality [Virkelighed]? Thought-reality is possibility, and thinking
needs onlytoreject anyfurther questioning about whetheritisactual.²¹
This excerpt presents several improvementsconcerning the distinction Ihave
been pointing out,aswell as some new featuresabout it.The excerpt appears
just after Kierkegaard’srebukeofHegel and Kant—even though the latter did
not go so far as the former—for having brought Virkelighed into the domain of
thought.²² Kierkegaard concedes that thoughthas Realitet—after all, even the
Greeks took it for granted—but radicallydenies that Realitet,qua thought,
could be identified with Virkelighed. Now we alreadyknow what it meansto
saythe thought has Realitet: thought can have Realitet inasmuchasitcan
hold the positive determinations of aconcept,its realitas,and, because of
this, thought can be called “real”insofar as this set of objective features of acon-
cept can be intersubjectively communicable. That Kierkegaard is thinkingabout
the differencebetween the wayofbeing as aparticularactual existent and the
wayofbeing as ageneral or universal idea can be seen acouple of pages
later,when he states once again the distinctionbetween Realitet and Virkelighed:
But to be an individual human beingisnot apureidea-existenceeither.Onlyhumanity in
general exists in this way, that is, does not exist.Existence is always the particular;the
abstractdoes not exist. To concludefromthis that the abstract does not have reality [Real-
itet]isamisunderstanding, but it is also amisunderstandingtoconfuse the discussionby
askingabout existenceinrelation to it or about actuality in the sense of existence[om Vir-
kelighed iBetydning af Existents].²³
SKS 7, 299 / CUP1,328;cf. also SKS 4, 318–319 / CA,11.
It seems that Kierkegaardunderstood exactlywhatKant meant by Positio,aspositing “the
subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit[ing] the object in relation to my concept”
(Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,A599/B627), i.e., positingarelationthat brings “actuality into
relation to thinking.”Concerning Hegel, it is interesting to noticethat he also mentions the
ambiguity of “Realität”:“Realität kann ein vieldeutiges Wort zu seyn scheinen,weilesvon sehr
verschiedenen, ja entgegengesetzen Bestimmungen gebraucht wird. Wenn von Gedanken, Begrif-
fen, Theorien gesagt wird, sie haben keine Realität, so heiβtdiβhier,daβihnen kein äusserliches
Daseyn, keine Wirklichkeit zukomme”(GeorgW.F.Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik,ed. by Friedrich
Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke, Hamburg: Meiner 1978,p.63). However,Hegel unifies those two
meanings—essential determinations and external existence—in the concept of Dasein and this is
preciselywhat Kierkegaardcannot accept: “Dieses beydes ist in dem Daseyn oder der Realität ver-
einigt”(Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik,p.64).
SKS 7, 301 / CUP1,330.
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Just as it wasstated both in Kierkegaard’sjournals and Philosophical Fragments,
the content of thoughtcan never be confused with Virkelighed since, qua
thought, anyobject or conceptual feature is amere possibility: “If thinking
could give actuality in the sense of actuality[iVirkelighedens Betydning]and
not thought-reality [Tanke-Realitet]inthe sense of possibility,then thinking
must also be able to take away existence, to takeawayfrom the existing person
the onlyactuality to which he relates himself.”²⁴
If on the one hand the differentiation between Realitet and Virkelighed in the
Postscript sums up thatdistinction previouslystated between the factualor
empirical being and ideal or conceptual being, on the other hand it also grasps
Kierkegaard’sposition regarding his concerns about the impossibility of actual-
ity being aconceptual attribute. It is especiallyinteresting that in the Postscript,
Kierkegaard in some sense summarizesthe results of his explanation also in a
commentary on the ontological argument.The excerpt is very significant and
deserves to be quotedinfull:
When, for example, it is said: God must have all perfections,orthe highestbeingmust have
all perfections [Fuldkommenheder], to be [at være]isalso aperfection; ergo the highest
beingmust be, or God must be—the whole movement is deceptive.That is, if in the first
part of this statement God actuallyisnot thoughtofasbeing, then the statement cannot
comeoff at all. It will then run somewhat like this: Asupreme beingwho,please note,
does not exist,must be in possession of all perfections,amongthem also that of existing;
ergo asupreme beingwho does not exist does exist.This would be astrangeconclusion.
The highestbeingmust either not be in the beginning of the discourse in order to come
into existenceinthe conclusion, and in that case it cannot comeinto existence; or the high-
est beingwas, and thus,ofcourse, it cannot come intoexistence, in which case the con-
clusion is afraudulent form of developingapredicate,afraudulent paraphrase of apresup-
position. In the other case, the conclusion must be kept purelyhypothetical:ifasupreme
beingisassumed to be, this beingmust also be assumed to be in possession of all perfec-
tions;tobeisaperfection, ergo this beingmust be—that is, if this beingisassumed to be.
By concluding within ahypothesis,one can surelynever conclude from the hypothesis.For
example, if this or that person is ahypocrite, he will act like ahypocrite, ahypocritewill do
this and that; ergo this or that person has done this and that.Itisthe same with the con-
clusion about God. When the conclusion is finished, God’sbeingisjust as hypothetical as it
was,but inside it thereisadvanced aconclusion-relation between asupreme beingand
beingasperfection, just as in the other case between beingahypocriteand aparticular
expression of it.The confusion is the same as explaining actuality [Virkelighed]inpure
thinking.²⁵
SKS 7, 303 / CUP1,331–332.
SKS 7, 305 / CUP1,334.
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The differentiation in itself and the hypothetical character of existence qua
thought, i.e., Realitet,leads us to the next point about the peculiarity of Virke-
lighed in its relation to thinking.
B. The Inapprehensibility of Virkelighed qua Virkelighed
Anotable point unveiled by the distinction between those twomeaningsofbeing
is an essential feature of the act of thinking. When talking about the relations
between being and thinking,Kierkegaard is alsostating apoint about how men-
tal apprehension works,that is, an epistemologicalposition. When thought
apprehends an object,inorder that this object somehow “exists”in it,the act
of thinkingmust changeittoapossible object,such as arepresentation or acon-
cept.Ofcourse, representations or concepts are actual as such (inasmuch as they
are actual representations or conceptsinanactual subjectwho thinks or repre-
sents),but such representations or concepts onlycontain the represented or
thoughtobject as apossible object.InClimacus’words: “All knowledge about
actuality is possibility.”²⁶This is avery keyaspect of Kierkegaard’saccount on
the relations between being and thought,since the act of thinking changes the
modality,which necessarilyleavesout the fundamental feature of being qua
actual. In another entry from Kierkegaard’spapers, now from 1850 (that is,
four years after the publishing of the Postscript), Kierkegaard plainly expresses
this point:
“Science”—The Existential
Actuality [Virkelighed]cannot be conceptualized. Johannes Climacus has alreadyshown
this correctlyand very simply. To conceptualize is to dissolve actuality into possibility—
but then it is impossible to conceptualize it,because to conceptualize it is to transform
it intopossibilityand thereforenot to hold to it as actuality.Asfar as actuality is concerned,
conceptualization is retrogression, astepbackward, not astep forward. It is not as if
“actuality”werevoid of concepts,not at all; no, the concept which is found by conceptu-
allydissolvingitintopossibilityisalso in actuality,but thereisstill somethingmore—that
it is actuality.Togofrompossibilitytoactuality is astepforward(except in relation to evil);
to go fromactuality to possibility is astepbackward. But in the modern period the baleful
confusion is that “actuality”has been included in logic, and then in distraction it is forgot-
tenthat “actuality”in logic is, however,onlya“thoughtactuality”i.e., is possibility.²⁷
SKS 7, 288/CUP1,316.
SKS 23,72, NB15:103 / JP 1, 1059.
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The inapprehensibility of Virkelighed qua Virkelighed is one of the theses Kierke-
gaardemphasizes the most in the Postscript. As one can see, this impossibility
arises because the process of mental apprehension consists preciselyinabstrac-
tion or suspension of the actualityofanactual being,insofar as the concept or
representation has as its purpose the making of an intra-mental entity that has
two essential features:namely, universality and, because of this, the mere possi-
bility of aparticularextra-mentalinstance. Kierkegaard makes it explicit in his
account of Cartesian cogito:
The Cartesian cogito ergosum has been repeated often enough. If the Iincogitoisunder-
stood to be and individual human being, then the statement demonstrates nothing: Iam
thinkingergo Iam, but if Iamthinking, no wonder,then, that Iam; after all, it has already
been said, and the first consequentlysaysevenmorethan the last.Ifthen, by the Iincog-
ito, one understands asingle individual existinghuman being, philosophyshouts:Foolish-
ness, foolishness, here it is not amatter of my Ioryour Ibut of the pureI.But surelythis
pureIcan have no other existencethan thought-existence[Ta nke-Existents]. What then, is
the concluding formula supposed to mean; indeed, thereisnoconclusion, for then the
statement is atautology.²⁸
The heterogeneity of Virkelighed and thought,that Kierkegaardalreadystated
due to the impossibilityofapprehension of the former,isnow reaffirmed in
the oppositeway.The kind of existencethat can be “derived”or “proved”as
the resultofthe Cartesian syllogism can onlybeexistenceunderstood as an
intra-mentalattribute (Tanke-Existents)and, as such, merelypossible and
unable to ensureits extra-mental actuality.Onceagain,itisthe solidincongruity
between Virkelighed and Realitet thatforbids boththe apprehension of actual
existence qua actual and its deduction from apossibleconcept.InKierkegaard’s
concluding words: “To conclude existencefrom thinking is, then,acontradic-
tion, because thinking does just the opposite and takes existenceawayfrom
the actual (fradet Virkelige)and thinks it by annulling it,bytransposing it
into possibility.”²⁹
C. ExistenceasInter-Esse amidst the Hypothetical Identity
of Being and Thought
The third move is, somehow,the conclusion from the two previous points. It is
also one of the most developedofKierkegaard’spositions regardingthe question
SKS 7, 288–289/CUP1,317.
SKS 7, 289/CUP1,317.
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of being and thought,because it presupposes and mobilizes those previous steps
towards aperspective that, as far as Ican see, is what is most distinctiveabout
the Kierkegaardian existential turn. If existenceisinseparably Virkelighed,and if
this is inapprehensible in the realm of thoughtassuch (due bothtoVirkelighed’s
nature and to the wayinwhich thinking functions), then existence qua actual
delimitsthe boundaries of theoretical knowledge.Actual existencethereforehin-
ders the identity of being and thought.
What actuality is cannot be renderedinthe languageofabstraction. Actuality is an inter-
esse [intermediatebeing] between thinkingand beinginthe hypothetical unity of abstrac-
tion. Abstraction deals with possibilityand actuality,but its conception of actuality is a
false rendition, sincethe medium is not actuality but possibility. Onlybyannullingactual-
ity can abstraction grasp it,but to annul it is preciselytochange it intopossibility.³⁰
The intermediateness to which Kierkegaard pointsmust be read in at least two
ways.First,weshallsee that Virkelighed settles itself, so to speak, amidst the
intended unity of being and thought by abstraction. Because of its inapprehen-
sibility,actuality keeps thosetwo spheres divorced due to aheterogeneousres-
idue. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard’sdiagnosis of this relationship would be defec-
tive if it would not take into account one fundamental aspect of the relation
between being and thoughtconcerning the actual existent.The intermediateness
of Virkelighed qua actual existencealso points to the actual existent.The existent
itself is also amidst being and thought inasmuchasinitbeing and thoughtare in
anon-identical simultaneity.³¹ “Ahuman being thinksand exists, and existence
SKS 7, 286–287/CUP1,314.The translation of the central proposition offers some challenges
and deserves some remarks. The Hongstranslate as quoted above; Alastair.Hannay(in his edi-
tion of Concluding Unscientific Postscript,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press 2009,p.263)
translates as follows: “Actuality is an inter-esse splittingthe hypothetical unity of abstraction’s
thought and being.”However,Ibelievethat abetterrendition of “Virkeligheden er et inter-esse
mellem Abstraktionens hypothetiske Eenhed af Tænken og Væren”would be “Actuality is an inter-
esse (an intermediatebeing) amidst abstraction’shypothetical unity of thinkingand being.”As
far as Ican see, both Hong’sand Hannay’stranslations fail to hit upon the actual meaning
somehow.What Kierkegaardissayinghere is that Virkelighed is somethingthat is between
beingand thought, somehow splittingthe hypothetical unity of thoughtand beingintended
by abstraction. Hannaychooses to put it explicitly, but since “mellem”literallymeans “middle”
or “medium,”likethe Latin prefix “inter,”Ithink the pun must be preserved. “Hypothetical”
heremeans “possible,”in the sense Ihavebeen showingabove, and moreover indicates that,
as apossibility,the “unity of thoughtand being”is unachievabledue to the unattainability
of Virkelighed. Iwould liketothank Carson Webb and Thomas Fauth Hansen for their valuable
suggestions on these translation issues.
The question of intermediateness is amajor theme in Kierkegaard’sontologyinthe Post-
script. See for instance SKS 7, 301–302/CUP1,329 –330.
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separates thinking and being,holds them apart from each other in succession.”³²
The actual existent is, at the same time, abeing who thinks; it has thought
within the temporality of becoming, even though existent and thoughtcannot
be identified. Existence “has joined thinkingand existing,inasmuchasanexist-
ing person is athinkingperson [Existerende er Tænkende].”³³ Therefore, to “think
actuality in the mediumofpossibility does not entail the difficulty of having to
think in the medium of existence, whereexistence as aprocess of becomingwill
hinder the existing person from thinking, as if actuality could not be thought,
although the existing person is nevertheless athinking person.”³⁴
III. “Holds them apartfromeach otherin
Succession”:ExistentialConsequences of the
Separation of Being qua Virkelighed and
Thought
Now we can indeedelucidate the deepestmeaning of the quotation we use in the
title, as well as dissipate the apparent contradiction raised by thosetwo suppos-
edlyopposite statements concerning being and thoughtpresented at the begin-
ning.When Kierkegaardstates the philosophical thesis that the identity of think-
ing and being affirms the very opposite of what it intends to say, one must keep
in mind that,asIhave been showing, “being”is an equivocal term thathas for
Kierkegaard at least twomeanings. In the case of 1842 –43 journal entry,which
recognizes ontology and mathematicsastwo realms, in which one trulyhas an
identity of being and thought,what is at stake is ameaning of “being”that can-
not be applied to the thesis from the Postscript;inthat sense, as Kierkegaard
plainlystates,being and thoughtare one. Here, the entities are objectswhose
being is exclusively intra-mental, that is, their existence is dependent on
thought. Accordingly, in this case, the relation of these objects—concepts, num-
bers and relations—with thought cannot be other than identity:
But then does it hold true of the moreperfect existences that thinkingand beingare one?
With regardtothe ideas,for example? Well, Hegelisinthe right,and yetwehavenot gone
one step further.The good, the beautiful, the ideas areinthemselvessoabstract that they
areindifferent to existenceand indifferent to anythingother than thought-existence. The
SKS 7, 303 / CUP1,332.
SKS 7, 286/CUP1,314.
SKS 7, 287–288/CUP1,316.
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reasonthat the identity of thinkingand beingholds true here is that beingcannot be under-
stood as anythingbut thinking.³⁵
But in the case of the title’squotation, as well as some similar ones,³⁶“being”
must refertoasortofmeaning which escapes from the identification with
thought. Hence, what Kierkegaard has in mind whenthe states the radical differ-
ence between being and thought is Virkelighed.
When “being”is understood as “Virkelighed,”the thesis thataims to estab-
lish the identity of being and thought ultimatelypresents its contrary,inasmuch
as the act of representing or abstracting made by the intellect can be done only
by leaving behind preciselythe actuality of what is being represented, because
“the only an-sich that cannot be thoughtisexisting,with which thinking has
nothing at all to do.”³⁷Through the distinction, and even the opposition,
between thosetwo relations concerning being and thought, Kierkegaard sheds
light on the central distinction between actual/factual being and ideal/possible
being,which plays amajor role in his own wayofthinking: “The philosophical
thesis of the identity of thinking and being is just the opposite of what it seems
to be; it expresses that thinking has completelyabandoned existence, thatithas
emigratedand found asixth continent whereitisabsolutelysufficient unto itself
in the absolute identity of thinking and being.”³⁸
The importance of the scheme Iampresentinghere is that it clarifies the cir-
cumscribed meanings of central terms like being,actuality,and existence. The
clarity gained by this scheme yields the following three consequences that illu-
minate the centralityofthis distinction in the broader framework of Kierke-
gaard’sphilosophy:
(a) If theoretical accesstoVirkelighed as such is forbidden, it follows neces-
sarilythat the domain in which one can deal with it must be something else. The
primacy or superiority of actuality in the realm of ethics and religious sphere is
not justamatter of choice,³⁹but an ontological-epistemological condition:
“From the ethical point of view,actualityissuperior to possibility.The ethical
SKS 7, 300 / CUP1,329.
See SKS 7, 276n / CUP1,302 –303n; SKS 7, 300 / CUP1,329.
SKS 7, 300 / CUP1,328.
SKS 7, 302/CUP1,331.
See SKS 7, Part II, Chapter2,§2/CUP1,Part II, Chapter2,§2.
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specificallywants to annihilate the disinterestedness of possibilitybymaking
existing the infinite interest.”⁴⁰
(b)Accordingtowhat was shown above, the non-coextensive simultaneity of
the domainsofbeing and thoughtfollows from boththe inapprehensibility of
Virkelighed and the fact thatthe existent is athinking being.Aconsequence
of this unachievable identity is the impossibility of asystem of existence,
which has its conditio sine qua non in the possibilityofsymmetry or full corre-
spondence between those two domains: “What does it mean to saythatbeing
is superior to thinking?…If it can be thought,then the thinking is superior; if
it cannot be thought, then no system of existenceispossible.”⁴¹
(c) From the two previous points arises the epistemologicaland methodolog-
ical problem of how to reason about existence. At the same time that the onto-
logical statusofthe existent makes impossiblethe buildingofasystem of exis-
tence, the simultaneity between being and thought in the heart of the existent
opens the possibility,and even the need,ofsome sort of rationalexposition
of existence, even though it cannot presuppose the identityofbeing and
thought. Climacus expresses aconcern about this alreadyinthe introduction
of the Postscript and raises acomplex problem, since he suggests that the
main subject of the book, “if properlypresented,…will pertain to everyone in
the same way….So the presentation of the issue is not some sort of immodesty
on my part,but merelyakind of lunacy.”⁴ ²Therefore, the problem of thinking
existence or,inother words, how one canpursue an existential-science(Existen-
tiel-Videnskab), imposes itself as one of the most urgent questions to Kierke-
gaard, who devotes awhole section of the Postscript to the task of the “subjective
thinker”⁴³who is “adialectician orientedtothe existential; he has the intellec-
tual passion to hold firm the qualitative disjunction (between his actuality and
thought).”⁴⁴
Therefore, the relationship between being and thought is at the coreof
Kierkegaard’sthoughtand must be seen as afundamental sourcefrom which
he unfolds even his apparentlymost remotethemes, such as ethics and the
relation to God.
SKS 7, 291 / CUP1,320.Herewecan also see some proximity between Kierkegaard and Kant,
sinceinthe latter the access to the unconditionedisdenied in the theoretical realm, but possible
(only) in the practical one.
SKS 7, 304 / CUP1,333.
SKS 7, 26 / CUP1,17.
SKS 7, 320 –328/CUP1,349–360.
SKS 7, 320/CUP1,350.
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