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ABDUL TARR
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND | JOHANNESBURG
ARUSHA: RWANDA
INSIGHT INTO THE ARUSHA NEGOTIATION PROCESS
Diplomacy and Negotiations
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Introduction
The art of negotiation in international politics is a procedure of structured
argument between officials representing different delegations with the aim of
achieving common interest, agreement on matters and acknowledgement of
similar interests. This paper aims to discuss the negotiating process, negotiating
skills and also the negotiation styles and outcomes of the Arusha Negotiations
against the backdrop of the civil war in Rwanda. The Arusha Negotiations were
launched in June 1992 and these negotiations depict conflict resolution gone
wrong. The Arusha Accords were signed on August 3, 1993 by two factions,
the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
There are many factors which contribute to the outcome of negotiations and
these include: the style of negotiations, the skills of the negotiators, the tactics
employed, the stakes involved, the teams involved (delegations), the deadlocks
overcome, the momentum gained, the compromises that are made and the
turning points amongst other factors which will be discussed in this paper. The
first section of this paper will look into the background of the Arusha
negotiations by looking at how the negotiations came about by looking at how
the agreement to negotiate came to pass, the different players (delegations)
involved in the process, what outcomes were preferred by each delegate, the
different tactics that were present in the negotiations, the strengths and
weaknesses of each delegation, and what were the roles of the mediators and
facilitators. The second section will comprise of a thorough analysis of the
Arusha negotiation process by looking at the turning points within the process,
whether the negotiations were successful or not and if so why not, analysing
the winners and losers by looking at which side benefitted more than the other
and lastly whether an agreement was reached and whether the agreement was
implemented. The third section of this paper will comprise of a brief reflection
on the negotiation process of Arusha and concluding remarks.
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Section 1:
Arusha beginnings and “around the table negotiations”
The ‘social revolution’ that took place in 1959 culminated in most Tutsi who
were in positions of power being pushed out of power and also ethnic massacres
against Tutsi people carried out in the country (Musahra and Huggins 2005,
270). Although the post-independence governance of Rwanda which was
largely dominated by Hutu elite under the leadership of President Habyarimana
had some positive characteristics, issues such as exclusionary state policies as
well as political linkages which operated through patron-client relations
between the divisions of the state elite came to be the way in which the post-
independence governance came to be characterised and this contributed to
poverty and mass grievances amongst the poor (Musahra and Huggins 2005,
270).
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) which was formed by Rwandans who were
in exile, invaded the country in 1990 and engaged the government forces
between the period of 1990 and 1994 and this resulted in the regimes repression
of the local Tutsi being intensified (Musahra and Huggins 2005, 270).This
marked the beginning of a three year civil war as well as regional mediation
efforts using summits in order to assist the parties involved reconcile their
differences (Scorgie 2004, 68). This can be considered as the pre-negotiation
phase which proved to be ineffective in stopping the war or encouraging
President Habyarimana to put forward political changes, despite this, these
summits laid the foundational work for the Arusha Accords (Scorgie 2004, 68).
The first action of formal negations of the Arusha peace process began in June
1992 whereby a deadlock between the two parties lead them to assemble in
France in order for terms for the peace process that was to take place in Arusha,
Tanzania to be agreed upon (Scorgie 2004, 68). The most important delegations
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at the Arusha talks were those of the GoR and the RPF (Jones 2001, 72).
Tanzania being the host nation, assumed the role of a facilitator and Rwanda’s
neighbouring countries which include Burundi, Zaire and Uganda along with
delegations from observer countries which include Senegal, Zimbabwe, Nigeria,
France, Germany, Belgium and the United States were present (Clapham 1998,
202). Organisations that were present in the peace process include the
Organisation of the African Union with the aim of establishing a planned
African Conflict Resolution Mechanism as well as the United Nations (Clapham
1998, 202).
The differences between the two most important delegations will be vital to
point out as these had an impact on the outcome of the peace process. One
notable difference was that the RPF delegation was well disciplined and
effective as opposed to the GoR delegation which was divided, undisciplined
and ineffective which proved to be advantageous for the RPF (Jones 2001, 72).
The reasoning behind this strength of the RPF can be alluded to the fact that the
RPF had a lot more to gain in the Arusha negotiation and the strong team that
the RPF sent to the negotiations which included Dr.Theogene Rudasingwa,
Pasteur Bizimungu who was seen as the eyes of Paul Kagame, and Dr. Patrick
Mazimpaka (Jones 2001, 72). The GoR was represented by members of three
dissimilar political parties namely the MRND, PL as well as the CDR which
was seen to be a very hard-line group (Jones 2001, 72). This division within the
GoR proved to be detrimental as these divisions lead to the inability to “keep
team positions secret” (Jones 2001, 72). A good example of this can be seen
through observer teams who would on occasion, have GoR negotiating papers
in their possession which would be stamped “Secret” via an unknown number in
Belgium, this failure to keep secret positions weakened their strength in Arusha
(Jones 2001, 73).
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The tactics employed by each delegation were also very different. The RPF
pursued a “maximalist” agenda and the insistence of the RFP to exclude the
CDR in the talk can be an example, this also reflects the organisation and
cohesive nature of the RPF during the peace process (Storey 2013, 21). Due to
the fact that GoR was disorganised, and saw themselves as “losers” in the peace
process, the “moderates” of the GoR delegation as well as the “extremists”
became really unsatisfied with the peace process which lead tothe GoR
delegation lacking strong tactics in the their negotiations. It is clear that a
negotiating team should possess coherent internal politics in order for the
success for bargaining to be attained. A united front was impossible in the case
of the GoR as the delegation was made up of three diverse factions, with the
CDR being extreme in nature and more moderate stances of the opposition
parties who were in effect vested in witnessing a change in power as opposed to
securing Hutu political dominance and this resulted in these moderates coming
to agreement with the RPF on various issues (Storey 2013, 21).
The major facilitator or mediator as already mentioned was Tanzania. The main
mediator was a Tanzanian diplomat by the name of Mpungwe who was also
linked to observers such as the US and France (Krieg 2008, 9). The interest of
Tanzania in taking part in the peace process stemmed from self-interest,
humanitarian concern as well as regional concerns (Jones 2001, 73).The self-
interest concern stemmed from the concern that conflict in Rwanda or even
Burundi would contribute to refugee camps on the border of Tanzania, this
would be a situation which Tanzania would not be well equipped to handle
(Jones 2001, 78). The regional concern of Tanzania stems from a historic sense
in that the country has always the promotion of stable governments in
neighbouring countries (Jones 2001, 78). Simply put, the humanitarian concern
was to ensure a peaceful outcome in Rwanda. Tanzania was seen as the only
neighbouring country that was neutral in the civil war of Rwanda as opposed to
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a neighbour such as Burundi, who seemed to have favoured the RPF (Jones
2001, 78). Although many sing the praises of Mpungwe’s success of the
negotiations due to his consensus nursing, backroom diplomacy as well as
channelling the ideas of the observer teams, critics often argue that the collapse
of the agreement was due to the mediator’s absence of anticipating the spoiler
role of Hutu extremists (CDR) due to their exclusion in the power-sharing
(Khadiagala 2007, 51).
Section 2:
Analysis of Arusha
The Tanzanian team adopted an incremental approach, which saw the least
contentious issues being addressed first (Adelman and Suhrke, 2000). These
efforts paid off very quickly into the Arusha peace process as a cease-fire
agreement was reached after only two days of the formal negotiation process as
well as an agreement for the OAU to install a Neutral Military Observer Group
in order to monitor the termination of hostilities (Scorgie 2004, 68). The first
round of the formal talks also called for another negotiating body to be
established, the Joint Political Military Commission (JPMC). The mandate of
the JPMC was to assume role of a back-channel for the negotiations whereby
members of the two delegations could informally discuss tricky issues and
where complaints could be aired (Scorgie 2004, 68).
The successes of the developments gave rise to momentum in the talks in the
second phase of Arusha (August 7-18, 1992) as the Protocol on the Rule of Law
was signed on the 18th of August 1992 (Jones 2001, 78).Arusha III took place
from 7-18 September 1992 and pursued the settling of issues of a new Broad-
Based Transitional Government (BBTG) whereby the powers of the President
would be effectively reduced to only ceremonial ones (Scorgie 2004, 68). The
concessions from the GoR throughout Arusha III became a consistent tendency
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even later on in the other phases that were to follow, examples include the
insistency of the RPF in the Arusha VI phase for the CDR which was the
extreme right-wing faction within the GoR delegation to be excluded from the
negotiations as well as any future government (Scorgie 2004, 68).
When assessing the process of Arusha, it is evident that the turning point which
almost derailed the entire process was the negotiation concerning the (BBTG)
with the continual insistence of the exclusion of the CDR by the RPF, 50-50
split between Tutsi and Hutu parties within government by the RPF and the
willingness of Habyarimana to only allow a 20-80 split in favour for Hutu
majority created sever strains on the negotiations. This resulted in the RPF
threatening to leave the negotiations and returning to the battlefield if the CDR
were to be allowed to participate further in the negotiations, this caused one of
the major problems of the Arusha Accords which was an attempt to establish a
power sharing agreement which excludes one party (Krieg 2008, 9).
This threat was accentuated by the fact that firstly the RPF could afford to fight
for a few more years as they had spent almost a decade in exile and armed
camps, more than they could afford to lose in the negotiations (Jones 2001, 73).
This was a clear example of coercive diplomacy being utilized. Military battles
ensued in January–February 1993, when 300 Tutsis were killed by Hutu
extremists and a quick retaliation of the RPF establishing a military offensive
from the north which quickly advanced and doubled the territory which it had
control over in minimal weeks (Krieg 2008, 9). It was clear that the military
superiority of the RPF, the crumbling economy, the international pressures, as
well as the fact that a large number of the Rwandans became refugees brought
the parties back to the negotiating table and helped overcome this deadlock
which naturally forced Habyarimana to eventually finalize the agreement. The
RPF received this request of CDR exclusion which weakened the negotiating
team of President Habyarimana severely as his government was reduced in with
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regards to voting power and was inherently marginalized from the “new order”
(Adelman and Suhrke, 2000).
The last rounds of negotiations were concluded on August 4 1993, as President
Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Colonel Alexis Kanyarqenge signed the final
agreement of the Arusha Accords. This peace process at the time reflected a
successful, almost perfect conflict resolution outcome, basically on paper; the
Accords seemed to be a clinical mediation process. This was not the case, as
several months later the failure of implementation of the accords became
evident as the excluded spoilers waged genocide of about 100 apocalyptic days
where close to a million people were killed. The delay of the deployment of the
United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) as well as the
intense ethnic polarization that was present within the post- Arusha era also
contributed to the failure of the implementation of the Accords (Khadiagala
2007, 51).
Section 3:
Conclusion
It is clear to see that the elements present within the Arusha negotiations were
actual victories for the RPF as opposed to mutually acceptable agreements, and
the RPF can be said to have been the overall victors of the entire peace process.
The coherence and undeniable organisation within the RPF delegation, the
coercive negotiation tactics, the maximalist agenda, as well as the discipline of
the RPF played a huge role in their victories. The clear divided nature of the
GoR delegation, the willingness to succumb to recruitment by the spoiler group
proved to be detrimental in achieving their quests. The Arusha Accord on paper
looked almost to be a “blueprint” of conflict resolution but this was not the case.
The inherent flaws of exclusion of the losers within the Accords, the absence of
mutually acceptable settlements, the failure of the mediators to acknowledge the
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spoiler problem that was recurring in the peace process, the inaction of the
immediate deployment of UNAMIR as well as the weakened bargaining ability
due to the incoherence of the GoR lead to the failure to achieve any significant
gains, which left the moderates as well as the extremists displeased when the
time for the actual Accords to be fully implemented all contributed to the failure
of Arusha.
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