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Turkish Studies
ISSN: 1468-3849 (Print) 1743-9663 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ftur20
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey
Through The Sèvres Syndrome
Türkay Salim Nefes
To cite this article: Türkay Salim Nefes (2015) Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric
in Turkey Through The Sèvres Syndrome, Turkish Studies, 16:4, 572-587, DOI:
10.1080/14683849.2015.1084876
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1084876
Published online: 28 Sep 2015.
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Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in
Turkey Through The Se
`vres Syndrome
TU
¨RKAY SALIM NEFES
Department of Sociology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
ABSTRACT While various studies suggest that anti-Semitism is almost non-existent in
Turkish society, the popularity of the conspiratorial rhetoric about Jews raises question
marks about this view. This article probes into contemporary anti-Semitism in Turkey by scru-
tinizing conspiracy theories about a crypto-Judaic society called Do
¨nme. It explores the influ-
ence of the paranoid style in Turkish politics, known as the Se
`vres syndrome, on the popular
conspiracy theories with anti-Semitic themes. The research relies on an analysis of the content
of conspiracy accounts and interviews with their authors. It concludes that the influence of the
Se
`vres syndrome is imperative to understand the rationale of anti-Semitic conspiracy rhetoric
in Turkey.
Introduction
Although many accounts highlight tolerance in Turkey towards the country’s Jewish
minority, there is an abundance of contemporary counter-evidence as well. Pew
survey data demonstrate a steeply increasing trend of anti-Jewish feelings in
Turkey in recent years, with a very unfavorable view of Jews steadily rising from
32 percent to 69 percent between 2004 and 2011.
1
A recent study on Turkish main-
stream media suggests that Jews are the most frequently targeted group of hate
speech.
2
Anti-Semitic conspiracy books, such as Mein Kampf, were bestsellers in
the Turkish book market.
3
Furthermore, recent tensions between Israel and Turkey
have created feelings of insecurity among Turkish Jews.
4
These render Turkish
anti-Semitism a very important area of research, which is insufficiently analyzed in
the academic literature.
This article is an attempt to fill the gap of empirical studies on contemporary anti-
Semitism in Turkey. The article builds on two points: (1) anti-Semitism is the hosti-
lity toward Jews as an ethno-religious community, and conspiratorial ideas about
Jews constitute the backbone of anti-Semitic ideology; and (2) understanding conspi-
racy theories about Jewish communities would afford invaluable perspectives on anti-
Semitism. This study examines the relationship between conspiratorial rhetoric and
Correspondence Address: Tu
¨rkay Salim Nefes, Camlik cd., Cigdem sk., Mutlu ap., No. 7/5, 34182, Bah-
celievler, Istanbul, Turkey. Email: turkay.nefes@sociology.ox.ac.uk
Turkish Studies, 2015
Vol. 16, No. 4, 572–587, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2015.1084876
#2015 Taylor & Francis
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anti-Semitism in Turkey. Particularly, it explores the impact of the Se
`vres syndrome,
a concept denoting the paranoid style in Turkish politics, on the dissemination of anti-
Semitic ideas. This article suggests that this syndrome empowers anti-Semitic con-
spiratorial rhetoric in Turkey.
This study focuses on conspiratorial rhetoric about a secret Judaic community,
called the Do
¨nme.
5
It analyses the content of popular conspiracy books about the
Do
¨nme in the 2000s and draws upon interviews conducted with their well-known
authors, namely Abdurrahman Dilipak, Yalc¸ın Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, and Soner Yalc¸ın. It scruti-
nizes the rationales of authors from different political orientations that contribute to
the same anti-Semitic rhetoric and pays special attention to the impact of the
Se
`vres syndrome on their works.
The study opens with a discussion about the scholarship on Turkish anti-Semitism.
Secondly, it discusses the concept of the Se
`vres syndrome and its historical signifi-
cance. Third, it outlines the history of the Do
¨nme community and the conspiratorial
rhetoric surrounding them. Subsequently, it explains the methodology and outlines
the findings. The article concludes with a brief discussion of the findings.
Perspectives on Turkish Anti-Semitism
There are two main currents in the scholarship on anti-Semitism in Turkey. While the
first view denies the prevalence of anti-Semitism in Turkish society and confines it
only to the political margins, the second perspective underlines the socio-political
exclusion of the Jewish minority in Turkey. To begin with the more optimistic
view, various studies depict Turks as good hosts who have provided a secure
home to the Jewish minority. According to this view, anti-Semitic events are sporadic
occurrences carried out by marginal groups and individuals.
6
Shaw, in his historical
analysis focusing on Jewish life in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic,
emphasizes the Turkish protection of the Jewish community and the loyalty and
excellent service of the Jewish community throughout history: For example, Sultan
Bayazid II welcomed the expelled Jews from Spain in the fifteenth century;
7
and
the Turkish Republic provided a safe passage for Jewish refugees in World War
II.
8
In parallel, Kuyas¸ claims that an anti-Semitic tradition does not exist in the
Ottoman Empire and distinguishes the Jewish experience in Turkey from Western
anti-Semitism.
9
Nevertheless, he notes that during a few events and provocations,
the masses turned against the Jewish minority in Turkey. Toktas¸ concurs that anti-
Semitism in Turkey is rather marginal compared to Western countries.
10
She adds
that the Jewish population, although not considered native Turks, was seen as a
loyal and beneficial minority in Turkish society.
11
By differentiating the Turkish case from Western and Christian anti-Semitism, these
studies echo Lewis’ perspective, which proposes that Muslim societies provided a safer
environment for Jewish minorities compared to European countries, at least until the
nineteenth century.
12
The main reason behind this lies in Islam’s recognition of Chris-
tianity and Judaism as “religions of the book” that led Muslim societies to give Jews the
status of believers and tolerate them as a subordinate religious minority, whereas, in
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 573
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contrast, a theologically rooted hostility exists between Christianity and Judaism.
Lewis describes Turkish relations with Jews as mixed, shaped by tolerance with con-
tempt: He writes, “Even when the Turkish attitude toward Jews was negative, it was on
the whole contemptuous rather than hostile, and it does not seem to have caused any
noticeable inconvenience to Jews until the seventeenth century and after.”
13
Lewis
also notes that the Ottomans’ tolerance was not unconditional, as they pragmatically
directed Jewish migration according to the needs of the empire.
14
Other scholars find these depictions too optimistic and focus on demonstrating the
exclusion of the Jewish minority in Turkey.
15
Various studies underline the exclu-
sionary practice of the Turkish state towards the Jewish minority,
16
and condemn
the secular Turkish state for failing to provide equal opportunities to its Jewish min-
ority.
17
Brink-Danan criticizes the optimistic perspective for advancing a deceitful,
peaceful relationship that serves the Turkish state ideology.
18
Bali calls those
members of the Jewish community who promote this optimistic perspective, the
“Jews of the state.”
19
He adds that these Jews, despite their loyalty, are not exempt
from the exclusionary attitude of the Turkish state.
20
In a recent ethnographic study, Brink-Danan describes the Jewish community in
Turkey as having to perform two roles by serving the country as loyal-patriots and repre-
senting the image of the tolerated other.
21
These roles are contradictory, as one empha-
sizes sameness and the other difference. Brink-Danan claims that Turkish Jews keep a
low profile as a strategy to veil their identity publicly in their attempt to assimilate into
Turkish society.
22
Furthermore, Guttstadt dismisses the view of the Turkish officers’
helping to save the Jews in Europe during World War II as exceptional cases.
23
Baer,
reflecting on the same issue, provides important evidence on how the Turkish state
attempted to stop Jewish migration from Germany to Turkey by not reinstating citizen-
ship to Turkish Jews living in Germany during the Holocaust period.
24
These two academic perspectives share a common understanding of Turkish Jews
as non-native residents. Accordingly, the tolerance perspective seems to encourage
Jewish assimilation into Turkish society as secular citizens;
25
the alternative view
is critical to what it sees as the exclusionary attitude of the Turkish state and
society. Although these accounts provide an informed view about the Jewish experi-
ence in Turkey, the scholarship can benefit from further empirical studies that focus
on contemporary anti-Semitic rhetoric in light of recent changes in Turkey that are
manifest in the common use of the term “New Turkey.” In addition, these studies
do not sufficiently address the reasons for the exclusionary view against Turkish
Jews. This study attempts to provide an explanation by presenting the Se
`vres syn-
drome as a paranoid mistrust in Turkish politics and society that empowers anti-
Semitic conspiratorial rhetoric.
The Paranoid Style in Turkish Politics and Its Significance
The Se
`vres syndrome refers to political anxiety in Turkey about the dismantlement of
the country by plots of Western countries and their local puppets, especially min-
orities.
26
The historical background of the syndrome dates to the collapse of the
574 T.S. Nefes
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Ottoman Empire. Throughout the nineteenth century, Ottoman authorities struggled
to preserve the empire against independence movements of minority groups (e.g.
Greeks, Serbs) and wars against Western powers.
27
These attempts were rendered
futile by the conclusion of the Se
`vres Treaty in 1920 at the end of World War I,
because the treaty divided up large portions of Ottoman territory between Western
powers and new Kurdish and Armenian states.
28
This agreement formally brought
an end to the empire and led to the Turkish War of Independence between 1919
and 1923, which was concluded by the Lausanne Treaty. This new treaty annulled
the Se
`vres Treaty and marked the establishment of the Turkish Republic.
29
For the
political elite of the new Turkish Republic, the Se
`vres Treaty represented the
epitome of external and internal existential threats, a mixture of the Western
powers and various ethnic and cultural minorities. Robins explains this as follows:
“Many Turks, apparently from all walks of life, regard Se
`vres as a moment of
clarity and insight into the real attitudes and intentions of the West Europeans.”
30
Various scholars referred to this paranoid vision about enemies’ intentions to
weaken and carve up Turkey as the Se
`vres syndrome.
31
The Se
`vres syndrome became an important theme in mainstream politics with
policy implications. Go
¨c¸ek recounts the historical progress of the syndrome in
three stages: (1) the Republican elite turned the treaty into a paranoid vision about
internal and external enemies; (2) many political actors, such as the Turkish army,
helped the reproduction of the syndrome; and (3) the syndrome began to lose its hege-
mony, but continued to be significant.
32
Scholarship on this topic refers to the socio-
political significance of the syndrome in different fields: on the creation of isolationist
state policies and insecurity about the Western countries;
33
the education curricu-
lum;
34
foreign policy;
35
and with respect the Kurdish insurrection, led by the Kurdi-
stan Workers Party (PKK).
36
Moreover, Guida suggests that the syndrome has shaped
Turkish intellectuals’ perception of society and politics.
37
It does not seem to be a farfetched idea to claim that this anxiety about the plots of
external enemies and their internal collaborators influences the perception of Turkish
Jews. Toktas¸’ three interrelated points about the perception of non-Muslims also
manifest the importance of the syndrome for Turkish anti-Semitism: (1) non-
Muslim minorities were seen as “alien elements” and were excluded; (2) Islam has
shaped Turkish nationalism and the definition of Turk; and (3) non-Muslims were
perceived as belonging to their kin states, such as Israel, which was seen as the
home of the Jewish minority.
38
These points seem to be in line with the rationale
of the syndrome, which builds on a mistrust about foreign powers and internal min-
orities. That is to say, we can read the Turkish state’s exclusion of non-Muslims from
the definition of the Turkish nation, and the suspicion of seeing them as extensions of
their kin states as a consequence of the paranoid anxieties of the Se
`vres syndrome. In
line with this view, Ziya Go
¨kalp, the founding father of Turkish sociology and an
early formulator of Turkish nationalism, points to the Sunni Turks of the Hanafi
school as the central group into which non-Turkish Muslims should assimilate and
leaves out non-Muslims in his view of the Turkish nation.
39
Following Durkheim’s
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 575
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sociological perspective, Go
¨kalp believes that religion is the root of a nation, and
therefore, non-Muslims in Turkey are not part of the nation.
40
The Do
¨nme Community
Before going into the conspiratorial rhetoric about the Do
¨nme, historical facts about
the community should be put forward. To begin, the Do
¨nme community is a name
given to the followers of Sabbatai Sevi (1626–76). In 1665, Sevi was claimed by
Nathan of Gaza to be the messiah of the Jews.
41
This message quickly gained accep-
tance among many communities, and Sevi became an important religious figure in the
seventeenth century.
42
In response to his growing influence, the Ottoman authorities
took Sevi to court and forced him to convert to Islam. His name was changed to Aziz
Mehmed Efendi, and he became an employee of the Ottoman Palace. Subsequently,
he was taken to court for the second time, as there were doubts about the genuineness
of his conversion to Islam. He was sent to a small town called U
¨lgu
¨n in today’s
Albania, where he stayed until the end of his life.
43
Sabbatai Sevi’s forced conversion generated immense disappointment among his
followers, and many ceased believing in him. Nevertheless, several hundred families
kept their belief and converted to Islam like Sevi in the seventeenth century, and thus
became the first Do
¨nme. While appearing as Muslims in public, they kept practicing
Sevi’s version of messianic Judaism in private.
44
In other words, their conversion to
Islam was not wholehearted. They did not marry outsiders and existed as a secret
community in the Ottoman Empire. However, their existence was known in the
empire and their secrecy was tolerated.
There are a few important historical moments for the Do
¨nme community. First, in
the late nineteenth century, some Do
¨nme, such as Mehmed Cavid Bey, took impor-
tant roles in the ruling pro-modernization party of the Ottoman Empire, the Commit-
tee of Union and Progress (CUP). Second, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire,
there was a population exchange in 1924 between Muslim Turks in Greece and
Orthodox Greeks in Turkey. In the exchange, the Do
¨nme, seen as Muslim Turks
by the Greek authorities, were deported to Turkey.
45
Third, the Capital Levy of
1942 in Turkey, which imposed heavy taxes on non-Muslim minorities, included
lists of Do
¨nme families in the non-Muslim category. Finally, the community came
back to public attention in the 1990s, especially through the works of Ilgaz Zorlu.
His book, Yes I am a Salonikan, and his media appearances amplified the interest
in the Do
¨nme.
46
Although the Do
¨nme community is a secret society, its existence has been brought
to public attention a number of times. It is uncertain how many Do
¨nme there are, and
whether the community has been completely assimilated. S¸is¸man estimates that there
are 70,000–80,000 people of Do
¨nme origin in Turkey today, and only around
3,000–4,000 people still follow the belief in Sevi.
47
Although many associate the
Do
¨nme community with the Jewish minority in Turkey, a predominantly Sephardic
population of approximately 27,500 as of 2005,
48
the Do
¨nme constitute a distinct
community.
49
Indeed, when Ilgaz Zorlu, a self-proclaimed member of the
576 T.S. Nefes
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community, wanted to retain his belief in Sevi and be a member of the Turkish-Jewish
community, the synagogue refused his application and denied the existence of the
community.
50
Moreover, when I interviewed the representatives of the Turkish-
Jewish community in 2009, they reiterated that they do not have any knowledge
about and interest in the followers of Sevi.
Anti-Semitic Literature about the Do
¨nme
The Do
¨nme have helped to produce persistent anti-Semitic rhetoric shaped by conspi-
racy theories.
51
According to Baer, the community constitutes the main focal point in
Turkish anti-Semitism.
52
Indeed, anti-Semitic conspiracy theories about the Do
¨nme
have been much more prevalent than conspiratorial rhetoric on Turkish Jews. The
emergence of the conspiracy theories about the Do
¨nme dates back to the beginning
of the twentieth century. The Do
¨nme involvement in the CUP helped to generate con-
spiracy theories. Theodor Herzl, the head of the World Zionist Organization, came to
Istanbul in 1899 with the intention of buying Palestine for Jews, but the Ottoman ruler
Sultan Abdulhamid II did not accept the request.
53
Subsequently, Abdulhamid II was
toppled by a CUP-organized coup d’etat in 1908, and some conspiratorial lines
claimed that this was a Jewish revenge for his refusal to sell Palestine. These theories
used the involvement in the coup d’etat of the Do
¨nme, Mehmed Cavid Bey, and the
Jewish Freemason, Emmanuel Carosso, as indicators of a Jewish conspiracy.
Conspiracy theories about the Do
¨nme became widespread among the Turkish
public in three distinct periods: the single-party period (1923– 50); the multi-party
democratic period (1950 – 90); and the post-1990 period.
54
First, during the single-
party period, they emerged after Karakas¸zade Ru
¨s¸du
¨, a self-proclaimed member of
the group, submitted a petition to the Turkish parliament about incoming Do
¨nme
in 1924. He proposed that the deportation of the Do
¨nme from Greece should be auth-
orized only on the condition that they were willing to assimilate into Turkish
society.
55
This led to a discussion on the Do
¨nme in the Turkish media, which
lasted a few weeks. There were conspiratorial claims about the community that
depicted the Do
¨nme as a secret and treacherous society degenerating Turkish
culture.
56
Following this, not many conspiracy theories about the Do
¨nme were
printed due censorship by the single party.
Second, after the end of the single party regime in 1950, state censorship over pol-
itical groups that published conspiracy theories decreased. Right-wing journals in
1952 published the claims of Nazif O
¨zge, another Do
¨nme, who accused the commu-
nity of immoral behavior.
57
This was followed by other conspiracy theories published
in right-wing sources that alleged that the community deliberately undermined
Turkish culture and unity. Until the 1990s, only right-wing and Islamist extremist
groups circulated the conspiracy theories about the Do
¨nme.
Third, as mentioned earlier, Ilgaz Zorlu wrote about the Do
¨nme in the 1990s. In
this period, conspiracy theories were not only proposed by the right-wing and Islamist
groups, but also extended to the left-wing and Kurdish intellectuals. Moreover, the
popularity of the book series called Efendi led to a lively debate in the Turkish
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 577
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media.
58
The positive responses to the books highlighted the importance of the
subject, while the criticisms mainly underlined the methodological weaknesses of
Yalc¸ın’s research and its anti-Semitic content. Bali suggests that this discussion rou-
tinized the anti-Semitic conspiratorial rhetoric about the hidden Jewish control in
Turkish politics.
59
Nefes underlines five recurring themes in the conspiracy theories: (1) the Do
¨nme
are clandestinely in power in Turkey; (2) the community members are composed of
the elite that established the Turkish Republic in the early twentieth century; (3) the
community hides its real and malevolent plans; (4) the community degenerates the
Turkish culture to destabilize the nation; and (5) the Do
¨nme ally with foreign
powers against the Turkish interests.
60
These imply an influence of the Se
`vres syn-
drome on the anti-Semitic rhetoric about the Do
¨nme community. The present
study details this analysis by exploring the content of the popular contemporary con-
spiracy books about the Do
¨nme and interviews with their authors.
Methods
I conducted semi-structured in-depth interviews with three authors who wrote
popular conspiratorial accounts about the Do
¨nme community, namely Yalc¸ın
Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, Soner Yalc¸ın, and Abdurrahman Dilipak. While three interviews may
sound like a thin database, there are only four living authors published on the
issue, and my interviewees have been prominent intellectuals for decades, represent-
ing different versions of the anti-Semitic conspiratorial rhetoric. In the academic lit-
erature to date, there are no interviews with conspiracy authors to understand the
reasons for and the ways of producing conspiratorial accounts. The interviews help
one to understand the rationale of conspiracy theorizing by looking into the ways
in which the conspiracy theorists portray the Do
¨nme community and their reasons
for writing these accounts. In that regard, the analysis of this study is confined to
their stances on the Do
¨nme debate, although these authors published about a plethora
of other topics.
I allowed the respondents to suggest the location in which they would feel comfor-
table. These places were either their houses or offices. Each interview took 60 –90
minutes, which provided the interviewees with enough time to elaborate on their
views of the Do
¨nme. The interviews focused on two main issues: the authors’
reasons for creating conspiratorial accounts about the Do
¨nme and how they see the
political impact of the community in Turkey. In this way, I was able to trace the
authors’ rationales in creating the conspiracy theories and the ways the Se
`vres syn-
drome may have influenced these accounts. This study also compares the content
of the interviews with the content of the authors’ books to provide a more compre-
hensive view. As the authors’ arguments in the interviews very often converged
with the content of the books, the following analysis, for the sake of brevity,
mainly underlines the points that diverged between them. Nevertheless, I added the
books as references when their content coincided with the interviews by quoting
from them as well.
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Before going into the analysis of the findings, a brief introduction of each of the
authors maybe helpful. To start with, Professor Yalc¸ınKu
¨c¸u
¨k, a prominent Marxist intel-
lectual, has been politically active for 50 years. During this period, he has been brought to
court and imprisoned various times. Indeed, a week after the interview, Ku
¨c¸u
¨kwas
arrested on suspicion of a connection to a conspiratorial plot called Ergenekon
61
and
released in December 2012. His recent works, especially about the Do
¨nme, have
become popular among the public.
62
The second respondent, Soner Yalc¸ın, is a well-
known left-leaning intellectual and journalist, who is closer to a secular and republican
ideological standpoint in Turkey. Yalc¸ın has written several books on Turkish politics
and history. Yalc¸ın’s conspiratorial account about the Do
¨nme community, Efendi,
becameabestseller.
63
Yalc¸ın was arrested in February 2011 on suspicion of taking
part in the Ergenekon plot and was released in December 2012.
64
Abdurrahman
Dilipak is a renowned Islamic intellectual and a human rights activist, who has been
involved in Turkish politics for approximately 50 years. He worked as an adviser to
the Islamist political party, National Salvation Party, between 1978 and 1980. He cur-
rently writes for a national Islamist newspaper, Yeni Akit.
Constructing the Conspiratorial Rhetoric about the Do
¨nme Community
The Authors’ Rationales for the Research
During the interview, Ku
¨c¸u
¨k mentions that a socialist perspective demands an analysis
that shows that rulers and the ruled are from different classes. Moreover, he wants to
unveil how the ruling class in Turkey comes from the same ethnic community:
“There is nothing more leftist than showing the ethnic origins of the upper class in
Turkey, and I am delighted to do that.” He claims that the Do
¨nme community is an
unexplored topic in Turkish academic literature and prides himself as a pioneer
using a scientific methodology of onomastics, the study of proper names of all kinds
and their origins, in searching the community’s influence in Turkey.
65
In his books,
although he does not explain his reasons for dealing with the topic very clearly,
Ku
¨c¸u
¨k states that the aim of the work is to unveil the political monopoly in Turkey.
66
In the interview, Yalc¸ın gives a lengthy account of the books he published to show
how he arrived at the Do
¨nme topic. He was first interested in the history of the
Turkish secret service, in which he claims to have found alleged Do
¨nmes. Sub-
sequently, when he was researching the backgrounds of these agency members, he
discovered other alleged Do
¨nmes in prominent positions of Turkish politics. This
made him realize that the Do
¨nme topic is very important. Like Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, he criticizes
that the Do
¨nme topic is not only ignored by social scientists in Turkey, but has
also been used pejoratively by Islamist and nationalist groups. He remarks, “The
Do
¨nme was .. . used as a derogatory word among radical Islamists and nationalists
... How come Sabbatai Sevi, who is very important for the history of Judaism,
does not exist in our history?” Yalc¸ın does not explain the reasons for working on
the topic in his books.
67
Nevertheless, he mentions that some anonymous people
encouraged him to research the Do
¨nme community.
68
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The third interviewee, Dilipak, did not start examining the Do
¨nme issue as an intel-
lectual curiosity. Dilipak met Ilgaz Zorlu, who initiated the Do
¨nme discussion in the
1990s. He helped Zorlu to legally change his religion on his national identity card
from Muslim to Jew and became interested in the topic. He observes, “Subsequently,
there were negative and positive reactions to the articles I wrote ... I was also sued
five times for this research, and therefore I needed to learn more about it.” In his
book, he underlines that the Do
¨nme issue is an important but unexplored topic.
69
He claims that some influential politicians are from the Do
¨nme community. In the
interview, he declares his desire to know more about the community to be conversant
about the people in power in Turkey.
Recounting the Do
¨nme Power in Different Ways
In the interview, Ku
¨c¸u
¨k argues that many well-known and powerful members of
Turkish society (e.g. prime ministers, celebrities, and academics), are Do
¨nme who
hide their identity.
70
Due to their networks, the Do
¨nme can become powerful in
Turkey without necessary qualifications. He alleges, “If somebody without a talent
rises in society, she or he has to have Jewish origins.” When he suspects that some-
body is in a prominent position but does not deserve it, he searches for the family tree
of the person to see whether she or he is Jewish or Do
¨nme in origin. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k suggests
that Do
¨nmes and Jews coalesced to establish the Turkish Republic, which they saw as
a potential Judaic homeland during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
However, they took an opposite political direction after 1967 to destroy the Republic.
In his books, he explains that Jews became confident of Israel’s continuous existence
in 1967 following the Israeli victory in the Six Day War, and this led the Jewish dia-
spora to devote their efforts to protecting the Israeli state.
71
They switched loyalty
from the countries in which they lived to Israel. In his books, he gives a similar
but more detailed account about the Jewish conspiracies in Turkey with claims
such as: “it is impossible to explain the Turkish modernization without referring to
the Do
¨nme community and beliefs.”
72
He regards the community as a dangerous
and powerful political opponent and protects his political allies.
In parallel, Yalc¸ın paints a picture of a powerful Do
¨nme community. He sees the
Do
¨nme as well educated and prosperous with cosmopolitan values. Like Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, he
suggests that Do
¨nme were the carriers of Turkish modernization in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries.
73
However, Yalc¸ın believes that the community lost its pol-
itical hegemony during the 1990s to Islamist movements. He explains the decrease
in Do
¨nme’s power according to demographic changes, especially the rural
migration from the 1950s onwards. He proposes that big migrant waves deformed
the cosmopolitan city culture and helped the Islamist movements to gain power.
Nevertheless, he states that Do
¨nme remained one of the most powerful lobbies
in Turkish politics. Yalc¸ ın refers to their lobby as a sociological necessity rather
than a hidden evil: “it is like fellow townsman relationships [hems¸erilik]...
people from Erzurum also meet and support each other, when they come to Istan-
bul.” He describes the community only as a lobby group, no longer a religious one,
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because he believes that the majority of the Do
¨nme have been secularized. Yalc¸ın
proposes that the Do
¨nme community is scattered among a variety of ideological
groups to manipulate Turkish politics from different angles.
74
They hide their
real interests and act as if they are genuine affiliates of various organizations,
but in reality, they secretly serve their community. He also suggests that despite
being a cosmopolitan and secular community and their power being undermined
by the Islamist-conservative politics, the Do
¨nme lobby cooperates with the Isla-
mists, because they shift political sides in different contexts depending on their
interests. He condemns the Do
¨nme for this pragmatic attitude shift and for not
holding onto their cosmopolitan values.
In his books, Yalc¸ ın contextualizes the Do
¨nme conspiracy as a part of global
Jewish plots against the Turkish nation.
75
The books, for the most part, constitute
a leftist account by associating Do
¨nme conspiracies with right-wing, liberal, and Isla-
mist groups. In this perspective, the USA and Jews have always intervened in Turkish
politics for their own benefits, in line with capitalism, and the Do
¨nme have played the
covert local collaborator role. While Yalc¸ ın talks about the decreasing power of the
community recently to the Islamist political groups during the interview, he does not
mention that in his Efendi series. He adds that the Do
¨nme secretly control many Isla-
mist groups and manipulate Turkish politics.
In the interview, Dilipak describes the Do
¨nme as a powerful, conspiring lobby that is
connected to important institutions inside and outside Turkey. He links the community
to various groups and ideologies such as Freemasonry, American capitalism, and the
Turkish “deep-state,” which is believed to be an extra-legal organization consisting
of high-level state officials to curb the marginal elements in Turkish politics by legal
and illegal means.
76
Dilipak views the Do
¨nme lobby not a sociological necessity,
like the townsman support-networks of people like Yalc¸ ın. He thinks that their relations
are much more deliberate and conspiratorial. He describes an interconnected system that
resembles the Olympic symbol. This conspiratorialorganization has members in all seg-
ments of society, who are unaware of what and whom they are serving. He opines,
“They can be anywhere! They are in the democracy discussion; they are the leading
members of socialism, liberalism and even of religious groups.” The reason behind
this, he claims, lies in the fact that the group members are secretly coordinated by a
global movement. Their distribution in different political groups is to create an illusion.
He states that the Do
¨nme become the partners of global powers because of their onto-
logical proximity, by which he means the cosmopolitan character of the community. In
other words, Dilipak understands the Do
¨nme community as a powerful lobby group that
is pawned by global powers, because its cosmopolitan character (i.e. non-Turkish, non-
Muslim) allows the global conspirators to easily control them.
77
This suggests that the Do
¨nme are not the sole problem, as their power is a by-product
of a global conspiracy, which Dilipak calls “the deep reality.” It is a secret system
beyond apparent that is located where the masters of the world geographically reside,
that is, “the United States and England and goes to the East, e.g. Israel.” “The deep
reality” has a much wider significance than contemporary geo-political coalitions, as
it is embedded in history and religion. Dilipak associates it with the construction of
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 581
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the prophet Suleyman’s temple, and the deep secret begins there for him: “It is a bit of
mythology, a bit of history, a bit of theology, and a bit of the hermetic world ...It is
something beyond virtual. It is about the ontological architecture of the world.” The
respondent believes that “the deep reality” aims to bring history to an end and
prepare the world for the Armageddon. He refers to many widespread themes of the
global conspiracy literature while portraying “the deep reality,” such as the Knights
Templar and the Rothschild family. He adds that the ordinary Do
¨nme is not aware of
this due to the complex manipulations of the system. In his book, he has a similar
tone, but focuses more on the Do
¨nme influence in Turkish politics.
78
He refers to the
account about the toppling of Abdulhamid II by a Jewish and Masonic conspiracy
and resumes the Islamist line of conspiratorial rhetoric on the topic.
Discussion and Conclusion
The findings support the premise that the Se
`vres syndrome invigorates anti-Semitic con-
spiratorial rhetoric in Turkey. In the current study, this is evident in the authors’ choice
of the topic and understanding the impacts of the community. To begin with the former,
the authors’ interests in the Do
¨nme topic are not shaped by anti-Semitic ideas that they
held before writing their books. Instead, they arrived at the Do
¨nme discussion as a result
of their previous intellectual and professional endeavors: Ku
¨c¸u
¨k’s work builds on the
postulate he first claimed in the 1990s that the ruling class in Turkey comes from the
Do
¨nme origins;
79
Yalc¸ın’s previous studies brought him to the Do
¨nme topic; Dilipak
became interested in the discussion while helping a Do
¨nme member to convert to
Judaism. Their previous books did not focus on Turkish Jews and the Do
¨nme, which
also attests that the community did not concern them from an anti-Semitic viewpoint.
The authors engaged with the debate once they thought that the community has been
shaping the political agenda in Turkey. That is to say, their political anxiety about the
significance of a secret non-Muslim minority in Turkish politics, resonant with the
Se
`vres syndrome, triggered their research on the Do
¨nme topic.
Second, the authors’ views on the political significance of the Do
¨nme community
as a secret, foreign community in Turkey are in line with the rhetoric of the Se
`vres
syndrome, an anxiety about minorities secretly controlled by foreign enemies
against the interests of the country. All of the authors see the community as a power-
ful inside threat to Turkey. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k believes that the Do
¨nme community constitutes a
formidable group working together with foreign powers in an attempt to destroy the
Turkish Republic. Yalc¸ ın has a similar perspective and portrays the community as a
local group serving the capitalistic interests of developed countries, such as the USA.
Dilipak reiterates the toppling of Abdulhamid II and presents the Do
¨nme community
as an internal enemy of the country pawned by external foes. Moreover, the Do
¨nme’s
alleged secrecy is a vital element that led the authors to create these accounts.
Ku
¨c¸u
¨k’s method relies on the postulate that the Do
¨nme secretly promote each
other and retain the prominent positions in Turkey. Yalc¸ın became involved in the
Do
¨nme discussion only after he allegedly unveiled the hidden Do
¨nme identity of a
number of successful people. Dilipak associates the Do
¨nme with “the deep
582 T.S. Nefes
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reality,” a secret system beyond apparent, and explains their secrecy as a deliberate
strategy to hide their activities. Furthermore, the authors use the conspiratorial
accounts pragmatically in line with their political views. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k openly states that
his task is to scientifically unveil the identity of his political enemies. From a political
Islamist position, Dilipak discredits groups that he sees with non-Islamic orientations,
such as non-Muslims, as easily controlled by “the deep reality.” Yalc¸ın finds the
Do
¨nme only among ideological opponents.
The discussion illustrates that the authors’ concerns are not international Jewry or
Judaism. It is Turkish politics from a pragmatic perspective. They focus on the
Do
¨nme topic as long as they perceive it as an existential threat to the Turkish Repub-
lic, in line with the Se
`vres syndrome. Once this condition is met, the authors reframe
the discussion from their political standpoints. This conclusion might have important
implications for comprehending the contemporary Turkish perception of Jews. On
the one hand, it resonates with the argument that Turkish anti-Semitism is not a main-
stream social and political movement in Turkey and is not comparable to Western and
Christian anti-Semitism. On the other hand, it implies that there is potential for the
wide dissemination of the anti-Semitic conspiratorial lines, when they are framed
in line with the Se
`vres syndrome. It might also mean that Turkish Jews are potential
suspects like any other communities that are seen as non-native and non-loyal. This
view can explain why anti-Semitism in Turkey tends to happen as sporadic move-
ments following international crises that are seen as related to Jews, such as the
Mavi Marmara flotilla incident;
80
they are prone to trigger the Se
`vres syndrome by
bringing into question the loyalty of Turkish Jews in terms of whether they would
defend the Turkish interests or be controlled by foreign powers.
One could object to this analysis by claiming that the discussion is only confined to
the Do
¨nme topic and does not represent the general perception of Jews in Turkey.
However, this argument would not be entirely valid, as the literature about the
Do
¨nme community constitutes various anti-Semitic arguments that concern Jews in
general. Indeed, this paper provides an exemplary and significant case of the
impacts of the Se
`vres syndrome in the perception of Jewry in Turkey. Future research
can look into different contexts of the perception of non-Muslims in Turkey and its
relationship to the Se
`vres syndrome.
All in all, reflecting on the production of the conspiratorial rhetoric about the
Do
¨nme community, the findings are in line with the view that anti-Semitism is not
a culturally rooted and prevalent phenomenon in Turkey. This seems to suggest
that they are treated as a non-native resident community that needs to prove its
loyalty on a constant basis due to the political insecurities about the perceived
non-local minorities, namely the Se
`vres syndrome.
Acknowledgements
This article benefited from the insightful comments of the anonymous reviewer and
the editor Paul Kubicek.
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 583
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Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Funding
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to the funding from The Scientific and Technological
Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) that provided the opportunity to develop this study for
publication.
Notes
1. Pew Research Centre, “Global Attitudes Project Question Base.”
2. Dink Foundation, “Medyada Nefret So
¨ylemi ve Ayrımcı Dil.”
3. Nefes, “Scrutinizing Impacts of Conspiracy Theories on Readers’ Political Views.”
4. Koc¸, “Reflections on the Davos Crisis.”
5. As the Do
¨nme hide their rituals, membership and organizations from the outsiders, the study calls them
a secret society.
6. For example, Levy, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire.
7. Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, 40.
8. Ibid., 256 – 7.
9. Kuyas¸, “Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Anti-Semitizm Var mıydı?”
10. Toktas¸, “Perceptions of Anti-Semitism.”
11. Toktas¸, “Citizenship and Minorities.”
12. Lewis, The Jews of Islam.
13. Ibid., 138.
14. Ibid.
15. For example, Baer, “Turk and Jew in Berlin,” Bali, “The Politics of Turkification,” and “Present-day
Anti-Semitism in Turkey.”
16. Haker, Once Upon a Time.
17. Bali, Musa’nın Evlatları Cumhuriyet’in Vatandas¸ları.
18. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st-Century Turkey.
19. Bali, Musa’nın Evlatları Cumhuriyet’in Vatandas¸ları.
20. Ibid., 25.
21. Brink-Danan, Jewish Life in 21st-Century Turkey.
22. Ibid.
23. Guttstadt, Tu
¨rkiye, Yahudiler ve Holokost.
24. Baer, “Turk and Jew in Berlin.”
25. See Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.
26. Nefes, “Ziya Go
¨kalp’s Adaptation.”
27. Nefes, “Political Parties’ Perceptions.”
28. Jung, “The Se
`vres Syndrome”
29. Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times.”
30. Robins, Suits and Uniforms, 104.
31. E.g. Jung, “The Se
`vres Syndrome.”
32. Go
¨c¸ ek, The Transformation of Turkey.
33. Yılmaz, “Euroscepticism in Turkey.”
34. Webb, “Resisting Anamnesis.”
35. Aras, “Turkey’s Rise,” 32.
36. Jung and Piccoli, “The Turkish-Israeli Alignment.”
584 T.S. Nefes
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37. Guida, “The Se
`vres syndrome”; Komplo, “Theories in the Islamist and Secular Press.”
38. Toktas¸, “Perceptions of Anti-Semitism.”
39. Go
¨kalp, The Principles of Turkism.
40. Ibid.
41. Baer, The Do
¨nme.
42. Neyzi, “Remembering to Forget”; S¸is¸man, “Sabetaycılıg
˘ın Osmanlı ve Tu
¨rkiye Seru
¨veni.”
43. S¸is¸man, Sabatay Sevi ve Sabataycılar.
44. Baer, The Do
¨nmes.
45. Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasony.
46. Zorlu, Evet Ben Selanik’liyim.
47. S¸is¸man, “Cortijo de Sevi.”
48. Ic¸duygu et al., “The Politics of Population.”
49. Baer, “The Double Bind of Race and Religion.”
50. Hu
¨rriyet, “Ekim’de Din Deg
˘is¸ tirme Davası Ac¸ acak.”
51. Nefes, “The History of the Social Constructions of Do
¨nmes (Converts).”
52. Baer, “An Enemy Old and New.”
53. Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons.
54. Ibid.
55. Bessemer, “Who is a Crypto-Jew?”
56. Nefes, “The Function of Secrecy”
57. Bali, “Bir Do
¨nmenin Hikayesi: Nazif O
¨zge kimdir?”
58. Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons.
59. Ibid.
60. Nefes, “The History of the Social Constructions of Do
¨nmes (Converts).”
61. Radikal, “Yo
¨n’den Ergenekon’a Yalc¸ın Ku
¨c¸u
¨k.”
62. Bali, A Scapegoat for All Seasons.
63. Ibid.
64. Radikal, “Soner Yalc¸ ın: Ak Parti Sadece Piyon.”
65. See also Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, Tekeliyet;Tekelistan.
66. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, Tekeliyet;Tekelistan.
67. Yalc¸ın, Efendi: Beyaz Tu
¨rklerin Bu
¨yu
¨k Sırrı;Efendi 2: Beyaz Mu
¨slu
¨manların Bu
¨yu
¨k Sırrı.
68. Yalc¸ın, Efendi 2: Beyaz Mu
¨slu
¨manların Bu
¨yu
¨k Sırrı.
69. Zorlu and Dilipak, S¸is¸li Terakki Davaları.
70. See also Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, Tekeliyet;Tekelistan.
71. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, Tekeliyet;Tekelistan.
72. Ibid.
73. See also Yalc¸ın, Efendi: Beyaz Tu
¨rklerin Bu
¨yu
¨k Sırrı.
74. See also ibid.
75. Yalc¸ın, Efendi: Beyaz Tu
¨rklerin Bu
¨yu
¨k Sırrı;Efendi 2: Beyaz Mu
¨slu
¨manların Bu
¨yu
¨kSırrı.
76. See also Zorlu and Dilipak, S¸is¸li Terakki Davaları.
77. See also ibid.
78. Ibid.
79. Ku
¨c¸u
¨k, “I
˙statistik-Lengistik Bakıs¸ ”; “Konversos ve Orhan Pamuk.”
80. Nefes, Online Anti-Semitism in Turkey.
Notes on Contributor
Tu
¨rkay Salim Nefes is a Research Associate at the Sociology Department of the University of Oxford. His
research interests are in the socio-political significance of conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism in Turkey and
political communication. Most recently, he has published a book called Online Anti-Semitism in Turkey
(Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
Understanding Anti-Semitic Rhetoric in Turkey 585
Downloaded by [173.190.228.162] at 02:57 30 January 2016
ORCID
Tu
¨rkay Salim Nefes http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0294-2064
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