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The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics

August 2015
Ekonomski horizonti 17(2):125-136

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The paper provides an insight into the dominant trends of contemporary evolutionary economics and outlines the important issues related to the articulation of this approach in thinking about the economy. The paper also affirms a proposition on institutions as carrier structures of socio-economic evolution, whose numerous effects at the societal level are decoded through the coordination function. In addition to the market, the process of coordination also employs other non-market institutional structures, whose profile and operational principles are the product of the trajectories of cultural and historical evolution, different among social orders. Projects aimed at the transformation of the economic system are to be sensitized to an objectively conditioned diversity of the institutional structures of the world economy, and in this sense, should be very careful in the installation of „universal” reform solutions.

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Economic Horizons, May - August 2015, Volume 17, Number 2, 123 - 134

Faculty of Economics, University of Kragujevac

UDC: 33 eISSN 2217-9232 www. ekfak.kg.ac.rs

Review paper

UDC:330.837

doi: 10.5937/ekonhor1502125S

INTRODUCTION

The economy of today’s, similar to other areas of

social organization, is passing through an extremely

dynamic era. Continuous pressures towards

redesigning economic structures, shifts in power

relations at dierent levels of the economy and

increasingly regular excessive movements of economic

ows undoubtedly put serious tasks before economic

theory, for the most part still habituated to having a

much more stable system, suitable for deliberation in

equilibristic categories, as an object of observation.

There is a growing need to reect the modern economy,

given the presence, frequency and scope of the changes

which it is exposed to, from the perspective that will

take into account the dynamics as its substantial

aribute. The conventional economic analysis,

supported by the mechanistic conceptualization of

the economy as a static, equilibrium system is an

appropriate and logical approximation of the real

economic system, with the proven educational and

analytical values. However, it has become obvious that

the metrics of modern, immanently dynamic economic

processes elude concise conceptual relations of this

THE COORDINATION ASPECT OF INSTITUTIONS IN

THE CONTEXT OF AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO

ECONOMIC DYNAMICS

Zoran Stefanovic*

Faculty of Economics, University of Nis, Nis, The Republic of Serbia

The paper provides an insight into the dominant trends of contemporary evolutionary economics and

outlines the important issues related to the articulation of this approach in thinking about the economy.

The paper also arms a proposition on institutions as carrier structures of socio-economic evolution, whose

numerous eects at the societal level are decoded through the coordination function. In addition to the

market, the process of coordination also employs other non-market institutional structures, whose prole

and operational principles are the product of the trajectories of cultural and historical evolution, dierent

among social orders. Projects aimed at the transformation of the economic system are to be sensitized to

an objectively conditioned diversity of the institutional structures of the world economy, and in this sense,

should be very careful in the installation of „universal” reform solutions.

Keywords: generalized Darwinism, replicator, interactor, institutions, coordination

JEL Classication: B15, B25, B52, E02, E14

* Correspondence to: Z. Stefanovic, Faculty of Economics,

University of Nis, Trg kralja Aleksandra Ujedinitelja 11, 18000

Nis, The Republic of Serbia;

e-mail: zoran.stefanovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

124 Economic Horizons (2015) 17(2), 123- 134

undoubtedly powerful epistemological approach.

Thus, an even modest step out of the orthodox

economic epistemology into some of alternative views,

which might be able to provide from reality a less

remote and yet suciently rigorous conceptualization

of economic reality, would be useful.

Beyond the boundaries of the mainstream of economic

thought, evolutionary economics is a particularly

popular epistemological orientation. As opposed to

economic orthodoxy, which conceptually mimics

classical physics, the above-mentioned approach

mainly draws on the epistemological metaphor taken

from the science of the evolution of biological systems.

The generalization of the principle of evolution refers

to a broad class of complex phenomena with the

features of complex population systems, among which

the economy can be counted as well. The economy

is, therefore, perceived as a system whose dynamics

takes place in accordance with the principles of the

evolutionary variation, heredity and selection. The

essential task in articulating this epistemological

framework is to identify entities with quasi-genetic

properties, which carry the evolution of the system.

Evolutionary economics has not yet provided any

unique answer to the aforementioned question, given

the fact that dierent structures are proposed in order

to ll this conceptual gap. Institutional structures

certainly represent one of the possible solutions in

the conceptualization of the „genetic” base of the

economy. Institutions accumulate knowledge and

provide recipes for the functioning of the system and

socio-economic coordination, as its focal point. As the

cardinal actor of coordination, the market is joined by

other institutions, which, depending on the cultural

circumstances, are dierently established. Every socio-

economic order represents a mixture of coordination

mechanisms shaped by cultural and historical

circumstances, including both the market and non-

market institutions. Capitalism, in this sense, can be

understood as a kind of a family of dierent models

of the market economy, whose individual coordinating

properties and adaptability are based on the quality of

relations between the market and other institutional

structures, produced by cultural and historical

evolution.

The goal of the paper is to provide an insight into the

recent achievements of the streams of the economic

evolutionary analysis, concentrated around these

problems. In this sense, it begins with a detailed

introduction to the evolutionary orientation in

economic theory. Its origins are linked to the founder

of the American institutional economics, Veblen, and

his aspiration to establish economics as a „modern

science”, based on the Darwinian principles. The

evolutionist moment, however, disappears from the

laer ows of the institutional analysis. With the

new formulation of the Darwinian approach within

the science of the evolution of the living world, an

interest in this epistemological approach began to

emerge again. The breakthrough of the evolutionary

metaphor into economics began in the early nineteen-

eighties. In the last four decades, the evolutionary

principles have been elaborated in various elds of

the economic analysis, in the absence of a common

conceptual framework. After having reviewed the

aforementioned economic-theoretical trends, this

paper will present the eorts towards formulating the

general epistemological base of the nowadays widely

dispersed evolutionary analysis of the economy.

One of the popular articulations of the evolutionary

approach is, certainly, Generalized Darwinism. The

paper will illustrate dierent views on the possible

ways of the conceptualization of the aforementioned

epistemological framework, regarding operational

principles, structural relations and the relevant

constitutive units. In this respect, the paper will

sketch the concepts of Hodgson-Knudsen-Vanberg and

Pelikan. An integral part of the paper will also be a

critique of generalizing the Darwinian evolution as a

model of thinking about the economy. The paper will

also present an alternative theory of socio-economic

evolution, which denies the Darwinian character of

the evolutionary ows in society, embodied in the

„continuity thesis”. The nal part of the paper outlines

the role of institutions as a crucial element of socio-

economic evolution, with the major responsibilities

in economic coordination. In this regard, the

heterogeneous institutional structures that shape the

coordination capacity of the society will also be taken

into account.

Z. Stefanovic, The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics 125

In accordance with the objectives of the paper, the

general starting p of the analysis can be formulated

through the following statement: the evolutionary

approach to economic theory, understood in terms of

thinking of the economy as an evolutionary system,

based on the Darwinian principles of variation,

heredity and selection, conceptually supported by

institutions as approximation replicator structures, is

an appropriate form of the conceptualization of the

contemporary economic dynamics.

The paper will use methods suited to the research

goals, particularly relying on the analytical description.

VEBLENIAN ECONOMICS AND

EVOLUTIONISM

For more than a century, there have been eorts

within economic theory to conceptualize the economy

as a system subjected to the laws that are applied in

the world of biological evolution. A pioneer of this

orientation in economic theory, Veblen, considered the

constitution of economics on the Darwinist starting

points as a prerequisite of its transformation into a

„modern” science. He considered the mainstream

of the economic thought of his time to be a „pre-

Darwinian” science, focused on the taxonomy of

regular relations in the economy, whose theoretical

framework eluded those forces that actually drive the

economic process. None of the leading schools of the

economic thought of the time was spared Veblen’s

charges for a lack of sensibility for the achievements of

modern science. Marxism and the neoclassical school

were accused of an inadequate, reductionist treatment

of the „human material”, relying on the individual as

an economic actor, whose acting is over-determined by

a collective, class inuence (Marxism) or by essentially

inert, hedonistic human nature (the individualism of

the neoclassical and the Austrian schools). He was

an opponent of the determinism present within the

aforementioned schools of economic thought, in terms

of the ability to predict the outcomes of socio-economic

dynamics (Marxian predictions about revolution

and equilibrium states in the neo-classical approach)

(Veblen, 1998/1898, Hodgson, 1998).

T. Veblen searched for an epistemological framework

which could enable the comprehension of the motional

mechanisms of the socio-economic processes and at

the same time help overcome the dichotomy between

methodological individualism and collectivism. The

reconstituted, post-Darwinian economic science should

explain the process of cultural growth determined by

economic interests as well as the cumulative succession

of institutions within this process (Veblen, 1998/1898,

413). In this respect, Veblen considers that economics

should be transformed into an evolutionary science,

which has the evolution of institutions at the center of

its occupation (Hodgson, 2008, 501). Veblen found the

epistemological basis for such an orientation of the

economic analysis in the conceptual framework of the

theory of biological evolution. The economy is viewed

as a collection of units subjected to the principles of

variation, heredity and selection. First, there must be

a diversity of units within a population (a variation),

only to be followed by an inter-generational transfer

of the properties of such individual units within the

population (heredity), and, nally, a mechanism that

enables beer-adapted organisms to have a higher

proportion of the population (the principle of natural

selection) (Hodgson, 2008, 501-502). As far as Veblen

understands it, the main unit of the evolutionary

process is institutions - the evolution of socio-economic

systems can be seen as a selection of the most properly

adapted habits of a thought (institutions) (Hodgson,

2005, 906-907).

The immediate followers of the Veblenian tradition

showed lile enthusiasm for the development of the

part of his learning about the evolution of institutions.

Faced with the problems of measurement, Mitchell

concluded that the conclusions Veblen had mentioned

in this domain were of a speculative nature and

equally dicult for empirical testing as the concepts

of orthodoxy (Rutherford, 1998, 473). The research

conducted by other institutionalists in the United

States between the two world wars did not implement

Veblen’s ambitions, either, mostly for the reason of the

fact that they were focused on studying the problems

of companies and markets, the labor and social

control of the economy, assuming a static institutional

structure (Rutherford, 1998). An exception to this is

the Common’s concept of the purposeful selection

126 Economic Horizons (2015) 17(2), 123- 134

of working rules as a method of regulating the US

economy (Vanberg, 1997).

THE DARWINIAN STREAM OF

CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC

EVOLUTIONISM

A sort of a wave of the implementation of the

evolutionary framework in consideration of various

problems of economic theory begins with the

application of the Darwinian principles within the

Neo-Schumpeterian analysis of the dynamics of

companies and industries by Nelson and Winter

(1982). The coming decades have experienced a kind

of an expansion of the evolutionary analysis in terms

of this approach being extended onto the dierent

classes of economic problems: technological change,

innovation systems, the study of the organization,

economic growth etc. (Dollimore & Hodgson, 2014).

However, many self-proclaimed evolutionary studies

do not actually use the Darwinist starting point. There

is an absence of a general epistemological paern,

which increases the risk of the fragmentation of the

evolutionary analysis (Dollimore & Hodgson, 2014).

The revival of the interest in the evolutionary

categories within economic theory itself was preceded

by the consolidation of the Darwinian paradigm

within the evolutionary science of the living world.

In fact, until the nineteen-thirties, Darwinism was

but one of the rival concepts of biological evolution.

The alternative paradigms were Neo-Lamarckianism

(which allows for the possibility of the inheritance of

acquired characteristics), Orthogenesis (which holds

that organisms are naturally predisposed to certain

types of variations, which have no connection with

adaptations to the environment) and Saltationism

(according to which, new biological designs only

occur after sudden, abrupt changes, whereas ne

adjustments only improve already created designs)

(Levit, Hossfeld & Wi, 2011, 551-552). Only with

the modern Darwinian synthesis, provided by the

integration of classical, population and molecular

genetics with microsystemics, which proved to be a

very good match with the available paleontological

data (Levit et al, 2011, 553), other explanations (except

for Saltationism, which still has some inuence) have

decreased in importance.

The Darwinian paradigm studies the dynamics of

populations of organisms as a result of a permanent

adaptation to changes in the environment, followed

by the dierential survival of certain traits in the

population, in the sense that beer-adapted traits

persist, which is provided by natural selection.

The evolutionary process is supported by the

principles of the variation (targeted or random)

of characteristics within a population, heredity (a

mechanism that ensures an inter-generational transfer

of characteristics) and selection (the survival of beer-

adapted traits) (Hodgson, 1994, 113).

Modern Darwinism in biology can be formulated as

a theory of how complex designs of living organisms

can arise from unconscious algorithms of variation,

selection and retention. The mechanism consists of a

variation in the genotype (the construction codes of

single organisms) and the selection of the phenotype

- the selective retention of behaviors successful in

obtaining resources from the environment. Selective

retention operates through the „generation lter”: the

genes of organisms that are not successful in a struggle

for survival or nding partners are lost in the next

round (Denne, 1995; Stoelhorst, 2008a).

Strictly speaking, the ontological starting point

of Darwinism (in this case dened outside the

biological sciences) consists of highlighting changes,

their causality (in the sense that changes need to be

explained), continuity (the current state is derived from

earlier states), and their manifestation at several levels

interconnected with each other, formed in accordance

with the principle of emergence (the generation of

new layers through the interaction of the layers of a

lower order) (Stoelhorst, 2008b). Population thinking

(the description of populations by the distribution

of dierences among the members of a population)

(Hodgson, 1994) and system thinking (the observation

of populations and individuals as complex systems

that are constantly adapting to the environment)

(Stoelhorst, 2008b) should be added to this. The main

feature of the evolutionary view is the refusal of any

determinism regarding the outcome of the process of

evolution (Hodgson, 1995).

Z. Stefanovic, The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics 127

Within evolutionary economics, aempts are made

to adapt the starting propositions, the logic and the

principles of the Darwinian approach to the study of

economic reality and simultaneously translate them

into an epistemological paern that would become

the framework for all, today fragmented, evolutionary

branches of the economy. This epistemological paern

should naturally be quite sensitized to the specics of

the economic process.

The evolutionary viewpoint generally postulates that

the economic process has properties of evolutionary

dynamics. However, in interpreting the nature of

economic evolution, the protagonists of the current

streams of evolutionary economics diverge amongst

themselves. In the most general sense, the subject of

disagreement is the Darwinian nature of the evolution

of the economy, which is contested within one branch

of evolutionary economics. What certainly is not

the subject of the dispute is the contextual nature of

economic evolution. Given the fact that it takes place in

real time, economic evolution is naturally „sensitive”

to cultural, historical and socio-psychological

circumstances (Dosi, 1991, 6).

The contemporary articulations of the Darwinian

epistemological paradigm are to a signicant extent

met in the concept of „generalized Darwinism”.

Darwinism is transferred from biology to economics

– therefore, in the beginning, aempts to elaborate

this approach of economic reality rst relied on the

forms of the operation of the evolutionary principles

in the biological world (Nelson & Winter, 1982;

Hodgson, 1993). Over time, however, a conclusion

prevailed that the economy has too large a volume

of specics that prevent us from drawing direct

analogies with biological phenomena. Instead of the

forced placement of economic phenomena in biological

Darwinian moulds, a more appropriate strategy for

constituting the evolutionary economic paradigm was

launched. In fact, without abandoning the original

seings, Darwinism needs to be „puried” from

all content-specic biological contents in order to

arrive at some sort of conceptual substratum, which

could serve as a universal epistemological model for

the study of the phenomena whose dynamics has

evolutionary characteristics. The resulting general

framework should be further developed, specically

for each class of phenomena exposed to evolutionary

dynamics, in accordance with the peculiar forms

of its manifestation. This led to one of the leading

evolutionary trends of economic thought known as

„Generalized Darwinism” that is almost turning into

a separate branch of evolutionary economics today

(Dollimore & Hodgson, 2014).

Generally speaking, generalized Darwinism combines

eorts to generalize the Darwinian approach up to

the level of an epistemological paern suitable for

the study of all the systems subjected to evolutionary

dynamics and accordingly possessing very specic

ontological unifying characteristics - biological, social

and others. Accordingly, the so-called „Universal

Darwinism” or „Generalized Darwinism” is supposed

to describe the phenomena which have the properties

of the so-called „Complex populations systems”

(Hodgson, 2007, 265-266). Complex population systems

should have the following characteristics: they are

inhabited by populations of dierent individual

units, faced with limited local resources and the

problem of survival; adaptive solutions generated in

the struggle for survival can be preserved over time

and transferred to other individuals, through broadly

dened mechanisms ensuring the operation of the

principle of inheritance (Hodgson, 2007).

The articulation of Generalized Darwinism as the

general epistemological framework in various complex

population systems to which it can refer, must respect

their peculiarities. In this sense, the elaboration of

Generalized Darwinism in economic theory has the

task of nding specic mechanisms, in accordance

with the universal Darwinist principles, that shape

the evolution of the economy. Accordingly, answers

should be looked for to the questions relating to the

mechanism of generating variation, natural selection

mechanisms and criteria, the mechanism of inheritance

etc. (Aldrich, Hodgson, Hull, Knudsen, Mokyr &

Vanberg, 2008, 584-585). A fundamentally important

task is to determine the entity that „bears” economic

evolution, whose viability is tested by selection

pressure, observed in the long-run. This entity would

need to have the ability to make an intergenerational

transfer of its properties, similar to genes in biological

evolution. It is the genotype, the principal „target”

of evolution, while its immediate objects are specic

128 Economic Horizons (2015) 17(2), 123- 134

units that carry the gene, presented by the phenotype

in biology. In more modern evolutionary terms, these

two entities are conceptualized as the replicator and

the interactor (Aldrich et al, 2008). Replication is a

causal relationship between entities where there is

a substantial similarity between the original and

replicated units and where the transfer of information

about solutions related to survival also takes place.

The replicator is an entity which transfers its structure

mainly as „untouched” through successive replication

(Hull, 1988, 408). On the other hand, the interactor is

an entity that, as a cohesive unit, directly enters into

reactions with the environment, in such a way that such

an interaction becomes a dierential (Hull, 1988, 408).

The selection process is identied as the dierential

disappearance or proliferation of interactors, which

ultimately leads to the dierential perpetuation of

the relevant replicator (Hull, 1988, 409), which occurs

at the multiple, interconnected levels of the systems

subjected to evolutionary dynamics.

Thus, the main actor in economic evolution should

be the entity that is suciently durable, has the

capability of replication and bears some solutions in a

ght for survival. The popular version of evolutionary

economics holds that the role of replicators is played by

habits and routines, and that the major „candidates”

for interactors are rms and similar organizations

(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004). Habits are the disposition

for certain types of behavior, which are generated by

the repetition of thoughts or behaviors, and are stored

in the human nervous system. These dispositions are

converted into behavior only in certain circumstances.

Habits are as dispositions suciently durable to be

the subject of evolution, simultaneously having the

capability of replication through imitation (Hodgson &

Knudsen, 2004, 286-289). The important determinants

of the transformation of habits into a behavior are

institutions. Social institutions stabilize and channel

both habits and behavior (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004,

289). The routines are organizational dispositions

that can stimulate certain paerns of the behavior of

individuals within a group, in a form of a sequential

response to cues. In organizations, some sort of mixing

the habits of their members takes place in the sense that

the habits of a member are the environment of another

member, so that such an environment can stimulate

some new behaviors that can lead to changes or the

replication of parts of the environment (Hodgson &

Knudsen, 2004). Routines can be considered as sets of

habits which, when triggered by circumstances, lead

to a sequential behavior within a group. Let it again

be noted that the habits and routines are subject to

the evolutionary principles of variation, heredity and

selection.

In the presented model, the survival of successful

rms is simultaneously a selective retention of their

business routines, which sequentially has a certain

inuence on the selection of the habits of those workers

whose organizational dispositions the rm’s routines

are composed of, and therefore, ultimately, some sort

of the selection of workers themselves, or their genetic

structures, takes place (which is then equated with the

„original” concept of biological evolution). Therefore,

there are several sorts of replicators - routines, habits,

genes - and levels at which selection works - companies

and individuals. The specied selection string, even

though it is exposed in this, quite a general form,

implies in a sense the existence of a certain kind of

synchronicity between biological and socio-economic

evolution; when, however, considering the laer kind

of evolutionary dynamics, selection ows at the level

of the biological replicator can be ignored (Hodgson &

Knudsen, 2004, 302).

A particularly important role in the above-described

conceptualization of Generalized Darwinism is

played by habits, as a constitutional element of the

relevant layers of a system exposed to evolutionary

selection. First of all, habits are replication structures

at the level of individuals as actors of socio-economic

processes. Also, the coherently united habits of

dierent individuals within a rm lead to a routine,

as a higher replication entity. The concept of a habit

within this approach is borrowed from the American

philosophy of pragmatism and instinctive psychology,

in terms of dispositions for certain types of behavior,

which are acquired through various mechanisms of

social interaction, where replication (although not

perfect) is expressed at the phenotypic level (behavior)

rather than the genotypic one (the genetically dened

psychological states of individuals). A further

clarication of the referred-to concept has found

support in the concept of a program-based behavior.

Z. Stefanovic, The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics 129

In the process of searching for suciently convincing

alternative to the concept of rational choice, Vanberg

(2002) utilizes the ndings of various disciplines

– evolutionary biology, epistemology, psychology

and the theory of bounded rationality. The ndings

within these disciplines about human behavior lead

to a conclusion that it is somehow coded, or program-

based. All human capacity of decision making,

concentrated in the human mind, has a threefold

origin: genetic inheritance, personal experience and

socio-cultural evolution. The available repertoire of

decision-making skills is formed through the selective

elimination of the behavior paerns that do not bring

success. All the „wisdom” of humans, therefore, is

a product of the past, derived from accumulated

adaptations to earlier environments that were favored

by evolutionary selection, while all increment in

the existing knowledge results from breakthroughs

from the existing gnoseological capacity based on

the principle of trial and error (Campbell, 1965, cited

in: Vanberg, 2002). Structures providing a support for

human decision making are organized as some sort of

programs, specialized for certain kinds of problems,

including social relationships (among the important

ones are those for detecting transactions and avoiding

agents who cheat on obligations) (Vanberg, 2002, 37).

An open question of what the relative presence of

programs obtained by genetic heritage and those

generated by personal learning and social-cultural

experience in the human mind is still remains. In

the context of the presented version of Generalized

Darwinism, the concept of human consciousness as a

modular structure composed of genetic instructions

and social-cultural backgrounds can nd its place in

the explanation of habits. As the core feature of socio-

economic evolution, habits can be considered to be a

special form of programs, in terms of ndings from

within the aforementioned disciplines (Aldrich et al,

2008, 590).

CRITICS OF GENERALIZED DARWINISM

AND THE CONTINUITY THESIS

The presented generalization of the Darwinian

paradigm and the manner it is adapted to the

requirements of studying economic reality does not

meet the widest support of the evolutionary research

community within economic theory. Objections

are related to the method of the construction of the

aforementioned epistemological paern as well as to

the very concept of economic evolution as a process

unfolding in accordance with the Darwinian model. To

a considerable extent, the contestations of Generalized

Darwinism in economic theory originate from the rival

course of evolutionary thinking in economics, known

as the continuity thesis.

The theoretical arguments supportive of the continuity

thesis take a critical aitude towards the Darwinian

mapping of the principles for the analysis of economic

processes as their starting point. In this respect, the

unjustied use of selection mechanisms in explaining

economic evolution is pointed to (Cordes, 2007, 136-

141). First, the nature of adaptation mechanisms in

the biological and the economic domains is dierent.

While the adaptation of biological units is a product of

random genetic mutations and sexual re-combinations,

economic entities have an ability to directly and

consciously react to impulses from the environment,

thus being even capable of reducing selection pressure.

Furthermore, treating rms as one of the forms of

interactors in the economy as well as aributing

replicator properties to routines are subjected to

criticism, too. It is pointed out that companies are

able to change their routines, whereas there is no

possibility of such a relation between interactors and

replicators in biological systems. Given their lack of

durability, the understanding of routines as replicators

is also problematic as they change in the business

processes relatively quickly and rather frequently. As

the principle objection, this line of thinking alleges

the irrelevance of the concept of natural selection,

as economic actors are able to consciously choose

organizational forms ensuring them a survival,

according to their own selection criteria. Accordingly,

the protagonists of the continuity thesis criticize

Generalized Darwinism because of the drawing of

uncritical analogies between economic and biological

processes (Wi, 2004, 128).

The fundamental theoretical starting point of the

protagonists of the continuity thesis is the one of

the existence of the ontological and the historical

continuities between biological and cultural evolution,

130 Economic Horizons (2015) 17(2), 123- 134

although their mechanisms are principally dierent.

Cultural evolution takes place in accordance to specic

paerns, but on the basis previously set by natural

selection, and in the form of inherited human traits

(Cordes, 2007, 141). Within this approach, evolution

is dened as the self-transformation of a particular

system guided by certain principles. During the

phylogeny of the human species, natural selection

has led to the formation of such a set of qualities

that provide people with signicantly higher rates of

reproduction in relation to other species. As a result,

selection pressure has signicantly weakened, which,

in turn, has led to the creation of conditions for the

other types of evolution: cultural, economic and

technological (Wi, 2004 132). The result of natural

selection is that the inputs from the environment,

materials and energy, are augmented by the genetic

knowledge of people shaped by natural selection,

which presents the input that self-transforms through

the creation and diusion of innovation. Increasing

the human knowledge accumulating from one

generation to another has had a decisive inuence

on production, thus generating economic evolution.

The various means of the improvement of the

expansion of human knowledge, amongst which are

wrien communication, the invention of the printing

technology and the modern means of the replication

of knowledge have played an important role in the

increase of such knowledge. . There is also a problem

of an increasingly weak compatibility of the human-

generated ows of the material and energy ows

with nature, which signicantly limits possible future

civilization eects of economic evolution (Wi, 2004,

141).

The proponents of the continuity thesis claim that the

proposition of the homology between the biological

and the economic processes, which according to the

interpretation of this theoretical concept can logically

be deduced from Generalized Darwinism, is not

realistic. Also, it is emphasized that the Generalization

of Darwinism in economics has shown lile interest in

the empirical conrmation of its own understanding

of evolutionary dynamics (Levit et al, 2011).

As can be inferred from the presented views, the

evolutionist stream of economic thought is actually a

conglomeration of dierent views on the possible form

of the process of evolution. It is certainly worth noting

that the Darwinian version of economic evolutionism

itself contains alternative conceptualizations of

economic evolution (Pelikan, 2011).

GROUP SELECTION, INSTITUTIONS

AND ECONOMIC COORDINATION

It should be noted at this point that, even when

not viewed from a strictly Darwinian standpoint,

economic evolution represents a multilevel process. All

the entities that form the ontology of social processes

are exposed to evolution. Consequently, one must

take into account the evolutionary dynamics of those

phenomena that reect the collective dimension of the

human activity. This leads to the problem of group

selection, which still represents a major challenge for

evolutionary theory. The central question is, in fact,

the question of a possibility of the survival of a group,

given the fact that, in evolutionary terms, groups

are normally made of „selsh” individuals, whose

survival combat will lead to the disintegration of the

group. More specically, a critical level of cooperation

is required to suppress the selshness of individuals to

the level that would ensure the survival of the group.

Looking through the current Darwinian schemata, if a

group is the interactor, then there must be some kind

of the replication structure providing an appropriate

balance between the innate selshness of the group

members and the cooperation necessary for its survival,

which is referred to as the problem of identifying the

so-called „social replicators” (Campbell, 1965).

With no intention of elaborating further on the

problem of group selection, it can be concluded

that institutional structures can represent quite a

convenient conceptual design in terms of nding a

solution to a social replicator. Namely, the signicant

presence of regulatory mechanisms is needed to

maintain the level of the cooperation of individuals

necessary for the survival of the group, among which

particularly important are those aecting the level

of trust. Only in the behavioral regime characterized

by a certainty regarding the behavior of partners in a

social interaction, primarily in the eld of obeying the

rules, will actors be encouraged to make cooperative

Z. Stefanovic, The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics 131

arrangements. Trust is a sort of the „invisible web”

of the cooperative behavior of individuals within a

group and as such is part of the informal institutional

regulation. The importance of this feature of an

institutional design is strongly conrmed in the sphere

of economic transactions, which may signicantly be

hampered due to opportunistic behavior, a loosely set

principal-agent relationship, asymmetric information

etc. (Lekovic, 2012, 65). The level of trust necessary

to maintain the cohesion of economic relations,

however, itself depends on the support of other social

institutions (Lekovic, 2012, 66). Therefore, even from

these rather modest insights, one can gain some

sense of the cardinal inuence of the joint eect of

institutional structures on economic evolution, and,

linked to that, the dierential survival of the economic

„units” of dierent levels, which speaks in favor of

electing institutions as a possible conceptual solution

to replicators of economic process.

Although the founder of economic evolutionism,

Veblen, considered institutions as the central theme

of the evolutionary theory of economic change, in

later Darwinian conceptualizations, they are partially

displaced from the center of interest. It remains an

open question whether the current intensity and

diversication of the research grouped within the

theoretical corpus of evolutionary economics will lead

to progress in articulating the role of institutional

structures in evolutionary dynamics or not. In this

regard, the two other representative approaches

tending to revitalize the role of institutions in

the conceptualization of economic evolution will

additionally be outlined here.

In a more recent version of his theory of economic

evolution, Pelikan conceptualizes the economy as

a set of agents at dierent ontological levels of the

hierarchy. The agents of the higher order arise as

emergent entities through the self-organization of the

lower-order agents in networks (Pelikan, 2011). All

agents have „built-in” behavior instructions in the

form of rules. In the economy, the relevant agents are

individuals, organizations and economies (Pelikan,

2011). Individuals have instructions in the form of their

cognitive capacities obtained by genetic evolution and

cultural experience, while the rules of organizations

and those of the economy are represented by formal

and informal institutions. Changes in institutional

rules through trial and error represent evolution,

while the internal dynamics of the network of agents

at lower levels, within the framework of the existing

institutions, is a process of economic development

(Pelikan, 2011).

The protagonists of evolutionary macroeconomics

consider the economy as a dissipative structure, which

transforms an energy input into an output. The system

is characterized by permanent imbalances as well as

by a homeostasis, and continuous eorts are made to

aract more energy in order to maintain the dynamics

of the system (Foster, 2011). The disintegration of the

system is prevented by meso rules, which provide

short-term stable macroeconomic trends. These rules

are hierarchically structured and can be identied with

the institutions of the society (Foster, 2011). These rules

are divided into physical, which provide knowledge of

the transformation of energy inputs, on the one hand,

and social, which dictate relations to other agents, on

the other. Economic growth is only possible through

an expansion of investments aimed at innovation,

which is only possible by making a change in meso

rules (Foster, 2011). In other words, the evolution of

meso rules and institutions is closely associated with

the path of the economic growth of dierent societies.

Independently of these considerations, if they may

not exactly be identied as the bearers of economic

evolution, social institutions may certainly be

taken into consideration for their relatively usable

approximation. Understood as the rules of the game

in a society, structure the socio-economic interaction

(North, 1994), institutions are a sort of an intersection

of a multitude of functions essential for the economy

- determining the behavior of its actors, providing

communication channels between them, shaping the

technological capacities of the society etc.

The central problem of the functioning of the economy

is ensuring economic coordination. In his anthological

elaboration of the mentioned issue, Hayek pointed to

the impossibility of any individual or central authority

to have the entirety of the economically relevant

knowledge at their disposal. There is, however,

a mechanism that enables the overcoming of the

problem of economic actors’ insucient knowledge in

this way or that, and enables puing somehow their

132 Economic Horizons (2015) 17(2), 123- 134

action in order in the nal outcome. It is the system

of the market prices whose pulsing gives an insight

into the relative scarcity of resources and is therefore

indicative of economic actors’ preferred direction of

allocation (Hayek, 1948). By directing the allocation of

resources towards various eective uses determined

by the price system, in conditions of uncertainty and

the actors’ incomplete knowledge, the market provides

an irreplaceable contribution to economic coordination

and keeping the economy on stable, equilibrium

trajectories. Hayek also points to other institutional

structures which have spontaneously emerged and

have been shaped in a long-lasting practice, which, in

conjunction with the market, perform socio-economic

coordination: the language, money, morality, law

(Hayek, 1960). Hayek’s more than eective analysis

threw light on coordination as the essential function

of institutional structures. The crucial mechanism

of economic coordination is denitely the market

mechanism, supported by other social institutions.

Similarly to the market, they somehow „decipher” the

environment, creating actors’ perceptions of how the

environment is structured and which preferred forms

of action are. By providing some sort of information

shelter for actors in conditions of uncertainty,

institutions compensate for their cognitive limits and,

in a way, make a meaningful economic action possible

(North, 1981).

Accordingly, each economy can be regarded as

a distinctive combination of markets and other

institutions in the service of socio-economic

coordination. The contemporary economy is inhabited

by numerous and richly dierentiated non-market

institutions, heterogeneous by origin and dierent

in coordination eects, which reects the dierent

paths of the cultural and historical evolution of

individual societies. Despite being an omnipresent and

undoubtedly dominant coordination structure, the

market itself does not represent a „natural” category,

but is only part of a collection of institutions emerged

in the process of socio-economic evolution. Moreover,

the market mechanism is the subject of continuous

societal interventions, aimed at shaping its multilateral

impacts in accordance with social interests. Various

institutional capacities are included in collective

eorts to limit, to a certain extent, the inuence of

the market on the socially acceptable distribution of

power between relevant economic actors. For example,

non-market institutions (especially judicial ones)

can be employed in the process of nding fair rules

for resolving permanent conicts generated by the

market exchange (Commons, 1968/1924, in: Vanberg,

1997). Non-market institutional structures themselves

represent some sort of a society’s defense from social

destruction that, in certain stages of civilization, is

naturally caused by the generalization of the market

mechanism (Polanyi, 1944). The comprehension of the

market as a natural, super-institutional entity mysties

the actual manner of its functioning, which, in a real

economy, is to a certain extent stamped by cultural and

historical circumstances (Dugger, 2005).

CONCLUSION

In terms of the material presented, the starting

point of the paper is shown to be sustainable. Even

independently of the arguments presented in the

paper, the various branches of the economic analysis

have detected the existence of various institutional

structures, which, in conjunction with the market,

enable economic coordination at various levels of

the economy. Induced by selection pressure, their

dynamics is to a lesser or greater extent a trajectory

dependent phenomenon, which is labeled as „path

dependency” by the conventional economic analysis. A

wave of neoliberal reforms, aimed at the absolutization

of the market mechanism, bears a considerable

destructive potential, given the fact that the frontal

aack on the existing diverse non-market institutions

in the world economy threatens to seriously reduce its

future adaptive capacity.

The valuation of institutional structures within the

evolutionary stream of economic thought may still not

fully reect their versatile and capital inuence on the

evolution of the economy. A more intense sensitization

to the institutional component of economic evolution

may be helpful in expanding the eectiveness of

evolutionary thinking of the economy. Some of the

research orientations, signicantly conscious in the

aforementioned sense, are the evolutionary theory of

economic growth, the comparative political economy,

the theory of the national innovation system etc.

Economic policies must also understand possible

Z. Stefanovic, The coordination aspect of institutions in the context of an evolutionary approach to economic dynamics 133

implications of this element of the economic process in

order to channel their perceived dynamics within the

limits of the possible, in accordance with the needs of

economic development.

One should not, however, expect a serious penetration

of the evolutionary approach into the mainstream

of economic thought. First, beside quite a general

epistemological framework, the convergence of the

alternative versions of economic evolutionism into a

uniform and consistent paradigmatic framework is

not on the horizon. Irrespective of this, the problem

is also the reception of the approach by economic

orthodoxy, responsible for the dissemination

of topics and ideas through the majority of the

economic theory community, which is showing

lile interest in the concepts that have not gone

through a rigorous mathematical formalization.

The evolutionary approach, however, remains very

convenient in circumstances where it is necessary that

the conventional economic analysis should be gone

beyond, to the study of real economic systems, whose

dynamics is context-specic and subject to cultural-

historical regularities. In line with this, the reection

of the economy within the evolutionist frameworks

can be a suitable point of orientation of the economic

polic y.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This paper is part of the research Project (No. 179066),

which is funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and

Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

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Zoran Stefanovic is an Associate Professor at the Department of General Economic Theory of the

Faculty of Economics of the University of Niš. He teaches the subjects of Economic Doctrines and

the Economics of Transition (in the undergraduate studies), Contemporary Economic Theories (in the

Master’s studies) and Transition of Post-Socialist Economies (in the doctoral studies). The major elds of

his research interest are contemporary economic paradigms, the economics of post-socialist transition

and the political economy of globalization.

Received on 15

June 2015,

after revision,

accepted for publication on 17

August 2015.

Published online on 25

August 2015

Ekonomski horizonti, Maj - Avgust 2015, Volumen 17, Sveska 2, 125 - 136

Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu

UDC: 33 ISSN: 1450-863 X www. ekfak.kg.ac.rs

Pregledni članak

UDK: 330.837

doi: 10.5937/ekonhor1502125S

UVOD

Privreda današnjice, slično ostalim oblastima društvene

organizacije, prolazi kroz izrazito dinamičnu epohu.

Neprekidni pritisci ka redizajniranju ekonomskih

struktura, prisutna pomeranja u relacijama moći na

različitim nivoima privrede, sve regularnija ekscesna

kretanja privrednih tokova, stavljaju nesumnjivo

ozbiljne zadatke pred ekonomsku teoriju, većim

delom ipak naviknutu da kao predmet posmatranja

ima daleko stabilniji sistem, koji se može promišljati u

ekvilibrističkim kategorijama.

Sve je prisutnija potreba da se savremena privreda, s

obzirom na prisustvo, frekvenciju i obuhvat promena

kojima je izložena, promišlja iz perspektive koja će

uzeti u obzir dinamiku kao njen suštinski atribut.

Konvencionalna ekonomska analiza, koja oslonac

nalazi u mehanističkoj konceptualizaciji privrede kao

statičkog, ravnotežnog sistema, predstavlja prikladnu

i logičnu aproksimaciju realnog ekonomskog sistema,

sa dokazanom edukativnom i analitičkom vrednošću.

Međutim, sva je prilika da metrika savremenih,

imanentno dinamičnih ekonomskih procesa, izmiče

egzaktnim konceptualnim relacijama ovog neosporno

moćnog epistemološkog pristupa. Prema tome,

koristan bi bio makar i ogledni iskorak iz ortodoksne

ekonomske epistemologije, ka nekom od alternativnih

gledišta, koje bi, možda, bilo u mogućnosti da pruži od

KOORDINACIONI ASPEKT INSTITUCIJA U KONTEKSTU

EVOLUCIONIONISTIČKOG PRISTUPA EKONOMSKOJ

DINAMICI

Zoran Stefanović*

Ekonomski fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu

Rad pruža uvid u dominantne tokove savremene evolucionističke ekonomije i skicira važnije probleme

vezane za artikulaciju pomenutog pristupa u promišljanju privrede. U radu se, takođe, zastupa stav o

institucijama kao nosećim strukturama društveno-ekonomske evolucije, čiji se brojni efekti na nivou društva

očitavaju kroz funkciju koordinacije. Proces koordinisanja upošljava, pored tržišta, i druge institucionalne

strukture, čiji su prol i operativna načela produkt tokova kulturno-istorijske evolucije, osobenih za svaki

društveni poredak. Projekti usmereni ka transformaciji ekonomskog sistema, moraju biti senzibilisani na

objektivno uslovljenu raznorodnost institucionalnih strutkura u svetskoj privredi, i, u tom smislu, veoma

oprezni u instaliranju „univerzalnih“ reformskih rešenja.

Ključne reči: generalizovani darvinizam, replikator, interaktor, institucije, koordinacija

JEL Classication: B15, B25, B52, E02, E14

* Korespondencija: Z. Stefanović, Ekonomski fakultet Univerzi-

teta u Nišu, Trg kralja Aleksandra Ujedinitelja 11, 18000 Niš,

Republika Srbija; e-mail: zoran.stefanovic@eknfak.ni.ac.rs

126 Ekonomski horizonti (2015) 17(2), 125 - 136

realnosti manje udaljenu, a opet dovoljno rigoroznu

konceptualizaciju privredne stvarnosti.

Van granica matice ekonomske misli, naročito

popularnu epistemološku orijentaciju predstavlja

evolucionistička ekonomija. Pomenuti pristup,

suprotno ekonomskoj ortodoksiji, koja konceptualno

podražava klasičnu ziku, većinski se naslanja

na epistemološku metaforu preuzetu iz nauke o

evoluciji bioloških sistema. Generalizacija principa

evolucije odnosi se na široku klasu fenomena sa

kararakteristikama kompleksnih populacionih

sistema, u koje se može svrstati i privreda. Privreda

se, shodno tome, posmatra kao sistem čija se dinamika

odvija u skladu sa evolutivnim principima varijacije,

herediteta i selekcije. Suštinski zadatak u artikulisanju

pomenutog epistemološkog okvira predstavlja

identikacija entiteta sa kvazigenetskim svojstvima,

koji nosi evoluciju sistema. Evolucionistička ekonomija

još uvek nema jedinstven odgovor na pomenuto

pitanje, s obzirom na to da se predlažu različitie

strukture za popunu ove konceptualne praznine.

Institucionalne strukture, svakako, predstavljaju jedno

od mogućih rešenja u konceptualizaciji „genetske“

osnovice privrede. Institucije akumuliraju znanje

i obezbeđuju recepturu za funkcionisanje sistema,

odnosno, društveno-ekonomsku koordinaciju, kao

njegovu težišnu odrednicu. Tržištu, kao kardinalnom

akteru koordinacije, pridružene su i druge

institucije, koje su u svakoj privredi, u zavisnosti od

kulturoloških okolnosti, različito postavljene. Svaki

društveno-ekonomski poredak predstavlja kulturalno-

istorijski oblikovan spoj koordinacionih mehanizama:

tržišta i netržišnih institucija. Kapitalizam se, u

tom smislu, može shvatiti kao svojevrsna porodica

različitih modela tržišne privrede, čija pojedinačna

koordinaciona svojstva i adaptibilnost počivaju na

kvalitetu uređenja odnosa između tržišta i drugih

institucionalnih struktura, produkovanih kulturalno-

istorijskom evolucijom.

Cilj rada je pružanje uvida u skorašnja dostignuća

tokova ekonomske analize koncentrisane oko

pomenutih problema.

U tom smislu, najpre se daje detaljan prikaz

evolucionističke orijentacije u ekonomskoj teoriji.

Njeni počeci vezuju se za rodonačelnika američke

institucionalne ekonomije, T. Veblen-a, i njegovu

težnju da ekonomiju koncipira kao „modernu

nauku“, zasnovanu na darvinističkim principima.

Evolucionistički momenat, međutim, iščezava

iz potonjih tokova institucioanalne analize. Sa

novom formulacijom darvinističkog pristupa u

nauci o evoluciji živog sveta, interesovanje za ovaj

epistemološki obrazac se obnavlja, da bi svoj ponovni

prodor u ekonomsku nauku, evolucionistička metafora

počela da ostvaruje početkom osamdesetih godina

XX veka. U poslednje četiri decenije, evolucionistička

načela se razrađuju u različitim oblastima ekonomske

analize, u odsustvu zajedničkog konceptualnog

okvira. Nakon uvida u pomenute ekonomsko-

teorijske tokove, u radu se prikazuju nastojanja ka

iznalaženju epistemološke osnovice danas široko

razuđene evolucionističke analize u ekonomiji. Jedna

od popularnih artikulacija evolucionističkog pristupa,

svakako, je generalizovani darvinizam. U radu će biti

ilustrovana različita gledišta o tome kako bi pomenuti

epistemološki okvir trebalo da bude konceptualizovan:

u domenu operativnih načela, strukturnih relacija,

relevantnih konstitutivnih jedinica. U tom smislu, biće

prikazana shvatanja Hodžson-Knudsen-Vanbergove

grupe i P. Pelikan-a. Sastavni deo prikaza biće i kritika

generalizovanog darvinizma, kao modela promišljanja

evolucije privrede. Biće učinjen osvrt i na i alternatvnu

teoriju društveno-ekonomske evolucije, koja negira

darvinistički karakter evolucionih tokova u društvu,

otelotvorena u „tezi o kontinuitetu“. Završni deo rada

skicira ulogu institucija kao kardinalnog elementa

društveno-ekonomske evolucije, zaduženog, ponajviše,

za ekonomsku koordinaciju. Ukazuje se, s tim u vezi, i

na heterogene institucionalne strukture koje oblikuju

koordinacioni kapacitet društva.

U skladu sa navedenim, generalno polazište

rada može se formulisati kroz sledeću postavku:

evolucionistički pristup u ekonomskoj teoriji, shvaćen

u smislu promišljanja privrede kao evolucionog

sistema, zasnovanog na darvinističkim načelima

varijacije, herediteta i selekcije, konceptualno

potpomognut institucijama kao aproksimacijom

replikatorskih struktura, predstavlja prikladnu formu

konceptualizacije savremene privredne dinamike.

U radu će biti korišćene metode primerene

postavljenom cilju istraživanja, uz naročiti oslonac na

analitičku deskripciju.

Z.Stefanović, Koordinacioni aspekt institucija u kontekstu evolucionionističkog pristupa ekonomskoj dinamici 127

VEBLENOVSKA EKONOMIJA I

EVOLUCIONIZAM

Već više od jednog veka, prisutna su nastojanja unutar

ekonomske teorije da se privreda konceptualizuje

kao sistem podložan zakonitostima koje važe u

svetu biološke evolucije. Pionir ove orijentacije

u ekonomskoj teoriji, T. Veblen, konstituisanje

ekonomije na darvinističkim polazištima smatrao

je preduslovom njenog prevođenja u „moderne“

nauke. Maticu ekonomske misli svoga doba smatrao

je „preddarvinističkom“ naukom, usmerenom na

taksonomiju zakonitih relacija u privredi, čijem

teorijskom okviru izmiču one snage koje, zapravo,

pokreću ekonomski proces. Nijedan od onovremenih

pravaca ekonomske misli nije bio pošteđen T.

Veblenovih optužbi za nedostatak senzibliteta

prema tekovinama moderne nauke. Marksizmu i

neoklasičnoj školi prebacivao je zbog neadekvatnog,

redukcionističkog tretmana „ljudskog materijala“,

odnosno, pojedinca kao ekonomskog aktera, čije

je delanje naddeterminisano kolektivnim, klasnim

uticajem (marksizam), ili suštinski inertnom,

hedonističkom ljudskom prirodom (individualizam

neoklasike i austrijske škole). Bio je protivnik i

determinizma prisutnog kod pomenutih pravaca

ekonomske misli, u smislu mogućnosti projekcije

ishoda društveno-ekonomske dinamike (revolucija

kod marksista i ravnoteža kod neoklasike) (Veblen,

1998/1898; Hodgson, 1998).

T. Veblen traga za epistemološkim okvirom uz pomoć

kojeg bi mogli da se spoznaju pokretački mehanizmi

društveno-ekonomskog procesa i, istovremeno,

prevazišla dihotomija između metodološkog

kolektivizma i individualizma. Rekonstituisana,

postdarvinistička ekonomska nauka trebalo bi da

objasni proces kulturnog rasta determinisanog

ekonomskim interesima, kao i kumulativnu sukcesiju

institucija unutar tog procesa (Veblen, 1998/1898, 413).

U tom smislu, T. Veblen smatra da ekonomija treba

da se transformiše u evolucionističku nauku, koja u

središtu svog interesovanja ima evoluciju institucija

(Hodgson, 2008, 501). Epistemološku osnovicu za tako

orijentisanu ekonomsku analizu, T. Veblen pronalazi

u konceptualnom okviru biološke teorije evolucije.

Privreda se posmatra kao skup jedinki podložnih

principima varijacije, herediteta i selekcije. Najpre

mora postojati različitost jedinki unutar populacije

(varijacije), intergeneracijski transfer osobina jedinki

unutar populacije (hereditet), i, konačno, mehanizam

koji omogaćava da bolje adaptirani organizmi imaju

veću proporciju u populaciji (princip naturalne

selekcije) (Hodgson, 2008). Glavna jedinica evolucionog

procesa, shodno T. Veblen-ovom shvatanju, upravo su

institucije - evolucija društveno-ekonomskih sistema

može se shvatiti kao selekcija najadaptiranijih navika

mišljenja (institucija).

Neposredni sledbenici veblenovske tradicije nisu

pokazivali preveliki entuzijazam za razradu dela

njegovog učenja o evoluciji institucija. Suočen sa

problemima merenja, V. Mičel zaključuje da su T.

Veblen-ovi stavovi u pomenutom domenu spekulativne

prirode i jednako teški za empirijsko testiranje kao

i koncepcije ortodoksije (Rutherford, 1998, 473). Ni

istraživanja ostalih institucionalista u SAD između

dva svetska rata nisu realizovala T. Veblen-ove

ambicije, s obzirom na to da su bila fokusirana na

proučavanje problema rmi i tržišta, radne snage

i društvene kontrole privrede, podrazumevajući

statičnu institucionalnu strukturu (Rutherford, 1998).

Izuzetak je J. Komonsova koncepcija svrsishodne

selekcije radnih pravila, kao metod regulisanja

američke privrede (Vanberg, 1997).

DARVINISTIČKI TOK SAVREMENOG

EKONOMSKOG EVOLUCIONIZMA

Svojevrsni talas primene evolucionističkog okvira

u promišljanju raznih problema ekonomske

teorije počinje sa primenom darvinističkih načela

u neošumpeterovskoj analizi dinamike rmi i

industrija, R. Nelson-a i S. Winter-a (1982). U toku

narednih decenija, evolucionistička analiza doživljava

svojevrsnu ekpsanziju, u smislu širenja na različite

klase ekonomskih problema: tehnološke promene,

inovacioni sistemi, nauka o organizaciji, privredni rast

i sl. (Dollimore & Hodgson, 2014). Međutim, mnoge

proklamovano evolucionističke studije se, zapravo, ne

koriste darvinističkim polazištima. Uočava se odsustvo

generalnog epistemološkog obrasca, što povećava rizik

128 Ekonomski horizonti (2015) 17(2), 125 - 136

od fragmentacije evolucionističke analize (Dollimore

& Hodgson, 2014).

Oživljavanju interesovanja za evolucionističke

kategorije unutar ekonomske teorije prethodilo je

konsolidovanje same darvinističke paradigme unutar

nauke o evoluciji živog sveta. Naime, sve do tridesetih

godina XX veka, darvinizam je bio samo jedna od

rivalskih koncepcija biološke evolucije. Alternativne

paradigme bile su neo-lamarkijanizam (koji, pored

urođenih, dozvoljava mogućnost nasleđivanja i stečenih

osobina), ortogeneza (koja smatra da su organizmi

prirodno predodređeni za određene vrste varijacija,

koje nemaju veza sa adaptacijama na okruženje) i

saltacionisitička (prema kojoj se novi biološki dizajni

javljaju samo nakon naglih, skokovitih promena, dok

se sitnim prilagođavanjima samo usavršavaju tako

stvorene strukture) (Levit, Hossfeld & Wi, 2011, 551-

552). Tek sa modernom darvinističkom sintezom,

koja je obezbedila integraciju klasične, populacione

i molekulske genetike sa mikrosistematikom, koja

se dobro uklopila sa raspoloživim paleontološkim

podacima (Levit et al, 2011, 553), ostala objašnjenja

(osim saltacionističkog, koje još uvek ima određenog

uticaja) izgubila su na značaju.

Darvinistička paradigma proučava dinamiku

populacije organizama kao rezultat permanentnih

adaptacija na promene u okruženju, koju prati

diferencijalni opstanak određenih osobina unutar

populacije, u smislu da bolje adaptirane osobine

opstaju, što omogućava prirodna selekcija. Evolucioni

proces podupiru principi varijacije (ciljane ili slučajne)

osobina unutar populacije, herediteta (mehanizam

koji obezbeđuje intergeneracijski transfer osobina)

i selekcije (opstanak bolje adaptiranih osobina)

(Hodgson, 1994, 113).

Savremeni darvinizam u biologiji može se formulisati

kao teorija o tome kako kompleksni dizajni živih

organizama mogu nastati iz nesvesnog algoritama

varijacije, selekcije i retencije. Mehanizam se sastoji

od varijacija u genotipu (kod za izgradnju organizma),

i selekcije fenotipa, oblika ponašanja uspešnog u

pribavljanju resursa iz okruženja. Selektivna retencija

deluje kroz „generacioni lter“, geni organizama koji

nisu uspešni u borbi za opstanak ili nalaženje partnera

za opstanak su izgubljeni za sledeću rundu (Denne,

1995; Stoelhorst, 2008a).

Strogo posmatrano, ontološka polazišta darvinizma

(istina denisana van biološke nauke), sastoje se u

isticanju promena, njihovoj uzročnosti (u smislu da

se promene moraju objasniti), kontinuitetu (sadašnje

stanje izvodi se iz ranijih), i njihovom ispoljavanju

na više međusobno povezanih nivoa, koji nastaju

saglasno načelu emergencije (nastajanje novih slojeva

kroz interakciju slojeva nižeg reda) (Stoelhorst, 2008b,

344-345). Tome treba dodati populaciono mišljenje

(opisivanje vrste prema distribuciji razlika kod članova

populacije) (Hodgson, 1994), kao i sistemski pristup

(posmatranje populacija i jedinki kao kompleksnih

sistema koji se neprekidno adaptiraju na okruženje)

(Stoelhorst, 2008b). Bitno obeležje evolucionističkog

mišljenja je i odbijanje bilo kakvog determinizma u

pogledu ishoda procesa evolucije (Hodgson, 1995).

Unutar evolucionističke ekonomije traju pokušaji da

se polazišta, logika i principi darvinističkog pristupa

adaptiraju na proučavanje privredne stvarnosti

i pretoče u epistemološki obrazac koji bi postao

okvir za sve, danas gotovo fragmentisane, grane

evolucionističke ekonomije. Taj bi obrazac, naravno,

morao da bude sasvim senzibilisan na specičnosti

ekonomskih procesa.

Evolucionističko stanovište, generalno, podrazumeva

da ekonomski proces ima svojstva evolucione

dinamike. Međutim, u tumačenju prirode ekonomske

evolucije, protagonisti ovog toka ekonomske teorije se

razilaze. U najopštijem smislu, predmet razilaženja

je darvinistički karakter evolucije privrede, koji

se osporava unutar jednog dela evolucionističke

ekonomije. Ono što, naravno, nije predmet spora je

kontekstualna priroda ekonomske evolucije. S obzirom

na to da se odvija u realnom vremenu, ekonomska

evolucija je prirodno osetljiva na kulturalno-istorijske

i socio-psihološke osobenosti (Dosi, 1991, 6).

Savremene artikulacije darvinističke epistemološke

paradigme značajnim delom susreću se u konceptu

„generalizovanog darvinizma“. Darvinizam je u

ekonomsku teoriju preuzet iz biologije, tako da su

pokušaji njegove razrade kao obrasca promišljanja

privredne stvarnosti najpre imali oslonac u spoznatim

Z.Stefanović, Koordinacioni aspekt institucija u kontekstu evolucionionističkog pristupa ekonomskoj dinamici 129

obrascima delovanja evolucionih načela u biološkom

svetu (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Hodgson, 1993).

Vremenom je, ipak, preovladalo uverenje da privreda

ima suviše veliki obim specičnosti, da bi se mogle da

povlače direktne analogije sa biološkim fenomenima.

Umesto nasilnog smeštanja privrednih pojava u

biološke darvinističke kalupe, došlo se do primerenije

strategije konstituisanja evolucionističke ekonomske

paradagme. Naime, ne napuštajući izvorne postavke

darvinizma, teži se ka njegovom prečišćavanju od svih

sadržaja specičnih za biološke fenomene, kako bi se

došlo do svojevrsnog konceptualnog supstrata, koji

bi mogao da posluži kao univerzalni epistemološki

obrazac za proučavanje svih pojava čija dinamika ima

evoluciona obeležja. Dobijeni generalni okvir treba

posebno razraditi za svaku klasu fenomena izloženu

evolucionoj dinamici, u skladu sa specičnim oblicima

njenog ispoljavanja. Tako se stiglo do jednog od vodećih

tokova evolucione ekonomske misli, poznatog kao

generalizovani darvinizam, koji se gotovo pretvara u

posebnu granu evolucionističke ekonomije (Dollimore

& Hodgson, 2014).

Najopštije posmatrano, generalizovani darvinizam

objedinjava nastojanja da se darvinistički pristup

generalizuje do nivoa epistomološkog obrasca koji je

podoban za proučavanje svih sistema koji su podložni

evolucionoj dinamici i, u skladu s tim, poseduju

određene ontološki unicirajuće karakteristike -

biološke, društvene i dr. Shodno tome, v. univerzalni

darvinizam ili generalizovani darvinizam trebalo

bi da opiše fenomene koji imaju svojstva v.

„kompleksnih populacionih sistema“ (Hodgson, 2007,

265-266). Kompleksni populacioni sistemi trebalo bi

da imaju sledeća svojstva: njih nastanjuju populacije

međusobno različitih jedinki, suočenih sa lokalno

ograničenim resursima i problemom opstanka; neka

adaptivna rešenja generisana u borbi za opstanak

mogu biti zadržana kroz vreme i preneta na druge

jedinke, kroz široko denisane mehanizme koji

obezbeđuju delovanje principa nasleđivanja (Hodgson,

2007).

Artikulisanje univerzalnog darvinizma kao

generalnog epistemološkog okvira, u raznim oblastima,

na različite kompleksne populacione sisteme na koje se

on može odnositi, mora da uvažava njihove osobenosti.

U tom smislu, razrada generalizovanog darvinizma u

ekonomskoj teoriji mora da ima zadatak iznalaženja

specičnih mehanizama koji, u skladu sa univerzalnim

darvinističkim načelima, oblikuju evoluciju u

privredi. Shodno tome, treba odgovoriti na pitanja

mehanizma generisanja varijacija, prirode selekcionog

mehanizma i kriterijuma, mehanizma nasleđivanja

i dr. (Aldrich, Hodgson, Hull, Knudsen, Mokyr &

Vanberg, 2008, 584-585). Suštinski važan zadatak

evolucione ekonomije je određivanje entiteta koji nosi

ekonomsku evoluciju, čiju sposobnost opstanka testira

selekcioni pritisak, dugoročno posmatrano. Taj bi

entitet trebalo da ima sposobnost intergeneracijskog

prenošenja svojih osobina, slično genima u biološkoj

evoluciji. Upravo je genotip suštinska „meta“ evolucije,

dok su njen neposredni predmet konkretne jedinke

koje nose gene, i u biologiji prezentuju fenotip. U

modernijoj evolucionističkoj terminologiji, ova dva

entiteta konceptualizuju se kao replikator i interaktor

(Aldrich et al, 2008). Replikacija predstavlja kauzalnu

vezu između entiteta gde postoji suštinska sličnost

između replikovanih jedinki i originala i gde se na

njih prenosi i informacija o rešenjima vezanim za

opstanak. Replikator je entitet koji prenosi svoju

strukturu uglavnom kao „netaknutu“ kroz sukcesivne

replikacije (Hull, 1988, 408). S druge strane, interaktor

je entitet koji direktno, kao koheziona celina, stupa

u reakcije sa okruženjem, na način da interakcija

postaje diferencijalna (Hull, 1988, 408). Selekcioni

proces identikuje se kao diferenijalni nestanak ili

proliferacija interaktora, koja u konačnom vodi ka

diferencijalnoj perpetuaciji odgovarajućih replikatora

(Hull, 1988, 409), što se događa na više, međusobno

povezanih, nivoa sistema na kojima se ispoljava

evoluciona dinamika.

Dakle, glavni akter ekonomske evolucije trebalo bi da

bude entitet koji je dovoljno trajan, ima sposobnost

replikacije, i nosi određena rešenja u borbi za opstanak.

Popularna verzija evolucionističke ekonomije

smatra da ulogu replikatora imaju navike i rutine,

a da su glavni kandidati za interaktora rme i slične

kohezione organizacije (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004).

Navike predstavljaju dispozicije za određene vrste

ponašanja, koje su nastale ponavljanjem, misonim

ili bihevioralnim, a pohranjene su u čovekovom

nervnom sistemu. Te dispozicije se pretvaraju u

ponašanje samo u određenim okolnostima. Navike

130 Ekonomski horizonti (2015) 17(2), 125 - 136

su kao dispozicije dovoljno trajne da bi bile predmet

evolucije, a istovremeno imaju i sposobnost replikacije,

imitiranja (Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004, 286-289). Važna

determinanta transformacije navika u ponašanje jesu

institucije. Upravo društvene institucije stabilizuju i

kanališu navike i ponašanje (Hodgson & Knudsen,

2004, 289). Rutine predstavljaju organizacione

dispozicije koje mogu stimulisati određene obrasce

ponašanja pojedinaca unutar grupe, koji, sa svoje

strane, istovremeno sadrže i sekvencijalne odgovore na

podsticaje. U organizacijama dolazi do mešanja navika

njihovih članova, u smislu da su navike jednog člana

okruženje za drugog, tako da takvo okruženje može

biti podsticaj za neka nova ponašanja koja mogu da

dovedu do promena ili replikacije delova tog okruženja

(Hodgson & Knudsen, 2004). Rutine se mogu smatrati

i koherentnim skupovima navika koje, kada su

podstaknute okolnostima, vode sekvencijalnom

ponašanju unutar grupe. I navike i rutine podložne su

delovanju evolucionih principa varijacije, herediteta i

selekcije.

U ponuđenom modelu, opstanak uspešnijih rmi

istovremeno predstavlja i selektivnu retenciju njihovih

poslovnih rutina, što posledično ima određenog

uticaja na odabir navika radnika od kojih su pomenute

organizacione dispozicije komponovane, pa samim

tim, ultimativno, i ka nekoj vrsti selekcije samih

radnika, odnosno, njihovih genetskih struktura (što

se onda izjednačava i sa „izvornim“ konceptom

biološke evolucije). Postoji dakle, više vrsta replikatora

- rutine, navike, geni - i više nivoa na kojima selekcija

deluje - rme i pojedinci. Navedeni selekcioni niz,

već i u izloženoj uopštenoj formi, u izvesnom smislu

nagoveštava postojanje određene vrste sinhroniciteta

biološke i društveno-ekonomske evolucije, ali se

prilikom razmatranja potonje vrste evolucione

dinamike mogu ignorisati selekcioni tokovi na nivou

bioloških replikatora (Hodgson, & Knudsen, 2004, 302).

Naročito važnu ulogu u prethodno opisanoj

konceptualizaciji generalizovanog darvinizma imaju

navike, s obzirom na to da predstavljaju gradivni

element više nivoa sistema na kojima deluje evolutivna

selekcija. Najpre, navike su replikaciona struktura na

nivou pojedinaca kao aktera društveno-ekonomskih

procesa. Takođe, koherentno sjedinjavanje navika

različitih pojedinaca unutar formi vodi ka stvaranju

rutina, kao viših entiteta replikacije. Koncept navike

je ovde preuzet iz američke lozoje pragmatizma

i nekadašnje instinktivne psihologije, u smislu

dispozicija za određene vrste ponašanja, koje se

stiču kroz razne mehanizme socijalne interakcije, pri

čemu se replikacija (koja nije savršena) izražava na

fenotipskom nivou (ponašanje), a ne genotipskom

(genetski denisana psihološka stanja pojedinaca).

Dalja klarsikacija pomenutog koncepta našla

je oslonca u koncepciji programski zasnovanog

ponašanja. U procesu traganja za dovoljno ubedljivom

alternativom koncepciji racionalnog izbora, V. J.

Vanberg (2002) objedinjava nalaze različitih disciplina:

evolutivne biologije, epistemologije, psihologije i teorije

ograničene racionalnosti. Saznanja iz pomenutih

oblasti o čovekovom ponašanju vode ka zaključku da

je ono, na neki način, kodirano, programski upravljano.

Ukupni kapacitet čoveka za odlučivanje, koncentrisan

u ljudskom umu, ima trojako poreklo: genetsko nasleđe,

lično iskustvo i socijalno-kulturološka evolucija.

Raspoloživi repertoar sposobnosti odlučivanja formira

se kroz selektivnu eliminiciju obrazaca ponašanja koji

ne donose uspeh. Sva mudrost čoveka, prema tome,

produkt je prošlosti, adaptacija na ranija okruženja

koje su prošle evolucioni odabir, dok je sav inkrement

u postojećem znanju rezultat iskoraka iz postojećih

gnoseoloških kapaciteta, koji se zasniva na principu

pokušaja i grešaka (Campbell, 1965, prema: Vanberg,

2002). Strukture koje u pomenutom smislu obezbeđuju

podršku ljudskom odlučivanju, organizovane su kao

svojevrsni programi, specijalizovani za pojedine

klase problema, uključujući i socijalne odnose (među

važnijima su detektovanje transakcija i izbegavanje

onih koji izigravaju obaveze) (Vanberg, 2002, 37). Ostaje

otvoreno pitanje kakvo je relativno učešće u ljudskom

umu programa dobijenih genetičkim nasleđem

u i onih generisanim ličnim učenjem i socijalno-

kulturnim iskustvom. U kontekstu prikazane verzije

generalizovanog darvinizma, koncepcija ljudske svesti

kao modularne strukture, komponovane od instrukcija

genetskog i socijalno-kulturalnog porekla, nalazi

mesta u objašnjenju navika. Kao okosnica društveno-

ekonomske evolucije, navike se mogu smatrati

naročitim oblikom programa u smislu saznanja iz

pomenutih disciplina (Aldrich et al, 2008, 590).

Z.Stefanović, Koordinacioni aspekt institucija u kontekstu evolucionionističkog pristupa ekonomskoj dinamici 131

KRITIKA GENERALIZOVANOG

DARVINIZMA I TEZA O KONTINUITETU

Izložena generalizacija darvinističke paradigme

i način njenog upodobljavanja prema zahtevima

proučavanja privredne stvarnosti, ne nailazi na

najširu podršku evolucionističke naučno-istraživačke

zajednice unutar ekonomske teorije. Primedbe se

upućuju metodu izgradnje pomenutog epistemološkog

obrasca, ali i samom koncipiranju ekonomske evolucije

kao procesa koji se odvija prema darvinističkom

modelu. Osporovanja generalizovanog darvinizma

u ekonomskoj teoriji značajnim delom potiču od

rivalskog toka evolucionističke misli u ekonomiji,

poznatog kao teza o kontinuitetu.

Teorijska argumentacija koja podupire tezu o

kontinuitetu kao svoje polazište ima kritički odnos

prema preslikavanju darvinističkih prinicipa na

analizu ekonomskih procesa. U tom smislu, ukazuje se

na neopravdanost korišćenja selekcionog mehanizma

u objašnjenju ekonomske evolucije (Cordes, 2007,

136-141). Najpre se ističe da je priroda adaptacionih

mehanizama u biološkom i ekonomskom domenu

različita. Dok su adaptacije bioloških jedinki

produkt slučajnih genetskih mutacija i seksualnih

rekombinacija, ekonomski entiteti imaju sposobnost

direktnog i svesnog reagovanja na impulse iz

okruženja, tako da čak mogu umanjiti selekcione

pritiske. Nadalje, kritikuje se tretman rmi kao jedne

od formi interaktora u privredi, kao i pripisivanje

rutinama replikatorskog svojstva. Ističe se da su

rme u stanju da menjaju svoje rutine, dok takva

relacija između interaktora i replikatora u biološkim

sistemima nije moguća. Takođe, problematično je

shvatanje rutina kao replikatora, s obzirom na njihovu

nedovoljnu trajnost, jer se one u poslovnim procesima

menjaju relativno brzo i često. Kao principijelna

zamerka navodi se neprimerenost koncepta prirodne

selekcije, jer su ekonomski akteri u stanju da svesno

biraju organizacione oblike obezbeđenja opstanka,

saglasno sopstvenim kriterijumima selekcije.

Shodno navedenom, protagonisti teze o kontinuitetu

kritikuju generalizovani darvinizam zbog nekritičkog

povlačenja analogija između ekonomskih i bioloških

procesa (Wi, 2004, 128).

Temeljno polazište protagonista teze o kontinuitetu

jeste ono o postojanju ontološkog i istorijskog

kontinuiteta između biološke i kulturološke evolucije,

iako se njihovi mehanizmi principijelno razlikuju.

Kulturološka evolucija odvija se prema sebi svojstvenim

zakonitostima, ali na osnovama koje je prethodno

postavila prirodna selekcija, u vidu urođenih ljudskih

osobina (Cordes, 2007, 141). Evolucija se u navedenom

pristupu deniše kao samotransformacija određenog

sistema, koja je vođena određenim zakonitostima. U

toku logenije ljudske vrste, prirodna selekcija dovela

je do formiranja takvog sklopa osobina koji je ljudima

obezbedio znatno veće stope reprodukcije u odnosu

na druge vrste. Kao posledica toga, znatno je oslabio

selekcioni pritisak, što je, sa svoje strane, dovelo do

stvaranja uslova za druge vrste evolucije: kulturološku,

ekonomsku, tehnološku (Wi, 2004, 132). Rezultat

prirodne selekcije je da se inputima iz okruženja,

materijalima i energiji, dodaje i prirodnom selekcijom

oblikovano genetičko znanje ljudi, kao input koji se

samotransformiše, kroz nastanak i širenje inovacija.

Rastuće ljudsko znanje koje se intergeneracijski

akumulira bilo je od odlučujućeg uticaja na

proizvodnju, oblikujući na taj način i ekonomsku

evoluciju. Važnu ulogu u narastanju ljudskog znanja

imala su razna sredstva unapređenja njegovog

širenja, kao što su pisana komunikacija, pronalazak

tehnologije štampanja i savremenih načina replikacije

znanja. Takođe, prisutan je i problem sve slabije

uklopljenosti ljudski generisanih tokova materijala

i energije u tokove prirode, kao bitno ograničenje

budućih civilizacijskih učinaka ekonomske evolucije

(Wi, 2004, 141).

Zastupnici teze o kontinuitetu ocenjuju da postavka

o homologiji bioloških i ekonomskih procesa, koja se

prema tumačenju ovog teorijskog pravca logično može

izvesti iz generalizovanog darvinizma, nije realistična.

Takođe, iznosi se stav da je generalizacija darvinizma

u ekonomskoj nauci pokazala malo interesovanja za

empirijsku potvrdu sopstvenog shvatanja evolucione

dinamike (Levit et al, 2011).

Kao što se iz izloženog može zaključiti, evolucionistički

tok ekonomske misli zapravo je konglomerat različitih

gledišta o mogućem obrascu evolucije privrednog

procesa. Treba, svakako, napomenuti da i unutar same

darvinističke verzije ekonomskog evolucionizma

postoje alternativne konceptualizacije ekonomske

evolucije (Pelikan, 2011).

132 Ekonomski horizonti (2015) 17(2), 125 - 136

GRUPNA SELEKCIJA, INSTITUCIJE I

EKONOMSKA KOORDINACIJA

Trebalo bi na ovom mestu istaći da, čak i kada se

ne posmatra sa strogo darvinističkog stanovišta,

ekonomska evolucija predstavlja višenivovski proces.

Njoj su izloženi svi entiteti koji tvore ontologiju

društvenih procesa. Konsekventno, mora se uzeti

u obzir evoluciona dinamika i onih fenomena koji

predstavljaju odraz kolektivne dimenzije ljudskog

delovanja. Tu se dolazi do problema grupne selekcije,

koji i danas predstavlja veliki izazov za evolucionu

teoriju. Nameće se, naime, pitanje mogućnosti opstanka

grupe, s obzirom na to da je u evolucionom smislu,

ona, po pravilu, sastavljena od „sebičnih“ pojedinaca,

koji će u borbi za opstanak dovesti do njene razgradnje.

Preciznije, potreban je kritičan nivo kooperacije,

koji bi suzbio sebičnost pojedinaca do nivoa koji bi

obezbedio opstanak grupe. Posmatrano kroz aktuelnu

darvinističku shematiku, ukoliko su grupe interaktor,

onda mora da postoji nekakva replikaciona struktura

koja obezbeđuje odgovarajući balans između urođene

sebičnosti članova grupe i kooperacije potrebne za njen

opstanak, što se označava i kao problem identikacije

v. „socijalnog replikatora“ (Campbell, 1965).

Bez namere da se ovde detaljnije ulazi u problematiku

grupne selekcije, može se konstatovati da su upravo

institucionalne strukture podobno konceptualno

rešenje u smislu nalaženja socijalnog replikatora.

Potrebno je, naime, značajno prisustvo regulacionih

mehanizama radi održanja za opstanak grupe

neophodnog nivoa kooperacije pojedinaca, među

kojima su od naročite važnosti oni koji utiču na

poverenje. Tek u režimu izvesnosti ponašanja

partnera u socijalnoj interakciji, pre svega, u domenu

poštovanja pravila, akteri će biti podstaknuti na

kooperativne aranžmane. Poverenje je svojevrsno

„nevidljivo tkanje“ kooperativnog ponašanja jedinki

unutar grupe i kao takvo predstavlja deo neformalne

institucionalne regulacije. Važnost ovog atributa

institucionalnog dizajna društva je snažno potvrđena

upravo u sferi ekonomskih transakcija, koje mogu biti

značajno sputane usled oportunističkog ponašanja,

loše postavljenih principal-agent odnosa, asimetričnih

informacija i sl. (Lekovic, 2012, 65). Nivo poverenja

potreban za održanje kohezije ekonomskih odnosa,

međutim, i sam zavisi od podrške drugih društvenih

institucija (Lekovic, 2012, 66). Možda se već iz izloženog

može naslutiti kardinalan uticaj združenog dejstva

institucionalnih struktura na ekonomsku evoluciju, i,

povezano sa tim, diferencijalni opstanak privrednih

„jedinki“ različitog nivoa, što govori u prilog njihovog

izbora kao mogućeg konceptualnog nosioca funkcije

replikatora privrednog procesa.

Iako je rodonačelnik ekonomskog evolucionizma,

T. Veblen je institucije smatrao centralnom temom

evolucione teorije privrednih tokova, u kasnijim

darvinističkim konceptualizacijama one bivaju

delimično istisnute iz središta interesovanja. Ostaje

otvoreno pitanje da li će postojeći intenzitet i

razgranatost istraživanja svrstanih u teorijski korpus

evolucionističke ekonomije, dovesti i do pomaka

u artikulisanju uloge institucionalnih struktura u

evolucionoj dinamici. U tom smislu, ovde će biti

skicirane još dve reprezentativne koncepcije, koje teže

ka revitalizaciji uloge institucija u konceptualizovanju

ekonomske evolucije.

U novijoj verziji svoje teorije ekonomske evolucije,

P. Pelikan privredu konceptualizuje kao skup

agenata na različitim ontološkim nivoima hijerarhije.

Agenti višeg reda nastaju kao emergentni entitet,

samoorganizacijom agenata nižeg reda u mreže

(Pelikan, 2011). Svi agenti imaju ugrađene instrukcije

o ponašanju u obliku pravila. U privredi, relevantni

agenti su pojedinci, organizacije i privreda (Pelikan,

2011). Pojedinci raspolažu instrukcijama u obliku

kognitivih kapaciteta dobijenih genetskom evolucijom

i kulturološkim iskustvom, dok su pravila organizacija

i privrede, zapravo, formalne i neformalne institucije.

Promene institucionalnih pravila kroz pokušaje i

greške predstavljaju evoluciju, dok dinamika unutar

mreža agenata nižeg reda, pod okriljem postojećih

institucija, predstavlja proces privrednog razvoja

(Pelikan, 2011).

Protagonisti evolutivne makroekonomije privredu

smatraju rasutom strukturom koja transformiše

energetski input, pretvarajući ga u output. Sistem

karakteriše neravnoteža, ali i homeostaza, prisutna su

neprekidna nastojanja da se privlači što više energije,

kako bi se održao dinamizam sistema (Foster, 2011).

Dezintegraciju sistema sprečavaju mezo-pravila, koja

Z.Stefanović, Koordinacioni aspekt institucija u kontekstu evolucionionističkog pristupa ekonomskoj dinamici 133

obezbeđuju kratkoročno stabilne makroekonomske

tokove. Ta su pravila hijerarhijski ustrojena, i mogu

se prepoznati u institucijama društva (Foster, 2011).

Dele se na zička, koja daju znanja o transformaciji

energetskog input-a, i socijalna, koja diktiraju

ponašanje prema drugim agentima. Privredni rast je

moguć samo ekspanzijom investicija usmerenih ka

inovacijama, a to je moguće samo promenom mezo-

pravila (Foster, 2011). Drugim rečima, evolucija mezo-

pravila, odnosno, institucija, blisko je povezana sa

putanjom privrednog rasta različitih društava.

Nezavisno od pomenutih razmatranja, ako se možda

i ne mogu egzaktno identikovati kao nosioci

ekonomske evolucije, društvene institucije mogu se

makar smatrati njihovom relativno upotrebljivom

aproksimacijom. Shvaćene kao pravila igre u društvu,

koja strukturišu društveno-ekonomske interakcije

(North, 1994), institucije su čvorište čitavog snopa za

privredu bitnih funkcija - od onih koje determinišu

ponašanje aktera, preko obezbeđenja kanala njihove

komunikacije, sve do oblikovanja tehnoloških

kapaciteta društva.

Centralni problem funkcionisanja privrede je

obezbeđenje ekonomske koordinacije. U svojoj

antologijskoj elaboraciji pomenutog pitanja, F. Hayek

je ukazivao na nemogućnost da bilo koji pojedinac,

ili kolektivni organ raspolažu ukupnošću ekonomski

relevantnog znanja. Postoji, međutim, mehanizam koji

premošćava problem nedovoljnog znanja ekonomskih

aktera, i omogućava da njihovo delovanje ipak na neki

način bude uređeno. Radi se o sistemu tržišnih cena, čije

pulsiranje pruža uvid u relativnu oskudnost resursa i

time signalizuje ekonomskim akterima poželjni smer

njihove alokacije (Hayek, 1948). Usmeravanjem resursa

na razne, cenovnim sistemom određene, delotvorne

upotrebe, u uslovima neizvesnosti i nepotpunog

znanja aktera, tržište daje nezamenljiv doprinos

ekonomskoj koordinaciji i održavanju privrede na

stabilnim, ravnotežnim trajektorijama. F. Hayek

ukazuje i na druge, spontano izrasle i kroz dugotrajnu

praksu oblikovane institucionalne strukture koje, u

sadejstvu sa tržištem, obavljaju društveno-ekonomsku

koordinaciju: jezik, novac, moral, pravo (Hayek,

1960). F. Hayek-ova efektna analiza bacila je svetlo na

koordinaciju kao težišnu funkciju institucionalnih

struktura. Njen je oslonac, svakako, u tržišnom

mehanizmu, kome potporu pružaju i druge društvene

institucije. Slično tržištu, one na neki način „dešifruju“,

okruženje, stvaraju predstavu kod aktera kako je ono

strukturisano i koji su poželjni obrasci delovanja.

Pružajući informaciono utočište akteru u uslovima

neizvesnosti, institucije nadomeštaju njegove saznajne

limite i omogućavaju mu smisleno ekonomsko

delovanje (North, 1981).

Shodno navedenom, svaka se privreda može smatrati

osobenim sklopom tržišta i drugih institucija u službi

društveno-ekonomske koordinacije. Svetsku privredu

nastanjuju brojne i bogato izdiferencirane vantržišne

institucije, čija su heterogenost i koordinacioni učinci

odraz različitih putanja kulturološko-istorijske

evolucije pojedinih društava. Pored toga što predstavlja

sveprisutnu, i nesumnjivo dominantnu koordinacionu

strukturu, ni samo tržište ne spada u red „naturalnih“

kategorija, već u kolekciju institucija izniklih u

procesu društveno-ekonomske evolucije. I više od

toga, tržišni mehanizam predmet je kontinuiranog

kolektivnog uticaja, usmerenog na oblikovanje

njegovih mnogostranih uticaja u skladu sa društvenim

interesima. Razni institucionalni kapaciteti uključeni su

u kolektivna nastojanja da se u određenoj meri ograniči

uticaj tržišta na društveno prihvatljivu distribuciju

moći između relevantnih ekonomskih aktera. Primera

radi, netržišne institucije (naročito, sudske), mogu biti

uposlene u procesu iznalaženja fer-pravila za rešavanje

permanentnih konikata generisanih tržišnom

razmenom (Commons, 1968/1924, prema: Vanberg,

1997). Vantržišne institiucionalne strukture, same po

sebi, predstavljaju i neku vrstu odbrane društva od

socijalne destrukcije koju, u određenim civilizacijskim

etapama, zakonito izaziva generalizacija tržišnog

mehanizma (Polanyi, 1944). Posmatranje tržišta kao

naturalnog, nadinstitucionalnog entiteta, zamagljuje

stvarni način njegovog funkcionisanja, koje nosi pečat

kulturalno-istorijskih okolnosti (Dugger, 2005).

ZAKLJUČAK

Polazište rada, u smislu prezentovane građe, pokazuje

se kao održivo. Čak i nezavisno od argumentacije

prikazane u radu, razne grane ekonomske analize

134 Ekonomski horizonti (2015) 17(2), 125 - 136

detektuju postojanje raznovrsnih institucionalnih

struktura, koje, u sadejstvu sa tržištem, omogućavaju

ekonomsku koordinaciju na raznim nivoima

privrede. Indukovana selekcionim pritiskom, njihova

dinamika se, u manjoj ili većoj meri, ispoljava kao

trajektorijski zavisni fenomen, u konvencionalnoj

ekonomskoj analizi označen kao „put zavisnosti“.

Talas neoliberalnih reformi, usmeren ka apsolutizaciji

tržišnog mehanizma, nosi značajan destruktivni

potencijal, s obzirom da frontalni atak na postojeće

raznorodne netržišne institucije u svetskoj privredi,

preti da ozbiljno umanji njen budući adaptivni

kapacitet.

Valorizacija institucionalnih struktura unutar

evolucionističkog toka ekonomska misli, možda još

uvek u potpunosti ne odražava njihov mnogostran

i kapitalan uticaj na evoluciju privrede. Još snažnija

senzibilizacija na institucionalnu komponentu

ekonomske evolucije možda može povećati

delotvornost evolucionističkog promišljanja privrede.

Neke od istraživačkih orijentacija, značajno osvešćenih

u pomenutom smislu, su evolutivna teorija privrednog

rasta, komparativna politička ekonomija, teorija

nacionalnih inovacionih sistema i dr. Ekonomska

politika, takođe, mora da razume moguće implikacije

ovog elementa privrednog procesa, kako bi se njegovo

dejstvo moglo, u granicama mogućeg, da kanališe u

skladu sa potrebama razvoja privrede.

Ne treba, međutim, očekivati ozbiljniju penetraciju

evolucionističkog pristupa u glavni tok ekonomske

misli. Najpre, mimo sasvim okvirnih epistemoloških

načela, ne nazire se skora konvergencija alternativnih

verzija ekonomskog evolucionizma u jedinstven

i konzistentan paradigmatski okvir. Postavlja se,

nezavisno od toga i pitanje recepcije pomenutog

pristupa od strane ekonomske ortodoksije, odgovorne

za diseminaciju tema i ideja kroz većinski deo

ekonomsko-teorijske zajednice, koja pokazuje slabo

interesovanje za koncepcije koje nisu prošle kroz

rigoroznu matematičku formalizaciju. Evolucionisički

pristup ostaje i dalje veoma prikladan u okolnostima

kada je potrebno napraviti iskorak iz konvencionalne

ekonomske analize ka proučavanju realnih ekonomskih

sistema, čija je dinamika kontekstualno-specična i

podložna kulturno-istorijskim zakonomernostima.

Tim više, promišljanje privrede u evolucionističkim

okvirima, može biti podoban orijentir za ekonomsku

politiku.

ZA H VALNICA

Ovaj rad deo je Projekta osnovnih istraživanja (br. 179066),

koji nansira Ministarstvo prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog

razvoja Republike Srbije.

REFERENCE