When Participatory Forest Management makes money: insights from Tanzania on governance, benefit sharing, and implications for REDD+

Abstract

Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and the more recent framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) are two resource management strategies that were introduced in part for their cobenefits, including forest protection, employment opportunities, and added income for forest adjacent communities. In this paper we examine the early implementation of PFM in Tanzania's Kilwa District, led and promoted by the nongovernmental organisation Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI). This organisation has also recently received support to design a REDD+ project that could potentially realise additional financial benefits for local communities through the sale of carbon offsets in PFM-supported villages. We explore the ways in which MCDI has established a PFM scheme in four villages, how it has supported the emergence of more robust local governance structures, and what villagers perceive to have been the main outcomes and pitfalls of PFM to date. MCDI has managed to reduce many of the challenges that have characterised PFM schemes in other contexts, such as conflicts arising from forest governance restructuring, elite capture, and illegitimate benefit sharing, but has been less successful in addressing some aspects related to participation, such as involving village hamlets and women more effectively in decision making due to spatial configuration of landscapes and settlements and to existing cultural norms. These insights suggest that well-implemented PFM can provide a solid foundation for REDD+ implementation but that full realisation of REDD+'s equitable benefit-sharing principle, particularly at the intracommunity level, may take time and will be dependent upon prevailing local cultural norms.

Full text

Environment and Planning A 2015, volume 47, pages 000 – 000
doi:10.1177/0308518X15595899
When Participatory Forest Management makes money:
insights from Tanzania on governance, benefit sharing,
and implications for REDD+
Kaysara Khatun
Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA), Universitat Autònoma de
Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain; e-mail: kaysaral@gmail.com
Nicole Gross-Camp
School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ,
Norfolk, England; e-mail: n.gross-camp@uea.ac.uk
Esteve Corbera ¶
Institute of Environmental Science and Technology, and Department of Economics and
Economic History, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Spain;
e-mail: esteve.corbera@uab.cat
Adrian Martin
School of International Development, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ,
Norfolk, England; e-mail: adrian.martin@uea.ac.uk
Steve Ball, Glory Massao
Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative, Kilwa Masoko, Tanzania;
e-mail: steve.ball@mpingoconservation.org, glory.massao@mpingoconservation.org
Received 4 October 2013; in revised form 20 February 2015
Abstract. Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and the more recent framework for
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) are two
resource management strategies that were introduced in part for their cobenefits, including
forest protection, employment opportunities, and added income for forest adjacent
communities. In this paper we examine the early implementation of PFM in Tanzania’s Kilwa
District, led and promoted by the nongovernmental organisation Mpingo Conservation
and Development Initiative (MCDI). This organisation has also recently received support
to design a REDD+ project that could potentially realise additional financial benefits
for local communities through the sale of carbon offsets in PFM-supported villages. We
explore the ways in which MCDI has established a PFM scheme in four villages, how
it has supported the emergence of more robust local governance structures, and what
villagers perceive to have been the main outcomes and pitfalls of PFM to date. MCDI has
managed to reduce many of the challenges that have characterised PFM schemes in other
contexts, such as conflicts arising from forest governance restructuring, elite capture,
and illegitimate benefit sharing, but has been less successful in addressing some aspects
related to participation, such as involving village hamlets and women more effectively in
decision making due to spatial configuration of landscapes and settlements and to existing
cultural norms. These insights suggest that well-implemented PFM can provide a solid
foundation for REDD+ implementation but that full realisation of REDD+’s equitable
benefit-sharing principle, particularly at the intracommunity level, may take time and will
be dependent upon prevailing local cultural norms.
Keywords: Participatory Forest Management, REDD+, participation, benefit sharing,
Tanzania
¶ Corresponding author.

2 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
1 Introduction
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) emerged in the late 1970s in response to the
degradation and deforestation of government-owned forests (Campbell, 2009). It has been
considered critical to a shift from top-down, government-based initiatives to community-
based forest management, with the sometimes unfulfilled aim to improve forest quality and
people’s livelihoods (Kumar, 2002, Lund and Treue, 2008, Persha et al, 2011). Successes
with PFM have been patchy (Khatun, 2013) with the most consistent improvements in forest
condition achieved where external-assisted projects emphasised employment and increased
participation (Blomley et al, 2008; Conroy, 2001; Matiku et al, 2012; Treue et al, 2014).
However, in other contexts, these initiatives have often been unable to reduce forest loss and
become a means through which elites have reinforced their privileges (Khare et al, 2000;
Mohammed and Inoue, 2011).
In light of the global framework for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest
Degradation (REDD) and the enhancement, sustainable management, and conservation
of forest stocks (REDD+), PFM is increasingly viewed as the institutional basis for managing
forest-based carbon offsets and associated revenues. To date, REDD+ has mobilised more
than US$ 8.7 billion from donor countries for early implementation (Norman and Nakhooda,
2014; Pistorius, 2012; Streck, 2012). Achieving optimal outcomes from REDD+ involves
examining the extent to which forest policies in host countries can contribute to halting
forest loss or enhancing biomass stocks, whilst being attentive to livelihood outcomes and
respecting the rights of rural and indigenous peoples. Given this emphasis on identifying
forest policies that are likely to succeed, PFM has a potentially key role to play in REDD+
implementation in Tanzania and elsewhere.
The Tanzanian Forest Act of 2002 describes two types of PFM: Community-Based Forest
Management (CBFM) allows communities to establish forest reserves on village lands,
holding all associated rights and responsibilities; and Joint Forest Management (JFM) enables
communities to collaborate with government and other forest owners over the management
of reserved forests. The latter has proved problematic due to the slow progress in agreeing
benefit-sharing terms between the government and collaborating communities. This study
thus focuses on community-based PFM.
Tanzania is one of the few African nations relatively advanced in carbon forestry, and
as such provides a good case for exploring the relationship between PFM and REDD+. It
has devoted significant resources towards developing a REDD+ national strategy and action
plan (NSAP) (Government of Tanzania, 2013), backed by key REDD+ donors. The cases
we report on here exemplify this PFM–REDD+ linkage as they are already using PFM as
a platform for a REDD+ pilot project and simultaneously grappling with the governance
challenges that arise from this. We study four communities in Tanzania’s Kilwa District that
first entered into PFM and have since become part of a REDD+ pilot project, facilitated
by the Mpingo Conservation and Development Initiative (MCDI), a Tanzanian nonprofit
organisation. Given that REDD+ is still at an early stage of implementation, our findings
about governance outcomes are primarily the effects of PFM, which has been in place for
longer. However, the preliminary activities of REDD+ are already in process and such
activities are intentionally piggy-backing on the PFM institutional setup. We therefore seek
to draw lessons about the development of PFM for REDD+ activities in our case villages, and
the wider implications for the scaling-up of REDD+ beyond its pilot phase.
MCDI has developed an approach to PFM that prioritises financial returns from sustainable
forest management, with a business plan involving sales of both timber and carbon offsets.
This model of PFM places particular demands on local institutions, and understanding
these challenges provides important lessons for the wider use of PFM for revenue-oriented

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 3
REDD+ activities. Learning from previous work on forest decentralisation, we propose
that participation, accountability and responsiveness are key institutional conditions for the
effectiveness of decentralised forest management, insofar as “it is only when constituents
come to exercise accountability, as a countervailing power that decentralization is likely to
be effective” (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999, page 5). In this context, we ask what are the key
local governance challenges for PFM-based REDD+. We examine how local villagers view
the new forest institutions, the procedures and outcomes of benefit sharing, the use of cash
revenues, and the potential for fostering collective action.
2 Building local institutions to realise PFM and REDD+ in Tanzania
2.1 Coupling PFM with REDD+
REDD+ interest in Tanzania stems from its status as a low-income nation with a high
deforestation rate of 1.1% (about 400 000 ha) per annum between 2005 and 2010 (Government
of Tanzania, 2013). It also has a relatively stable legal, institutional, and political basis for
PFM, and well-established civil society organisations that support pilot projects (Campese,
2012; Mustalahti and Rakotonarivo, 2014). Specific legislation on carbon rights does not yet
exist in Tanzania, but it has been argued that such rights should be “tied directly to forest/tree
rights in order to ensure that PFM and other forest and land tenure regimes can support
equitable REDD+ benefit sharing” (Campese, 2012, page 31). In practice, this means that
communities with PFM would be the legitimate owners of carbon offsets.
By 2008, 12.8% of Tanzania’s forestland was managed under PFM of one sort or another,
with 22% of villages having PFM institutional arrangements (Government of Tanzania, 2013).
Simple environmental measures of success (basal area and timber volume) have been found
to increase in PFM forests, while such measures declined in forests under open access and
state management (Blomley et al, 2008). This partly explains why Tanzania’s REDD+ NSAP
recognises PFM as a key pillar upon which REDD+ may be realised. However, evidence
of the social benefits is somewhat less positive. In Tanzania, economic benefits from PFM
are typically low due to lack of high-value products, and benefit capture by elites (Meshack
et al, 2006; Vyamana, 2009). At the same time, PFM and REDD+ pilots have involved
both opportunity and transaction costs for communities, in terms of foregone forest use and
individual and institutional time committed to forest management operations (Merger et al,
2012). For the average villager, PFM might mean unwanted additional work in return for
minimal benefits, a situation that might only be sustained because it remains in the interest of
the elite minority whose will prevails (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2006; Blomley et al, 2008).
This relative paucity of social benefits, often coupled with weak governance of benefits,
poses a critical problem for the expansion and sustainability of PFM and for a PFM-based
implementation of REDD+ projects in general (Burgess et al, 2010).
Despite existing problems with PFM in Tanzania, land rights devolution programmes
have become recognised as a necessary vehicle to pursue the commodification of carbon
offsets. Such coupling of PFM and REDD+ emphasises the importance of ensuring the
effectiveness of PFM, and in particular the need to develop institutional conditions that can
guarantee environmental effectiveness and fair benefit sharing, which are significant features
in PFM schemes (Ravindranath and Sudha, 2004; Schreckenberg and Luttrell, 2009) and
have not been found in other REDD+ PFM-based projects in Tanzania (Scheba, 2014).
2.2 Integrating PFM and REDD+ in Kilwa
MCDI promotes the sustainable management of high-value timber trees, including East
African Blackwood (Dalbergia melanoxylon or ‘mpingo’), used in Europe and North America
predominantly for the production of musical instruments. The model of PFM developed
by MCDI is potentially highly rewarding for participating communities, with an estimated

4 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
potential income of US$ 25/ha/year for community forests, based on average extraction rates
of approximately 1.5% of standing timber volume per year.(1) Initially MCDI focused solely
on the sale of timbers to provide forest revenues, with an aim to secure premium prices
through Forest Stewardship Council certification, secured in 2009. Since 2010 MCDI has
involved four PFM early-participating (and six other) villages in a pilot REDD+ project
with a view to future carbon-offset sales. Whilst selling timber and carbon sequestration may
appear contradictory, the carbon offsets are to be generated through the introduction of a fire-
management process, based on controlled burning activities during the early dry season, to
prevent more intense fires later in the dry season (Ryan and Williams, 2011).(2) This enhances
carbon storage by reducing mortality of larger trees, which will also support sustainable
harvesting of a fraction of the additional biomass.
The integration of PFM with REDD+ is anticipated to generate an additional gross income
of US$ 2.1/ha of forest (based on a carbon price of US$ 7/tCO2e), which MCDI would split
between a carbon trading intermediary—who would get 33% of the revenue to cover marketing
and tax costs—and the communities—who would split equally the remaining 67% with the
project developer. Whilst opportunity costs of REDD+ pilots in Tanzania can be as high as
US $28.8/tCO2e (Merger et al, 2012) they are close to zero under the MCDI fire-management
approach, since the lands being targeted have already been put aside by the community for
sustainable timber harvesting under PFM. The sale of timber and carbon offsets provides the
potential to overcome the aforementioned lack of income in much community-based PFM
in Tanzania, but it also presents new risks for local communities. Experience in Tanzania
and elsewhere suggests that high rents can enhance the incentive for elite capture, leading
to distributional inequities, conflicts, and destabilisation of local management institutions
(Balooni et al, 2010; Fritzen, 2007; Iversen et al, 2006). Therefore, introducing carbon offset
sales can only add to the requirement for strong local institutions and enhance the likelihood
that weak institutions will be unable to manage benefits equitably and peacefully.
In addition to problems of local elite capture, there is a danger that incorporation into
global carbon markets can further disenfranchise local communities, through top-down
imposition of new ideas about how forests should be valued, and by introducing opaque,
highly technical and distantly designed means of measuring these values. Any threat to local
authority over forests should be taken very seriously because loss of community participation
and control is likely to be detrimental to both social and environmental outcomes of forest
management (Persha et al, 2011; Porter-Bolland et al, 2012).
3 Case study
Our study was carried out in four rural villages of Kilwa District (see figure 1), one of the
poorest parts of Tanzania and most densely forested, with forests and woodlands covering
around 70% of land (National Bureau of Statistics, 2013).(3) Forests in central Kilwa are a
complex mosaic of miombo woodlands and patches of East African Coastal Forest. At the
time of writing, MCDI was supporting PFM in ten villages around the district (as well as
two in neighbouring Rufiji district). We focused on the four villages that MCDI has been
supporting the longest. The REDD+ project noted above will be implemented across all the
villages in Kilwa where MCDI is currently working.
(1) This figure is theoretically obtainable, but as of 2012 MCDI achieved revenue of US $1/ha/year due
to low market demand.
(2) MCDI has recently had the project methodology approved, in 2014 (Fehse and Ball, 2014).
(3) Kilwa is a coastal district, but all the villages under study are inland and derive no income from
fishing.

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 5
PFM in Tanzania is founded on the legal designation of a Village Land Forest Reserve
(VLFR) for community forestry under PFM rules. Governance is overseen by an elected village
council (VC) comprising up to twenty-five members led by an elected village chairperson
and supported by the village executive officer (VEO), a salaried post appointed by the district
authorities and generally coming from outside of the village.(4) The VC is complemented by
an assortment of elected committees, including, in PFM villages, a sixteen-member Village
Natural Resource Committee (VNRC) which manages the VLFR. Committee members serve
for three-year terms and may be reelected for additional terms.
3.1 Methods
Data collection involved a revenue and expenditure audit of PFM activities, focus groups,
and semistructured interviews. For the former we reviewed VC and VNRC documentation
of income generated from timber sales and associated expenditures, from July 2009 through
June 2012. In addition, we held separate meetings with the VC and VNRC in each village
to examine awareness of revenue and expenditure and to assess perceptions about how
expenditures were beneficial to the community. To achieve this, we calculated the proportion
of the PFM project’s revenues spent on process versus outcome delivery. Broadly speaking
(4) The VC is elected at the general assembly (GA) which, by law, should occur every three months, are
open to all residents over the age of 18 years, and is considered the supreme authority over the affairs
of the village.
Figure 1. [In colour online.] Location of the Kilwa district and study villages, with the corresponding
year project established, community forest area (ha), and population (source: own elaboration).

6 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
process refers to administrative and PFM management costs whereas outcomes refers to
activities targeting collective well-being paid for out of PFM profits (ie, after deducting
process costs): for example, borehole development and classroom construction.
Additionally, we conducted four focus-group discussions per village (N = 16) involving
representatives of the VC only, the VNRC only, an all-male group, and an all-female group of
community members. Groups consisted of six to eight people, purposively selected to include
a range of perspectives, including critical ones. Both the village chairperson and MCDI staff
assisted with this selection and this may have led to a bias towards individuals who are
more positive about PFM and REDD. Nonetheless, the results were helpful for assessing
and qualifying general cohesion and collaboration between the VC and VNRC, as well as
community perspectives on the use of the monies generated from the PFM timber sales.
Our third data-collection method involved thirty semistructured interviews across the
four villages. These consisted of eighteen general community members (men and women),
eight people from the VC or VNRC, and four MCDI staff.(5) These interviews focused
on perceptions of both the new PFM institutions and the use of PFM revenues. Again,
the sample was purposive, involving the range of respondents we believed could provide
useful experience of village-level PFM implementation. Respondents were selected based
on information gained during focus groups and discussion with local informants and with
MCDI staff.
We recognise that both interviews and focus groups may have had accidental ‘bias’ due
to small sample size, nonrandom selection procedures, and the positionality of researchers.
Where possible, we therefore seek to cross-check for consistency with more extensive
(though less in-depth) survey data collected in 2011. Firstly, we look at data from a household
survey that used a stratified random sample of thirty households per village (Corbera et al,
2012). Second, we examine the findings of participatory governance assessment workshops
conducted in each village (Springate-Baginski et al, 2013).
4 Results
4.1 The community-based PFM scheme: knowledge, participation, and accountability
Here we look at governance outcomes and relate these findings to our working proposal
(section 1) that more effective forest decentralisation will be facilitated by enhanced
accountability and associated knowledge. We also explore social divisions that shape the
patterns of participation and empowerment that have developed under PFM.
One of the key findings from our semistructured interviews was that all respondents
reported a positive change in their perception of forests and forest management. There are
two main factors that explain this. First, PFM has delivered additional revenue to villages,
whilst imposing little or no cost on individual households. Respondents did not see PFM as
placing costly restrictions on their access to resources because sufficient alternative resources
exist outside of the VLFRs. Secondly, PFM is reported to have improved forest governance
through changes in powers and accountabilities that arise from enhanced knowledge and
participation linked to a new village decision-making body, the VNRC. The increase in the
level of control exercised by villages over the VLFR is highlighted by an example from
Liwiti where a woman in a focus group explained that
“ [before] we viewed it as just standing trees with no value, [we] did not care about the
forest, we could just go with a match and burn it, we really did not care about it. Now we
see that it is our property with value, something that has been conserved.”
(5) To avoid unintentional bias, the lead author was funded from a separate fellowship, and three of the
authors are affiliated with academic organisations and not MCDI.

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 7
PFM governance interventions are reported to have led to an increase in overall
understanding, transparency and downward accountability concerning forest management
issues in the study villages. For example, interviewees say that they are now able to use their
understanding of PFM to challenge and question village leaders through the GA, something
that they did not do before. In other words, whilst PFM formally devolves rights and decision-
making powers to village-level institutions, villagers seem to recognise that the effective
working of these institutions requires that their constituencies are themselves empowered—
to enhance responsiveness to local needs. Prior to PFM, financial decisions were made by
the VC and voted on by the community at the GA. Some interviewees stated that, previous
to the inception of the VNRC, the decision-making process was not transparent, with the
VC sometimes acting autonomously without community involvement. Most community
members (all bar three female respondents) were now aware of the difference in the roles,
duties, and corresponding election process of the two governing bodies. Most also considered
elections to now be fair, although two respondents stated that elections were subject to
nepotism from village leaders [a view shared by some MCDI staff and also found in other
study areas (see eg, Mustalahi and Rakotonarivo, 2014)].
These findings support the view that knowledge dissemination is an important factor
in successful decentralisation of forest management. However, we did not find that better
individual knowledge of PFM or REDD+ always translates into perceptions of better forest
governance. Through the earlier household survey (Corbera et al, 2012), we recorded
knowledge of MCDI’s project activities in three classes: those who had heard of the project
and had some awareness of project activities, those who had heard of the project but were
not aware of specific activities, and those who had not heard of the project. Not surprisingly,
the greatest knowledge was found in the villages where PFM had been introduced earlier—
Kikole (established 2004) and Kisangi (2005) versus Nainokwe and Liwiti (both, 2009)
(Corbera et al, 2012). Whilst respondents considered knowledge to be important for
accountability, villages that report the best governance outcomes do not simply correspond
to those reporting the best knowledge of PFM. For example, Kikole is widely considered to
have better governance than Kisangi because the VNRC has emerged as a rival centre of
power that is more accountable to the wider population and reduces misuse of PFM revenues.
This challenge to the VC has generated friction, which has sometimes impeded management
effectiveness, but MCDI staff do not view this friction as a negative outcome. From their
perspective, the VC had complete control over village affairs prior to PFM and the newly
created tensions with the VNRC have made decisions more balanced and transparent.
In Liwiti the changes in forest governance introduced through PFM also led to frictions,
partly due to a sense of empowerment of the community to challenge perceived misuse of
authority. This friction resulted in sixteen (of the twenty-five) VC members resigning from
their posts due to pressures from the community shortly before we conducted our fieldwork.
The previous VC chairperson had been forced to resign because he had brought loggers into
parts of the village lands (outside the VLFR) without the permissions of other VC or VNRC
members. We were unable to ascertain why exactly the other VC members resigned, although
alignment with the chairperson’s activities was implied. Despite having been caught in illegal
activities, the resignation of the chairperson was viewed as a mixture of positive and negative
by the all-male focus group—positive because he was “hindering the VNRC’s work”, but
negative because of the lack of a chairperson. The focus group felt that there was a haraka
sana (big hurry) to repopulate the VC as “the members involved at present are not able to
do all of their duties” which was in turn affecting the VNRC, illustrating the importance of a
‘healthy’ VC to the ability of the VNRC to function.

8 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
In Kisangi we found similarly high levels of PFM knowledge to Kikole, but little
evidence that the VNRC was providing a forum that could turn this capacity into improved
transparency and accountability. The VNRC did not create the kind of frictions seen in Kikole
and Liwiti because it was said to be co-opted by the VC’s leadership through their control
over appointments. The problem seemed to stem from the appointment of a VC member as
the VNRC chair, thus removing its power to counter the VC. MCDI described the subsequent
leadership of the VNRC as “too much hand in glove” whilst village respondents complained
that they had lost faith in it. The VNRC was not sticking to budgets or apprehending
illegal loggers. Instead, it was concentrating solely on patrolling, for which it received a
daily stipend and a portion of all fines levied. Thus, whilst the absence of obvious friction
presented an outwards appearance of better cooperation between the VNRC and VC than in
Kisangi, villagers and MCDI felt that this really amounted to a continuation of a status quo
in which leaders were not responsive to the preferences of their constituents nor accountable
leadership. In the fourth study village, Nainokwe, the VC and the VNRC were reported to be
working well together, both interviews and focus groups have shown that the community is
generally happy with the governing bodies, and to date there is little friction between the two.
In this case the absence of friction is not seen to result from the retention of power by the VC.
In all villages, there are concerns about who knows about PFM and REDD+, who attends
GA meetings, and what groups of people are fully recognised as PFM constituents. On average
less than half of household heads attend the GA meetings and interviewees recognised this
problem of poor representation. The spatial configuration of landscapes and settlements is one
factor that clearly impacts on who participates. One group of particular concern in Nainokwe
and Kikole is those living in outlying subvillages, with several interviewees acknowledging
that the most important barrier to participation is living away from the main village centre.
Villages in this part of Tanzania cover large areas; in Nainokwe, for example, the subvillage
is 18 km from the main village and low participation was largely due to the three-hour walk
to attend meetings. In Kikole, however, the men’s focus group felt that the absence of people
from one subvillage was not only a matter of physical remoteness but also a result of leader
behaviour—not wanting to include people from the subvillage in an effort to concentrate
benefits in the main village.
What emerges then is that PFM institutions are more accountable to some villagers than
to others. Distance to the centre of village power is one factor in this, and in the case of
Kikole this is exacerbated by the sociopolitical divisions across physical space. We also
found a gender division across all villages, and whilst women are certainly present on each
of the committees, their voice is heard less. A number of interviewees among community
leaders and MCDI staff explained the lack of parity for women as resulting from a process
of cultural disempowerment, where women do not talk or argue in public, especially before
older men. The women we interviewed had participated in GA and VNRC meetings as
appointed members, but were unable to describe certain aspects such as the distribution of
PFM revenues, the role of the VNRC compared with the VC, or the VNRC election process.
Men had a better grasp of the roles of the governing structures, distribution, and spending
processes. Lack of knowledge of PFM benefits has perhaps contributed to women having
lower expectations of benefits. In the household survey conducted across all ten MCDI
villages, 61% of male respondents expected to gain benefits from the project against 32% of
female respondents (N = 268). Interestingly, male respondents, presumably partly based on
better information, were also more likely to anticipate some potential negative effects of the
project on livelihoods (Corbera et al, 2012).

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 9
4.2 Fiscal powers: sharing PFM revenue
We turn our attention to issues surrounding how PFM revenue is disbursed, a governance
issue that is considered important to villagers, and which is centrally related to our focus
on accountability, participation, and benefit sharing. VLFR management plans establish
the proportions of VLFR revenues that go to the VNRC to cover forest management costs,
and to the VC for village development activities, with a smaller percentage (~ 5%) going to
the district authority. People were generally aware of and in agreement with these planned
distributions of PFM revenues. On average, villages were spending approximately 50% of
timber revenues on process activities and 50% on outcome-oriented activities. One village,
Nainokwe, differs in that it is spending slightly more on outcome than process because it
has also earned substantially more: ie, 13.4 million TSh (about US $8395) in 2011 alone
(table 1). As explained below, only one village has transferred a share of outcome-oriented
monies to individual households.
Forest management costs (process) are mostly VNRC field activities such as boundary
clearing and patrolling. The exception is in Nainokwe where only 29.9% was spent on field
activities, with the majority spent on (a) travel costs of accessing their bank account (all
villages must travel ~ 100 km to Kilwa Masoko town for banking) and (b) uniforms for
VNRC members. Nainokwe village, with relatively more income from timber sales, was
also unique in targeting some money for vulnerable groups: health insurance for twelve older
people and meals for school children. The former is in the form of a voluntary community
health fund, with a contribution of 5000–15 000 TSh, which exempts local people from
paying small service fees at the point of access (eg, the district hospital). Minutes from GA
meetings confirmed that school meals were supported; however, we were not able to collect
the precise amount of either of these spends nor how many households benefited from free
school meals.
In Kisangi, Liwiti, and Nainokwe more than 90% of the outcome spends were considered
to be widely beneficial to the community across all focus groups. In Kikole the male focus
group was more critical, stating: “The VC uses the money for meetings allowance and not
community development. We see a budget for a project like that of the midwife’s house, but
it is never finished.” In contrast, the semi-structured interviews found wide agreement that
such purchases represented a ‘wise’ choice of spending. One key reason expressed was
that decisions taken at GA meetings are ‘participatory’, or, in other words, the decision-
making forum itself underwrites the legitimacy of the decision. However, it was also apparent
that the average community member had little more than voting rights at these assemblies,
with spending proposals almost exclusively generated by the VC and VNRC.
Nainokwe’s use of PFM monies for building a new house for the VEO was the one
expenditure that ‘raised eyebrows’ amongst external stakeholders, including MCDI staff
Table 1. Total income and expenditures for timber sale revenues (TSh).
Village Total
income
Total
expenditure
Process
spend
Outcome
spend
Process
spend
(%)
Outcome
spend
(%)
Outcomes
widely
beneficial
Outcomes
widely
beneficial
(%)
Kikole 6 695 200 4 377 300 2 544 700 1 832 600 58.1 41.9 882 200 48.1
Kisangi 9 614 800 3 963 140 2 585 400 1 377 740 65.2 34.8 1 377 740 100.0
Liwiti 5 113 800 4 142 500 1 870 000 2 272 500 45.1 54.9 2 201 000 96.9
Nainokwe 14 232 000 11 459 488 4 414 600 7 044 888 38.5 61.5 7 044 888 100.0
Average
(%)
51.7 48.2 86.2

10 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
who feared it constituted elite capture. The concern was that this house benefited only one
individual who happened to be one of the most powerful actors in the village. This was not
seen as a public good comparable with, say, expenditure on the school building in Liwiti, the
medic’s house in Kisangi, or the midwife’s house in Kikole. However, villagers themselves
did not see this either as elite capture or a failure of downward accountability. Respondents
explained that the community voted for building the VEO’s house because he was renting
and had a family and because the VEO was important for village development. Therefore,
this expenditure was viewed as a public good by most of our interviewees.
The majority of the interviewees across the four villages (89%) said that the communities
had gained as a result of PFM. The most common benefits described were economic (income
from timber sales), environmental (water, trees, fewer fires), and social (participation in
village affairs). Only three interviewees, from different villages, felt that VC and the VNRC
committee members were benefitting disproportionately and unfairly, because they received
money from attending meetings and patrolling. In Kikole and Nainokwe the VNRC and VC
have made efforts to increase more community members in patrolling, and such responsiveness
to the concerns of (minority) constituencies is likely to be important in future activities.
Increased income from timber sales was the most cited benefit with the most positive
impact on village life. Prior to PFM, revenue from timber sales went directly to the central
and district governments with communities receiving a tiny amount in the form of levies that
were typically TSh 100 (approx. US $0.06) per log, less than 1% of what they now get under
PFM. Some noted a reduction of illegal timber harvesting as a result of PFM and associated
forest regeneration (consistent with Blomley et al, 2008). Whilst this could potentially be
costly to those individuals who previously benefitted from illegal logging, interviewees did
not express this inability to harvest where and when they wanted as a negative outcome
of PFM.
5 Discussion: when PFM meets REDD+
So far we have shown that PFM in the four MCDI villages has contributed to creating a new
local institution, which includes a landscape space (the VLFR), an organisation (the VNRC),
and new rules for forest management (through the VLFR management plan). This institution
represents a new arena for political influence, decision making, and for generating revenue
at the village level. Forest governance across the four villages has improved, and collective
action for forest patrolling and management has been organised and articulated by the new
VNRC. Timber revenues have been used differently in each village, with varying degrees of
investment in collective goods. Households involved in boundary clearing and patrolling in
all villages have benefitted through direct payments and through specific allocations to elders
or families with schoolchildren in Nainokwe. No social group in the villages has vehemently
opposed the overall allocation of revenues in the first timber sale, but a few interviewees
have suggested that VC and VNRC members may have unevenly captured patrolling fees.
A common finding across the four villages is also a relatively low level of participation in
GA—the main decision-making body where VC and VNRC plans and decisions are discussed.
These insights related to participation should be approached and interpreted carefully,
however, since our method has not allowed us to capture and analyse decision-making
processes over time, or across the multiple dimensions of participation (Kumar, 2002;
Stringer et al, 2006). That said, it is possible to suggest that ‘equitable access to decision
making’ remains a challenge for PFM and therefore for a PFM-based REDD+. In the studied
villages, challenges arose from both site-specific issues and from more widely felt institutional
conditions. Site-specific issues included the preexisting political–institutional landscape, and
the implications for the extent to which VNRCs could develop countervailing powers that
brought greater accountability. They also included specific settlement geographies and in

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 11
particular the difficulties of achieving parity of participation for remote hamlets. Of the wider
institutions that structure the experience of PFM, gender emerged as critical.
Women have a poorer understanding than men of PFM aspects such as governance
and distribution, and, even though they do not articulate this as a problem, that in itself
is a manifestation of marginal involvement: lack of knowledge has translated into low
expectations and therefore expressions of satisfaction must be treated with care.
The gender question and the other barriers to equal participation indicate how
longstanding cultural and social structures can make it difficult to bring about step-changes
towards inclusive and transformative participation. Involving women in PFM programmes
and REDD+ pilots can prove challenging in Tanzania and beyond (Krause et al, 2013; Peach
Brown, 2011), which in turn suggests that both donors and international policy makers should
be aware that (gender) equity is culturally mediated and should be carefully interpreted.
Conversely, it is questionable whether PFM programmes are the most effective vehicle
through which to reduce the marginalisation of women in community decision making, due
to the fact that women’s involvement in forest management institutions has been found to
be correlated with their education, households’ income inequality levels, and the democratic
features of local governance institutions (Coleman and Mwangi, 2013). In this regard, PFM
efforts such as MCDI’s can surely make reasonable efforts to provide equitable procedures
(eg, promoting and enforcing the minimum one-third representation by women on all village
committees required by Tanzanian law), as well as provide empowering role models in
the form of competent and self-confident female staff, although they cannot of themselves
force women to speak up when they prefer to remain silent, and they are unlikely to have a
great impact on women’s basic education and income levels. Furthermore, the complexity
of the challenge of achieving equal access to knowledge of PFM, and the potentially even
greater challenge of uneven understanding of carbon-offsetting methodologies, will conflict
with the commonly declared intention to operate a system of free, prior, and informed consent
under REDD+. What constitutes sufficiently ‘informed consent’ is clearly a question that
must engage communities as well as wider stakeholders.
Also in line with other studies of PFM programmes and REDD+ pilots, we have found that
financial revenues are viewed as contributing to well-being, both investments in collective
goods and direct payments to villagers for forest patrolling efforts or for more sustainable
agricultural practices (Duchelle et al, 2014; Robinson and Lokina, 2012; Schreckenberg and
Luttrell, 2009; Vyamana, 2009). At the same time, we have found no evidence of outcomes
being captured by elites—at least in the sense that this term is interpreted locally. What
was perceived as elite capture by project managers and donors (Nainokwe’s VEO house) was
regarded as legitimate at the village level, partly it seems because of a relatively transparent
decision-making procedure, and partly as the house was itself seen as something necessary
to support local governance capacity. As one would expect, there is not 100% consensus
about specific uses of proceeds, but the procedure is generally considered legitimate within
the community itself, with only a very few respondents pointing to discrimination, nepotism,
or ‘political’ agendas. This controversial issue highlights potential differences that exist
between external and local conceptions of equitable or ‘pro-poor’ allocation of expenditures.
Similar to our conclusion about informed consent, this suggests a need for careful attention to
what constitutes ‘equitable’ benefit sharing and the basis upon which different stakeholders
construct cases for this.
The current tendency towards community-level agreement may change as timber
revenues continue to flow into the village and REDD+ payments are added to this. Revenue
from the VLFRs is likely to become the largest source of village-controlled public income
and expenditure, thus raising the potential for rent-seeking and rewarding allies (eg, based
on political party affiliation). Thus, MCDI and community monitoring systems, as well

12 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
as researchers, should continue to pay close attention to the everyday ways in which local
control of PFM and REDD+ operates, and the tensions that these operations generate within
and between communities, and external stakeholders. This will ideally include a better
understanding of locally relevant norms of procedural and distributional equity: for example,
around distinctions between ‘elite control’ of project decision making and ‘elite capture’ of
project benefits (Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013).
Evidence from other parts of Tanzania also suggests that conflicts between villagers and
between villages and other external actors in PFM and REDD+ can result from the clash of
multiple discourses and interests, specifically regarding the allocation of boundaries around
protected landscapes and the rules that should govern such protection (Beymer-Farris and
Bassett, 2012; Scheba, 2014). As reflected over the course of this paper, however, we have not
found evidence of significant intracommunity conflicts in the MCDI case that can undermine
project viability in the short term, but circumstances might change over time if perceived
benefits and costs change. There is a long tradition of conflicts over property and access to
Tanzania’s forests, including those in Kilwa district (Sunseri, 2009), which suggests that
the current trend toward improved forest governance in MCDI sites can change if villagers
or village elites begin to perceive that PFM and REDD+ activities are geared against their
interest, or if the government intervenes in existing benefit-sharing rules and timber and
carbon property rights configuration.
In this regard, we suggest that the current level of intravillage agreement and project
buy-in can probably be understood in terms of a favourable cost–benefit ratio. Whilst we do
not yet have data on the costs of PFM and REDD+ management operations for different local
stakeholders, our research has found nothing to contradict the view that opportunity costs
of alternative land uses are quite minimal compared with some other locations in Tanzania
(Merger et al, 2012; Meshack et al, 2006). This is due to the existence of substantial forest
areas available to villages outside the formal VLFRs, and that VLFRs are often far from the
majority of settlement areas and therefore not much valued for agriculture or non-timber
forest products collection. But this widely held perception of low opportunity costs may
change in the future, particularly if local elites become more confident that PFM and REDD+
does generate significant cash income and that much of this can be spent locally, leading
them to support the allocation of larger areas of village land to PFM. This can, in turn, impact
access to resources required by villagers for their food and energy needs, which are currently
met from land outside the PFM, but may reduce, if less land is available for such activities.
For example, the most recent village to enter into the MCDI project has devoted more than
60 000 ha of its forest as a VLFR, bordering agricultural lands; already this has led to conflict
with migrant farmers from a neighbouring district. Thus the stakes are set to increase, in
terms of both benefits and costs, placing greater demands on governance and benefit-sharing
systems in order to maintain a sense of fairness.
Finally, our research also demonstrates that PFM is being used to set the foundations of
carbon offsetting, a potentially important source of funding for conservation organisations.
This is part of a wider phenomenon of attempting to adapt promising existing forms of
forest governance to the needs of carbon accounting and to the quest for land-use emission
reductions. This approach to the climate problem runs the risk of repackaging landscapes
as carbon sinks, and in doing so it can change how these landscapes are represented
(eg, by statistics about potential carbon storage), what they are valued for, and what are
the legitimate land-management objectives, rights and responsibilities. Such re-presenting of
landscapes can serve to strengthen claims to legitimacy of existing governance forms (Leach
and Scoones, 2013; Lyons and Westoby, 2014), but can also serve to render landscapes
investable for new land uses and users (Li, 2014). Such transformations in the valuation of
landscapes can transform motivations for conservation, and bring additional investments to

When Participatory Forest Management makes money 13
local communities; but we need to be aware that they can also impose additional burdens,
especially for those who are most often excluded from participation and benefit sharing in
forest management and conservation efforts.
6 Conclusion
From the perspective of PFM and REDD+, our study has contributed to identify some factors
that commonly help to promote effective governance for collective action under decentralised
forest management, which can subsequently lead to land-use emission reductions under local
and national REDD+ efforts. These include (a) the transfer of sufficient authority, including
local control over substantial revenues; (b) transparency served by wide dissemination of
information within the community; and (c) downward accountability through democratic
local institutions supported by transparency. However, none of these factors makes PFM,
and therefore REDD+, outcomes predictable. They play out in different ways according to
the particular contexts into which new institutional arrangements are inserted. We saw new
institutions quickly co-opted by preexisting elites in one village, whereas in another we saw
a power struggle unfold that we think is generally positive in terms of the evolution of more
democratic and effective forest governance. We also saw instances where some specific
outcomes of ‘effective’ local governance are not to the taste of MCDI and its funders. The
more effort project managers and governments dedicate to explaining these initiatives on the
ground, the more attentive they become to local exclusions; and the more time they spend
in the village rather than in the office, the more likely it is that PFM and REDD+ efforts
translate into beneficial outcomes for livelihoods.
The successes we found in this case study are more profound than the concerns. The
former include added accountability under the VNRC, transparency, participation, and
awareness about how the village forests can be more sustainably managed and how much
villages can get in return. The last two successes, whilst still needed in larger degrees, are
critical pillars upon which an additional layer of carbon accounting and management could
be built. Community engagement can lead to stronger demands for good leadership and good
governance more broadly. The concerns, in turn, relate to awareness issues, gender equality
in decision making, and potential conflicts arising from the future and periodical distribution
of revenue from both timber sales. These should also be taken into account when REDD+
activities are incorporated in PFM and other villages, as carbon accounting, monitoring, and
the potential generation of an additional revenue stream (ie, carbon-offset sales) generate
another layer of complexity. Negotiating a fair share of carbon revenues with communities,
and its subsequent distribution across the VC and the VNRC, will be a challenging task due
to an inherent risk of misunderstanding what carbon offsets are and how they are valued and
commercialised. Furthermore, monitoring who gets employment from REDD+ activities,
who has the ability to express possible concerns in public meetings, and who decides on
collective expenditures will be critical to ensure that well-being across the village improves
and that carbon monies do not contribute to, foster, or consolidate elite capture.
The extent to which PFM can effectively contribute to reduce emissions from land-use
change in Tanzania and in a significant way is most likely to require a large-scale, committed
implementation across all existing sites. The experience of MCDI suggests that PFM can
indeed result in an enabling mechanism to put in place more effective governance structures
for forest management and, importantly, lay the ground for benefit-sharing of forest and
carbon-related revenues. This experience also suggests that, from a national and governmental
point of view, the identification of existing and legitimate PFM activities could be a good
place to start for experimenting with direct economic or in-kind rewards for people’s efforts
to manage timber sustainably while potentially reducing the country’s expected land-use
emissions.

14 K Khatun, N Gross-Camp, E Corbera, A Martin, S Ball, G Massao
Acknowledgements. The authors would like to thank the studied villages for their time and hospitality.
All authors gratefully acknowledge Norwegian funding of MCDI’s REDD+ pilot project that paid for
much of this research, and Comic Relief which funded much of the community forestry whose results
this paper assesses. KK and EC acknowledge the financial support of a ‘Juan de la Cierva’ (JdC-
2011-11205) and a ‘Ramón y Cajal’ research programme fellowship (RYC-2010-07183), respectively.
Finally, we thank other MCDI staff who have made this work possible, especially Jasper Makala and
Fredson Mwendo, and Oliver Springate-Baginski at UEA whose work on governance monitoring has
contributed to this study.
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