Debates about the efficacy of private environmental regimes have been
fueled by disparate research findings, such as when the same regime that
has been effective in one setting is found to be ineffective in another.
In this article, we show that the efficacy of ISO 14001, the most widely
adopted voluntary environmental regime in the world, is conditioned by
the stringency of countries’ domestic regulations. In doing so, we outline a
model of strategic corporate environmentalism wherein firms strategically
focus their International Organization for Standardization (ISO) certification
to reduce emissions of visible air pollutants as opposed to less visible water
pollutants. Our analyses of pollution levels for a panel of 159 countries (73
for water pollution) from 1991 to 2005 indicate that ISO 14001 certifications
reduce air (SO2) emissions in countries with less stringent environmental
regulations but have no effect on air emissions in countries with stringent
environmental regulations. We also find that ISO membership levels are not
associated with reductions in water pollution levels (Biochemical Oxygen
Demand BOD), irrespective of stringency of domestic law. Our article
suggests that the efficacy of global private environmental regimes is likely to
be conditioned by the domestic regulatory context in which firms function