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NGO research program: a collective action perspective
Abstract
This paper outlines a collective action approach to study nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). We contend that while political scientists and sociologists have extensively written about NGOs, they have not systematically examined fundamental collective action issues such as why and where NGOs emerge, how they function, how they are structured, and what strategies they employ to mitigate agency conflicts and ensure accountability. Instead of theorizing about NGOs as a category, NGO scholars have developed descriptive typologies relevant to study small subsets of the NGO population. In contrast, the non-profit literature, which studies broadly the same actor category, has systematically focused on fundamental questions inherent in any collective endeavor. We conclude that by employing a collective action perspective, specifically the theories of firm, NGO scholars will be able to develop explanations about NGO origin, structure, and strategy that have superior explanatory power and are generalizable across NGOs.
... One plausible argument might be that the cadre of people joining NGOs is intrinsically more 'moral' than the ones working for firms. (Prakash 2007) That particular argument, as I argue elsewhere in this essay, may also have been held onto too tightly by NGOs, and needs to now be challenged. ...
In recent years, leading international nongovernmental organizations (INGO) such as Oxfam International, Save the Children, and Amnesty International have been implicated in scandals about sexual abuse and other forms of abuse of power and harassment. I suggest focusing on organizational and sectoral culture as an explanatory variable for these crises, which are particularly hard hitting for purportedly value-based organizations. In the case of NGOs, in my observation as a practitioner and ‘pracademic’, these are driven by six factors:(1) particular individual leadership traits that may be prevalent especially in the emergency and humanitarian relief related sector; (2) the effect of power on leaders’ perspectives and behaviors ; (3) a culture of silence that makes it hard for NGO staff to speak up about toxic workplace behaviors ; (4) the presence of deep power structures within NGOs which are not openly acknowledged and therefore addressed; (5) the myth of own innocence that leads NGOs to treat wrong doing as aberrations instead of systemic problems; and finally (6) a culture of limited individual and team-level accountability practices . The extent to which these cultural failures can be addressed through formal policy and (self)regulatory measures is limited, given that culture is primarily about informal, covert belief systems. NGOs will have to do sustained and disciplined culture work themselves if the roots of the scandals are to be taken away.
Recent research has usefully documented the contribution that nonprofit organizations make to “social capital” and to the economic and political development it seems to foster. Because of a gross lack of basic comparative data, however, the question of what it is that allows such organizations to develop remains far from settled. This article seeks to remedy this by testing five existing theories of the nonprofit sector against data assembled on eight countries as part of the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project. The five theories are: (a) government failure/market failure theory; (b) supply-side theory; (c) trust theories; (d) welfare state theory; and (e) interdependence theory. The article finds none of these theories adequate to explain the variations among countries in either the size, the composition, or the financing of the nonprofit sector. On this basis it suggests a new theoretical approach to explaining patterns of nonprofit development among countries—the “social origins” approach—which focuses on broader social, political, and economic relationships. Using this theory, the article identifies four “routes” of third-sector development (the liberal, the social democratic, the corporatist, and the statist), each associated with a particular constellation of class relationships and pattern of state-society relations. The article then tests this theory against the eight-country data and finds that it helps make sense of anomalies left unexplained by the prevailing theories.
This article examines the institutional preconditions or rules that shape collaborative natural resource management between public agencies and citizen groups. In particular, it asks: How do the preconditions surrounding a given natural resource, such as property rights, legislative frameworks, and agency performance incentives, circumscribe the possibilities for collaboration? Drawing upon irrigation and forest management policies and practices in India from the mid-1800s onward, it is argued that the context of irrigation provides some opportunities for supporting agency-citizen collaboration, whereas such efforts in forestry are unlikely to succeed without fundamental structural change.
This article develops a political economy approach to the study of contemporary transnational networks. We argue that many aspects of International Organization (IO) and International Non Governmental Organization (NGO) behavior can be explained by materialist analysis and an examination of the incentives and constraints produced by the transnational sector’s institutional environment.
We advance two theoretical propositions. First, the growing number of IOs and INGOs within a given transnational sector increases uncertainty, competition, and insecurity for all organizations in that sector. This proposition disputes the liberal view that INGO proliferation is, in and of it- self, evidence of a robust global civil society. Second, we suggest that the marketization of many IO and INGO activities—particularly the use of com- petitive tenders and renewable contracting—generates incentives that produce dysfunctional outcomes. This claim disputes the popular assumption that market-based institutions in the transnational sector increase INGO efficiency and effectiveness.
In advancing these arguments, we do not criticize the normative agendas, moral character, or nominal goals of individual transnational groups. Rather we suggest that dysfunctional organizational behavior is likely to be a rational response to systematic and predictable institutional pressures. In many cases, uncooperative local actors will take advantage of the transnational sector’s perverse incentives to further their own opportunistic agendas.
Over the last ten years or so, an important new approach to the study of organizations has emerged within economics. It is perhaps best characterized by three elements: a contractual perspective on organizational relationships, a theoretical focus on hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent models. This paper provides political scientists with an overview of the "new economics of organization" and explores its implications for the study of public bureaucracy. So far, positive political theory has not contributed much to our understanding of public bureaucracy. In part this is due to the unsympathetic treatment that rational modeling and most other modes of quantitative analysis have long received from students of public administration. The other side of the coin, however, is that positive theorists have not made much of an effort to develop theories of bureaucracy. Their concerns have centered around two basic mechanisms of social choice, voting and markets, and they have devoted little systematic attention to a third mechanism that is clearly important for understanding how societies and other aggregates make collective decisions. This third and relatively unexplored mechanism is hierarchy. Movement toward a positive theory of hierarchies would fill a serious gap in the social choice literature, while at the same time making a theoretical contribution that strikes to the essence of public bureaucracy, indeed of all organizations. In fact, significant steps toward a positive theory of hierarchies have very recently been taken-but by economists, not political scientists. In small numbers, of course, economists made contributions to the study of public bureaucracy some time ago with the pioneering works of Downs (1967), Tullock (1965), and Niskanen (1971). But this new wave of theoretical work is different. It is already a large, complex body of literature that is the focus of innovation and excitement among a growing number of economists, and it reflects an unusual degree of theoretical coherence and cumulative effort. Work in this tradition tends to receive orientation from a distinctive economic approach to the analysis of organizations, an approach perhaps best characterized by three elements: a contractual perspective on organizational relationships, a focus on hierarchical control, and formal analysis via principal-agent models. This approach has emerged from recent attempts to move beyond the neoclassical theory of the firm, which assumes away all organizational considerations, to a theory of economic organizations that can explain why firms, corporations, and other enterprises behave as they do. Propo
There have been widely differing claims about how environmental groups attempt to reform environmental policy—from those who see the movement as challenging the prevailing social paradigm through confrontation and violence, to those who lament the movement's reliance on conventional styles of political persuasion. This article uses data from the 1998 Global Environmental Organizations Survey (GEOS) to map the political activities used by environmental groups across the globe and to determine what best accounts for these patterns of action. The authors examine the responses of 248 environmental groups in the GEOS; these data allow the authors to compare environmental group behaviors across 59 nations and 5 continents. They find that most environmental groups engage in a mixture of political methods and activities. Although there is little evidence that institutional structures influence participation, the mix of organizational resources and ideology are potent influences on participation patterns. The results help to explain the role that environmental groups play in contemporary politics and the factors that affect this role.
Some scholars suggest that the Middle East's oil wealth helps explain its failure to democratize. This article examines three aspects of this “oil impedes democracy” claim. First, is it true? Does oil have a consistendy antidemocratic effect on states, once other factors are accounted for? Second, can this claim be generalized? Is it true only in the Middle East or elsewhere as well? Is it true for other types of mineral wealth and other types of commodity wealth or only for oil? Finally, if oil does have antidemocratic properties, what is the causal mechanism?
The author uses pooled time-series cross-national data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997 to show that oil exports are strongly associated with authoritarian rule; that this effect is not limited to the Middle East; and that other types of mineral exports have a similar antidemocratic effect, while other types of commodity exports do not.
The author also tests three explanations for this pattern: a “rentier effect,” which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to dampen democratic pressures; a “repression effect,” which holds that resource wealth enables governments to strengthen their internal security forces and hence repress popular movements; and a “modernization effect,” which implies that growth that is based on the export of oil and minerals will fail to bring about die social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He finds at least limited support for all three effects.
Rational choice theory tends to view political institutions as
structures of voluntary cooperation that resolve collective action
problems and benefit all concerned. Yet the political process often gives
rise to institutions that are good for some people and bad for others,
depending on who has the power to impose their will. Political
institutions may be structures of cooperation, but they may also be
structures of power—and the theory does not tell us much about this.
As a result, it gives us a one-sided and overly benign view of what
political institutions are and do. This problem is not well understood,
and indeed is not typically seen as a problem at all. For there is a
widespread sense in the rational choice literature that, because power is
frequently discussed, it is an integral part of the theory and
just as fundamental as cooperation. Confusion on this score has undermined
efforts to right the imbalance. My purpose here is to clarify the analytic
roles that power and cooperation actually play in this literature, and to
argue that a more balanced theory—one that brings power from its
periphery to its very core—is both necessary and entirely
possible. a
Debates about globalization have centered on calls to improve accountability to limit abuses of power in world politics. How should we think about global accountability in the absence of global democracy? Who should hold whom to account and according to what standards? Thinking clearly about these questions requires recognizing a distinction, evident in theories of accountability at the nation-state level, between “participation” and “delegation” models of accountability. The distinction helps to explain why accountability is so problematic at the global level and to clarify alternative possibilities for pragmatic improvements in accountability mechanisms globally. We identify seven types of accountability mechanisms and consider their applicability to states, NGOs, multilateral organizations, multinational corporations, and transgovernmental networks. By disaggregating the problem in this way, we hope to identify opportunities for improving protections against abuses of power at the global level.
The conversion of a nonprofit firm to the for-profit form is commercialism carried to an extreme. Conversion is increasingly common, most notably in health cave. We seek to advance understanding of why nonprofit conversions occur and what public policy should be toward them. A transfer of control-the essence of a conversion-over nonprofit assets can be accomplished in various ways. Thus, if would be a public policy mistake to focus narrowly on formal legal conversions or outright sales. We explore the possible motives for conversion, and speculate about the reasons for the flurry of conversion activity in hospitals and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). We conclude that there are three central public policy questions raised by conversions: (1) under what circumstances is conversion appropriate-when does it represent an efficient reallocation of resources and when only a redistribution of wealth ?; (2) how should the nonprofit's assets be valued?; and (3) what should happen to the financial assets that remain after a conversion?
This paper analyzes the survival of organizations in which decision agents do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. This is what the literature on large corporations calls separation of 'ownership' and 'control.' Such separation of decision and risk bearing functions is also common to organizations like large professional partnerships, financial mutuals and nonprofits. We contend that separation of decision and risk bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common approach to controlling the implied agency problems. In particular, the contract structures of all these organizations separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from the initiation and implementation of the decisions.
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics offers a critical survey of the field of empirical political science through the collection of a set of articles written by forty-seven scholars in the discipline of comparative politics. Part I includes articles surveying the key research methodologies employed in comparative politics (the comparative method, the use of history, the practice and status of case-study research, and the contributions of field research) and assessing the possibility of constructing a science of comparative politics. Parts II to IV examine the foundations of political order: the origins of states and the extent to which they relate to war and to economic development; the sources of compliance or political obligation among citizens; democratic transitions, the role of civic culture; authoritarianism; revolutions; civil wars and contentious politics. Parts V and VI explore the mobilization, representation, and the coordination of political demands. Part V considers why parties emerge, and the forms they take and the ways in which voters choose parties. The text then includes articles on collective action, social movements, and political participation. Part VI opens with essays on the mechanisms through which political demands are aggregated and coordinated. This sets the agenda to the systematic exploration of the workings and effects of particular institutions: electoral systems, federalism, legislative-executive relationships, the judiciary and bureaucracy. Finally, Part VII is organized around the burgeoning literature on macro-political economy of the last two decades. This Handbook is one of The Oxford Handbooks of Political Science a ten-volume set of reference books offering authoritative and engaging critical overviews of the state of political science.
Understanding sources of sustained competitive advantage has become a major area of research in strategic management. Building on the assumptions that strategic resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms and that these differences are stable over time, this article examines the link between firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Four empirical indicators of the potential of firm resources to generate sustained competitive advantage-value, rareness, imitability, and substitutability are discussed. The model is applied by analyzing the potential of several firm resources for generating sustained competitive advantages. The article concludes by examining implications of this firm resource model of sustained competitive advantage for other business disciplines.
Nonprofit organizations are increasingly resembling private firms in a transformation bringing with it a shift in financial dependence from charitable donation to commercial sales activity. This book, first published in 1998, examines the reasons and consequences of the mimicry of private firms by fundraising nonprofits. User fees and revenue from 'ancillary' activities are mushrooming, with each having important side effects: pricing out of the market certain target groups; or distracting the nonprofit from its central mission. The authors focus first on issues that apply to nonprofits generally: the role of competition, analysis of nonprofit organization behavior, the effects of distribution goals and differential taxation of nonprofit and for-profit activity revenue, the effects of changes in donations on commercial activity, and conversions of nonprofits to for-profits. They then turn to specific industries: hospitals, universities, social service providers, zoos, museums, and public broadcasting. The book concludes with recommendations for research and for public policy toward nonprofits.
Responding to comments on “Social Origins of Civil Society,” an article published in this issue of Voluntas, this article focuses on three critical issues that underlie cross-national theory building and theory testing in the field of nonprofit studies: the issue of definitions, the challenge of operationalizing key theoretical concepts, and the nature of the tests available to verify results. Regarding the first, the article defends the structural-operational definition used in The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project against suggestions by the commentators that it either be expanded or narrowed, arguing that the alternative is either to broaden the focus beyond what is manageable or to make the basic yardstick vulnerable to changing political and policy shifts—a sure prescription for confusion. Regarding the question of operationalization, the article concedes that better measures of some key features of prevailing theories might be imaginable, but, since few of these are available, it cautions against letting the best become the enemy of the good in cross-national nonprofit theory testing. Finally, the article finds, in suggestions that multivariate techniques be used in testing various nonprofit theories, confirmation of its central argument that a contextual analysis of the sort embodied in the authors' “social origins” approach is needed to come to terms with the reality of the nonprofit sector cross-nationally. Taken together these comments underline the need to continue the kind of systematic data gathering and theory testing that the authors have undertaken, to utilize an interdisciplinary approach, and to link the study of the nonprofit sector to social analysis more generally.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOS) both lobby states and work within and across societies to advance their interests. These latter efforts are generally ignored by students of world politics because they do not directly involve governments. A study of transnational environmental activist groups (TEAGs) such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and World Wildlife Fund demonstrates that NGO societal efforts indeed shape widespread behavior throughout the world. TEAGs work through transnational social, economic, and cultural networks to shift standards of good conduct, change corporate practices, and empower local communities. This type of practice involves “world civic politics.” That is, TEAGs influence widespread behavior by politicizing global civil society—that slice of collective life which exists above the individual and below the state yet across national boundaries. This article examines the activity of world civic politics as practiced by environmental activists and evaluates its relevance for the study of NGOs and world politics in general.
This study analyzes organization of economic activity within and between markets and hierarchies. It considers the transaction to be the ultimate unit of microeconomic analysis, and defines hierarchical transactions as ones for which a single administrative entity spans both sides of the transaction, some form of subordination prevails and, typically, consolidated ownership obtains. Discusses the advantages of the transactional approach by examining three issues: price discrimination, insurance, and vertical integration. Develops the concept of the organizational failure framework, and demonstrates why it is always the combination of human with environmental factors, not either taken by itself, that causes transactional problems. The study also describes each of the transactional relations of interest, and presents the advantages of internal organization with respect to the transactional condition. The analysis explains why primary work groups of the peer group and simple hierarchy types arise. The same transactional factor which impede autonomous contracting between individuals also impede market exchange between technologically separable work groups. Peer groups can be understood as an internal organizational response to the frictions of intermediate product markets, while conglomerate organization can be seen as a response to failures in the capital market. In both contexts, the same human factors, such as bounded rationality and opportunism, occur. Examines the reasons for and properties of the employment relation, which is commonly associated with voluntary subordination. The analysis attempts better to assess the employment relation in circumstances where workers acquire, during the course of the employment, significant job-specific skills and knowledge. The study compares alternative labor-contracting modes and demonstrates that collective organization is helpful in enhancing the acquisition of idiosyncratic knowledge and skills by the work force. The study then examines more complex structures -- the movement from simple hierarchies to the vertical integration of firms, then multidivisional structures, conglomerates, monopolies and oligopolies. Discusses the market structure in relation to technical and organizational innovation. The study proposes a systems approach to the innovation process. Its purpose is to permit the realization of the distinctive advantages of both small and large firms which apply at different stages of the innovation process. The analysis also examines the relation of organizational innovation to technological innovation. (AT)
Recent scholars have broadened the study of transnational relations, once limited to political economy, to include contentious international politics. This is a refreshing trend, but most of them leap directly from globalization or some other such process to transnational social movements and thence to a global civil society. In addition, they have so far failed to distinguish among movements, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and transnational networks and do not adequately specify their relations with states and international institutions. In particular, few mechanisms are proposed to link domestic actors to transnational ones and to states and international institutions. This paper argues that mass-based transnational social movements are hard to construct, are difficult to maintain, and have very different relations to states and international institutions than more routinized international NGOs or activist networks. These latter forms may be encouraged both by states and international institutions and by the growth of a cosmopolitan class of transnational activists. Rather than being the antipodes of transnational contention, international institutions offer resources, opportunities, and incentives for the formation of actors in transnational politics. If transnational social movements form, it will be through a second-stage process of domestication of international conflict.
This empirical study suggests that Japanese competitive advantage in complex-product industries is at least partly due to differences in value chain governance and interfirm asset co-specialization. Comparative data are offered which indicate that U.S. firms rely largely on markets and hierarchies to facilitate exchange, whereas Japanese firms rely largely on "hybrid" governance or alliances. The empirical findings suggest that Japanese automotive firms (value chains) have been able to achieve a competitive advantage over their U.S. counterparts by effectively using hybrid/alliance governance for three primary reasons: (1) Japanese automotive value chains are characterized by greater interfirm asset co-specialization than U.S. chains. In particular, greater human asset co-specialization between firms results in superior coordination, information sharing, and learning which is critical in complex-product industries, (2) hybrids/alliances as employed by Japanese automakers realize virtually all of the advantages of hierarchy (e.g., asset co-specialization) without the disadvantages (e.g., loss of market discipline, loss of flexibility, higher labor costs), and (3) Japanese automotive value chains incur lower transaction costs than U.S. value chains. Thus, alliances, as structured in Japan, simultaneously realize the benefits of decentralization and competition without sacrificing economies of scale, coordination, or co-specialization of assets. These findings support transaction cost theories which suggest that effectively aligning governance structures with transactions will result in efficiency advantages. However, inconsistent with extant transaction cost theory, findings from this study suggest that: (1) hybrid governance may be more efficient than hierarchical governance under conditions of uncertainty, and (2) transaction costs do not necessarily increase with an increase in asset specificity.
To what degree can Western countries “purchase” civic engagement and participation in less developed countries that do not share the Western liberal tradition? Drawing on interview data as well as internal documents, this article looks at the effects of Western and international assistance on building civil society and, hence, democracy in Russia by focusing on the Russian nongovernmental organization (NGO) community. Although Western assistance has provided tangible equipment and training for NGOs, overall funding designed to facilitate the growth of civil society has had unintended consequences. Institutions, interests, and incentive structures impede successful collective action toward building a civic community by encouraging both funders and NGO activists to pursue short-term benefits over long-term development. The result is the creation of patron-client ties between the international donor and the Russian recipient rather than horizontal networks of civic engagement among Russian NGOs and their domestic audience.
Obra que reconstruye el origen y evolución de las actuales redes transnacionales que, con la utilización de las nuevas tecnologías informativas como recurso organizador y aglutinador, han logrado constituirse en movimientos más o menos presionadores en la defensa de los derechos humanos, de la protección ambiental y de una mayor equidad de género, entre otros.
This article examines the commercial practices and sales income of national nonprofit social services associations in the United States. The associations span the fields of youth services, health charities, community and recreation services, and advocacy programs for older Americans and children. The commercial ventures of these associations reflect an important trend in the non-profit social services sector, which has implications for taxation, financing,and regulatory policies. The conceptual framework that defines nonprofit organizations as multiproduct economic organizations helps illuminate the relationship of commercial sales to the pursuit of the mission. In general, the commercial initiatives of the associations examined are not solely revenue-producing ventures in that they make direct contributions to the mission as well; indeed, pains are taken by association leaders to avoid activities that would damage their associations’ abilities to pursue their missions. Statistical analysis of the sales revenues of local affiliates of one association—the Jewish Community Centers Association—demonstrates that losses of external income from grants and contributions stimulate sales income whereas increases in memberships expand the markets within which these organizations can generate revenue from user fees.
Property in transition (Book I, chapter 1) …The typical business unit of the 19th century was owned by individuals or small groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main, limited in size by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These units have been supplanted in ever greater measure by great aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even hundreds of thousands of individuals, are combined through the corporate mechanism into a single producing organization under unified control and management.… Such an organization of economic activity rests upon two developments, each of which has made possible an extension of the area under unified control. The factory system, the basis of the industrial revolution, brought an increasingly large number of workers directly under a single management. Then, the modern corporation, equally revolutionary in its effect, placed the wealth of innumerable individuals under the same central control. By each of these changes the power of those in control was immensely enlarged and the status of those involved, worker or property owner, was radically changed. The independent worker who entered the factory became a wage laborer surrendering the direction of his labor to his industrial master. The property owner who invests in a modern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that he has exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become merely recipient of the wages of capital.
This article takes stock of a plethora of recent works examining the flowering of transnational civil society activism in world politics. The author argues that this work contributes to a progressive research agenda that responds to a succession of criticisms from alternative perspectives. As the research program has advanced, new areas of inquiry have been opened up, including the need for a central place for normative international theory. The author also contends that the focus of this research on the transnationalization of civil society provides a trenchant response to an important puzzle concerning the leverage of civil society vis-à-vis the contemporary state in an era of globalization. Further, the liberal variant of transnational advocacy research constitutes a powerful theoretical counter not only to other nonliberal theories that privilege other agents or structures but also to other varieties of contemporary liberal international theory, such as those privileging preexisting domestic preference formation or state centric versions of liberal constructivism.
Interest in and research on nonprofit organizations and sectors have developed rapidly in recent years. Much of this work by sociologists has focussed on particular subsectors rather than on nonprofits as a class. This review attempts to extract from a large and varied literature a distinctively sociological perspective on nonprofits, which it contrasts to influential work in economics. Two questions—“Why (and where) are there nonprofit organizations” and “What difference does nonprofitness make?”—are addressed at the levels of organization, industry, and firm. Three central conclusions, each with research implications, emerge from this review: (a) The origins and behavior nonprofit organizations reflect institutional factors and state policies as well as the social-choice processes and utility functions emphasized by economists. (b) Understandingth e origins of nonprofit sectors and behavioral differences between nonprofits and for-profit or government organizations requires an industry-level ecological ...
The frequent resort to protest activity by relatively powerless groups in recent American politics suggests that protest represents an important aspect of minority group and low income group politics. At the same time that Negro civil rights strategists have recognized the problem of using protest as a meaningful political instrument, groups associated with the “war on poverty” have increasingly received publicity for protest activity. Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation, for example, continues to receive invitations to help organize low income communities because of its ability to mobilize poor people around the tactic of protest. The riots which dominated urban affairs in the summer of 1967 appear not to have diminished the dependence of some groups on protest as a mode of political activity.
This article provides a theoretical perspective on protest activity as a political resource. The discussion is concentrated on the limitations inherent in protest which occur because of the need of protest leaders to appeal to four constituencies at the same time. As the concept of protest is developed here, it will be argued that protest leaders must nurture and sustain an organization comprised of people with whom they may or may not share common values. They must articulate goals and choose strategies so as to maximize their public exposure through communications media. They must maximize the impact of third parties in the political conflict. Finally, they must try to maximize chances of success among those capable of granting goals.
The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatization of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. After critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom uses institutional analysis to explore different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the 'tragedy of the commons' argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
This analysis is based on two cases of national-level policy change in the Philippines and two cases of transnational alliances which aimed to influence World Bank projects. Both national and transnational alliances are examined because each has important consequences for the lives of people in developing countries. The analysis seeks to answer two questions: (i) what factors increase the effectiveness of alliances in achieving policy outcomes and strengthening civil society? and (ii) what factors enable alliances to be accountable to their members, especially grassroots groups? -from Author
This article examines the concept of accountability from various disciplinary lenses in order to develop an integrated understanding of the term. Special attention is devoted to principal—agent perspectives from political science and economics. An integrated framework is developed, based on four central observations. (1) Accountability is relational in nature and is constructed through inter- and intraorganizational relationships. (2) Accountability is complicated by the dual role of nonprofits as both principals and agents in their relationships with other actors. (3) Characteristics of accountability necessarily vary with the type of nonprofit organization being examined. (4) Accountability operates through external as well as internal processes, such that an emphasis on external oversight and control misses other dimensions of accountability essential to nonprofit organizations. The analysis draws from the experiences of both Northern and Southern nonprofits, that is, organizations based in wealthy industrialized regions of the world (the global North) and those in economically poorer areas (the South).