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11
Religious Affiliation and
Individual Economic and
Political Attitudes in Ukraine
Maria Snegovaya
INTRODUCTION
The relationship between religion and economic development has
been a longstanding topic in social sciences research (Hegel, Weber,
Braudel, Robertson, and Samuelsson, Inglehart to name a few). Scholars
have argued that some aspects of Christianity have huge potential for
encouraging social and economic development, mainly in the theoretical
sense. Unlike other social sciences, economic literature has not paid much
attention to the impact of the religious factor on economic and political
development of societies until recently. However, today there is a grow-
ing empirical literature to investigate the causal relationship between
religion and economic development: Barro and McClearly (2003), Guiso
et al. (2003), Basten and Betz (2009), Radek and Filipova (2009) et al. But
the findings are rather contradictory and counterintuitive. One particular
problem is that researchers usually frame the issue in terms of statisti-
cal work, rather than taking an interdisciplinary approach that would
include historic, sociologic, socio-psychological, and theological sciences.
A further problem is the paucity of research on Eastern Orthodox de-
nominations in this context. One reason for this neglect may be the lack of
sufficient data on Orthodoxy both across nations, as well as within single
countries and among individuals.
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146 Maria Snegovaya
Since the passage of the 1990 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Re-
ligious Belief, “a very liberal document that introduced legal religious
equality and the separation of church and state for the first time in Rus-
sian history,”1 religious revival has continued to grow in the post-Soviet
region. Today, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is regarded as one
of the most influential institutions that shape Russians’ values, attitudes,
and behavior regarding public policy.2 According to Levada-Center data,
in 2012 almost twice as many Russians considered themselves Orthodox,
compared with 1996 (79 percent versus 44 percent respectively).3 The Rus-
sian Orthodox Church is now the second most trusted institution in the
country following the President of Russia.4 At the same time, the Russian
government has attempted to take the Orthodox Church under its control.
The government in recent years has changed the high school curriculum
to include religious education. They have also used the church to fulfill
their diplomatic objectives. Moreover, in 2010 United Russia, the coun-
try’s leading political party, announced that they believed in Orthodoxy
as a moral basis for modernization. They claimed that the “stable spiritual
and moral foundation” provided by Orthodox ethics promotes values of
patriotism, sobornost and serving to the common good5. However, the data
do not support this modernization thesis. Consider the examples in
In table 11.1, countries are grouped on the basis of their dominant
religious denomination.6 There is an interesting recurrent relationship
between these groups: the GDP gap per capita between Orthodox and
Catholic countries has grown considerably, comparing 1990 and 2007
indices. Over the same time period, the gap between Catholic and Prot-
estant countries remained stable. If all developed countries are excluded
Table 11.1 . Comparisons of Countries’ Indicators of Development
N
GDP
per
Capita
19901
GDP
per
Capita
20072
Government
Effectiveness
(WB)3
Rule
of
Law
(WB)4
CPI
(TI)5
Economic
Freedom
(HF)6
PROTESTANT 12 Mean 15,807 30,858 92.0 90.3 7.9 75.7
Median 31,650 95.3 95.0 8.3 76.7
CATHOLIC 40 Mean 7,746 15,300 60.8 53.7 4.7 63.2
Median 13,350 66.2 58.6 4.5 64.6
ORTHODOX 13 Mean 6,269 9,123 49.8 45.9 3.5 59.6
Median 7,800 50.7 44.0 3.4 60.8
1. Angus Maddison. Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD (Horizontal file,
copyright Angus Maddison, university of Groningen)// www.ggdc.net/MADDISON/oriindex.htm
2. Ibid.
3. World Bank//www.info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp
4. Ibid.
5. Transparency International// www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table
6. Heritage Foundation// www.hwritage.org/Index/Ranking.aspx
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 147
and only developing countries are left in the table, the relationship re-
mains the same. Our provisional hypothesis is that the Orthodox religion
may account for developmental lag of the examined countries.
Significantly, almost no econometric study analyzes this situation. This
article is an early attempt to begin filling this gap. We analyze the relation-
ship between belonging to a certain religious denomination (Orthodoxy
or Catholicism) and respondents’ political and economic perceptions,
based on data from Ukraine. We employ an interdisciplinary approach to
address these issues by combining both qualitative and quantitative data.
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES
As all creatures evolve over time, religions also evolve, adapting to
new political and social environments. Even under communist regimes,
government institutions were not independent from cultural prereq-
uisites, and were in part influenced by the Eastern Orthodox histori-
cal pattern of subordination to the authorities. The Russian Orthodox
Church led by the Moscow Patriarchate constitutes an autocephalous
Eastern Orthodox Church under the jurisdiction of Moscow. Doctrinal,
institutional and historical aspects of the evolution shifted the Eastern
Orthodox Church toward more support of authority and power hierar-
chy over time. This makes the Eastern Orthodox Church unique from
other Christian denominations.
Polity IV, which measures the level of democracy (or autocracy) in each
country, provides quite illustrative evidence that Orthodox countries
tended to have less political freedom (higher scores on institutionalized
autocracy, lower scores on institutionalized democracy) than Catholic and
Protestant countries throughout the nineteenth century, long before the
initiation of communist regimes.7
Historical aspects of these churches’ evolutions have determined differ-
ences in their institutional organization and belief systems. In our analy-
sis, we assume that those individuals who identify themselves with the
Orthodox or Catholic religions believe in their church’s official dogmas.8,9
This is a reasonable assumption, because although each church has many
branches, it holds to a constant set of fundamental postulates. Three po-
tential sources of expected differences between the attitudes of Catholic
and Orthodox groups are as follows:
1. Unlike the Catholic church, which is headed by the Pope and con-
solidates all Catholic churches notwithstanding their country affiliation,
the Orthodox church comprises a community of fifteen separate national
churches—autocephalous and autonomous ones,10 which do not have a
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148 Maria Snegovaya
single earthly leader similar to the Pope of Rome. Each autocephalous
church is fully independent in its canonic and administrative manage-
ment. This creates disagreements between autocephalous churches and
leads to their vulnerability and state dependence. Lacking a Pope-like
single leader, the Orthodox Church has a long history of disputes between
autocephalies. The church’s institution has been historically weakened
when local churches sought support from heads of the state.
The autocephalous structure of the Orthodox churches contributed to
their historical choice of making alliances with authorities (instead of com-
peting with them, as the Roman Catholic Church has done). This choice
resulted in both the ROC’s antidemocratic internal organization (bureau-
cratization and episcopate domination instead of proclaimed sobornost)
and external organization (ROC’s transformation into a kind of state’s
Ministry of Protection and Police). Thus its history has oriented the Eastern
Orthodox Church to support the state and depend on civil authorities.11
Doctrinal documents illustrate these differences. Since World War II the
Catholic Church has emphasized liberal democracy as a natural political
system, closest to Christian ideals.12 On the contrary, the Elements of Social
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church (2000) shows a skeptical attitude
toward democracy, and embraces absolute monarchy. The authors state
that except for anarchy, democracy is the worst political system, while the
(medieval-style) monarchy is the best:
For this authority to be effective, the faith in society should be very strong.
Under monarchy, power remains God-given, but for its exercise it uses not so
much spiritual authority as coercion . . . Contemporary democracies, includ-
ing those monarchic in form, do not seek the divine sanction of power . . . The
change of the form of authorities to the one having deeper religious roots,
without the vivification of the society itself will, by no means, degenerate
into lie and hypocrisy, will render this form powerless and will depreciate it
in the eyes of people.13
Such an attitude greatly contrasts with Western Catholicism’s general
support of democracy.
2. The economic attitudes of Orthodox believers are influenced by the
fact that Orthodoxy does not endorse work or the work ethic. More ex-
actly, there is a partial, limited endorsement. Business and work are not
rejected by the Orthodox tradition, they are even formally approved. But
this is a conditional approval, depending on regulatory criteria estab-
lished by the Russian Orthodox Church.14 This concept is illustrated by
another excerpt from Elements of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox
Church: “From the Christian point of view work itself is not an uncon-
ditional value. It is blessed, when being of assistance to God, helping to
implement His design of the world and man. Anyway, the work is not godly,
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 149
if it serves egoistic interests of an individual or of human communities, as well as
the satisfaction of godless needs of spirit and flesh [emphasis added].”15
Such an approach can be countered with the interpretation of the mod-
ern Catholic Church: In the Laborem Excercens encyclic, work or human
labor is interpreted not as an auxiliary side of the human existence, but
as its very essence, the metaphysical condition of its genesis, a basic es-
sence of the human genesis on Earth. The original sin did not originate
the labor, but became a reason for the difficulty of labor, accompanied by
suffering. By committing a sin man has revolted against God’s lordship.
As a result, all things that were naturally subordinated to man revolted
against him. Humans were deprived from their natural dominion over
nature and acquired this supremacy again due to work.16
3. The religious foundations of Orthodox Christianity have remained
unchanged for the last thousand years due to various reasons. Among
them historians cite lack of the Ancient Greek philosophic tradition,
which on the contrary was successfully inherited by Catholic scholars
and later incorporated in works of Catholic scholastics. The Orthodox ap-
proach resulted in intellectual stagnation, with both resistance to change
and prohibition of any changes in traditionally accepted routine in spiri-
tual and material life. Orthodox conservatism underlay both the lack of
philosophical tradition in Russian thought up until the late nineteenth
century and “technological conservatism”—the enmity of Russian peas-
ants toward innovative methods in agriculture, as illustrated by sociologi-
cal data. According to well-known Russian sociologist Ovsey Shkaratan,
Byzantine traditions, which the Rus people accepted upon baptism, were
also characterized by rejection of technological advances.17
We choose Ukraine for our regression analysis because it is a country
where the distribution of religious groups allows comparisons of the
Orthodox population (approximately 80 percent) to Catholics (approxi-
mately 10 percent18). Ukraine’s historical and cultural characteristics re-
semble Russia’s and permit us to extend our conclusions to the Russian
case. But it is also important to highlight the particular historical discrep-
ancies between Catholics and Orthodox Christians in Ukraine.
Catholic regions of Ukraine have a history different from the Eastern
Orthodox part of Ukraine. Historically, after the collapse of the Kievan
Rus in the twelfth century, three of its regions (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and
Ternopil) formed the independent Galicia principality, which was later
conquered by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Poland. Under Polish
influence, Russian Orthodox Christians of the region accepted the authority
of the Roman Pope (Eastern-rite Catholicism) for about two hundred years.
By the end of eighteenth century territories of the former Galicia principal-
ity fell under Austrian influence, which established the Ukrainian Greco-
Catholic Church (UGCC). While other regions of Ukraine converted back to
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150 Maria Snegovaya
the Russian Orthodox Church, the former Galicia territories retained their
Greco-Catholic Church, uniting discriminated “Russian” peasants against
Austrian authorities and Polish landowners. UGCC, with its energetic, edu-
cated, independent and powerful priests, sharply differed from the slug-
gish and government-dependent ROC priests. Between 1920 and 1930 the
USSR’s domestic policy increased Ukrainian pro-nationalist movements,
further cementing these differences.
Starting in1939 after Western Ukraine was occupied by the Red Army,
Soviet authorities completely destroyed UGCC. Thousands of priests
and believers were repressed and sent to the Gulag camps. In 1946 Soviet
authorities transferred former UGCC parishes to the ROC (Moscow patri-
archate). However, the Ukrainians’ inner resistance and fidelity to Galician
religious service and rites survived and was strengthened by their hatred
of the Soviet government. People were even able to save some of the UGCC
churches. At the beginning of 1980s in the former Galician and Zakarpat-
tia (Transcarpathian) regions there were more than eight hundred priests
of the formally non-existent UGCC, according to the Institute of Church
History in Lviv.19 Ukrainian independence and its opposition to both the
USSR and Russia was therefore closely linked to religious revival in these
regions. Nowadays western regions of Ukraine show preferences—such as
significant opposition to Moscow-connected religious and political initia-
tives—that differ from the rest of Ukraine. However, not only Catholics, but
all the population of western regions differs in this respect. For example,
both Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Ukrainians of Galicia oppose the
strengthening of Moscow’s influence in the region.
The history of a religion represents a mixture of its historical and doc-
trinal aspects. Support for democracy, which is characteristic of Catholics,
may result from the Ukrainian region’s opposition to Russia and histori-
cal attraction to Western forms of governance. However, we assume that
differences, which account for UGCC history, may well be captured by
regional controls, which we include in our regressions. The question is
whether religion still has a pure effect on people’s attitudes.
To what extent can we differentiate between history and value aspects
when analyzing people’s preferences? To approach this question, for
every variable tested we include an additional regression (three in all),
in which the analysis is limited to four regions (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv,
Ternopil and Zakarpattia). Although in these regions, as suggested above,
both Catholic and Orthodox Christians express similar pro-Western ori-
entations, we will try to find whether being Catholic still has significant
effects on political and economic preferences.
With this doctrinal, institutional and historical background in mind,
we investigate the relationship between people’s religious affiliation and
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 151
their political-economic preferences using two waves of the World Values
Survey (WVS). We expect that Orthodox people will show more paternal-
istic political and economic preferences than Catholics do.
Research Methods
The purpose of this work is to research political and economic perceptions
of religious groups. Our main data source is the World Values Survey
(WVS). Each wave includes data on about 2,800 individuals per year from
a nationally representative sample, and contains a variety of indicators of
the respondent’s social and economic values, political views, and demo-
graphic characteristics.
In this work we take a culturological approach; i.e., we consider not
the influence of a separate Orthodox Church institution, but rather the
“Orthodox” and the “Catholic” denominations as factors related to the
formation of socioeconomic and political attitudes of respondents. Based
on this approach, although there are actually three main kinds of Ortho-
dox and two types of Catholic churches in Ukraine. All respondents who
identified themselves as Orthodox20 or as Catholic21 were included in the
same survey group. We do not focus on the effect of church attendance on
attitudes. Due to the short period of religious freedom in the post-Soviet
region and therefore limited exposure of flocks to the ROC influence
(more than ten years by the time of 2006 WVS wave, few years by the
time of 1996 WVS wave), as opposed to the Catholic Church,22 church at-
tendance is unlikely to have a strong effect on preferences.
Our hypothesis is that there are differences in socioeconomic and politi-
cal attitudes and perceptions between Orthodox Christians and Catholics
in Ukraine. We use the typology of Mariano Grondona, Argentinean col-
umnist, to relate the revealed differences to progress-oriented or progress-
rejecting cultures. This typology, based on twenty-five cultural factors,
distinguishes cultures favorable for economic development, from cultures
that hinder such development.23 The factors from Grondona’s typology in
table 11.2 have been used for analysis purposes.24
To test our hypothesis, we used two WVS waves to perform a mul-
tivariate analysis (1996 and 2006 waves). Data were analyzed by the
least-squares method,25 ordinal and binary regression (probit and ordinal
probit). The dependent variables are the individual worldview along with
perceptions of authority and democracy, and economic concepts (such as
competition and work). All regressions comprised the individual-level
controls, including respondents’ gender, marital status, education level,
city size, age, income, number of children and domicile (region). The im-
portance of obtained differences was determined by t-test.
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152 Maria Snegovaya
Small sampling sizes, limited by sizes of two WVS waves do not allow
us to draw definitive conclusions, but the research will be extended to
detail the robustness for large samplings.
To approach the problem of omitted variables or reverse causality, we
look closely at the number of individuals in the survey who were raised
religiously. Unfortunately in the WVS dataset the question of “religious
upbringing” was only posed in the first wave (table 11.3).
We note that almost all Catholic respondents were raised religiously
(i.e., their religious choice was not affected by their socioeconomic atti-
tudes). This is consistent with the history of UGCC congregations, which
retained religious traditions during the Soviet period. However, there is
a substantial share of Orthodox believers without religious upbringing
(more than 50 percent). This fact has two explanations: first, many people
converted to the Orthodox tradition after the collapse of the USSR,26 and
second, sociologists often find that even respondents answering that they
“don’t believe in God” call themselves Orthodox. This happens because
Orthodoxy is more a civil identity component for Ukrainians than a
religious identity component (which is in line with the culturological ap-
proach discussed above).
We next add to our general regression its shorter version (“reduced
regression”), limited to the number of Catholic and Orthodox respon-
dents who said they received a religious upbringing (sample 2). These are
people whose religious affiliation was formed in childhood and therefore
Table 11.2. Factors from Grondona’s Typology Instrumental for the Analysis
Factor in Grondona’s
Typology Progress-oriented Culture Progress-rejecting Culture
1. RELIGION Rationality /Feasibility Irrationality/Utopia
2. WORLD Positive-sum game Zero-sum game
3. WEALTH Product of human creativity,
expandable (positive sum)
What exists (zero-sum)
4. WORK/
ACHIEVEMENTS
To live for working
Work provides wealth
To work for living
Labor is paupers’ destiny
5. COMPETITION Improves the society Link to aggressiveness,
danger to equality and
privileges
6. INDIVIDUAL/
GROUP
Stress (but not excessive one) Stress on the group on
the individual
7. POWER Dispersity, checks Centralized, no limits
8. DESTINY I can influence my destiny
for the better
Fatalism, resignation,
sorcery
9. TIME ORIENTATION Future focus promotes
planning, punctuality,
deferred gratification
Present or past focus
discourages planning,
punctuality, saving
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 153
Table 11.3. Number of Religious People with Religious Upbringing (WVS, 1996 wave)
Total Yes (1) No (0)
Catholic 234 3577
Orthodox 2172 1639
Raised
Religiously
Religous Denomination
Tot a lBuddhist Hindu Jew Muslim Orthodox Protestant Catholic
No 2 1 3 1 857 6 8 878
Yes 0 1 0 5 621 3154 784
Total 2 2 3 6 1478 9162 1662
their choice of religion is unlikely to be affected by their political and
economic attitudes.27 The results t this reduced regression are similar to
the results of the general regression. Further solutions to the causality
problem are provided in the next part of the research.
Finally, as stated above we also include the third regression, of four
historically Catholic regions only: Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil and
Zakarpattia. As both Catholic and Orthodox Christians have similar pro-
Western orientations in these regions,28 we analyze whether there are still
significant effects of being Catholic on political and economic preferences
in these regions. Because the sample is very small in this case (table 11.4),
we only look at effect of being Catholic in these regions relative to being
an Orthodox believer.
In the regions where historically there are a large number of Catholics,
self-identified Orthodox believers are less likely to express a national
identity and more likely to express their actual religious views (which
would be very helpful for us had we some representative dataset of non-
believers or atheists in these regions). Therefore, the differences we are
capturing in these regions are more likely to indicate the actual dogmatic
differences in religions.
We draw several conclusions from the regression analysis as shown in
tables 11.5, 11.6 and 11.7.
Table 11.4. Distribution of Catholic and Orthodox Christians in four selected
Ukrainian regions. WVS, 1996 wave.
Region, Where the Interview was Conducted
Religious Denomination
“Orthodox” “Catholic” Total
Zakarpattia oblast 20 16 36
Ivano-Frankivsk oblast 29 25 54
Lviv oblast 41 60 101
Ternopil oblast 16 46 62
Total 106 147 253
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Table 11.5.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs.
Catholic 0.061 0.240 3811
Orthodox 0.570 0.495 3811
Age 44.901 16.387 3811
Gender (Male) 0.388 0.487 3811
Marital_Status:
1. married
2. living together as married
3. divorced
4. separated
5. widowed
6. single/never married
2.242 1.927 3785
Education:
1. inadequately completed elementary education
2. completed (compulsory) elementary education
3. incomplete secondary school: technical
4. complete secondary school: technical
5. incomplete secondary: university-preparation
6. complete secondary: university-preparation
7. some university without degree/higher
education
8. university with degree/higher education
5.093 2.006 3792
Town-size
1. 2,000 and less
2. 2,000–5,000
3. 5,000–10,000
4. 10,000–20,000
5. 20,000–50,000
6. 50,000–100,000
7. 100,000–500,000
8. 500,000 and more
4.694 2.741 2811
Income
1. lower step
2. second step
3. third step
4. fourth step
5. fifth step
6. sixth step
7. seventh step
8. eigth step
9. nineth step
10. tenth step
3.889 2.244 3244
Dchild 0.027 0.162 3792
Child 0.819 0.385 3792
Region
1. western
2. eastern
3. central
4. southern
0.195
0.297
0.333
0.175
0.396
0.457
0.471
0.380
3811
3811
3811
3811
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 155
1. The ROC approach legitimized hierarchy and, as an outcome, a more
pro-authoritarian orientation of the society, in contrast to pro-democratic
orientation of today’s Catholic Church. Today Catholics show signifi-
cantly higher levels of positive attitudes toward democracy and less re-
spect of authority (table 11.5).
These results are confirmed in the reduced sample. According to
Grondona’s typology, the Catholics’ support of democracy is more typi-
cal for progress-oriented cultures, while Eastern Orthodox individuals
show preferences (statistically non-significant) characteristic of progress-
rejecting cultures.
2. Orthodoxy lacked labor endorsement, as opposed to partial endorse-
ment of work in the Catholic tradition. As table 11.6 indicates, modern
Catholics more actively support work values and competition, and be-
Table 11.6.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. No. Obs.
Catholic 0.458 0.500 330
Orthodox 0.409 0.492 330
Age 43.670 15.136 330
Gender (Male) 0.412 0.493 330
Marital_Status:
1. married
2. separated
3. single/widowed
1.695 1.481 328
Education:
1. elementary education
2. secondary education
3. university level education
3.602 2.047 329
Town-size
1. 2,000–10,000
2. 10,000–20,000
3. 50,000-more
2.591 1.995 330
Income
1. lower-second step
2. third-fourth step
3. fifth-sixth step
4. eighth-tenth step
3.041 2.03 294
Dchild 0.033 0.180 329
Child 0.872 0.334 329
Region
1. Zakarpattia oblast
2. Ivano-Frankivsk
3. Lviv oblast
4. Ternopil oblast
0.179
0.182
0.430
0.209
0.384
0.386
0.496
0.407
330
330
330
330
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156 Maria Snegovaya
lieve that work serves as a tool to overcome poverty and achieve success.
Results on the restricted sample tend to support these conclusions.
3. We also find stronger support of progress, positive future-orien-
tation and aspiration to change the world on the Catholic sample, in
contrast to the conservative orientation characteristic of the Orthodox
mindset. Catholics also tend to view the world as a positive-sum game,
which is an important feature of progress-oriented cultures, according
to Grondona’s typology.
Our findings on a sample (3), reduced to four regions, are consistent
with the results on the major sample.
Overall Orthodox Christians and Catholics demonstrate different
political attitudes and perceptions, as illustrated by t-test results. Im-
portantly, these results are still significant after including controls for
Ukrainian districts, which account for the effects of regional historical
differences. As to social and economic attitudes, groups of Orthodox
Ukrainians demonstrate a more fatalistic worldview. Second, as to their
political attitudes, Catholics express more support of democratic values.
The causality questions will be approached later. However, the results
on the restricted sample (2) supporting our findings on general regres-
sions, suggest that religious affiliation impacts political and economic
preferences, rather than vice versa. Individuals with childhood-formed
religiosity (weakened endogeneity) show preferences similar to Catholic
and Orthodox overall.
That all the statistically significant results on the larger sample (1) are
mostly found for Catholics (as opposed to Orthodox) can be explained
by very little differences in opinions between cultural Orthodox and
non-religious respondents. The remaining part of the sample (about
15–30 percent) is predominantly composed of non-religious Ukrainians or
atheists. So our findings are consistent with recent sociological studies in
Russia, indicating that there is “very little difference in opinion between
cultural Orthodox and non-religious respondents. This could suggest
that, although identification as an Orthodox Christian varied among
respondents, many actual underlying values may not have. That is, the
minor differences identified by whether or not a respondent was a cul-
tural Orthodox and his or her social or political values may be due to the
fact that all respondents share common values based upon their culture
and history. With a thousand-year history of Orthodox Christianity, it is
only natural for religious and cultural values to become fused—even to
the point that some identify themselves as “Orthodox atheists,” such as
Alexandr Lukashenko, the president of Belarus.29
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 157
Note that in four Ukrainian regions (Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Ternopil
and Zakarpattia) with traditionally a large percentage of Catholics, self-
identification as an Orthodox Christian does not reflect national identity
but rather pure religious affiliation. On such samples (3) we still get com-
parable effects, relative to the rest of Orthodox believers.
Based on our current findings we are unable to conclude that the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church has a strong effect on the socioeconomic prefer-
ences of Ukrainians. These findings, however, are still consistent with our
initial hypotheses. Adding comprehensive controls, we find statistical
evidence on both samples that Catholics significantly differ in their pref-
erences from Eastern Orthodox Christians: they are more likely to have
less paternalistic and more pro-democratic political preferences, as well
as stronger progress orientation, than Orthodox Christians do. Based on
Grondona’s typology and revealed differences in political preferences, we
can conclude that the analyzed values expressed by Orthodox groups cor-
respond to values of progress-rejecting countries; whereas the values ex-
pressed by Catholics are characteristic of progress-prone cultures. These
results can be explained by differences in doctrine between Catholic and
Orthodox churches, as well as by their contrasting institutional and his-
torical evolutions.
Understanding the ROC’s impact on people’s attitudes toward eco-
nomic development and democracy, and doctrinal assumptions that limit
the prospects for Russia’s democratic development, is of particular im-
portance nowadays. The ROC’s resistance to the Western values remains
one of the factors that influences Russia’s fear of NATO expansion and
other areas of its antagonistic and anti-American foreign policies. How-
ever, the ROC has the potential to rediscover its independent voice and to
revive ancient traditions, as illustrated by Phillip II, Metropolitan of Mos-
cow, who spoke out against Ivan the Terrible during his murderous reign
in the sixteenth century. Such policies would improve the international
relations between Russia and the rest of the globalizing world.
Our further research aims are to enrich the understanding of these is-
sues. The establishment of the dynamic relation between specific value
orientations and religious denominations will allow us to derive some
practical recommendations. These policy recommendations could help
reinterpret religious ideas and trends to encourage more progress-prone
values among religious people.
15_049-Harrison.indb 15715_049-Harrison.indb 157 2/3/15 1:37 PM2/3/15 1:37 PM
Table 11.7.
Factor In
Grondona’s
Typology
Power
Democracies are indecisive and
have too much squabbling
(agree-disagree) [1;4]
Democracies aren’t good at
maintaining order
(agree-disagree) [1;4]
Future changes: Greater
Respect for authority
(no-yes) [0;1]
Democracy may have
problems, but is better
(no-yes) [1;4]
In Democracy, the economic
system runs badly
(agree; disagree) [1;4]
General
Sample
(1)
Reduced
Sample
(2)
Four
Regions
(3)
General
Sample
(1)
Reduced
Sample
(2)
Four
Regions
(3)
General
Sample
(1)
Reduced
Sample
(2)
Four
Regions
(3)1
General
Sample
(1)
Reduced
Sample
(2)
Four
Regions
(3)
General
Sample
(1)
Reduced
Sample
(2)
Four
Regions
(3)2
Orthodox –0.048*
(0.81)
0.022
(0.36)
–0.137
(–0.61)
0.125
(1.31)
–0.028
(0.57)
Catholic 0.524***
(3.95)
0.414**
(2.62)
0.447***
(3.14)
0.422**
(2.44)
–0.581**
(2.96)
NA 0.538**
(1.93)
0.723**
(2.63)
0.521**
(2.61)
0.625***
(6.61)
Orthodox-
raised
–0.687***
(4.72)
–0.404**
(2.58)
0.997**
(2.43)
–0.172
(0.59)
–0.650***
(4.17)
Western 0.339*** 0.591*** 0.569*** 0.570***
Eastern –0.329*** –0.217*** 0.113 –0.168***
Central 0.196*** 0.201** 0.280* 0.415***
Zakarpattia 0.957*** –1.084*** 0.880*** 0.872***
Ivano-
Frankiv
0.469*** 0.4675*** –0.135 0.528***
Lviv –0.075 0.2701* 0.497*** 0.519***
Observations 1734 452 171 1624 413 155 1330 345 1603 499 174 1665 432 161
Pseudo R2 0.0506 0.1178 0.0732 0.0538 0.1150 0.1478 0.1342 0.5154 0.1139 0.2655 0.1321 0.0622 0.1283 0.1264
T-Test 21.70*** 22.28*** 6.86** 10.50*** 6.67*** 5.96** 5.36** 5.91**35.20* 0.34 6.93** 7.46** 17.41*** 43.70***
1. No data.
2. Probit: [1;3]
3. Wald test—linear hypothesis
15_049-Harrison.indb 15815_049-Harrison.indb 158 2/3/15 1:37 PM2/3/15 1:37 PM
Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 159
NOTES
1. Christopher Marsh, “Russian Orthodox Christians and their Orientation
toward Church and State,” Journal of Church & State, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2005), pp.
545–62.
2. In a way this phenomenon is stipulated by the fact that in the modern Rus-
sian society association with the Russian Orthodox Church is the most important
factor of civil identity. However, this is not the purpose of the research here.
3. http://www.levada.ru/11-10-2012/rossiyane-o-religii-i-tserkvi.
4. http://www.levada.ru/02-11-2012/grazhdane-veryat-v-tserkov-armiyu-i
-spetssluzhby.
5. The Moral Modernization Basis. National Institute for the Modern Ideology
Development. 12.02.2010// www.mk.ru/include/docs/rostovsk001.pdf.
Lenta.ru, February 17, 2010. http://lenta.ru/news/2010/02/17/formula/.
6. Identification of the clear majority of the populous with a particular reli-
gious denomination is used as a grouping principal.
7. The analyzed countries have the clear majority of citizens (more than 60
percent), who affiliate themselves with one particular religious denomination.
8. By the Orthodox tradition we mean belief in: scriptures of Fathers of the
First Ecumenical Council with the text of the Belief; the Nicene—Constantino-
politan Creed; the salvation through the denomination of faith in one God; the
consubstantiality of the Holy Trinity; the denomination by Jesus Christ, God and
Son of God; the incarnation of God; the resurrection of the flesh; the assumption
and the coming second Coming of Jesus Christ and the future century life; one-
ness, holiness and capholity of church headed by Jesus Christ; the devotional
representation of holy ones.
9. By the Catholic tradition we mean belief in: the bases are Bible and Holy
Tradition, comprising cannons of Ecumenical Councils; the Catechesis of the
Catholic Church and the Code of canonic law; the dogmas of the Immaculate
Conception and Carnal Ascension; the teachings on the purgatory and indulgen-
cies; hyperdulia; the latria and the dulia; the enhancement of the monarchic power
of the bishop of Rome over the whole Church, as he is the inheritor of Peter the
Apostle; the centrality of the church organization; the infallibilitas ex cathedra; the
indissolubility of the Mystery of Marriage.
10. Autocephalous (of an Eastern Christian Church) means appointing its own
head, not subject to the authority of an external patriarch or archbishop.
11. Orthodox patriarchs prefer calling this type of relations between the church
and the state as “symphony.”
12. Paul E. Sigmund. The Catholic Tradition and Modern Democracy. The Re-
view of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 530–548.
13. Elements of Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. 2000// www
.mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts.
English version: Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate// http://
orthodoxeurope.org/page/3/14.aspx.
14. See the same at Т.Koval: “. . . the Orthodoxy is concentrated on the internal
heart life of people. In the context of our topic this means, that just the internal
15_049-Harrison.indb 15915_049-Harrison.indb 159 2/3/15 1:37 PM2/3/15 1:37 PM
160 Maria Snegovaya
work motivation and the internal attitude to external events, including worldly
goods, the remuneration for work etc, prove to be most important ones. These
spiritual motivations and aims, hidden from the outside glance, serve to assess the
usefulness of work and of mundane desires in whole. The “usefulness” for soul
becomes the main criteria. So, if the work serves to the soul improvement—it is
useful, if no—it is harmful.”
15. Elements of Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. 2000// www.
mospat.ru/ru/documents/social-concepts.
English version: Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate// http://
orthodoxeurope.org/page/3/14.aspx.
16. Ioannes Paulus II. Laborem exercens. Libreria Editrice Vaticana, Citta del
Vaticano, 1981// http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/
documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html.
17. Shkaratan O. Society and reforms. Russian Culture of Work and Manage-
ment. Social Sciences and Modernity, 2003. No 1.
18. CIA World Factbook// www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-fact-
book/geos/up.html.
19. Mitrokhin N. Russian Orthodox Church and Greco-Catholics in Western
Ukraine. Otechestvennye Zapiski, no 7(7), 2002// www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=
8&article=418.
20. Orthodoxy: Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kiev Patriarchy—50.4 percent;
Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Моscow Patriarchy—26.1 percent; Ukrainian Au-
tocephalous Orthodox Church–7.2 percent. (by 2006 data of Razumkov Center).
21. Catholicism: Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church- 8 percent; Roman Catholic
Church—2.2 percent (by 2006 data of Razumkov Center).
22. As discussed above, UGCC remained powerful in four Ukrainian regions
during 20th century.
23. Grondona M. A Cultural Typology of Economic Development [pp.46–47].
Nowadays Grondona’s typology is being tested at the World Value Survey by the
Cultural Change Institute (Fletcher School, Tufts University).
24. Grondona M. A Cultural Typology of Economic Development [pp.46–47].
25. The results on OLS regressions are consistent with our findings. We do not
show them hereunder due to the lack of space.
26. This is why we are not estimating the impact of church attendance in this
paper. As the majority of Orthodox Christians have only recently converted to the
Eastern Orthodox tradition, our estimates are unlikely to uncover any strong ef-
fect of church attendance on the preferences of religious people.
27. Though there is still a problem that both choice of religion and political-
economic attitudes may have come directly from family traditions (an omitted
variable problem).
28. Mitrokhin N. Russian Orthodox Church and Greco-Catholics in Western
Ukraine. Otechestvennye Zapiski, no 7(7), 2002// www.strana-oz.ru/?numid =
8&article = 418.
29. Marsh K. Russian Orthodox Christians and Their Orientation toward
Church and State. The Journal of Church and State, Vol.46, No.2 (Summer 2005).
Pp.545–561.
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Religious Affiliation and Individual Economic and Political Attitudes 161
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