State Cyberterrorism: A Contradiction in Terms?

Abstract

This article explores findings from a global survey of the terrorism research community to explore whether states may be deemed capable of conducting cyberterrorism. The article begins with a brief review of recent literature on state terrorism, identifying empirical and analytical justifications for greater use of this concept. Following a discussion of our research methodology we make two arguments. First, that there exists considerable ‘expert’ support for the validity of the proposition that states can indeed engage in cyberterrorism. Second, that whether states are deemed capable of cyberterrorism has implications for subsidiary debates, including around the threat that cyberterrorism poses.

Full text

62JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
State Cyberterrorism: A Contradiction in Terms?
by Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Lella Nouri
is work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
is article explores ndings from a global survey of the terrorism research community to explore whether states
may be deemed capable of conducting cyberterrorism. e article begins with a brief review of recent literature
on state terrorism, identifying empirical and analytical justications for greater engagement with this concept.
Following a discussion of our research methodology we then make two arguments. First, that there exists
considerable ‘expert’ support for the validity of the proposition that states can indeed engage in cyberterrorism.
Second, that whether states are deemed capable of cyberterrorism has implications for subsidiary debates,
including around the threat that cyberterrorism poses.
Keywords: State terrorism, Cyberterrorism; Terrorism; Internet; reat; Security; Survey
Introduction
Violence conducted in cyberspace presents important challenges for academic disciplines such as
International Relations and Law which traditionally work with a state-centric ontology. Two of the most
obvious of these challenges are the reduced signicance of national boundaries within cyberspace – which
encourages a rethinking of the importance of territorial entities – and the anonymity this oers would-
be belligerents, which requires new forms of knowledge about security threats. is article contributes to
contemporary debate on a particular category of violence in cyberspace – ‘cyberterrorism’ – asking about the
signicance of actor and non-actor based denitions of this phenomenon. In so doing, it aims to connect
these debates to the recent upsurge of interest in the concept of ‘state terrorism’ in order to ask whether or not
states may be deemed capable of committing cyberterrorism, and what might be gained (and indeed lost) in
such judgements.
In order to do this, the article introduces original empirical data drawn from a survey of the global research
community on cyberterrorism. e survey was designed to chart areas of disagreement, consensus and
ambiguity in relation to this term, and received responses from 118 researchers working across 24 dierent
countries. In this article we report on ndings relating specically to the question of whether or not
states can engage in cyberterrorism. ese are then connected to researcher views on the threat posed by
cyberterrorism, and accounts of whether or not cyberterrorism has ever taken place that were given within
the same survey.
Our engagement with this research question is driven by two dynamics. e rst is the continuing
contestability of the term ‘cyberterrorism’ within academic, legal and other debate (Jarvis and Macdonald
2014). Establishing – or enquiring into – who can commit cyberterrorism here oers potential for taking
stock of the state of current opinion on an important generative characteristic of this term. e second driver
is the rise of recent scholarly research on the nature of ‘state terrorism’ more broadly. Exploring whether
researchers believe states can commit cyberterrorism might, we suggest, tell us something important about
the distinctiveness of this phenomenon.

63JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
e article begins with a review of relevant academic literature on state terrorism. Here, we identify two
arguments for taking the notion of state terrorism more seriously than is sometimes the case. First, is a
relatively straightforward empirical argument which justies increased attention to state terrorism due to
the higher human costs that result from state based violences. Second, is an analytical argument which
insists that greater attention should be paid to state violence in order to achieve greater consistency in the
application of existing denitions of terrorism. ese arguments, this article suggests constitute a powerful
attempt to broaden the agenda of terrorism studies. e article’s second section then details our research
methodology, reecting on the sampling strategy, distribution of respondents and formulation of our
questions. A third section introduces qualitative and quantitative data from answers to the three questions
on which we here focus. e article concludes by pointing to the importance of these ndings for the state
terrorism debate, and more specically for a (re)thinking of the rationale behind the state/non-state actor
divide in terrorism studies.
State Terrorism: Issues and Debates
Recent years have witnessed a fairly dramatic growth of interest in the concept of state terrorism. is has
been driven, in part, by a series of explicit and powerful critiques of the historical disengagement with the
state within terrorism studies; a eld of research which, for many, has too long prioritised the violences
of non-state actors (see, for example, Blakeley 2007; Jackson et al 2010). ese arguments have drawn
stimulation from two contemporary developments in particular. e rst is the recent ‘critical turn’ in
terrorism studies (see, for example, Gunning 2007; Jackson 2007; Egerton 2009; Jackson et al 2009; Jackson
et al 2011) and its attempt to deconstruct this eld’s established theoretical and methodological assumptions.
e second is a concerted hostility toward contemporary counter-terrorism practices associated with the
post-9/11 ‘war on terrorism’ and its violent excesses. Although this momentum within state terrorism
research is, therefore, comparatively recent, such work builds on a small number of important earlier
attempts to re-centre the study of terrorism around the violences of states (see, for example, George 1991;
Claridge 1996; Chomsky 2001; Chomsky 2002). For new and old alike there are at least two powerful reasons
for so doing.
e rst, and perhaps most common, justication is a simple empirical calculation of the human costs
of state and non-state violence. State or ‘wholesale’ terrorism, in this line of argument, has brought far
greater harm to humanity than have the activities of non-state groups; a trend widely acknowledged, if
not necessarily prioritised, within scholarship on terrorism (for comparison, see Blakeley 2008; Horgan
and Boyle 2008). As Michael Stohl notes, “the number of victims produced by state terror is on a scale
exponentially larger than that of insurgent terrorists” (Stohl 2008: 6). Goodin, similarly, in a discussion
of ‘revolutionary terrorism’, argues that, “…state terrorism is an enormously important subject; it is
incontestable, for example that state terrorism has claimed many more victims than has terrorism as I dene
it here” (Goodin 2006: 2027). What is important to note, however, is that – for these authors – the liberal
democracies of the ‘global North’ have been as culpable as the totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-century to
which we might instinctively turn upon hearing the phrase ‘state terrorism’ (see, for example, Blakeley 2007;
Blakeley 2009; Primoratz 2004; Gareau 2004). In short, there is, for some, a tremendous disconnect between
research priorities and empirical realities within scholarship on terrorism.
A second set of arguments for taking state terrorism more seriously are more strictly analytical. In the rst
instance, there are arguments for greater consistency in the application of existing denitions of terrorism

64JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
(see, for example, Chomsky 1991; Jaggar 2005; Blakeley 2007). Such denitions, approached from this
perspective, are, in essence, adequate for the capture of a multitude of violences. It is their usage in practice
– by policymakers and ‘terrorologists’ alike – that limits discussion of state violences within the language
of terrorism. Here there is much to be gained – in analytical as well as political terms – for refusing the
temptation toward denitional exibility (for contrasting perspectives see Richardson 2006; Crenshaw
and Robinson 2010). In Chomsky’s description of what he terms the ‘literal’ approach to the study of
terrorism, for example, “…we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of
the phenomenon – concentrating on the major examples, if we are serious – and try to determine causes and
remedies” (Chomsky 1991: 12; see also Chomsky 2001).is argument for greater consistency is pertinent to
many, perhaps most, understandings of terrorist violence. A strategy favoured by many working in this area,
indeed, is to juxtapose ocial US denitions of the term with its historical engagements in Nicaragua, Chile,
Cuba and beyond. e argument’s value is more limited, however, where actor-specic clauses are built into
particular denitions of terrorism such as that employed by the US State Department in which terrorism is
approached as, “…premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets
by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to inuence an audience” (cited in Whittaker
2003: 3; see also Stohl 2006). In response to actor-specic understandings of terrorism such as these, an
alternative argument is oen made on behaviouralist grounds: one that suggests that terrorism is a form of
violence which is separable from its practitioner. Hence, for Jackson et al, for example:
To suggest when state agents engage in the very same strategies as non-state terrorists, such as when
they blow up civilian airliners (the Lockerbie bombing) or a protest ship (the Rainbow Warrior
bombing) or plant a series of bombs in public places (the Lavon aair), it ceases to be terrorism is
eectively the abandonment of scholarly research principles (Jackson et al 2010: 3).
For Teichman, similarly:
….we have to acknowledge that governments oen do things, both to their own people, and against
enemies in peace and war, which share the features of the worst types of revolutionary terrorism.
State terrorism is characterized by such actions as the kidnapping and assassination of political oppo-
nents of the government by the police or the secret service or the army; imprisonment without trial;
torture; massacres of racial or religious minorities or of certain social classes; incarceration of citizens
in concentration camps; and generally speaking government by fear (Teichman 1989: 509).
If we take them together, these arguments constitute a powerful (if still nascent) attempt to broaden the
agenda of terrorism studies (Jarvis 2009). Minimally, the aim is to extend the study of terrorism beyond
its traditional, narrow, parameters in order to facilitate the analysis of certain state violences under this
rubric (for example Gunning 2007). Maximally, where articulated most ambitiously, the ultimate aim is the
advancement of emancipatory political projects predicated on a refusal to remain silent in the face of any
(terrorist) violences, whoever their authors (see Blakeley 2008; McDonald 2009; Toros and Gunning 2009).
us, for Jackson et al, for example:
…there are important ethical-normative reasons for retaining the term ‘state terrorism’. For example,
due to the powerful connotations of the ‘terrorism’ label, its retention as a descriptor of certain forms
of state violence could be an important means of advancing a progressive political project aimed at
protecting marginalized and vulnerable populations from indiscriminate and oppressive forms of
state violence, whether they occur under the rubric of war or counter-terrorism (Jackson et al 2010:
5).

65JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
With the ground thus prepared for greater engagement with state terrorism, the research agenda of this
literature to date has focused on attempting to dene and typologise this form of violence (Jarvis and Lister
2014). Engagements with denitional issues oen lead to reection on the core characteristics of state
terrorism, with the following themes particularly dominant therein: the involvement of state representatives
in the commission or practice of violence; instrumental or purposive behaviour where acts of violence and
their victims function as means to future ends; an identiably communicative or symbolic function; and,
the experience of terror in a broader population (compare Blakeley 2010 and Raphael 2010). Such reection
leads some to dene state terrorism as a distinctive form of violence, for example:
…the intentional use or threat of violence by state agents or their proxies against individuals or
groups who are victimised for the purpose of intimidating or frightening a broader audience (Jackson
et al 2010: 3).
Or:
Terrorism by states is characterized by ocial support for policies of violence, repression, and intimi-
dation. is violence and coercion is directed against perceived enemies that the state has determined
threaten its interests or security. Although the perpetrators of state terrorist campaigns are
frequently government personnel, and directives do originate from government ocials, those who
carry out the violence are also quite oen unocial agents of the government (Martin, cited in Jack-
son et al 2011: 178).
Others prefer instead to dene ‘terrorism’ more inclusively before applying this understanding to the actions
of states as appropriate. e following, for instance, is the denition employed in Gareau’s account of US
involvement in state terrorism:
Terrorism consists of deliberate acts of a physical and/or psychological nature perpetrated on select
groups of victims. Its intent is to mould the thinking and behaviour not only of those targeted groups,
but more importantly, of larger sections of society that identify or share the views and aspirations
of the targeted groups or who might easily be led to do so. e intent is to intimidate or coerce both
groups by causing them intense fear, anxiety, apprehension, panic, dread, and/or horror (Gareau
2004: 14).
Typologies of state terrorism seek to dierentiate the various forms that this phenomenon can take. Michael
Stohl, for example, distinguishes between overt engagements in coercive diplomacy; covert participation in
assassinations, coups, and the like; and, surrogate activities, whereby assistance is oered to a secondary state
or insurgent organisation engaging in terrorist violence (Stohl 1984). Blakeley, more recently, separates state
perpetration and state sponsorship of terrorism (Blakeley 2009). She also, moreover, distinguishes “limited
state terrorism” which is targeted at a specic, narrow audience, from “generalised” state terrorism, which
works to target entire populations (Blakeley 2009: 44). Although (as we might expect) no single, universally
accepted typology of state terrorism exists (Primoratz 2002), these discussions do remind us that the
terrorism of states can take myriad forms, and use myriad techniques and technologies. With this in mind,
we proceed now to our discussion of whether states can commit cyberterrorism and what responses to this
may mean for the literature discussed in this section. First, however this article outlines the methodology
used to collect the empirical data on ‘expert’ opinion on cyberterrorism.

66JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
Methodology
Our attempt to contribute to these ongoing discussions around the phenomenon of state terrorism draws
from a recent empirical research project on cyberterrorism. is research made use of an ‘expert survey’,
which was distributed to over six hundred members of the global research community between June and
November 2012. Respondents to the survey were identied using a purposive – hence non-probabilistic
– sampling strategy with four primary strands. e rst of these was a targeted literature review search to
identify researchers who have published on cyberterrorism within peer-reviewed journals, monographs,
edited books, or other literature. is was completed using the main catalogue of the British Library, as well
as 47 other online databases[1]. Our search was limited to outputs that had been published on or aer 1
January 2004.
e second strand was to target active researchers within the terrorism research community more widely.
Whilst these individuals may not have published on cyberterrorism specically, their knowledge of the
major debates around terrorism meant they would be well-positioned to contribute to this research. us,
individuals that had published in any of the following four journals since January 1st 2009 were added to the
sample: Studies in Conict and Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, Critical Studies on Terrorism, and,
Perspectives on Terrorism. Members of the editorial boards of these journals (as of August 1st 2012) were also
added, given their similarly prominent standing within terrorism research.
e third strategy was a ‘snowball method’ in which we contacted potential respondents who were explicitly
identied to us by individuals who had already completed the survey. e fourth was via two mailing lists
maintained by British academic associations: the Terrorism and Political Violence Association[2], and the
British International Studies Association Critical Terrorism Studies Working Group[3]. Although there was,
of course, overlap in the individuals identied in our four strategies, these latter two methods engendered far
fewer responses than did our initial literature review searches.
e use of a purposive, non-probabilistic, sampling strategy was, we argue, appropriate to the survey’s
ambitions. Whilst it involves sacricing any strict claim to statistical representativeness, this may be defended
given the nature of the population in whom we were interested: the terrorism research community. Where
the boundaries of this community lie, and who may be considered a legitimate member of it, are, of course,
entirely contestable. Moreover, as with any epistemic community – indeed, perhaps more than many – the
eld of terrorism research is, by its nature, uid and porous. Individuals enter and leave according to their
evolving research interests, and any eort to capture opinion therein can oer only a brief and temporary
snapshot of a dynamic enterprise. In this sense, the sacrice of strict representativeness in our study of
researchers is justied given that no discernible, denitive, population could reasonably be said objectively to
exist.
A total of 118 responses from researchers working in 24 countries across six continents were generated
by our survey. Of the 117 responses that provided geographical information to us, our sample had a
majority of respondents working in the United States of America and the United Kingdom: 41 (35% of the
total) and 32 (27%) respectively. e next largest sites were Australia (7 respondents, 6%) and Canada (4
respondents, 3%). is weighting toward anglophonic countries is unfortunate, but unsurprising, given the
traditional anglocentricism of terrorism research (Stump and Dixit 2013). In terms of professional status,
the distribution of our respondents was skewed toward permanent and temporary academic sta as follows:
Academic Sta (Permanent): 75 (64%); Academic Sta (Temporary): 16 (14%); Research Student: 9 (8%);
Independent Researcher: 11 (9%); Retired: 2 (2%); and, None of the Above: 5(4%). In terms of disciplinary

67JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
background, nally, our sample described themselves in the following way, with several researchers self-
identifying with more than one academic discipline: Political Science/International Relations: 69 (50%);
Psychology/Anthropology: 20 (15%); Engineering/Computer Science/Cyber 17(12%); Law/Criminology: 15
(11%); Literature/Arts/History: 9 (7%); Independent Researchers/Analysts: 5 (4%); and, Economics/Business:
2 (1%).
Our survey employed a combination of open-ended and closed questions designed to generate quantitative
and qualitative data. Twenty questions were included in total. ese focused on the following: demographic
information; denitional issues around terrorism and cyberterrorism; the cyberterrorism threat; countering
cyberterrorism; and, views of current research on this phenomenon, including the major challenges facing
contemporary scholars. To encourage as high a completion rate as possible, the questionnaire was made
available in two formats: an online survey and a word processing document. In the following section, this
article turns to the ndings of the survey in relation to the concept of state cyberterrorism and the impact
this has on responses to questions on the signicance and existence of the cyberterrorism threat.
Findings and Analysis
e rst question of relevance from our survey – numbered Question 13 – asked respondents, ‘In your
view, can states engage in cyberterrorism?’ A free text box was provided for responses, in order to allow
respondents to develop and explain their answers. In total, the question was answered by 109 respondents
(response rate: 92%). Answers were subsequently analysed and coded using the following ve categories: yes
(unqualied); yes (qualied); other; no (qualied); and, no (unqualied). As chart 1 demonstrates, a total of
83% of respondents agreed that states can potentially engage in cyberterrorism. Moreover, the vast majority
of these respondents oered unqualied agreement.
Chart 1: Can states engage in cyberterrorism?
When explaining their view that states can engage in cyberterrorism, several respondents explicitly rejected
any attempt to distinguish between state and non-state actors. One respondent, for example, argued that: ‘Any
social actor with sucient knowledge, means and intent can utilise any particular tactic, be it cyberterrorism
or anything else, be they states or any other social entity’[4]. Another, drawing on similarly behaviouralist
reasoning, stated: ‘By denition all forms of terrorism are a tactic open to all and therefore no individual
or entity is exempt from the option of using this tactic’[5]. Others still drew analogy with alternative forms

68JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
of terrorism, arguing that since states can engage in oine terrorism there is no reason why states cannot
also engage in cyberterrorism[6]. In fact, one respondent went so far as to suggest that, without state
involvement, the technological complexities render cyberterrorism impossible[7]. By contrast, there were
other respondents who – whilst agreeing that states can engage in cyberterrorism – described states’ potential
involvement in more limited terms. In their opinion, a cyber-attack would only constitute cyberterrorism
if state actors played no more than a supporting or facilitative role. For example, one respondent answered:
‘Only as state sponsors of terrorist groups’[8], whilst others referred to the role of the state as a place to
‘harbour’[9] or ‘support’[10] non-state actors who launch cyberterrorist attacks.
ere were other respondents who answered armatively to this survey question, yet qualied their answer
by querying whether cyberterrorism is the most appropriate label for cyber-attacks perpetrated by state
actors. Like some of the respondents mentioned in the previous paragraph, some of these individuals drew
an analogy with traditional forms of terrorism. But unlike those mentioned above, these respondents asserted
that oine terrorists are conventionally regarded as non-state actors. Hence one respondent answered: ‘Yes
[states can engage in cyberterrorism], although the standard denition of terrorism rules out state action
(so Hiroshima isn’t formally an act of terrorism)’[11]. Similarly, another answered: ‘Yes, just like states can
engage in terrorism, however the standard denition of terrorism does focus on non-state armed groups
only, leaving terrorist behaviour of states out of the equation’[12]. is respondent went on to suggest that
state cyberterrorism should instead be labelled as a crime against humanity. Others also suggested alternative
labels. One commented: ‘In eect [states can engage in cyberterrorism], even if it should be more carefully
labelled as espionage/sabotage’[13], whilst another observed that: ‘States can engage in the act of terrorism,
including cyberterrorism (though we still call them states, not terrorists)’[14].
A further signicant nding from our survey is that a number of respondents drew on empirical reasoning
similar to that discussed in the above literature review to argue that there exists a greater threat of state
cyberterrorism than non-state cyberterrorism. One went so far as to suggest that: ‘[state cyberterrorists]
are the greatest threat, and make non-government sources of this threat nearly inconsequential in
comparison’[15]. e most common reason respondents oered for this view was that states have access
to far greater resources and capabilities than non-state actors[16]. Others pointed out that cyberterrorism
is likely to prove attractive to states because of the diculties of attribution and concomitant potential
for anonymity. As one respondent remarked, states engage in cyberterrorism ‘because of the ease with
which a state operator can mask itself online’[17]. In fact, several respondents claimed that states already
engage in cyberterrorism[18], with a number of examples being oered in support of this assertion. e
most commonly cited of these was Stuxnet[19] with other suggested examples including the cyber-attacks
on Estonia[20] and Georgia,[21] attempted attacks on the US by China and North Korea[22] and ‘acts
perpetrated by Russia and China’[23].
As chart 1 showed, there were a total of 17 respondents (15%) who said that states cannot engage in
cyberterrorism. In the opinion of a number of these respondents, the concept of state cyberterrorism is
simply a misnomer. Dierent reasons were oered in support of this view. e most common reason was that
terrorism is, by its very nature, a non-state activity[24]. If the perpetrator is a state actor, then the conduct
is cyberwarfare[25] or cyber espionage[26], not cyberterrorism. Second, one respondent suggested that
cyber-attacks orchestrated by state actors may not be terroristic in nature. Using Stuxnet as an example,
this respondent argued that it ‘was not used in a way that appears intended to create terror. ese acts are
probably best thought of as politically or strategically motivated sabotage’[27]. Lastly, one respondent argued
that it is mistaken to talk of state cyberterrorism because cyberterrorism itself is a misnomer, despite the

69JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
fact that, ‘Cyberattacks and espionage which originate from states certainly do exist’[28]. Meanwhile, there
were other respondents that were willing to accept the concept of state cyberterrorism in principle, but who
nonetheless answered no to the survey question on the basis that it is preferable to use a dierent label[29].
As one explained, ‘actions by states are best viewed in terms of warfare/coercive foreign policy. Reserving the
term [cyberterrorism] for non-state actors (even if sponsored by states) aords a certain degree of analytical
clarity’[30].
Finally, it is important to note that respondents’ views on the state cyberterrorism question had a discernible
impact on their answers to other important questions, particularly surrounding the signicance of
the cyberterrorist threat. Chart 2 shows the answers to question 10 of our survey – ‘In your view, does
cyberterrorism constitute a signicant threat?’ – for three groups: all respondents; those respondents for
whom states can engage in cyberterrorism; and, those respondents who argued that states cannot engage
in cyberterrorism. 60% of researchers who said that states can engage in cyberterrorism also believed that
cyberterrorism poses a signicant threat. is gure was considerably lower for those who said that states
cannot engage in cyberterrorism, at 47%. Similarly, only 15% of those who said that states can engage in
cyberterrorism opined that cyberterrorism is not a signicant threat, compared to 41% of those who said that
states cannot engage in cyberterrorism.
Chart 2: Does cyberterrorism pose a signicant threat?
A similar pattern is evident in chart 3, which shows the answers of the same three groups of respondents to
question 11 of our survey: ‘do you consider that a cyberterrorism attack has ever taken place?’. 69% of those
who said that states cannot engage in cyberterrorism believed that no cyberterrorist attack has ever occurred
– compared to 44% of those who said that states can engage in cyberterrorism.

70JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
Chart 3: Do you consider that a cyberterrorist attack has ever taken place?
So, just as an individual’s view on whether cyberterrorism should be conceived in narrow terms (as a terrorist
attack which has computers as its means and/or target) or broad terms (as any form of online terrorist
activity) aects that individual’s assessment of the cyberterrorism threat (Jarvis et al 2014), so too does an
individual’s view of whether states can engage in cyberterrorism.
Concluding Remarks
Our survey revealed general agreement that states have perpetrated cyberattacks, with respondents
oering a number of examples including Stuxnet and the attacks on Estonia and Georgia. is article has
raised the question of how we should conceive of these attacks. Should they be understood as instances of
cyberterrorism perpetrated by state actors? Or should we employ a dierent label, and reserve the term
cyberterrorism for non-state actors? Answering these questions requires consideration of two issues. First, is
it possible to speak of state cyberterrorism, or is the term oxymoronic? And, second, if it is possible to speak
of state cyberterrorism, should we do so?
As explained previously, perhaps the most common justication for employing the term state terrorism in
discussions of oine violences is the empirical claim that historically states have inicted more harm than
non-state actors. e same appears to hold true in the cyber realm, in that a number of our respondents
pointed out that most or all of the large-scale cyberattacks to date have been perpetrated by state actors. In
fact, it has been argued that from a cost-benet perspective it is unlikely that non-state terrorists will attempt
to launch Stuxnet-like cyberattacks at any point in the foreseeable future (Conway 2014; Al-Garni and Chen
2015). But whilst the majority of our respondents suggested that states can commit acts of cyberterrorism,
there were also dissenting voices. In fact, even some of those that said that states can commit acts of
cyberterrorism qualied their answers by suggesting that another label might be more apt.

71JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
e second set of arguments that we outlined previously for engaging with the concept of state terrorism
were analytical in nature. Our ndings suggest that, as noted above, the argument that existing denitions
of terrorism should be applied with greater consistency is of limited utility. e argument presupposes that
denitions of terrorism are not actor-specic. But whilst a number of our respondents explicitly rejected any
attempt to distinguish between state and non-state actors, there were others who insisted on the importance
of this distinction, claiming that terrorism is by denition a non-state activity. For the same reason, the
alternative argument – that terrorism is a form of violence which has nothing to do with its practitioner – is,
for these respondents at least, equally problematic.
In summary, the diversity of opinions oered by our respondents demonstrates that there is nothing
inherent in the concept of terrorism that requires a particular answer to the question of whether states can
commit terrorist acts. e choice of denition, and of typology, is a political one. Our ndings do suggest,
however, that the dominant view within the research community at present is that states can commit acts
of cyberterrorism. e cyber realm thus presents a challenge to the traditional view that emphasises the
distinction between state and non-state actors and lends weight to the growing interest in the concept of state
terrorism.
About the authors
Lee Jarvis is a Reader in International Security and a member of the Critical Global Politics research group
at the University of East Anglia. His work has been published in journals including Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, Security Dialogue and Political Studies, and recent books include Security: A Critical
Introduction (with Jack Holland, Palgrave: 2015) and Anti-Terrorism, Citizenship and Security (with Michael
Lister, Manchester University Press, 2015).
Stuart Macdonald is Associate Professor in Law and Deputy Director of the Centre for Criminal Justice and
Criminology at Swansea University. He is co-editor of Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response
(New York: Springer, 2014) (with Lee Jarvis and omas Chen) and Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and
Technology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015) (with Lee Jarvis and omas Chen). His research has been published
in journals including Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Studies in Conict and Terrorism, Terrorism
and Political Violence, Criminal Law and Philosophy and Sydney Law Review. He has held visiting scholarships
at Columbia University Law School, New York, the Institute of Criminology at the University of Sydney and the
Faculté de Droit at the Université de Grenoble.
Lella Nouri lectures in the Department of Criminology at Swansea University. She is currently completing her
PhD which investigates the construction of cyberterrorism as an issue of national security within US political
discourse. Since undertaking her doctorate she has had work published on a range of topics that reect her
research interests including: terrorism, cyberterrorism and online radicalisation.
Notes
[1] e complete list is as follows: ACM Digital Library; Anthropoligical Index Online; Applied Social
Sciences Index and Abstracts; Bibliography of British & Irish History; BioMed Central Journals; British
Humanities Index (CSA); British Periodicals (XML); Business Source Complete (EBSCO); CINAHL Plus
(EBSCO); Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Wiley); Education Resources Information Centre;
Emerald; HeinOnline; HMIC (Ovid); IEEE Xplore; INSPEC (Ovid); International Bibliography of the

72JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
Social Sciences; IOP Journals Z39; JISC Journals Archives; JSTOR; Kluwer Law Journals; Lecture Notes in
Computer Science (Springer Link); Lexis Library; MathSciNet (AMS); Medline (EBSCO); MLA International
Bibliography; Oxford Journals; Periodicals Archive online; Philosopher’s Index (Ovid); Project Muse;
Proquest Business Collection; PsycARTICLES (Ovid); PsycINFO (Ovid); PubMed; Royal Society Journals;
SAGE Journals Online; Scopus (Elsevier); Social Care Online (SCIE); Springer Link (Metapress); Taylor &
Francis Online; Web of Knowledge (Cross Search); Web of Knowledge (ISI); Web of Science (Cross Search);
Web of Science (ISI); Westlaw; Wiley Interscience; and, Zetoc.
[2] For further information on the association, please see: http://tapva.com/.
[3]For further information on this working group, see: http://www.bisa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=93&catid=37&Itemid=68.
[4] R65.
[5] R8.
[6] R6, R62.
[7] R31.
[8] R49. Similarly, R90 stated: ‘If states sponsor non-state groups to do cyberattacks, then that could easily be
described as states (indirectly) engaging in cyberterrorism’.
[9] R59.
[10] R33.
[11] R75.
[12] R106.
[13] R99.
[14] R78.
[15] R15.
[16] R30, R45.
[17] R20. R10 also commented, ‘Of course [states can engage in cyberterrorism], but they are likely to have
their participation hidden’.
[8] In response to the survey question, R111 wrote ‘Most terrorism, including cyberterrorism, is conducted
by states’, whilst R102 simply wrote ‘ey already do’.
[9] R16, R27, R45, R80.
[20] R51, R69.
[21] R69.
[22] R85.
[23] R37.
[24] R3, R9, R52, R55, R71, R83, R87, R108.
[25] R3, R9, R52, R71, R83.
[26] R26, R83, R87.

73JTR, Volume 6, Issue 3–September 2015
[27] R87.
[28] R26.
[29] R1, R63, R64, R73.
[30] R1.
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