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El Tribunal Constitucional y el control de los actos del Poder Ejecutivo
This research studies the regulation as a source of administrative law in Chile and its jurisdictional control. The author maintains that these norms have acquired a set of characteristics and elements that give him a physiognomy that distinguishes him from other sources. Thus, the regulation has a central function in the development of the constitutional and legal precepts; and a directive position within the administrative norms. From this hypothesis, other problems are solved, such as its relationship with the law, abandoning the traditional thesis of the legal maximum domain; the distinction with administrative acts, circulars and the official interpretation of the Administration; the scope of its obligatory force; the illegalities that may affect it and the control mechanisms, in particular the jurisdictional control.
Resumen Después de la reforma constitucional de 2005, el Tribunal Constitucional chileno se está vol-viendo más activo en el ejercicio de sus poderes en contra del Poder Ejecutivo. Ello se explica principalmente debido al enroque que sufrió la composición del Tribunal Constitucional, donde un grupo de jueces provenientes del mundo académico reemplazaron a un grupo de jueces ligados a la carrera judicial. Los jueces chilenos tienen una larga reputación de ser deferentes con el gobierno y de dictar sentencias de manera unánime. Esta actitud, sin embargo, va más allá de la afiliación partidista. Como se muestra en este artículo, los cambios en el comportamiento del Tribunal parecen estar más vinculados a cambios en la cultura jurídica subyacente, que a diferencias en la orientación política de los ministros. Tribunal Constitucional chileno – sentencias unánimes – disidencias judiciales Abstract After a constitutional amendment in 2005, the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal is becoming more active in exercising its powers against the executive branch. This effect is mainly due to a castling in the composition of the court between career judges and justices coming from the academia. Chilean judges have had a long-standing reputation of being deferential with the government and of following a rule of unanimity. That attitude, however, goes beyond partisan affiliation. As it is shown in this paper, the changes in the behavior of the court seems to be more related with a change in the underlying legal culture, than with differences in the partisan affiliation of the justices.
Using an original methodology that mixes directional coding and Pritchett's correlations, this paper argues that the Chilean Constitutional Court is becoming more active in exercising its powers against the executive branch. We also argue, however, that any political analysis should proceed with caution. The trend has its origin in a constitutional reform in 2005 that substantially changed the mechanism to appoint the Court’s justices. However, the movement towards judicial activism seems to be related with the decreasing influence of the legalistic culture embodied in the Chilean judiciary and cannot be properly explained with classic attitudinal model.
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