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Lainfluencia de las relaciones laborales sobre la decisión de financiación de las empresas: Unanálisisteórico

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Abstract

En este artículo se analiza la influencia de las relaciones laborales y las características del mercado de trabajo sobre la financiación de las empresas. De este nuevo enfoque se derivan va-rias implicaciones sobre el diseño de la estructura de capital. Primero, el interés de las empresas en favorecer las inversiones de los trabajadores en capital humano específico podría conducir a un menor empleo de la financiación con deuda. Segundo, la deuda permite a los accionistas me-jorar su poder de negociación frente a los trabajadores. Por último, en el contexto del control de la discrecionalidad directiva, la deuda impide la adopción de medidas de política laboral, en cuanto a la promoción o estabilidad en el empleo de los trabajadores, que resulten incompatibles con el objetivo de creación de valor para el accionista.

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Thesis
Nous proposons, dans le cadre de ce travail, d’étudier les interactions possibles entre le comportement stratégique sur le marché du produit et les décisions financières des firmes dans un cadre de concurrence imparfaite. L’objectif principal de cette recherche consiste à offrir une vue globale des relations possibles entre la structure financière, les parties prenantes de la firme, la structure du marché et le comportement stratégique de la firme. Pour atteindre cet objectif, la relation entre la structure financière et le comportement stratégique sur le marché des biens est abordée selon trois approches : - la théorie de la stratégie concurrentielle des firmes ; - la théorie des parties prenantes de la structure financière ; - la théorie de la structure du marché. Cette thèse apporte un éclairage nouveau sur la politique d'endettement des firmes industrielles lorsque l'on reconnaît une fonction prépondérante aux mécanismes concurrentiels. Elle prolonge la littérature existante en examinant théoriquement et empiriquement comment la concurrence entre les firmes sur le marché des produits peut déterminer leurs structures financières d’une part ; et d’autre part, comment l’engagement sur une structure financière donnée peut affecter la concurrence sur le marché des produits. Plus précisément, cette recherche contribue à la littérature existante selon les deux dimensions suivantes : - théoriquement, en revisitant le modèle de Clayton (2009) ; - empiriquement, en testant l’impact de l’interaction entre l’endettement et la concurrence sur la performance des firmes tunisiennes.
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This paper studies the effect of contract duration on the incentive to make relationship-specific investments, when the parties to the relationship are rational, with perfect information and perfect foresight, and contracts are costlessly enforceable and complete, except that short-term contracts do not allow commitments to actions taken beyond the contract period. Whether contracting for less than the entire life of the relationship suffices for efficient relationship-specific investment is shown to depend on whether parties need their relationship for consumption-smoothing, and on the predominance, in the efficient plan, of investment that involves sunk costs over investment that does not. In the absence of asymmetric-information incentive problems, the duration of contracts affects investment decisions only when the relationship plays a consumption-smoothing role, and then only when efficiency requires mainly sunk-cost investment. In this case, short-term contracting has a general, but not universal, tendency to make parties invest too little in their relationship.
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