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Organizational Leadership and Collective Action in International Governance: An Introduction
Global Policy
Abstract
While the exercise of leadership by states is critical in the study of regional and global governance, scholars must pay close attention to the role of nonstate actors and networks as well.
... Policy leadership in collective action is a central theme of governance and policy studies (Ostrom, the coming decades. In order to understand collective action, one must be aware of the framework in which all actors find themselves, in other words, the 'institutions, as rules of behaviour facilitating and restricting actors' interactions' (Prakash, Héritier, Koremenos, & Brousseau, 2015, p. 1) must be known, because institutions determine initiation at first, but also the preservation and successfulness of collective action after all (North, 1990). Policy leadership depends on policy entrepreneurs, and even though both terms are sometimes used interchangeably, Roberts and King (1991) distinguish several kinds of entrepreneurship and therefore make the synonymous discourse between entrepreneurs and leaders void (Roberts & King, 1991): This distinction implies that policy leaders -in contrast to policy entrepreneurs -hold a formal position in a government, albeit at international, regional, national or local level. ...
... Here lies another difference between policy leaders and policy entrepreneurs: the desire to respectively agree upon a satisfactory collective policy that is respected by all involved actors and the pursuit of resources and even preferences for certain outcomes (Prakash et al., 2015). Here, policy leaders implicitly lay the foundation for policy construction, as they determine the channels through which interests are communicated. ...
... Also, Copa-Cogeca sees food security -which is threatened as the demand of food is set to rise -as the main reason not to use any arable land to create EFA's: holding EFA's should be optional and should not exceed 3% (Table 1); more specifically, all greening components should be optional and farmers should be able to choose from a common EU list of measures (Table 1) (Allen & Hart, 2013, p. 15) as the CAP reform is not solid enough for the EU to adequately prepare its agricultural sector for the coming resource-constrained world. Academics also have argued 'that the proposed greening measures may increase biodiversity and will also limit production within the EU and will leave room for other players' (Klavert & Keijzer, 2012, p. 18 (Prakash et al., 2015). While BirdLife felt betrayed by the trilogue, Clift and Woll (2012) observe that EU's policy constitutes 'a policy regime that discriminates in favour of particular social groups, firms or sectors understood by policy-makers as "insiders" because of their territorial status' (Clift & Woll, 2012, p. 308). ...
The process up to the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform 2014-2020 has been a complex one for several reasons. First, the many stakeholders involved – as the CAP touches upon a lot of interests – brought about a complicated labyrinth. Second, the introduction and essence of the ‘greening’ of the CAP triggered many stakeholders to organize themselves and to get their voices heard in Brussels. This paper examines (1) who the main policy entrepreneurs and innovators were in influencing the ‘greening’ of the CAP, and (2) how those policy entrepreneurs achieved the implementation of their desired policy interests. The green direct payments have shown to be the chief obstacle during the negotiation and decision-making process of the reform, primarily due to two opposing stakeholder groups and an indistinct trilogue. The interaction between the main policy entrepreneurs, policy advocacy coalitions and policy leaders is our central focus. We argue that the watering down of the initially rather environmental friendly communication by the Commission is a consequence of favouritism and hegemonic ideas forecasted by policy leaders, already during the negotiation stage. Involved stakeholders, say policy entrepreneurs’ legitimacy relies primarily on their expertise on the subject-matter. However, the negotiation process has shown little signs of a constructivist discourse.
... Some of the existing policy literature emphasizes the role of 'boundary-spanners' or 'meta-governors' and their role in existing collaborations (Sørensen 2007, Torfing 2012, Williams 2002, whereas other literature concentrates on the role of leadership in international governance (Saz-Carranza 2015, Prakash et al. 2015). Within the public policy literature several scholars focus on micro-level processes, and particularly on the role of policy entrepreneurs. ...
... Some of the existing policy literature emphasizes the role of 'boundary-spanners' or 'meta-governors' and their role in existing collaborations (Sørensen, 2007;Torfing, 2012;Williams, 2002), whereas other literature concentrates on the role of leadership in international governance (Saz-Carranza, 2015;Prakash et al., 2015). Within the public policy literature several scholars focus on micro-level processes, and particularly on the role of policy entrepreneurs. ...
Global collaborations across level, domain, and sector boundaries are on the rise. This article analyses policy entrepreneurship for the establishment of the Global Alliance for Climate‐Smart Agriculture (GACSA), a global multi‐actor collaboration to address climate change and foster food security and development. We explore policy entrepreneurship as a process embedded within specific contexts. To that end we focus on the strategizing process, consisting of conditions, activities, and implications. Through a congruence case study based on interviews, documents, survey, and observation we find that: (1) accommodating a varied global community requires flexibility and adaptability from entrepreneurs towards a dynamic and changing environment; (2) the variety of actors constituting GACSA compromises vigour of the collaboration, and confuses the meaning of CSA; (3) whereas collective entrepreneurship is often depicted as joint operation of multiple actors, it might also be characterized by conflicting activities and/or successive involvement; (4) policy entrepreneurship is useful to establish collaborations, but its role is temporary. Entrepreneurs must therefore be sensitive to their potential obsoleteness and withdraw at the right moment. Our results show that policy entrepreneurship is a useful lens to study global policy processes, while providing guidelines to inspire and support practitioners to engage with global policy processes.
... But the contributions are important beyond the study of labor standards, by clarifying what we know about the broader relationship between the public and the private in international economic governance generally (e.g. B€ uthe, 2010; Gale, 2014;Jessop 1997;Prakash et al. 2015). We expect the various contributions to be on their own terms useful to theory and empirics of contemporary global policy making, but to be particularly useful when taken together as a group and in concert. ...
This article introduces a Global Policy Special Issue on public and private protections of labor and social standards in the global economy, exploring whether public and private regulations of such standards develop in harmony or tension with one another. It promotes an approach to studying public-private interactions in global labor governance that is sensitive to how interactions are important at different stages in the making of public and private regulation; how the causal interaction can go from the public to the private and from the private to the public; how such interaction varies in quality and promise across different parts of the world, labor issue areas and policy instruments; and how public-private interaction can only be captured by combining case histories with large-N analysis. The evidence from the Special Issue's articles leads to a set of generic propositions, describing how public interventions tend to strengthen private labor policy, while private interventions tend to either modestly substitute for or have little effect upon public labor and social protections. The article then discusses how these dynamics may be influenced by the political contentiousness of the specific labor issue and the characteristics of the state.
When an hegemonic power, such as the US, terminates its support for international institutions it has helped to create, this poses a severe challenge to them. This book explains why some institutions are resilient while others decay after hegemonic withdrawal. It introduces the Leadership Transition Theory (LTT) and argues that the agency of alternative leaders is key to institutional resilience. The LTT posits that international institutions are more likely to be resilient after hegemonic withdrawal when actors are willing and able, due to their control over soft and hard power resources, to exercise alternative leadership. To assess the LTT empirically, this book focuses on the “American century” and employs a multi-method approach. It introduces an original, comprehensive dataset about the withdrawal of US support from international organizations and agreements in the period of 1945-2020 and their subsequent resilience or decay. The book not only assesses the LTT statistically but also provides four detailed case studies – the World Trade Organization (WTO), the “Iran Deal”, the the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) – and additional examples leveraging more than 60 interviews and background conversations with senior officials from various abandoned institutions’ administrations and their membership. The book demonstrates that US withdrawal is a recurring phenomenon not limited to the Trump Administration and that abandoned institutions are resilient when other Western governments and IO bureaucracies provided alternative leadership. The results of this book therefore come with important implications for the proponents of the international order to ensure the durability of international institutions against Trump 2.0 and beyond.
There has to be a detailed and in-depth analysis of why we don't solve looming disasters.
Looming disasters mostly require collective action but international law is traditionally consent based. For a state to be bound by international law, it needs to have ratified a treaty (e.g. concerning climate change) or must be bound by customary international law. This horizontal form of cooperation makes the system sensitive to collective action problems (like free-riding on global public good, overuse of commons, begging-thy-neighbor etc.). I explore the question of whether other forms of cooperation, e.g. cooperation through soft law or international organizations mitigate the problem and under what circumstances this might be so. Furthermore, international law design might need to take into account internal processes within states (breaking up the black box) as well as behavioral economic insights. The paper suggests some mechanisms to help states overcoming the cooperation problem with regard to looming disasters and highlights their limits as well. It submits that international lawyers need to look at all behavioral mechanisms of international law in order to understand how it can be designed and used to prevent looming disasters.
Hix (European and comparative politics, London School of Economics and Political Science, UK) presents an introduction to the political system of the European Union. Assessing a variety of explanatory theoretical models, he describes the organization and operation of executive, legislative, and judicial governance. He then offers separate chapters analyzing the influence of public opinion, parties and elections, and interest representation on EU politics. Finally, he looks at the formation of policy in the areas of market regulation, expenditures, economic and monetary union, citizen freedom and security policies, and foreign policy.
Political scientists have been increasingly interested in entrepreneurs—individuals who change the direction and flow of politics. In this research note, we synthesize aspects of an economic approach to entrepreneurship with concepts used in political science. We then tie these theoretical observations to the emergence of entrepreneurs in local governments and test components of our theory using observations from a large set of suburban municipal governments. Empirically, we identify several conditions that affect the probability that an entrepreneur will emerge in a local government, especially slack budgetary resources that the political entrepreneur can reallocate. We also find that the probability with which an entrepreneur is found in local government is a function of the difficulty of overcoming collective action problems in a community.
Examines the role that institutions, defined as the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction, play in economic performance and how those institutions change and how a model of dynamic institutions explains the differential performance of economies through time. Institutions are separate from organizations, which are assemblages of people directed to strategically operating within institutional constraints. Institutions affect the economy by influencing, together with technology, transaction and production costs. They do this by reducing uncertainty in human interaction, albeit not always efficiently. Entrepreneurs accomplish incremental changes in institutions by perceiving opportunities to do better through altering the institutional framework of political and economic organizations. Importantly, the ability to perceive these opportunities depends on both the completeness of information and the mental constructs used to process that information. Thus, institutions and entrepreneurs stand in a symbiotic relationship where each gives feedback to the other. Neoclassical economics suggests that inefficient institutions ought to be rapidly replaced. This symbiotic relationship helps explain why this theoretical consequence is often not observed: while this relationship allows growth, it also allows inefficient institutions to persist. The author identifies changes in relative prices and prevailing ideas as the source of institutional alterations. Transaction costs, however, may keep relative price changes from being fully exploited. Transaction costs are influenced by institutions and institutional development is accordingly path-dependent. (CAR)
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Extensive empirical evidence and theoretical developments in multiple disciplines stimulate a need to expand the range of rational choice models to be used as a foundation for the study of social dilemmas and collective action. After an introduction to the problem of overcoming social dilemmas through collective action, the remainder of this article is divided into six sections. The first briefly reviews the theoretical predictions of currently accepted rational choice theory related to social dilemmas. The second section summarizes the challenges to the sole reliance on a complete model of rationality presented by extensive experimental research. In the third section, I discuss two major empirical findings that begin to show how individuals achieve results that are "better than rational" by building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-run self-interest. The fourth section raises the possibility of developing second-generation models of rationality, the fifth section develops an initial theoretical scenario, and the final section concludes by examining the implications of placing reciprocity, reputation, and trust at the core of an empirically tested, behavioral theory of collective action.
Systematically revised and rewritten throughout and updated to cover the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, this highly-successful and ground-breaking text remains unique in analyzing the EU as a political system using the methods of comparative political science.
En esta obra, Douglass C. North, premio Nobel de Economía de 1993, expone un marco analítico para explicar las formas en que las instituciones y los cambios internos en ellas afectan a la economía.
She won a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for her interdisciplinary research on international relations and law. Her book, The Continent of International Law, is forthcoming with
- Barbara Koremenos
Barbara Koremenos, Associate Professor of Political Science at the
University of Michigan, received her PhD from the University of Chicago. She won a National Science Foundation CAREER Award for
her interdisciplinary research on international relations and law. Her
book, The Continent of International Law, is forthcoming with
Cambridge University Press.