The European Union's Role in International Economic Fora: The G20

Abstract

This study on the role of the EU in G20 has been conducted for the European Parliament (Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy). This study forms part of a series of nine studies on the role of the European Union in international economic prepared at the request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament. It provides factual background information about the G20, the European Union's role and representation therein, its accountability as well as the coordination and impact thereof. The G20 has played a key role in measure taken to overcome the economic and financial crisis and promoted rules to prevent a repetition of such a crisis. The high compliance rate of the EU in implementing these commitments highlights the importance of the legally non-binding G20 commitments. Yet, the G20 is an informal international body where executives from officials’ up to leaders’ level meet. As a body G20 lacks meaningful accountability mechanisms. Moreover also the EU can hardly be held to account for its action at the G20 level. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the G20 and EU’s action at the G20 level. It sets out the EU legal framework for the participation of the EU and its Member States in the G20. In applying a two-tier accountability framework it identifies accountability gaps and concludes with policy recommendations.

Full text

Economic and Monetary Affairs
Employment and Social Affairs
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Industry, Research and Energy
Internal Market and Consumer Protection
DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIfIC POLICY
A
POLICY DEPARTMENT
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIfIC POLICY
A
DIRECTORATEGENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
Role
Policy departments are research units that provide specialised advice
to committees, inter-parliamentary delegations and other parliamentary bodies.
Policy Areas
Economic and Monetary Affairs
Employment and Social Affairs
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety
Industry, Research and Energy
Internal Market and Consumer Protection
Documents
Visit the European Parliament website: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies
PHOTO CREDIT:
iStockphoto.com; Shutterstock/beboy
Economic and Monetary Affairs
CAT:
CAT:
QA-02-15-409-EN-C
QA-02-15-409-EN-N
(paper)
(pdf)
The European Union's
Role in International
Economic Fora
Paper 1: The G20
ISBN
ISBN
978-92-823-7324-8
978-92-823-7325-5
(paper)
(pdf)
doi:
doi:
10.2861/31989
10.2861/981810
(paper)
(pdf)
The European Union's Role in International Economic Fora Paper 1: The G20 PS
Study for the ECON Committee
EN
2015

DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR INTERNAL POLICIES
POLICY DEPARTMENT A: ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC POLICY
The European Union's Role in
International Economic Fora
Paper 1: The G20
STUDY
Abstract
This paper forms part of a series of nine studies on the role of the European
Union in international economic fora, prepared by Policy Department A at the
request of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European
Parliament. It provides factual background information about the G20, the EU’s
role and representation therein, its accountability as well as the coordination
and impact thereof. The G20 has played a key role in measures taken to
overcome the economic and financial crisis and promoted rules to prevent a
repetition of such a crisis. The high compliance rate of the EU in implementing
these commitments highlights the importance of the legally non-binding G20
commitments. Yet, the G20 is an informal international body where executives
from officials’ up to leaders’ level meet. As a body G20 lacks meaningful
accountability mechanisms. Moreover the EU can hardly be held to account for
its action at the G20 level. This study provides a thorough analysis of the G20
and EU’s action at the G20 level. It sets out the EU legal framework for the
participation of the EU and its Member States in the G20. In applying a two-tier
accountability framework it identifies accountability gaps and concludes with
policy recommendations.
IP/A/ECON/2014-15 April 2015
PE 542.207 EN

This document was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Economic and
Monetary Affairs
AUTHOR(S)
European Research Centre for Economic and Financial Governance (EURO-CEFG)
with contributions from Prof. Dr. Fabian Amtenbrink, Prof. Dr. Niels Blokker, Prof. Dr.
Stefaan van den Bogaert, Dr. Armin Cuyvers, Prof. Dr. Klaus Heine, Prof. Dr. Christophe
Hillion, Jarosław Kantorowicz, Hannes Lenk, René Repasi.
RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR
Dirk VERBEKEN
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Mirari URIARTE
LINGUISTIC VERSIONS
Original: EN
ABOUT THE EDITOR
Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy
European Parliament
B-1047 Brussels
Policy departments provide in-house and external expertise to support EP committees and
other parliamentary bodies in shaping legislation and exercising democratic scrutiny over
EU internal policies.
To contact the Policy Department or to subscribe to its newsletter please write to:
Poldep-Economy-Science@ep.europa.eu
Manuscript completed in March 2015
© European Union, 2015
This document is available on the Internet at:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.
Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the
source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
3
CONTENTS
CONTENTS 3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 6
LIST OF TABLES 7
Executive Summary 8
1. Introduction 11
2. Organisation of the G20 12
Legal status and the history of establishment of the G20 12
How was the G20 established? 12 2.1.1.
Legal status of the G20 13 2.1.2.
Objectives and mission statements of the G20 13
Governance structure of the G20 17
Participation and Membership 17 2.1.3.
Governance structure, bodies involved in the decision making process 19 2.1.4.
Stakeholders’ involvement 24 2.1.5.
Voting modalities 26 2.1.6.
Financing of activities of the G20 27 2.1.7.
Current Membership of the G20 27
Participating entities 27 2.1.8.
Status of membership of ESAs, ECB, Commission 27 2.1.9.
Membership in internal bodies 28
Description of the ‘products’ and process 29
Type of ‘products’ developed by the G20 29 2.1.10.
Mandate for the development of ‘products’ and process of development31 2.1.11.
Transparency and timeline for the development of ‘products’ 33 2.1.12.
Functional analysis of the effectiveness of the G20 33
3. Legal framework, coordination, level and impact of EU participation 38
Rules framing the role of the EU and its Member States in the G20 38
EU participation in the G20: legal framework 38 3.1.1.
EU obligations for Member States when participating in G20 41 3.1.2.
EU obligations based on G20 decisions 43 3.1.3.
Practice of coordination 44
Determination of positions of EU participants, mandate and coordination 3.1.4. processes 44
Conflicts of interest between participants from the EU 46 3.1.5.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
4
Affection of the European Economic Governance and the Global Economic Governance
by the G20 47
Influence of the EU on shaping international standards via the G20 50
4. Conceptualising and operationalising (democratic) accountability for
informal international bodies 52
The rise of informal international bodies in economic and financial market regulation 52
Trend towards depoliticisation and denationalisation of public policy 4.1.1. making 52
The function of informal international bodies 53 4.1.2.
The case for the democratic legitimacy and accountability of informal international
bodies 54
The function of accountability in the democratic legitimation of public 4.1.3. power and policy making 54
A working definition of accountability 55 4.1.4.
A two-tier accountability framework for informal international bodies 56
Foundations of accountability 56 4.1.5.
Instruments for accountability 57 4.1.6.
The ‘collective’ accountability of G20 59
Accountable to whom? 59 4.1.7.
Foundations of accountability 60 4.1.8.
Instruments for accountability 62 4.1.9.
The accountability of the EU for its role in the G20 63
Accountable to whom? 63 4.1.10.
Foundations of accountability 64 4.1.11.
Instruments of accountability 64 4.1.12.
5. SWOT Analysis 66
SWOT: G20 as a collective body 66
Strengths 66 5.1.1.
Weaknesses 66 5.1.2.
Opportunities 67 5.1.3.
Threats 68 5.1.4.
Overview 69 5.1.5.
SWOT: EU participation in the G20 70
Strengths 70 5.1.6.
Weaknesses 70 5.1.7.
Opportunities 70 5.1.8.
Threats 71 5.1.9.
Overview 72 5.1.10.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
5
6. Policy recommendations 73
Recommendations concerning the G20 73
Recommendations concerning the strengthening of EU’s role and voice in the G20 73
Recommendations concerning the accountability of the Union’s action at the G20 level
74
Recommendation concerning possibilities for the European Parliament to influence the
positions of the EU in the G20 74
References 75
List of Cases 84
Appendix 1. 85
Appendix 2. 86

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
6
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ASEAN
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
ECB
European Central Bank
ECJ Court of Justice of the European Union
EEAS European External Action Service
EFC
Economic and Financial Committee
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
FSB
Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security
ILA
International Law Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO’s International Organisations
IOSCO
International Organization of Securities Commissions
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
SCIMF
Sub-committee on IMF-related issues
TEU
Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Funtioning of the European Union
UN
United Nations
WB
World Bank
WTO World Trade Organisation

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
7
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 1.
Priorities of all summits (presidencies) between 2008 and 2015 14
TABLE 2.
Outreach participants in the leaders’ summits since 2008 18
TABLE 3.
Country groups for rotating presidency 20
TABLE 4.
Interactions between G20, FSB, other international organisations and standard
setting bodies 23
TABLE 5.
Participation in the speakers’ consultations since their inception 26
TABLE 6.
The European Union representation in the G20 28
TABLE 7.
Selected commitments from the leaders’ communiqué after the Brisbane Summit in
November 2014 29
TABLE 8.
Delegation of product development to international organisations (selection of
tasks) 32
TABLE 9.
Compliance scores by summit, 2008–2013 (N = 130) 35
TABLE 10.
Compliance scores by policy areas, 2008–2013 (N = 130) 36
TABLE 11.
Compliance scores by summits for EU4 and the EU, 2008–2013 (N = 130) 36
TABLE 12.
The number and compliance scores for macroeconomic policy and financial
regulation reform, average for the period 2008–2013 48
TABLE 13.
SWOT analysis for the G20 as a collective body 69
TABLE 14.
SWOT analysis for the EU participation in the G20 72

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
8
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Group of 20 (G20) was established in 1999 in the aftermath of the East Asian financial
crisis as a forum of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The aim of the newly
created platform was to “broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues
among systemically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and
sustainable world economic growth that benefits all”. In 2008, the G20 was elevated to the
level of Heads of State or Government and invested with an important task to tackle the
burgeoning financial crisis. Shortly thereafter in 2009 the G20 self-proclaimed itself as a
“premier forum for international economic cooperation” (G20 2009b: para 19).
Organisation of the G20
G20 consists of 20 formal members, who together represent around 90% of global GDP,
80% of global trade and approximately 2/3 of the world’s population. For the G20 mem-
bers, these figures represent a heavy “economic weight” and are considered to warrant the
so-called “input” legitimacy.
The membership in the G20 is exclusive, i.e. rules for admitting new members do not exist.
However, a practice has been established of inviting selected international organisations
and guest countries to participate in meetings as so-called outreach participants. Notwith-
standing this, the fact that G20 permanently excludes more than 170 countries causes
“representational illegitimacy”. The “Illegitimacy” argument is further supported by the fact
that G20 agenda-setting and decision-making is largely dominated by the “executives”.
Involvement of external stakeholders in the process, particularly with regard to domestic
institutions (national parliaments) and non-governmental organisations, is rather weak.
From the outset the G20 has operated as an informal forum of states without any legal
foundation, stable procedural rules and a permanent secretariat. Yet, despite huge criticism
of the informal character of the G20, the member countries positively refer to the “power of
informality”. Due to the informality, consensus on global issues is allegedly reached “quick-
ly, flexibly and effectively” (Cameron 2011: 14).
The working of the G20 boils down to a series of (closed) meetings, with the leader’s sum-
mit at the apex of the meetings hierarchy. After the summits, a list of commitments to be
followed, along with action plans and other strategic documents, is published. Commit-
ments are approved by consensus, whereby all G20 members are equal in casting a veto.
Commitments are of varying nature and precision, apart from prescribing different time
horizons to be met. There is also huge heterogeneity in the implementation of the commit-
ments by the G20 member countries.
Due to the lack of in-house expertise, own financial resources and enforcement capacity,
the G20 is dependent on the expertise of numerous international organisations and stand-
ard-setting bodies to develop and implement G20 commitments. This relationship between
the latter and the G20 can be described as complementary, whereby both institutions rein-
force each other. On the one hand, the G20 generates political support for the activities of
international organisations; on the other hand, these bodies provide expertise, implement
and monitor the G20 commitments.
The EU enjoys the status of permanent (formal) member in the G20. For the Leaders’
Summits, the President of the European Commission and the European Council form the
single delegation to represent the European Union.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
9
Legal framework for EU’s participation in the G20
The participation of the EU in the G20 is governed by primary and secondary Union law.
The general right for the EU to exercise a formal role in international organisations or bod-
ies such as the G20 follows from its legal personality, as accorded by Article 47 TEU. In
order to act at the international level, the EU must have the competence to act conferred
upon it by the Lisbon Treaty. These can be an exclusive or shared competence, which is
explicitly listed or implied in the Treaties. Whenever an external Union competence is found
in the Treaties or implicitly deduced from them, the EU has the right to act at the interna-
tional level.
The question of the competence to act has to be distinguished from the institution that rep-
resents the EU at the international level. In general, the European Commission represents
the EU. However, in matters concerning the CFSP it is the High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy who represents the EU at ministerial level and the President of
the European Council who represents the EU at the level of Heads of Governments and
States. Furthermore, in matters concerning monetary policy, the EU is represented by the
ECB. In particular, the double representation by the two presidents on the G20 leaders’
level has been identified as an anomaly that potentially complicates the identification of the
adequate representative for the respective G20 topic.
This complexity is increased by the presence of the four permanent G20 EU Member States
(France, Germany, Italy and the UK = EU4), which legally speaking have the full capacity
to represent their interests in all areas discussed by the G20. The internal division of com-
petences between the EU and its Member States prescribed by the Lisbon Treaty does not
limit the capacity of sovereign Member States to act internationally. As a result, EU action
in the G20 is generally characterized by a multitude of individual decisions that attempt to
project a common position of the EU and its Member States.
This leads to the legal framework set by the Treaties for Member States’ action at interna-
tional level. Under the principle of sincere cooperation, as enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU,
Member States still have the capacity to act internationally. They are, however, bound by a
standstill obligation in foreign affairs in situations covered by Union competences. Here one
has to distinguish in accordance with the nature of the competence. First, where G20 topics
fall within the scope of exclusive EU external competences, the EU4 are prevented from
taking any individual position in the G20. Second, in areas of shared competences, unilat-
eral action of the EU4 might be pre-empted, if the EU has already exercised its compe-
tence. Third, in areas where the EU4 have in fact retained competences, they are precluded
from acting in the G20 in a way that compromises EU objectives. Fourth, the EU4 are in
any case under an obligation to cooperate closely with the EU in all aspects of their partici-
pation in the G20.
Finally, it is important to remember that the ECJ decided that Member States have to ab-
stain from acting internationally where the EU has taken action with a view to adopting a
concerted strategy on the matter. The existence of such a strategy is to be assumed where
Member States have discussed the particular question in the Council and arrived at a com-
mon position. A concerted strategy can be triggered by a Commission proposal to the
Council and does not require a formal vote in the Council.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
10
Accountability of the G20 and of EU’s participation in the G20
The fact that the G20 in a formal legal sense does not qualify as an international organiza-
tion and, moreover, does not feature formal decision-making procedures that result in le-
gally binding acts, should not be mistaken as a sign of a lack of authority and influence. By
means of committing the member countries and the EU to a particular course of action and
through the subsequent compliance by the G20 members, the G20 engages in ‘informal
international lawmaking’ at the international level. In doing so this informal international
body fills a gap in global economic and financial governance, as the gradual denationaliza-
tion of public policy-making has not been matched by adequate formal institutions and de-
cision making structures. This role of the G20, which has become particularly prevailing in
the recent global economic and financial crisis, has brought the attention to (an observed
lack of) democratic legitimacy and accountability of this body and its participating members
for their role therein, including the European Union.
Zooming in on accountability it is argued in this study that accountability essentially boils
down to mechanisms ensuring that a body engaging de jure or de facto in the exercise of
public power or public policy-making is subject to continuous control and evaluation of its
performance, and moreover can face consequences in case of bad performance or unde-
sired behaviour. A systematic study of accountability that avoids clichés requires an analyt-
ical framework that allows taking into account all aspects contributing to accountability. To
this end the present study introduces a two-tier accountability framework, introducing a
basic distinction between aspects that facilitate the exercise of continuous control and to
pass a judgment on performance (foundations of accountability), and aspects that allow
assigning consequences to this judgment (instrument of accountability). By means of this
differentiation it becomes inter alia clear that while a high degree of transparency, e.g.
through publications, forms an important foundation of accountability, it cannot function as
an accountability instrument.
From applying the two-tier accountability it becomes clear that the G20 as a body suffers
from a serious accountability deficit on almost all accounts. This can be traced back to its
informal nature, lacking a legal basis/statute, as well as a formalized institutional structures
and decision making procedures. What is more, it is rather ambiguous which party would
be charged with holding the G20 to account. Most importantly, it cannot be seen how any
accountability arrangements at the level of the G20 members (national/EU level), even
when considered jointly, could amount to a collective accountability of the G20. For the
latter to be effectively provided for in the future, it would be necessary to strengthen the
G20 as a ‘body’ essentially by its institutionalization (juridification). Yet, this could come at
the expense of the effectiveness and flexibility of today’s G20, namely in times of crisis.
Applying the two-tier accountability to the EU’s action in the G20 shows that the Union’s
accountability is precarious. Whilst the objectives defined by primary and secondary EU law
constitute a clear yardstick, the access to information for the European Parliament as the
forum that holds the EU to account for its activities in the G20 is very limited. There is no
permanent exchange of information between the Union institutions and the EP, which is not
based on the initiative of single MEPs. Furthermore, as regards instruments of accountabil-
ity, the strongest means for the EP is to override a Commission proposal for a legal act that
aims at implementing the G20 commitments during the legislative procedure. This consti-
tutes an effective ex post influence. There is, however, no formal ex ante influence of the
EP on policy choices made by the Union institutions. Yet, the EU legal framework has room
for setting up a mechanism that grants the EP an ex ante influence.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
11
1. INTRODUCTION
This study examines the role of the European Union (EU) and its Member States in the
Group of Twenty (hereinafter the G20). Particular emphasis is put on the (democratic) ac-
countability of G20 as a collective body and of the Union participating in this body.
Hereafter, section 2 provides concise information on the institutional environment of the
G20, highlighting where relevant the representation and the role of the EU. Section 3 turns
to the depiction of the EU legal framework governing the role of the EU (participants) and
the practice of the coordination of EU’s and Member States’ action in the G20 and the level
and impact of EU participation. Thereafter, section 4 conceptualizes the (democratic) ac-
countability of informal international bodies, mainly by briefly examining the role of infor-
mal international bodies in (economic) policy making, by explaining the need for the ac-
countability of such bodies given their de facto exercise of public power, and by developing
a two-tier accountability framework that will be applied subsequently to evaluate the G20
and the role of the EU and its Member States therein. Section 5 turns to an analysis of
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (‘SWOT’) for the EU and the Member States
regarding the current situation in G20 and of possible alternative approaches. Finally, sec-
tion 6 concludes and gives policy recommendations for an improved framework at the G20
and EU level, which inter alia could enhance the EU role in the G20, while at the same time
ensuring adequate levels of (democratic) accountability.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
12
2. ORGANISATION OF THE G20
Legal status and the history of establishment of the G20
How was the G20 established? 2.1.1.
The Mexican peso crisis of 1994 and the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and
their later spreads to other emerging economies (Russia and Latin America) proved that the
G71 was not able to effectively respond to the challenges of a global economy (G20 2008b:
9; Kirton 2000: 153). As a result, there was a growing understanding that dealing with
global implications of the crises requires a more representative forum than G7 (Callaghan
2013a: 4). In September 1999, G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors proposed
therefore “to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among sys-
temically significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable
world economic growth that benefits all” (G20 2008b: 8). They subsequently invited their
“counterparts from a number of systemically important countries from regions around the
world” to a meeting in Berlin in December 1999 (G20 2008b: 5). As such the Berlin meet-
ing marked the official birth of what became known as the G20 – an informal forum bring-
ing around the table Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors from important indus-
trialized and emerging economies with the purpose to better coordinate global economic
policies (G20 2008b: 5). For some, the establishment of the G20 marked a paradigm or
“tectonic” shift from a system of international cooperation based on hegemony of the most
advanced economies (G7/G8), to a system of more diverse membership reflecting the in-
creased role of emerging countries in the global economy (G20 2008b: 9; Beeson & Bell
2009: 68).
In the period 1999-2008, the most important gatherings within the G20 were annual meet-
ings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. While the meetings were deemed
useful by participants, they did not attract considerable public attention (Callaghan 2013a:
4) in particular after the sense of urgency related to the crisis in the late 1990s faded away
(Debaere et al. 2014: 8). The special meeting of the G20 held in Washington in November
2008 constituted the turning point in the history of the G20. The Washington gathering was
for the first time elevated to the level of Heads of State or Government2 (the highest level
of political representation) and vested with the important task to tackle the burgeoning
financial crisis (Kirton 2008). The meeting was officially named the G20 Special Leaders’
Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy3. As the Washington Summit and
subsequent London Summit in the view of those involved had proven the G20’s added-
value as a “crisis committee” or a “crisis beaker” (Cooper 2010: 741), the leaders an-
nounced in 2009 that this group would replace the G7/8 as a main global economic govern-
ance executive or “premier forum for international economic cooperation” (G20 2009b: pa-
ra 19). As a result of these amendments, since 2008, the G20 Summits of Heads of State
1 The G7 comprises Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States plus the
European Union. If Russia is counted then the group extends to G8. For more information on G7/G8 see
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/ (accessed on February 25, 2015).
2 The idea to launch the G20 meeting at the level of Heads of State or Government in 2008 was not new. Some
first suggestions with that respect have already been given in the mid-2000s (Bradford & Linn 2004: 2; Martin
2004). A final impetus to create the G20 Summit with a heavy political weight was given by the financial crisis
and political pressure exerted by the EU delegation in Washington in October 2008. The delegation of the
French President N. Sarkozy and the European Commission President J. Barroso equipped with a mandate from
the European Council was important as it paved the way for the G20 Summit in Washington in November
2008, which forged the basis for a next crucial summit in London in April 2009 (Hodson 2011: 6).
3 The Washington Summit in 2008 was the only summit with a special title (the G20 Special Leaders’ Summit on
Financial Markets and the World Economy in Washington). All subsequent summits were named after the host-
ing city.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
13
or Government have been organized in addition to G20 meetings of Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors. The Finance Ministers and Governors continue to meet mainly in
order to prepare the Summits and implement leaders’ commitments (Henley & Blokker
2013: 22).
A general observation from this concise historical sketch is that both creation and upgrade
of the G20 to the Leaders’ Summit was due to the crisis circumstances. Currently, however,
the role of the G20 appears to evolve from providing a forum for the immediate interna-
tional response to the global financial crisis to a forum for international cooperation in mul-
tiple policy areas, in other words from a “crisis committee” to a “steering committee”
(Cooper 2010).
Legal status of the G20 2.1.2.
G20 is not an international organisation in the sense of the definition provided by the Inter-
national Law Association (ILA). According to the ILA, an international organisation is “cre-
ated under international law by an international agreement amongst States, possessing a
constitution and organs separate from its Member States” (International Law Association
2004: 4).
The G20 is disqualified as an international organisation since it operates as an informal fo-
rum of states without any legal foundation and a permanent secretariat (Nasra & Debaere
2012: 4). According to Wouters & Ramopoulos (2012: 14), G20 is better characterized as a
“club” or a “network”. The reason for this being that the G20 is not governed, or con-
strained, by a constitutional charter. Neither do predetermined membership criteria or deci-
sion-making procedures apply, nor does the G20 feature a dispute resolution mechanism.
Decisions (in a non-technical sense) are in principle reached through mutual agreement in
what has been described as by diplomatic means in a culture of reciprocity and trust
(Wouters & Ramopoulos 2012: 14). Due to the lack of legal anchoring, the G20 has been
also characterised as a de facto international forum with a special agenda of discussion
(Giovannini et al. 2012: 17).
Despite some criticism of the informal character of the G20 (Vestergaard 2011;
Vestergaard & Wade 2012; Der Spiegel 2010, Åslund 2009), the UK Prime Minister – David
Cameron – in his report to the G20 Cannes Summit positively referred to the G20’s “power
of informality”. Due to the informality, consensus on global issues is reached “quickly, flexi-
bly and effectively” (Cameron 2011: 14). The G20 Leaders welcomed Cameron’s report and
mentioned it explicitly in the Cannes Summit Declaration (G20 2011a: para 90). In the
same Declaration they subsequently highlighted that G20 is “a Leader-led and informal
group and it should remain so” (para 91) thereby, at that time, implicitly rebuffing the pro-
posal to institutionalize the G20 (Wouters & Ramopoulos 2012: 23)4. At the same, as will
be discussed in section 4 hereafter, this aura of informality arguably constitutes a major
challenge for the accountability of the G20 as a body, as well as the individual participants,
including namely the EU.
Objectives and mission statements of the G20
The G20 was created with broad and open-ended agenda and namely as “a new mecha-
nism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system, to
broaden the discussions on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically
significant economies and promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable world
4 For proposals of the institutionalization and reform of the G20 see, for instance, Subacchi & Pickford 2011;
Vestergaard 2011; Vestergaard & Wade 2012.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
14
economic growth that benefits all” (G20 1999: para 2). The G20’s mandate encompasses
therefore both financial stability concerns and long-term growth related issues. However,
according to Paul Martin – the first chair of G20 – “there is virtually no major aspects of the
global economy or international financial system that will be outside of the groups’ purview”
(G20 2008b: 28).
During the 2009 Pittsburgh gathering leaders upgraded the G20 to the “premier forum for
international economic cooperation” (G20 2009b: 19), replacing G7 as a main global gov-
ernance forum. The ultimate objectives of the premier forum are not well defined, however
(Angeloni & Pisani-Ferry 2012: 13; Callaghan 2013b: 3). Put differently, a single authorita-
tive document stating the G20’s uniform objectives and/or aims in a clear manner is miss-
ing (see also section 4.4.1. on the impact this has on accountability). This is highlighted by
the various descriptions of the broad G20 objectives by subsequent presidencies. For in-
stance, according to the Russian presidency in 2013, the G20 broad objectives were as fol-
lows: (1) “policy coordination between its members in order to achieve global economic
stability, sustainable growth”5; (2) “promoting financial regulations that reduce risks and
prevent future financial crises”; (3) “modernizing international financial architecture”. The
Turkish presidency in 2015 lists the following general purpose of the G20: “to strengthen
the global economy, reform international financial institutions, improve financial regulation
and implement the key economic reforms that are needed in each member economy” (G20
2015a).
If at all, what arguably can be interpreted a common denominator is the promotion of fi-
nancial stability and sustainable economic growth. This view is confirmed by a study of the
priority areas formulated by the G20 in documents issued after the summits. Table 1 sum-
marizes the major priorities for all presidencies from 2008 to 2015. Noticeable is an expan-
sion of the priorities over time and shift from financial regulation reforms to issues concern-
ing balanced economic growth, corruption, climate change, development issues etc.
Table 1. Priorities of all summits (presidencies) between 2008 and 2015
Summit
Date
Major priorities
Washington November 2008 • Financial reform
• International financial institutions
• Commitment to an open global economy
London April 2009 • Global fiscal and monetary stimulus
• Financial reform
• International financial institutions
(strengthening of the resources available)
• Resisting protectionism and promoting global
trade
• Development issues
Pittsburgh
September 2009
•
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
5 With respect to the “policy coordination between [the G20] members in order to achieve global economic sta-
bility, sustainable growth”, it is important to mention the so-called Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and
Balanced Growth, which was launched during the Pittsburg Summit (Callaghan 2013b: 3). The aim of this
framework is to reassure that “fiscal, monetary, trade, and structural policies are collectively consistent” with
the objectives which are set out to achieve sustainable and balanced growth. At the same time it has been ob-
served that the framework allows for flexibility of objectives, which “should be updated as conditions evolve”
(G20 2009b: para 6).

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
15
Summit
Date
Major priorities
Balanced Growth
• Financial reform
• International financial institutions
• Trade issues and protectionism
• For the first time considerable broadening of
the agenda: energy security, climate change,
development issues, jobs quality
• G20 governance
Toronto
June 2010
•
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth
• Financial reform
• Fighting protectionism and promoting trade
• Sustainability of public finance
• Fight against corruption, green growth,
energy subsidies, development issues
Seoul November 2010 • Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth
• Financial reform
• Trade issues
• Financial safety nets
• International financial institutions (reform of
IMF governance)
• Development issues, tackling corruption,
climate change
Cannes
November 2011
•
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth/A global strategy for
growth and jobs
• Financial reform
• Reform of international monetary system
(management of capital flows, principles for
cooperation between the IMF and regional
financial arraignments)
• Multilateral trading system
• Development issues, fight against climate
change and corruption, volatility of
commodity prices
• G20 governance
Los Cabos
June 2012
•
Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth/Growth and Jobs Action
Plan
• Financial reform and financial inclusion
• International financial architecture
• Trade issues
• Development issues, infrastructure, food
security and commodity price volatility
• Green growth, climate change, fight against

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
16
Summit
Date
Major priorities
corruption
St. Petersburg September 2013 • Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth/St Petersburg Action Plan
• Growth through quality jobs and investment
• Financial reform and financial inclusion
• International financial architecture
• Multilateral trade
• Tackling tax avoidance, evasion
• Development issues, food security,
infrastructure, green growth, sustainable
energy policy, resilience of global commodity
markets, fight against climate change and
corruption
• Accountability assessment
Brisbane November 2014 • Framework for Strong, Sustainable and
Balanced Growth/Brisbane Action Plan
• Financial reform
• International financial architecture
• Trade issues
• Tax avoidance, evasion
• Development issues, infrastructure,
remittances
• Gender inequality, reducing youth
unemployment
• Fight against climate change and corruption
• Resilient energy markets
• Accountability assessment
Antalya
November 2015
Broad priorities for 2015:
• Strengthening the Global Recovery and
Lifting the Potential
• Enhancing resilience
• Buttressing sustainability
Source: Angeloni & Pisani-Ferry 2012: 13-14; G20 2008a; G20 2009a; G20 2009b; G20 2010a; G20 2010b; G20
2011b; G20 2012; G20 2013; G20 2014c.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
17
Governance structure of the G20
Participation and Membership 2.1.3.
On a regular basis G20 gathers Heads of State or Government, Finance Ministers, Central
Bank Governors, Deputies Finance Ministers, Senior Central Bank Officials, Sherpas and
sous-Sherpas (leaders’ personal representatives (Debaere & Orbie 2013: 22)) of the 19
“most significant” countries in the world, plus the European Union. Overall these members
represent around 90% of global GDP, 80% of global trade, 84% of all fossil fuel emission
and approximately 2/3 of the world’s population,6 but only 10% of total number of coun-
tries (Van Ham 2012: 1).
If the EU Member States represented indirectly by the EU officials are excluded, the G20
accounts for 77% of global GDP, 60% of trade, and 62% of world population (Vestergaard
& Wade 2012: 260). According to Nolle (2014: 4), the G20 countries are particularly domi-
nant when it comes to aggregates of the financial markets. In 2012, the G20 members “ac-
counted for 90% of world banking system, 81% of global market capitalization, and 94% of
global bond markets” (Noelle 2014: 4). For the G20 members, these figures, which repre-
sent a heavy “economic weight”, warrant the so-called “input” legitimacy (Vestergaard &
Wade 2012: 260) (see also section 4).
When the G7 countries were selecting 20 original members of G20, the following five in-
formal criteria played the most crucial role: (1) “countries had to be systematically im-
portant”, (2) “they had the ability to contribute to global economic and financial stability”,
(3) the group was supposed to be “broadly representative of the global economy”, (4) the
group needed to be “regionally balanced”, and (5) the group should be small in order to
“foster close working relationship and raise the level of trust among its members” (G20
2008b: 20). Consequently, membership did not depend purely on economic criteria. Geo-
political considerations were also taken into account in order to achieve a “regionally bal-
anced” international forum.
It has been observed that this lack of formal criteria for membership highlights a consider-
able degree of informality of the G20 (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 6). At the same time this
informality has also been described as causing “representational illegitimacy” (Vestergaard
2011: 26). Notice the discrepancy between “representational illegitimacy”, on the one
hand, and “input” legitimacy stemming from the “economic weight” of the G20 members,
on the other hand.
The membership in the G20 is exclusive (Jokela 2011: 8), i.e. membership is fixed and
rules for admitting new members do not exist. However, the G20 has established a practice
of inviting selected international organisations (IO’s) and non-Member States (guest coun-
tries) to participate in meetings as so-called outreach participants. According to Henley and
Blokker (2013, p.15), a status of outreach participant mirrors “the practice of granting ‘ob-
server status’ to non-members in international organisations”. Invitations to outreach par-
ticipants are issued by the acting presidency, after consulting and getting consent from the
other G20 members (Jin-seo 2010).
Overall, there are three categories of attendees at the G20 meetings:
Formal (permanent) members: 19 original member countries (i.e. Argentina, Australia,
Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexi-
co, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
plus the European Union;
6 The numbers are extracted from http://www.oecd.org/g20/ (accessed on March 20, 2015).

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
18
IO’s and international bodies (consensus seems to emerge to invite
chairs/directors/presidents of the following organisations: Financial Stability Board (FSB),
International Labour Organization (ILO), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations (UN), World Bank
(WB) and World Trade Organization (WTO));
Guest countries (invited on an ad hoc basis, however some standing invitations started to
emerge, e.g. Spain7 referred to as a “permanent invitee”, two African countries chairing
the African Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development as well as chairs of Associ-
ation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Global Governance Group.
Under the Korean chair in 2010, some principles on the outreach participation of guest
countries were established. According to the Seoul Summit Document (G20 2010c: para
74), the number of guest countries should not exceed five, of which a minimum two should
be African countries. Yet, with the exception of the French presidency, all presidencies have
deviated from this rule, as the number of guest countries amounted to six (see table 2). At
the same time the principle of inviting at least two African countries has been upheld.
In fact, due to the amendments concerning outreach participation, the G20 comprises 20
formal members, 5-6 guest countries and seven IO’s/international bodies. This results in a
total number of 32-33 “members”. The name of the group “G20” is preserved, however, as
a round number is considered to provide a sense of finality and is consistent with the num-
ber of formal members (G20 2008b: 22). Table 2 shows the outreach participants to the
leaders’ summits since their outset in 2008.
Table 2. Outreach participants in the leaders’ summits since 2008
Summit
Date
Outreach participants
Washington November 2008 • IOs & bodies: Financial Stability Forum
(converted to FSB in 2009), IMF, UN and WB
• Guest countries: the Netherlands and Spain
London April 2009 • IOs & bodies: Financial Stability Forum (now
FSB), IMF, UN, WB and WTO
• Guest countries: Ethiopia, the Netherlands,
Spain and Thailand
Pittsburgh
September 2009
•
IOs & bodies: Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation, Financial Stability Forum (now
FSB), IMF, UN, WB and WTO
• Guest countries: Ethiopia, the Netherlands,
Spain and Thailand
Toronto
June 2010
•
IOs & bodies: FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, the
Netherlands, Spain and Vietnam.
Seoul November 2010 • IOs & bodies: FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Singapore,
7 Since Spain is the only guest country to make policy declarations similar to those of formal members, some
perceive Spain as a de facto member of the G20 (Henley & Blokker 2013: 19).

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
19
Summit
Date
Outreach participants
Spain and Vietnam
Cannes November 2011 • IOs & bodies: Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS), FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD,
UN, WB and WTO
• Guest countries: Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia,
Singapore, United Arab Emirates and Spain
Los Cabos June 2012 • IOs & bodies: FSB, Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Benin, Cambodia, Chile,
Colombia, Ethiopia and Spain
St. Petersburg September 2013 • IOs & bodies: FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Brunei Darussalam,
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Singapore
and Spain
Brisbane
November 2014
•
IOs & bodies: FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Mauritania, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Senegal, Singapore and Spain
Antalya November 2015 • IOs & bodies: FSB, ILO, IMF, OECD, UN, WB
and WTO
• Guest countries: Azerbaijan, Malaysia,
Singapore and Spain + two African countries
Source: G20 Research Group 2008; G20 Research Group 2010; G20 2013b: 11; G20 2014c: 12; G20 2014d; Eun
2013; French Embassy in Canada 2011; Jin-seo 2010; SAFPI 2012.8
Governance structure, bodies involved in the decision making process 2.1.4.
After two years of chairing the G20 (1999-2001) by Canada, a consensus was reached that
the G20’s chair/presidency would rotate annually among the members and in accordance
with principles, which guide the selection of prospective chairs (G20 2008b: 22). For this
purpose the 19 G20 member countries have been divided into five groups (see table 3),
whereby the chair/presidency is always held in sequence by one country of a given group
(G20 2008b: 22). For instance, in the period 2001-2006, the presidency was held subse-
quently by Canada (Group one) in 2001, India (Group two) in 2002, Mexico (Group three)
in 2003, Germany (Group four) in 2004, China (Group five) in 2005, and Australia (again
Group one) in 2006. There were some deviations from this orderly sequence at the height
of the global economic and financial crisis, when the United States did not only organised a
summit in Washington in 2008, but also in Pittsburgh in 2009, the same year in which a
summit was held in London. Moreover, in 2010 both Toronto and Seoul hosted summits.
Also countries from Group one – Russia (2013) and Turkey (2015) – have been chairing the
8 It should be noted that different to what is suggested in Table 2, in the opinion of the authors of the present
study, FSB cannot be formally characerised as an international organisation, but rather constitutes an interna-
tional body.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
20
G20 more often in a recent period. Currently the broad rule is not to grant the presidency
to countries from the same group in two subsequent years. A return to the stringent sys-
tem of rotating is scheduled for after 2015, when the country from Group five, i.e. China,
will be chairing the G20 (G20 2011a: para 94).
It should be stressed in this context that the European Union is the only formal G20 mem-
ber, which is not included in the chair/presidency rotation.
Table 3. Country groups for rotating presidency
Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four Group Five
Australia (2014)
India
Argentina
France (2011)
China (2016)
Canada (2010) Russia (2013) Brazil Germany Indonesia
Saudi Arabia South Africa Mexico (2012) Italy Japan
United States
(2008, 2009) Turkey (2015) United Kingdom
(2009) Korea (2010)
Source: G20 2008b: 130.
As to agenda-setting it has to be first of all noticed that G20 operates without a permanent
secretariat or staff9 (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 9). Moreover, besides the G20 policy manu-
al (G20 2008: 23), an internal document that is not available publicly, an established set of
procedural rules does not exist.
In practice, while all G20 members provide input into the development of the annual G20
program, the chairing country takes the lead in the agenda-setting process. The acting
chair/presidency establishes a temporary secretariat or steering committee (Çanacki 2013),
which coordinates the G20’s operations and arranges its meetings (Wouters & Geraets
2012: 10). The acting chair takes part in a “revolving three-member management group of
past, present and future chairs”, the so called “Troika”, which is supposed to “ensure conti-
nuity in the G20’s work and management across years” (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 10).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are limits to what extent the agenda can be in-
fluenced and shaped by the chairing country. In fact it has been observed that approx. 60-
70% of the agenda is somewhat predetermined, relating to macroeconomic issues, interna-
tional financial institution, regulation and supervision (Se-jeong 2010).
The agenda-setting process starts with two meetings some months in advance of the meet-
ing of the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in February (Wouters &
Geraets 2012: 10). During the first meeting, the chairing country hosts the Deputy Finance
Ministers and senior central bank officials. In this first meeting the agenda and work pro-
gram for the G20 “Finance Track” is discussed. The Finance Track provides inputs on (1)
framework for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, (2) international financial architec-
ture reform, (3) financial regulation, and (4) financing for long-term invest-
ment/international tax items (Çanacki 2013). The second meeting gathers Sherpas who
discuss the presidency’s priorities, the work program and notably issues from the “Sherpas’
Track” such as: (1) employment, (2) energy, (3) development, (4) trade, and (5) anti-
corruption (G20 2015d). Although extensive discussions are conducted in these two meet-
9 There is a concern that the institutionalisation of a permanent secretariat would lead to the G20 usurpation of
the UN (Alexandroff et al. 2010). For that reason, some proposal were made on a cyber or virtual secretariat,
where issues would be discussed on-line.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
21
ings, the chairing country will have the final say in the adoption of the agenda (Wouters &
Ramopoulos 2012: 16).
After these initial agenda-setting meetings, the work and agenda-setting activities continue
to be organised broadly within two aforementioned tracks, i.e. (1) the “Finance Track” and
(2) the “Sherpas’ Track”.
Within the “Finance Track”, after the initial meeting of the Deputies10, the agenda is further
influenced during the gatherings of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors11 (here-
inafter “ministerials”) under the leadership of the chairing/presidency country. “Ministerials”
are crucial, as they prepare the agenda for the leaders’ summits and subsequently imple-
ment the agreements reached at previous summits. From 2008, a convention has been
developed whereby “ministerials” are subordinated and to some extent directed by the
leaders’ summit.12 As far as official documents are concerned, “ministerials” present a
“communiqué” or a “declaration” (rarely a “statement”), in which they specify the progress
made and the future course of action.
Within the “Sherpas’ Track” several meetings are held during the year, in which Sherpas
deliberate on political non-financial issues. However, the Sherpas’ responsibilities go be-
yond these meetings. For instance, Sherpas are “tasked by their leaders to negotiate the
summits documents on their behalf” (G20 2015b). They are also involved in the testing of
ideas for reforms and in forging consensus at the top political level. Yet, no official docu-
ments are released after the Sherpas’ meeting. This is contrary to the “ministerials”, after
which “communiqués” or other types of documents are issued.
Both the “Finance” and “Sherpas” tracks benefit from a technical analysis, assistance and
recommendations of working groups and task forces, which are held on specific thematic
issues (G20 2015c). These working groups and task forces gather officials (from relevant
ministries) nominated by their respective governments. Delegates from the guest coun-
tries, international organisations and engagement groups also participate in these fora (see
section 2.5 for details). These meetings are typically co-chaired by representatives from
one advanced and one emerging economy of the G20 (G20 2015c).
Different or additional participants – particularly relevant ministers – attend the more re-
cently-instituted sectorial “ministerials”, such as: (1) G20 Meetings of Labour and Employ-
ment Ministers, (2) Meetings of G20 Trade Ministers, G20 Meetings of Agriculture Ministers
and informal G20 Meetings of Foreign Ministers. Detailed information on the participation in
this kind of meetings is scant, however. According to Wouters and Geraets (2012, p. 8),
this “proliferation of sectorial ministerial meetings indicates the broadening of the G20 and
increases the degree of informality within G20 setting”.
It should be noted that Heads of State or Government, ministers, central bankers and other
officials representing their country in the G20 gatherings act on behalf of their constituen-
cies (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 22). Therefore, the mandate and instruction of the partici-
pating representatives are determined by member countries.
Overall, the annual G20 program boils down to a series of deputies’, Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors, working group/task forces and sectorial “ministerial” meetings13
10 The Finance Deputies meet quite regularly, usually prior to the Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’
meetings.
11 The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meet bi-annually and, moreover, also during the IMF-World
Bank Spring and Annual Meetings.
12 Note that the “ministerials” were the most important meetings from all gatherings organised within the G20
framework before 2008, when the G20 was upgraded to the leaders’ level. See section 2.1.1.
13 In 2013, there were 65 gatherings organised under the G20 umbrella. In 2014, there were almost 70 meet-
ings. It amounts to more than one meeting per week. See http://en.g20russia.ru/ section ‘Program’ (accessed
on February 23, 2015).

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
22
that work towards the leader’s summit held at the end of each year (usually November).14
Similar to what has been observed for the “ministerials”, after the summits a “communi-
qué” or “declaration” (or rarely a “statement”) is published, comprising a list of commit-
ments to be followed, along with action plans and other strategic documents (see section
2.6).
It has to be noted that the G20 engages in what Eccleston et al. (2015) describe as “net-
work relationships” with “a broad array of international organisations, technical agencies
and networks.” Due to the lack of in-house expertise and own financial resources, the G20
is “generally highly dependent on the inputs, expertise and capacities of various affiliated
organisations and groups to develop and implement technical regulatory programs” (Ec-
cleston et al. 2015). While in particular IO’s are not legally obliged to cooperate with
G20,15 they do so voluntarily, as they acknowledge that this provides an opportunity to
augment the global influence of IO’s. This is achieved by providing the highest political en-
dorsement and commitment to comply with agenda set by IO’s, such as for example in the
case of the OECD’s tax transparency agenda (Eccleston et al. 2015).16
What further defines this relationship of the G20 with international organisations and
standards setting bodies is the absence of an executive body at G20. The G20 must thus
rely on peer pressure, national regulators and in particular on international organisations
and standard setting bodies to ensure that commitments/declarations are implemented
and, moreover, to scrutinize the progress achieved. Some characterize this as a triangular
governance structure, i.e. the G20 on top supported notably by the FSB and the IMF (An-
geloni & Pisani-Ferry 2012: 15; Van Ham 2012: 5). Others, mainly with reference to the
“Finance Track”, refer to a hierarchical decision-making structure with the G20 summits
and “ministerials” on top and a prominent role for the FSB (Nolle 2014: 8).
The FSB, which was established during the London Summit in 2009 (G20 2009a: para 15)
and strengthened during the Cannes Summit in 2011 (G20 2011b: para 16), is vested, in-
ter alia, with the following tasks: (1) “to assess vulnerabilities affecting the global financial
system and identify and review on a timely and ongoing basis the regulatory, supervisory
and related actions needed to address them, and their outcomes”; (2) “to promote coordi-
nation and information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability”; (3)
“to undertake joint strategic reviews of the policy development work of the international
standard setting bodies to ensure their work is timely, coordinated, focused on priorities
and addressing gaps”; (4) “to help coordinate the alignment of the activities of the SSBs
[standard setting bodies] to address any overlaps or gaps and clarify demarcations in light
of changes in national and regional regulatory structures relating to prudential and system-
ic risk, market integrity and investor and consumer protection, infrastructure, as well as
accounting and auditing” (Article 2 of the FSB Charter). Therefore, in particular with respect
to the standard setting bodies, the FSB functions as a catalyst of G20 commitments that
thereafter translate into more concrete policies. The relationship between the FSB and
some international organisations is more subtle. However, according to Nolle (2014: 9-10),
there is an implicit understanding within the G20 that international organisation – notably
the IMF – defer and report to the FSB.
By some the relationship between the G20 and international organisations and standard
setting bodies is described as complementary, where both institutions reinforce each other
14 Note that in 2009 and 2010 two summits where held in a single year.
15 The G20 directly requests actions from IO’s thereby bypassing formal decision-making procedure of these
organisations (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 13). Non-G20 members often flag their concern regarding the fact
that a large portion of work of IO’s is now produced by requested by the G20 without the non-G20 members’
consent (Wouters & Geraets 2012: 13).
16 For the relationship between the G20 and the OECD, see Wouters & Van Kerckhoven 2011a.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
23
(Martinez-Diaz & Woods 2009: 2). On the one hand, the G20 generates political support for
the activities of international organisations and standard setting bodies, and therefore en-
hances their role in the global economic governance. On the other hand, these institutions
provide expertise, implement and monitor the G20 commitments, without which the G20
would be a toothless talking shop (Vestergaard 2011: 29).
Table 4 demonstrates how encompassing the interactions between the G20, FSB, interna-
tional organisations and standard setting bodies are. It summarizes the G20 requests from
the “ministerial” communiqué published on September 21, 2014. The G20 refers to this
process of requesting actions as “tasking” (see, for instance, G20 2010a: para 20).
Table 4. Interactions between G20, FSB, other international organisations and
standard setting bodies
Who is requested?
What is requested?
IMF/OECD “to analyse the implications of the tax policy mix and composition
of government expenditure for growth outcomes.”
OECD
“to deliver the rest of the effective approaches to implement the
G20/OECD High-Level Principles on Long Term Investment
Financing by Institutional Investors by the 2015 Summit”.
IMF/OECD/
World Bank Group “to work with other relevant international organisations to identify
where advances can be made with financing instruments which
could further promote financing for SMEs and infrastructure”.
BCBS/IOSCO “to identify the factors that may be hindering the development of
sustainable securitisation markets”.
IMF/FSB
“to [receive] a report on the Data Gaps Initiative highlighting the
progress made and including a proposal for a second phase of the
initiative”.
IMF/FSB/BIS
“to take forward the work on data gaps on foreign currency
exposures described in their respective submissions, building as far
as possible on existing statistical and data initiatives, and report
back to us in one year”.
FSB/IOSCO “to [receive] consultative document jointly prepared with IOSCO
on the proposed assessment methodologies for non-bank non-
insurer global systemically important financial institutions”.
OECD/IMF/UN/
World Bank Group “to build on its current engagement with developing countries and
develop a new structured dialogue process, with clear avenues for
developing countries to work together and directly input in the
G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project by the Leaders'
Summit in November [2014]”.
OECD/IMF//UN/ World
Bank Group “to work together to develop toolkits to assist developing
economies implement Base Erosion and Profit Shifting action
items”.
IMF/OECD/UN/ “to prepare in 2015 options on efficient and effective use of tax

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
24
Who is requested?
What is requested?
World Bank Group
incentives in low income countries”.
OECD/World Bank
Group “to explore ways to support ongoing efforts to improve the
availability of quality transfer pricing comparability data for
developing economies”.
Global Forum on
Transparency and the
Exchange of Infor-
mation for Tax Pur-
poses
“to [receive] the report (…), which will include: progress made by
jurisdictions in relation to the exchange of information on request;
how the Financial Action Task Force's work on beneficial ownership
has been incorporated into the Global Forum's standards; and a
detailed report on the status of commitments by Global Forum
members to implement the Common Reporting Standard for
automatic exchange of information for tax purposes.
Global Forum on
Transparency and the
Exchange of Infor-
mation for Tax Pur-
poses
“to report back by the second half of 2015 on progress made by its
members in signing the Multilateral Convention on Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters”.
“to implement the proposed Automatic Exchange of Information
roadmap pilot”.
OECD
“to work with all G20 members to propose possible tougher
incentives and implementation processes, to deal with those
countries which fail to respect Global Forum standards on
exchange of tax information on request”.
Source: G20 2014c.
Stakeholders’ involvement 2.1.5.
Stakeholders may be defined as “any group or individual who is affected by or can affect
the achievement of an organisation’s objectives” (Freeman 1984: 5). Based on this defini-
tion, the Global Accountability Report identifies two groups of stakeholders: internal and
external stakeholders (Kovach et al. 2003: 3). The former constitute a part of an organisa-
tion and, in the context of G20, these are the “executives” of the 19 Member States and
European Union. The external stakeholders encompass individuals and groups that are af-
fected by the G20’s decision-making, but are not officially part thereof. The focus of this
section is on external stakeholders.
There are three vehicles that serve to engage external stakeholders in the G20 agenda-
setting and/or decision-making process.
The first vehicle is the practice of inviting outreach participants (guest countries and inter-
national organisations) to the G20 meetings (see section 3.3.1). Background of this prac-
tice is that the decisions made by the G20 do not impact exclusively the G20 members, but
serve to set global standards, which influence a broad array of countries and international
organisations.17 The admission of outreach participants is thus a way to recognise that the
17 The G20’s chair organises also occasional meetings with Low Income Developing Countries to develop an inter-
national understanding of the G20, to seek views and input the 2015 agenda and promote international eco-
nomic governance”. See https://g20.org/about-g20/g20-members/g20-world/ (accessed on February 25,
2015).

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
25
G20 decisions have global effects and that non-G20 members should be given the oppor-
tunity to voice their considerations and concerns.18
The second vehicle is a series of official engagement groups’ meetings, which are held in
conjunction with the G20 meetings. Those engagement groups are: (1) Business 20 (B20,
business forum)19, (2) Labour 20 (L20, labour and union forum)20, (3) Civil 20 (C20,
NGOs and civil society)21, (4) Youth 20 (Y20, youth forum)22, and (5) Think 20 (T20, a fo-
rum of leading think tanks)23. The principal task of engagement groups is to facilitate ex-
changes between sectorial communities from different countries, to develop consensuses
around critical sectorial issues, to influence the agenda-setting process of the G20 and to
serve as a source for ideas for G20. The representatives of these engagement groups are
occasionally invited for a consultative meeting with G20 officials (G20 2014e), to the work-
ing groups24 and conferences25 organised under the G20 framework. Little is known how-
ever, to what extent the recommendations of “X20” affect the G20 agenda. Although re-
cently contribution of the “X20” to the G20 work has been explicitly acknowledged in the
leaders’ communiqué issued after the Brisbane Summit in 2014 (G20 2014a).
The third vehicle serving to involve external stakeholders are so-called speakers’ confer-
ences/consultations taking place alongside the G20. These consultations gather representa-
tives from the G20 members’ national parliaments and the European Parliament (EP). The
aim is to address global issues at parliamentary level (Szczepański & Bassot 2015: 10).
Different to the engagement groups’ meetings, speakers’ consultations are not integrated
into the official G20 activities. The first meeting of the speakers of the parliaments of the
G20 countries was organised by Canada in September 2010 (Ottawa), after the Toronto
Summit in June 2010. At the time of writing of this report, four speakers’ conferences had
been organised. Besides Canada, also Korea (2011), Saudi Arabia (2012) and Mexico
(2013) launched the consultations. France, Russia and Australia did not organise any par-
liamentary level meetings (Szczepański & Bassot 2015: 10).
Little is known about how these speakers’ consultations influence the agenda-setting and
decision-making process at the G20, as there is no formal link between them. One could
infer, however, that this influence is rather miniscule as the speakers’ consultations are
held after the summits, the consultations’ agendas in most parts deviate from the summits’
outlines,26 and not all member states’ parliaments are represented during the consulta-
18 See for instance See https://g20.org/about-g20/g20-members/ (accessed on February 25, 2015).
19 The first official B20 summit took place during the Korean presidency in 2010, and was convened during sub-
sequent French, Mexican, Russian, and Australian G20 presidencies. Since the first B20 summit, more than
400 recommendations relating to business were presented to G20 leaders. See http://b20turkey.org/the-
b20/about-the-b20/ (accessed on February 24, 2015).
20 L20 was established in 2011 during the French presidency (Wouters and Geraets 2012, p. 13).
21 Officially, C20 was first established during the Russian presidency in 2013. See http://www.g20
civil.com/g20civil-society/ (accessed February 24, 2015).
22 Y20 has a relatively long history. As a ‘Junior 8’ forum was held in parallel to the G8 gatherings in 2006 (Hen-
ley & Blokker 2013: 30).
23 The T20 was initiated by the Mexican presidency in 2012. See http://www.t20turkey.org/eng/
pages/t20studies.html (accessed on February 24, 2015).
24 See for instance, the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting in in Istanbul on March 4-5, 2015
https://g20.org/first-g20-anti-corruption-working-group-meeting-held-in-istanbul/ (accessed on March 21,
2015).
25 See for instance, the G20-OECD Conference on Promoting Quality Apprenticeships held in Antalya on February
25, 2015 https://g20.org/g20-oecd-conference-on-promoting-quality-apprenticeships-held-in-antalya/ (ac-
cessed on March 21, 2015).
26 For instance, while the Seoul Summit was devoted to issues such as the Framework for Strong, Sustainable
and Balanced Growth, financial reform, trade, financial safety nets, reform of IMF governance, development,
corruption and climate change, the G20 Speakers’ Consultation in Seoul, held roughly half a year after the
Seoul Summit, was mainly concerned with disaster prevention, nuclear safety standards, climate change, glob-
al peace and stability, and development gap (G20 Speakers’ Consultation 2011).

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
26
tions. For instance, Australia and Germany have never sent their representatives to the
speakers’ consultations.
Table 5 shows participation in the speakers’ consultation meetings since their inception in
2010. Table 5 also highlights various statuses of the representatives from the G20 Member
States. These positions vary from President of the Parliament to Member of Parliament and
Ambassador.
Table 5. Participation in the speakers’ consultations since their inception
ARG
AUS
BRA
CAN
PRC
EU
FRA
GER
IND
INA
ITA
JAP
MEX
RUS
SAU
RSA
KOR
TUR
UK
USA
Ottawa 2010
A - M P VP VP VP - VP M VP VP VP VP P P P P M A
Seoul 2011
VP - P P VP VP VP - P P VP VP P P P - P P M M
Riyadh 2012
P - P P VP VP - - VP P VP - A VP P - P P - -
Mexico 2013
P - P P VP VP M - - VP - M P VP P P P VP P -
P=President of the Parliament, VP=Vice-president of the parliament, M=Member of Parliament, A=Ambassador.
Source: Szczepański & Bassot 2015: 10.
Despite the existence of these vehicles aimed at enhancing involvement of external stake-
holders, agenda-setting at the G20 is still largely dominated by the “executives” and as-
sumes a rather weak involvement of external stakeholders in the process, particularly with
regard to domestic institutions and non-governmental organisations. Likewise, external
stakeholders do not participate in the negotiations of decisions incorporated in communi-
qués/declarations, however their opinion may be asked occasionally by the G20 presidency
(Wouters & Ramopoulos 2012: 20). Overall, the G20 has been largely criticized for the lack
of an institutional obligation to involve stakeholders (Subacchi & Pickford 2011: 6; Her-
waman 2010).
Voting modalities 2.1.6.
The G20 decisions/commitments are incorporated in a leaders’ “communiqué” or a “decla-
ration” (or rarely a “statement”). Decisions in the G20 are taken by consensus (Bertoldi et
al. 2013: 7), whereby all G20 members are equal in casting the veto (G20 2011b: para 31;
Debaere & Orbie 2013: 318). Some assert that the G20 decision-making process repre-
sents a “definitive departure from the post-WWII model of global economic governance
dominated by few industrialized western nations” (Giovannini et al. 2012: 16).

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
27
Financing of activities of the G20 2.1.7.
The logistics and organisation of the G20 meetings are coordinated and planned by the pre-
siding country, which also bears the costs of the G20 meetings, such as the renting facili-
ties, security arrangements and impact on infrastructure (Henley & Blokker 2013: 49).
However, each participant pays its own expenses in relation to attending and participating
in meetings. In the last two years, the estimated cost for the hosting country of all G20
events was between $200-400 million (Interfax 2013; Callaghan 2014: 112). As compared
to these costs, the spending of $860 million born by the Canadian presidency in 2010
should be considered as exceptionally high (CTV 2010).
“Tasking” allows the G20 to obtain relevant expertise and know-how namely from IO’s and
standard setting bodies (see section 3.3.1). The G20 does not pay for these services and,
consequently, IO’s must bear all costs associated with the preparation of the relevant ma-
terials requested by the G20 (Henley & Blokker 2013: 28; Wouters & Van Kerckhoven
2011a: 359).
Current Membership of the G20
Participating entities 2.1.8.
In 2015, the G20 participation is, as previously outlined (see section 2.3.1.), as follows:
Permanent (formal) members: (1) nine advanced economies (based on the IMF classifica-
tion): Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom,
and the United States; plus the European Union; (2) 10 emerging and developing markets
(based on the IMF classification): Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey.
The G20’s guests include Spain (a permanent invitee); the Chair of ASEAN (Malaysia);
Global Governance Group (Singapore); two African countries (the chair of the African Union
and a representative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development) and a country invit-
ed by the presidency, Azerbaijan. This amounts to a total of six guest countries, exceeding
by one the agreed number of countries to be invited (see section 3.3.1).
Officials from international organisations are invited to relevant G20 meetings, including
Summits, “ministerials”, Deputies’, Sherpas’ meetings, working groups and task forces. The
invited organisations for 2015 include (1) FSB, (2) ILO, (3) IMF, (4) OECD, (5) UN, (6) WB,
and (7) WTO.
Status of membership of ESAs, ECB, Commission 2.1.9.
The EU enjoys status of the permanent (formal) member in the G20 (the only formal mem-
ber being a “regional organisation” (Wouters et al. 2012: 3) (see also section 3).
In the G20 Leaders’ Summits, the President of the European Commission and the European
Council form the single delegation of the European Union (Nasra & Debaere 2012: 5). While
the President of the Commission represent the EU in the economic and financial matters,
the President of the European Council speaks on behalf of the EU in matters of foreign poli-
cy and security (Pop 2010).
In the “ministerials”, the European Union is represented by the European Commissioner for
Economic and Financial Affairs, Taxation and Customs (previously by the European Com-
missioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs), the Minister of Finance of the country hold-
ing the rotating Council presidency and the President of the European Central Bank (Nasra
& Debaere 2012: 5).

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
28
At the Sherpa level, the European Union is represented by the Sherpa nominated by the
President of the European Commission (a person from President’s cabinet) (Debaere & Or-
bie 2013). A representative from the European Commission, occasionally accompanied by
the relevant minister from the rotating Council presidency, is present in other ministerial
meetings, such as G20 Labour and Employment “ministerial” or G20 Agriculture “ministeri-
al”.
At the working groups/task forces level, a European Commission official and an official from
rotating Council Presidency represent the European Union. The European Supervisory Au-
thorities (ESAs) do not (directly) participate in the G20 gatherings.
Table 6 summarizes the European Union representation in the G20.
Table 6. The European Union representation in the G20
Type of
meeting Official occupation
Person
(nationality)
Heads of State
or Government
(summits)
President of the European Council
President of the European Commission
Donald Tusk (Poland)
Jean-Claude Juncker
(Luxemburg)
Finance
Ministers and
Central Bank
Governors
(“ministerials”)
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs,
Taxation and Customs
Finance Minister from rotating
Council presidency
President of the European Central Bank
Pierre Moscovici
(France)
Jānis Reirs (Latvia)
Mario Draghi (Italy)
Sherpas
Sherpa: a person the President of the European
Commission’s cabinet
Sous-Sherpa: European Commission official
Richard Szostak (the
United Kingdom)
Other
ministerial
meetings
G20 Labour & Employment Ministers:
European Commission official
G20 Agriculture Ministers:
European Commissioner and Minister from
rotating Council presidency
Working
groups/ task
forces
European Commission official and official from
rotating Council presidency depending on
resources, commitment and the topic
Source: Debaere & Orbie 2013.
Membership in internal bodies
Besides leaders’ summits, “ministerials”, deputies’, and Sherpas’ meetings, the G20 often
establishes working groups and task forces to “provide G20 members with analysis and
insights to inform their consideration of specific policy challenges and options” (Henley &
Blokker 2013: 27). During the 2013 Russian G20 presidency five types of working groups
were established, including (1) Framework for Strong Sustainable and Balanced Growth
Working Group (three meetings), (2) International Financial Architecture Working Group
(four meetings), (3) Energy Sustainability Working Group (two meetings), (4) Anti-
Corruption Working Group (three meetings), and (5) Development Working Group (four

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
29
meetings).27 In 2013, also four meetings of the Taskforce on Employment were organised.
In 2014, during the Australian G20 presidency similar pattern of working groups’ meetings
was upheld. Some minor differences concerned the number of meetings. Also the Interna-
tional Financial Architecture Working Group was replaced by Investment and Infrastructure
Working Group.
Little is known, however, about who exactly participate in the working groups. Information
on the official website does not go beyond the general description such as: “representatives
of the G20 Finance Ministries and Central Banks, as well as experts from International Or-
ganisations attended the G20 Framework Working Group”, (2) “senior officials from each
G20 member country” attended Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting, (3) “Representa-
tives of G20 members, invited countries and international organisations attended” G20 De-
velopment Working Group or (4) “G20 members, invited countries and international organi-
sations attended the meeting. Representatives of the B20 and Transparency International
also attended certain sessions held on the 2nd day of the Anti-Corruption Working Group
meeting”.28
Within the G20 framework, various conferences, workshops, symposia and roundtables
have been also organised. Besides representatives of G20 Member States, guest countries
and international organisations, these additional G20 gatherings host invited representa-
tives of national and international business, civil society, academics and members of the
media. Conferences, workshops, symposia and roundtables often follow working group
gatherings. For instance, the Fifth Annual High Level Conference on Anti-Corruption held on
March 6, 2015 followed the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group meeting organised on
March 4-5, 2015.29 The goal of these additional G20 gatherings is to provide a platform for
exchange of information and ideas on a given topic and to reinforce cooperation between
governments, private sector and civil society.
Description of the ‘products’ and process
Type of ‘products’ developed by the G20 2.1.10.
The main document produced during the G20 leaders’ summit is a leaders’ communiqué or
a declaration (or rarely a statement), which summarises the G20 members’ commit-
ments/decisions, i.e. to set out the policies, to reach targets, to follow action plans and
principles, to support and endorse initiatives and to develop rules and guidelines. Commit-
ments can be of different nature and precision as well as prescribe different time horizon to
be achieved. To illustrate this point, table 7 lists selected commitments from the leaders’
communiqué after the Brisbane Summit held on November 15-16, 2014.
Table 7. Selected commitments from the leaders’ communiqué after the Brisbane
Summit in November 2014
1.
Commitment to work in partnership to lift growth, boost economic resilience
and strengthen global institutions. The year ambitious goal is to lift the
G20’s GDP by at least an additional 2% by 2018. Actions to reassure com-
pliance with this target are set out in the Brisbane Action Plan.
2. Commitment to establish a Global Infrastructure Hub (knowledge-sharing
platform) to support implementation of the Global Infrastructure Initiative.
27 Own calculations based on http://en.g20russia.ru/events/ (accessed on February 24, 2015).
28 https://g20.org/first-g20-anti-corruption-working-group-meeting-held-in-istanbul/ (accessed March 21, 2015).
29 https://g20.org/fifth-annual-high-level-conference-on-anti-corruption-organized-in-istanbul/ (accessed on
March 21, 2015).

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
30
3. Commitments to facilitate trade by lowering costs, reducing regulatory bur-
dens and strengthening trade-e
nabling services. Commitments to promote
competition, entrepreneurship and innovation including lowering barriers to
new business entrants and investment.
4.
Commitment to reduce the gap in labour participation rates between man
and women by 25% by 2025. Commitment to bring more than 100 million
women into the labour force in order to strengthen growth, reduce poverty
and inequality.
5. Commitment to reduce youth unemployment. Employment Plans
include
investments in apprenticeships, education and training, and incentives for
hiring young people and encouraging entrepreneurship.
6.
Commitment to poverty eradication and development. Commitment to take
strong practical measures to reduce the global cost of transferring remit-
tances to 5%. Commitment to comply with G20 Food Security and Nutrition
Framework in order to strengthen growth by lifting investment in food sys-
tems and expand food supply.
7.
Commitment to progress with G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
Action Plan.
8.
Commitment to implement the G20 High Level Principles on Beneficial Own-
ership Transparency and to reach Agreement on Action Plan for Voluntary
Collaboration on Energy Efficiency. On top of that, the G20 endorses Finan-
cial Stability Board proposal requiring global systematically important banks
to hold additional loss absorbing capacity that would further protect taxpay-
ers if these banks fails. The G20 also endorses the G20 Anti-Corruption Ac-
tion and the G20 Principles on Energy Collaboration.
Source: G20 2014a.
The G20 Research Group at the University of Toronto has attempted to aggregate and clas-
sify all G20 commitments announced via the leaders’ communiqués since 2008. In the
course of six years, more than 1.5 thousands commitments were “produced” in various
categories ranging from macroeconomic policy to crime and corruption. By far, the largest
amount of commitments was announced in the category “macroeconomic policy” (354
commitments). The second most popular category is the “financial regulation” (246 com-
mitments). Over 100 commitments were also issued in the category “reform of internation-
al financial institutions” and “development”. Moderately popular are commitments related
to “trade” (97 commitments), “energy” (95 commitments) and “employment and labour”
(82 commitments). The number of commitments in these areas corresponds well with the
priority objectives listed in table 1 in section 2.2. See appendix 1 for a detailed division of
all identified commitments into categories.
Since the outset of the leaders’ summits, the Cannes (2011) and St Petersburg (2013)
Summits have “produced” the largest amount of commitments, slightly less than 300 (see
figure 1). The Brisbane (2014) and Los Cabos (2012) Summits follow with around 200
commitments. The lowest number of commitments has been produced during the Washing-
ton (2008) and Toronto (2010) Summits. As seen in figure 1, the general trend is a grow-
ing number of commitments.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
31
Figure 1. Number of commitments “produced” during the Summits
Source: own figure based on G20 Research Group 2015a.
The number of commitments by no means should be interpreted as a proxy for the effec-
tiveness of the G20. What counts and what proxies the effectiveness is the compliance with
the stated commitments. The effectiveness, i.e. the compliance with the G20 commitments,
is addressed in section 2.7.
Mandate for the development of ‘products’ and process of development 2.1.11.
The leaders’ communiqués (declarations, statements), which comprise the most important
G20 commitments, are developed gradually throughout a series of meetings of Deputies,
Sherpas, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors and working groups (see section
2.3.2). Sectorial “ministerials” and engagement groups may also contribute to the devel-
opment of commitments, although only if requested (see section 2.3.3). The leading figures
in drafting leaders’ communiqués and, hence, commitments are Sherpas (G20 2015b).
Usually the commitments are drafted before the leaders’ summit, after Sherpas’ negotia-
tions. Whenever there is a disagreement regarding the wording of the commitments, the
practice is to borrow the exact wording from a previous communiqué (Callaghan 2013a: 6).
Consequently, the leaders’ summit is a culmination of the process, within which commit-
ments are gradually developed. One may argue therefore that the leaders’ summit is held
in order to assign a political heavyweight to the commitments, which are developed before-
hand. Nevertheless, the most controversial issues on which there is no consensus are fre-
quently left for the leaders to resolve (Callaghan 2013a: 6).
Since the G20 constitutes a self-appointed forum, (Vestergaard 2011: 18; Szczepański &
Bassot 2015: 7), the mandate to develop the G20 commitments is in a way self-assigned
by the participating countries, more specifically by their “executives”. Sherpas, who are
responsible for drafting the final leaders’ communiqué comprising commitments, get man-
date to develop commitments directly from the leaders’ as they act on leaders’ behalf (G20
2015b). The Sherpas have been described as the leaders’ personal representatives at the
G20 meetings (Debaere & Orbie 2013: 22).
050 100 150 200 250 300
Washington 2008
London 2009
Pittsburgh 2009
Toronto 2010
Seoul 2010
Cannes 2011
Los Cabos 2012
St Petersburg 2013
Brisbane 2014

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
32
Some of the G20 commitments30 assume an explicit delegation of tasks and development
of the “products” to IO’s and international standard setting bodies, such as for instance the
FSB, IMF, OECD and/or other bodies. Hence, G20 members give an explicit mandate to
develop the “products” to such bodies. These “products”, such rules, recommendations,
codes of conduct, are typically endorsed during the subsequent summit. As has been ob-
served in section 2.3.2, “tasking” is a frequent practice, as the G20 lacks in-house exper-
tise, knowledge of best practices, as well as executive capacity. Selected examples of dele-
gation of “product” development are shown in table 8.
Table 8. Delegation of product development to international organisations
(selection of tasks)
When and by whom
a mandate was
given?
Responsible
international
organisation
Developed
product
G20 Washington
Summit/ November
2008
IMF/FSF (converted to
FSB in 2009) FSF Principles for Sound Compensation
Practices
G20 Washington
Summit/ November
2008
International standard
setters BCBS International regulatory
framework for banks (Basel III)
G20 Seoul Summit/
November 2010 Implicitly FSB FSB High-level principles for monitoring
the shadow banking system
G20 Cannes Summit/
September 2011 FSB FSB Principles on loss absorbing and
recapitalization capacity of G-SIBs in
resolution
G20 Cannes Summit/
November 2011 IOSCO IOSCO Report on the Credit Default
Swap Market
G20 Cannes Summit/
November 2011
IOSCO
IOSCO Report on Risk Mitigation
Standards for Non-centrally Cleared
Over-the-counter Derivatives
G20 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank
Governors/ February
2011
OECD/FSB High-Level Principles on Financial
Consumer Protection
G20 Finance Ministers
and Central Bank
Governors/
February 2013
OECD High-Level Principles of Long-Term
Investment Financing by Institutional
Investors
Source: G20 2008a; G20 2009b; G20 2010b; G20 2011a; BCBS 2010; FSF 2009; FSB 2011; FSB 2014; IOSCO
2012; IOSCO 2015; OECD 2011; OECD 2014.
30 In some cases the development of products is delegated by the leaders to « ministerials », which subsequently
delegate the task to the IO’s or standard setting bodies

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
33
Transparency and timeline for the development of ‘products’ 2.1.12.
Negotiations over the commitments are pursued during closed G20 meetings. Selective
documents are made public after the G20 meetings, namely the leaders’ communi-
qués/declarations/statements,31 as well as Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’
communiqués/declarations/statements. The documents after the Deputies’ and Sherpas’
meetings are not disclosed, however. Some documents, such as communiqués, statements,
reports, are also disclosed after other sectorial “ministerials”. However, there is only a ra-
ther unsystematic account of these publications (see also section 4.4.1.).
An interesting query is what the “average time to agree on the products” is. There are,
however, two ways to tackle this question, depending on what precisely is meant by the
“average time to agree on the products”. First, one could think of the “average time to
agree” on certain commitments during the summit, whereby all commitments were drafted
beforehand and the agreement on them was unofficially tested by Sherpas. If this is the
interpretation given to “average time to agree”, then this is approximately two days (the
length of the summit). If, on the other hand, the whole process of reaching consensus (i.e.
from a first agenda-setting meeting, through the development of the commitments by
“ministerials” and Sherpas’ meeting, until the decision is reached during the summit) is to
be considered, then this “average time to agree” amounts to one year, often even longer.
However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate the average time to agree on the spe-
cific commitments. It depends on the urgency of issue. “Crisis” summits were much more
effective and faster in reaching consensus. They imposed harsh deadlines for the “immedi-
ate actions” (G20 2008: para 10). “Crisis” summits were held semi-annually32, which also
facilitated reaching consensus in timely manner. Whereas the initial “emergency” period
(Washington and London summits) was marked by swift action on financial reform and cri-
sis mode, the transition is now observed to the second stage, which is marked by economic
normalization, renewed asymmetry between advanced and emerging countries, political
fatigue and slower progress (Angeloni & Pisani-Ferry 2012: 25). There is hence a noticeable
difference in “speed” of reaching agreements between a crisis management mode (period
of 2008-2010) and long-term governance mode of G20 prevailing nowadays.
Likewise, the development of “products” that are requested by the G20 from the interna-
tional institutions vary in time. However, the most standard procedure is that during one
summit the G20 leaders task international organisations to develop certain “products”,
which are typically endorsed during the subsequent leaders’ summit. It takes therefore one
year from the point when the “product” is requested to the point when it is approved.
Functional analysis of the effectiveness of the G20
Ideally, effectiveness of the G20 should be assessed against explicitly stated objectives. As
demonstrated in section 2.2, however, the universal and ultimate G20 objectives are not
clearly defined (see also section 4.4.1.), and the policy priorities evolve and are driven by
subsequent chairing countries and timely urgencies (Angeloni & Pisani-Ferry 2012: 13).
Against this backdrop, the most reasonable way to evaluate the G20 effectiveness is by
studying the G20 member states compliance with stated commitments (see section 2.6.1).
The G20 Research Group verified a compliance with 130 high priority commitments33,
which were comprised in the leaders’ communiqués from 2008 to 2013. These commit-
31 An immediate disclosure of leaders’ communiqué/declaration/statement was not a practice in the past. For
instance, the Toronto leaders’ declaration was made public after it was leaked.
32 The Washington Summit (November 14-15, 2008), the London Summit (April 1-2, 2009), the Pittsburgh
Summit (September 24-25, 2009), the Toronto Summit (June 26-27, 2010), the Seoul Summit (November 11-
12, 2010).
33 This is roughly 10% of all the commitments announced in years 2008-2013.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
34
ments encompass all most important policy areas, such as macroeconomic policy, financial
reform, development issues, etc. The following system of coding the compliance was con-
ceptualised: 1 was assigned for full or nearly full compliance with a commitment; 0 was
assigned for “inability to commit” or a “work in progress”; and -1 indicated complete or
nearly complete failure to implement a commitment (Kirton et al. 2014: 17). Since com-
mitments in the leaders’ communiqués are made on an annual basis, they are assessed
from the conclusion of one summit to the beginning of the next, which is currently approx-
imately one year (Kirton et al. 2014: 17). This coding enables constructing compliance
scores, averages values, for each G20 Member State, summit and policy area. A positive
compliance score means that on average there was some degree of compliance with com-
mitments, whereas a negative score suggests that non-compliance prevailed (Angeloni &
Pisani-Ferry 2012: 26).
Table 9 demonstrates the compliance scores divided by summits for the whole G20 as well
as for sub-groups of countries, such as the G20 advanced and emerging economies, G7 and
European representatives, i.e. EU4 (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) plus
the EU. The average compliance score for the whole G20 in years 2008-2013 equals to
0.42 indicating a moderate “effectiveness”, proxied as the compliance with the stated
commitments. However, the compliance scores, and therefore effectiveness, varied be-
tween the summits. The highest scores are found for the Washington, Cannes and Los
Cabos Summits, whereas the lowest scores are observed in case of the London, Toronto
and Seoul Summits. These results stand in a slight contradiction to the common perception
regarding the summits’ outcomes. For instance, the G20 Summit in London in 2009 was
announced as a huge success (Jokela 2011: 6). The analysis presented here questions this
common perception. It could be that the commitments of that particular Summit were in-
deed crucial but too ambitious and their implementation appeared to be difficult in practice.
There is also noticeable difference in effectiveness between the advanced and emerging
economies of G20, with advanced economies systematically outperforming the emerging
countries. Importantly, the European members score above the average for the advanced
economies, with an exception of the Pittsburgh Summit in case of the EU and the Los Cabos
Summit in case of EU4. That means that collectively the European representatives were the
most effective in complying with the summits’ commitments. The highest standard devia-
tion, which informs on the variation in compliance scores between the G20 members, is
found for the London Summit suggesting that the compliance with commitments was large-
ly unbalanced after that Summit.

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
35
Table 9. Compliance scores by summit, 2008–2013 (N = 130)
G20 G20
Advance
d
G20
Emergin
g G7 Europ
e EU4 Europea
n Union
St.
deviatio
n
Washingto
n 2008
0.6
6 0.82 0.50
0.8
4 0.90
0.8
8 1.00 0.25
London
2009
0.1
7 0.43 -0.10
0.4
6 0.57
0.5
4 0.67 0.40
Pittsburgh
2009
0.3
3 0.57 0.10
0.5
9 0.55
0.5
9 0.38 0.35
Toronto
2010
0.3
8 0.61 0.14
0.6
1 0.65
0.6
3 0.73 0.29
Seoul
2010
0.3
6 0.54 0.19
0.5
4 0.60
0.5
9 0.63 0.22
Cannes
2011 0.5
2 0.64 0.40 0.6
3 0.69 0.6
6 0.79 0.23
Los Cabos
2012 0.5
2 0.60 0.44 0.5
5 0.52 0.4
9 0.65 0.20
St
Petersburg
2013
0.4
7 0.60 0.34 0.6
1 0.64 0.6
4 0.63 0.20
G20
Average
0.4
2 0.59 0.25
0.5
8 0.62
0.6
1 0.65 0.20
Source: G20 Research Group 2015b, authors’ calculations.
Compliance scores, and hence effectiveness, by policy areas are presented in table 10. Be-
sides the category “other”, which combines commitments in areas such as for instance la-
bour, employment, food security and agriculture, the highest compliance scores are found
for “macroeconomic policy” and “energy” issues. The lowest scores, on the other hand, are
observed for “corruption” and “trade”. The G20 advanced economies are the most effective
in area such as “financial institutions reforms”, “financial regulation” and “macroeconomic
policy”. The emerging economies are effective in “macroeconomic policy”, “energy” and
“financial regulation” policy areas. As for the European representatives, EU4 features the
highest compliance scores for “financial institutions reforms” and “financial regulations”,
whereas the EU is highly effective in “macroeconomic policy” and financial regulation”.
Standard deviation suggests that the compliance in the “trade” policy area was largely un-
balanced. It is apparent after comparing the advanced economies, which cast moderate
compliance (effectiveness) in “trade” policy area, with emerging economies, which mostly
do not comply.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
36
Table 10. Compliance scores by policy areas, 2008–2013 (N = 130)
G20 G20
Advanced G20
Emerging G7 Europe EU4 European
Union St.
deviation
Macroeconomic
policy 0.59 0.67 0.51 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.75 0.20
Financial
regulation 0.46 0.68 0.24 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.75 0.27
International
financial
institutions 0.48 0.77 0.20 0.75 0.73 0.75 0.67 0.43
Development
issues 0.34 0.57 0.11 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.27
Trade
0.17
0.51
-0.17
0.47
0.53
0.50
0.63
0.46
Energy 0.50 0.59 0.41 0.54 0.61 0.68 0.30 0.29
Climate
change 0.27 0.50 0.03 0.49 0.52 0.48 0.67 0.39
Corruption
0.13
0.14
0.12
0.13
0.16
0.10
0.40
0.36
Other 0.60 0.64 0.56 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.74 0.20
Average
0.42
0.59
0.25
0.58
0.62
0.61
0.65
0.20
Source: G20 Research Group 2015b, authors’ calculations.
Table 11 exclusively focuses on the effectiveness of the European representatives. Among
them, the highest compliance scores are achieved by the United Kingdom (0.75), and ex
aequo by Germany and the EU (0.65). France with a score of 0.61 casts only slightly weak-
er effectiveness. Comparing to these countries, Italy with a score of only 0.41 should be
classified as an outlier. Italy is also characterised by a relatively unbalanced compliance. On
the one hand, Italy performed very weakly in 2009, which was reflected by low compliance
scores after the London and Pittsburgh Summits. On the other hand, Italy was quite effec-
tive in complying with commitments after the Washington and Cannes Summits. Comparing
EU4 and the EU to other G20 members, it appears that the United Kingdom is the most
effective in complying with commitments among all G20 members. Germany and the EU
perform marginally weaker than the second most effective country: Australia (0.66).
France performs similarly to Canada (0.61). Italy is further outperformed by the United
States (0.55) and South Korea (0.53). See appendix 2 for a detailed classification of the
G20 members.
Table 11. Compliance scores by summits for EU4 and the EU, 2008–2013 (N =
130)
Washington
2008 London
2009 Pittsburgh
2009 Toronto
2010 Seoul
2010 Cannes
2011
Los
Cabos
2012
St
Petersburg
2013
Overall
Compliance
France
0.75 0.67 0.73 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.65 0.63 0.61
Germany
1.00 0.67 0.69 0.54 0.63 0.69 0.53 0.74 0.65

The European Union’s Role in International Economic Fora - Paper 1: the G20
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
37
Italy
0.75 0.00 0.08 0.69 0.44 0.75 0.06 0.53 0.42
United
Kingdom 1.00 0.83 0.87 0.77 0.74 0.75 0.71 0.68 0.76
European
Union 1.00 0.67 0.38 0.73 0.63 0.79 0.65 0.63 0.65
G20
Average 0.66 0.17 0.33 0.38 0.36 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.42
Source: G20 Research Group 2015b, authors’ calculations.

Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
____________________________________________________________________________________________
PE 542.207
38
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK, COORDINATION, LEVEL AND
IMPACT OF EU PARTICIPATION
Rules framing the role of the EU and its Member States in the G20
EU participation in the G20: legal framework 3.1.1.
The role of the EU and its Member States in the G20 is determined by a set of (highly) in-
terrelated legal rules and principles, which define the outer limits of the EU’s capacity to act
internationally. This section will first describe the legal framework governing EU participa-
tion in the G20. Section 3.1.2. will then focus on the EU law obligations of Member States
when participating in the G20 context.
The starting point for the legal framework for EU participation is the principle of conferral.
According to this principle, now enshrined in Article 5(2) TEU, “the Union shall act only
within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties
to attain the objectives set out therein.” It also applies in the sphere of EU external action
such as participation in the G20 (De Baere 2008). Powers not conferred upon the EU re-
main with the Member States. It is pivotal, therefore, that all action of the EU has a legal
basis in the Treaties, is objectively founded and amenable to judicial review (Case 45/86,
para. 11; Case C-300/89, para. 10; Case C-440/05, para. 61), as an incorrect legal basis
invalidates the EU legal act (Opinion 2/00). Moreover, it is pertinent to distinguish between
(1) the existence of EU external competence, which the EU derives under the Treaty either
expressly or impliedly; and (2) the nature of such competence, which can be exclusive or
shared.
As to the existence and nature of express EU competences the Treaty of Lisbon has signifi-
cantly simplified matters by essentially cataloguing them and indicating which competences
are exclusive and which are shared. Article 3 defines the EU’s exclusive competences, and
Article 4 TFEU the EU’s shared competences. Article 5 TFEU, which provides for the co-
ordination of economic, employment and social policies and Article 6 TFEU, which defines
the areas where the EU is empowered to support, co-ordinate, or supplement Member
State action, may also be of relevance for EU exter