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Running Head: HEURISTIC EXPLANATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR THE STATUS QUO
An Early-Emerging Explanatory Heuristic Promotes Support for the Status Quo
Larisa J. Hussak
Andrei Cimpian
University of Illinois
Hussak, L. J., & Cimpian, A. (2015). An early-emerging explanatory heuristic promotes support
for the status quo. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 109(5), 739–752.
Supplemental materials at http://bit.ly/1FjN8ps
©American Psychological Association, 2015. This paper is not the copy of record and may not
exactly replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or
cite without author's permission. The final article is available at:
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000033
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 2
Abstract
People often view their sociopolitical systems as fair and natural despite glaring biases in
their structure. Current theories of this striking phenomenon trace its roots to a motivation to
alleviate anxiety and uncertainty. Here, we propose a complementary cognitive pathway for these
system-endorsing attitudes. Specifically, we propose that the fundamental mechanisms through
which people explain the world around them may also be a source of such attitudes. These
explanatory processes are inadvertently biased to yield inherent or internal facts as explanations
for a wide variety of social and natural phenomena, including—we claim—sociopolitical
patterns (e.g., why are some people rich? because they are really smart). In turn, this bias toward
inherent attributions makes it seem that the observations being explained (such as the societal
status quo) are legitimate and thus worthy of support. Four studies with participants as young as
4 provided correlational and experimental evidence for the hypothesized link between
explanatory processes and support for the status quo. These findings suggest that the tendency to
endorse existing sociopolitical arrangements emerges partly on a foundation laid early in life by
a basic component of human cognition.
Keywords: system justification; explanation; inherence heuristic; social cognition; development
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 3
An Early-Emerging Explanatory Heuristic Promotes Support for the Status Quo
After escaping from the North Korean prison camp system into which was born, Shin
Dong-hyuk revealed in an episode of 60 Minutes that, for much of his internment, he never
questioned his place in that system. Instead, he believed that “those people who carry guns were
born to carry guns. And prisoners … were born as prisoners” (Cooper, 2012; see Choe, 2015, for
updated details of Shin’s story). In other words, the social hierarchy in which he was embedded
seemed to him to be exactly as it should be, with each person occupying the position they were
born to occupy. Although Shin’s experiences are unique in many respects, his attitude regarding
the legitimacy of his social setting is surprisingly common. A robust tendency to uphold existing
sociopolitical structures—even those that may be harmful to one’s own welfare—has been
documented in a variety of contexts and participant populations (e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost,
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; Newheiser, Dunham, Merrill,
Hoosain, & Olson, 2014; Nosek et al., 2007; Olson, Dweck, Spelke, & Banaji, 2011; cf. Brandt,
2013; Sengupta, Osborne, & Sibley, 2014). This support of the status quo takes many forms.
People sometimes develop implicit (or even explicit) preferences toward high-status groups,
preferences that legitimize the privileged position of these groups in society (e.g., Newheiser et
al., 2014; Nosek et al, 2007). People also tend to rationalize inequalities by appealing to
stereotypes (e.g., negative stereotypes about low-status groups; Jost & Banaji, 1994) or by
subscribing to ideologies that make such inequalities appear inevitable (e.g., meritocratic beliefs;
LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Whatever its precise form, the general
tendency to imbue current sociopolitical systems with legitimacy seems to be widespread.
On reflection, it’s rather remarkable that beliefs about the legitimacy of the status quo are
as common as they are. Research across the academic spectrum suggests that—contrary to these
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 4
beliefs—most sociopolitical systems exhibit more than a fair amount of arbitrariness and bias
(e.g., Diamond, 1998; Foucault, 1978; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Unger, 1983; Watts, 2011). Also
puzzling is the fact that attitudes that endorse the status quo emerge early in development: Even
preschool children seem prone to perpetuate existing inequalities by, for example, preferentially
distributing resources to advantaged rather than disadvantaged groups (Olson et al., 2011). These
considerations raise an obvious question: Why would people so often, and from such a young
age, consistently adopt system-supporting attitudes?
Here, we propose that system-legitimizing beliefs emerge in part as a byproduct of the
basic cognitive mechanisms people rely on to explain the world around them. More specifically,
our claim is that the explanatory processes people typically employ have certain quirks that—
when these processes are used to explain broad societal patterns—bias their output toward
system-supporting intuitions. This view suggests that there are important cognitive inputs into a
phenomenon that, as we summarize below, has been largely conceptualized as a motivated
tendency.
Motivated Origins of System Justification
Theorizing on the tendency to uphold current sociopolitical conditions has suggested that
people are motivated to see their societal systems in a positive light, just as they are motivated to
maintain a positive image of their own selves and their in-groups (Jost & Banaji, 1994):
“…prevailing conditions, be they social, political, economic, sexual, or legal, are accepted,
explained, and justified simply because they exist” (p. 11). Doing so, however, often comes at a
cost: Accepting the status quo entails accepting that one deserves one’s station in life, which—
for the majority of people who are disadvantaged by the system—is in conflict with the motive to
protect and enhance one’s self-image. Why would people defend the system if doing so inflicts
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 5
psychological and material harm?
This question was not resolved until later formulations of the theory, in which defending
the status quo was hypothesized to help people “cope with and adapt to unjust or unpleasant
realities that appear to be inevitable” (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, p. 146; see also Cichocka & Jost,
2014; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Liviatan & Jost, 2011). From this perspective, the tendency to
support current societal arrangements emerges as people attempt to alleviate the unpleasant
feelings that may arise when contemplating the structures of one’s society and one’s position in
these structures (e.g., feelings of uncertainty and uncontrollability, of threat and anxiety, of
discontent) by endorsing the belief that society is fair and just, and thus that one’s position in it is
warranted. Because system-justifying beliefs fulfill this important palliative function, people are
motivated to endorse them, even if doing so sometimes comes at the price of a hit in self-esteem.
This palliative account is supported by a wealth of evidence. For example, the defense of
the status quo is most vigorous among those individuals who are most motivated to avoid the
affective consequences of contemplating an unfair society (for a review, see Jost & Hunyady,
2005). Even more convincingly, experimental manipulations that heighten these affective
consequences (e.g., by making people feel dependent on their social systems) lead to
corresponding increases in endorsement of palliative, system-endorsing beliefs (Kay et al., 2009;
see also Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost, Kivetz, Rubini, Guermandi, & Mosso, 2005).
In the present research, we argue that this exclusive focus on the role of motivation in the
defense of the status quo has led researchers to overlook important sources of system support
that are not motive-driven but rather have to do with biases in the default information-processing
mechanisms by which humans interpret the world. Thus, we seek to provide evidence for a
complementary pathway to system justification, one that is rooted in the basic cognitive
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 6
processes that enable people to generate explanations for what they observe.
Prior Evidence for a Cognitive Pathway to System Support
Preliminary support for a link between the process of extracting understanding from the
world and the tendency to endorse the status quo can be found in the work on psychological
essentialism (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011) and the correspondence bias (e.g., Gilbert &
Malone, 1995).
Psychological Essentialism. People implicitly assume that the members of natural kinds
(e.g., dogs) and many social groups (e.g., African Americans) share a deep, microstructural
essence that is passed on from generation to generation and that gives rise to category-typical
features and behaviors (e.g., Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Gelman, 2003, 2004; Haslam,
Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000; Hirschfeld, 1995; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek,
2012; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). These essentialist tendencies
are likely to influence how people make sense of social patterns, including status and
socioeconomic disparities. Specifically, essentialism may lead people to attribute such patterns to
the presumed biological essences of the groups involved, thus casting existing hierarchies as
natural and legitimate (e.g., Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002; Keller, 2005; Williams &
Eberhardt, 2008).
However, the research to date has invoked essentialist beliefs as means of status-quo
rationalization that is downstream of palliative motivations (e.g., Brescoll et al., 2013; Morton,
Postmes, Haslam, & Hornsey, 2009; Kraus & Keltner, 2013; see also Keller, 2005; Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011). For instance, Brescoll et al. (2013) found that inducing feelings of system threat
(which arguably heightened palliative needs) caused participants to rely on essentialist beliefs
significantly more than when exposed to system-affirming information (see also Morton et al.,
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 7
2009). These findings are therefore more consistent with the claim that essentialism is a vessel
through which palliative motives are expressed: When we are anxious about our place in society,
we essentialize in order to reaffirm the naturalness of existing hierarchies and thereby alleviate
our anxieties. This claim is quite different from the one we propose here—that biases in the
cognitive processes with which we routinely interpret reality are, in and of themselves, sufficient
to give rise to system-supporting attitudes.
The Correspondence Bias. People have a robust bias to attribute others’ behaviors to
corresponding internal dispositions rather than contextual or situational forces (for reviews, see
Gawronski, 2004; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977; Trope & Gaunt, 2007).
This correspondence bias may also legitimize the hierarchies observed in the world (e.g., Ross et
al., 1977), as individuals’ successes and failures are understood as arising from internal traits and
thus as reflecting a sort of natural order. Indeed, the over-attribution of individuals’ outcomes to
dispositional traits has been associated with conservative ideology (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998;
Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlain, 2002; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991)
and victim-blaming behaviors (e.g., Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
As was the case with essentialism, however, the literature that has explored the link
between the correspondence bias and endorsement of the status quo has conceived of internal
attributions as downstream—or as a byproduct—of motives, such as the need for cognitive
closure (e.g., Jost, Kruglanski, & Simon, 1999) or the desire to see the world as fair and just
(e.g., Dalbert, 2001; Hafer & Bègue, 2005). In other words, correspondent attributions that
uphold societal conditions might simply be a cognitive tool in the service of various motives.
Interim Conclusion. So far, the research linking explanatory inferences with system
justification has portrayed these inferences as mere means of achieving some motivated end.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 8
Here, we propose instead that the cognitive processes by which people explain the world might
in and of themselves give rise to system-supporting attitudes, whether or not motives are present.
To characterize these processes, we will go beyond the mechanisms previously identified in the
literature to propose what we see as a more satisfactory account: namely, the inherence heuristic
(Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b). This account will then serve as a theoretical framework for
our studies.
Characterizing the Explanatory Underpinnings of System Support
Our goal in this section is to provide a description of the hypothesized cognitive route to
system support. What is it that people do, cognitively, that leads them to see the world as fair and
just? Although essentialist and correspondent inferences could in principle legitimize the status
quo even without prompting by motives (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988),
these inferences are nevertheless limited in important respects. For example, the set of social
groups that are essentialized is relatively small, leaving out many groups that figure prominently
in people’s reasoning about their societies (e.g., Midwesterners, the middle class, citizens of
America, smart people, doctors, teachers; see Haslam et al., 2000, 2002; Kraus & Keltner, 2013;
Lickel et al., 2000). Consider also that the correspondence bias was formulated to account
specifically for explanations of individuals’ behaviors. In contrast, many (if not most) of the
judgments that defend the status quo in everyday life pertain to broad facts that extend far
beyond the level of individual actions. Impressions of social targets at different levels of
generality (e.g., an individual vs. a group) might be based on different information, as broader
groups lack some of the unity and coherence that individuals are assumed to possess (e.g.,
Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Kashima et al., 2005; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997; but
see Nier, Bajaj, McLean, & Schwartz, 2013). In sum, essentialism and the correspondence bias
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 9
lack some of the inferential machinery needed for a complete cognitive account of system
support.
Essentialist and correspondent inferences legitimize the status quo because they promote
a focus on internal explanations. However, rather than simply being the product of special-
purpose mechanisms such as these, the overreliance on internal explanations may actually be due
to the more general cognitive process by which people come up with in-the-moment
explanations (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b). In many everyday
circumstances, explaining proceeds heuristically. That is, people generate explanations by
relying on information that is easily accessible in memory rather than on effortful searches
through the space of possible judgments to identify the optimal explanation. In this respect,
explanations are similar to numerous other heuristic judgments that are generated during
ordinary cognitive activity (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006; Evans, 2006, 2008; Kahneman, 2011;
Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). Importantly, the fact that the process of explaining
relies on information that is easily retrieved from memory gives rise to certain commonalities in
the content of the explanations generated. Specifically, memory is organized such that, when
explaining an observation involving entity X, the information that is most easily activated usually
consists of inherent, or constitutive, facts about X (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Hussak & Cimpian, 2014;
Lewis, 1983; McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005; Weatherson & Marshall, 2014). For
instance, a quick heuristic explanation for why the Mona Lisa is so popular might appeal
exclusively to the inherent artistic qualities of the painting itself (e.g., the subject’s captivating
smile). Such an explanation overlooks the possibility that other, non-inherent factors contributed
to Mona Lisa’s popularity, although these factors are often a crucial part of an accurate
explanation. In Mona Lisa’s case, for example, it was its 1911 theft from the Louvre museum
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 10
which propelled it to international fame (Watts, 2011). In sum, the heuristic process that
generates explanations for a wide range of everyday observations is likely to bias the content of
these explanations toward an overreliance on inherent facts, and is thus termed the inherence
heuristic (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b).
To clarify, inherent facts are those that describe what an entity is like, in and of itself
(e.g., Barr & Caplan, 1987; Lewis, 1983; Weatherson & Marshall, 2013).1 For example, the fact
that a laptop is rectangular and has metallic components describes inherent properties of this
entity. In contrast, the fact that the laptop is stored in a neoprene sleeve or was made in Taiwan
are non-inherent (or extrinsic) facts about it—facts that involve entities other than the laptop
itself. Inherent facts dominate the output of the inherence heuristic simply because they are
highly accessible in memory (i.e., because they are “low-hanging fruit,” retrieval-wise)—and not
because people seek them out preferentially for the purpose of constructing explanations.2
The bias in the output of the inherence heuristic also makes it relevant to the tendency to
support the status quo: Any sociopolitical arrangement that is explained in inherent terms is also
likely to be seen as reasonable and fair—just as it seems reasonable that, given its (supposedly)
unmatched artistic qualities, Mona Lisa should be the most famous painting in the world. In
effect, the typical output of the inherence heuristic legitimizes the observations it is explaining,
casting them as byproducts of how the relevant entities are constituted.
1 In this account, inherence is a psychological, not metaphysical, construct. Although it is unclear whether inherent
features truly exist in the world (e.g., Weatherson & Marshall, 2014), this construct has psychological reality (e.g.,
Hussak & Cimpian, 2014; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006, 2009).
2 Note that, because the outputs generated by this heuristic process vary depending on what is accessible in memory,
the pull of inherent explanations is not inescapable. For instance, the operation of the inherence heuristic can be
influenced by contextual and cultural factors, which can increase the memory accessibility of various non-inherent
facts, and thus their prevalence in explanations (Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a;
Morris & Peng, 1994). However, we argue that, in its basic form, the process by which many everyday explanations
are generated introduces a degree of bias in their content, leading them to appeal to inherent facts more often than
might be warranted.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 11
The inherence heuristic supplies in-the-moment explanations for a broad range of
observations, including those that are the usual targets of essentialist and correspondent
inferences (e.g., why women are underrepresented in science, why Jim is a CEO) but also many
others that fall outside the scope of these previously-studied inferences but are nevertheless
relevant to the defense of the status quo (e.g., why the Star-Spangled Banner is sung before
sporting events). As such, we propose that it provides the most complete characterization of a
cognitive pathway to system support.
Consistent with this claim, inherence-biased heuristic explanations have recently been
hypothesized to be the root cause of other cognitive phenomena that make the status quo appear
desirable. For example, the system-legitimizing existence and longevity biases investigated in
prior work—biases that lead people to view existing and long-standing states of affairs,
respectively, as legitimate—might themselves stem from a “heuristic tendency to ascribe
existence and longevity to inherent features” (Eidelman & Crandall, 2014, p. 54; see also
Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010). This provides
further reason to adopt the inherence heuristic as a unified framework for understanding the
cognitive underpinnings of system support.
The Present Research
We proposed that people interpret societal patterns via an inherence heuristic even when
there is little need to rationalize these patterns; in turn, the typical output of this heuristic makes
the status quo appear natural and reasonable, and thereby worthy of support. The key prediction
of this proposal is that judgments legitimizing the status quo should emerge reliably even in the
absence of motives to see the status quo in a positive light. To test this prediction, we designed
our studies so as to reduce, as much as possible, the influence of such motives. Note, however,
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 12
that this strategy is not trivial to carry out, in part because it is notoriously challenging to
determine whether any particular judgment is generated simply as a result of run-of-the-mill
cognitive activity or, alternatively, because of some ulterior motive (e.g., Ross, 1977; Miller &
Ross, 1975; Tetlock & Levi, 1982). No matter what the judgment, one can always postulate
some plausible benefit that the reasoner might derive from that judgment. Even so, the motivated
account of system justification is actually quite specific about the benefits of system-justifying
judgments: “they reduce anxiety, guilt, dissonance, discomfort, and uncertainty for people who
are in positions that are either advantaged or disadvantaged” (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, p. 114).
Thus, rather than trying to reduce every single source of motivation, we can take on the more
modest task of reducing the specific sort of palliative benefits that are provided by system-
supporting judgments.
We did so in two complementary ways. First, we asked participants to reason about
societal systems to which they did not belong (e.g., the Blarks and the Orps on the fictional
planet Teeku). This feature of the design was intended to minimize the personal involvement of
our participants: When reasoning about alien planets, one should derive no benefit from
defending whatever status quo is in force on these planets. Second, we tested not just adults but
also children as young as 4 years of age. In principle, it is possible that adults would draw
explicit analogies between the fictional societies described in our tasks and their own
experiences, which might allow palliative motives to influence their judgments. However, young
children’s analogical reasoning abilities are limited (e.g., Gentner & Rattermann, 1991;
Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006), insofar as children often fail to see the deeper relational
similarities across superficially different contexts. If children are less likely to recognize the
structural parallels between their own societies and the novel ones described in our studies, then
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 13
their judgments should correspondingly be less influenced by palliative needs.
In sum, we chose our stimuli and participants so as to limit the influence of palliative
motives. Owing to these methodological choices, the system-endorsing attitudes adopted by the
participants in our studies would provide evidence for a cognitive pathway into the tendency to
defend the status quo. We formulate three specific predictions below:
Prediction 1: Both adults and children should explain unfamiliar sociopolitical patterns
predominantly in terms of the inherent features of their constituents rather than by
appealing to non-inherent (e.g., extrinsic, historical) facts (Studies 1–3).
Prediction 2: The extent of adults’ and children’s reliance on inherent explanations for
unfamiliar sociopolitical patterns should be predictive of their tendency to view these
patterns as fair and just (Studies 1 and 2).
Prediction 3: An experimental manipulation of children’s explanations for unfamiliar
sociopolitical patterns should have a downstream effect on the extent to which children
view these patterns as legitimate (Study 4).
Study 1
Study 1 provided a test of our first two predictions in a sample of adult participants. That
is, we tested (1) whether participants would explain unfamiliar status disparities in inherent terms
and (2) whether this preference would in turn predict the degree to which they endorse these
disparities.
Method
Participants. We recruited 101 adult participants (41 males, 60 females; Mage = 34.16
years, SD = 12.16) from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk service. Participants completed all tasks
online in a single session and were paid $0.75. Five additional participants were tested but
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 14
excluded from the final sample because they had IP addresses outside of the US (n = 1), failed
the catch questions in the Inherence Heuristic Scale (n = 3; see below), or indicated during
debriefing that they had not paid attention during the study (n = 1).
Materials and Procedure. Four vignettes describing status disparities on alien planets
were created (e.g., on planet Teeku, “the Blarks have a lot more money than the Orps”). They
included four pictures of unfamiliar planets (one for each disparity) and eight pictures of people
to represent the two groups on each of the four planets (e.g., the Blarks and the Orps). The two
individuals representing the groups on a certain planet were matched in terms of age, race, and
gender, and differed only in their costume (see the complete set of stimuli in the Supplemental
Materials). Moreover, the assignment of each picture to the high- and the low-status group was
counterbalanced across subjects, so that no perceptual cues consistently co-occurred with social
status. The group’s name was printed beneath each picture, and the high-status group always
appeared on the left.
Two explanations were provided for each disparity, in random order: an explanation that
appealed to inherent features (e.g., “Maybe the Blarks are smarter, or are better workers than the
Orps are, or there’s something else about them”) and an explanation that appealed to extrinsic or
historical facts (e.g., “Maybe the Blarks won a war, or found gold, or something else happened a
long time ago”; see Table 1 and the Supplemental Materials). The inherent and extrinsic
explanations were carefully formulated to meet several criteria: First, they were relatively broad,
so as to capture a range of inherent (“there’s something about them”) and extrinsic (“something
happened a long time ago”) intuitions. Second, they were matched on length and in-principle
plausibility (see the Pilot Studies section below). Third, they were worded simply, so that they
could be used with children as well (Study 2). Participants read the inherent and extrinsic
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 15
explanation for each disparity and indicated their agreement with each explanation on a 4-point
scale (e.g., “…is [it] right or not right to think that the Blarks have a lot more money because of
something about them [vs. something that happened a long time ago]?”; 1 = “really not right” to
4 = “really right”).
To assess defense of the status quo, we asked participants whether they had a preference
for the high-status over the low-status groups (e.g., “How favorable is your impression of the
Blarks [Orps]?”) and whether they thought the disparity between the groups was fair (e.g., “How
fair do you think it is that the Blarks have a lot more money than the Orps?”), each on 9-point
scales. These questions were combined into a single composite measure of system support (α =
.71).
Finally, participants completed three individual difference measures: the General System
Justification Scale (Kay & Jost, 2003), the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao,
1984), and the Inherence Heuristic Scale (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). The General System
Justification Scale is composed of seven statements that measure the extent to which people see
their own social systems as fair and just (e.g., “In general, you find society to be fair”). This
scale served as a control in our analyses, allowing us to further investigate whether participants’
explanatory tendencies predict their support for unfamiliar status disparities above and beyond
their (potentially motivated) tendency to view their own sociopolitical systems in a positive light.
The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) is an 18-item measure that
assesses participants’ attitudes regarding effortful thinking (e.g., “The notion of thinking
abstractly appeals to me”). This scale was also included as a control: Our proposal is of a unique
link between heuristic explanations and system support—a link that should not boil down to a
link between heuristic thinking in general and system support. Thus, we expected to find a
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 16
relationship between participants’ explanatory preferences and their tendency to endorse the
alien status disparities even when statistically adjusting for their preference for effortful thinking.
The Inherence Heuristic Scale (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014) contains 15 statements designed to
capture participants’ reliance on heuristic, inherence-based explanations (e.g., “It seems natural
to use red in a traffic light to mean ‘stop’”). We included this scale in order to explore the
relationship between participants’ broader tendencies to explain inherently (as measured with
this scale) and their explanatory preferences for the status-relevant stimuli in the present task.
Four catch items, designed to elicit either strong disagreement (e.g., “It seems right to kill other
people for fun”) or strong agreement (e.g., “It seems ideal for hotel rooms to have bathrooms”),
were included in the Inherence Heuristic Scale in order identify participants who were not paying
attention or who adopted a fixed response pattern (e.g., high agreement). Participants who
provided unexpected answers (e.g., agreeing that it is right to kill people for fun) on two or more
of these catch items were excluded from further analyses (as in Salomon & Cimpian, 2014). Item
order was randomized for all scales, as was the order of the scales themselves. Participants used
9-point scales to indicate their agreement with the scale items.
Pilot Studies. Two separate samples of adults (both Ns = 30) were recruited from
Mechanical Turk for the purpose of verifying that the stimulus explanations met several key
criteria. The first pilot study was conducted to verify that the inherent explanations used in the
main task were, in fact, more inherent than the extrinsic ones. Participants were first given
information about the difference between inherent explanations (e.g., “An inherent explanation is
one that explains something using intrinsic, internal, or person-specific reasons”) and extrinsic
explanations (e.g., “An extrinsic explanation is one that explains something using environmental,
external, or historical reasons”). Then, participants were presented with the explanations from
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 17
the main task and asked to rate them on a 9-point scale in terms of how inherence-based they
were. As expected, participants rated our inherent explanations (M = 7.47) as significantly more
inherent than our extrinsic explanations (M = 2.76), t(29) = 9.76, p < .001.
The second pilot study was conducted in order to rule out the possibility that differences
in explanation ratings on the main task could simply be due to differences in the a priori, in-
principle plausibility of the explanations. Although we predict that the inherent explanations will
seem more plausible than the extrinsic ones when participants are trying to make sense of the
specific sociopolitical disparities presented in the main task, this difference should not be due to
mismatches in whether these explanations could, in the abstract, account for such disparities. For
example, participants should agree that, in principle, historical events could adequately explain
status disparities, even though such events might not ultimately be chosen as the actual
explanations for observed disparities (in the main task). We thus asked adults to rate the in-
principle plausibility of each explanation (e.g., “Imagine that Group A have a lot more money
than Group B. In principle, could the following fact adequately explain this difference? Group A
are a lot smarter and are a lot better workers than Group B”). Responses were recorded on a 4-
point scale (1 = “definitely no” to 4 = “definitely yes”). Participants rated the inherent and
extrinsic explanations as equivalent in their in-principle plausibility (Ms = 3.1 and 3.3,
respectively), t(28) = 1.09, p = .28. These results suggest that any differences in ratings on the
main task cannot be attributed to differences in the in-principle plausibility of the inherent and
extrinsic explanations provided to participants.
Results and Discussion
To test Prediction 1 (that of a tendency to explain sociopolitical patterns in inherent
terms), we compared participants’ evaluations of the inherent and extrinsic explanations. As
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 18
predicted, the inherent explanations (M = 2.74, SD = .72) were rated significantly higher than the
extrinsic ones (M = 2.50, SD = .64), despite their equal in-principle plausibility, t(100) = 2.52, p
= .013, d = .35 (see Figure 1 and Table 2).3 These results suggest that people may indeed have a
tendency to explain sociopolitical patterns (even ones in which they have no personal stake) in
terms of inherent facts about the entities that make up these patterns.
To test Prediction 2 (that of a link between inherent explanations and support for the
status quo), we examined whether participants’ preference for inherent (vs. extrinsic)
explanations of status disparities, calculated as a difference score, was related to their beliefs that
such disparities were fair and defensible. Consistent with our argument, participants’ preference
for inherent explanations of novel sociopolitical patterns significantly predicted their tendency to
uphold these patterns, r(99) = .51, p < .001 (see Figure 2). Moreover, this relationship remained
significant even when statistically adjusting for participants’ (potentially motivated) tendency to
uphold the structure of their own society (assessed with the General System Justification Scale),
r(98) = .47, p < .001 (see Table 3 for the full correlation matrix). This result provides further
evidence that the process of explaining may be a source of system-legitimizing cognitions that is
independent of the palliative motivation to support the status quo. Similarly, controlling for the
habitual tendency to engage in effortful thinking (as measured with the Need for Cognition
Scale) had no effect on the relationship between participants’ explanations and their support for
the status quo, r(98) = .51, p < .001. Thus, this relationship is not simply parasitic on a
relationship between general heuristic thinking and system support; rather, heuristic explanations
are uniquely predictive of people’s endorsement of the status quo. Notably, the hypothesized
relationship also remained significant when adjusting for both control scales simultaneously,
3 For this and all future pairwise comparisons, we report Cohen’s d as a measure of effect size.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 19
r(97) = .46, p < .001.
Finally, we examined whether participants’ habitual tendency to rely on the inherence
heuristic (assessed with the Inherence Heuristic Scale) may have enhanced their support for the
disparities in Study 1 by increasing the likelihood that they explained these particular disparities
in inherent terms. Indeed, a bootstrapped product-of-coefficients mediation analysis (10,000
replications) revealed a significant indirect path linking participants’ scores on the Inherence
Heuristic Scale with their support for the novel disparities via their explanations for these
disparities (specifically, the extent to which they preferred inherent explanations), ab = .08 [.02,
.17]. This path remained significant even when adjusting for participants’ views about the
fairness of their own sociopolitical systems, ab = .07 [.02, .16]. Likewise, the indirect path
remained significant when Need for Cognition was used as a control variable, ab = .08 [.02, .17],
and when both control variables were included simultaneously, ab = .06 [.00, .14]. These results
bolster our claim of a link between the cognitive process of explanation and the tendency to
support the status quo.
Studies 2a and 2b
The goal of Study 2 was to provide a stronger test of our proposal by investigating
whether the hypothesized link between heuristic explanations and system support is present in
childhood.
Method
Participants. Participants in Study 2a were 30 seven- and eight-year-old children (Mage =
8.34 years, SD = 0.48). Participants in Study 2b were 60 seven- and eight-year-old children (Mage
= 8.19 years, SD = 0.47). Children this age have sufficient linguistic skill to meet the demands of
our task, but their analogical reasoning abilities are still immature (e.g., Richland et al., 2006),
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 20
making it unlikely that their judgments about alien systems would be based on a sophisticated
relational mapping onto their own circumstances. Participants were recruited from a small city in
the Midwestern U.S. and were tested either in a university lab (n = 42) or in a quiet room at their
school (n = 48). Five additional children were tested but excluded from the final sample because
they refused to complete the study.
Materials and Procedure. Participants in Studies 2a and 2b received the same vignettes
as in Study 1 and rated the same inherent and extrinsic explanations. Children’s agreement with
the explanations was measured with a visual 4-point “thumbs down” vs. “thumbs up” scale (1 =
“really not right” to 4 = “really right”). The only difference between Studies 2a and 2b was that
only the latter study measured children’s support for the novel disparities. Specifically, a 6-point
scale was used in Study 2b to assess children’s ideas about the fairness of each disparity (e.g., “Is
it fair that the Blarks have a lot more money than the Orps?”; “Is it okay that the Blarks have a
lot more money than the Orps?”) and their liking of each group (e.g., “Do you like the Blarks
[Orps]?”) (α = .78).
Results and Discussion
Study 2a tested only the first prediction of our account—that concerning the content of
children’s explanations. Like the adults in Study 1, children evaluated the inherent explanations
for status disparities (M = 2.87, SD = .75) more positively than the extrinsic ones (M = 2.28, SD
= .57), t(29) = 2.92, p = .007, d = .89 (see Figure 1 and Table 2). Thus, even children seem prone
to view status differences as due to the inherent traits of the relevant groups, not as emerging
from extrinsic circumstances or historical events.
In Study 2b, we replicated this advantage for inherent explanations (M = 2.86, SD = .65)
over extrinsic explanations (M = 2.43, SD = .65), t(59) = 4.05, p < .001, d = .66 (see Figure 1)
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 21
but also assessed children’s attitudes regarding the status quo (see Table 2). The results revealed
again that higher endorsement of inherent over extrinsic explanations predicted stronger system
support, r(58) = .27, p = .039 (see Figure 2). For children as well, then, the process of explaining
is linked with their attitudes toward sociopolitical patterns.
Studies 3a and 3b
In Study 3, we explored whether explanations for status disparities display an inherence
skew even (1) in younger children (specifically, four- and five-year-olds) and (2) when children
generate their own explanations as opposed to evaluating experimenter-provided ones. The
younger the children, the less plausible it is to suppose that their reasoning would be influenced
by anxieties stemming from an analogical projection of their own position in the societal
hierarchy onto the alien status disparities. As a result, recruiting these younger participants
afforded an even stronger test of our proposal. Eliciting children’s spontaneous explanations
served the same purpose: Because our claims concern the link between the explanations that
people themselves generate and their subsequent endorsement of system-endorsing attitudes, it is
important to show that the hypothesized bias toward inherence is found in participants’
spontaneous production as well.
Method
Participants. Participants in Study 3a were 20 four- and five-year-old children (Mage =
5.10 years, SD = 0.52) and 20 seven- and eight-year-old children (Mage = 8.05 years, SD = 0.40).
Participants in Study 3b were 20 four- to eight-year-old children (Mage = 6.66 years, SD = 1.34).
Participants were recruited from a small city in the Midwestern U.S. and were tested either in a
university lab (n = 24) or in a quiet room at their school (n = 36). Three additional children were
tested but excluded from the final sample because they refused to complete the study (n = 2) or
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 22
failed to provide any explanations (n = 1).
Materials and Procedure. Participants in Study 3a heard the same disparity vignettes as
in Studies 1 and 2 but were prompted to provide their own explanations for the disparities (e.g.,
“Why do you think the Blarks have a lot more money than the Orps?”). The procedure in Study
3b was identical, except that children were told about two individuals (instead of groups) who
lived on each planet (e.g., Blark and Orp).
Coding. Children’s explanations were coded into three categories: inherent (e.g.,
“Because they work harder”), extrinsic (e.g., “Maybe the Blarks have a lot more places they can
go and work, and the Orps don’t have as many buildings to work at”), or nonsensical (e.g., “They
get more”). To assess reliability, all explanations were coded independently by a second,
hypothesis-blind researcher. The average agreement for the inherent and extrinsic explanations
was 91.3% for Study 3a and 86.3% for Study 3b (kappas = .81 and .72, respectively).
Disagreements were resolved via discussion.
Results and Discussion
In Study 3a, we compared the proportions of the four novel disparities for which children
generated inherent vs. extrinsic explanations. Our main prediction was that inherent explanations
would be more frequent than extrinsic explanations in both five- and eight-year-olds’ reasoning.
To test this prediction, we entered each child’s proportions of inherent and extrinsic explanations
as a within-subject variable in a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) that also included
children’s age (five- vs. eight-year-olds) as a between-subjects factor. Consistent with our
proposal, children in Study 3a generated significantly more inherent (M = .53, SD = .27) than
extrinsic (M = .31, SD = .27) explanations for the novel status disparities, F(1, 38) = 9.66, p =
.004, η2 = .20 (see Table 4). This effect did not differ by age group, F(1, 38) = .03, p = .864. In
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 23
fact, inherent explanations were more prevalent than extrinsic ones for both the five-year-olds
(Minherent = .45, SDinherent = .28 vs. Mextrinsic = .24, SDextrinsic = .25; t[19] = 2.17, p = .043, d = .79)
and the eight-year-olds (Minherent = .62, SDinherent = .24 vs. Mextrinsic =.38, SDextrinsic = .29; t[19] =
2.23, p = .038, d = .90; see Figure 3).
Study 3b was conducted to ensure that the inherence bias in Study 3a was a genuine
reflection of how children typically make sense of large-scale sociopolitical patterns, and not the
result of any surface features of the stimuli or shallow affective associations with high vs. low
status. In this study, we asked children to explain status disparities between particular individuals
(e.g., “Blark has a lot more money than Orp”).
Based on prior theorizing about the operation of the inherence heuristic (Cimpian &
Salomon, 2014a, 2014b), we predicted that these items would not elicit as strong an inherence
bias as the disparities between groups did (Study 3a), largely because extrinsic information (e.g.,
past events, external circumstances) is more readily accessible when reasoning about specific
individuals than about broad patterns—and thus more easily incorporated into quick heuristic
explanations (e.g., Cimpian & Markman, 2009, 2011; Hussak & Cimpian, 2014). This is a fairly
counterintuitive prediction: Probability-wise, it is actually more likely that a specific individual
would possess a certain inherent trait (e.g., intelligence) than that an entire group would. And
yet, extrinsic information (about context, history, etc.) is more likely to be cognitively
represented, and is thus more accessible to heuristic processes, at the level of individuals than at
the level of groups. For example, it is easier to think about what a particular girl did yesterday,
about where she comes from, and so on, than it is to think about what girls in general did
yesterday, about where girls in general come from, and so on (Cimpian & Markman, 2011). As a
result, extrinsic information may be called to mind more readily when reasoning heuristically
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 24
about individuals (vs. groups), leading to a reduction in the magnitude of the typical inherence
bias.4 While inherent information may still be accessible and thus prevalent in children’s
explanations even in these cases, we predicted that the boost in accessibility afforded to extrinsic
information by the individual-specific format of the vignettes would result in a more even split
between inherent and extrinsic explanations.
As predicted, children’s spontaneous explanations in Study 3b no longer appealed to
inherent (M = .54, SD = .28) more than extrinsic (M = .49, SD = .27) factors, t(19) = .55, p = .59,
d = .18 (see Table 4). The fact that children tailored their explanations to the nature of the
observations to be explained (status disparities between groups vs. individuals) in precisely the
way predicted by the inherence heuristic account suggests that our experimental paradigm
successfully taps into the cognitive processes by which children make sense of the world.
Together, Studies 3a and 3b reinforce our claims of an inherence bias in people’s explanations
for sociopolitical patterns, a bias that is present even in preschool children.
Study 4
In Study 4, we tested our claim of a causal link between explanations and system support
(Prediction 3). Would manipulating how children explain sociopolitical patterns also affect their
tendency to uphold these patterns? More precisely, would providing children with inherent
explanations for a certain status disparity lead them see it as more legitimate and fair than if the
same disparity had been explained in extrinsic terms?
Method
Participants. Participants were 20 four- and five-year-old children (Mage = 5.29 years,
4 It is important to keep in mind that this reduction is relative to the case when people are explaining broad patterns.
In an absolute sense, inherent facts may be overly accessible (and therefore likely to bias explanatory intuitions)
even when considering specific events (Cimpian & Salomon 2014a, 2014b; see also, e.g., Gilbert et al., 1988).
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 25
SD = .50) and 20 seven- and eight-year-old children (Mage = 8.27 years, SD = .44). Participants
were recruited from a small city in the Midwestern U.S. and were tested either in a university lab
(n = 16) or in a quiet room at their school (n = 24). Ten additional children were tested but
excluded from the final sample because they refused to complete the task (n = 6) or answered
two or more manipulation check questions incorrectly (n = 4; see below).
Materials and Procedure. We introduced participants to the status disparities used in
Studies 1–3a. For two of the disparities, children were provided with an inherent explanation
(e.g., the Blarks “are smarter and better workers”); for the other two disparities, children heard
an extrinsic explanation (e.g., the Blarks “live in a town with better jobs and a lot more banks”;
see Table 1 and the Supplemental Materials). Each disparity received an inherent explanation for
half of the participants and an extrinsic explanation for the other half. After children heard each
explanation, they were asked to repeat it to the experimenter as a comprehension check. If
children were unable to repeat the explanation (either fully or partially), the experimenter re-read
it and asked again. If children could not repeat the explanation after three attempts, the
experimenter moved on to the next trial.
After passing the comprehension check, children were asked how much they liked each
group, whether they thought the disparity between them was fair (6-point scales), and whether
they thought the high-status group deserved their advantage (yes/no). Responses to these
questions about status quo endorsement were combined into a standardized composite score (α =
.72). Question order was counterbalanced.
As a manipulation check, at the end of each trial we asked children to recall the
explanation provided on that trial. The experimenter provided no feedback at this point and
simply proceeded with the study. However, any trials for which children failed to answer this
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 26
question correctly were excluded from the analyses (6.9% of all trials).
Pilot Study. We assessed whether the inherent and extrinsic explanations were
equivalent in their in-principle plausibility, using the same method as in Study 1. Adults (N = 30)
were recruited from Mechanical Turk and were asked to rate the explanations in terms of their
in-principle plausibility on a 4-point scale. The inherent and extrinsic explanations were
equivalent on this dimension (Ms = 3.0 and 3.2, respectively), t(28) = .53, p = .60.
Results and Discussion
In this study, we compared children’s support for disparities that had been explained in
terms of inherent vs. extrinsic factors. We averaged children’s support for the two disparities
explained inherently and, separately, for the two disparities explained extrinsically and then
entered these two averages as a within-subject factor (inherent vs. extrinsic) in a mixed-design
ANOVA, along with children’s age (five- vs. eight-year-olds; between subjects).
As predicted, exposure to inherent (vs. extrinsic) explanations for status disparities
resulted in greater support for these disparities, Minherent = .30, SDinherent = 1.18 vs. Mextrinsic = −.23,
SDextrinsic = 1.05, F(1, 38) = 22.62, p < .001, η2 = .37 (see Table 5). This difference did not vary
by age, F(1, 38) = .01, p = .91: Both the five-year-olds (Minherent = .49, SDinherent = .83 vs. Mextrinsic
= −.02, SDextrinsic = .73) and the eight-year-olds (Minherent = .10, SDinherent = .81 vs. Mextrinsic = −.43,
SDextrinsic = .62) were significantly more likely to endorse status disparities for which they heard
inherent explanations, t(19) = 3.15, p = .005, d = .65, for the five-year-olds, and t(19) = 3.60, p =
.002, d = .73, for the eight-year-olds (see Figure 4).
Interestingly, the five-year-olds were somewhat more likely than the eight-year-olds to
endorse system-supporting attitudes overall (Mfives = .24, SDfives = .69 vs. Meights = .16, SDeights =
.64), F(1, 38) = 3.56, p = .067, η2 = .09. This developmental trend is compatible with our
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 27
account, insofar as the inherence heuristic—and heuristic reasoning in general—has a more
pervasive influence earlier in development (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a; Cimpian & Steinberg,
2014). This claim should be interpreted with caution, however, since in Study 3a the younger
children did not generate more inherent explanations for status disparities than the older children.
These results suggest that, even for young children, understanding a sociopolitical pattern
as being due to some feature of the groups that comprise it leads to greater endorsement of this
pattern relative to understanding it as the product of extrinsic forces. Together with the evidence
that inherent explanations are common in people’s understanding of macro-societal features
(Studies 1–3), these findings support the claim that explanation-generating processes provide an
independent path for the development of attitudes that uphold the status quo.
General Discussion
Political thought is characterized by a prevailing tendency to view the status quo as fair
and natural. The present work suggests that this tendency emerges in part as a byproduct the
cognitive processes through which people explain the world (Cimpian, 2015; Cimpian &
Salomon, 2014a, 2014b; see also Eidelman & Crandall, 2014). These processes lead people to
overuse easily-accessible inherent facts in their explanations for a wide range of observations,
from broad natural phenomena to specific human behaviors. When such inherence-biased
explanations are generated to make sense of existing sociopolitical arrangements, they portray
these arrangements as fair, natural, and legitimate. This proposal received consistent support
across four studies. First, we found a marked tendency to explain large-scale social disparities in
inherent terms (Studies 1, 2, and 3a). Second, this tendency was predictive of participants’
support for the status quo (Studies 1 and 2b). Third, manipulating this explanatory skew toward
inherence led to subsequent changes in the extent to which people endorsed the status quo (Study
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 28
4). In sum, our findings provide strong evidence that the cognitive processes underlying
explanation are an independent, and potentially prolific, source of support for the status quo. To
clarify, however, we view this perspective as complementing, not competing with, those
proposing that system-legitimizing cognitions arise because they serve the palliative function of
reducing anxiety and uncertainty about one’s station in life. In all likelihood, there are multiple
ways to arrive at judgments that defend the status quo. Some of these may be primarily driven by
motives, whereas others may be driven more strongly by information-processing factors.
The claim of a primarily cognitive source for the judgments documented in our studies is
licensed by the fact that we designed these studies so as to reduce the influence of palliative
motives. First, we asked participants about unfamiliar disparities on alien planets—stimuli that
lower participants’ personal involvement and the possibility of self-relevant negative emotions.
Under these circumstances, it seems less likely that participants would derive a palliative benefit
from defending the status quo. Second, we recruited young children. Children are a useful test
case because, relative to adults, they should have more difficulties analogically projecting
whatever understanding they have of their own societal position onto a world that is superficially
different. As a result, self-relevant negative emotions should be even less influential in their
judgments. However, we cannot claim to have completely eliminated the possibility of such
projections, or of motivated influences more generally.
In addition to documenting a cognitive foundation for status-quo support, the present
research sought an adequately general and parsimonious way to characterize this foundation. In
the end, we adopted the inherence heuristic account as a theoretical framework. What is the
value of doing so? Could these studies have been motivated and interpreted just as well from the
perspective of essentialism or the correspondence bias? The inherence heuristic approach is in
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 29
fact better able to account for the present findings than either essentialism or the correspondence
bias. Consider, first, that the individuals representing the unfamiliar groups in our stimuli were
matched for race, gender, and body type, differing mainly in clothing (see Supplemental
Materials). Novel groups marked by such superficial features are not spontaneously essentialized
by children (Rhodes et al., 2012); thus, essentialism per se cannot explain why children made so
many inherent attributions for the differential status of these groups. Second, participants’ status-
supporting judgments in Study 1 were uniquely predicted by a scale measuring individual
differences in reliance on the inherence heuristic. Given the discriminant validity of this scale
with multiple measures of essentialism (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014), the predictive relationships
between inherent explanations and system support cannot be accounted for by essentialism per
se. Third, the fact that the bias toward internal explanations was lower when children explained
status disparities between individuals than when they explained disparities between groups
(Studies 3a and 3b) is not predicted, and cannot be easily accommodated, by either essentialism
or the correspondence bias. In contrast, such a difference was explicitly discussed and predicted
in prior theorizing about the inherence heuristic (Cimpian & Salomon, 2014a, 2014b). Finally, it
is unclear how the developmental trend whereby older children were less likely to endorse the
status quo than younger ones (Study 4) can be accommodated by work on essentialism, where
the trend is usually toward stronger, more coherent essentialist beliefs with age (e.g., Gelman,
Heyman, & Legare, 2007; but see Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). In contrast, it is well documented
that heuristic reasoning of the sort that underlies the inherence heuristic decreases with age (e.g.,
Cimpian & Steinberg, 2014; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). In sum, the advantages of
adopting the inherence heuristic as a mechanistic framework extend beyond the theoretical
argument laid out in the introduction: Without this framework, it becomes unclear how to
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 30
interpret many important aspects of the present results.
Looking toward the future, it would be worthwhile to examine whether, and how, the
cognitive mechanism proposed here might interact with various motivated processes to bring
about system-supporting attitudes. Although we took care to lower palliative motives in our
tasks, such motives may influence individuals’ (especially adults’) heuristic explanations outside
the lab. According to the inherence heuristic account, affective or motivational factors may, at
times, modulate the operation of the heuristic processes identified here (Cimpian & Salomon,
2014a, 2014b). For example, any anxiety or discomfort that is evoked by one’s societal rank
could erode the amount of cognitive resources (such as working memory) available to the
reasoner (e.g., Schmader, Johns, & Forbes, 2008). Lower cognitive resources would in turn
translate into looser supervision of heuristic processes by analytic, working-memory-dependent
processes (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006). In the case of the inherence heuristic, this could result
in a stronger inherence bias in the explanations people adopt for observed sociopolitical patterns,
and thus stronger intuitions about the legitimacy of the status quo. In this manner, palliative
motivations and heuristic processes could in fact interact to promote status quo endorsement.
Future research along these lines would provide further insight into the complex mechanisms
underlying system-justifying beliefs.
It is also important to investigate the contextual influences that are likely to moderate the
relationship between the inherence heuristic and status-quo-defending beliefs. Because the
content of the explanations generated by the inherence heuristic varies systematically according
to information that is easily accessible in memory, any context that promotes effortless retrieval
of extrinsic (historical, situational, etc.) facts might correspondingly lower the inherence skew in
heuristic explanations and, as a result, the extent to which they legitimize existing societal
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 31
arrangements. For example, if cultures vary in the extent to which they highlight extrinsic
influences (e.g., Choi et al., 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994), spontaneous explanations for observed
sociopolitical patterns may likewise vary in the support they provide for the status quo. One’s
social class may also influence the content of the information available in memory for the
purpose of generating explanations. For instance, individuals from low socioeconomic status
backgrounds might be more likely to have access to information about contextual barriers to
success (e.g., education, family history), which might in turn reduce the extent to which they
explain status disparities by appealing to system-legitimizing inherent traits (e.g., Kluegel &
Smith, 1986; Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2009). As suggested by these examples, future
investigations of the relationship between the inherence heuristic and system-supporting beliefs
would benefit from attending to the influence of context on people’s spontaneous explanations
for their social world.
While the tendency to uphold the status quo may provide relief from tension and
uncertainty, it also reinforces harmful stereotypes of the disadvantaged; it reproduces long-
standing inequalities; and it propagates the belief that unfair policies and practices are just. It is
worrying to think that this tendency is present even in 4-year-old children (as our own data
suggest). By revealing how an early-emerging heuristic shortcut contributes to this tendency, the
present research also suggests how one could instill a more balanced, open-minded stance toward
the sociopolitical status quo. The heuristic tendencies of the human mind do not impose a hard
limit on its output: Facile intuitions (which usually disguise themselves as common sense) can
indeed be revised, and prior research has identified many meta-cognitive strategies whose
adoption promotes analytic, rational thought (e.g., Baron, 1994; Stanovich, 2009). By learning to
scrutinize one’s heuristic intuitions, one gains the ability to recognize potential shortcomings in
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 32
the structure of society, and thus to avoid the pitfalls of an unquestioning endorsement of the
status quo.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 33
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Table 1
Sample inherent and extrinsic explanations presented for the disparities in Studies 1, 2, and 4
Study
Inherent Explanations
Extrinsic Explanations
1 and 2
…maybe the Blarks have a lot more
money than the Orps because the
Blarks are smarter, or are better
workers than the Orps are, or there’s
something else about them that made
them get a lot of money.
…maybe the Blarks have a lot more
money than the Orps because of things
that happened a long time ago, like maybe
the Blarks won a war, or they found gold,
or something else happened that made
them get a lot of money.
4 There are a lot of things that are the
same about the Blarks and the Orps.
They live in the same neighborhoods,
go to the same schools, and are both
very friendly. But, there’s one really
important thing that’s different about
the Blarks and the Orps. The Blarks are
really really smart, and are much better
workers than the Orps are. They are a
lot smarter, and are much better
workers than the Orps. Because of this,
the Blarks have a lot more money than
the Orps. They have a lot more money
because they’re smarter and are better
workers.
There are a lot of things that are the same
about the Blarks and the Orps. They are
both very smart, they like the same sorts
of things, and are both very friendly. But
there’s one really important thing that’s
different about the Blarks and the Orps.
The Blarks happen to live in a town that
has much better jobs, and a lot more
banks. The town where the Blarks live
happens to have much better jobs and a lot
more banks. Because of this, the Blarks
have a lot more money than the Orps.
They have a lot more money because they
happen to live in a town with better jobs
and a lot more banks.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 45
Table 2
Mean endorsement of explanations and system-supporting beliefs in Studies 1 and 2
Note. For adults (Study 1), disparity fairness and group liking were assessed using 9-point scales. For
children (Study 2b), we used 6-point scales. Inherent and extrinsic explanation endorsement was assessed
using 4-point scales for both adults and children. High-status group preference was calculated by
subtracting low-status group liking from high-status group liking. Standard deviations are indicated in
parentheses.
Inherent
Explanation
Endorsement
Extrinsic
Explanation
Endorsement
Disparity
Fairness
Rating
High-Status
Group
Preference
Adults (Study 1) 2.74 (0.72) 2.50 (0.64) 4.10 (1.56) −0.11 (1.70)
8-year-olds (Study 2a) 2.87 (0.75) 2.28 (0.57) — —
8-year-olds (Study 2b) 2.86 (0.65) 2.43 (0.65) 2.93 (0.99) −0.26 (1.53)
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 46
Table 3
Correlations between the measures in Study 1
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01.
1 2 3 4 5
1. Preference for Inherent Explanations 1 .51** .28** .25* −.11
2. System Support Composite 1 .30** .34** −.11
3. Inherence Heuristic Scale 1 .33** −.35**
4. General System Justification Scale 1 −.04
5. Need for Cognition Scale 1
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 47
Table 4
Proportion of explanations generated in Study 3
Inherent Extrinsic Nonsensical
Study 3a
5-year-olds .45 (.28) .24 (.25) .39 (.25)
8-year-olds .62 (.24) .38 (.29) .11 (.15)
Study 3b
4–8-year-olds .54 (.28) .49 (.27) .06 (.18)
Note. The values in this table represent the proportion of trials on which an explanation was coded as
being inherent, extrinsic, or nonsensical. Because explanation codes were assigned independently (i.e., an
explanation could be coded as containing both inherent and extrinsic components), the proportions do not
necessarily add up to 1. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 48
Table 5
Mean endorsement of system-supporting beliefs following inherent and extrinsic explanations in
Study 4
Disparity
Fairness
(“Is it fair…?”)
Disparity
Fairness
(“Is it ok…?”)
High-Status
Group
Deservingness
High-Status
Group
Preference
System Support
Composite
Inherent
5-year-olds 3.52 (1.88) 4.25 (1.77) 0.73 (0.41) 0.83 (2.82) 0.49 (0.83)
8-year-olds 2.85 (1.72) 3.33 (1.69) 0.56 (0.41) 0.43 (2.08) 0.10 (0.81)
Extrinsic
5-year-olds 2.23 (1.48) 2.75 (1.76) 0.53 (0.47) 0.93 (2.07) −0.02 (0.73)
8-year-olds 2.33 (1.23) 2.98 (1.45) 0.35 (0.37) −1.28 (1.67) −0.43 (0.62)
Note. Disparity fairness ratings were assessed using a 6-point scale. High-status group deservingness was
assessed with a dichotomous yes/no question. High-status group preference was calculated as the
difference score between liking for the high- and the low-status groups (each assessed using a 6-point
scale). The system support composite was calculated by (1) standardizing the relevant measures (e.g.,
participants’ average rating of the fairness of the disparities) and then (2) averaging each participant’s
standardized scores across these measures. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses.
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 49
Figure 1. Adults’ (Study 1) and 8-year-olds’ (Studies 2a and 2b) endorsement of inherent
and extrinsic explanations for social disparities (1 = “really not right” to 4 = “really
right”). Error bars represent ± 1 SE. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001.
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Study1 Study2a Study2b
ExplanationEndorsement
Inherent
Extrinsic
***
**
*
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 50
Figure 2. Participants’ system support as a function of their preference for inherent
explanations of social disparities in Studies 1 and 2b.
‐3
‐2
‐1
0
1
2
3
‐2.5 ‐1.5 ‐0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5
SystemSupport
Composite
PreferenceforInherent Explanations
Study1(adults) Study2b(8‐year‐olds)
‐2.5
‐1.5
‐0.5
0.5
1.5
2.5
‐2.5 ‐1.5 ‐0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5 3.5
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 51
Figure 3. The proportion of trials on which children generated inherent and extrinsic
explanations of social disparities in Study 3a. (Both bars are lower for the 5-year-olds
than for the 8-year-olds because the younger children generated more nonsensical
explanations [see Table 4 for exact means].) Error bars represent ± 1 SE. * p < .05.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
5‐year‐olds 8‐year‐olds
ProportionofExplanations
Inherent
Extrinsic
*
*
Heuristic explanations and support for the status quo 52
Figure 4. Five- and 8-year-olds’ system support following inherent and extrinsic
explanations in Study 4. Error bars represent ± 1 SE. ** p < .01.
‐0.8
‐0.6
‐0.4
‐0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
5‐year‐olds 8‐year‐olds
SystemSupportComposite
InherentExpl.
ExtrinsicExpl.
**
**
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