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Focus Article
How do young people
engage with climate change?
The role of knowledge, values,
message framing, and
trusted communicators
Adam Corner,
1
*Olga Roberts,
1
Sybille Chiari,
2
Sonja Völler,
3
Elisabeth S. Mayrhuber,
4
Sylvia Mandl
4
and Kate Monson
1
Despite several decades of research on more effectively communicating climate
change to the general public, there is only a limited amount of knowledge about
how young people engage with an issue that will shape and define their generation.
We provide a thorough review of international studies in this area, drawing on sur-
vey data and qualitative research. The review is organized into two main sections.
The first briefly situates young people’s engagement with climate change relative to
other concerns and examines levels of awareness, concern and ‘scepticism’among
this age group. The second focuses on four key determinants of effective climate
change communication and assess whether young people differ in any appreciable
way from research findings relating to the general population. The four factors are
the role of values and worldviews in determining climate change views; the efficacy
of ‘information-based’interventions; the ‘psychological distance’of climate change
and message framing; and the role of trusted messengers. In the concluding
section we discuss the implications for engaging young people more effectively
and explore possibilities for future research. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
How to cite this article:
WIREs Clim Change 2015, 6:523–534. doi: 10.1002/wcc.353
INTRODUCTION
Young people are in a unique position as they face
the reality of a changing climate. National and
international legislation for mitigating climate change
typically operates on decadal timescales, with many
targets for decarbonization focusing on the
2020–2050 time period.
1
As the generation whose
adult lives will overlap most closely with this policy
window, they are potentially best-placed to define the
long-term societal response to climate change. Yet they
are also the most vulnerable to the legacy of decisions
made by the older generations. Although young people
arguably have the most to gain and the most to lose in a
changing climate, their voices are not prominent in the
political, media, or cultural discourse on climate
change
2
and (as the evidence presented in this review
shows) engagement with climate change among this
important demographic group is in many ways limited.
While some studies have captured young people’s
views about climate change, there is very little existing
research exploring ways in which this population
could be more effectively engaged. There is, however,
a much larger literature on environmental psychology
that dates back to the 1960s and, more recently,
*Correspondence to: adam.corner@climateoutreach.org.uk
1
Climate Outreach and Information Network, Oxford, UK
2
Center for Global Change and Sustainability, BOKU University of
Natural Resources and Life Sciences, Vienna, Austria
3
Environment Agency Austria, Vienna, Austria
4
Austrian Institute for Sustainable Development, Vienna, Austria
Conflict of interest: The authors have declared no conflicts of interest
for this article.
Vo lum e 6 , S e p t embe r / O c tobe r 2 0 1 5 © 2015 Wil e y P e r i odic a l s , I nc. 523
environmental education theory, both of which pro-
vide valuable and relevant insights. While we situate
the current review within this broader literature and
draw from it on occasion, the focus is on evidence
directly related to climate change and how people aged
12–25 engage with this issue specifically. We define
‘young people’using this broad age category for two
reasons. First, there is no universally agreed definition
of ‘youth,’and studies in this review that have
described their sample using terms such as ‘young
adults’or ‘young people’exhibit substantial variation
in the mean age (and range) of the sample investigated.
Secondly, as the literature focusing directly on
how young people engage with climate change is still
relatively limited, excluding studies on the basis of
a narrower definition of the target group seemed
unwarranted.
We report a thorough review of international
studies (including some published in German),
although European, Australian and U.S. research dom-
inates the literature. We draw on survey data and qual-
itative research, and the review is organized into two
major sections. The first briefly situates young people’s
engagement with climate change relative to other con-
cerns (such as the economy) and asks how politically
engaged young people are in general. It also examines
levels of awareness, concern, and ‘scepticism’about cli-
mate change among the target age group and considers
levels of knowledge about the underlying science,
causes, and impacts of climate change. In the second
section, we consider four key determinants of effective
climate change communication and assess whether
young people differ in any appreciable way from
research findings on the general population. The four
factors are the role of values and worldviews in deter-
mining climate change views; the efficacy of ‘informa-
tion-based’interventions; the ‘psychological distance’
of climate change and message framing; and the role
of trusted messengers. In the conclusion we summarize
the key messages from the literature review, discuss the
implications for engaging young people more effec-
tively, and explore possibilities for future research.
PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: ARE YOUNG
PEOPLE DIFFERENT?
Climate Change in Context
In a recent review of international trends in public atti-
tudes toward climate change over the past 25 years,
Capstick et al.
3
identified a number of key themes.
After a period of rising concern in many Western
nations between the late 1980s and the mid-2000s,
polls show a sharp decline in concern about climate
change in countries such as the UK, the United States
and Australia. By contrast, in regions such as sub-
Saharan Africa, much of mainland Europe, and South
America, concern about climate change has been on the
increase in recent years. However, climate change is
typically relegated in the public mind behind issues
such as the economy, health, or education. Recent polls
demonstrate that concerns over unemployment, infla-
tion, and government debt continue to dominate public
concern in Europe and the United States.
4,5
The situation for young people is no different.
Research from the UK and Australia indicates that con-
cerns about the economy, employment opportunities
and access to affordable education trump worries
about issues like climate change for the people in
15–26 age range.
6–9
The post-2008 global economic
downturn appears to have resulted in a re-prioritiza-
tion of economic concerns for many people; a particu-
larly pronounced trend for young adults as they seek
employment and to establish careers.
10
This is the
background against which initiatives to engage young
people on climate change must be viewed: there are
many competing priorities for this age group’s atten-
tion, as well as concerns and worries that are, in many
ways, more immediate than climate change.
One particular challenge is the level and extent of
political engagement among young people. There is a
large body of literature examining the reasons behind
the steep decline in civic engagement and de-alignment
from political parties: this is a trend particularly pro-
nounced among young adults, with a low percentage
of young people (under 40% in some studies) reporting
an interest in politics.
11–13
However, it would be inac-
curate to say that young people are simply apathetic:
there is widespread skepticism about formal political
parties, distrust in political figures and a general
sense of alienation from mainstream politics.
6
Interna-
tional data suggest that young people are in fact
more likely to engage in ‘cause-oriented’or ‘micro-
politics.’
6,12
Attitudes to Climate Change
Typically, surveys show young Europeans exhibit
either comparable or in some cases higher levels of
reported interest and concern about climate change
than in older age groups.
14
Several studies in Germany,
Austria and Switzerland found that 76% of respon-
dents perceived climate change as a very or fairly big
problem.
15–18
To a lesser extent this is reflected in
UK youth studies.
19,20
Research focused on young peo-
ple in India,
21
Oman,
22
and the United States
23
also
show slightly elevated levels of concern relative to older
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age groups. However, just as in the general population
climate change concern is very rarely the top priority
among younger people.
There is a significant degree of recognition among
young Britons that climate change is happening
‘now,’
19,24
although UK data and Australian research
suggest that young people still view climate change as
primarily affecting ‘far away’places
20,25
reflecting a
consistent trend among people of all ages toward psy-
chological distancing.
26
In a nationally representative
poll, Americans aged 18–35 were found to be the most
likely of all age groups surveyed to discount the harm-
ful effects of climate change, with only 21% believing
that people are currently experiencing any harm.
27
In contrast to quantitative European survey data
(including UK polls), qualitative research from the UK
indicates a lack of concern about climate change among
16- to 24-year olds, who reported feelings of disengage-
ment and inaction in relation to climate change.
7
The
lack of low-carbon infrastructure, poor quality media
coverage, and an absence of shared values and practices
to encourage sustainable lifestyles were cited as rea-
sons. In addition, nationally representative U.S. survey
data
27
found that only 10% of people aged 18–34 had
thought about climate change a lot, only 9% felt very
worried, and 22% reported never having thought of
global warming previously. However, a smaller subset
of people aged 18–22 registered slightly higher levels of
concern and perceived personal relevance than people
aged 23–34 (possibly reflecting greater media attention
and lower scientific uncertainty about the issue during
their lifetimes).
A significant amount of research on young people
and climate change has been conducted in Australia. A
strong theme running through much of the Australian
literature is a sense of foreboding and anxiety among
young people about a future that cannot easily be pre-
dicted or controlled. The environment and climate
change feature as a major cause for concern and in
some cases are associated with feelings of anxiety,
stress and despair.
6,9,28
Swedish research has explicitly
recognized climate change as a ‘stressor,’with particu-
lar implications for the psychological well-being of chil-
dren as young as 12.
29
A nationally representative
U.S. survey found similar emotions expressed by adult
respondents when asked to think about global warm-
ing, including worry (50%), helplessness (45%), anger
(44%), sadness (43%) fear (36%), and depres-
sion (26%).
30
Among the general population, women consist-
ently exhibit higher levels of concern than men, a
trend reflected in United States,
31
Australian,
28
and
German
32
studies of adolescents. Another consistent
finding in surveys of public opinion on climate change
is that governments are seen as primarily responsible
for taking action and exhibiting leadership on this
issue; this is part of what has been termed the ‘govern-
ance trap’of climate change between the public and
politicians,
33
whereby governments claim that they
would be more ambitious on climate change if they
had the electoral mandate, while the electorate looks
to the government for leadership. As per wider sampled
age groups, Britons aged 18–24 select ‘national govern-
ments’first in their choice of who is ‘most responsible
for tackling climate change.’
20
About two thirds of
Germans and Austrians aged between 12 and 25 attrib-
uted high levels of responsibility for climate change to
industry and ‘big corporations,’politicians and ‘the
rich,’with widespread agreement that ‘rich industria-
lised nations are primarily responsible for climate
change.’
15,17,34
Compared to older age groups, young people
appear to be somewhat less fatalistic about combating
climate change, with polls showing that the majority
perceive climate change to be a serious but ‘solvable’
problem.
18,35
For example, 69% of young Germans
in one poll opposed the statement ‘it is already too late,
nothing can be done against climate change,’
17
while
over half of people aged 18–34 in the United States
believe humans can reduce global warming, roughly
10% more than older age groups.
27
This tendency
toward lower levels of fatalism may be related to the
way that young people perceive the immediacy of cli-
mate threats: in the same U.S. study, young Americans
were less likely to believe that climate change was
already harming people in the United States and across
the world than the older adults.
27
One study of young
people in Sweden
36
found that ‘constructive’hope in
the face of climate change (but not denial of the prob-
lem altogether) was positively associated with pro-
environmental behavior. We return to the relationship
between distancing, coping strategies, emotion, and
self-efficacy later in the paper.
Knowledge About Climate Change
In terms of knowledge about climate change, it has
been suggested that the current generation of 18- to
25-year olds is likely to be the best informed of any
in history
25
but polls and qualitative research paint a
mixed picture. Young people in Germany and Austria
show relatively high levels of knowledge about the
causes and effects of climate change, particularly
the socioeconomic factors.
15,17,34,37
However, as in
the general population, there remains much uncer-
tainty around basic underlying scientific concepts
among young people, for example: confusing damage
to the ozone layer with climate change;
34,38
or making
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inaccurate causal links between short-term weather
and long-term climate change.
39
Unclear distinctions
made by school pupils in Turkey, Greece, Iran, and
the United States between the causes and effects of cli-
mate change were found to produce confusions
between mitigation and adaptation measures.
40–43
Studies in Australia found limited conceptual and
even worse factual knowledge about environmental
issues among high school students,
28,44
although,
of the concepts tested, the greenhouse effect was among
the better known and understood.
28
The majority of
the UK surveys indicate lower levels of knowledge,
either comparable or below that found in other age
groups.
7,20
When asked how many degrees global tem-
peratures need to rise for climate change to become
dangerous only 7% of people aged 18–34 in one survey
chose the ‘correct’answer of 2C, compared to 9% of
the British public.
45
While aware of climate change and
broadly able to define the term, people aged 16- to 26-
years in a qualitative UK study showed an uneven
knowledge of key events and concepts.
7
In a survey
of young people in six nations, awareness of the term
‘carbon footprint’was found to be high in the United
States, UK, and South Africa, but with the majority
of respondents reporting that they did not fully under-
stand what it meant. Awareness was considerably
lower in South Korea and Brazil.
46
Even given these low levels of carbon literacy, cli-
mate skepticism is less likely to be found among
younger age groups, who show a greater acceptance
of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate
change.
7,27
Research from Germany and Austria found
high levels of agreement on the anthropogenic nature of
climate change in age groups ranging from 10 to
25 years, in some cases as high as 80%.
17
Despite
higher levels of acceptance of climate change, young
people still tend to underestimate the level of scientific
consensus on climate change,
25,47
although this dispar-
ity appears to be less than in the general popula-
tion.
45,48
This underlines the consistent finding
among older adult populations that there is not a
straightforward relationship between knowledge and
concern about climate change. Instead (as we explore
in the next section), beliefs about climate change tend
to be grounded in political views with a consistent rela-
tionship between ‘conservatism’and skepticism about
climate change,
49
values
50
and ‘worldviews’(prefer-
ences for how society should be structured).
51
In this section we have summarized the key find-
ings from studies of young people’s perceptions of cli-
mate change. In the next section, we move on to
consider the challenge of communicating about climate
change more effectively with this important demo-
graphic. We focus on four key determinants of
engagement with climate change and indicate (where
there is youth-specific evidence available) how young
people differ from older cohorts.
COMMUNICATING CLIMATE
CHANGE: ARE YOUNG
PEOPLE DIFFERENT?
The Role of Values and Worldviews
The ideological divide over anthropogenic climate
change between Democrats and Republicans in the
United States is a consistent finding in public percep-
tions research. Typically, being politically of the ‘left’
is associated with higher levels of concern about cli-
mate change, while those on the ‘right’are more skep-
tical about the reality and seriousness of the problem.
52
This pattern is replicated among 18–34 age group,
27
and research investigating how political ‘worldviews’
and knowledge about climate change influenced risk
perceptions among adolescents in the United States
found that young people with ‘individualist’and ‘hier-
archical’worldviews were more likely to be skeptical
about climate change.
31
Interestingly, though, this ide-
ology-based polarization in climate change beliefs was
substantially reduced for those participants with higher
levels of climate science knowledge. The authors pro-
posed that while worldviews are well entrenched
among adult populations, during teenage years they
are still forming and this ‘plasticity’may explain why
climate change knowledge mitigates worldview-based
skepticism among young people.
There is a robust body of evidence documenting
the relationship between the values that people hold
and their views about climate change.
50
‘Self-tran-
scendent’values (such as altruism and concern for
the welfare of others) are associated with positive
engagement with climate change, while ‘self-enhan-
cing’values (like wealth, status, and power) are gener-
ally not. Analyses of data from multiple European
nations suggest that self-transcendent values are con-
sistently rated as more important by members of
the public than self-enhancing ones.
53
Several recent
studies have pointed to the effectiveness of framing
messages about climate change using ‘self-transcend-
ing’values, and the potential for increasing positive
‘spillover’between pro-environmental attitudes
(or behaviors) based on this strategy.
54
Openness to change and a willingness to think
deeply about issues have been linked to positive engage-
ment with climate change among school students.
55
However, studies from different countries suggest that
young people lack ‘post-materialistic’values and there-
fore tend to put self-enhancing principles like comfort,
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ease, and luxury above other more self-transcendent
concerns when considering pro-environmental behav-
ior choices.
56,57
In a qualitative UK study, young peo-
ple identified self-image, self-identity, and social
recognition as key values linked to high-carbon beha-
viors such as personal car use.
58
With only limited evi-
dence on how their values interact with the issue of
climate change, though, it remains unclear whether
younger age groups possess distinct value-orientations
and how these might influence communication around
the issue.
The Efficacy of Information-Based
Interventions
It has long been recognized in studies of the general
population that merely presenting the scientific evi-
dence for climate change is insufficient to increase
engagement or overcome skepticism.
59
There is some
evidence from Finland and the United States that edu-
cation about climate change tends to increase young
people’s engagement with the issue.
31,60,61
However,
while many educational campaigns are broader in
scope than simply conveying facts and figures, most
studies suggest (as is the case in the general population)
that being informed about climate change is not, on its
own, sufficient to engage young people, much less gal-
vanize behavioral changes.
62–65
In fact, research from
different countries indicates that young people tend
to engage in minimal inconvenience, individual, pro-
environmental behaviors, such as switching the lights
off or recycling,
15,21,34,60,62,66
even when they know
that more inconvenient behavioral changes (taking
public transport or giving up meat) or collective, polit-
ical actions (attending a demonstration) are likely to be
more effective.
22,40,57,66–68
While information-based interventions alone are
unlikely to engage young people effectively, there has
been significant interest among scholars and practi-
tioners in the potential of ‘edutainment’programs that
seek to make scientific issues engaging by placing them
in an informal and entertaining context,
69,70
which we
explore in the next section on overcoming ‘psycholog-
ical distance.’
Psychological Distance and
Message Framing
One key consideration for effective communication is
the widely-documented ‘psychological distance’
between climate change and the public,
26
which
(as discussed earlier in the paper), may be particularly
pronounced for young people. Typically, people living
in countries in the northern hemisphere are yet to
physically experience the more extreme impacts of cli-
mate change and even when climate-related impacts are
‘encountered,’they may not lead directly to greater
concern about climate change.
71
In response, some
researches have focused on framing messages around
the ‘co-benefits’tackling climate change may bring,
typically around improvements in public health or by
addressing energy security.
72
These findings are con-
sistent with other work showing that a ‘gain’frame
(emphasizing the benefits of action, rather than the neg-
ative consequences of not acting) produces more posi-
tive attitudes toward taking action on climate
change.
73
Reflecting this, recent practitioner debates
in the UK and United States have focused on ways of
making climate change more salient by demonstrating
the ways in which climate change will affect the ‘things
people love,’
74
with one recent UK qualitative study
(see Box 1) finding support among 18- to 25-year-old
age groups for this principle.
75
Strategies to reduce the psychological distance of
climate change are likely to be as important for younger
age groups as they are in the general population,
although there is very little direct evidence regarding
the impact of differentially ‘framed’messages on young
people. However, it is also possible that distancing is
part of a (constructive) process of ‘meaning-focused
coping,’
29,76
whereby positive emotions are marshaled
in order to provide strength in times of difficulty, or in
the face of serious threats. The relationship between
different types of affect, the function served by psycho-
logical distancing, and coping strategies employed by
young people in the face of climate change is an impor-
tant question for further research.
77
One relevant factor that is known to play a cen-
tral role in how young people engage with climate
change is perceived self-efficacy. Research from differ-
ent countries indicates that this is a key determinant of
pro-environmental engagement and behavior change
among children and young people, particularly in rela-
tion to large-scale environmental problems like climate
change.
78–82
Feelings of powerlessness in the face of
global climate change and the sense that personal
actions would not make a difference have been
reported in several youth studies.
28,29,34
Recommendations for enhancing perceived self-
efficacy among young people include the use of positive
and relevant narratives and frames in the media,
7
schools
29
and campaigns
74
and guidance on individual
and collective action to accompany information on the
causes and impacts of climate change.
66,83
Positive
experiences in nature and ‘key outdoor moments’
in childhood and adolescence have been linked to
pro-environmental attitudes and behavior in later
life.
78,84,85
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A substantial amount of international research
also demonstrates that children and young people are
more likely to understand, care, and act on climate
change if they can engage with it directly and experien-
tially, through some form of educational, outreach, or
social activity.
36,79,82,86–88
A U.S. study found that high
school students benefited from a series of ‘edutainment’
assemblies on climate change in terms of improved sci-
entific knowledge and pro-environmental attitudes and
behaviors, in addition to more frequent ‘interpersonal
discussion with parents and friends.’
70
However, the
context in which new beliefs and behaviors are
acquired and then subsequently reinforced is impor-
tant. British and Australian studies have suggested that
climate literacy programs and pro-environmental edu-
cation are most effective when young people can embed
their learning in their daily social practice (i.e., when
there are regular opportunities to ‘practice’new beha-
viors, where the social environment is supportive of
this, and where positive social norms in terms of their
peers’behaviors are visible.
65,82
The Role of Trusted Messengers
Among the general population, scientists continue to be
perceived as highly trusted messengers on climate
change,
33
and although there is an expectation that
government should lead on climate change, there is
generally very low trust on politicians. These trends
are largely reflected in youth-specific studies. Americans
aged 18–35 were found to be more trusting the scientists
(82% of those surveyed in a nationally representative
poll), President Barack Obama, and Al Gore than older
age groups, with least trust on the former Alaskan
Governor Sarah Palin, a well-known Republican climate
skeptic.
27
Peer-to-peer interaction and communication
around climate change is particularly effective for
engaging younger age groups.
79,89
For example, UK
students sharing their experiences of a climate cam-
paign (particularly via social media) proved a better
recruitment tool than informational advocacy.
87
Unsurprisingly, some of the best-known youth-focused
climate change organizations are either entirely youth-
driven
90
or encourage youth participation.
91
By con-
trast, activities seen as designed by large or corporate
organizations are less likely to either meaningfully res-
onate with young adults or maintain a long-term hold
(Box 2).
92
Besides youth-driven communications, teachers
and lecturers rank highly in the list of messengers suc-
cessfully facilitating climate awareness among young
people.
15,85
Researchers in Australia have suggested
broadening the scope of environmental- and climate-
related education to introduce a more inter-disciplinary
approach that includes the economics and politics of
climate change as well as negotiation, analytical, and
scientific skills.
9,38,43,44
There have also been calls for
a more localized, solutions-based approach in schools,
focusing on impacts that young people can relate to
their own lives combined with positive messaging
around alternative visions and the capacity of humans
to adapt.
9,28,42
BOX 1
YOUNG VOICES ON CLIMATE CHANGE
COIN’s Young Voices report was released in
October 2014.
75
It was one of the first attempts
to involve young people directly in a conversation
about more effectively engaging them on cli-
mate change. In a series of qualitative discussion
groups (termed ‘narrative workshops’) with
36 young adults in the UK, participants’views
on climate change and climate policies were
explored. Four climate change ‘narratives’(short
pieces of written text using different language
styles to describe climate change and potential
policies) were then evaluated. Based on partici-
pants’responses to these materials, a number
of recommendations were made for more effec-
tive engagement with this audience. These
included:
Here and now: Young people respond posi-
tively to messages that frame climate change as
a contemporary concern requiring an immediate
response.
Everyday concerns: Young people are recep-
tive to the idea of protecting the ‘things they
love’from climate change, but these need to be
identified through research, not assumed.
Speak plainly: Jargon such as ‘managing cli-
mate risks’and concepts such as the ‘2 degrees
limit’can be unfamiliar and disengaging.
Focus on the ‘social’as well as the ‘scientific’
consensus: The idea of a ‘97% scientific consen-
sus’was viewed by some as a compelling and
persuasive statistic, but finding ways to commu-
nicate the ‘social consensus’around tackling cli-
mate change is likely to be important too.
Trusted messengers: Peer networks and social
media are important sources of information on
climate change for young people. Generally
speaking, they are suspicious of the mainstream
media, with the exception of the BBC, big busi-
nesses, and politicians.
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Unsurprisingly, a host of studies from different
countries conclude that parents have a strong influence
on their children’s attitudes and behavior toward the
environment and climate change.
81,84,85,97,98
Encour-
aging greater intergenerational dialog, and the involve-
ment of parents (and other social groups) directly in
climate education have both been identified as ways
of facilitating the positive influence of parents on their
offspring’s climate-relevant beliefs and behaviors.
9,44
Celebrities play a prominent role in many youth-
focused advocacy campaigns, but their impact on
public engagement is unclear, with some research cau-
tioning that young people who follow celebrity culture
are ‘the least likely to be politically engaged.’
99
While
the intersection of environmentalism and celebrity
has been the subject of some academic critique,
100,101
the efficacy of celebrities as climate change messengers
specifically has not been well researched. However, the
limited amount of existing evidence suggests that the
perceived popularity, credibility, and trustworthiness
of a celebrity ‘needs’to be considered carefully before
involving them in climate campaigns.
102
In one British
study of 16- to 26-year old groups, some participants
felt that celebrity involvement was a good way to raise
the issue’s profile but a greater number felt it was
inappropriate due to their questionable legitimacy in
terms of high carbon lifestyles and relevant expertise.
7
Other studies have argued that the notion of ‘eco-celeb-
rity’(i.e., values-driven engagement with environmen-
tal issues, perceived as being central to the celebrity’s
public persona), can be very effective at mobilizing
young people in pro-environmental discourses and
advocacy, including fans of the celebrity making envi-
ronmental-based connections with each other.
103
This is particularly the case if ‘eco-celebrities’can
tap into the collectivism of the social media generation
via platforms such as Twitter.
103
However, while social
media has clearly transformed the way in which infor-
mal communication about a whole range of issues
occurs, there is currently very limited research on the
role of social media in climate change engagement.
One recent study
104
focused on the way in which Twit-
ter users responded to the release of the most recent
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report.
For the most part, individuals tended to engage with
others who shared their views, with only limited evi-
dence of cooperative engagement among people with
conflicting or contrasting opinions. While there is cer-
tainly potential, therefore, for social media to transcend
some of the challenges associated with more traditional
media, issues such as attitude polarization may con-
tinue to pose barriers to public engagement on climate
change, whatever the mode of communication.
DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION: HOW
DO YOUNG PEOPLE ENGAGE WITH
CLIMATE CHANGE?
Many of the trends that characterize adult population’s
views about climate change are reflected in young peo-
ple’s views. For example, there are generally high levels
of climate change concern among the younger age
groups (in some cases higher than in older age groups),
but it is rarely the top priority among younger people or
the general population. There are competing priorities
for this age group’s attention as well as concerns and
worries that are, in a sense, more immediate and impor-
tant than the climate change. This is the context against
which initiatives to engage young people on climate
change must be viewed.
Among young people there is a fairly low level of
knowledge about the basic scientific concepts that
underpin climate change and a tendency to underesti-
mate the level of scientific consensus on climate change;
however, this seems less prominent among the general
population, and importantly, levels of skepticism about
the reality of climate change seem to be lower among
younger people.
BOX 2
PRACTICAL INITIATIVES TO ENGAGE
YOUNG PEOPLE
Many practical initiatives have focused on visual
media as a tool for engaging young people. Con-
nect4Climate has run two short filmmaking com-
petitions for the under 35 years of age, asking
young directors to tell their stories of climate
impacts, solutions, and actions.
91
Last year, The
Climate Reality Project called for young climate
activists to upload their videos addressing the
UN Climate Summit.
93
Music has also been uti-
lized as a tool for engaging younger generations
in environmental issues. For example, the Hip
Hop Caucus in the U.S. works to engage young
urban Americans with environmental and social
justice by linking their cultural expression with
their political experience.
94
Two climate change
games—Climate Challenge
95
in 2007 and Fate
of the World
96
in 2010—have been played by
over a million people. By creating a role-play plat-
form for engagement, and combining it with
real-life information, the games are seen as a
way of empowering young adults in climate-
related decision-making processes.
WIREs Climate Change Engaging young people with climate change
Vo lum e 6 , S e p t embe r / O c tobe r 2 0 1 5 © 2015 Wil e y P e r i odic a l s , I nc. 529
Compared to older age groups, young people
in Europe appear to be less fatalistic about combating
climate change, possibly reflecting a strategy of ‘mean-
ing-focused coping’which permits the magnitude of the
climate threat to be manageable.
29
But negative affect is
still a central theme of young people’s views about cli-
mate change (as it is in older populations
105,106
) with
feelings of anxiety, stress and despair reported in sev-
eral studies of Australian young adults. Young people
tend to see governments as having the greatest respon-
sibility for catalyzing a response to climate change, but
express low levels of trust in them. There is also a great
deal of dissatisfaction with the political process, and a
low level of voting among the young in many countries
across the world, which is an obvious barrier to engage
with climate policies. For these and other reasons, there
appears to be a lack of perceived self-efficacy among
younger people with regards to climate change. Young
people do not necessarily see what they can do in
response to climate change, and when perceived self-
efficacy is limited, personal engagement with climate
change is likely to be lower.
In terms of engaging young people more effec-
tively, there are some tentative lessons that can be
drawn from the existing literature. First, as for older
populations, providing accurate information (either
about the science of climate change or behavioral/pol-
icy responses) is insufficient for effective engagement.
Instead, messages should be presented in a way that
speaks to the interests and values of young people—
perhaps using ‘edutainment’programs
70
or by focusing
on the issues young people are passionate about that
may be affected by climate change.
74
Importantly,
young people’s interests should not be assumed but
instead established through elicitation exercises with
this audience.
Better understanding the recipients of climate
change messages and paying careful attention to
the messengers are also crucial. Our review has
identified parents, teachers, peers, and scientists as
well-trusted messengers for climate change messages.
Building young people’s sense of self-efficacy would also
appear to be important: this variable has been identified
in several studies as a barrier to behavioral engagement.
In terms of encouraging behavioral change, it is the
‘experiential’that seems to matter the most: topics and
media driven by young people themselves, preferably
facilitated through a peer-to-peer approach, have been
found to promote sustainable behavior. Group activities
and peer-led programs may prove more successful in
encouraging long-term modification of environmental
behavior than information campaigns.
Of these potential messengers, young people
themselves would appear to offer significant promise,
also raising the possibility of promoting positive social
norms among this age group around climate change
engagement. Negative social norms associated with
pro-environmental behaviors have been identified as
a challenge for communicating with this audience
58
and if pro-environmental behaviors conflict with other
priorities (e.g., leisure activities), they are likely to be
avoided. In particular, energy-saving or conservation
behaviors that are ‘inconvenient’or ‘uncool’are
unlikely to appeal to young people. Finally, there
would appear to be limited interest among young peo-
ple in challenging the arguments and positions of
organized skeptic groups.
75
It may therefore be more
effective to focus on the merits of different climate pol-
icy solutions (framed using tangible benefits to health,
for example), than the credibility of the underlying sci-
ence as a means of engagement.
There are still some major gaps in terms of
understanding how to engage young people on cli-
mate change—including significant discrepancies in
the level of understanding about young people and
climate change in different nations, with a strong bias
toward European, Australian, and U.S. data. Build-
ing a richer understanding of international youth per-
spectives on climate change should be an important
priority for future research. Although the literature
on how the general population engages with this cli-
mate change has proliferated, there are many areas
where no direct evidence in relation to young people
is yet available. For example, while the challenges of
communicating risk and uncertainty
107
and the pit-
falls of using fear, guilt, or ‘alarmism’to attract pub-
lic attention
108
have been explored, there is limited
guidance for young people specifically (although
there is evidence that guilt-based messaging on cli-
mate change risks ‘disengaging, desensitizing and
even antagonising young people’in the UK
7
). Worry
and fear may not in themselves be barriers to engage-
ment with climate change, but they must be counter-
balanced by constructive emotions such as hopeful-
ness if engagement with climate change is to be
maintained.
36
It may be that young people are no different to
older populations in many regards—and certainly,
there is evidence in this review that this is largely the
case in some key respects. Also, it should be acknowl-
edged that many psychological studies are conducted
using undergraduate populations (i.e., aged 18–22),
but are neither labeled nor analyzed as studies of
‘young people.’But future research should seek to more
closely investigate any discrepancies between younger
and older cohorts of the public in terms of climate
change engagement—in particular to compare and
evaluate the sorts of messages, language, and narratives
Focus Article wires.wiley.com/climatechange
530 © 2015 W i l e y P eri o d i c als, In c . Vol u m e 6 , S eptem b e r /Octo b e r 2 015
that are likely to resonate with young people. If care-
fully designed, this kind of ‘action research’(whereby
communication strategies are explored and improved
at the same time) can help to ensure that when the
young people of today assume decision-making posi-
tions in sectors across society, the evidence base for
engaging them on climate change is much stronger than
it is today.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This work was conducted as part of the AUTreach Project, which received funding from the Austrian Climate and
Energy Fund within the Austrian Climate Research Programme (ACRP).
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