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Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

April 2015
African Security Review 24(2):207-231

DOI:10.1080/10246029.2015.1051824

Authors:

Institute for Security Studies

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.

Post-1999 elections and violence

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Major terrorist acts committed during the 2015 presidential election

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Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential

election a victory for Boko Haram or for

democracy?

Martin Ewi

Published online: 07 Jul 2015.

To cite this article: Martin Ewi (2015) Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a

victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?, African Security Review, 24:2, 207-231, DOI:

10.1080/10246029.2015.1051824

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2015.1051824

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Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential

election a victory for Boko Haram or

for democracy?

Martin Ewi

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a

member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The

smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the interna-

tional community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because

Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that

Jonathan’s growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a

major role in the president’s sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus

a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.

Keywords democracy, terrorism, election, security, Boko Haram, violence, Nigeria, politics, party, electoral terrorism

With anger swelling over corruption, inequality and a devastating Islamist insurgency in the

nation’s north, Nigerians by a wide margin chose an austere former general who once

ruled with an iron hand to be their next president…

Introduction

Contrary to widespread expectations that violence, chaos and electoral malpractice would mar

the 2015 presidential election, Nigerians made history by voting in relatively peaceful and

orderly conditions, making it a significant milestone in the electoral history of Africa’s largest

democracy. The successful election, which was hailed by international observers as credible,

reaffirms the constitutional proclamation that Nigeria remains an indivisible and indissoluble

sovereign state.

On 28 March, Nigerians went to the polls for the fifth time since the reintroduction of

democracy in 1999 to perform one of the most important constitutional duties of electing or

re-electing the president of the Federal Republic. The stakes in the election were particularly

high for several reasons. Firstly, the election was held at a time when Nigeria was battling a

ISSN: Print 1024-6029/Online 2154-0128

#2015 Institute for Security Studies

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2015.1051824

http://www.tandfonline.com

African Security Review, 24.2, June 2015, 207–231

Martin Ewi is a senior researcher

in the Transnational Threats and

International Crime Division of

the Institute for Security Studies,

Pretoria (mewi@issafrica.org)

Downloaded by [Martin Ewi] at 10:29 07 July 2015

pernicious and violent form of terrorism, which raised critical issues of security for the

election itself. Secondly, polls taken before the election showed that this was the closest

contest to date, in which the main opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), led

by former military leader General Muhammadu Buhari, looked likely to unseat the ruling

People’s Democratic Party (PDP) led by incumbent Dr Goodluck Jonathan, which had

dominated Nigeria’s politics for the past 16 years. Thirdly, Nigerians were also grappling with

daunting crises of unemployment, a sluggish economy, widespread corruption, and electricity

and petrol shortages, all of which had resulted in anger and discontent among Nigerians. And

fourthly, the two principal contestants represented the two arch-rival regions of Nigeria –the

North, represented by Buhari, a Muslim, and the South, respresented by Jonathan, a

Christian. In these two candidates, all the contradictions of Nigeria came together –zonal

politics, minority–majority politics, ethnicity, religion, corruption, and insecurity –in an

intriguing interplay.

Hence, the two candidates led a campaign that was marked by ‘bitter, divisive and

sometimes hateful rhetoric which left little hope that the election would end without massive

violence’.

For the opposition, the election was an opportunity for the Nigerian people to

prosecute and pass verdict on the performance of Jonathan’s administration, which had ruled

Nigeria since 2010, following the untimely death of then-president Musa Yar’Adua.

Meanwhile for the ruling party it was another occasion to reassert its authority and prove

once again the PDP’s resilience.

The election stood on a knife’s edge. It could make history in Nigeria by becoming the first

election ever in which the opposition unseated the incumbent through the ballot box, and at

the same time it could easily descend into the abyss of bloodshed. In a country where violence

has become a recurrent factor in elections, and compounded by the imminent threat posed by

Boko Haram, the latter seemed almost certain to be the fate of the election. James Schneider

and Peter Eze of the New African magazine aptly captured the aura of fear that surrounded the

election in their statement: ‘These elections could spell disaster. Boko Haram, the Islamist

insurgency focused in the country’s northeast, could heavily disrupt voting in much of the

country.’

Many analysts predicted widespread violence and electoral malpractice, with the

risks of triggering a civil war and precipitating the break-up of Nigeria along North–South

lines or Muslim–Christian lines.

Even after casting his vote, Wole Soyinka, Nigeria’s Nobel

Laureate in Literature and one of the most celebrated African authors, decried the proceedings

as ‘the most vicious, unprincipled, vulgar and violent election exercises I have ever

witnessed’.

Despite all of this, and the threat that Boko Haram posed to the elections, 29 432 083

Nigerians were out in the streets in defiance of the warnings of the Islamist group and voted in

a relatively peaceful and orderly manner.

By any measure the elections were never perfect,

but where sporadic violence and electoral malpractice occurred, the Independent National

Electoral Commission (INEC) responded to them with neutrality. Party leaders also showed

maturity in making use of peaceful and democratic mechanisms for managing grievances.

What epitomised this election was the resounding victory of the APC, which marks the first

time in Nigeria’s history that an opposition party has defeated a ruling party in open and

peaceful elections. Jonathan’s telephone call to concede defeat and congratulate his opponent,

Buhari was not only unprecedented, but was also hailed across the world as the decisive point

in the election. In addition, the president also appealed to his partisans, particularly those who

may have felt aggrieved, to follow due process based on the constitution and Nigeria’s

208 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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electoral laws, in seeking redress,

following a practice that has remained the hallmark of

civilised democracies in Europe and America.

Jonathan’s charismatic handling of the

election proved him not only a leader but also a democrat and the first sitting President to

accept defeat and even congratulate his opponent in the Nigerian history of elections’.

The success of the 2015 elections raises a key research question relating to whether the

victory of former military leader, Buhari, was a victory for democracy or a victory for

terrorism. If the acclaimed scholar of contemporary democracy, Larry Diamond, is right that

‘the ability to turn the ruling party out of power is a crucial threshold for democratization’,

does it mean that the 2015 elections will usher in a new dawn for democracy in Nigeria? The

election also raises the need to critically interrogate the relationship between terrorism and

elections. This article is therefore an attempt to critically assess the role that the threat of Boko

Haram played in the 2015 presidential election, and how the two principal political parties

dealt with it. It explains the extent to which this threat impacted the outcome of the election

with a view to critically interrogate the relationship between elections and terrorism. To this

end, the article is divided into five main sections. The first offers a brief overview of the

general theoretical framework used in explaining the links between elections and terrorism.

The second provides a historical perspective of the links between terrorism and democracy in

Nigeria. Section three examines the phenomenon of electoral terrorism in Nigeria. Section

four analyses the 2015 presidential election and the threat of Boko Haram. In section five, the

article examines the the nature of the terrorism seen during the 2015 election, with a view to

critically appraise its implications. It concludes that the relationship between elections and

terrorism is not mutual, as the latter exploits the former to achieve its goals. In this context, it

is argued that the election was a win for Boko Haram and for democracy.

Terrorism and elections: a theoretical framework

The vulnerability of the 2015 presidential election to terrorism reflects both Nigeria’s

daunting challenges in terms of elections and a growing global phenomenon whereby terrorist

organisations are increasingly targeting elections and democratic institutions.

Terrorists have

struck at electoral processes even in big democracies such as the United States (US), the

United Kingdom (UK), Spain and Israel. This has attracted a burgeoning scholarly interest in

the relationship between terrorism and elections and democratic systems in general. The

extant literature on the topic suggests that terrorists are political actors who see elections as an

opportunity to compete or settle scores with other political actors. Others have espoused the

view that terrorists may attack elections to influence voters’decisions or as a reaction to voters’

preferences.

Several scholars have also emphasised the intrinsic nature of the relationship

between terrorism and elections. Violence in general has long been a prominent feature of

elections, not least in Africa, where elections became a dominant cause of conflict and political

instability in the post-Cold War era.

It is paradoxical that an ‘election’which is supposed to

be ‘a means to provide ordinary citizens [with] a voice in government and a greater stake in

political outcomes’is attacked by the same people who are supposed to use it to effect the

desired change.

This has been the most controversial aspect of political violence.

The risks of violence occurring in elections seems to be extremely high in societies

emerging from conflict or political instability, where elections turn out to be highly polarised

and divisive.

As one scholar puts it, ‘elections in emerging democracies are a tightrope walk

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between war and peace, stability and instability’.

This paper furthers the view that historical

precedence and the environment in which elections are held are the key variables in

determining the propensity for violence during and after elections. Where violence is or has

been prevalent in the form of conflict or intermittent crisis, it is highly likely for electoral

violence to occur. Indeed, David Hume may have been right in his view of the election as ‘a

“political craft”, which determines the fate of a nation in tumultuous times of revolution, war,

or conquest’.

His pessimistic view of elections as nothing more than ‘a few great men, who

decide for the whole, and will allow of no opposition’,oras‘a fury of the multitude, that

follow a seditious ringleader’,

seems to encapsulate the elitist nature of some elections or

what some have termed the ‘ceremonial façade for the reshuffling of elites’power’in

Nigeria.

The 1999 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and

Combating of Terrorism, which has been signed by 50 of the 54 African Union (AU) member

states and ratified by 41 of them,

defines a terrorist act as:

any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger

the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to any person, any

number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property,

natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

(i) intimidate, put in fear, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the

general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to

adopt or abandon a particular standpoint or to act according to certain principles; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to

create a public emergency; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State.

Some definitions have emphasised the ‘use of violence by an organization other than a

national government to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience’,

be it

government, private sector, individuals or groups, with the purpose of fulfilling ideological,

political or socio-economic goals. In this article, the term terrorism shall mean as defined by

the 1990 OAU Convention, with emphasis on non-state actors. Terrorism or electoral

terrorism is generally considered a subset of electoral violence.

The relationship between terrorism and elections is complex and often poses methodo-

logical difficulties for researchers. From empirical observation, at least three levels of analysis

exist. Firstly, non-state terrorist groups may deliberately target elections to intimidate voters in

order to vote (or not vote) in a specific pattern in favour of the terrorist group or they may

target electoral institutions or the candidates of certain political parties. An election, defined

here as a critical activity of democratic expression, which allows people to freely choose their

leaders, may also be incompatible with terrorists’ideology and therefore be targeted. Secondly,

political thugs or spoilers may wish to disrupt elections by intimidating voters and/or electoral

institutions by pursuing terrorist tactics. Thirdly, political parties or elites may rent or sponsor

such groups or utilise state security mechanisms in order to influence electoral outcomes. This

is remarkably consistent with Stanford University scholar Martha Crenshaw’s claim that

terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection and that it is a strategy employed by a

minority.

Terrorist attacks on elections may employ various strategies or tactics, including

acts of sabotage and vandalism, kidnapping, snatching and hijacking of electoral materials,

210 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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bombings, arson attacks on electoral properties, the brutalising, maiming and killing of

electoral personnel, suicide attacks, and gun violence, with the sole intention of intimidating

and spreading fear among voters and electoral personnel with a view to influencing electoral

outcomes or discrediting the election process itself.

In a study, Roland Hodler and Dominic Rohner find that the risk of terrorist attacks is

highest at the beginning of electoral terms because, as they explain, ‘striking early allows the

terrorists to collect valuable information about the government’s type, and also because

terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness

closer to an upcoming election’.

Other scholars have postulated the view that the risk of

electoral terrorism is dependent on the permissibility of electoral systems. In this context,

where electoral institutions are highly permissive, the risk of violent elections or electoral

terrorism occurring is low. According to Deniz Aksoy and David Carter, ‘[w]hen electoral

permissiveness is high, there are institutional means for even the most marginal discontented

groups to seek their political goals by forming new parties, competing in elections and gaining

representation in the legislature’,

rather than resorting to violent means.

The relationship between elections and terrorism may also be understood within the

broader theoretical debate on the relationship between democracy and peace. It is important to

bear in mind that terrorism in this context is limited, except where stated otherwise, to non-

state terrorism.

In a seminal study in 2003, Robert Pape found that democracies are much more vulnerable

to suicide attacks. ‘In fact,’he states, ‘the target state of every modern suicide campaign has

been a democracy.’

Pape’s finding is further corroborated by Erica Chenoweth, a Wesleyan

University scholar, who argues that terrorist incidents are more prevalent in democracies than

in states without it. She asserts that ‘terrorism proliferates in democracies not due to the

presence of civil liberties, but rather because of intergroup dynamics, when political

organizations are motivated to escalate their activities due to political competition’.

Pape’s theoretical paradigm sharply contrasts Imannuel Kant’s widely acclaimed ‘demo-

cratic peace’maxim, which has dominated international politics in the last two centuries. It

inspired the spread of democracy in Africa in the 1990s and was specifically recommended as a

panacea to the continent’s myriad internal armed conflicts and civil wars, which Gerard

Prunier calls ‘Africa’s World War’.

The democratic peace theory holds that democracies or

republican systems of government are inherently more peaceful than nondemocratic

regimes.

According to Kant:

if Fortune ordains that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic –which

by its very nature is inclined to perpetual peace –this would serve as a centre of federal

union for other states wishing to join, and thus secure conditions of freedom among the

states in accordance with the idea of the law of nations.

The Kantian democratic peace is anchored on the core axiom that the structural design of

democracies, particularly their key internal attributes of representation, elections, public

opinion, liberties and rule of law, make it difficult for them to initiate war. Kant argued that

these institutional constraints –a structure of division of powers, checks and balances –would

make it difficult for democratic leaders to move their countries into war.

Kant’s preference

for a ‘republic’over a ‘democracy’, the latter of which he accused of despotism, was not

unique. Even prior to the publication of his Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay in 1795,

American thinkers and founding fathers had been debating what form of government America

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should adopt, with James Madison producing what was perhaps the most cogent argument in

favour of a republic over a democracy. Madison saw democracy as a source of conflict and

instability because decisions are not made ‘according to the rules of justice and the rights of

the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority’.

In Madisonian terms, it may be more appropriate to call it ‘republican peace’than

‘democratic peace’, since the latter is paradoxical because, for Madison, democracy is

inherently violent or ‘unpeaceful’. It is therefore important to stress here that the use of the

term ‘democratic peace’is purely in the Kantian sense of a republic, which is in consonance

with Madison’s. The democratic peace theory assumed a new currency in the works of Dean

Babst, who, in a seminal paper entitled ‘Elective governments –a force for peace’, published

in the now discontinued Wisconsin Sociologist journal in 1964, argued, on the basis of empirical

evidence from 116 countries, that freely elected governments of independent states do not go

to war against each other. Babst’s reasoning that ‘the general public does not want war if it can

choose’

resonates with Kant’s strong belief in the moral imperative in human nature or the

view that humanity is ‘driven by self-interest as well as moral maxims incompatible with

war’.

Further reflections and empirical enquiry into the Kantian proposition by liberal

thinkers have firmly established the notion that democracies almost never go to war with each

other. This idea has acquired the status of a universal norm or what some scholars have

referred to as ‘empirical law’

in international relations,

and has become one of the

fundamental tenets of the liberal and idealist view of global order. Anastasia Xenias is right in

her observation that ‘[t]heorists and policymakers alike have clung to this proposition with

incredible zeal, offering it up as a cure to the world’s political ills especially to security threats

and to war’.

As a source for peace and global stability, the democratic peace proposition has been

rejected by realist thinkers who, like the German scholar Hans Joachim Morgenthau, argue

that ‘moral and ethic premises alone are not enough to understand international politics –they

have to be brought into balance with hard power interests’.

Realists contend that a

permanent peace between mutually recognised democracies is not possible, because liberal

states like all other states must base foreign policy on the imperative of power politics.

Neo-

realists further stress that ‘competition for the scarce resources of security and prosperity make

international conflicts unavoidable’.

The late American political scientist Kenneth Waltz

accused proponents of democratic peace of overlooking the fact that democracy alone cannot

guarantee peace and that the latter depends on the ‘precarious balance of forces’.

Waltz

emphasised the view that peace is maintained by a delicate balance of internal and external

restraints,

and that the causes of peace and conflict are to be found in the international

distribution of national power capabilities.

Other criticisms against the democratic peace

precept have highlighted its inadequacies in the explanation of the causal relationship between

democracy and peace,

the fluidity of the definition of democracy or liberal democracy, which

often leads liberal states to dismiss or label warlike states as non-democracies,

and its lack of

understanding of the causes of violence,

and explication of domestic conflicts and civil strife

in democratic states.

The theoretical debate on democratic peace focuses predominantly on the actions of states

but with limited or no attention given to non-state transnational or global forces, which affect

domestic and global politics irrespective of the regime type. For example, the emergence of al-

Qaeda as a global terrorist group in the 1990s has, perhaps more than any other non-state actor

in recent history, significantly influenced international politics, particularly after the 9/11

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attacks in the US. Regime type may only be important in determining terrorist sanctuaries.

For example, al-Qaeda was able to utilise non-democratic spaces in Sudan and Afghanistan to

attack democratic states such as Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the US in 2001, respectively.

The link between terrorism and democracy is more glaring in the writings of counter-

terrorism scholars and practitioners. While democracy has been advanced as a cure for

insurrection and social violence, including terrorism, increasingly a growing number of

empirical studies have found that modern democracies exhibit conditions conducive to

terrorism, thus challenging the basic claim that democracy is the antidote to terrorism.

Core

democratic values such as liberalism and freedoms, which are what proponents of democratic

peace see as factors that make democracies resilient, are the same factors that counter-

terrorism scholars see as motivation for drivers of terrorism in a democracy. Paul Wilkinson

puts it neatly:

It is because they [liberal democracies] enjoy constitutional legitimacy in the eyes of the

majority of their citizens that modern liberal democracies have proved remarkably resilient

against terrorist campaigns by extremist political movements. Compared to colonial

regimes and autocracies the Western liberal democracies have been remarkably free of

large-scale revolutionary strife and separatist wars. However, they have not proved to be

immune against terrorist attacks: on the contrary, the intrinsic freedoms of the democratic

society make the tasks of terrorist propaganda, recruitment, organisation and the mounting

of operations a relatively easy matter. There is ease of movement in and out of the country,

and freedom of travel within it. Rights of free speech and a free media can be used as

shields for terrorist defamation of democratic leaders and institutions and terrorist

incitement to violence.

Furthermore, he argues that there is an intrinsic relationship between liberal democracy and

terrorism and stresses that new or emerging democracies are the most at risk of terrorism.

To strengthen this intrinsic link between democracy and terrorism, Chenoweth posits that

towards the end of the 20

century, terrorism was primarily a democratic phenomenon:

between 1968 and 1997, terrorist attacks occurred with more frequency in democracies than in

non-democracies.

According to Chenoweth, the motivation for terrorism in a democracy

arises from political competition. She argues that in a democracy, interest groups compete for

space, which is crowded or dominated by numerous issues.

Indeed, such competition, which

may occur between groups of unequal sizes –whereby one group may have more political

influence –may result in terrorist activities. The group with less political influence (in terms

of number of votes or support for policies) is likely to resort to intimidating tactics such as

terrorism, particularly in emerging democracies where the winner-takes-all principle prevails,

or what some have termed, ‘a matter of death or life struggle’.

The group with greater

influence may also use intimidating tactics either in revenge or to suppress the rights of

minorities.

After analysing the data on all known suicide terrorist attacks that occurred between 1980

and 2004, Pape concluded that global suicide terrorist attacks are driven by ‘a clear strategic

objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that

the terrorists view as their homeland’.

Although suicide terrorism has evolved from its

primary focus on occupation to become a routine terrorist tactic, Pape’s explanation of why

democracies are particularly vulnerable provides further insights into why terrorism is

prevalent in democracies. According to Pape, democracies are often viewed as ‘soft’targets

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because they have ‘low thresholds of cost tolerance and high ability to affect state policy’, they

generally show restraint ‘in their use of force against civilians’, and suicide attacks ‘may also be

harder to organize or publicize in authoritarian police states’.

From the extant literature discussed above, it is important to note that democracy is not

portrayed as a primary cause of terrorism or as containing the conditions for terrorist

grievances. Instead democracy is discussed as a conduit for terrorism –or the fact that

terrorists may exploit conditions inherent in a democracy such as free speech, freedom of

movement and association, right to privacy, free and independent media, social media, and

political competition among factions. Terrorism therefore represents a governance and

security issue within a democracy or any system of governance. This may explain why some

democracies have been more efficient in managing, containing or preventing terrorism.

Scholars, such as F Gregory Gause III, of Texas A&M University, believe that terrorism stems

from factors much more specific than regime type and that democracy is unlikely to eliminate

terrorism.

Nigeria: a history of democracy and electoral violence

Nigeria is one of many African countries that transitioned from military dictatorship to

multiparty electoral rule in the 1990s. However, the extent to which these countries could be

regarded as democracies –in terms of Kant’s‘republic’–remains heavily contested.

The

Economist, for example, thinks that democracy on the continent is ‘a glass half-full’, and it

ranks only one African country, Mauritius, as a ‘full’democracy.

The relatively stable and

peaceful nature of Mauritius may provide further empirical evidence for the democratic peace

proposition. Nigeria and a host of other nations are classified as ‘hybrid regimes’,

which is

also consistent with the Freedom House and Global Democracy rankings of Nigeria as ‘partly

free’

and ‘among the 10 worst countries’,

respectively. Notwithstanding these rankings,

and for the purposes of this article, Nigeria would be considered a democracy on the basis of

its 1999 constitution.

Nigeria is one of Africa’s youngest democracies, and the 2015 presidential election was

only the country’s fifth election since democracy replaced the military rule that had dominated

Nigeria’s politics since 1966, during which time military coups were the fashionable mode of

power transition. In fact, of the 11 administrations that ruled Nigeria between 1960 and 1998,

seven came to power through a military coup

and only two came to power through elections

by universal suffrage, while two were transitional administrations. Since the adoption of a

liberal democratic constitution in 1999, elections have become more regular and systematic,

replacing military coups as a tool for change of power. Although Nigeria only introduced

multiparty politics in 1999, the country has a much longer experience with elections. Nigeria

began its experimentation with democratic elections in 1923 following the introduction of the

Clifford Constitution in 1922, which for the first time provided for the ‘Legislative Council of

Nigeria’and regional elections in Lagos and Calabar.

This election, like many others held

prior to independence in 1960, was conducted under British colonial rule. Nigeria’s first post-

independence election, however, was only held in 1964.

In order to fully appreciate the democratic credentials of the post-military rule era, it may

be useful to provide some comparative statistics. Of the nine general and presidential elections

conducted between 1964 and 2015, five have been conducted in the past 16 years, while only

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four were conducted in 34 years (the period 1964 to 1998) –and only two of them produced a

change of government, while one was annulled. There are various reports that the 1964

election and subsequent elections in Nigeria were seriously marred by violence. The violence

has been so incessant that it is the most predictable factor in Nigeria’s elections. As one

commentator stated: ‘The Nigerian polity over the years had been immersed with endemic

electoral violence.’

Sharing the same frustration, Akin Oyebode, Professor of Law at Lagos

University, said that ‘elections in Nigeria have constantly been an embarrassment to the

civilized world’.

For the purposes of this article, electoral violence is understood as

a sub-category of political violence that is primarily distinguished by its timing and motive.

It is a coercive and deliberate strategy used by political actors –incumbents as well as

opposition parties –to advance their interests or achieve specific political goals in relation

to an electoral contest.

Table 1 examines the phenomenon of electoral violence in Nigeria prior to 1999, the

benchmark for Nigeria’s modern democracy, in order to determine the prevalence of violence.

Table 1 shows that with the exception of the general elections of 1964–5, which were

extremely polarised and divisive, most of the elections conducted prior to 1999 were relatively

peaceful. Two of them were held under civilian administrations: the election of Abubakar

Tafawa Balewa –the first president of Nigeria, who was killed in the 1966 military coup led by

Yakubu Gowon –and the election of Shehu Shagari in 1983. Accusations of extensive

corruption, electoral malpractice, political thuggery, intimidation and other violent acts were

levelled at both electoral processes, while both elections produced the extreme consequences

of military coups d’état and were most deadly post-election. Table 1 also notes that elections

Ta b l e 1 Pre-1999 elections and violence

Election Year Reported violence Outcome

General 1964–5 Severe pre-electoral, electoral and

post-electoral violence included

maiming, kidnapping, vandalism,

and acts of sabotage, arson and

murder due to boycotts and

contestation of results.

Nigerian National Alliance (NNA)

won 198 seats, coup d’e

´tat and

civil war.

Presidential 1979 Mild post-electoral violence and

thuggery due to contestation of

results.

Shehu Shagari won the election for

the National Party of Nigeria (NPN).

Presidential 1983 Sporadic post-electoral violence

epitomised by the Ondo State

electoral violence debacle and the

Ekwueme Movement –hundreds of

people are believed to have died.

Shehu Shagari won for the NPN

amidst widespread allegations of

fraud and electoral malpractice,

military coup d’e

´tat (Muhammadu

Buhari).

Presidential 1993 Relatively peaceful pre-election and

during election, widespread post-

electoral violence, mostly targeted,

including assassinations.

MKO Abiola won for the United

Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP);

result annulled, military coup d’e

´tat

(Sani Abacha).

Africa Watch 215

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organised under military rule, particularly when the incumbent military leader is not a

candidate, were relatively peaceful. Another important observation is that elections that

produced new leaders or where the incumbent was not a winner tended to be more peaceful.

This concurs with the finding of a study conducted by two Nigerian researchers,

Nkwachukwu Orji and Nkiru Uzodi, who observe that transitional elections are generally

more peaceful than consolidation elections.

Table 2 shows that multiparty elections have become regularised and the sole mode of

power transition since the adoption of the 1999 constitution, showing evidence of liberal

democracy. However, while elections have become more frequent, their quality has declined.

There is a visible increase in violence and allegations of electoral malpractice. It is also evident

from Table 2 that elections that were held to confirm an incumbent, as in 2003 and 2011, have

generally been more violent and more deadly. Indeed, some analysts have estimated the death

toll of the 2003 elections to be as high as 10 000.

The limited violence in the 2015 elections

may be due to the fact that the opposition won, which significantly reduced post-electoral

violence.

Another reason could be that there was little effort by the incumbent to influence results or

that the electoral institutions were relatively more independent and efficient. Many have

attributed the low level of violence and the success of the 2015 elections to the role played by

Jonathan, the incumbent, and to some extent, Buhari, the main opposition leader. The two

leaders urged their partisans to be peaceful and follow due process in resolving any electoral

injustices. This reaffirmed the significant influence of elites both as a source of and as a

mitigating factor for electoral violence.

Table 2 Post-1999 elections and violence

Election Year Reported violence Outcome

Presidential 1999 Widespread post-electoral violence following

allegations of fraud (estimated deaths: 80).

Olusegun Obasanjo

won for the PDP.

Presidential 2003 Widespread pre-electoral, electoral and post-

electoral violence, in the form of thuggery,

vandalism, violent riots and gun violence

(estimated deaths: 400).

Obasanjo won for

the PDP.

Presidential 2007 Widespread post-electoral violence, particularly

riots in the north, including thuggery, intimidation,

bombings, gun violence and other terrorist

activities instigated by the Movement for the

Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)

(estimated deaths: 200).

Umaru Musa Yar’Adua

won for the PDP.

Presidential 2011 Widespread pre-electoral, electoral, and post-

electoral violence characterised by political

thuggery, terrorist acts, assassinations and voter

intimidation (estimated deaths, mostly attributed

to Boko Haram: 800).

Jonathan won for

the PDP.

Presidential 2015 Political thuggery, sporadic pre-electoral violence

and electoral terrorist attacks. A few states

experienced post-electoral violence (estimated

deaths: 70).

Buhari won for

the APC.

216 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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Also worth mentioning is the mitigating role played by the international community

through the shuttle diplomacy of Kofi Annan. The latter was instrumental in brokering the

peace pact signed in January 2015 by all the 2015 election presidential candidates. In March

2015, Jonathan and Buhari signed another peace accord. The two agreements obliged all the

presidential aspirants and their supporters to pursue a non-violent campaign and to avoid

inflammatory statements

. Jonathan and Buhari further pledged that their ‘electoral

campaigns will not involve any religious incitement, ethnic or tribal profiling’.

The two tables, however, confirm the claim that, though the degree of violence has varied

with each election, violence has been a permanent factor in Nigeria’s long electoral history.

Although political violence has a much longer history in Nigeria, the advent of elections has

exacerbated it. Nigeria has been plagued by various internecine conflicts, including Christian–

Muslim conflict, ethnic conflict, herder–sedentary farmer conflict and secessionist conflict.

These conflicts and crises have occasionally been so severe that scholars have warned against

the disintegration or balkanisation of the Nigerian state,

while others have referred to it as a

‘failed state’.

Nigeria was one of the examples used in Robert Kaplan’s premonitions for

anarchy. In his 1994 article entitled, ‘The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, over-

population, tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet’, the

American political scientist averred that Nigeria is ‘likely to split into several pieces’.

Nigeria

has not split, but it has come close many times.

Against this background, elections have

occurred in a very fragile environment, increasing vulnerability and the risk of electoral

violence.

Numerous studies have emphasised different causal factors of electoral violence in

Nigeria. Some have blamed intraparty feuds, interparty clashes, communal unrest, zoning,

resource-based competition, social divisions, spoilers and post-electoral grievances.

Others have identified the lucrative nature of political office, weak electoral institutions

and enforcement regimes, greedy and selfish political leaders, poverty and structural

inequality, chronic corruption, the history of tension between the major ethnic and religious

groups, and electoral fraud and other unregulated and unconstitutional practices as the

drivers of electoral violence in Nigeria.

While all of these factors may be

at play, this article argues that the major cause of electoral violence in Nigeria is the

‘democratic deficit’or the fact that the 1999 constitution created a democratic system, but

did not create the democrats to enforce it.

Consequently, individuals are more powerful

than institutions.

The American scholar, Peter Lewis, lamented this apparent institutional

failureandspokeoftheneedfor‘a strong democratic movement rooted in strategic elites or

abroadercivilsociety’to bridge this democracy gap in Nigeria.

Apart from its debilitating impact on democracy, electoral violence in Nigeria has also

taken a terrible toll on human life, with telling ramifications on human rights and

humanitarian conditions. It has been estimated that electoral violence claimed more than

11 000 lives in Nigeria between 1999 and 2006.

Other estimates suggest that 10 000 people

were killed in political, ethnic and religious violence between 1999 and 2003.

At least 1 000

people perished in electoral violence in 2007 and 2011, with at least 800 of the deaths

occurring in the post-2011 election aftermath alone.

Electoral violence is not peculiar to

Nigeria. Indeed, the situation in Nigeria is in many respects a reflection of a worsening

continental ordeal. Electoral bloodbaths in Algeria in 1991–2, Angola in 1992, Kenya in 2007,

and Côte d’Ivoire in 2010, to name a few, are a vivid illustration of how elections have become

a primary source of conflict and political violence.

Africa Watch 217

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Electoral terrorism in Nigeria

Electoral terrorism is a sub-category of electoral violence, which refers to the deliberate use of

tactics that are terrorist in nature to attack voters, candidates for elections, electoral institutions

and values, with the intention of causing fear and intimidation in order to disrupt the election,

influence its outcome or create a reaction to its outcome. It is distinguishable from other

electoral violence acts by its motive, which may be political, ideological or philosophical.

Terrorism was a source of insecurity in Nigeria long before it became a concern for elections.

Terror-style attacks have been a worrisome adjunct to the persistent violence in Nigeria,

which in its different permutations has been characterised by assassinations, gruesome

murders, indiscriminate bombings, arson attacks, abductions and kidnappings, mass

disappearances and other violent acts meant to intimidate the population. It is important to

note that electoral terrorism only occurs in the pre-election, election and immediate post-

election periods, and may only be deemed as such if attacks or motives are directly or

indirectly related to elections. The choice of target, motive and/or method of attack are key

elements of this definition. Electoral terrorism may be perpetrated by a non-state terrorist

group, thugs or spoilers, political parties or state security outfits or agencies. For the purposes

of this article, electoral terrorism shall refer to violent acts including threats of violence and the

propaganda of non-state terrorist groups or individuals directed against elections, as well as

acts such as kidnappings and abductions, bombings, suicide attacks, assassinations, murders,

arson and mass disappearances perpetrated by other entities with a political or ideological

motive.

The causes of electoral terrorism are complex and may not always be located within the

election. Grievances may vary widely and may sometimes be regarding issues unrelated to the

election. The election may, however, provide an opportunity to settle scores. Electoral

terrorism in Nigeria preys on the impunity gap caused by several years of conflicts, military

coups, rebellions and insurgencies. Understanding electoral terrorism in Nigeria requires an

understanding of the root causes of terrorism. Four main issues have shaped, animated and

entrenched terrorism in post-independence Nigeria. The first is Islamic revivalism, which has

its contemporary roots in the jihad led by Shehu Usman Dan Fodio, whose reformist

campaign to purge Islam of paganism and ritualistic practices in the then ‘Hausaland’resulted

in the establishment of a fundamentalist Muslim empire called the Sokoto Caliphate in

1804.

The demise of the Caliphate at the dawn of the British colonial administration in 1903

generated new impulses that would fuel Islamic rebellion and radicalisation in northern

Nigeria, the precursor to the age-old tension between contemporary Muslims and Christians.

The continued existence of this conflict has spurred the growth of Islamist extremist groups

such as Boko Haram.

The second issue is resource competition, which has come to be epitomised by the Niger

Delta insurgency, from which many groups, including the Movement for the Emancipation of

the Niger Delta (MEND), have evolved. The third is communal or interethnic conflicts,

which have given birth to groups such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People

(MOSOP), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and

the Odua Peoples Congress (OPC), a military wing of the Egbe Omo Oduduwa (a Yoruba

outfit).

The fourth is the age-old herders–farmers conflict in various parts of Nigeria, which

is caused by a combination of factors including a growing scarcity of natural resources,

demographic expansion, climate change and ethnic diversity.

218 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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The origin of terrorism in Nigeria has been traced as far back as the pre-colonial period.

In the post-independence era, terrorism is believed to have begun with the declaration of the

‘Niger Delta Republic’(NDR) on 23 February 1966 by Major Isaac Jasper Adaka Boro (of

ethnic Ijaw descent). The declaration of the NDR and the subsequent formation of its armed

wing, the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF),

ignited an insurgency that would remain a

vexing issue for Nigeria’s national security.

Although terrorist tactics have been used almost invariably in the reported electoral

violence, terrorism per se first became an issue in Nigeria’s elections in 2007. Terrorism was

not initially at the forefront of the elections, particularly before and during the 14 April 2007

election. Terrorism, however, became a dominant issue post-election. Nevertheless, pre-

election, MEND made a number of declarations both to clarify its interest in the elections and

to signal its views about the way elections were conducted in the country. In its 2 April

statement, the Niger Delta terrorist group made clear that its interest in the election was to

seek a candidate who would be able to hand over control of the Niger Delta resources to the

indigenes.

It also stated that it would achieve the goal of such resource control through any

form possible.

But the 2007 presidential elections turned out to be a shambles, replete with

fraud and widespread rigging and electoral malpractice, which led many commentators and

observers to declare it the worst in Nigeria’s turbulent history of elections.

Following the failed elections, MEND threatened to respond to what it described as the

imposition of unelected persons with ‘terror in infinite terms’.

To match words with

actions, between 30 April and 30 May, MEND carried out a series of high-profile attacks on

oil installations in the Niger Delta region, including kidnappings and acts of sabotage, in

protest of the fraudulent elections in Nigeria. The worst of these attacks were the explosions

in Otuoke, Bayelsa State, which targeted the hometown of the-then state governor and vice-

president-elect, Jonathan.

The 2011 presidential election was one of Nigeria’s most controversial and divisive. Acting

president Jonathan ran in the elections against all odds as northern elites decried his PDP

presidential candidature as deviating from a long-held unwritten principle of zonal rotation.

The northerners claimed that a northern candidate should replace the late Yar’Adua.

By 2011, MEND had been significantly weakened following an amnesty deal in 2009,

through which the government of Nigeria partially resolved the Niger Delta issue, which had

been the source of MEND’s grievances. At the same time that MEND was being disarmed

and disbanded, an Islamist group calling itself Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Liddawati wal Jihad

(meaning ‘group committed to the propagation of the teachings of the Prophet and Jihad’) was

on the rise. The group is popularly known by its local slang name, Boko Haram, from the

Hausa and Arabic words meaning ‘Western education is sin’, though some experts have

emphasised that ‘Western education’here refers to ‘Western civilisation’.

Ideologically, the

2011 presidential election was incompatible with Boko Haram, which recognised only Sharia

as a legitimate system of government. In addition, the controversial nature of the candidature

of Jonathan provided another reason for the group to condemn the election. Indeed, the

group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, threatened to disrupt the election.

During the pre-election period, terrible attacks took place around the country. As the

International Crisis Group (ICG) reported, ‘[b]etween 22 and 25 March, reckless and

indiscriminate violence rocked a third of the 36 states: Akwa Ibom, Anambra, Bayelsa, Benue,

Delta, Edo, Ekiti, Kwara, Niger, Oyo, Plateau and Taraba’.

Heavy bomb blasts targeting

INEC’s offices near Abuja ‘heralded the National Assembly elections held on 9 April’, causing

Africa Watch 219

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many casualties.

At least two persons were killed when suspected Boko Haram members

detonated two bombs in Maiduguri and Bauchi just before the presidential election on 16

April.

100

The Islamist militants were also suspected of detonating a bomb in Kaduna in a

private house a few days before the gubernatorial elections.

101

More bombings and widespread

attacks by suspected Boko Haram militants followed the announcement of the victory of

Jonathan in the presidential election. In one such attack, suspected Boko Haram militants

detonated explosives just metres away from where Jonathan was being inaugurated in Abuja

on 29 May 2011. Estimates of the total casualties of what is regarded as the deadliest elections

since 1999 range from 800 to 1 000 deaths and 65 000 to 74 000 people displaced.

102

These incidents show that electoral terrorism is entrenched in Nigeria’s electoral violence.

However, Nigeria is not the only democracy to experience electoral terrorism. Terrorists have

hit electoral processes in Spain (Madrid, 2004),

103

Britain (London, 2005), Kenya (2007) and

Israel (2001–9).

104

Boko Haram, terrorism and the 2015 presidential

elections

Boko Haram is generally believed to have been founded in 2002, by Ustadz Mohammed

Yusuf, who led the group until 2009 when he was allegedly killed extra-judicially while in

police custody. Boko Haram was unknown to the world until 2009, when the group organised

a five-day period of violent riots against security forces from 25 to 30 July, in which it is

believed that between 700 and 1 000 people perished. Boko Haram is believed to be the

reincarnation of the Maitatsine movement, a radical brand of Islamism whose origin is often

attributed to the preaching and teachings of Muhammadu Marwa from north Cameroon. The

core of the movement was its complete rejection of affluence, Western materialism and

Western technology.

105

The Maitatsine revolt spread throughout northern Nigeria in the

1980s and 1990s,

106

where it was responsible for several thousands of deaths. In one of its

deadliest uprisings, which took place in Kano in December 1980, it was reported that 4 177

people died.

107

There is a remarkable resemblance between Maitatsine and Boko Haram,

particularly in their ideology, both of which J Peter Pham describes as ‘fanatical sects’.

108

Both

groups are against Western influence and follow a hard-line approach to accomplish their

objectives. It is possible, particularly in view of the similarities between the two groups, that

Boko Haram was designed after the Maitatsine.

109

Explaining Boko Haram has never been a simple matter. The group has attracted a great

deal of scholarly research, which has focused almost entirely on internal dynamics to explain

the group’s origin and factors that continue to precipitate its evolution in Nigeria, while only a

few, tenuous references are made to external factors. The effect of this is to erroneously reduce

the status of Boko Haram to merely a domestic terrorist group. This domestic focus was

largely encouraged by the fact that the group had, until recently, almost entirely confined its

operations to Nigeria. With no intention of reducing the significant influence of the domestic

arena, this article underscores a need to wear a dual lens when viewing the internal and

external dimensions of Boko Haram. It is no coincidence that the group was formed in 2002,

less than a year after the 9/11 attacks in the US. It is also no coincidence that the group’s

members have always included foreign fighters from neighbouring countries. The perception

that terrorism in Nigeria is a consequence of globalisation is empirically relevant.

110

This

220 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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point is further strengthened by the view that Islam in Nigeria is linked to global Islam.

Through this link, Islam in Nigeria is vulnerable to global Islamic issues. For example, the

grand mosque massacre and the Iranian revolution of 1979 were blamed for fuelling the

Maitatsine in Nigeria.

111

The Miss World saga in which more than 220 people were killed and

about 1 000 others wounded,

112

as well as the killing of nine polio health workers,

113

are just

some of the events that have illustrated the confluence between fundamentalism and

globalisation.

Boko Haram’s ideology is firmly rooted in Salafist philosophy, which advocates the strict

and dogmatic application of the Holy Koran as in the days of the Prophet. Consistent with this

doctrine, the main tenets of the group are well summarised by Abimbola O. Adesoji:

Characteristically, the sect was not only opposed to, but out rightly rejected, Western

education, Western culture, and modern science. It embraced and advocated the

propagation of, and strict adherence to, Islam by everyone, regardless of whether it was

wanted or not.

114

In order to be able to determine whether the 2015 election was a victory for Boko Haram or

for democracy, it is important to broadly examine the objectives of Boko Haram and

specifically its election objectives. Crenshaw has argued that ‘[t]he most basic reason for

terrorism is to gain recognition or attention’.

115

She also contends that ‘terrorism is often

designed to disrupt and discredit the processes of government’.

116

In the case of Boko Haram, it is important to note that, like its tactics and target selection,

the group’s goal are constantly evolving, leaving analysts unsure as to what the group really

wants. In its earlier permutations, Boko Haram was motivated by perceived economic and

structural injustices in northern Nigeria. It also opposed the secular regime in Nigeria and

sought to replace the 1999 democratic constitution with Sharia as the law of Nigeria. Like the

Maitatsine and the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, Boko Haram sought to purify the application

of Sharia in northern Nigeria. Currently, the group seems to have evolved beyond these

objectives with rhetorical emphasis that continues to be placed on Islamic militancy. The

group’s objectives have also included the release of militants currently in Nigerian jails and the

acquisition and control of territories –during 2014, the group controlled as many as 37 towns

and villages in north-eastern Nigeria.

The 2015 presidential election marked a departure from previously held elections in

Nigeria. Like the 2011 election, it was deeply mired in controversy. Incumbent president

Jonathan had once again declared his candidature, which was met with bitter opposition in the

North. Nigerians were starkly divided along ethnic, religious and geographic cleavages –the

northern Muslim region and the south-west Yoruba land backed the main opposition leader,

Buhari, representing the APC, while Jonathan secured only the south-south and south-east

regions. Terrorism emerged as a prominent issue in the election. Boko Haram, through its

hard-line leader, Abubakar Shekau, issued numerous threats of violence and stated its

intention to disrupt the elections. The group was bent on ousting Jonathan from power and in

some of its numerous YouTube video messages it threatened to kidnap Jonathan and some of

his family members.

117

The pre-election period was the most violent and deadly of this election. Indeed, the role of

Boko Haram was unprecedented in Nigeria’s history of elections, and Shekau was among the

three most powerful actors in the few months leading up to the election, standing shoulder to

shoulder with Jonathan and Buhari. Apart from attacking civilians and security personnel,

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Boko Haram also acquired several territories in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. Between January

and March 2015, Boko Haram carried out 70 attacks in which more than 3 000 people were

killed, with 2 000 allegedly dying in a single massacre in Baga.

Table 3 shows the 10 deadliest terrorist incidents in the pre-election period (January to

March). It is also evident from the table that suicide bombing was the predominant strategy

used by Boko Haram. Most of the suicide bombers were girls. The pre-election violence was

so widespread that the campaign teams of Buhari and Jonathan were sometimes exposed to

such attacks during campaign activities. For example, Jonathan’s team was attacked in

Bauchi,

118

Gombe, Katsina and Maiduguri.

119

Boko Haram and the postponement of the 2015 presidential election

The relationship between terrorism and election came to the fore in the 2015 presidential

election, when it became clear that the threat of Boko Haram was affecting security conditions

on the ground. It raised serious issues of safety for the 600 000 INEC personnel and the

millions of voters in the north, as well as the security of electoral materials. The Boko Haram

crisis also raised humanitarian issues. The group’s indiscriminate attacks had forced thousands

of Nigerians into internal displacement, and created refugees. Should these people not be

given the opportunity to vote, it would mean that terrorism had deprived them of this crucial

democratic right. In addition, Boko Haram had captured and was controlling several territories

and there were no guarantees or plans to ensure that those living in these territories could cast

their vote. It was on the basis of these considerations that INEC decided to postpone the

election from its initial date of 14 February to 28 March.

120

One of the main reasons for this

postponement was to enable the government to flush out Boko Haram and create a safe

environment for the election. Though the postponement was initially politicised and

controversial, it contributed to the safety, security and success of the election. It allowed

the military to achieve unprecedented progress in defeating Boko Haram. As one of the

election observers put it, ‘it played a huge role in defusing tensions’.

121

Terror attacks during the 2015 presidential election

Terrorism and violence during the 2015 presidential election was widely expected. The

question as to whether terrorism would occur in the 2015 election was no longer relevant;

rather, the question was what degree of violence would occur. Despite the success of the

election in many respects, it was not violence-free. On the day of the election, 28 March 2015,

some violent acts that can be categorised as terrorism were committed by Boko Haram and

political thugs of the two principal political parties –the APC and the PDP. Nonetheless, the

violence was nothing close to the pre-electoral violence. Table 4 summarises the major

terrorist acts committed during the two days of voting on 28 and 29 March 2015.

The table shows that there were few instances of violence –mainly thuggery directed

against INEC. Even with Boko Haram’s attacks, including the Gombe attack, the election-day

violence was far less deadly than the attacks that took place during the pre-election period,

largely because Boko Haram had been significantly weakened by election day.

222 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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Ta b l e 3 Deadliest pre-election terrorist attacks

Attack Date Place Perpetrator Target Deaths Injured

Militants open

fire and shoot

randomly at

civilians,

setting ablaze

houses

3–7 Jan Baga Boko Haram Civilians 2 000 Unknown

10-year-old girl

used as a

suicide

bomber.

10 Jan Maiduguri Boko Haram Civilians 20 Unknown

Two female

suicide

bombers

attack a GSM

market.

10 Jan Potiskum Boko Haram Civilians 20 Unknown

Militants

attempt to

invade

Maiduguri,

shooting and

setting off

bombs.

1 Feb Maiduguri Boko Haram Civilians 82 Unknown

Militants killed

at random

while fleeing.

20 Feb Bauchi Boko Haram Soldiers 21 Unknown

Suicide

bomber strikes

two buses.

24 Feb Damaturu Boko Haram Civilians at a

bus station

26 Unknown

Two suicide

bombers

attack a

commuter bus

station.

26 Feb Biu Boko Haram Civilians 32 Unknown

Militants attack

a village,

shooting and

burning

houses.

3 Mar Njaba Boko Haram Children 68 Unknown

Three suicide

bombers

attack a busy

market and a

commuter bus

station.

7 Mar Maiduguri Boko Haram Civilians at a

local market

58 139

Suspected

Islamist

militants

attacked the

town of

Ngamdu.

10 Mar Ngamdu,

Borno State

Boko Haram Civilians 12 Unknown

Islamist fighters

set many

houses on fire

15 Mar Bama Boko Haram Civilian

residences

Unknown Unknown

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Conclusion

The outcome of the 2015 presidential election has been astonishing and at the same time raises

critical questions. According to INEC, Buhari beat the incumbent by 15 424 921 to 12 853 162

votes.

122

Jonathan made history by contacting Buhari, even before the counting of the votes

was completed, to gracefully concede victory and congratulate his opponent. As already noted

elsewhere in this article, there were three main actors in this 2015 election: Jonathan, Buhari

and Shekau. Shekau wanted Jonathan out at all costs and had even threatened to kidnap the

president and his daughter. He did everything to disrupt, weaken and impair Jonathan’s

administration by doing things that made Jonathan unpopular –kidnapping the Chibok girls,

bombing the United Nations (UN), and bombing the Nigerian Federal Police Headquarters

and other high-profile national strategic institutions. He also seized territories from Jonathan

and used young girls as suicide bombers. He did all of these things in excess and successfully

turned public opinion against Jonathan, who in turn set the military against the Islamist sect,

uprooting it from its bases and weakening its ability to carry out frequent attacks.

The key question therefore is, who won the 2015 presidential election? Was it a victory for

Shekau or for democracy? After a thorough analysis, this article argues that it was a win both

for Shekau and for democracy. Shekau successfully ousted Jonathan via the ballot box. The

smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international

community as a victory and a new era of democracy in Nigeria. It was therefore also a win for

democracy because Nigerians were able to vent their discontent, frustration and anger through

the ballot rather than the usual coups and violent conflicts.

This article has reviewed both the theoretical and practical aspects of the relationship

between terrorism and the election process in Nigeria. The 2015 presidential election offers

useful insights for interrogating this relationship. The democratic peace proposition is useful

for explaining the domestic roots of terrorism. However, international and transnational

Table 3 (Continued)

Attack Date Place Perpetrator Target Deaths Injured

in Bama,

forcing

residents to

flee the town.

Suspected

Islamist

militants

attacked a

border town.

18 Mar Gamboru-

Ngala

Boko Haram Civilians 11 Unknown

Islamist

attackers

slaughtered

civilians in

Gwoza.

25 Mar Gwoza,

Borno State

Boko Haram Civilians 75 Unknown

Islamist

militants attack

civilians,

shooting and

slitting throats.

27 Mar Buratai,

Borno

Boko Haram Civilians 25 5

224 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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Table 4 Major terrorist acts committed during the 2015 presidential election

Attack Date Place Perpetrator Target Deaths Injured

Gunmen attack local government. 29 Mar Bauchi Boko Haram Government 1 Unknown

Arson attack on INEC. 29 Mar Benue Political thugs Electoral institution 1 Unknown

Bomb explosion at a primary school. 28 Mar Enugu State Political thug Electoral institution Unknown Unknown

Bomb explosion. 28 Mar Anambra State Unknown Electoral institution Unknown Unknown

Gunmen storm a polling station. 28 Mar Bauchi Unknown Electoral institution Unknown Unknown

Boko Haram launched attacks in Gombe. 28 Mar Gombe Boko Haram Electoral institution 24 Unknown

An unknown group hacked the computers of INEC. 28 Mar Unknown Electoral institution 7 Unknown

Africa Watch 225

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terrorism defies the Kantian logic. Transnational terrorist networks may not necessarily have

to ask questions about a country’s political system in order to decide on which country to

attack. Terrorism has been in Nigeria for several years –not because Nigeria is a democracy,

but because of procrastination, weak institutions and bad governance. As such, it can only be

successfully dealt with through an effective security and governance approach.

Funding

This article was produced with funding to the Institute for Security Studies from the Government of the

Netherlands, particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism and international crime in Africa.

Notes

1 A Nossiter, In Nigeria’s election, Muhammadu Buhari defeats Goodluck Jonathan, The New York Times,31

March 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/africa/nigeria-election-muhammadu-buhari-goodluck-

jonathan.html?_r=0

2 Various international and regional organisations, including the European Union (EU), the United Nations

(UN), the United States (US) government, the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African

States (ECOWAS) and the Commonwealth, along with many other independent and civil society organisations

described the elections as credible, transparent, peaceful and orderly. See, for example, S Ogbaje, Commonwealth

observer group hails Saturday’s election, News24 Nigeria, 31 March 2015, http://www.news24.com.ng/Elections/

News/Commonwealth-observer-group-hails-Saturdays-election-20150331; President Ouedraogo salutes Niger-

ians, urges consolidation of democracy in West Africa, ECOWAS, 3 April 2015, http://www.ecowas.int/president-

ouedraogo-salutes-nigerians-urges-consolidation-of-democracy-in-west-africa/; ND Zuma, Statement by the

Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the official election results in the Federal Republic of Nigeria,

African Union, 31 March 2015, http://cpauc.au.int/en/content/statement-chairperson-african-union-commission-

official-election-results-federal-republic-of-Nigeria; Welcoming peaceful Nigerian elections, Ban encourages

patience as polls wrap up, UN News Centre, 29 March 2015, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?

NewsID=50453#.VR9YMmaczV0.

3 See Article 2(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, http://www.legislativedatabank.

nassnig.org/lawsa1.php?id=22, (accessed 1 April 2015).

4 M Segun, Buhari, Boko Haram and human rights, The Guardian, 6 April 2015, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/

2015/04/buhari-boko-haram-and-human-rights/

5 J Schneider and P Eze, Vote 2015: defining a nation, New African, January 2015, 11.

6 See, for example, C Onumah, As another civil war looms, Sahara Reporters, 20 November 2014, http://

saharareporters.com/2014/11/20/another-civil-war-looms-chido-onumah

7 See D Smith, Nigerian laureate Wole Soyinka laments ‘vicious, unprincipled’elections, The Guardian, 29

March 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/mar/29/wole-soyinka-interview-nigeria-corruption-goodluck-

jonathan

8 For details about voter turnout and the results of the elections, see Independent National Electoral Commission

(INEC), Results for 2015 presidential general elections, http://inecnigeria.org/?page_id=31, (accessed 20

April 2015).

9 See President Goodluck Jonathan’s concession speech: I Wakili, Nigeria: I’ve fulfilled my promise –Jonathan,

AllAfrica, 1 April 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories/201504010626.html

10 See an excerpt of the statement issued by Santiago Fisas, the head of the EU observers of the 2015 elections:

EU election observation mission says Jonathan’s concession of defeat is extraordinary example for world, Bella

Naija, 2 April 2015, http://www.bellanaija.com/2015/04/02/eu-election-observation-mission-says-jonathans-

concession-of-defeat-is-extraordinary-example-for-world/, (accessed 3 April 2015).

11 See an excerpt of the statement issued by the Arewa Consultative Forum: Jonathan’s acceptance of defeat historic

–ACF, The Guardian (Nigeria), 1 April 2015, http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/04/jonathans-acceptance-of-

defeat-historic-acf/

226 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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12 L Diamond, Introduction, in L Diamond and MF Plattner (eds.), Democratization in Africa, Johns Hopkins

University Press and the National Endowment for Democracy, 1999, xxv.

13 See, for example, D Aksoy, Elections and the timing of terrorist attacks in democracies, The Journal of Politics,

76, 2014.

14 See for example, C Berrebi and EF Klor, Are voters sensitive to terrorism? Direct evidence from the Israeli

electorate, Rand, Working Paper 477-1, 2008, http://www.rand.org/search.html?query=Are%20voters%20

sensitive%20to%20terrorism%3F, (accessed 8 March 2015).

15 See, for example, MG Ngwane, Election-related conflicts in Africa, 15 July 2011, http://www.gngwane.com/2011/

07/election-related-conflicts-in-africa.html

16 I Salehyan and C Linebarger, Elections and social conflict in Africa, Research Brief 6, 2013, http://www.

strausscenter.org/ccaps-social-conflict-news/new-research-on-conflict-in-africa.html, (accessed 1 April 2015), 2.

17 In a study, Idean Salehyan and Christopher Linebarger used data from the Social Conflict in Africa Database

(SCAD) to demonstrate that of the 685 conflict events recorded between 1990 and 2011, elections were a major

source of conflict. The study also shows that the average incidence of electoral conflict has increased from 7.6% in

the 1990s to 10.1% in the 2000s; see I Salehyan and C Linebarger, Elections and social conflict in Africa, Research

Brief 6, 2013, http://www.strausscenter.org/ccaps-social-conflict-news/new-research-on-conflict-in-africa.html,

(accessed 1 April 2015).

18 W Kühne, The role of elections in emerging democracies and post-conflict countries: key issues, lessons learned and dilemmas,

Berlin: Friedrick-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, 2.

19 D Hume, cited in JM Corcoran, David Hume’s political philosophy: the farce of sovereign authority, Social &

Political Review, 19, 2009, 27.

20 Ibid.

21 See, for example, DFID, Elections in Nigeria in 2007, http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/elections-in-

nigeria-in-2007, (accessed 1 May 2015), 2.

22 See African Union, OAU/AU treaties, conventions, protocols & charters, http://au.int/en/treaties, (accessed 8

May 2015).

23 See Article 1 of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, http://au.int/en/treaties,

(accessed 24 January 2015).

24 See RA Pape, Suicide terrorism and democracy: what we’ve learned since 9/11, Cato Institute, Policy Analysis

582, 2006, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/suicide-terrorism-democracy-what-weve-learned-911,

(accessed 1 April 2015), 3.

25 M Crenshaw, The causes of terrorism, Comparative Politics, 13, 1981, 384.

26 R Hodler and D Rohner, Electoral terms and terrorism, Public Choice, 150, 2012, 181.

27 D Aksoy and DB Carter, Electoral institutions and the emergence of terrorist groups, British Journal of Political

Science, 44, 2014, 2.

28 The opening of the post-Arab Spring regimes in Tunisia and Egypt to Islamist parties, which had previously been

banned from participating in elections, has offered empirical evidence of the theory of permissibility. Robin

Wright, for example, argues that most of the 50 Islamist parties now engaged in politics have renounced terrorist

tactics and that some have even demonstrated willingness to work with secular and centrist parties; see R Wright

(ed.), The Islamists are coming: who they really are, Herndon, VA: US Institute for Peace Press, 2012, 2.

29 RA Pape, The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, American Political Science Review, 97, 2003, 350.

30 E Chenoweth, Democratic competition and terrorist activity, The Journal of Politics, 72, 2010, 27.

31 See G Prunier, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan genocide, and the making of a continental catastrophe, New York,

NY: Oxford University Press, 2010.

32 JA Ferejohn and FM Rosenbluth, Warlike democracies, 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_

id=1154094, (accessed 9 April 2015), 39.

33 I Kant, Perpetual peace: a philosophical essay, MC Smith (trans.), London: George Allen & Unwin, 1795/1917,

134–135.

34 B Russett, Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-cold war world, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

1993, 38.

35 J Madison, The utility of the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection,The Federalist,22

November 1787. http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa10.htm (accessed 13 April 2015).

36 DV Babst, Elective governments –a force for peace, The Wisconsin Sociologist, 3:1, 1964, 9.

Africa Watch 227

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37 See, for example, V Danilovic and J Clare, The Kantian liberal peace (revisited), American Journal of Political Science,

51, 2007, 401.

38 See EA Henderson, Disturbing the peace: African warfare, political inversion and the universality of the

democratic peace thesis, British Journal of Political Science, 39, 2009, 25.

39 See, for example, F Chernoff, The study of democratic peace and progress in international relations, International

Studies Review, 6, 2004; B Russett, Grasping the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world, Princeton, NJ:

Princeton University Press, 1993, 4.

40 A Xenias, Can a global peace last even if achieved? Huntington and the democratic peace, International Studies

Review, 7, 2005, 357.

41 See C Hacke, Power and morality on the legacy of Hans J Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy Interests, 27,

2005, 172.

42 JM Owen, How liberalism produces democratic peace, International Security, 19:2, 1994, 119.

43 D Roy, Neorealism and Kant: no pacific union, Journal of Peace Research, 30, 1993, 451.

44 K Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, International Security, 25:1, 2000, 13.

45 Ibid. See also K Waltz, Reflections on theory of international politics, 1986, cited in D Roy, Neorealism and Kant:

no pacific union, Journal of Peace Research, 30, 1993, 452.

46 K Waltz, Structural realism after the Cold War, International Security, 25:1, 2000, 26.

47 See, for example, S Hates, TL Knutsen and JW Moses, Democracy and peace: a more skeptical view, Journal of

Peace Research, 33, 1996, 7; S Rosato, The flawed logic of democratic peace theory, The American Political Science

Review, 97, 2003, 587.

48 J Ferejohn and FC Rosenbluth, Warlike democracies, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52, 2008.

49 See, for example, K Scott, A Girardian critique of the liberal democratic peace theory, Contagion: Journal of Violence,

Mimesis, and Culture, 15/16, 2008–9, 49.

50 S Stoddard, Rethinking the relationship between democracy and terrorism, International Affairs Review, 19:1,

2010, 94.

51 P Wilkinson, Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response, New York, NY: Routledge, 2006, 20.

52 Ibid., 21.

53 E Chenoweth, Is terrorism still a democratic phenomenon? Uluslararasıİlişkiler, 8, 2012, 87.

54 E Chenoweth, Democratic competition and terrorist activity, The Journal of Politics, 72, 2010, 19.

55 See M. Abdullahi, Elections and political violence in Nigeria: past mistakes and challenges ahead, International

Journal of Advanced Legal Studies and Governance, 4:1, 2013, 64.

56 RA Pape, The logic of suicide terrorism: it’s the occupation, not the fundamentalism, The American Conservative,

18 July 2005, http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-logic-of-suicide-terrorism/

57 RA Pape, The strategic logic of suicide terrorism, American Political Science Review, 97, 2003, 349–350.

58 FG Gause, III, Can democracy stop terrorism? Foreign Affairs, 84:5, 2005, 62.

59 T Jackson, Democracy.org, New African, February 2015, 66.

60 African democracy: a glass half-full, The Economist, 31 March 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21551494

61 Ibid.

62 Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2015: Nigeria, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/

nigeria#.VUH_5maczV0, (accessed 20 April 2015).

63 Global Democracy Ranking, Full dataset for the 2014 ranking, http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/?

page_id=828, (accessed 28 April 2015).

64 The African Elections Database (AED) has ranked Nigeria as a ‘democracy’for the period between 1999 and 2007

and as an ‘emerging democracy’for the period from 2007 to present; see African Elections Database, Elections in

Nigeria, http://africanelections.tripod.com/ng.html, (accessed 28 April 2015).

65 For a detailed list of successful military coups in Nigeria, see List of coups d’état and coup attempts by country,

http://www.systemicpeace.org/africaconflict.html (accessed 23 May 2015).

66 See BO Nwabueze, A constitutional history of Nigeria, London: C Hurst, 1982, 39.

67 IP Odion, Elections, electoral reforms and post-election violence: problems and way forward, Vanguard,12

November 2012, http://community.vanguardngr.com/forum/topics/elections-electoral-reforms-and-post-election-

violence-problems

228 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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68 A Oyebode, History and critical analysis of the elections in Nigeria with special attention to the April 2011

elections, Nigeria Village Square, 29 September 2011, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/akin-oyebode/history-

and-critical-analysis-of-elections-in-nigeria-with-special-attention-to-the-april-2011-elect.html

69 EV Adolfo et al, Electoral violence in Africa, 2012, http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%

3A556709&dswid=2434, (accessed 1 March 2015), 1.

70 N Orji and N Uzodi, The 2011 post-election violence in Nigeria, Abuja: Policy and Legal Advocacy Centre, 2012,

17–18.

71 IO Albert, Analysing electoral violence in Nigeria, in LN Asiegbu (ed.), Critical issues in the 2011 general elections in

Nigeria, Ibadan: John Archers, 2011, 42.

72 See for example, 2015: Jonathan, Buhari, others sign violence-free accord, The Nation online, 14 January 2015:

http://thenationonlineng.net/new/2015-jonathan-buhari-others-sign-violence-free-accord/ (17 February 2015)

73 See for example, Jonathan, Buhari Sign Another Peace Accord, Channels Television, 26 March 2015: http://www.

channelstv.com/2015/03/26/jonathan-buhari-sign-another-peace-accord/ (30 April 2015)

74 See, for example, NO Obakhedo, Curbing electoral violence in Nigeria: the imperative of political education,

African Research Revise, 5:5, 2011, 100.

75 Professor Wole Soyinka, Nigeria’s most acclaimed scholar, claimed in 2012 that Nigeria was already

disintegrating: see P Sam-Duru, Nigeria is already disintegrating –Soyinka, Vanguard, 25 January 2012, http://

www.vanguardngr.com/2012/01/nigeria-is-already-disintegrating-soyinka-2/

76 See, for example, CJ Kinnan et al, Failed state 2030: Nigeria –a case study, Occasional Paper 67, Centre for Strategy

and Technology, 2011.

77 RD Kaplan, The coming anarchy: how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, tribalism, and disease are rapidly

destroying the social fabric of our planet, The Atlantic, 1 February 1994, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/

archive/1994/02/the-coming-anarchy/304670/,5.

78 There are some views that Nigeria, as a state, collapsed in the 1990s, as with Somalia and Sierra Leone. For details,

see RI Rotberg, Failed states, collapsed states, weak states: causes and indicators, in RI Rotberg (ed.), State failure

and state weakness in a time of terror, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, 9.

79 E Onwudiwe and C Berwind-Dart, Breaking the cycle of electoral violence in Nigeria, 2010, http://www.usip.

org/publications/breaking-the-cycle-of-electoral-violence-in-nigeria, (accessed 12 February 2015), 5–10.

80 See, for example, J Herskovits, Nigeria’s rigged democracy, Foreign Affairs, 86:4, 2007; J Lunn and D Harari,

Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues and future prospects, Research Paper 15/02, London: House of Commons

Library, 2015; LP Blanchard, Nigeria’s 2015 elections and the Boko Haram crisis, Washington, DC:

Congressional Research Service, 2015.

81 See, for example, U Ukiwo, Politics, ethno-religious conflicts and democratic consolidation in Nigeria, The

Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 2003, 131.

82 See, for example, GA Chukwu and CG Chidume, Political mismanagement in the electoral process of Nigeria: a

brief review, American Journal of Social Issues and Humanities, 4, 2014.

83 PM Lewis, Endgame in Nigeria? The politics of the failed democratic transition, African Affairs, 93, 1994, 331.

84 See TB Ugiagbe, Electoral violence in Nigeria: implications for security, peace and development, Peace & Conflict

Monitor, 3 May 2010, http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=697

85 See, for example, the records of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) for 2003: IPU, Nigeria: Parliamentary

Chamber: House of Representatives: Elections held in 2003, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2363_03.

htm, (accessed 20 February 2015).

86 See for example, D Bekoe, Nigeria’s 2011 elections: best run, but most violent, 2011, http://www.usip.org/

publications/nigeria-s-2011-elections-best-run-most-violent, (accessed 7 January 2015).

87 I Sulaiman, A revolution in history: the jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, London: Mansell, 1986, 102–116.

88 For more details on these groups, see, for example, BM Monsuru, DU Unwana-Obong, and OM Kamilu,

Historical antecedents of Boko Haram insurgency and its implications for sustainable and educational

development in north central Nigeria, Journal of Education and Practice, 5:22, 2014.

89 For a detailed discussion of the factors that cause farmers–herders conflicts, see, for example, M Moritz,

Changing contexts and dynamics of farmer-herder conflicts across West Africa, Canadian Journal of African Studies,

40, 2006.

90 See, for example, AA Akanni, History of terrorism, youth psychology and unemployment in Nigeria, The Journal

of Pan African Studies, 7:3, 2014, 67.

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91 AO Muzan, Insurgency in Nigeria: addressing the causes as part of the solution, African Human Rights Law Journal,

14, 2014, 223.

92 International Crisis Group (ICG), Nigeria: failed elections, failing state?, Africa Report No. 126, 2007, 10, http://

www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/126-nigeria-failed-elections-failing-state.aspx, (accessed

12 January 2015).

93 Ibid.

94 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, Criminal politics: violence, ‘godfathers’and corruption in Nigeria, 2007,

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2007/10/11/criminal-politics-0, (accessed 28 February 2015).

95 ICG, Nigeria: failed elections, failing state?, Africa Report 126, 2007, 10, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

africa/west-africa/nigeria/126-nigeria-failed-elections-failing-state.aspx, (accessed 12 January 2015).

96 Ibid., 11.

97 See, for example, FC Onuoha, Boko Haram: Nigeria’s extremist Islamic sect, Al Jazeera Reports, 29 February

2012, 2.

98 ICG, Lessons from Nigeria’s 2011 elections, Africa Briefing 81, 2011, 7, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/

africa/west-africa/nigeria/B81%20Lessons%20from%20Nigerias%202011%20Elections.aspx, (accessed 12 Janu-

ary 2015).

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid., 8.

103 See, for example, N Michavila, War, terrorism and elections: electoral impact of the Islamist terror attacks on

Madrid, Working Paper (WP) 13/2005, Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.

104 See, for example, A Getmansky and T Zeitzoff, Terrorism and voting: the effect of rocket threat on voting in

Israeli elections, American Political Science Review, forthcoming.

105 See E Isichei, The Maitatsine risings in Nigeria 1980–85: a revolt of the disinherited, Journal of Religion in Africa, 17,

1997, 196.

106 A Adesoji, The Boko Haram uprising and Islamic revivalism in Nigeria, Africa Spectrum, 45:2, 2010, 96–97.

107 E Isichei, The Maitatsine risings in Nigeria 1980–85: a revolt of the disinherited, Journal of Religion in Africa, 17,

1997, 197.

108 JP Pham, Boko Haram’s evolving threat, Africa Security Brief 20, 2012, http://africacenter.org/2012/04/boko-

harams-evolving-threat/, (accessed 28 February 2015), 2.

109 See, for example, DA Tonwe and SJ Eke, State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram,

African Security Review, 22:4, 2013, 235.

110 See, for example, ET Njoku, Globalization and terrorism in Nigeria, Foreign Policy Journal, 13 August 2011, 9.

111 JC Aguwa, Religious conflict in Nigeria: impact on nation building, Dialectical Anthropology, 22, 1997, 337.

112 See, for example, A Henry, The truth behind the Miss World riots in Nigeria: sexism, fundamentalism

globalization and oil, Off Our Backs, 33:3/4, 2003.

113 C Madu, Gunmen kill nine polio health workers in Nigeria, Reuters, 8 February 2013, http://www.reuters.com/

article/2013/02/08/us-nigeria-violence-idUSBRE9170C120130208

114 AO Adesoji, Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic fundamentalism and the response of the Nigerian

state, Africa Today, 57:4, 2011, 106.

115 M Crenshaw, The causes of terrorism, Comparative Politics, 13, 1981, 386.

116 Ibid.

117 See Naija TV, Boko Haram threaten to kill President Jonathan within three months, http://www.youtube.com/

watch?v=jq9JmPmDMQE, (accessed 25 April 2015). See also Boko Haram threatens to kidnap Goodluck

Jonathan’s daughter, The Net (Nigeria), 6 May 2014, http://thenet.ng/2014/05/boko-haram-threatens-to-kidnap-

goodluck-jonathans-daughter/

118 J Owuamanam, O Adetayo and A Bakam, Youths attack President’s campaign team in Bauchi, Punch, 23 January

2015, http://www.punchng.com/news/youths-attack-presidents-campaign-team-in-bauchi/

119 H Umoru, APC, Buhari behind attack on Jonathan in Katsina –PDP, Vanguard, 22 January 2015, http://www.

vanguardngr.com/2015/01/apc-buhari-behind-attack-jonathan-katsina-pdp/

230 African Security Review 24.2 Institute for Security Studies

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120 For details, see the statement made by INEC justifying the postponement: AM Jega, Statement on the timetable

for 2015 general elections by the Chairman, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), posted by O

Emmanuel, Full INEC official statement on postponement of 2015 elections, Premium Times, 8 February 2015,

http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/176445-full-inec-official-statement-on-postponement-of-2015-elections.

html

121 P Fabricius, Good luck, Buhari, ISS Today, 2 April 2015, http://www.issafrica.org/acpst/news/good-luck-buhari

122 For details, see Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Results for 2015 presidential general

elections, http://inecnigeria.org/?page_id=31, (accessed 20 April 2015).

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Aug 2020

Antonino Adamo

This article analyses the 2015 intervention of Specialized Tasks, Training, Equipment and Protection (STTEP International Ltd), a South African private military company (PMC), against Boko Haram, the Islamic terrorist group in Nigeria. The origins of PMCs are highlighted before an in-depth analysis of the mercenary intervention against Boko Haram is performed, with an eye on previous major PMC interventions in sub-Saharan Africa. On the one hand, the paper emphasises the unprecedented use of PMCs against Islamic extremist groups but on the other reveals that PMC interventions have not changed much. Finally, the article assesses STTEP’s intervention in light of the current debate on private security involving those who advocate its use and regulation and those who question the legitimacy of PMCs as a tool of conflict resolution.

Farmer-herder conflict: the politics of media discourse in Nigeria

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2020
Ponte

The conflict between farming communities and herders in Nigeria has increased in the last four years. It has become a subject of discourse in various domains, including the media and body politic. The intensification of the crisis has spurred renewed scholarly attention to the other ways the conflict could be understood. The increased role of media in the crisis has been identified, but existing studies on the role of the media focus on media reportage, framing and coverage. There is relatively scare research on the politics of media discourse of the conflict, which can reveal representations of subjects and identities, subject-positions, subjectivity and power relations in the narrative of the conflict. Thus, this research analyses the politics of newspapers’ discourse of the conflict in Nigeria. The representations of the conflict cluster around five albeit overlapping themes, namely causes, victims, consequences, government’s responses and resolution strategies to the conflict. The discourse of the dispute is constructed as a security issue which embodies other forms of security viz national security, food security, the security of statehood and unity of the nations that make up the Nigerian state. The article shows that the construction of the conflict draws on the political and ideological dispositions of the papers. It argues that the link between the newspapers’ representation of the conflict and the strategies they proposed for curbing the dispute is weak. Thus, while media representations of the conflict can reveal the various contestations in the framing of the conflict in Nigeria, it might be insufficient to establish the link between discourse, identity and policy. Further, it argues that developing a sustainable strategy for the resolution of the crisis requires among other things, a national dialogue.

Sources of political parties' campaign expenditure in Nigeria's Fourth Republic: Examining the 2015 General Election

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2019

A periodic election is a fundamental pillar and backbone of any democratic regime, and for a proper election to take place there must be some activities, most especially by parties and contestants to vote for them most especially competing to secure the electorates. These activities require huge expenditure from the parties and their financiers through campaigns, media advertisements and other related activities. The problem is that parties and their candidates are allowed, in Nigeria constitutionally and by the Electoral Act 2010, to source their campaign finance privately, which has led to illegal financing. The objective of this paper is to examine the sources of parties' campaign expenditure in the Fourth Republic, taking the 2015 General Election as the case study. The research used a qualitative method of data collection and analysis where both primary and secondary sources were used. The primary source was an in-depth personal interview with some selected informants/participants from the categories of stakeholders in the electoral process, Article 2 International Area Studies Review 00(0) parties, and agencies responsible for regulating their activities. The secondary source was the use of available documents such as books, journals and Internet sources on the subject matter of the study. The data obtained were analysed and interpreted using thematic analytical interpretations from the informants' views and the existing data in the field. The research discovered that there are basically six major sources of campaign expenditure for parties and that some of the sources are illegal and the spending has violated the regulations. The research recommends thorough supervision and monitoring of the sources of parties' campaign expenditure and the spending process.

Exploration Into Usage, Frequency, and Prominence of Propaganda Devices by Political Parties in Nigerian Newspapers During the 2019 Electioneering Campaigns

Article

Dec 2023

The study explored the usage, frequency and prominence of placements of propaganda devices by All Progressives Congress and People’s Democratic Party in select Nigerian newspapers during the 2019 electioneering campaigns. Content analysis design was used. Sample size of 288 was drawn from a population of 1,096 daily and weekly editions of four national newspapers in Nigeria between July 2018 and March 2019. Systematic sampling technique and intercoder reliability of 92% were used. The study found that propaganda devices were effectively used by political parties with grave implications for the processes of political communications in Nigeria. The most used propaganda devices were name-calling and bandwagon while the least used was transfer. These appeared more daily, placed in the front and inside pages, and helped to advance the tenets of agenda-setting and propaganda theories. It concluded that the usage, frequency, and prominence of placements of propaganda devices are effectually important in the entire process of electioneering, coverage, and mobilization, but recommended a professional use of propaganda to mitigate its reference as a negative tool of communication.

An Epidemic of Kidnapping: Interpreting School Abductions and Insecurity in Nigeria

Article

Full-text available

Oct 2021

Attacks on Nigerian school students from December 2020 to August 2021 saw hundreds of children abducted and prompted a national outcry at the state’s seeming inability to prevent such events. This recent wave of abductions follows other notorious incidents of mass abduction and murder of students, most prominently the cases of the Chibok and Dapchi girls. In assessing the more recent abductions, the authorities and some analysts have made a distinction between contemporary and earlier episodes on the basis of the perceived identity of the perpetrators. While Boko Haram was responsible for the Chibok and Dapchi abductions, “bandits” are held responsible for the attacks in 2020-21. This focus on the perpetrators, however, does not explain how attacks on schools fit into the broader political economy of violence and insecurity of contemporary Nigeria, and why kidnapping has become a fast growing industry. Moreover, the ensuing reaction of largely treating abductions as security problems requiring a greater military and police response, accompanied by the physical fortification of schools, treats the symptoms rather than the cause. As these same security actors implicated in corruption, violence, and the systemic abuse of civilians are not credible providers of security, in the name of safeguarding and rescuing students Nigeria risks becoming ever more militarized and repressive.

Inter-Ethnic Dynamics in the Wake of Terrorist Attacks: Evidence from the 2015 Baga Massacre

Article

Apr 2020

Alessandro Belmonte

This paper investigates the consequences for inter-group conflicts of terrorist attacks. I study the 2015 Baga massacre, a large scale attack conducted by Boko Haram at the far North-East state of Borno, Nigeria, as a quasi-natural experiment and examine a set of attitudes in the aftermath of the event of Christians and Muslims throughout the country. Comparing individuals, outside the region of Borno, interviewed by Afrobarometer immediately after the massacre and those interviewed the days before within same regions and holding fixed a number of individual characteristics, I document that the informational exposure to the event rendered Christians less amiable to neighboring Muslims and Muslims less likely to recognize the legitimacy of the state. Nonetheless, Muslims increased their view of the elections as a device to remove leaders in office, event that took place 2 months later with the election of the challenger, Muhammadu Buhari. My findings indicate that terrorist attacks may generate a relevant and heterogeneous backlash across ethnic groups.

OPEN ACCESS Political Mismanagement in the Electoral Process of Nigeria: A Brief Review

Article

Full-text available

May 2014

Democratic elections are fundamental to the existence, survival and development of a free and fair political system in contemporary society. Individuals and political parties play a significant role to promote democracy in many nations around the world. Nigeria underwent several elections since its independence in 1960. However, all elections were not truly democratic and some elections have also witnessed violence instigated by politicians who lack societal values. The consequences of the 1964 parliamentary election for example created the breakdown of law and order resulting in military takeover two years later. The general elections of 1983 also witnessed multiple spate of violence, especially in Ondo State where lives and property worth millions of dollars were lost. Similarly, the elections conducted in 2003, 2007 and 2011 were met by sporadic violence challenging the rule of law in Nigeria. This paper reviews the unlawful political activities and their implications in the Nigerian political system.

Insurgency in Nigeria: Addressing the causes as part of the solution

Article

Full-text available

Jan 2014

Allswell Osini Muzan

Taking a cue from recent pronouncements by Chief Justice Dahiru Musdapher on the current precarious situation in Nigeria, this article examines the issues raised by the learned Chief Justice and concludes that none of those issues, working alone, is capable of making Nigeria a failed state. The one exception is the issue of insurgency, which is growing in strength and sophistication and becoming quite ominous for Nigeria. The article examines the growth of various insurgency movements in Nigeria, noting the strengths and impact of each and their potential to destabilise the country to the point of state failure and possible disintegration. The article then addresses the causative factors of insurgency in Nigeria, including the religious and ideological discontent which appears to be propelling the current conflict in Northern Nigeria. The article then considers some of the policy options for addressing these causes and conflict and recommends, among other measures, the establishment of a constitutional body - a supreme council for interreligious conflict - to function as a final arbiter in all interreligious conflicts that are potentially explosive conflicts that threaten a serious breach of the peace.

Is Terrorism Still a Democratic Phenomenon?

Article

Full-text available

Dec 2012

Erica Chenoweth

In recent years, multiple studies have confirmed that terrorism occurs in democracies more often than in nondemocratic regimes. There are five primary groups of explanations for this phenomenon, including the openness of democratic systems, organizational pressures resulting from democratic competition, the problem of underreporting in authoritarian regimes, gridlock resulting from multiparty institutions, and the coercive effectiveness of terrorism against democracies. Most of these studies, however, examine the relationship only through 1997. In this article, I explore whether terrorism has continued to occur more in democratic countries through 2010. I find that while terrorism is still prevalent in democracies, it has increased in "anocracies," countries that policymakers would often describe as "weak" or "failed" states. I offer a potential reason for this increase: the American-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. I conclude by offering some insights into how the rise of terrorism in anocracies affects the typical explanations for terrorism and democracy, and I suggest a few ways to improve on our current understanding.

Terrorism and Voting: The Effect of Rocket Threat on Voting in Israeli Elections

Article

Full-text available

Aug 2014

How does the threat of becoming a victim of terrorism affect voting behavior? Localities in southern Israel have been exposed to rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip since 2001. Relying on variation across time and space in the range of rockets, we identify the effect of this threat on voting in Israeli elections. We first show that the evolution of the rockets’ range leads to exogenous variation in the threat of terrorism. We then compare voting in national elections within and outside the rockets’ range. Our results suggest that the right-wing vote share is 2 to 6 percentage points higher in localities that are within the range—a substantively significant effect. Unlike previous studies that explore the role of actual exposure to terrorism on political preferences and behavior, we show that the mere threat of an attack affects voting.

Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World

Article

Oct 1996

Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism? Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate

Article

Jan 2008

This paper relies on the variation of terror attacks across time and space as an instrument to identify the causal effects of terrorism on the preferences of the Israeli electorate. We find that the occurrence of a terror attack within three months of the elections is associated with a 1.35 percentage points increase on the local support for the right bloc of political parties out of the two blocs vote. This effect is of a significant political magnitude given the level of terrorism in Israel and the fact that its electorate is closely split between the right and left blocs. Moreover, a terror fatality has important electoral effects beyond the locality where the attack is perpetrated, and their electoral impact is stronger the closer to the elections they occur. Interestingly, the observed political effects are not affected by the identity of the party holding office. These results provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the electorate shows a highly sensitive reaction to terrorism, and substantiate the claim that terror organizations especially target democratic regimes because these regimes are more prone to make territorial concessions.

Boko Haram's Evolving Threat

Article

Jan 2012

J.P. Pham

Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response, 2nd edition

Article

Jun 2006

Paul Wilkinson

'No one understands terrorism better than Paul Wilkinson...if policy makers read this book they will understand the problems better. If terrorists read it they will understand themselves a lot better.' - Michael Clarke, King's College London, University of London, UK This acclaimed study examines both the new terror networks and those that have been around for decades. This new edition brings it up-to-date with the dramatic opening of the twenty-first century, with new chapters on the 9/11 attacks, the growth of international terrorism, the Al Qaeda network and the War on Terror. This text provides us with some much needed criteria for distinguishing between terrorists and freedom fighters and an explanation of the uses of terrorism as a political, social, religious and criminal weapon. Wilkinson also links the use of terrorism to a wider repertoire of struggle. He proposes a variety of possible counter-measures and valuable principles carefully distilled from the recent past to help design a response that is compatible with democratic principles, the rule of law and respect for human rights. This book is essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate students of terrorism studies, political science and international relations, as well as for policy makers and journalists.

Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?

Article

Sep 2005
FOREIGN AFF

F. Gregory Gause

The Bush administration contends that the push for democracy in the Muslim world will improve U.S. security. But this premise is faulty: there is no evidence that democracy reduces terrorism. Indeed, a democratic Middle East would probably result in Islamist governments unwilling to cooperate with Washington.

Curbing Electoral Violence in Nigeria: The Imperative of Political Education

Article

Nov 2011

NO Obakhedo

Both domestic and international political sociologists based on empiricalinvestigations argue that the greatest obstacle to democratic consolidation inNigeria is electoral violence. This is as a result of the rascal politics that thepolitical elites engage in. Sometimes, the violence is intra-party, and most ofthe time, it is inter-party. Apart from that the fact that this phenomenonaffects the credibility of the electoral system, the democratic system and therule of law, the nature, extent and magnitude of violence and riggingassociated with elections in Nigeria had assumed alarming proportions thatnecessitates intellectual excursion to the realm of possible solutions.Education has been discovered to be a major strategy and weapon to curbingthis democratic impediment. To this end, this paper examines the imperativeof political education in curbing this ugly trend if the nation is to enthroneenduring and sustainable democratic order that would be a delight to behold.

Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

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