David Ritchie (2003b) defended Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) theory of conceptual metaphor against criticism made by Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996). Though Ritchie modified theory of conceptual metaphor, he held fast to the idea that much of abstract thought depends on metaphorical projection from embodied experience. We argue therein lie reductionism's dangers, seriously misrepresenting abstract thought, and a straightjacket-an inability to account for significant cognitive phenomena that are often presupposed by the theory of conceptual metaphor. As an alternative to explanations relying on embodied experience, we propose a more cognitive account of pervasive mappings, e.g., of spatial relations onto other domains. We show our account fits well with procedural knowledge and procedural similarity, factors that Ritchie addressed. Finally, we suggest that conceptual blending theory, a theoretical foundation Ritchie favored for conceptual metaphor theory, cannot do the work he has hoped for.