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7373
UCOWR
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCation
Universities CoUnCil on Water resoUrCes
JoUrnal of Contemporary Water researCh & edUCation
issUe 155, pages 73-82, JUly 2015
The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam:
Is There a Meeting Point between Nationalism and
Hydrosolidarity?
Dalia Abdelhady1, Karin Aggestam2, Dan-Erik Andersson1, Olof Beckman3, *Ronny
Berndtsson1,4, Karin Broberg Palmgren5, Kaveh Madani6, Umut Ozkirimli1, Kenneth M.
Persson3, and Petter Pilesjö7
1Centre for Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 2Peace & Conict Studies, Lund University, Lund,
Sweden, 3Human Rights Studies, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 4Department of Water Resources Engineering,
Lund University Lund, Sweden, 5Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Lund University, Lund, Sweden, 6Centre
for Environmental Policy, Imperial College, London, UK, 7GIS Centre, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
*Corresponding Author
The Nile River plays a crucial role in the
economics, politics, and cultural life of its
eleven riparian countries and more than
370 million inhabitants. The population of these
countries is expected to double within the next three
to four decades. This means that an astonishing
three-quarter of a billion people will be dependent
on the Nile for their livelihood. In 2025, Egypt´s
population is expected to reach about 97 million and
Ethiopia’s, 127 million. Both countries will then
experience physical water scarcity (Egypt by about
630 m3 and Ethiopia by about 840 m3 per year and
capita). Ethiopia and the upper Blue Nile generate
about 85% of the total Nile River ow. The 1959
agreement between Egypt and Sudan, however, has
allocated 75% of the total ow to Egypt and 25% of
the ow to Sudan. Several regional developments
in 2011 and 2012 have added to the complexity
of the situation. Popular uprisings in a number of
Arab countries, especially Egypt, brought hope
Abstract: The soon-to-be completed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will be the
largest hydroelectric power plant and among the largest reservoirs in Africa, has highlighted the need
for expanding traditional integrated water resources management to better include the cultural, social,
and political complexities of large water infrastructure in development projects. The GERD will store a
maximum of 74 billion cubic meters of water corresponding to approximately the average annual outow
of the Nile from the Aswan high dam. Undoubtedly, the GERD will be vital for energy production and a key
factor for food production, economic development, and poverty reduction in Ethiopia and the Nile Basin.
However, the GERD is also a political statement that in one stroke has re-written the hydropolitical map
of the Nile Basin. The GERD has become a symbol of Ethiopian nationalism or “renaissance” (hidase
in Amharic). A contrasting concept to nationalism is hydrosolidarity. This concept has been put forward
to better stress equitable use of water in international water management challenges that would lead to
sustainable socioeconomic development. We use the opposing notions of nationalism and hydrosolidarity
at three different scales, everyday politics, state policies, and interstate and global politics to analyse some
aspects of the new hydropolitical map of the Nile Basin. We argue that nationalism and national interests
are not necessarily negative standpoints but that there may instead be a meeting point where regional
and national interests join with hydrosolidarity principles. We believe that this meeting point can maximize
not only the common good, but also the good from a national interest point of view. For this, it is important
not increase collaboration instead of being locked in to the historical narrative of nationalistic culture and
historical discourse. This would benet and improve future sustainability.
Keywords: Nile, Egypt, hidase, Ethiopian nationalism, conict, transboundary, water
74 Abdelhady et al.
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCationUCOWR
for improvement in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region regarding democracy and
human rights standards. In 2011, Sudan was divided
into two countries. At the same time, Ethiopia
launched the construction of the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam (GERD). Approximately 30%
of the funding for the dam was secured from China
(The Economist 2011), and the remainder is funded
by the Government of Ethiopia through the selling
of bonds and donations, both within Ethiopia and
internationally (Water Technology.net 2014).
Earlier, Egypt threatened war if Ethiopia tried to
block the Nile ow and the response from Ethiopia
stated that no country could prevent its use of the
Nile waters (Time 2013). However, Ethiopia’s
economic development requires better use of the
hydropower and irrigation potential of the Nile (the
Harmon doctrine). Egypt, whose only water source
is the Nile, in turn declared that it would not give up
its share of the river’s waters. After the sudden death
of the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in
2012, however, a joint Egyptian, Sudanese, and
Ethiopian committee was formed to evaluate the
downstream effects of the dam. At the same time,
neither Egypt, nor Ethiopia has chosen to sign and
ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
which entered into force on 17 August 2014.
The objective of this paper is to use the opposing
notions of nationalism and hydrosolidarity at three
different scales namely, everyday politics, state
policies, and interstate and global politics to analyse
some aspects of the new hydropolitical map after
creation of the GERD in the Nile Basin. We briey
rst introduce the concepts of nationalism and
hydrosolidarity as two mechanisms at play in the
Nile Basin. Then, we discuss common drawbacks
of the traditional integrated water resources
management principles and difculties involved in
applying such principles in, for example, the Nile
Basin, followed by a discussion on the role of scales
in nationalism and hydrosolidarity in the Nile Basin.
We close with summarizing comments.
Nationalism vs. Hydrosolidarity
The construction of GERD is part of the larger
Millennium Project initiated by the current
Ethiopian People´s Revolutionary Democratic
(EPRDF) regime. The EPRDF took power in 1991
with a view to creating a “national consensus”, i.e.,
“to enable the whole society to have a shared vision
with respect to national issues on development and
building a democratic system” (EFDR 2005). As
such, the project represents a shift from a “politics
of difference”, associated with ethnic federalism, to
emphasizing “unity in diversity”, and is designed
to bring together the country’s more than 80 ethno-
linguistic groups. Hence, GERD has become a
symbol of Ethiopian nationalism or “renaissance”
(hidase; a newly coined word in Amharic, linking
the Ethiopian initiative with wider Neo Pan-
Africanist ideas of African revival; Orlowska
2013; Arsano 2007; see also Clapham 1995 and
Belachev 2009). After its completion, GERD will
be the largest hydroelectric power plant and one of
the largest reservoirs in Africa. Water is vital for
energy production and a delimiting factor for food
production, economic development, and poverty
reduction in Ethiopia and the Nile basin. The
GERD will generate 6000 MW per year and store a
maximum of 74 billion cubic meters of water (mean
annual inow to the Aswan dam is ~84 billion cubic
meters of water). At the same time downstream
countries have raised concern regarding the changed
streamow and effects on environment and ecology
that the dam will induce. In spite of its potentially
huge impact on downstream conditions, studies on
environmental and ecological effects of the dam have
been scant. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan agreed to set
up a Tripartite National Committee (TNC) of four
members from each country to follow up and conduct
the studies recommended by the International
Panel of Experts (IPoE; Ethiopian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2014). The IPoE recommended
two studies to be conducted by the TNC; a water
resources/hydropower system simulation model and
a transboundary environmental and socioeconomic
impact assessment (Horn Affairs 2014). The
Tripartite National Council recently held its second
meeting in Cairo (October 2014). It has been stated
that at present about 40% of GERD is completed
(Ahram 2014). The rst stage of the dam will be
operational from June 2015 and will produce 700
megawatts of electricity.
As opposed to “hidase” or nationalism that can
be seen as a top-down national-scale ideology, the
notion of hydrosolidarity has been launched as a
75
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Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCation
The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
way to guarantee water access from an equitable
standpoint (Lundqvist 1999; Gerlak et al. 2009;
2011). Hydrosolidarity builds on human ethics
and person to person empathy which is a bottom-
up approach and implies that water use will not
jeopardize the use of water by downstream riparians
(Falkenmark 2005; Falkenmark et al. 2009).
Moreover, hydrosolidarity aims to ensure that the
outcomes of new water infrastructure as well as water
management are “socially and environmentally
sustainable, promote economic development and
ensure community cohesion within a decision-
making process that makes the necessary local
compromises transparent” (Bjornlund and McKay
2003). In essence, the notion of hydrosolidarity
correlates with a good faith interpretation of the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization
and participation as expressed in article 5 of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses:
“Watercourse States shall in their respective
territories utilize an international watercourse
in an equitable and reasonable manner. In
particular, an international watercourse
shall be used and developed by watercourse
States with a view to attaining optimal and
sustainable utilization thereof and benets
therefrom, taking into account the interests of
the watercourse States concerned, consistent
with adequate protection of the watercourse.”
Solidarity in general is signicant in producing
cooperation between different groupings in order
to meet the needs of their members (e.g., Grey and
Sadoff 2007; Sadoff and Grey 2008). Sustainability
needs to be taken into consideration as it protects
future generations and guards intergenerational
fairness.
Both Ethiopian nationalism and the
hydrosolidarity concept emphasize the need for
cooperation at present while also upholding the
signicance of sustainability, but from different
viewpoints, as mentioned above. As such, they offer
effective starting points for investigating present-
day conditions of environmental concern and also
future-oriented policies and actions. It should
be noted that we do not regard nationalism as a
negative standpoint in this paper. The “hidase” is
a uniting element that works partly as a top-down
national-scale process, but partly also as a bottom-
up uniting process. This is exemplied by the
GERD funding in which the Ethiopian Government
has issued bonds targeted at Ethiopians in the
country and abroad (The Economist 2011). Without
a broad, bottom-up unifying process this funding
would not have been possible. Thus, nationalism
and the national interests both in Ethiopia and Egypt
should be seen as a starting point for negotiating the
ways both countries can reach their economic goals
by maximizing the total benets of the Nile River
water. For this to occur it is not a matter of either
nationalism or hydrosolidarity. Hydrosolidarity
should not necessarily be seen as a benet that is
given away due to solidarity principles. Instead,
hydrosolidarity, with its emphasis on recognition
of water use as a multinational issue, should be
viewed as a way to expand the benets available to
each riparian nation, carrying water management
beyond simple advocacy of national interests alone.
Thus, national interests and hydrosolidarity have an
important meeting point. In the case of GERD this
would be to highlight benets to Egypt that would
not have happened without the dam construction.
A practical example of this is the decrease in
evaporation occurring in the Ethiopian highlands.
By collaboration and by minimizing evaporative
losses for the entire Nile Basin storage system,
the completed GERD could actually mean larger
long-term inow to the Aswan Dam as compared
to the situation before the GERD (e.g., Mulat and
Moges 2014). Thus, the agreement of Egypt for
construction of the GERD and the cooperation of
both countries in handling the short-term risks and
negative effects during the lling of the dam could
lead to long-term and sustainable benets to both
Egypt and Ethiopia that otherwise would not have
been possible. On the other hand, for this to occur
greater collaboration between the countries and
increased tolerance for short-term national costs and
inconveniences is necessary in order to reach these
sustainable long-term benets.
Integrated Water Resources
Management (IWRM)
The case of GERD highlights a number of
questions that have great importance beyond the
dam itself, such as water sharing in transboundary
rivers, collective claim making processes, and
76 Abdelhady et al.
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCationUCOWR
global economic development. Large hydraulic
projects in transboundary river basins suffering from
water scarcity naturally lead to contest surrounding
water management. For example, in the Nile Basin
there is a historical, nationalistic rivalry between
Egypt and Ethiopia on the one hand, and on the
other, uniting historical and cultural elements such
as the relationships between the Coptic Church and
the Orthodox Ethiopian Church (e.g., Rubenson
2009). The overarching question is how ideas about
water management and economic development are
generated, transformed, and recongured in the face
of economic, social, and political realities in the Nile
countries. Integrated water resources management
(IWRM) has been brought forward during the recent
decades to solve the intricacies of all water resources
related planning and management. However, it is
more and more acknowledged that the monolithic,
complicated structure of IWRM does not work in
practice for complex international river basins with
a multitude of hierarchies (e.g., Biswas 2010). The
main weakness of IWRM is its tendency to tackle
water policy and related conicts from a commodity
perspective, to a great extent overlooking the
human and social dimensions of the process. Water
disputes are not just over commodities and property
rights, but also closely linked to aspects of justice
and fairness (Anand 2007). Furthermore, dam-
based development is a process with important
gender based social consequences regarding
relations, identities, and distribution of resources
(e.g., Mehta 2011). Lately, the working model of
transboundary, bi- and multilateral governmental
cooperation has been discussed as a potential
approach for situations involving the multitude of
authority structures present in large and complex
water basins (e.g., Cascao et al. 2012; Earle et al.
2010). There is, however, still no comprehensive
working methodology that can systematically
attempt to bridge ethnical and religious borders
while also considering differing cultural and
historical values. Thus, there is an urgent need to
explore different ways in which multinational social
realities, expressed through economic, cultural, and
political realms, may be combined with integrated
water resources management principles. The
interconnectedness of economic development has
to be considered alongside social, cultural, and
political dynamics that shape sustainability and
ultimately nationalism and/or hydrosolidarity in
the Nile Basin. Historical, social, political, and
institutional processes are often at play in river
water disputes (e.g., Elimam et al. 2008; Madani
and Hipel 2007). These interconnected processes
foster the ways individuals and organizations
perceive their claims on river water, the extent to
which individuals partake in collective action to
inuence the state or other institutional actors, the
ways state policies relate to the collective interests
of different groups, and the interest of various
states in recognizing and dealing with the claims of
other states (Anand 2007). As such, management
of water resources is linked to macro policy issues
like global security, environmental protection, good
governance, poverty eradication, and human rights.
At the same time, water management issues connect
to micro dynamics of daily social interactions,
gendered impact, identity constructions, and cultural
repertoires.
The strengthening of the Nile identity and
highlighting the cultural heritage of the Nile together
with increased dialogue and poverty eradication
could be an approach to better bring about a just
water allocation as compared to the traditional
IWRM approach (Tvedt 1998; University of Bergen
2012). Common heritage, history, and cultural
identity most likely play strong roles at the village
level as well as at the national level. Also, religion
is at the centre of everyday life on an individual,
family, and village level. Traditionally, these aspects
have been given very small space in practical water
problem solving, yet are often important reasons
why water projects are not successful. Thus, there
is a need to further explore these issues and factor
them into traditional IWRM approaches.
Scales in Nationalism and
Hydrosolidarity in the Nile Basin
In the Nile River basin, the role of negotiation of
nationalism and hydrosolidarity can be said to have
effects at three levels of scale: everyday politics,
state politics, and interstate and global politics.
(1) At the individual everyday level, the
political identity shapes and is shaped through
religious beliefs, national narratives, and cultural
perceptions of the right to the Nile water. Local
water organizations have an important role in water
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The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
negotiations among community members and
claim making vis-à-vis state policy institutions.
Large dam constructions often lead to internal
forced migration and affect the daily lives of many
communities. Thus, structural forces are likely to
shape the daily realities of water refugees. There
is no specic estimate of the number of people that
have been/will be resettled to make room for dams
and reservoirs in Ethiopia. Estimates for GERD
vary between 5,000-20,000 people that need to be
relocated around the construction site of the GERD
(e.g., International Rivers 2008). Relocated people
are reportedly being compensated, but it is not clear
to what degree. According to Veilleux (2013) locals
express hope that the GERD project will bring them
benet. They appear, however, to be unsure of what
a dam actually is, though they understand that it
will cause the river to ood the valley. Community
meetings for affected people are informing about
the impacts of the dam on their livelihoods.
Large reservoirs need comprehensive health
management components not to increase the
number of water borne and water related diseases
in the area (WHO 2015). The area around the Grand
Renaissance reservoir will consist of a 5 km buffer
zone for malaria control that will not be available
for settlement. There are also other health issues
related to GERD that are not yet resolved. Parasitic
diseases are the second most frequent cause of
outpatient morbidity in Ethiopia (e.g., Fentie et al.
2013). The nearby Lake Tana is experiencing large
problems with water related diseases. Hookworm
is the predominant intestinal parasite, followed by
Ascaris lumbricoides, and Schistosoma mansoni.
About 30% of all children are stated to have
multiple parasitic infections in areas close to Lake
Tana. Without precautionary planning, similar
health problems may result from the construction of
the GERD.
Dams such as GERD affect men and women in
signicantly different ways, as they are likely to
aggravate gender inequality (e.g., Mehta 2011). The
displacement of vulnerable communities disrupts
their traditional social ties and economic activities
(Farmer 2006). Reportedly, this increases incidents
of domestic violence, limits women’s mobility and
reduces their control over resources (Ibid). Such
consequences often trigger mass mobilizations
of people, especially women, to oppose dams and
related development policies (Shiva 2006).
Globally, NGOs are the guardians of water as
a social and cultural good. Within the context of
economic development, NGOs have an important
role in empowering marginal groups, strengthening
local capacity, and promoting cooperation. At the
same time, they are part of the symbolic and political
order in which they operate (e.g., Tvedt 1998). The
World Commission on Dams (2000) underlines
that development needs should be formulated
through an open and participatory process and that
comprehensive assessment of all options should be
made giving social and environmental aspects the
same weight as technical, economic and nancial
factors. Large-scale development projects such as
the GERD often take place without the consultation
of women or assessing the gendered impact of the
project (Obbo 2011). So far in the GERD case,
participatory processes are non-existent, and a social
impact assessment has not yet been undertaken.
The absence of participatory mechanisms hampers
a gender-sensitive development that is known to
provide perspectives that meet the needs of affected
communities and individuals at large (Ibid.).
NGOs promote the advance of democracy, mass
mobilization, poverty alleviation, and social justice
in many countries of the Nile Basin, and are thus
important actors in constructing perceptions and
attitudes towards development and social change.
Particularly, NGOs have an important role in bringing
attention to the impact of large development projects
on women. Local water management organizations
are an important arena to assess the social impact
of GERD and investigate the ways they attempt
to alleviate the negative consequences of GERD
on individuals and communities. As sites where
water and environmental policies are formulated
and implemented, these local organizations provide
avenues to analyse the inter-linkages between
global discourses of rights and freedoms, regional
inter-state conicts over water, national policies and
discourses related to GERD, and everyday practices
related to sustainable development and social
cohesion. Moreover, local water organizations are
also appropriate sites for promoting a vision of just,
democratic, and ecologically sustainable use of
water resources. Additionally, NGOs are regional
and global players who have a signicant role to
play in the promotion of social and environmental
78 Abdelhady et al.
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCationUCOWR
justice and sustainable development at the local
level in the Nile Basin. Finally, NGOs can partake
in shaping a global discourse on environmental
justice and hydrosolidarity. Hydrosolidarity may be
relevant even considering authoritarian regimes. In
the example of the GERD, the NGO International
Rivers has highlighted several potential safety issues,
negative environmental impacts and consequences
for the downstream ow. The Nile Basin Initiative,
an organisation for the Nile’s riparian states,
advocates a more equitable allocation of the water
and has tried to moderate Egypt’s historical control.
(2) At the state level, processes of negotiation
in formulating and implementing water-related
policies become more important. These include
interactions between state institutions and policies
of economic development on one hand, and between
these institutions and local organizations and interest
groups that are affected by state policies on the
other hand. The role of international development
assistance in shaping water-related policies needs
is also important. National cultures and identities
play an important role in shaping attitudes towards
the Nile in general and shaping the risk of emerging
conict between Egypt and Ethiopia in particular.
The Nile has been the connecting link between
Egypt and Ethiopia for thousands of years. Starting
from the 3rd century A.D., the Nile connected early
Ethiopian Christianity with the Alexandrian Coptic
Church that has continued uninterrupted for 1600
years (Ayele 1986; Erlich 2002). Consequently,
despite their differences, Ethiopia and Egypt have
several similarities. Both societies have witnessed
millennia long constructive relations between
different religions. In Egypt, the Coptic Church has
played a signicant role within the Muslim majority
society. An example of this is the mediating role
that the church has taken over the dispute on the
Renaissance Dam (Al Monitor 2014). In Ethiopia,
some of the oldest Muslim and Jewish communities
live side by side with communities of the Orthodox
Ethiopian Church. Their long history, however, has
also been lled by disputes. Ayele (1986) notes that
during a 7-year famine period, 1066-1072 A.D., in
Egypt, the Egyptian Khalifah believed that Ethiopia
might have deected the course of the Nile. Thus,
he sent emissaries and gifts to the Ethiopian king
to persuade him to let the Nile return to its course
(Wallis Budge 1934). The long history between
these two main balancing powers of the Nile Basin
is pitted with similar incidences, and the historical
Egyptian fear over changes in the river course of the
Nile has now become a reality through construction
of the GERD. The exact impact of the dam on
downstream countries is not presently known.
Assumedly, during the lling of the reservoir, 11 to
19 km3 of water per year could be lost. This could
cause two million farmers to lose their income
during the period of lling the reservoir (Al Jazeera
2013).
In response to these concerns, Ethiopia, Egypt,
and Sudan agreed to form an international Panel of
Experts after the construction of GERD began, in
order to review the GERD’s social and environmental
impacts on downstream nations. The 10-member
panel submitted its rst report to the governments in
June 2013. The panel found need for more details in
the impact assessment of the GERD (International
Rivers 2014). In January 2014, after a series of
high-level meetings between the three governments,
discussions broke down. In April 2014, Ethiopia’s
Prime Minister invited Egypt and Sudan to another
round of talks over the dam. In August 2014, a
Tripartite Ministerial-level meeting agreed to set
up a Tripartite National Committee (TNC) meeting
over the dam. The rst TNC meeting took place in
September 2014 in Ethiopia (All Africa 2014). At
present, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have agreed to
select two European advisory ofces to carry out
technical studies on the Renaissance Dam and its
effects on the Nile water share of the downstream
countries (All Africa 2015). Consequently, technical
cooperation is leading to increasing political
partnership at state level.
(3) At the interstate and global level, nationalism
and hydrosolidarity may shape the role global
water discourses and politics play in the Nile Basin.
Particularly, political processes of deliberation and
negotiation in the shaping of general principles and
legal norms governing the relationship between
riparian states in view of environmental effects and
climate change need to be addressed. In economic
terms, Ethiopia will most likely see a much needed
development boost. The unavoidable expropriations
for construction and ooding will, however, increase
the urgency of agenda items such as property rights,
livelihood, individual petitioning and access to legal
remedies. Similarly, culturally motivated land rights
79
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The Nile and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam
and rights of indigenous populations will inevitably
challenge the response capacity of the Ethiopian
government to ensure the rights of protected
minorities. Once completed, the economic added
value generated by the dam will pose a challenge
with regard to claims of local social and economic
rights and their relationship to foreign investors and
loan providers. As a developing country, Ethiopia
is under international legal obligation to ensure the
economic, social and cultural rights of their citizens
progressively and to the maximum of their available
resources. Moreover, while multiple stakeholder
perspectives are increasingly emphasized in the
general discourse on water management and water
rights, international agreements provide limited or
no legal standing for entities other than states. The
paradigm on water management has changed in
many respects, but the existing formal framework
remains profoundly conservative. Meanwhile, the
building of GERD is undertaken in an uncertain
international situation. The major actors, Egypt
and Ethiopia, subscribe to incompatible legal
regimes regarding the Nile. Egypt refers to the
1959 agreement and historically based arguments
of custom. In contrast, Ethiopia rejects both the
validity and applicability of such claims, referring to
the colonial taint of the agreement and the fact that
it did not include Ethiopia at its origin. The situation
is potentially dangerous as there is virtually no
agreement on anything apart from the diplomatic
inventions between Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia
during the last year.
Over the past 40 years, human rights have
become a signicant part of the established political
vocabulary of international actors. In international
relations, protecting human rights is a mainstreaming
tool and a common denominator capable of bridging
different political standpoints. This notion can be
both upheld and criticized on a number of different
grounds, depending on the choice of perspective.
While economic, social, and cultural rights easily
can be held to mutually reinforce the most common
notions of development, more individually oriented
rights can potentially pose a challenge to broader
socio-economic development. The utility aspect of
development often becomes difcult to reconcile
with diligent legal protection of individual human
rights. This normative tension between individual
human rights based claims and the political
priorities of development will be further accentuated
with increasing emphasis on sustainability in the
discourse, when solidarity with unborn generations
is pitted against the immediate needs of today´s
poor.
Summarizing Comments
We argue that the seemingly divergent concepts
of nationalism and hydrosolidarity can be used
together to better understand cultural, social, and
political aspects of water management challenges
and how these relate to sustainable development.
The GERD highlights a number of questions that
have relevance beyond the dam itself, such as water
sharing in transboundary rivers, collective claim
making processes, and economic development
globally. Using the GERD as a case study, we
identify three different scales for the role of politics
in nationalism and hydrosolidarity; everyday
politics, state policies, and interstate and global
politics. At the individual everyday level, the
identity shapes and is shaped by religious beliefs,
national narratives, and cultural perceptions of
the right to water. Local water organizations as
well as NGOs have an important role in water
negotiations among community members and claim
making vis-à-vis state policy institutions. At the
state level, processes of negotiation in formulating
and implementing water-related policies become
important. These include interactions between state
institutions and policies of economic development
on one hand, and between these institutions and local
organizations and interest groups that are affected
by state policies on the other hand. At the interstate
and global level, nationalism and hydrosolidarity
can shape the potential for global water discourses
and politics at play in the Nile basin. Particularly,
political processes of deliberation and negotiation
in the shaping of general principles and legal norms
governing the relationship between riparian states
are important.
We also argue that national interests and
hydrosolidarity have an important meeting point.
For this meeting point to occur we believe that short-
term negative implications of water management
decisions have to be carefully managed by intensied
collaboration in order to reach the more long-term
sustainable goals. Thus, the meeting point between
80 Abdelhady et al.
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCationUCOWR
national interests and hydrosolidarity means that
advantages and benets from cooperation to a great
extent exceed the benets that otherwise would have
been reached by not collaborating. In case of GERD
there is a severe lack of collaboration between Egypt,
Sudan, and Ethiopia. Only intensied collaboration
and detailed studies on the management of the
GERD can bring out benets that can potentially
improve living conditions in all countries within the
Nile Basin.
Acknowledgements
Funding from the MECW project at the Center for Middle
Eastern Studies, and the Hydrosolidarity in the Nile Basin
project at the Pufendorf Institute for Advanced Studies,
Lund University, is gratefully acknowledged.
Author Bio and Contact Information
Dalia abDelhaDy is senior researcher at the Centre for
Middle Eastern Studies (CMES), Lund University (Dalia.
Abdelhady@cmes.lu.se).
Karin aggestam is professor in Political Sciences
(Karin.Aggestam@svet.lu.se).
Dan-eriK anDersson is senior lecturer in human rights
and with a background of ethics and co-director of the
CMES (Dan-Erik.Andersson@cme.lu.se).
olof becKman is assistant professor of Human Rights
Studies at Lund University (Olof.Beckman@mrs.lu.se).
ronny bernDtsson is professor at Department of
Water Resources Engineering, Lund University (Ronny.
Berndtsson@tvrl.lth.se).
Karin broberg-Palmgren is associate professor
at Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Lund
University (Karin.Broberg_Palmgren@med.lu.se).
Kaveh maDani is lecturer in Environmental Management
at the Centre for Environmental Policy, Imperial College,
London (K.Madani@imperial.ac.uk).
UmUt ÖzKirimlii is professor at CMES, Lund University
(Umut.Ozkirimli@cme.lu.se).
Kenneth m. Persson is professor at Department of
Water Resources Engineering, Lund University and
head of research at VA SYD a regional water supply and
sanitation company (Kenneth_M.Persson@tvrl.lth.se).
Petter PilesjÖ is professor and the head of the GIS
centre at Lund University (Petter.Pilesjo@gis.lu.se).
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