The Constitution of Liberty
... This natural, individual dynamism is augmented by social interactionism. Where many people, individually seeking out their own betterment, interact to share knowledge and ideas and to produce new solutions, the generative capacity of those individuals, conjointly, is exponentially augmented ( Bylund, 2016 ;Hayek, 1948Hayek, , 1978aMises, 1949 ). Ongoing changes to social situations (changing supply, demand, production capacity, etc.) are accompanied by ever-changing individual knowledge and expectations, which requires adapting coordinative plans ( Lachmann, 1977( Lachmann, , 1986. ...
As design science advances into the foreground of entrepreneurship theory, we see a meta-theoretical tension between Simon's classic exposition of design and entrepreneurship theory's foundations within the Austrian school of economics. To resolve this tension, we argue that design science is mispositioned atop the conventional positivism that Simon embraced and is much better aligned with Austrian-style subjectivism of values, knowledge, and expectations. We elaborate design themes from classical contributions to Austrian economics to lay foundations for an “Austrian” approach to design. We conclude by illustrating how design processes are foundational to Austrian market theory and the Austrian theory of the firm.
... Wealth is the free power. It unifies the nature of freedom [9,[15][16][17] in literature, philosophy, politics, economics, ecology and physics---freedom is wealth, that is, free energy. ...
... 4 In particular, more research on the effects of school choice regulations on the average quality and specialization of participating schools is needed to better inform policymakers. As Hayek (1960) famously stated: A free market system does not exclude on principle . . . all regulations governing the techniques of production . . . ...
Private school voucher programs provide government subsidies to eligible students for tuition and other education-related costs. Parents participating in choice programs benefit from a larger and more diverse supply of education providers. Private schools must choose whether or not to participate in a voucher program in their community. In deciding, private school leaders likely weigh program participation benefits against any associated regulatory costs. The higher the regulatory costs of participation, the less likely a private school is to participate in a school voucher program, given a fixed amount of benefit. Since we do not know with certainty which regulations will be viewed by school leaders as more or less costly, we explore whether specific regulations that are common to private school choice programs do or do not deter likely voucher program participation. We use a survey experiment to identify regulatory provisions that are deal-breakers for private schools. We randomly assign different regulations to 4,825 private school leaders in the states of California and New York and ask them whether or not they would participate in a new school voucher program during the following school year. Relative to no regulations, our most conservative models find that open-enrollment mandates reduce the likelihood that private school leaders are certain to participate in a hypothetical choice program by about 19 percentage points, or 60%. State standardized testing requirements reduce the likelihood that private school leaders are certain to participate by 9 percentage points, or 29%. We find no evidence to suggest that the prohibition of copayment or nationally norm-referenced testing requirements affect the overall willingness to participate in a voucher program.
... It is worth noting that Hayek repeated that charge against Dewey later on in his philosophical opus magnum -The Constitution of Liberty. 36 Notwithstanding the enormous popularity of The Road to Serfdom, Hayek's most important arguments in defence of the old individualistic creed were laid down in various articles published in scholarly journals. In "Individualism True or False" Hayek distinguished two main streams of individualist thinking. ...
... 7 No primeiro caso, a justiça reside na correção racional do procedimento adotado. A essa classe de teorias pertencem tanto as concepções mais libertárias de justiça, como as de Friedrich Hayek (1960) e de John Nozick (1974), como as mais igualitárias, como a de John Rawls. 8 Nem todas as concepções procedimentais de justiça se prestam a justificar políticas de ação afirmativa. ...
... Ein verbreiteter Einwand gegen Gleichheit lautet, daß ein egalitaristischer Wohlfahrtsstaat der menschlichen Eigenverantwortung widerspreche, weil er die Bürgerinnen und Bürger zur Passivität erziehe (so schon Hayek 1960). Es ist demnach ungerecht, jemanden von den Folgen eines Tuns oder Unterlassens zu entlasten, das er selbst zu vertreten hätte. ...
The author defends an egalitarian conception of justice against recent anti-egalitarian criticisms in politics and philosophy. On a conceptual level he argues that modern morality is based on a principle of equal respect and concern. As a consequence, all that a conception of distributive justice has to elaborate is an adequate interpretation of equality. In short, equality is the epitome of justice. The article gives an outline of a conception that respects and accentuates the responsibility of persons for leading their own lives and that nevertheless justifies strong demands for redistribution in the realm of social politics.
In this paper we analyse the concept of coerced exchange (and partly of voluntary exchange inasmuch as the absence of coercion is its necessary condition), which is of utmost importance to economic theory in general and to the Austrian School of Economics in particular. The subject matter literature normally assumes that a coerced action occurs under threat. Threats in turn can be studied from the perspective of speech act theory, which is concerned with the speaker’s intentions. Ultimately, our goal is to provide a descriptive (i.e. non-moralized) definitions of threat and coercion, based on the analysis of the coercer’s intentions. If successful, we would be in a position to present such an account of coerced and voluntary exchanges that is compatible with both speech act theory and the Austrian methodology. Although we focus on the Austrian School of Economics, we believe that our investigations might impact on economic theory in general. We also criticize a rights-based account of coercion employed in the research practice of some neo-Austrians and based on the libertarian ethic of property rights.
Nach kurzen Erläuterungen zu Karl Poppers (1902–1994) Kritischem Rationalismus wird die Relevanz klassischer Entscheidungsregeln für die Zielsetzungen wirtschaftspolitischen Handelns bewertet. Behandelt werden dabei die Maximax-, Leximax-, Maximin-, Leximin-, Hurwicz-, Savage-Niehans-, Laplace-, Bayes- und μ-σ-Regel. Das Gefangenen-Dilemma leitet die Berücksichtigung strategischer Aspekte ein. In deren Zentrum steht die Strategieanalyse mit der Untersuchung externer und interner Umweltbedinungen, die Strategieentwicklung mit GAP-, SWOT-, TOWS-Analyse und Benchmarking sowie die Strategieformulierung mit der Innovations-, Imitations-, Adaptions-, Kostenführerschafts-, Differenzierungs-, Nischen- und Diversifikationsstrategie. Die 36 Strategeme des Tan Daoji geben einen Einblick in das Denken chinesischer Strategen. Nach verhaltensökonomischen Erläuterungen zu systematischen („biases“) und unsystematischen („noise“) Verzerrungen sowie zum staatlichen Nudging und Sludging bildet die Präsentation des innovationsfreundlichen Serendipitätsprinzips den Abschluss dieses Kapitels.
In den politökonomischen Grundlagen wird gezeigt, wie politische Kalküle die Wirtschaftspolitik eines Landes beeinflussen: Für den Wählerstimmen maximierenden Politiker sind die Präferenzen des Medianwählers sowie der politische Konjunkturzyklus von zentraler Bedeutung. Bürokraten und andere Interessengruppen verfolgen zum Teil Ziele, die den kollektiven Zielen einer Volkswirtschaft zuwiderlaufen. Rentenstreben und anreizinkompatible Regulierungen sorgen für mangelnde Effizienz wirtschaftspolitischen Handelns. Lösungen, die für eine tragfähige Schulden- und eine nachhaltige Klimapolitik erforderlich sind, stehen Zeitinkonsistenzen entgegen, sofern positive Effekte erst langfristig zu erwarten sind, Kosten hingegen bereits kurz- und mittelfristig anfallen. Auch wenn ihre Bedeutung aufgrund des hohen Abstraktionsgrades, der für universalistische Prinzipien charakteristisch ist, oft unterschätzt wird, so gehört der Schutz privater Eigentums- und Verfügungsrechte zu einer der wichtigsten Aufgaben der Wirtschaftspolitik.
The theory and practice of corporate governance has been in something of an arms race with corporate malefactors-as corporate governance mechanisms have incrementally advance, so too have the strategies of malefactors who skirt those gov-ernance practices to engage in costly misconduct. Modern centralized governance approaches appear inapt to filling the gaps caused by agency and knowledge problems. Here, we start afresh using the atypical 'praxeological' method to reconstruct governance theory anew from basic foundations. The resultant theory is distinctive from prevailing corporate governance theorizing in several key ways. One of the more important conclusions from our reconstructed theory is that governance may benefit from a more 'market' or decentralized approach. In short, the governance holes derived from agency and knowledge problems are, or may be, much smaller when governance is decentralized, where employees police each other. While the implementation of such a radical rethinking of governance practice is left ambiguous in our treatment, the theoretical basis for such an approach is compelling. Keywords Corporate governance · Agency theory · Knowledge asymmetry · Ownership · Management · Praxeological method JEL Classification G30 · G34 · O16 · B53 · D82 · D86 Most directors today recognize the importance of robust oversight, but it is unclear whether boards, as they are currently constituted and operate, are up to the task. The increasing size and complexity of companies, the expanding array of risk areas, and the difficulty boards have in getting the information needed to exercise effective oversight all bode poorly for a positive answer to this question.
How is freedom valuable? And how should we go about defining freedom? In this essay, I discuss a distinction between two general ways of valuing freedom: one appeals to the good (e.g., to freedom's contribution to well‐being); the other appeals to how persons have reason to treat one another in virtue of their status as purposive beings (to the right). The analysis of these two values has many relevant implications and it is preliminary to a better understanding of the relationships between freedom and justice. First, it contributes to shed light on the relationship between trust and the value of freedom, and on two attitudes towards freedom – promoting and respecting freedom. Second, it disambiguates between two versions of the claim that freedom has non‐specific/content‐independent value: one appeals to the good, the other to the right. And third, I show that certain implications concerning the definition of freedom follow from assuming an account of the value of freedom that exclusively appeals to the right, illustrating how the value of freedom can shape what freedom is.
Twice in the Journal of Business Ethics, Walter Block provides a libertarian argument that The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is unjust because it is a violation of a business’s property rights and therefore ought to be repealed. No libertarian reply to Block has ever been given, creating the mistaken impression that his argument is the true representation of libertarian theory with regards to civil rights. This paper focuses on Title II and argues that both Block, and this prevailing opinion of libertarian theory, are wrong. There are different types of libertarian theory. Block’s theory of natural rights is one of them, but there is another strain of libertarian thought that embraces the common law, at least as it existed up until the late 1800’s. This paper explicates a libertarian argument, based on the common law, which supports and defends Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Specifically, the evolution of contracts via assumpsit arguments, found in Blackstone’s Commentaries, endogenously and consistently gives rise to the obligation to serve all. Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is consistent with this common law tradition on public accommodations. Libertarian arguments that accept the common law on contracts ought also to accept common law doctrine on public accommodations and, perforce, the justness of Title II.
With the development of global value chains, more and more countries are involved in global trade, which has brought an extensive social impact. Past studies on the employment impact of trade have pointed out that free trade has significantly boosted employment in developing economies, with large populations working in export-related jobs along the value chains. Recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused global trade protectionism to become more rampant. This study aims to establish a trade employment effect accounting model, based on the comparison of multiple scenarios, to discuss the employment impact of trade lockdown on major developing and developed countries. Specifically, based on a multi-regional input–output model, we map the flow network of trade-induced employment in 15 major global economies, and the scenarios of free trade and restricted trade are simulated to determine the employment impact of protectionism across multiple trade patterns. The results show that the current labor flow induced by global trade mainly flows from developing countries such as China and India to developed countries such as the EU and the United States. In the total employment induced by trade, the proportion of final products trade reached 42.82%. Trade protection would cut 19.86 million jobs worldwide. Under the trade restriction scenario, employment in developing countries would be reduced, with China and India losing 45.24 million and 10.10 million jobs, respectively. People working in the final product processing trade face the greatest risk of unemployment, especially in manufacturing and services. Among developed countries, the EU and the US would add 5.52 and 2.23 million jobs due to industrial repatriation.
Die Frage, inwieweit der Staat oder der Markt die dominierende Rolle einer Volkswirtschaft einnehmen soll, ist die Frage aller Fragen, bei der sich die Geister scheiden. In der Regel haben Politiker stärkere Präferenzen für den starken Staat als Ökonomen, von denen einige darin sogar eine „Anmaßung von Wissen“ sehen, das staatliche Entscheider gar nicht haben (können). Konstitutionenökonomische Rechtfertigungen des Staates sprechen für staatliche Aktivität, steigende staatliche Budgets für eine Begrenzung derselben. Bei Vorliegen öffentlicher Güter versagt allerdings der Markt, sodass der Staat dann auch aus Sicht von Marktapologeten aktiv werden muss. Ein gutes Marktdesign hat zudem informationsökonomische Erkenntnisse zu berücksichtigen, weil ansonsten Signalling, moralische Wagnisse, adverse Selektion, Trittbrettfahren oder Drückebergerei Fehlallokationen hervorrufen. Schließlich steht jedes Gemeinwesen vor dem Problem, dass individuelle und kollektive Rationalität nicht immer miteinander harmonieren, sondern manchmal auch konfligieren.
The discipline of economics has long dominated the role of the social sciences in public policy. While this can partly be explained by the superior sophistication of economic theory, this is in itself partly the result of the tendency of economists to ignore complex variables that stand outside its own sphere. A number of policy examples are discussed, which demonstrate some of the negative consequences that have flowed from this: enduring economic geographical inequalities among cities and regions; the impact of unregulated globalization; the initial construction of the single European currency; recent labour market reforms; and the use of market analogues in public services. It will be concluded that the quality of much public policy-making in many countries would have been improved if the knowledge and insights of other social sciences had had access to policy-makers alongside economists. This would however demand a greater willingness among decision-makers to accept ambiguity and uncertainty in the advice that they receive from social scientists.
Historische Transformationsprozesse stehen bevor. Vor allem der Klimawandel, die Digitalisierung und die Globalisierung stellen Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft vor tief greifende, geradezu disruptive Veränderungen. Das Zusammenspiel von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft bestimmt die Richtung von Wandel und Wachstum.
Radical democracy is usually fleeting. What are the possibilities for institutionalising it? If we want to understand them, we have to look carefully at the institutions and practices of local government and distance ourselves from the ideal of the nation-state, focusing instead on the possibilities of the open city. In that context, this article refers back to the work of Hannah Arendt and Robert Dahl, considering it in light of more recent contributions from Nancy Rosenblum, Andy Merrifield, Jacques Ranciere, and others.
The complexity of the U.S. income tax system emerged in part from the differentiated fiscal treatment of specific investments and various sorts of business expenditures that, as Richard Wagner says, creates “a tax code so large that no one can read it and which creates nearly a unique tax liability for each taxpayer.” While tax scholarship documents the costs of complexity, current scholarship lacks a normative legal theory that could inspire an alternative to this practice of targeted credits and deduction rules. This paper builds on Epstein’s general Simple Rules framework to develop a radical simplification of income tax: the operationalization of a uniform expense rule, i.e., the application of a single deduction scheme across all expenses and investments. With regard to the trade-off between targeted rules and this general approach, this paper investigates the nature of a uniform expense rule and reveals its strengths with respect to political economy. First, a stable and universal expense rule would narrow the scope of politicians’ ability to concentrate benefits on special-interest groups and would limit rent-seeking. The abolition of deviating rules for investments would restrict the scope of tax optimization, meaning that individual and corporate tax liabilities would be more determined by the ability to pay them. The same policy would save companies and government millions of dollars that they currently spend on tax compliance and administration of the tax system, respectively. Last, a deduction rule that applies across all businesses and industries would be less price distortive and thus would enhance the quality of the price signal.
When asked whether some people deserve more income than others, Milton Friedman responded: “I don’t think desert has anything to do with it. Desert is an impossible thing to decide. Who deserves what? Nobody deserves anything. Thank god we don’t get what we deserve!” To defend his skepticism about desert, Friedman points out that how hard people work, and how large of a productive contribution they make, is ultimately a matter of luck. We argue that Friedman’s luck challenge to desert can be resisted. In particular, it seems to us that one particular conception of desert can plausibly justify unequal pay: compensatory desert. Salaries should compensate workers for the relative reduction of welfare opportunities compared to other types of work that exist in society.
The MENA region is characterized by numerous crises. These range from the Covid-19 pandemic sweeping through the region to religious fundamentalism, violent sectarianism, vast economic discrepancies, pressing environmental challenges, the intrusions of external actors in the region, and a debilitating authoritarian culture. All of these variables are exacerbated or ameliorated by globalization – a reality that no state can wish away. These challenges can be mitigated by political elites engaging in robust institution-building creating structures fit for purpose whilst at the same time laying the foundation of values amongst citizens like trust in those institutional structures.
In this chapter I discuss my analytical approach—the purpose of which is to build theory. In order to build theory, I start with a core set of theories and use them to identify anomalies in the data. I then use these anomalies to extend my core theories. I begin by discussing the Extended Case Method (e.g., Burawoy 2009) as my general analytical framework. I then explain my adaptation of this approach to analyze legitimations in semi-structured interviews. I do so by using what I call “Rationales” (Vila-Henninger 2019a)—which applies the Extended Case Method in a way that is similar to abduction (e.g., Timmermans and Tavory 2012). Next, I discuss the core theories I used to identify anomalous rationales. Subsequently, I outline the supplemental theoretical frameworks these core theories led me to employ. I used this approach in order to address my second research question.
Taking cue from the honoree’s lifelong interest in constitutional issues, interdisciplinary research, and intergenerational equity, this chapter presents and assesses the case for constitutional precommitments as means to correct the short-termist bias of democracy. It discusses two different forms that rationality-securing precommitment can take—mechanical and fiduciary—and argues that the former (rules) cannot accommodate reasonable pluralism with respect to intergenerational justice, hence jeopardizing constitutional legitimacy. As to the latter (principles), while it may be able to reconcile rationality and pluralism, the standard method for its enforcement—judicial review—is unfit for the task within the realm of intergenerational issues. That calls for a different type of constitutional arrangement, and therefore a renewal of interest in institutional imagination and design.
Scientific progress has many facets and can be conceptualized in different ways, for example in terms of problem-solving, of truthlikeness or of growth of knowledge. The main claim of the paper is that the most important prerequisite of scientific progress is the institutionalization of competition and criticism. An institutional framework appropriately channeling competition and criticism is the crucial factor determining the direction and rate of scientific progress, independently on how one might wish to conceptualize scientific progress itself. The main intention is to narrow the divide between traditional philosophy of science and the sociological, economic and political outlook at science that emphasizes the private interests motivating scientists and the subsequent contingent nature of the enterprise. The aim is to show that although science is a social enterprise taking place in historical time and thus is of a contingent nature, it can and in fact does lead to genuine scientific progress - contrary to the claims of certain sociologists of science and other relativists who standardly stress its social nature, but deny its progressive character. I will first deal with the factual issue by way of introducing the main concepts and mechanisms of modern institutional theory and by applying them to the analysis of the cultural phenomenon that we call modern science. I will then turn to the normative issue: what is the appropriate content of the institutional framework, for scientific progress to emerge and be sustained at which level should it be set and by whom? Addressing this problematic is equivalent to conducting a constitutional debate leading to a Constitution of Science.
The book is part of the renewed debate on equality. In the wake of a leftist libertarian approach, equal freedom is in my opinion the fundamental characteristic of a “good place” to live is equal freedom. However, if someone is subordinate to the power of others, he is not free; and if someone leads others, exercising his power, he cannot enjoy the interaction with free people. Therefore, an effective equal freedom requires equality of power. Isocracy is a society where nobody commands or obeys; a place where there is order without power, where cooperation is non-hierarchical. More precisely, in order to prevent someone from prevailing over others, his power must be neutralised by another power. Isocracy is a society in which institutions try to facilitate the mutual balancing of the various forms of power. Even without reaching the perfect and definitive levelling of powers, those who come to lead within a certain sphere cannot prevail also in other spheres, without bearing costs, ultimately dominating overall.
Bireylerin yaptıkları yahut yapmaktan kaçındıkları her bir davranışın bir maliyeti vardır. Bu maliyet, neredeyse hiçbir kaynağın sınırsız olmamasındandır. Dolayısıyla bireyler, kendi arzuları doğrultusunda maliyet analizi yaparak belirli bir yönde davranırlar. Bu perspektiften bakıldığında insanlar hayatlarını, farkında olmasalar da ekonomik hesaplamalarla idame ettirirler. Bu davranışların bir başkasını ekonomik açıdan etkilemesiyle piyasa olarak adlandırılan ekonomik mübadele ortamı meydana gelir. Bu ortamın muhafazasına ilişkin muhtelif görüşler ileri sürülmüşse de üzerinde mutabık kalınan husus, piyasanın varlığı ve mümkün mertebe kesintisiz işlemesidir. İşte bu mutabakatın gereklerinin ceza hukuku kapsamında yerine getirilmesi, ekonomi ceza hukukunu meşgul eden bir konudur. Bu istikamette çeşitli kanun maddeleri sevk edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada 5237 sayılı Türk Ceza Kanunu bünyesinde ihdas edilen ekonomik suçlardan biri olan mal veya hizmet satımından kaçınma suçu (m. 240) incelenmektedir.
------
Each act that an individual conducts or avoids to conduct comes with a cost. This cost stems from the fact that no resource is infinite. Therefore, individuals behave according to their own will, albeit in a certain way pursuant to their cost analysis. With a glance from this perspective, it is observed that individuals maintain their living standards by dwelling upon economic considerations and calculations, even though they are unaware of this phenomenon. An individual's behavior affecting another individual creates a medium of economic exhcange, which is referred to as the market. Although there are different views regarding the maintenance of this atmosphere, the common denominator of all is that the free market economy should be preserved by an uninterrupted, continuous handling. This common understanding manifests itself under the rules of economic criminal law, which constitutes an integral part of criminal law. With this respect, a number of stipulations have been foreseen by the legislator. The work at hand examines the crime of avoiding the sales of goods or provision of services (Art. 240) stipulated under Turkish Criminal Code No. 5237.
These days, economic liberalism and international capitalism are typically presented as two sides of the same coin. Therefore, when discussing the downsides of capitalism, the critique usually stems from a socialist and thus “outside” perspective. However, a distinct – and historically overlooked – critique of capitalism comes from the inside of liberalism, namely from the so-called ordoliberalism. This is a German variant of liberalism from the 1930s and 1940s, and it may come as a surprise to some that it actually has a lot to offer in the present-day discussion of capitalism. This article reconstructs the ordoliberal critique and argues that ordoliberalism presents a strong and coherent critique of capitalism. In my reconstruction of ordoliberalism, I divide the critique into five categories (methodological, anthropological, moral, monopolistic, and strategic) and show that these five forms are bound together and underpin each other. Above all, this means that the connection between economic liberalism and capitalism is not as close as otherwise assumed.
Research on higher education is drawing growing attention, as attested by the recent organization of Japan Society for Studies into Higher Education. This paper presents an epistemological model of higher education studies which involves three significant layers -discourses about policy and practice, empirical studies and conceptual paradigms. The establishment of the Society is important because the organization will provide the link connecting the three layers. But the coherence of the field will be critically dependent on the conceptual paradigm.
From this perspective, past developments in higher education studies in Japan are reviewed. In the 1970’s the Mass Higher Education thesis played a significant role as a paradigm, which provided the link between empirical analyses and policy issues in Japan at the time. Since the late 1980’s the nature of the issues in higher education. Mass Higher Education is an established reality and universal attendance is not envisaged. The Mass Higher Education thesis is now being replaced by Universal Higher Education thesis as a paradigm, but its basic logic will not change.
Meanwhile a completely new paradigm is emerging - that is the development of Market-Orientation in higher education. It involves a set of issues that are significant not only in designing changes of policy and practices, but also analytical issues that have to be carefully scrutinized through empirical analyses.
Dialogue is a category that is central to politics, media, and education, and yet in all of these domains it can be confusing and ambiguous. Starting from a critical framework built on the work of educational philosopher Paulo Freire, we undertake an inquiry into the meaning of dialogical intersubjectivity and its political determinations, with a particular focus on liberal models. We situate this discussion in the context of the rise of radical Right populisms, which have exposed the strength of racial resentment and white supremacy in contemporary politics, and raised questions about the meaning of social cohesion and the relationship between speech and violence. In this context, we show how liberal calls for unity and reflexive defenses of free speech obscure the exclusions and antagonisms that traverse society, while also flattening the meaning of dialogue and betraying its emancipatory vocation. Finally, we suggest that educators should understand their work as continuous with a broader landscape of struggle, and that their interventions should be informed by an awareness of the pedagogical costs of reducing dialogue to a form of talk or method that refuses ethical and political commitment.
Utilising cross-country data, this article analyses the implications of promoting inclusive legal justice for inclusive economic development. The analysis is carried out by quantifying the effects of inclusive legal justice in terms of inclusive criminal justice and in terms of inclusive civil justice on inclusive economic development. The results suggest that, accounting for the endogeneity of inclusive legal justice, both criminal and civil, countries with higher levels of inclusive legal justice are very likely to enjoy higher real GDP per capita, improved equal economic opportunity, lower socio-economic disparity and more inclusive economic development. These findings reveal that inclusive economic development is unlikely to be achieved without inclusive legal justice.
The Homo oeconomicus relates economy to anthropology. Discussed in this chapter are its links to real life, and its different characteristics, all presupposition for much of today’s economic thinking: rationality, self-interest, individualism, and freedom. What about anthropological theories? Does economic competition, based on an instrumentalist-oriented anthropology, reduce the human being to a means and not always also an end in himself or herself? An egotistic-oriented anthropology (individualism and self-interest) is closely linked to competitive economics. An elitist-oriented anthropology, focusing on human ranking and differences as well as a stress on doing and achieving rather than being, is supportive of economic competition. Humanistic anthropological values (individualism, freedom, self-realization) correspond to values in (especially perfect) competitive economics. An opposition to such legitimization focuses on the special way humanistic values are emphasized and selectively used. A competitive economy can be legitimized by a Christian understanding of man as God’s free, self-realizing, and responsible steward acting to benefit himself and others. A Christian view of self-interest, as a vital element of sin, opposes this: self-interest and self-realization take only a limited account of common interests, and freedom is likely to be used as an argument to ignore the interests of others. Economic competition, therefore, must be regulated. The chapter ends with a discussion on how, and to what extent, human dignity (as understood within a humanistic and Christian tradition) is protected or is not present in a competitive economy. Consideration is given to whether such dignity represents a critical and normative potential vis-à-vis an economy.
Abstract
The Qianhai Shenzhen-Hong Kong Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone, as another pilot project of reforming and innovation of Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, will emphasize Shenzhen – Hong Kong regional cooperation. But the cooperation and competition among governments are of public choice, and the development of Qianhai is related to the decisions made or to be made by the Central Government and local governments of Hong Kong, Guangdong and Shenzhen. This study explored and analyzed the strategy selection of Qianhai Cooperation Zone by Hong Kong and Shenzhen governments using game theory. We believed that the goal of maximizing local benefits on the part of local governments, as the local interest protectors, will inevitably result in problems such as local protectionism, market segmentation, synergetic development and so on. More importantly, the coordination by the Central Government is a valid channel shifting from the Prisoner’s Dilemma to the Cooperative Game for the development of Qianhai Cooperation Zone, thus providing references for the study on the development strategy of Cooperation Zone.
I argue that the case for freedom is about either knowledge or incentives. Freedom optimises the production and use of knowledge, and gives people the right incentives. I trace the history of these arguments. Knowledge‐based justifications can be found in the writings of Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, Wilhelm von Humboldt, J. S. Mill, Friedrich von Hayek, and Karl Popper. Incentive‐based arguments are due to Thomas Aquinas, Adam Smith, and James Mill. I then go on to query the extent to which classical freedom is compatible with other aims such as efficiency, enforcement of contracts, freedom of choice, political participation, and the socialist concept of freedom. Finally, I reject natural selection as a justification of freedom or of the right of property.
Summarizing our results and putting them into perspective with new and especially designed statistical analyses developed for the aims of this chapter, we first of all emphasize that differences between cultures are far less decisive than differences between countries in determining value development. There is a breathtaking variety of active Catholicism around the world.
Our data are from two sets of reliable and regularly repeated global opinion surveys: the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS). Our statistical calculations were performed by the routine and standard IBM-SPSS statistical program (IBM-SPSS XXIV) and relied on the so-called oblique rotation of the factors, underlying the correlation matrix. In each comparison, we evaluated the democratic civil society commitment of the overall population and of the practicing Roman Catholics, i.e., those Catholics who attend Sunday Mass regularly.
Der Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den Themenkomplex „wirtschaftspolitische Governance“. Dieser Begriff dient in Volkswirtschaftslehre und benachbarten Sozialwissenschaften als Ober-/Sammelbegriff unter dem üblicherweise alle Aktivitäten subsumiert werden, die wirtschaftspolitische Akteure entfalten, um das Wirtschaftssystem, einzelne Märkte darin oder bestimmte Wirtschaftsakteure (z. B. Unternehmen, Konsumenten) zu steuern. Neben einer genaueren Klärung des Governance-Begriffs und der Vorstellung von wirtschaftspolitischen Governance-Instrumenten und -Akteuren wird diskutiert, warum bzw. in welchen Situationen wirtschaftspolitische Governance notwendig ist. Diese Fragestellung ist Gegenstand einer anhaltenden, in Politik, Öffentlichkeit und den Sozialwissenschaften geführten Debatte.
The first chapter takes an overview of the argument, explaining its origins in terms of both theory and recent political events. The central ethical premise is explained: that of the Welcome Principle as a feature of a move towards a more place-based ethics, aesthetics, economics and politics. The problematic role of the nation state as a meso level structure between the macro level structures of global corporatism and the micro level structure of the local community is discussed. Four aspects of globalisation, partly intentional and partly not so, are defined: standardisation, impersonalism, a mechanistic approach to life, and universal ethics. Problems arising from these positions include narrow performativity, a sense that many people and communities have been ‘left behind’ and a democratic deficit, whereby local voices are increasingly ignored. The argument also considers the limiting effects of humanism and the need for ecological awareness and action. The theoretical influences on the argument are also explained, particularly its debt to semiotic pragmatism.
Bu çalışmanın amacı evrimsel biyoloji ve ekonomi arasında çeşitli analojiler kurarak iktisadi problemleri çok fazla girilmeyen bir bakış açısı ile açıklamaya çalışmaktır. Bernard Mandeville (1988 [1714]) Adam Smith’in düşüncelerini de etkileyen “Arıların Masalı” adlı çalışmasında toplum hayatını ve ekonomiyi arı kovanı ve toplum hayatı arasında analoji kurarak analiz etmiştir. Bu çalışmada ise iktisadi problemler, insan toplumu ile karınca kolonisi arasında kurulan analojiler yardımıyla analiz edilmektedir. Karınca kolonilerindeki “kendiliğinden düzen” ve “sosyal organizasyon” incelenmekte ayrıca insan toplumu ile benzerlikleri tartışılmaktadır. Sonuç olarak karıncaların bireyden sosyal organizasyonlara doğru evriminin, insan toplumu ve iktisadi olaylar hakkında da fikirler sağladığı görülmektedir.
In this chapter, starting with an appreciation of radical conflicts (antagonistic but non-destructive), the political institutions of isocracy are illustrated through five perspectives, partial but complementary to each other. The reputation of impartiality animates assemblies devoted to the preventive check of laws and independent authorities that follow a liberal tradition combining the Montesquieu approach with Friedrich August von Hayek’s proposals. The diffused power favours, inter alia, the electoral mandate with the right of revocation and the referendum with a preliminary random selection of participating citizens. In addition, it allows control over the financial remuneration of elected representatives and establishes that each citizen receives a token in currency that he can use to finance the electoral campaign of some candidate. The power-sharing incentivizes, inter alia, the proportional distribution of positions and resources, the positive discrimination policies and the multilateral horizontal surveillance (with which the members of each group submit their political actions to the scrutiny of the peer members of all the other groups). A “partisan” institution is, for instance, the multiple votes, taken from John Stuart Mill but applied to the parents of minors (including single-parent families, those with more than two parents and those made up of same-sex parents) in order to grant political representation to those who are not given a voice on the grounds of age. Another one is the “tribunate”, a peculiar form of counter-power (with the option to place a veto on choices not agreed upon) retrieved from Machiavelli and the tradition of republicanism. Finally, in tune with the polyarchic method that is the underlining fil rouge of the whole treatise, the federalist institutions also play a very important role. Multiple non-state governments, or jurisdictions, can perform all public functions, apart from a few crucial public goods, whose provision is assigned, through constitutionally defined procedures, only to one jurisdiction. This configuration is extended on a planetary scale in order to establish a multipolar and multilevel balance of power.
This Article discusses the significance of law in neoliberal theory and practice. Prefaced by a brief look at the role that law plays in the theories of the ordo- and neoliberal thinkers Franz Böhm and Friedrich August von Hayek, the subsequent chapters focus on the work of James Buchanan and his brand of neoliberalism, which combines constitutional economics public choice theory. Buchanan's core demand is a balanced-budget amendment to the constitution. The following Sections examine this measure in its various aspects before the final section switches to the world of “actually existing neoliberalism” with a discussion of the various reforms of the economic governance structure of the European Union in recent years, particularly the “Fiscal Compact”, which amounts to the real world equivalent of a balanced-budget amendment.
p align="right">Karl Polanyi demostró que el liberalismo clásico y el actual neoliberalismo fueron movimientos políticos organizados, pero sus éxitos produjeron una adversa reacción social y política. Esta dialéctica continua dando forma al debate doméstico e internacional y a los movimiento sociales. Inspirados por el la obra maestra e Karl Polanyi, La Gran Transformación , este artículo ofrece una periodización de la interaccción dialéctica, o el “doble movimien-to”, para guiar nuestra comprensión del neliberallismo de nuestros días. También se busca arrojar luz sobre algunos cambios recientes en el discurso político desde la crisis financiera mundial de 2008.
JEL: B15; B17; B25
</div
Dies ist der Versuch einer Verfremdung. Ich schlage vor, an den hierarchischen Verhältnissen in Organisationen, besonders Unternehmen, eine spezifische Befremdlichkeit wahrzunehmen, indem man sie im Lichte juristischer Bedenken gegen mangelhafte Gewaltenteilung, genauer: gegen die „Verschleifung“ von Gesetzen mit ihrer und durch ihre Anwendung betrachtet. In Unternehmen sind die „Gesetzgeber“ ganz selbstverständlich zugleich „Richter“, und dass „Gesetze“ – die organisationalen Regeln – im Zuge und durch die Art ihrer Anwendung modifiziert, situativ ent- oder verschärft, suspendiert, aufgehoben oder neu geschaffen werden können, dient dort Opportunitäten und Zweckmäßigkeiten, notwendiger Flexibilität und lokalen Rationalitäten. Den Richtern als Anwendern der Gesetze dagegen ist das verwehrt oder jedenfalls, aus guten Gründen, stark erschwert. Sie sollen unbefangen sein, befangen weder durch Eigeninteresse noch durch sonstwie partikularistische Gesichtspunkte, während im Falle der Manager deren Eigeninteresse gerade Wasser auf die Mühlen der Organisation ist und sein soll. Manager sind „Gesetzgeber“, „Regierung“ und „Richter“ zugleich – und sogar selbst Nutznießer ihrer Entscheidungen in allen diesen Rollen.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.