Local seafood: Rethinking the direct marketing paradigm

Abstract

Faced with strict regulations, rising operational costs, depleted stocks, and competition from less expensive foreign imports, many fishers are pursuing new ways to market and sell their catch. Direct marketing arrangements can increase the ex-vessel value of seafood and profitability of operations for fishers by circumventing dominant wholesale chains of custody and capturing the premium that customers are willing to pay for local seafood. Our analysis goes beyond a paradigm that understands direct marketing arrangements as solely economic tools to consider how these emerging business configurations create a set of conditions that can result in increased bonding and bridging capital among fishers by incentivizing cooperation, communication, and information production and organization. To build our case, we report on the economic value being generated for fishers in a cooperatively owned and operated direct marketing arrangement in eastern North Carolina. Over the course of 2 years, fishers participating in the Walking Fish community-supported fishery received 33% more revenue for their catch compared to the average monthly ex-vessel price of finfish and shellfish landed in the surrounding region, and an additional 14% to 18% more per dollar by way of year-end profit sharing. We argue that these economic benefits create an incentive to participate, resulting in cooperation among fishers and increased communication skills that foster bonding and bridging capital that put fishers in a position to identify and respond to challenges that threaten the social-ecological resilience of the systems within which they operate. We suggest that “institutional starters” like these can play a critical role in increasing the resilience of social-ecological systems, including fisheries.

Full text

Copyright © 2015 by the author(s). Published here under license by the Resilience Alliance.
Stoll, J. S., B. A. Dubik, and L. M. Campbell. 2015. Local seafood: rethinking the direct marketing paradigm. Ecology and Society 20
(2): 40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/ES-07686-200240
Research
Local seafood: rethinking the direct marketing paradigm
Joshua S. Stoll
1
, Bradford A. Dubik
2
and Lisa M. Campbell
2
ABSTRACT. Faced with strict regulations, rising operational costs, depleted stocks, and competition from less expensive foreign
imports, many fishers are pursuing new ways to market and sell their catch. Direct marketing arrangements can increase the ex-vessel
value of seafood and profitability of operations for fishers by circumventing dominant wholesale chains of custody and capturing the
premium that customers are willing to pay for local seafood. Our analysis goes beyond a paradigm that understands direct marketing
arrangements as solely economic tools to consider how these emerging business configurations create a set of conditions that can result
in increased bonding and bridging capital among fishers by incentivizing cooperation, communication, and information production
and organization. To build our case, we report on the economic value being generated for fishers in a cooperatively owned and operated
direct marketing arrangement in eastern North Carolina. Over the course of 2 years, fishers participating in the Walking Fish community-
supported fishery received 33% more revenue for their catch compared to the average monthly ex-vessel price of finfish and shellfish
landed in the surrounding region, and an additional 14% to 18% more per dollar by way of year-end profit sharing. We argue that
these economic benefits create an incentive to participate, resulting in cooperation among fishers and increased communication skills
that foster bonding and bridging capital that put fishers in a position to identify and respond to challenges that threaten the social-
ecological resilience of the systems within which they operate. We suggest that “institutional starters” like these can play a critical role
in increasing the resilience of social-ecological systems, including fisheries.
Key Words: community-supported fisheries; direct marketing; institutional starters; local seafood; resilience; social capital
INTRODUCTION
The economics of fishing are changing (Olson 2011); no longer
can fishers simply catch more to compensate for low ex-vessel
prices (Kasperski and Holland 2013). With strict regulations
(Hilborn 2012), depleted fish stocks (Jackson et al. 2001), rising
operational costs (Garcia and Rosenberg 2010), competition with
foreign imports (Pramod et al. 2014), and the privatization of
resources (Lowe and Carothers 2008), many small-scale fishers
are seeking new ways to partner with or bypass middlemen to sell
their catch directly to consumers, restaurants, and wholesale
buyers (Brinson et al. 2011). These direct marketing arrangements
represent a promising new strategy for fishers as they attempt to
reposition themselves, as both producers and dealers, in crowded
and often highly competitive markets.
We provide an economic portrait of a direct marketing
arrangement and describe how emerging business configurations
like it provide a mechanism to increase social capital among
fishers. We pay particular attention to a class of these
arrangements called “community-supported fisheries” (CSFs).
CSFs represent one of a variety of types of direct marketing
arrangements that link fishers to consumers, restaurants, and
wholesale buyers, e.g., schools and hospitals. We focus on the ways
these arrangements incentivize cooperation among fishers and
improve communication with individuals and organizations
outside their immediate social networks, considering how the
production of both bonding and bridging capital may enable
fishers to respond to local problems that threaten social-
ecological resilience. With this framework, we seek to extend our
analysis beyond a paradigm that understands these enterprises
solely as economic tools to help fishers earn higher prices for their
catch. The purpose of reframing this discussion is not to
understate the economic value of direct marketing or dismiss the
financial challenges that many fishers face, both of which are
significant in the case we considered. Rather, our goal is to think
more imaginatively about these nascent enterprises, exploring
their broader relevance in achieving socioeconomic and
ecological sustainability in fisheries.
We aim to bring focus to the interplay between CSFs and social-
ecological resilience, which we define as the capacity to withstand
socioeconomic and ecological stresses without fundamentally
shifting to an alternate and less desirable state (Walker et al. 2004),
by describing how direct marketing arrangements can act as a
type of “institutional starter” by fostering the emergence of
nascent institutions that facilitate the production and
mobilization of social capital toward improved social and
ecological conditions. We make a distinction between direct
marketing arrangements as a type of business practice and the
social networks, rules, and norms that are formed and catalyzed
through these arrangements. This delineation is consistent with
the literature on new institutionalism that differentiates between
institutions that are defined as the set of rules, procedures, social
practices, and protocols that catalyze interactions between actors
(Young 2002) and the organizations through which they are
enacted (Ostrom 1990, Folke et al. 2007). Viewed through this
lens, direct marketing arrangements themselves are not
institutions. Rather, as we suggest, they are a business practice
that creates a set of conditions that facilitates institutional
emergence. These institutions, in this context social networks,
rules, and norms, help to sustain business operations and position
fishers such that they may be responsive to disturbances that
threaten the viability of the systems within which they operate.
Such disturbances include, but are not limited to, socioeconomic
problems associated with low and volatile prices (Dahl and
Oglend 2014), poor public perception about commercial fishing
1
School of Marine Sciences, University of Maine,
2
Duke University Marine Laboratory, Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
(Gelcich et al. 2014), and inequitable relationships between fishers
and fish dealers (Wilson 1980), as well as ecological issues related
to stock declines, bycatch, and habitat loss (Crowder et al. 2008).
The need for thinking about institutional starters arises out of
the ongoing discussion on transformations in social-ecological
systems (Westley et al. 2013). Transformability is “the capacity to
create untried beginnings from which to evolve a new way of living
when existing ecological, economic, or social structures become
untenable” (Walker et al. 2004). Such transformation can occur
at multiple levels and in multiple phases (Westley et al. 2013),
although many suggest that crises and “jolts” often create
windows of opportunity, an observation that is consistent with
work by Holling and Gunderson (2002) on adaptive cycles (e.g.,
Greenwood et al. 2002, Biggs et al. 2010). Studying the
mechanisms that spark transformation is viewed as a necessary
step toward rebuilding underperforming, dysfunctional, and
collapsed social-ecological systems (Olsson et al. 2004, Chapin et
al. 2010, Westley et al. 2011). However, there is a relative lack of
detail on the levers in these systems that dislodge inertia, motivate
change, and cultivate capacity (Yu et al. 2014, although see
Abernethy et al. 2014).
We use an exploratory case study approach (Yin 1984) to develop
the concept of institutional starters. Using case studies allows for
what McCarthy et al. (2014) describe as an “in-depth longitudinal
understanding” that is largely missing from the literature on
transformability, as well as in published literature on CSFs more
generally. The published literature on CSFs is limited, particularly
with regard to their broader implications as a social phenomenon
and potential impacts on management (although see Brinson et
al. 2011, Campbell et al. 2014, McClenachan et al. 2014). More
fundamentally, the economic and noneconomic benefits of CSFs
have yet to be described in detail. Our intent is to draw on the
fine-grained knowledge of institutional dynamics afforded by a
case study approach to develop a working model of the
relationship between economic incentives, social capital
development, and resilience, to be further refined and expanded
as academic study of CSFs continues.
We build our case by focusing on the details of a direct marketing
arrangement between fishers and consumers to lend depth to our
analysis, using a CSF in eastern North Carolina, called Walking
Fish (WF; see also Stoll et al. 2010, Campbell et al. 2014). Data
from WF are used to quantify and describe the economic value
that is incentivizing fishers to participate in the CSF. These data,
coupled with 5 years of experience collaborating with and closely
observing WF, elucidate, in practice, how direct marketing
arrangements can cultivate social capital among fishers and better
position them to act as institutional entrepreneurs (as described
by Young 2002, Maguire et al. 2004, Rosen and Olsson 2013) able
to actively identify and pursue context-specific strategies that
address problems that threaten the social-ecological resilience of
fisheries within which they operate. We begin with a brief
description of the theoretical underpinning that supports our
discussion.
LINKING SOCIAL CAPITAL TO RESILIENCE
Resilient social-ecological systems are those that can withstand
impacts without undergoing structural or functional changes
(Walker et al. 2004). Marine systems are particularly vulnerable
to ecological flips that fundamentally alter the form and function
of ecological systems as the result of anthropogenic stresses that
have cascading effects that negatively impact the social and
economic components of the systems (Ames 2004, Frank et al.
2011, Steneck et al. 2011). These shifts can be buffered against by
actions that serve to maintain the integrity and complexity of
these systems (Levin 2007). In fisheries, this includes protecting
age and stock structure, habitat and water quality, and food web
dynamics. Part of the challenge in managing these components
in practice is that these systems are often highly heterogeneous
and dynamic, making it difficult for managers to track conditions
in a particular place from afar without having access to locally
grounded information. This relationship between conservation
objectives and information production creates an important link
between the ecological and social components of a system. That
is to say, because marine systems are complex, efforts to maintain
ecological resilience can be aided by insights and ideas generated
by those who are directly embedded in these systems. Such a
dynamic has been observed in the American lobster (Homarus
americanus) fishery in the Gulf of Maine, where commercial
fishers have played a key role in providing information about the
fishery that has led to the institutionalization of management
strategies that have helped to sustain the industry and steward the
resource (Acheson 2003). Conversely, there are also instances in
which the disregard for these context-specific data resulted in
management strategies that failed to maintain the ecological
integrity of systems, as was observed in maritime Canada when
inshore Atlantic cod fishers’ knowledge about the resource was
ignored by managers until the fishery was in crisis (Finlayson
1994).
In this way, although there is a strong tendency to think about
fisheries conservation in terms of the biological and ecological
components of the system, the social dimensions are often no less
important to social-ecological resilience (Berkes 2009, Le Cornu
et al. 2014). Indeed, the capacity for individual actors and
organizations to adapt to and shape change is a key aspect of
resilience in complex social-ecological systems (Berkes et al.
2006). Folke et al. (2010) make a distinction between “specific”
and “general” resilience. Specific resilience refers to the ability of
a system to tolerate a particular disturbance, whereas general
resilience, as the term suggests, is about “coping with uncertainty
in all ways.” In this way, we can view general resilience as a more
holistic conceptualization of resilience that aligns well with
aspirations for socioeconomically and ecologically productive
fisheries. Key to general resilience, which is the focus of our
analysis, is responsiveness and adaptability. Responsiveness and
adaptability in the context of fisheries can be in reference to both
socioeconomic and ecological stressors. Various factors affect the
extent to which responsiveness and adaptability exist, including
individual and collective agency (Wijen and Ansari 2007,
Coulthard 2012), leadership (Folke et al. 2005, Gutiérrez et al.
2011), and existing context (McCay 2002). Underlying all of these
factors is the idea that for actors to be adaptable they must be
able to mobilize information and resources at the appropriate
moments. This depends, in part, on the social ties individuals have
to each other. Thus, social capital can be considered a prerequisite
for resilience (Olsson et al. 2004).
Social capital is the value derived from institutional arrangements
and social bonds (Coleman 1988, Putnam 1995). Social capital
can be subdivided into four categories: (1) relations of trust; (2)

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
reciprocity and exchange; (3) common rules, norms, and
sanctions; and (4) and connectedness, networks, and groups
(Pretty and Ward 2001). These social interactions foster
“bonding” within groups and “bridging” among groups
(Woolcock and Narayan 2000). Bonding capital within groups
facilitates joint learning, instills shared identity among actors, and
lowers the cost of collaboration (Pretty and Smith 2004). Bridging
capital, in contrast, facilitates knowledge exchange, innovation,
and engagement with exogenous groups and resources (Lin 2002,
Newman and Dale 2007). Both bonding and bridging capital are
realized through social networks, themselves a type of institution.
The lack of either type of social capital is thought to undermine
effective management of social-ecological systems. For example,
Holland et al. (2013) examine social capital in the Northeast
Multispecies Groundfish Fishery using indices to quantify social
capital among groups of fishers, called sectors. They hypothesize
that the long-term viability and economic success of these self-
organized, voluntarily formed entities are contingent on their
ability to establish and maintain social capital in the future. In
another case, Wilson et al. (2013) provide an interesting side by
side comparative analysis of the lobster, groundfish, and sea
urchin (Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis) fisheries, arguing that
the ecological and regulatory context within which they are
situated has facilitated the production of social capital in the
lobster fishery while inhibiting its production in the latter two
fisheries. Wilson et al. argue that it is this ability to generate social
capital and act collectively that has led to the long-term
sustainability of the lobster fishery and the destruction of the
groundfish and sea urchin fisheries.
The relationship between social capital and social-ecological
resilience is complex. It is dependent not only on the amount of
social capital that exists, but also on the balance between bonding
and bridging capital and on the interplay and feedback that occurs
(Westley 1995). Indeed, how and in what ways these forms of
capital are accumulated and configured within social-ecological
systems influences how individuals and groups interact with one
another and with natural resources (Bodin and Crona 2009,
Barnes-Mauthe et al. 2015). For instance, high bonding capital
and low bridging capital may limit the transfer and uptake of
innovation from outside groups. Conversely, low bonding capital
and high bridging capital can limit social cohesion, diminishing
opportunities for collective actions (Bodin and Crona 2009). In
these scenarios, social capital can constrain actors’ ability to
mobilize the resources necessary to adapt and respond to threats
that can or are eroding the social and ecological dimensions of a
system.
We argue that if social capital is tied to resilience in social-
ecological systems (Folke et al. 2005), then there is a need to bring
focus to the mechanisms and types of arrangements that lead to
institutions that produce and maintain the “appropriate” balance
of social capital, particularly in situations in which general
resilience is suspect, as is the case in many fisheries in North
America and elsewhere (as illustrated, e.g., by Hennessey and
Healy 2000, Steneck et al. 2013).
RISE OF DIRECT MARKETING ARRANGEMENTS
CSFs are one of the most visible and rapidly expanding types of
direct marketing arrangements in North America, attracting
attention because of their parallels to community-supported
agriculture (CSA) farms (Campbell et al. 2014) and the ecological
benefits they afford (McClenachan et al. 2014). Although CSA
farms have operated in North America for more than 3 decades
(Cooley and Lass 1998), CSFs are a relatively new phenomenon,
first documented in Maine in 2007 (Libby 2011). There are now
at least 40 active CSFs in North America, operating
approximately 190 delivery locations in coastal communities
(LocalCatch.org 2014), as well as ones in the United Kingdom,
Chile, Italy, and Germany (M. Mesmain, 2014, personal
communication; Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Map of community-supported fisheries delivery
locations in North America (LocalCatch.org 2014).
The rise of direct marketing arrangements is partly a reflection
of consumers’ growing demand for the social, ecological, and
economic value of local foods and associated terroirs
(Kloppenburg et al. 1996, O’Hara and Stagl 2001). Indeed, direct
marketing arrangements for seafood are being touted in popular
media as among the “hottest” food trends (e.g., Greenberg 2014).
However, it is not just consumer demand that is driving their
emergence; these arrangements are also being driven by the fishing
sector in an effort to reform the existing seafood economy and
more effectively integrate seafood into local food systems (Olson
et al. 2014). This push to relocalize seafood markets hints at the
socioeconomic and ecological externalities caused by the
globalization of fishing fleets and seafood markets, which have
led to widespread overexploitation of marine resources (Berkes
et al. 2006).
Each direct marketing arrangement is implemented differently,
conforming to locally specific social, economic, and ecological
factors. CSFs differ in size, ranging from a few dozen participants
to upward of a thousand (LocalCatch.org 2014; J. S. Stoll,
unpublished data). The logistical structures include instances in
which customers meet fishers to pick up seafood on their docks,
subscribers receive seafood by mail, or subscribers pick up shares
at “drop-off” locations several hundred miles away or even in
other states or provinces. Port Clyde Fresh Catch (based in Maine,
USA), for example, has offered shares to subscribers in Blue Hill,
Rockland, and other nearby communities in Maine and has also
shipped shares to consumers in other states. In contrast, the
operators of Abundant Seafood sell shares of snapper and
grouper directly off a pier in Charleston, South Carolina, where

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
their boat, F/V Amy Marie, is docked. McClenachan et al. (2014)
report that the average distance seafood is distributed through a
CSF is 65 km, considerably less than the 8812 km they determined
industrially sourced product travels. CSFs also differ in terms of
the species composition offered and in the way shares are prepared
and processed. Core Sound Seafood, a North Carolina–based
CSF, has offered its subscribers well over a dozen species, whereas
the operators of Alaskan’s Own sell only a few species. Such
variability is tied to both the local availability of seafood and the
fishers that participate in a given CSF. Weather conditions;
regulatory constraints, e.g., seasonal closures and catch limits;
and health and safety considerations also affect the amount of
variety offered through a CSF. There is also variation in the legal
and organizational structure of direct marketing arrangements
like these. Existing CSFs are owned and operated by individual
fishing families, coordinators, cooperatives, processors, and
seafood dealers. Skipper Otto’s CSF in Vancouver, British
Columbia, Canada, is a small-scale, family-owned and operated
CSF that focuses on salmon and other species caught in northern
British Columbia. In contrast, Cape Ann Fresh Catch is owned
and operated by the Gloucester Fishermen’s Wives’ Association
in partnership with a local processor, fishers, and staff.
Our focus is on the subset of these entities that involve
collaboration among fishers. The structural and material diversity
of CSFs has not been explored previously, but this diversity is not
surprising given that CSFs are a relatively new phenomenon and
experimentation is often associated with emergent forms of
innovation (Holling and Gunderson 2002, Westley et al. 2011).
Despite the nuances that differentiate each CSF, as we describe
subsequently, the fundamental mechanics of CSFs are largely
similar. Thus, even though the variability observed among CSFs
will have a direct bearing on how these arrangements are
operationalized, we contend that these differences do not diminish
CSFs as a meaningful analytic category.
BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL MODEL
We put forward a conceptual model that describes direct
marketing arrangements as mechanisms for the production of
bonding and bridging capital, rather than solely as tools for
economic development. Our model starts with economic
incentives, recognizing that the economic potential associated
with these direct marketing arrangements is an important element
of their proliferation.
Economic incentive leads to participation
Many small-scale commercial fishers are under increasing
pressure to find ways to earn more for their catch. Direct
marketing arrangements have the potential to increase the
amount of money fishers earn for their catch (see Brinson et al.
2011 and the data we present). Not only can fishers earn higher
up-front prices by bypassing or developing new partnerships with
middlemen, but they can also benefit from additional economic
draws such as end-of-year profit sharing, health care
subsidization, and cash advances to purchase and repair gear
(National Summit Planning Committee 2012). The particulars of
these economic benefits will differ between CSFs, but in all cases,
these benefits create an incentive for fishers to participate.
Participation leads to cooperation
One of the challenges that fishers face in sustaining CSFs is being
able to satisfy subscribers’ demand for variety, i.e., multiple types
of seafood (Campbell et al. 2014). This challenge is not unique
to fisheries. Indeed, farmers must also provide a diverse array of
vegetables to their CSA members (Perez et al. 2003). However, it
is often more difficult for a fisher to supply consistent variety than
it is for farmers because of the nature of their occupation, i.e.,
farmers can plant in ways that maximize variability. Fishers,
unlike their agricultural counterparts, cannot seamlessly shift
between fisheries or necessarily harvest a wide range of species
because they are constrained by regulations, access to quota,
licensing requirements, and the cost and time involved in
switching gears. Thus, the advantages of specializing as an
individual fisher create a codependence among fishers in CSFs;
to meet and sustain market demand, fishers need to work together
to obtain, accumulate, and supply their market with a consistent
and diverse range of products. To fulfill orders, fishers must also
coordinate to process and distribute product.
Cooperation creates bonding capital through information
management
The need to meet subscribers’ demands, e.g., by providing variety,
quality, and freshness, creates an incentive for fishers to work
together, but it does not necessarily ensure prolonged cooperation
among fishers. Indeed, working collaboratively creates
opportunity for conflict. Tensions can arise for any number of
reasons, ranging from the resurfacing of prior arguments to
disagreements over marketing strategies. Tensions can also arise
over economic matters related to managing operational costs that
affect the prices fishers earn for the catch, the percentages of
profits members receive, and the fixed costs such as coordination,
processing, or transportation. These conflicts have the potential
to undermine cooperation, thereby negatively affecting the ability
of CSFs to function effectively. To hedge against this potential
risk, operational rules are devised that establish agreed upon
boundaries and make expectations explicit (Young 2002). These
rules, like social networks, are a type of institution. Within the
context of direct marketing arrangements, these rules might relate
to the amount of seafood fishers will contribute to the CSF or
how ex-vessel prices are established and profits are distributed.
These rules can only be enforced if accurate and detailed
information about the CSF is maintained. Without this
information, fishers might suspect cheating, such as inequitable
allocations of year-end profits. Thus, information collection and
organization not only is necessary to manage daily business
operations, but also serves as a strategy for maintaining trust and
sustaining and building bonding capital among fishers. The same
level of data collection and management is not necessary for
individuals that operate independent businesses. Even if it makes
good business sense to maintain these records, doing so does not
directly affect their relationships with other fishers or have an
impact on other fishers’ earnings.
Communication creates bridging capital through engagement
with outsiders
Through direct marketing arrangements, fishers must regularly
and effectively communicate with subscribers to convey
information about their catch, openly discussing topics related to
seafood, marine conservation, and management. Subscriber
communication represents a departure from tradition. Where in
the past fishers may have sold their catch to an increasingly limited
number of fish buyers, i.e., middlemen, CSFs provide an
opportunity for fishers to sell to hundreds if not thousands of
individuals directly. Communicating with subscribers is not like

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
communicating with fish buyers or other fishers that live and work
in the industry and have a tacit understanding of “how things
work.” Rather, subscribers are often “outsiders” with different
and sometimes conflicting values. Communicating with this
sector means that fishers need to translate what, why, and how
they catch seafood into a lexicon that is both understandable and
tractable to their audience. This requires a set of skills that is not
necessary for running a commercial fishing vessel, catching fish,
or selling to a local fish buyer. Not only does it often involve
effective use of social media and e-mail, which in some cases is
unfamiliar territory for fishers, it also means honing messages and
learning to effectively promote aspects of their businesses, such
as low-impact fishing practices and local production, that
resonate with subscribers and potential subscribers. This is an
iterative learning process, but one that is necessary for maintaining
subscriber participation.
The benefits gleaned from regular and repeated communication
with subscribers does more than help fishers sustain their market.
Regular interaction with subscribers leads to experience
translating complex and often contentious issues for nonexperts
that have limited knowledge and expertise in commercial fishing.
Such proficiency is not only helpful in attracting and maintaining
a customer base; it is also useful in establishing bridging capital
with other outsiders, such as fisheries scientists, managers, policy
makers, media, and granting agencies.
Social capital fosters opportunity to increase resilience
The capacity to sustain and cultivate cooperation among fishers
and to communicate with outsiders can enable CSF operators to
work collectively to pursue other opportunities such as building
markets, expanding clientele, and taking on and addressing
nonmarket challenges that threaten the social-ecological systems
within which they are embedded. Such agency and ability to be
adaptive is a cornerstone of general resilience and a key to
sustaining the social and ecological components of dynamic
systems such as those associated with marine resources (Folke et
al. 2010, Westley et al. 2011). We bring this conceptual model
together in Figure 2, illustrating how CSFs represent a type of
institutional starter that can build capacity among fishers and
mobilize social capital in ways that contribute to the social-
ecological resilience of systems.
To summarize, fishers are drawn to CSFs to earn more money for
their catch to offset the low ex-vessel prices that they receive from
fish dealers. In joining, fishers must develop a set of rules to
manage the internal operations of these businesses and
simultaneously hone their communication skills so that they can
effectively engage with and maintain customers. These processes
lead to the production of bonding and bridging capital that has
utility that extends beyond the relatively simple task of
aggregating and distributing seafood. Specifically, bonding
capital facilitates collective action, and bridging capital fosters
access to new ideas and external resources. It is this combination
of social capitals that is directly relevant to increasing social-
ecological resilience. By being able to work collectively and gain
access to new resources and new ideas, fishers may be able to
overcome two common obstacles. First, the lack of cooperation
among fishers often impedes efforts to develop a shared
understanding of the cause of social and ecological disturbances
or envision, implement, and enforce rules that support sustainable
resource management (Wilson et al. 2013, Acheson and Gardner
2014). The production of bonding capital addresses this problem
by making it easier for stakeholders to work together. In this way,
bonding capital acts as a precursor to collective action. Such
collective action will not be inherently conservation oriented, but
there are enough instances in which collective action among
natural resource users has led to improved ecological conditions
or the sustainability of these resources that it is not outside the
range of possibility (e.g., Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009).
Second, small-scale fishers often, but not always, lack a surplus
of resources to experiment with innovative strategies for
improving their operations or reducing unnecessary impacts on
the resources (Tietze and Villareal 2003). Thus, fishers’ ability to
access external resources, including funding, research, and
technical assistance, represents an important way to
operationalize locally generated and locally grounded ideas about
how to improve the ecological system within which they operate,
such as how to address particular bycatch problems, the timing
of temporal closures, or the placement of spatial boundaries to
reduce environmental impacts. Access to these resources may be
aided by increased bonding capital that is derived by
communication with outside individuals and organizations.
Fig. 2. Conceptual model depicting the interplay between direct
marketing arrangements and social capital. Fishers are initially
drawn to community-supported fisheries (CSFs) as a means to
earn more for their catch (thick black arrow). The economic
incentive, combined with the structure of CSFs, can create a set
of conditions that foster bonding and bridging capital (gray
arrow). The social networks through which this social capital is
produced and the rules and norms created to sustain and
manage this social capital represent new institutions. Roman
numerals correspond to each component of the model: (i)
economic incentive leads to participation; (ii) participation
leads to cooperation; (iii) cooperation creates bonding capital
through information management; (iv) communication creates
bridging capital through engagement with outsiders; and (v)
social capital fosters opportunity to increase resilience.
CASE STUDY
To more fully elucidate the relationship between direct marketing
arrangements, institutional emergence, social capital production,
and social-ecological resilience, we focus on a case study in North
Carolina (USA). It is structured such that it follows the same
format of the conceptual model, starting with a description of
how the economic potential of the direct market arrangement has
incentivized participation and ending with consideration of the
link between the operation and social-ecological resilience. The
first four sections of this case study are supported by quantitative

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
and qualitative data, whereas the discussion about social-
ecological resilience is more speculative. Although it builds off of
concrete examples, our discussion about social-ecological
resilience is inherently more theoretical because we do not yet
have enough data to know with any certainty if the efforts by the
CSF will result in meaningful ecological change.
WF is a direct marketing arrangement based in Carteret County
at the southern extent of the barrier island chain known as the
Outer Banks. WF is a cooperative that owns and operates a CSF
that delivers shares of fresh, locally caught seafood to subscribers
in the urban center of the state (Campbell et al. 2014). In the WF
CSF, subscribers purchase a share for a 12-week season and, in
doing so, agree to “take what they get” in their CSF cooler at each
delivery. Shares of seafood cost subscribers between $114 and
$516, depending on the quantity of seafood, frequency of
delivery, and type of processing, i.e., headed and gutted or
filleted.
Although WF owns and operates the like-named CSF, the CSF
actually preceded the cooperative. Duke University graduate
students studying at the Nicholas School of Environment
initiated WF in 2009 in partnership with fishers and several locally
based for-profit and nonprofit organizations to see if the CSF
model could work in North Carolina. After 2 years of operations,
the CSF transitioned to the participating fishers, a processor, and
support staff that is paid through the income generated by the
sale of seafood. WF filed articles of incorporation and bylaws
with the state of North Carolina and the federal government in
the winter of 2010 and became a marketing cooperative in January
2011. The cooperative, which started with five members, has three
membership classes composed of employees, processors, and
fishers. Each ownership class is represented on the board of
directors and receives a proportion of profit as specified in its
bylaws. It is the only fishers’ cooperative in Carteret County. The
profit fishers receive is distributed among individuals based on
the value in dollars of seafood each fisher sells to the cooperative.
This rule and others are negotiated by the board of directors and
implemented through a detailed agreement that is updated and
signed before each season.
We focus on WF during its initial 2 years as a nascent cooperative,
from January 2011 to December 2012. We first describe the
economic gains made by the cooperative, using price premiums
as a proxy for the value created from the CSF. Price premiums
were derived by comparing WF prices, i.e., the prices that the
cooperative paid to its members for finfish and shellfish, to the
average monthly ex-vessel prices of seafood in Carteret County
and the adjacent counties of Craven, Onslow, and Pamlico. The
multicounty (regional) data were derived from reporting data that
licensed seafood dealers voluntarily submitted to the North
Carolina Division of Marine Fisheries (DMF). These data were
supplied to us in anonymized electronic format by DMF. Most
data were reported in U.S. dollars per pound; those that were
reported by number or bushel were converted to U.S. dollars per
pound by DMF. In total, we calculated price premiums for 21 of
the 28 species of finfish and shellfish sold through the cooperative,
accounting for 98% of the seafood (by value) sold by WF. To
calculate these values for each species and in total, we determined
the differences between the WF prices and the multicounty
(regional) monthly average for each pound of seafood sold
through the CSF and then weighted these values by the total
poundage of each transaction to derive a weighted average price
premium for each species. Taking this approach allowed us to
account for seasonal price variability and adjust for differences
in prices across species that would otherwise skew the results.
Microeconomic data like these have not yet been described in the
literature.
We discuss how these economic benefits served to incentivize
cooperation and have since helped to spur collective action by
WF to address issues relating to the social-ecological resilience of
the immediate community. Data on the latter are descriptive,
derived through participant observation and regular engagement
with the cooperative from 2009 to 2014. J.S.S. worked closely with
fishers and other community representatives to start WF and to
set up its cooperative structure from 2009 to 2011 and has since
provided technical support as requested. B.A.D. has worked with
WF since the summer of 2013, developing a short documentary
film and assisting in an ongoing working waterfront development
project. L.M.C. has served as faculty adviser to students involved
in WF and has helped to maintain a connection between WF and
Duke University. All these experiences allow us to practice
“observant participation” (Brewer 1994), both on how WF has
evolved and matured, and how it fits and is perceived within the
broader socioeconomic landscape.
Economic incentive leads to participation
The cooperative operated 3 seasons per year (winter, spring, and
fall) during the 2-year period in which price data were shared. In
year 2, the cooperative made 12% more deliveries (n = 35)
compared to year 1 (n = 31). During this period, WF supplied 28
different species, including lesser known and underutilized species
like jumping mullet (Mugil cephalus) and sheepshead
(Archosargus probatocephalus). By percentage, hard clams
(Mercenaria mercenaria), flounder (Paralichthys dentalus, P.
lethostigma, and P. albigutta), and shrimp (Farfantepenaeus
duorarum, F. aztecus, and Litopenaeus setiferus) made up the
greatest proportion of seafood delivered to customers in both
years (Table 1). The weighted average price premium of all species
purchased from cooperative members was 33% during the 2-year
period (Table 2). Price premiums varied considerably across
species but were never lower than the average ex-vessel prices in
the region, ranging from 5.8% to 185% above the regional
averages. Generally, lower value species had higher price
premiums than higher value species. For example, the price
premium for jumping mullet (M. cephalus) ranged from 89% to
127% with an average weighted price premium of 114% (Table 2).
Although there is a market for jumping mullet roe in Asian
markets, and local prices tend to spike in the late summer and fall
when the fish have a high roe count, the average ex-vessel price of
jumping mullet did not exceed $1 per pound during the 2-year
period. Therefore, an increase in ex-vessel price for jumping mullet
represents a much larger increase in percentage than the same
increase in the price for a higher value species like gray triggerfish
(Balistes capriscus) or red grouper (Epinephelus morio). For these
species, the weighted average price premium was 24% and 6%,
respectively.

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
Table 1. Summary of community-supported fisheries in year 1,
year 2, and combined. The number of deliveries increased in year
2, whereas the number of species delivered decreased.
2011 2012 Total
Deliveries 31 35 66
Species 25 22 28
Top 3 Hard Clams,
Flounder,
Shrimp
Hard Clams,
Flounder,
Shrimp
Hard Clams,
Flounder,
Shrimp
In addition to price premiums earned on seafood sold to the CSF,
overall profits earned by WF were distributed by way of dividends
paid to cooperative members at the end of year 1 and year 2,
adding to the overall value of the CSF to members. Year-end
profits were distributed to fishers based on the amount of seafood
(by value) individuals sold to the CSF during the course of each
year. Fishers that contributed larger amounts of seafood received
a larger proportion of the profit than those that did not contribute
as much product. This approach rewarded participation and was
established to prevent free riders from benefiting from other
members’ contributions. Profit margins fluctuated from year 1 to
year 2, decreasing slightly from a $0.18 dividend per dollar of
seafood sold to the cooperative in year 1 to $0.14 per dollar in
year 2. We do not report absolute dollar values of profit or end-
of-year dividends to protect proprietary information of the
cooperative.
Several members in the cooperative also received short-term, no-
interest loans and outright payment for equipment or repairs on
equipment. During the 2-year period, 2 loans were given to fishers
to purchase new pound nets for flounder fishing. In both
instances, these loans were repaid within 6 months with seafood
supplied to the CSF. The cooperative also made 2 direct payments
to repair equipment or purchase new gear. In the first instance,
money was given to a fisher in the cooperative for repairs to a
refrigerated truck. In the second case, the cooperative purchased
20 crab pots for fishers to replace those that were destroyed by
loggerhead sea turtles (Caretta caretta), using money earned from
a special marketing campaign. CSF subscribers were given
information about the situation and asked to buy a trap for a
fisher. In exchange for purchasing a trap, the CSF subscribers
received 3 dozen blue crabs (Callinectes sapidus) and a
handwritten thank-you card from the cooperative. This exchange
resulted in a combination of benefits. First, consumers benefited
from the transaction by gaining access to fresh blue crabs on a
regular basis over the course of the season. Second, fishers
benefited by receiving money to purchase new crab pots. There is
also arguably a third (indirect) benefit that has relevance to the
discussion about ecological resilience. Loggerhead sea turtle
interactions in North Carolina are a source of ongoing tension
because they are listed as endangered under the U.S. Endangered
Species Act (Boucquey et al. 2012, Campbell et al. 2014). The
basic problem has been that as sea turtle abundance has increased
in the region, gear interactions are becoming less avoidable. This
situation has been particularly problematic in the large-mesh gill
net fishery for flounder, where entanglements have led to multiple
closures. These closures have added another layer of economic
hardship to local fishers, many of whom have historically
depended on the gill net fishery (Campbell et al. 2014). The
cooperative’s effort to raise money to buy crab pots does not help
to solve the gill net problem, but it does act to support an
alternative fishery that does not have the same impact on sea
turtles; if anything, the pot fishery may benefit turtles by making
a food source, e.g., blue crabs, more accessible. In this way, the
cooperative’s crab pot exchange served to cultivate general social-
ecological resilience by supporting a system in which both fishers
and sea turtles can coexist.
The cooperative also benefited those providing services to the
CSF. These included paying a member of WF to transport seafood
to Raleigh and Durham, about a 3-hour drive from the coast. In
addition, the cooperative hired a coordinator to oversee sales,
education and outreach activities, and website maintenance. The
cooperative also paid a local retail business to provide processing,
storage, and waste removal services. Through the cooperative’s
investment in the local retail business, the owner was also able to
expand, hiring a full-time salaried employee, and make several
improvements to the facility. The coordinator and the processor
are members of the cooperative and receive a share of the end-
of-year profit.
Participation leads to cooperation
WF grew its membership modestly during the 2-year period,
expanding from 5 members in January 2011 to 12 members in
December 2012. The upward trajectory was a reflection of the
cooperative’s efforts to gain access to a broader and more diverse
range of species. In North Carolina, the geography is such that
commercial fishers can exploit a wide range of inshore and
offshore species. However, even in North Carolina where there
are a multitude of species and fishers can still shift between
fisheries relatively easily with a single general category license,
compared to places where there are more limited entry programs
that limit access, fishers tend to be somewhat specialized; offshore
fishers tend to predominantly fish offshore, whereas the inshore
fleet stays in the shallow water sounds or near shore. This pattern
is reflected in the WF data, in which the most species an individual
fisher contributed to WF was 12, with the mean being 3.6 and the
low being 1. Thus, to meet customer demand for variety, WF had
to actively solicit new fishers to join the cooperative. In particular,
it targeted fishers who could supply species that other members
in the cooperative did not already target or who could target them
at different time periods because they used a different gear type.
Joining WF has meant more than simply reaping the benefits of
the price premium and profit sharing associated with the CSF. It
has also involved becoming a member of a new social network
geared toward sustaining and growing the CSF. The
responsibilities associated with being part of this network have
continually evolved as rules and directions for the CSF are
proposed, tested, adopted or rejected, and refined. Both rules and
directions have come from founding members of the CSF and
newer members, particularly those most actively involved in daily
operations. These rules were specified in an operational plan that
was developed each season. Having a system in place to document
and refine rules and strategies allowed the cooperative to
experiment with new marketing strategies and be explicit about
how to move forward with contested decisions. For example, after
months of negotiation, the board of directors voted to start a

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
Table 2. Price premiums for 21 species of seafood sold through Walking Fish relative to the average monthly ex-vessel prices in the
region. “All” category denotes seafood purchased from members and nonmembers of the cooperative. “Members” category denotes
seafood purchased from individuals in the cooperative only. “All” category is higher than the “members” category because a portion
of the seafood purchased from nonmembers was from local fish houses. Buying seafood from a fish house costs more than buying
seafood from a fisher because these businesses act as middlemen in the supply chain. Note: price premiums were not calculated for
oysters or blue crabs (soft) because data were either incompatible or unavailable.
Species Scientific name All Members
Blue Crab (Hard) Callinectes sapidus 185% 185%
Blue Crab (Soft) Callinectes sapidus NA NA
Bluefish Pomatomus saltatrix 78% 78%
Clam, Hard (numbers) Mercenaria mercenaria 77% 77%
Cobia Rachycentron canadum 49% 18%
Drum, Red Sciaenops ocellatus 42% NA
Flounders Paralichthys dentalus, P. lethostigma, P. albigutta 29% 26%
Grouper, Red Epinephelus morio 6% 6%
Mackerel, King Scomberomorus cavalla 27% 27%
Mackerel, Spanish Scomberomorus maculatus 31% 22%
Mahi-Mahi Corypaena hippurus 21% 21%
Mullet, Sea Menticirrhus americanu 66% NA
Mullets, Jumping Mugil cephalus 110% 114%
Oyster (bushels) Crassostrea virginica NA NA
Sheepshead Archosargus probatocephalus 124% 122%
Shrimp (head on) Farfantepenaeus duorarum, F. aztecus, Litopenaeus
setiferus
29% NA
Snapper, Pink Pagrus pagrus 26% 12%
Snapper, Vermilion Rhomboplites aurorubens 18% 17%
Spot Leiostomus xanthurus 37% 52%
Triggerfish, Gray Balistes capriscus 28% 24%
Trout, Gray Cynoscion regalis 24% 51%
Weighted Average 41% 33%
CSF delivery in the county where WF is based. This was not an
easy decision because several members were concerned that it
would create competition with local seafood dealers, including
the processor involved in WF. Having decisions like this
documented in the operational plan provided a way for the
cooperative to progressively coadapt management strategies and
responsibilities and sustain cooperation among members.
Cooperation creates bonding capital through information
management
Information that WF collected to manage its operations appears
to have played an important role in enabling the emergence of
bonding capital among its members. To understand this
relationship requires a basic understanding of the cooperative’s
operating agreement. WF supplemented its bylaws with an
operating plan that provides detailed information about the roles
and responsibilities of cooperative members. During the
corresponding 2-year period, the operational plan was reviewed,
amended as necessary, and signed by the board of directors prior
to the start of each of the 6 seasons it executed. The information
specified in the operational plan represents an attempt on the part
of the cooperative to articulate a set of rules that are transparent
and fair. Many of these rules deal with pricing, profit sharing,
and other economic issues. The operational plan also described
and delegated responsibilities to members of the cooperative for
the different aspects of the CSF from processing to
correspondence with customers to transportation. Some of the
rules and responsibilities outlined in the plan can be easily
enforced because it is relatively simple to determine whether they
are being complied with on a regular basis. For example, it takes
minimal effort to figure out if someone is doing a poor job
cleaning fish or if deliveries to subscribers are not occurring
smoothly, because customers are quick to respond via e-mail
expressing concern. However, this is not the case for all rules.
Indeed, some of the most important rules, i.e., those that have
direct financial implications for fishers, are difficult to monitor,
creating the potential for suspicion and opportunities for cheating
that can undermine cooperation and unravel the bonding capital
derived from working together to execute the CSF. For example,
each fisher may be able to keep track of the amount of seafood
he or she contributed to the CSF but cannot easily monitor the
proportion of catch he or she contributed relative to other fishers
during the course of a particular season. Therefore, it is difficult
to know with certainty how much of the year-end profit,
calculated by proportional contribution, a fisher should receive.
WF has sought to ameliorate this risk by maintaining detailed
information about its operations, tracking each pound of product
from boat to consumer. By keeping these detailed records about
when seafood was caught and by whom, where it was landed and
with what gear, how much was sold and for what prices, what it
cost to process and transport, and what subscribers thought about
it, WF has the ability to retrace each transaction. These detailed
records were not the only way fishers were able to maintain and
build bonding capital, but they facilitated group cohesion by
reducing the need for each fisher to be suspicious of other
members of the cooperative or worry that he or she would not
receive a fair portion of the profit.

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
Communication creates bridging capital through engagement
with outsiders
WF consistently communicated with a few thousand people per
week through social media and e-mail during the 2-year period
and attracted untold others to its website. Most of this
correspondence was with customers based outside Carteret
County within the state’s urban hub where its CSF delivery
locations were based. Fishers in the cooperative also directly
interacted with people during educational events that they hosted
or were invited to attend. These events are chronicled on the
cooperative’s website and ranged from speaking engagements at
Duke University to an art exhibit and auction it hosted in
Beaufort. The focus of these communications was often to
promote upcoming sales or notify customers about the week’s
seafood. Through these routine exchanges, WF regularly fielded
comments, questions, and concerns that ranged from fears from
anxious customers about how to clean the blue crabs that they
received to more critical comments about the real and perceived
impacts of certain gear types. Customers even periodically
approached WF with business propositions relating to ways to
sell more seafood or create new products with waste from bycatch
or processing scraps. These exchanges were typically facilitated
by the cooperative’s paid coordinator, who would receive the
initial e-mail or phone call and then direct it to the appropriate
cooperative member. No matter how pedestrian or how complex
the topic, each response represented an opportunity to gain
proficiency conveying information about the CSF and the seafood
WF harvested.
The experience gained from these exchanges has no doubt proved
helpful in engaging with other audiences outside of Carteret
County and the immediate fishing sector because these
communication skills are transferable. Indeed, as the result of
WF’s visibility, the cooperative also had opportunities to engage
with and forge relationships with a range of people and
organizations across the United States. For example, the
cooperative was invited to participate in the Capitol Hill Ocean
Week in Washington, D.C.; a Regional Fishery Management
Council contacted the cooperative to request information; the
cooperative was invited to attend a national conference on CSFs;
graduate students and faculty from colleges and universities
across the United States probed the cooperative for data; and
media outlets from coast to coast periodically requested
interviews and sound bites. These opportunities enabled WF to
share its story and build bridging capital with nonprofit
organizations, private investors, other fishers, and fisheries
scientists and policy makers.
Social capital fosters opportunity to increase resilience
Increasing socioeconomic resilience
WF provides a suite of economic benefits to its members,
including higher ex-vessel prices and profit sharing. Inasmuch as
these benefits correspond to improving the well-being of the
cooperative’s members and helping fishers diversify the ways that
they can get their catch to market, WF can be seen as contributing
to socioeconomic resilience. WF may also serve to strengthen
social resilience more broadly by working to improve the public
perception of commercial fishing in North Carolina, using the
weekly delivery of seafood as a platform to engage consumers
and their followers on Facebook and Twitter in discussions about
the industry and fisheries more broadly. By forging these
connections, WF is cultivating a new base of nontraditional
advocates that may ultimately ally themselves with the
commercial fishing sector when it comes to normative public
policy decisions about resource allocation and access that threaten
to undermine the socioeconomic viability of fishers. This is a
particularly important issue in North Carolina where there is a
highly politicized campaign underway to reallocate marine
resources to the recreational angling sector. Through this effort,
there have been attempts to ban particular commercial fishing
practices and designate species like red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus)
as “recreational,” meaning that they can only be caught and
landed by recreational anglers.
Increasing ecological resilience
There are also a variety of ways that WF has sought to reduce
the environmental footprint of its operations. For example, the
cooperative has experimented with different ways to utilize the
fish scraps that are generated from processing seafood for each
week’s delivery. Strategies have ranged from giving it to fishers to
use as bait in the blue crab pot fishery to hauling it to a local
organic farm to use as fertilizer. These efforts have also been
complemented by attempts to more fully utilize whole fish for
food by exposing consumers to different parts of fish, e.g., fish
heads, row, “gizzards,” and even skins. There may also be an
ecological benefit from the relatively short distance that the
seafood is distributed (maximum: 290 km one way). Although
WF distributes its product over a greater distance than the average
CSF reported by McClenachan et al. (2014), this distance is much
less than the distance most seafood is transported. Further, WF
has in the past purchased carbon credits to offset the carbon
footprint associated with this distribution (Stoll et al. 2010). These
strategies are complemented by how WF has sourced seafood for
the CSF. As evidenced by the data we have discussed, WF has
consistently supplied consumers with a diverse range of species.
This has including using underutilized species as well as bycatch.
This approach aligns well with the view that fisheries impacts can
be muted by diffusing impacts across fisheries and the marine
environment (Zhou et al., in press), rather than depleting
particular species in particular locations and then moving on
(Berkes et al. 2006). In this way, broadening the portfolio of
species on which fishers can draw provides greater flexibility for
fishers while at the same time decreasing the impact on any one
particular fish stock.
Increasing social-ecological resilience
All of the aforementioned actions can be linked to increased social
or ecological resilience of the system within which WF is situated.
However, to limit the discussion to these activities is to restrain
our analysis of the interplay between direct marketing
arrangements and their potential to cultivate general social-
ecological resilience. Resilience is often achieved by what Westley
et al. (2013) describe as a “deft mobilization of energy” at multiple
scales. “Deft mobilization” implies both efficacy, i.e., deftness,
and action, i.e., mobilization, in response to social-ecological
disturbances. The bonding and bridging capital that has been
produced by WF and the emergent institutions that have both
enabled and helped to sustain this social capital have created
opportunities for WF to identify problems and mobilize resources
to pursue a range of initiatives. In this way, WF is becoming a
type of institutional entrepreneur. By this we mean that the CSF

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
has become a “gateway” for the cooperative, leading to new
complementary endeavors that serve fishers in the cooperative
and the broader community. We see this in the way WF has
expanded its markets and in how it has invested in projects that
extend beyond the economic dimensions of fisheries, touching on
other key elements of the social-ecological system that are
ultimately critical to sustaining the long-term viability and
resilience of fisheries. This active pursuit of opportunities is
perhaps most evident in WF’s emerging focus on cooperative
research.
WF’s first collective foray into cooperative research dealt with
monitoring contaminants in seafood. The research was motivated
by subscribers’ concerns about the healthfulness of the seafood
they were getting through the CSF. Much of this concern stemmed
from the ubiquitous educational seafood cards that classify
certain species as unsustainable or unhealthy because of
pollutants (as described by Stoll and Johnson 2015). One of the
species listed on several of these cards is blue crab, the largest and
most economically important fishery in North Carolina. Indeed,
the Food and Water Watch listed blue crabs as one of the “dirty
dozen” based on elevated levels of PCBs found in samples taken
from sites off the coast of Texas and Georgia. Concerned both
that these data did not accurately represent the pollutant levels
of blue crabs in North Carolina, and, if they did, that something
needed to be done to address the issue, a fisher in the cooperative
worked with Duke University to develop a proposal to study
pollutant levels of blue crabs and a variety of other inshore species
(Freitag et al. 2012). This research, which eventually expanded to
included partners at North Carolina State University and North
Carolina Sea Grant, came about because fishers in the cooperative
wanted to maintain bridging capital with subscribers who wanted
to be sure the seafood they were eating was safe, and this was
possible because WF had previously forged bridging capital with
researchers at Duke University. Results from this research showed
that the pollutant levels in blue crab, and the inshore fisheries that
were analyzed in the study, do not pose a health risk (Freitag et
al. 2012).
Since this project, WF has pursued a range of different projects
as a group and individually. Some of these efforts have been
funded or supported with in-kind support from entities like Duke
University and North Carolina Sea Grant, whereas others, like
the development of bycatch avoidance gear for sea turtles in the
large-mesh gill net flounder fishery, have not yet attracted external
partners. However, this has not deterred WF from moving toward
a broader and more ambitious cooperative research agenda.
Looking for ways to build on the success of the CSF and expand
further, WF is in the process of pursuing several capacity-building
projects. Most notably, the cooperative recently embarked on a
2-year effort in partnership with the local harbor authority to
design and develop a working waterfront facility that meets the
needs of small-scale fishers and aligns with the existing social and
ecological conditions of the area. The vision for this facility is one
that both provides the infrastructure and services that small-scale
commercial fishers need to sustain their businesses and
simultaneously serves as an innovation hub that brings together
fishers, researchers, and community leaders to forge solutions to
the challenges that threaten the long-term viability of their
region’s resources and those who depend on them. In this way, it
aims to forward both the individual economic goals of fishers and
the broader and more complex ecological needs of the local
resources. This project was motivated by growing awareness that
the loss of working waterfront in North Carolina has the potential
to create bottlenecks in the distribution system and undercut the
fishing sector’s ability to land and sell its catch (Garrity-Blake
and Nash 2012). Through this project, WF members have had an
opportunity to travel to other parts of the state and country to
learn more about how other fishing communities are organizing
their operations and sustaining their working waterfronts, e.g.,
WF members have participated in trips to the Northeast (United
States) and California coast as part of a National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation Fisheries Innovation Fund grant, sharing
experiences and information with other fishers, managers, and
seafood industry members. One of the innovative aspects of the
proposed design for the facility is for it to serve as a hub for
cooperative research among fishers and fisheries scientists and
researchers with state, federal, and academic agencies and
institutions in the region. It is too early to predict the outcome of
this project, but this foray into coastal development and
cooperative research demonstrates that WF has moved beyond a
marketing initiative and is actively working to address pressing
social and ecological issues at the local level. Demonstrating an
ability to identify and respond to context-specific issues is vital
to adaptive and resilient social-ecological systems (Hughes et al.
2005).
CONCLUSION
We put forward a qualitative model that begins to sketch out the
mechanisms by which CSFs facilitate the production of
institutions. These institutions revolve around building,
maintaining, and managing bonding and bridging capital and
appear to position CSF operators such that they may better
respond to social-ecological threats. We give depth to our model
by providing a comprehensive analysis of a CSF based in the
southeastern United States. We calculate the price premium that
fishers in the cooperative received over a 2-year period. These data
show that the weighted average price premium across species was
33%. Fishers also received an additional 14% to 18% for their
catch by way of a year-end dividend. This analysis represents the
first detailed economic examination of a CSF in the literature and
provides evidence to support the relatively untested assumption
that CSFs can offer fishers a way to earn more for their catch. We
suggest that this economic benefit is incentivizing cooperation
among fishers and resulting in more effective communication with
stakeholders outside their immediate community. As a result,
fishers are increasing bonding and bridging capital and beginning
to leverage it to pursue other opportunities that support the long-
term viability of fisheries. In the case of WF, fishers are leveraging
their social capital to develop a multipurpose working waterfront
facility that they can use as a hub for cooperative research with
researchers and fisheries scientists in the region.
Formal cooperation among fishers is not the norm in most U.S.
fisheries. Top-down strategies can be used to spur collective
action, but without the simultaneous production of social capital,
these efforts are unlikely to succeed (Holland et al. 2013). Given
this dynamic, we suggest that there is a need to identify and explore
emerging and voluntary strategies, such as CSFs, that can
facilitate adaptability and ultimately lead to increased general
resilience by way of promoting cooperation among resource users.
Robust local institutions like these are paramount to resilience in

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
social-ecological systems because they can be more attuned to
what is happening in particular places and thus can be more
responsive to rapid, subtle, and small-scale changes that are
difficult to discern at higher levels. Put another way, these
institutions can be “alert to learning moments” and thus more
capable of being responsive to local disturbances that are caused
by such things as fisheries decline, conflict between resource uses,
and regional and global market shifts (Westley et al. 2013). Such
alertness is critical to identifying, acknowledging, and addressing
problems that threaten social-ecological systems.
We refer to these types of entities as institutional starters because
they have the potential to create the conditions within which new
social networks, rules, and norms can be constructed in places
where they did not exist previously. We suggest that the concept
of institutional starters has the potential to be helpful in
theorizing how systems that are currently “bent out of shape” are
transformed and gain (or regain) resilience. More work is needed
to more fully develop this concept both in terms of their
relationship to direct marketing arrangements and more broadly.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7686
Acknowledgments:
This article is the outgrowth of a 5-year relationship between the
authors of this paper and members of the Walking Fish Cooperative.
We would like to express our appreciation to the cooperative for
letting us explore their data for this paper. In particular, we thank
Debra Callaway and Bill Rice for their insights and perspective. We
also thank Jessica Leahy and two anonymous reviewers for their
insightful feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript.
LITERATURE CITED
Abernethy, K. E., Ö. Bodin, P. Olsson, Z. Hilly, and A. Schwarz.
2014. Two steps forward, two steps back: the role of innovation
in transforming towards community-based marine resource
management in Solomon Islands. Global Environmental Change
28:309-321. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.07.008
Acheson, J. M. 2003. Capturing the commons: devising institutions
to manage the Maine lobster industry. Hanover, NH: University
Press of New England.
Acheson, J., and R. Gardner. 2014. Fishing failure and success in
the Gulf of Maine: lobster and groundfish management.
Maritime Studies 13(1):8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/2212-9790-13-8
Ames, E. P. 2004. Atlantic cod stock structure in the Gulf of
Maine. Fisheries 29(1):10-28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1577/1548-8446
(2004)29[10:acssit]2.0.co;2
Barnes-Mauthe, M., S. A. Gray, S. Arita, J. Lynham, and P. Leung.
2015. What determines social capital in a social–ecological
system? Insights from a network perspective. Environmental
Management 55:392-410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00267-014-0395-7
Berkes, F. 2009. Evolution of co-management: role of knowledge
generation, bridging organizations and social learning. Journal of
Environmental Management 90(5):1692-1702. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2008.12.001
Berkes, F., T. P. Hughes, R. S. Steneck, J. A. Wilson, D. R.
Bellwood, B. Crona, C. Folke, L. H. Gunderson, H. M. Leslie, J.
Norberg, M. Nyström, P. Olsson, H. Österblom, M. Scheffer, and
B. Worm. 2006. Globalization, roving bandits, and marine
resources. Science 311(5767):1557-1558. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/
science.1122804
Biggs, R., F. R. Westley, and S. R. Carpenter. 2010. Navigating
the back loop: fostering social innovation and transformation in
ecosystem management. Ecology and Society 15(2): 9. [online]
URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss2/art9/
Bodin, Ö., and B. I. Crona. 2009. The role of social networks in
natural resource governance: what relational patterns make a
difference? Global Environmental Change 19(3):366-374. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2009.05.002
Bodin, Ö., B. Crona, and H. Ernstson. 2006. Social networks in
natural resource management: what is there to learn from a
structural perspective? Ecology and Society 11(2): r2. [online]
URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/resp2/
Boucquey, N., L. M. Campbell, G. Cumming, Z. A. Meletis, C.
Norwood, and J. Stoll. 2012. Interpreting amenities, envisioning
the future: common ground and conflict in North Carolina’s rural
coastal communities. GeoJournal 77(1):83-101. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10708-010-9387-1
Brewer, J. D. 1994. The ethnographic critique of ethnography:
sectarianism in the RUC. Sociology 28(1):231-244. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0038038594028001014
Brinson, A., M.-Y. Lee, and B. Rountree. 2011. Direct marketing
strategies: the rise of community supported fishery programs.
Marine Policy 35(4):542-548. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2011.01.014
Campbell, L. M., N. Boucquey, J. Stoll, H. Coppola, and M. D.
Smith. 2014. From vegetable box to seafood cooler: applying the
community-supported agriculture model to fisheries. Society &
Natural Resources: An International Journal 27(1):88-106. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2013.842276
Chapin, F. S., III, S. R. Carpenter, G. P. Kofinas, C. Folke, N.
Abel, W. C. Clark, P. Olsson, D. M. Stafford Smith, B. Walker, O.
R. Young, F. Berkes, R. Biggs, J. M. Grove, R. L. Naylor, E.
Pinkerton, W. Steffen, and F. J. Swanson. 2010. Ecosystem
stewardship: sustainability strategies for a rapidly changing
planet. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 25(4):241-249. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2009.10.008
Coleman, J. S 1988. Social capital in the creation of human capital.
American Journal of Sociology 94(supplement):S95-S120. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1086/228943
Cooley, J. P., and D. A. Lass. 1998. Consumer benefits from
community supported agriculture membership. Applied
Economic Perspectives and Policy 20(1):227-237. http://dx.doi.
org/10.2307/1349547
Coulthard, S. 2012. Can we be both resilient and well, and what
choices do people have? Incorporating agency into the resilience
debate from a fisheries perspective. Ecology and Society 17(1): 4.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/es-04483-170104

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
Crowder, L. B., E. L. Hazen, N. Avissar, R. Bjorkland, C.
Latanich, and M. B. Ogburn. 2008. The impacts of fisheries on
marine ecosystems and the transition to ecosystem-based
management. Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and
Systematics 39:259-278. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.
ecolsys.39.110707.173406
Cudney-Bueno, R., and X. Basurto. 2009. Lack of cross-scale
linkages reduces robustness of community-based fisheries
management. PLoS ONE 4(7):e6253. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0006253
Dahl, R. E., and A. Oglend. 2014. Fish price volatility. Marine
Resource Economics 29(4):305-322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678925
Finlayson, C. 1994. Fishing for truth: a sociological analysis of
northern cod stock assessments from 1977 to 1990. Institute of
Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of
Newfoundland, St. John’s, Newfoundland, Canada.
Folke, C., S. R. Carpenter, B. Walker, M. Scheffer, T. Chapin, and
J. Rockström. 2010. Resilience thinking: integrating resilience,
adaptability and transformability. Ecology and Society 15(4): 20.
[online] URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/
art20/
Folke, C., T. Hahn, P. Olsson, and J. Norberg. 2005. Adaptive
governance of social-ecological systems. Annual Review of
Environmental Resources 30:441-473. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.energy.30.050504.144511
Folke, C., L. Pritchard, F. Berkes, J. Colding, and U. Svedin. 2007.
The problem of fit between ecosystems and institutions: ten years
later. Ecology and Society 12(1): 30. [online] URL: http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art30/
Frank, K. T., B. Petrie, J. A. D. Fisher, and W. C. Leggett. 2011.
Transient dynamics of an altered large marine ecosystem. Nature
477(7362):86-89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature10285
Freitag, A., N. Sohn, M. Hooper, and D. Rittschof. 2012. The
geography of mercury and PCBs in North Carolina’s local
seafood. Marine Pollution Bulletin 64(7):1330-1338. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.marpolbul.2012.05.003
Garcia, S. M., and A. A. Rosenberg. 2010. Food security and
marine capture fisheries: characteristics, trends, drivers and future
perspectives. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences 365(1554):2869-2880. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/
rstb.2010.0171
Garrity-Blake, B., and B. Nash. 2012. An inventory of North
Carolina fish houses: five-year update. UNC-SG-12-06. North
Carolina Sea Grant, Morehead City, North Carolina, USA.
Gelcich, S., P. Buckley, J. K. Pinnegar, J. Chilvers, I. Lorenzoni,
G. Terry, M. Guerrero, J. C. Castilla, A. Valdebenito, and C. M.
Duarte. 2014. Public awareness, concerns, and priorities about
anthropogenic impacts on marine environments. Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
111(42):15042-15047. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1417344111
Greenberg, P. 2014. American catch: the fight for our local seafood.
Penguin, New York, New York, USA.
Greenwood, R., R. Suddaby, and C. R. Hinings. 2002. Theorizing
change: the role of professional associations in the transformation
of institutionalized fields. Academy of Management Journal 45
(1):58-80. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3069285
Gutiérrez, N. L., R. Hilborn, and O. Defeo. 2011. Leadership,
social capital and incentives promote successful fisheries. Nature
470(7334):386-389. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature09689
Hennessey, T., and M. Healey. 2000. Ludwig’s ratchet and the
collapse of New England groundfish stocks. Coastal Management
28(3):187-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/089207500408629
Hilborn, R. 2012. The evolution of quantitative marine fisheries
management 1985–2010. Natural Resource Modeling 25
(1):122-144. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-7445.2011.00100.x
Holland, D. S., A. W. Kitts, P. Pinto da Silva, and J. Wiersma.
2013. Social capital and the success of harvest cooperatives in the
New England groundfish fishery. Marine Resource Economics 28
(2):133-153. http://dx.doi.org/10.5950/0738-1360-28.2.133
Holling, C. S., and L. H. Gunderson. 2002. Resilience and
adaptive cycles. Pages 25-62 in L. H. Gunderson and C. S. Holling,
editors. Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and
natural systems. Island, Washington, D.C., USA.
Hughes, T. P., D. R. Bellwood, C. Folke, R. S. Steneck, and J.
Wilson. 2005. New paradigms for supporting the resilience of
marine ecosystems. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 20(7):380-386.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tree.2005.03.022
Jackson, J. B. C., M. X. Kirby, W. H. Berger, K. A. Bjorndal, L.
W. Botsford, B. J. Bourque, R. H. Bradbury, R. Cooke, J.
Erlandson, J. A. Estes, T. P. Hughes, S. Kidwell, C. B. Lange, H.
S. Lenihan, J. M. Pandolfi, C. H. Peterson, R. S. Steneck, M. J.
Tegner, and R. R. Warner. 2001. Historical overfishing and the
recent collapse of coastal ecosystems. Science 293(5530):629-637.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1059199
Kasperski, S., and D. S. Holland. 2013. Income diversification
and risk for fishermen. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America 110(6):2076-2081. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1212278110
Kloppenburg, J., Jr., J. Hendrickson, and G. W. Stevenson. 1996.
Coming in to the foodshed. Agriculture and Human Values 13
(3):33-42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01538225
Le Cornu, E., J. N. Kittinger, J. Z. Koehn, E. M. Finkbeiner, and
L. B. Crowder. 2014. Current practice and future prospects for
social data in coastal and ocean planning. Conservation Biology
28(4):902-911. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/cobi.12310
Levin, S. 2007. Fragile dominion. Basic Books, New York, New
York, USA.
Libby, R. 2011. An abundant food system. Maine Policy Review
20(1):61-65.
Lin, N. 2002. Social capital: a theory of social structure and action
(structural analysis in the social sciences). Social Forces 82
(3):1209-1211.
LocalCatch.org. 2014. Community supported fisheries.
LocalCatch.org. [online] URL: http://www.localcatch.org/
Lowe, M., and C. Carothers, editors. 2008. Enclosing the fisheries:
people, places, and power. Symposium 68, American Fisheries
Society, Bethesda, Maryland, USA.

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
Maguire, S., C. Hardy, and T. B. Lawrence. 2004. Institutional
entrepreneurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment
advocacy in Canada. Academy of Management Journal 47
(5):657-679. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20159610
McCarthy, D. D. P., G. S. Whitelaw, F. R. Westley, D. D. Crandall,
and D. Burnett. 2014. The Oak Ridges Moraine as a social
innovation: strategic vision as a social-ecological interaction.
Ecology and Society 19(1): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/
ES-06212-190148
McCay, B. J. 2002. Emergence of institutions for the commons:
contexts, situations, and events. Pages 361-402 in E. Ostrom, T.
Dietz, N. Dolšak, P. C. Stern, S. Stovich, and E. U. Weber, editors.
The drama of the commons. National Academy, Washington, D.
C., USA.
McClenachan, L., B. P. Neal, D. Al-Abdulrazzak, T. Witkin, K.
Fisher, and J. N. Kittinger. 2014. Do community supported
fisheries (CSFs) improve sustainability? Fisheries Research
157:62-69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.fishres.2014.03.016
National Summit Planning Committee. 2012. National summit on
community supported fisheries: building a network, identifying
challenges and opportunities, & defining next steps. Final Report,
Needs Assessment, and Recommendations. LocalCatch.org.
[online] URL: http://www.localcatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/
Summit_Report.pdf
Newman, L., and A. Dale. 2007. Homophily and agency: creating
effective sustainable development networks. Environment,
Development and Sustainability 9(1):79-90. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1007/s10668-005-9004-5
O’Hara, S. U., and S. Stagl. 2001. Global food markets and their
local alternatives: a socio-ecological economic perspective.
Population and Environment 22(6):533-554. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1023/A:1010795305097
Olson, J. 2011. Understanding and contextualizing social impacts
from the privatization of fisheries: an overview. Ocean & Coastal
Management 54(5):353-363. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ocecoaman.2011.02.002
Olson, J., P. M. Clay, and P. Pinto da Silva. 2014. Putting the
seafood in sustainable food systems. Marine Policy 43:104-111.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2013.05.001
Olsson, P., C. Folke, and T. Hahn. 2004. Social-ecological
transformation for ecosystem management: the development of
adaptive co-management of a wetland landscape in southern
Sweden. Ecology and Society 9(4): 2. [online] URL: http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss4/art2/
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evolution of
institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511807763
Perez, J., P. Allen, and M. Brown. 2003. Community supported
agriculture on the Central Coast: the CSA member experience.
Research Brief No. 1. The Center for Agroecology & Sustainable
Food Systems, University of California, Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz,
California, USA.
Pramod, G., K. Nakamura, T. J. Pitcher, and L. Delagran. 2014.
Estimates of illegal and unreported fish in seafood imports to the
USA. Marine Policy 48:102-113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
marpol.2014.03.019
Pretty, J., and D. Smith. 2004. Social capital in biodiversity
conservation and management. Conservation Biology 18
(3):631-638. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2004.00126.x
Pretty, J., and H. Ward. 2001. Social capital and the environment.
World Development 29(2):209-227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
s0305-750x(00)00098-x
Putnam, R. D. 1995. Bowling alone: America’s declining social
capital. Journal of Democracy 6:65-78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/
jod.1995.0002
Rosen, F., and P. Olsson. 2013. Institutional entrepreneurs, global
networks, and the emergence of international institutions for
ecosystem-based management: the Coral Triangle Initiative.
Marine Policy 38:195-204. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.036
Steneck, R. S., T. P. Hughes, J. E. Cinner, W. N. Adger, S. N.
Arnold, F. Berkes, S. A. Boudreau, K. Brown, C. Folke, L.
Gunderson, P. Olsson, M. Scheffer, E. Stephenson, B. Walker, J.
Wilson, and B. Worm. 2011. Creation of a gilded trap by the high
economic value of the Maine lobster fishery. Conservation Biology
25(5):904-912. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2011.01717.
x
Steneck, R. S., A. Leland, D. C. McNaught, and J. Vavrinec. 2013.
Ecosystem flips, locks, and feedbacks: the lasting effects of
fisheries on Maine’s kelp forest ecosystem. Bulletin of Marine
Science 89(1):31-55. http://dx.doi.org/10.5343/bms.2011.1148
Stoll, J., A. Baldera, K. Gordon, and N. Mallos. 2010. Walking
Fish: steps towards a viable future in small-scale fisheries. Walking
Fish, Beaufort, North Carolina, USA. [online] URL: http://www.
localcatch.org/Walking_Fish_Report_2009.pdf
Stoll, J. S., and T. R. Johnson. 2015. Under the banner of
sustainability: the politics and prose of an emerging US federal
seafood certification. Marine Policy 51:415-422. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1016/j.marpol.2014.09.027
Tietze, U., and L. V. Villareal. 2003. Microfinance in fisheries and
aquaculture: guidelines and case studies. Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Fisheries Technical
Paper 440. FAO, Rome, Italy.
Walker, B., C. S. Holling, S. R. Carpenter, and A. Kinzig. 2004.
Resilience, adaptability and transformability in social-ecological
systems. Ecology and Society 9(2): 5. [online] URL: http://www.
ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/
Westley, F. 1995. Governing design: the management of social
systems and ecosystems management. Pages 391-427 in L. H.
Gunderson, C. S. Holling, and S. S. Light, editors. Barriers and
bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and institutions. Columbia
University Press, New York, New York, USA.
Westley, F., P. Olsson, C. Folke, T. Homer-Dixon, H. Vredenburg,
D. Loorbach, J. Thompson, M. Nilsson, E. Lambin, J. Sendzimir,
B. Banerjee, V. Galaz, and S. Van der Leeuw. 2011. Tipping toward
sustainability: emerging pathways of transformation. AMBIO 40
(7):762-780. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13280-011-0186-9
Westley, F. R., O. Tjornbo, L. Schultz, P. Olsson, C. Folke, B.
Crona, and Ö. Bodin. 2013. A theory of transformative agency

Ecology and Society 20(2): 40
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol20/iss2/art40/
in linked social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society 18(3): 27.
http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/es-05072-180327
Wijen, F., and S. Ansari. 2007. Overcoming inaction through
collective institutional entrepreneurship: insights from regime
theory. Organization Studies 28(7):1079-1100. http://dx.doi.
org/10.1177/0170840607078115
Wilson, J. A. 1980. Adaptation to uncertainty and small numbers
exchange: the New England fresh fish market. Bell Journal of
Economics 11(2):491-504. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003375
Wilson, J. A., J. M. Acheson, and T. R. Johnson. 2013. The cost
of useful knowledge and collective action in three fisheries.
Ecological Economics 96:165-172. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2013.09.012
Woolcock, M., and D. Narayan. 2000. Social capital: implications
for development theory, research, and policy. World Bank
Research Observer 15(2):225-249. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/
wbro/15.2.225
Yin, R. K. 1984. Case study research: design and methods. Sage,
Beverly Hills, California, USA.
Young, O. 2002. The institutional dimensions of environmental
change: fit, interplay, and scale. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, USA.
Yu, D., J. M. Anderies, D. Lee, and I. Perez. 2014. Transformation
of resource management institutions under globalization: the case
of songgye community forests in South Korea. Ecology and
Society 19(2): 2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5751/es-06135-190202
Zhou, S., A. D. M. Smith, and E. E. Knudsen. In press. Ending
overfishing while catching more fish. Fish and Fisheries. http://dx.
doi.org/10.1111/faf.12077