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Marchandisation du vote, citoyenneté et consolidation démocratique au Bénin
Abstract
Commercialisation of the vote, citizenship and democratic consolidation in Benin.
In Benin, democratic consolidation and the creation of new systems of political subjectivity are taking place, paradoxically, in the melting-pot of clientelist practices and the more general matrix of the «government of the belly ». We can thus see that the «political migration» of electors, who «eat up» indifferently the money of the candidates, has become a means of asserting the rights of the «individual-citizen». The hypothesis of the commercialisation of democracy is then examined in order to understand the complex and ambivalent methods for «taming» the pluralism of the modem world. The repertoire of the belly, which is generally used to stigmatise the injustice and greed of politicians, is now being used as an expression of equity, social justice and democratic accountability. In order to explain this, we must go beyond the utilitarian approach to electoral dealings and analyse the moral systems in which representations of power and money are set and take a deeper look into the «internal architecture of civic virtue» of ordinary citizens. As long as we can distinguish the registers of cunning from those of the trust, humility and «self-respect» which compose the moral capital of the «xomé» (the belly, interiority) , we can see that in the melting-pot of «government of the belly», decisive changes are taking place in the representations of political accountability.
... 23 When it was generalised after the end of the bush war (1981)(1982)(1983)(1984)(1985)(1986), the system of Local councils considerably extended the possibilities for citizen participation in the affairs of the State (Banégas 1998a(Banégas , 1998b. But from the end of the 1980s, M. Mamdani (1989) noted the tendency of the State to want to monopolise the organisational initiative. ...
... Members of parliament and local leaders often complain of seeing their homes "invaded" night and day by people making claims; of having to contribute financially to marriages, funerals, school fees, and to more collective enterprises (buying an ambulance, supporting "local community groups" − women, young people, veterans − and setting up school bursary schemes) (Collord 2013, 27 Collord has pointed out that in 2015, Ugandan MPs spent on average 1,700 USD for each visit to their constituency for the "personal needs" of their constituents. Echoing what Richard Banégas described in the case of Benin, Collord's study shows however that these practices should not be simply put down to "buying votes," but reflect a redefinition of the role of the MP or local leader as patron, which implies a whole range of social and moral obligations with regard to taking care of the well-being of the populations that they represent or administer (Banégas 1998b). In this regard, their actions may be the target of recriminations which may prove particularly insistent from citizens: ...
... A third camp of scholars has emphasised a potential link between electoral clientelism and political attitudes (e.g. Manzetti and Wilson, 2009;Banegas, 1998;Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). Generally, political attitudes include components such as party identification, efficacy, political interest, political information, political trust, political participation, and support for democracy (Verba et al., 1995). ...
... Of course, this finding is neither new nor surprising, given that the existing literature on clientelism has long suggested such a relationship (e.g. Banegas, 1998;Kerkvliet, 1991;Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). By contrast, other political attitudes have little effect in determining vote buying in Indonesia, including support for democracy or political (i.e. ...
Despite the ubiquity of vote buying, the question of what types of individuals are targeted by vote buying remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the individual-level determinants of targeting of vote buying and provides a comprehensive profile of the typical vote ‘sellers.’ The final part of this chapter then identifies the most striking aspects of vote buying in the national legislative elections. One of the key findings is that voter identification with political parties is significantly linked to vote buying. The closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to receive vote-buying offers. Contrary to prior expectations, most of the variables associated with modernisation theory have little correlation with vote buying.
... It should be emphasized that buying people's consciences is not a pathology in the African context; on the contrary, the practice is an integral part of the electoral process. Moreover, in many cases, it is the electorate itself that encourages political actors to donate and a political candidate is 'evaluated' on his or her capacity to distribute money, but also other goods in kind (Banegas, 1998). According to observations and interviews conducted, the results seem to show that the youth in general do not have any faith, love, or conviction in this party, but the party has "bought" political space through actions and an unusual generosity compared to Mahamane Ousmane, who is not in this field. ...
The goal of this paper is to examine the relationships between political choice and ethnic and geographical affiliation. Drawing on previous work, we seek to identify the level of influence of ethnic and geographical affiliation on the political choices of young people in the city of Zinder, Niger. The data collection was mainly done through semi-directive interviews, focus groups, case studies, and direct observations. The results show that some young people support political leaders with whom they share the same ethnic or local geographical affiliations. However, these young people's choices are not determined by ethno-regionalist considerations (sentiments). In other words, it is not an identity-based choice founded on their preference for their ethnicity and rejection of others. What is most important to many of the interviewees are their proximity to politicians, the social relationships that political leaders maintain with militants, and the benefits they can access. Résumé : Cet article a pour objectif d'analyser les rapports entre le choix politique et l'appartenance ethnique et géographique. En s'inspirant des travaux réalisés auparavant, nous cherchons à identifier le niveau d'influence de cette appartenance ethnique et géographique dans le choix politique des jeunes de la ville de Zinder au Niger. La collecte des données a été faite principalement à partir des entretiens semi-directifs, des focus group, des études de cas et des observations directes. Les résultats obtenus montrent que certains jeunes soutiennent les leaders politiques avec lesquels ils sont de la même ethnie ou de la même localité. Cependant, le choix de ces jeunes n'est pas forcement déterminé par des considérations (sentiments) ethno-régionalistes. En d'autres termes, il ne s'agit pas d'un choix identitaire basé sur l'amour de leur ethnie et le rejet de celle d'autrui. Les plus importants aux yeux de beaucoup de personnes interviewées sont la proximité avec les hommes politiques, les relations sociales que les leaders politiques entretiennent avec les militants et les avantages auxquels ils peuvent accéder.
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Or la conduite des politiciens est influencée, dans une grande mesure, par les matrices morales de la société qu'ils représentent. Ainsi, selon Banégas (1998), bon nombre d'électeurs africains considèrent la promesse ou l'offre d'argent et d'autres faveurs en période électorale comme une vertu éthique et civique, et n'y voient rien d'anormal. ...
... Gerakan preventif ini mendorong budaya partisipan. Budaya partisipan menurut Banegas (1998) Dari data di atas menjelaskan bahwa 50% pemilih di Desa APU (anti-politik uang) memutuskan pilihan calegnya dengan didasari oleh program terbaik yang ditawarkan oleh caleg tersebut. Hanya 2% yang mengatakan bahwa isi amplop atau memberi amplop menjadi penentu pilihannya. ...
... Gerakan preventif ini mendorong budaya partisipan. Budaya partisipan menurut Banegas (1998) Dari data di atas menjelaskan bahwa 50% pemilih di Desa APU (anti-politik uang) memutuskan pilihan calegnya dengan didasari oleh program terbaik yang ditawarkan oleh caleg tersebut. Hanya 2% yang mengatakan bahwa isi amplop atau memberi amplop menjadi penentu pilihannya. ...
Abstract
This study explains related to political education in preventing the practice of money politics. The practice of money politics will create corruption and harmful to society. This research used qualitative methods. The results of this study are: first, political education with pre-emtive concept, where the village community declares Anti-Political Money Village in 34 Villages in DIY. Conduct political education ahead of the 2019 elections which is considered effective because people understand that money politics is part of bribery. Second, political education with a preventive concept. The Anti-Money Politics Village Team opens a complaints center for people who witnessed or conducted money politics transactions. These efforts provide social sanctions for bribes.
Keywords: Political Education, Pre-emtive, Preventive, Money Politic, Anti-Money Politic Movement, Election
Abstrak
Penelitian ini membahas terkait dengan pendidikan politik dalam mencegah praktik politik uang. Praktik politik uang akan menciptakan korupsi dan merugikan masyarakat. Penelitian ini mengunakan metode kualitatif. Hasil penelitian ini, pertama, pendidikan politik dengan konsep per-emtif dimana masyarakat desa mendeklarasikan Desa Anti-Politik Uang di 34 Desa di DIY. Melakukan pendidikan politik menjelang pemilu 2019 yang dianggap efektif karena masyarakat memahami bahwa politik uang bagian dari suap. Kedua, pendidikan politik dengan konsep preventif yaitu Tim Desa Anti-Politik Uang membuka posko pengaduan bagi masyarakat yang menyaksikan atau melakukan transaksi politik uang. Upaya tersebut memberikan sanksi sosial bagi para pelaku suap.
Kata Kunci: Pendidikan Politik, Pre-emtif, Preventif, Politik Uang, Gerakan Anti-Politik Uang, Pemilu
... While the specific arguments and analyses differ, much of this work is linked by the idea that handouts may not always be the centerpiece of a transaction between politician and voter, and that we should take seriously how the individual actors in the system interpret and understand the political and social meaning behind handouts. For example, Richard Banegas, working in Benin, argues that many voters do not see handouts as vote buying, but instead as an opportunity to recoup some of the resources that they believe politicians are likely to have embezzled while in office (Banegas 1998). Staffan Lindberg's (2003) analysis of clientelism in Ghana produces a similar conclusion: Ghanaian voters often see handouts as an informal tax refund, rather than a direct attempt to purchase their vote. ...
... Dans ce cas, on vend et on achète sur le marché politique des idées, des astuces, des acteurs, des institutions, de l'argent, etc. » (Largoye, 2008, p.39). Par contre, selon Banegas (1998), la marchandisation du vote consiste à transformer le vote en un marché. Sur ce marché, on n'achète que le suffrage électoral à cause de la faim, du ventre et de l'argent. ...
... Rather than winning the electorate's support by designing convincing political and economic programmes, these parties generally specialize in vote buying and electoral clientelism. [23] In an interview, Joseph Gnonlonfoun, former MP in the 1990s and President of the 2011 National Electoral Commission bitterly concluded, parties in Benin have lost their ideological conviction since the first 1991 parliament. He stressed that even though the concepts of majority and opposition are legally defined, no party presents itself as the official opposition. ...
... Seguendo questa linea è illuminante in questo senso l'articolo diBanégas (1998) sul Benin. Sulla competizione tra patroni v. prima di luiCoulon (1995), per il Senegal.22 Per il Kenya v. Oloo(2005) e Katumanga(2005). ...
Comment penser la sociabilité en Afrique aujourd’hui ? La formule toponymique choisie – côté jardin, côté cour – comme emblème thématique de ce Cahier fait explicitement référence au passage d’un roman de Tchicaya U Tam’Si. Cet extrait renvoie à la métaphore de la maison, lieu où l’on reste, lieu où l’on revient. Le côté jardin, c’est non seulement la science, mais aussi la civilisation occidentale importée avec la colonisation et la réalité apparente des hommes et des choses dans le monde visible des vivants, alors que le côté cour, c’est le fétiche, c’est-à-dire la magie, la sorcellerie et le monde invisible des esprits et des morts. Comment peut-on être à la fois magicien et magistrat, sorcier et président de la République dans une même peau humaine ?...
Conventional wisdom suggests that state leaders try to direct resources toward members of their own party and away from their opponents. However, such “strategies of subversion” are more complicated in reality: incumbents do not necessarily favor their co-partisans and sometimes even sabotage them politically. The present article tries to make sense of this apparent paradox, arguing that seemingly irrational political strategies are in fact rational. It focuses on Niger, a country where subversion of the municipal authorities is extremely common. Qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that subversion strategies do not always help the ruling party in urban areas, in terms of either vote margin or public opinion, but they nevertheless insulate rulers from would-be rivals while securing some electoral gains in the countryside.
Scholars argue that access to information about a politician’s programmatic performance helps voters reward good performers and punish poor ones. But in places where resources are made conditional on collective electoral behavior, voters may not want to defect to vote for a strong legislative performer if they do not believe that others will. We argue that two conditions must hold for information about politician performance to affect voter behavior: Voters must care about the information and believe that others in their constituency care as well. In a field experiment around legislative elections in Benin, voters rewarded good programmatic performance only when information was both made relevant to voters and widely disseminated within the electoral district. Otherwise, access to positive legislative performance information actually lowered vote share for the incumbent’s party. These results demonstrate the joint importance of Salience and voter coordination in shaping information’s impact in clientelistic democracies.
Cet article présente l’échange entre les partis politiques et le personnel politique intérimaire pendant la campagne électorale. Il montre comment, pendant cette période, les partis politiques ont recours à des auxiliaires du jeu électoral pour fabriquer et diffuser leur matériel afin de sensibiliser et mobiliser les électeurs. En échange de ces services, ces auxiliaires électoraux reçoivent des avantages financiers, vestimentaires et alimentaires ainsi que des promesses d’emplois et autres bénéfices symboliques.
This is a briefing to inform USAID Niger 5 year governance programme.
Since 2004, the legislative election systems in Indonesia started to apply the open list PR and it fully adopted in the 2009 election. It gradually change the campaign strategy, methods, and actors to become a more candidate-centered campaign rather than party centered campaign. But, these were not symmetrically reflected into their campaign financial report. I found a fundamental problem in the electoral legal framework that need to be fixed.
Political scientists and anthropologists who study Africa share much in common. This chapter begins with a discussion of research on state formation and development and show how political scientists working on Africa have engaged directly with anthropological work in order to advance this important political science literature. The main goal is to provide examples of how anthropology has influenced and shaped the work of political scientists working on Africa. The chapter presents a discussion of the literature on ethnic and identity politics, highlighting how anthropological research has impacted both the way that many Africanist political scientists think about the concept of ethnic identity and the types of questions that Africanist political scientists seek to address. It also examines a number of important literatures in Africanist political science state formation and development, identity politics, democracy and governance, and the role and consequences of international intervention to demonstrate how Africanist anthropology has influenced Africanist political science.
Meskipun pemilu di Indonesia telah berlangsung empat kali setelah masa reformasi di tahun1998 dan mendapat pujian dalam penyelenggaraannya, salah satunya adalah tidak menimbulkan konflik dan kekerasan, namun ada pertanyaan penting yang belum tuntas terkait pembiayaan pemilu di Indonesia. Berapa sebenarnya penerimaan yang diperoleh oleh peserta pemilu dalam rangka menyukseskan pencalonan mereka? Darimana saja penerimaan tersebut diperoleh? Berapa sebenarnya pengeluaran yang harus dialokasikan oleh peserta pemilu? Bagaimana peserta pemilu mengelola dana kampanye dalam rangka meraup dukungan pemilih? Termasuk juga, bagaimana dengan pembiayaan dana pengelolaan pemilu dari sisi penyelenggara? Buku ini disusun oleh mereka yang menekuni pembiayaan pemilu untuk menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut.
In the face of considerable scepticism from some British commentators, elections by secret ballot and adult suffrage emerged as central features of the end of British rule in Africa. This article considers the trajectories of electoral politics in three territories – Ghana (Gold Coast), Kenya, and Uganda. It shows that in each of these, the ballot box came to provide a point of convergence for the disparate ambitions of nationalist politicians, colonial policy-makers, and a hopeful, restive public: performing order, asserting maturity and equality, and staking a claim to prosperity. Late-colonial elections, we argue, constrained political possibility even as they offered citizenship, presenting the developmentalist state as the only possible future and ensuring substantial continuities from late colonialism to independence. They also established a linkage between nationhood, adulthood, and the ballot that was to have enduring political force. Yet at the same time, they established elections as a space for a local politics of clientelism, and for kinds of claims-making and accountability that were to complicate post-independence projects of nation-building.
Party defections have increasingly become a major trend of Ugandan multiparty politics, not only for individual elites at the national level and in the parties’ leadership but at the grassroots level by local party members too. These shifts of allegiance are now systematically part of the staging and imagery of President Museveni’s electoral campaigns. A common explanation of this phenomenon points at the inconsistency of partisan loyalties and ideologies. It is often taken for granted that defections are expressions of clientelism, political opportunism and above all democratic immaturity and a misunderstanding of multipartyism. This paper argues on the contrary that mass defections reflect the social technology of the National Resistance Movement hegemonic rule at the local level, and the constraints for opposition parties whose structures it co-opts. They are part of the monopolisation of organisational initiatives at the grassroots level by the regime. Defections are not simply a symbol of electoral opportunism but part of a routine economic posture in a context of straddling lines between the economic and political spheres. Following up the trajectories of two specific groups of defectors from Teso over several years, this paper seeks to give precise insights on the local presence and rooting of political parties, their modes of mobilisation, recruitment, their repertoires of action, and more generally on the transformation of identities, partisan practices and political activism but also on the hegemonic ruling party’s mode of governance at the local level. This micro-sociologic approach opens windows on how hegemony is built in a dialogic way with local political entrepreneurs and vote brokers. Hegemonic rule therefore also contains its own limits as it requires a permanent renegotiation with individual actors embedded in a set of local power relationships.
Under Benin's neo-patrimonial multi-party democracy, political continuity and social peace have been achieved at the cost of political immobilism. Major reform projects have advanced very slowly at best, relying heavily on donor-financed expertise and external pressure. At the same time, poorly coordinated and rather clientelistic aid has been a major factor in limiting the coherence of government action. This chapter suggests that it would be unrealistic and even dangerous, under these conditions, to expect very much very fast from the PRSP approach in Benin. The 'regime change' that is called for will require at least a substantial shift in donor behaviour, coordinated progress with stalled public management reforms and a step-change in the politics of reform in the country.
Why is vote buying effective even where ballot secrecy is protected? Most answerse merge from models of machine politics, in which a machine holds recipients of handouts accountable for their subsequent political behavior. Yet vote buying is common in many contexts where political party machine sare not present, or where parties exert little effort in monitoring voters. This article addresses this puzzle. The author argues that politicians often distribute electoral handouts to convey information to voters.This vote buying conveys information with respect to the future provision of resources to the poor.The author tests the argument with original qualitative and experimental data collected in Kenya. A voter's information about a candidate's vote buying leads to substantial increases in electoral support, an effect driven by expectations about the provision of clientelist benefits beyond the electoral period. The results, showing that the distribution of material benefits can be electorally effective for persuasive reasons, there by explain how vote buying can be effective in the absence of machine politics.
Im Gegensatz zu Lateinamerika, Süd- und Osteuropa ist die Transitions- und Systemwechselforschung in Afrika nicht als zentraler methodischer und theoretischer Ansatz der jeweiligen area-Forschung etabliert. Ob wir es im subsaharischen Afrika mit defekten, nicht-konsolidierten oder gar keinen Demokratien zu tun haben, dürfte eine Frage sein, die zwar aus der Perspektive der vergleichenden Systemwechselforschung interessiert, in Afrika selbst aber von kaum jemand gestellt würde.
Die Diskriminierung des Eigentümerwechsels der Unternehmungen hat allokative Folgen, wenn sich Rangfolgen der Investitionsobjekte verändern. Verharrt ein Investor aufgrund eines Transaktionshemmnisses in der bestehenden Investition, obwohl die Rentabilität der alternativen Investition höher ist (Lock-in Effekt), sind Markttransaktionen gestört. Verzerrte einzelwirtschaftliche Entscheidungen können zu einer gesamtwirtschaftlich ineffizienten Mittelverwendung führen, wenn die nur wegen des Lock-in Effektes unrentable Investition nicht von anderen Investoren unternommen wird. Eine Begünstigung des Eigentümerwechsels führt genau so wie eine Diskriminierung zu ineffizienten Mittelverwendungen, wenn aufgrund der Transaktionsbegünstigung Investitionen getätigt werden, die weniger rentabel sind und ohne Transaktionsbegünstigung unterblieben wären. Differenzen zwischen Veräußerergrenzpreis und Erwerbergrenzpreis zeigen eine Diskriminierung (Pv
− PE
> 0) bzw. Begünstigung (Pv
− PE
< 0) des Unternehmenseigentümerwechsels an.
Parties in Africa are often described as organisationally and programmatically weak. On the other hand, they mobilise substantial numbers of voters at election time. This contradiction provokes an interesting question: How do political parties in Africa relate to the society? How do they mobilise their voters and sympathisers, and which strategies do they employ? Anja Osei analyses how parties in Ghana and Senegal adapt to their local context by employing locally embedded strategies. © VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden 2012. All rights are reserved.
Creeping authoritarianism ?
The passive democratic revolution slides off the rails in Benin
Since 2012, Benin has undergone political tensions related to the “Talon Affair.” This article analyzes the Boni Yayi regime’s slide toward authoritarianism and its complicated relationship with opposition forces. The article also sheds light on factional battles over the capture of national economic rents — battles that often assume deliberately ethnic and regionalist guises. Will these tensions turn the peaceful model of the so-called “passive democratic revolution” into a more conflictual scenario of “hegemonic rupture” ? The article concludes that analyses of current conflicts should use a medium-term perspective — one that addresses how Benin, a pioneer of peaceful transitions in Africa, has consolidated pluralism since the 1990s.
Political participation and religious injunction : trajectories of muslim activists in Senegal
This article highlights the endogenous modes of participation in Senegal which are not considered as such when international development programs aim to implement participatory mechanisms. By tracing the variety of practices of political participation set up by young muslims activits led by Sheikh Bethio Thioune, a charismatic and controversial Sufi leade, this paper wants to question the existence of a "religious injunction". The latter can explain the continuum of participation between religious and political spaces in which the group develops its public activities. Paradoxically, the public and political engagement of these young followers, although driven by the requirement of their religious leader, seems to empower their citizenship.
Since 2012, political tension has threatened to undermine Benin's image as a model democracy. The President's efforts to amend the constitution to enable him to contest a third consecutive term, alongside the persecution of some of his former allies, have created a climate of political uncertainty. As a result, a wave of civic protest has gained momentum, a general strike launched in January 2014 lasted for more than four months, and the Catholic Church has broken its silence and denounced the excesses of those in power for the first time since the National Conference in 1990. This Briefing argues that these developments can be considered, on the one hand, as an extension of Benin's passive democratic revolution, a process whereby the co-option of actors from different generations and social strata – the expansion of the “politics of the belly”1 – facilitated the transition from one-party to multi-party rule. On the other hand, the highly volatile situation of the last two years could be said to mark a shift towards a more confrontational scenario of hegemonic rupture in which past agreements on how to share power are torn up by a President determined to capture all economic and political opportunities for himself...
Les intérêts sont des variables incontournables pour la compréhension des phénomènes politiques en Afrique. Peu d’auteurs ont cependant proposé un cadre systématique permettant de comprendre le mécanisme à travers lequel cette variable façonne le jeu politique en Afrique. Comment et quand les intérêts (variables stratégiques) permettent-ils d’expliquer les processus d’émergence des politiques et des stratégies de développement sur ce continent ? Cet article propose une contribution originale en faisant le point théorique sur la question et analysant de manière empirique le rôle joué par les intérêts et les stratégies des dirigeants africains dans leurs relations avec les institutions financières internationales dans le processus d’émergence des stratégies de développement, notamment des plans d’ajustement structurel (années 1980 et 1990) et des documents stratégiques pour la réduction de la pauvreté (années 2000 et 2010). Les cas empiriques du Mali et du Togo servent d’illustration aux mécanismes présentés, relatifs particulièrement à l’articulation des intérêts et des stratégies des acteurs aux paradigmes économiques et aux contextes temporels dans l’orientation et la configuration de l’émergence et de la forme des innovations en matière de stratégies de développement en Afrique.
This article examines the impact of the third wave of democratisation on economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts by assessing the extent of democratisation in the region, and concludes that political reforms have resulted in the routinisation of multiparty elections, but that political competition remains imperfect and that only a few countries could qualify as ‘liberal’ democracies. The article then examines the economic performance of African countries during the 1990s. It finds no significant differences across regime types or across time. The region's political changes have not yet had a lasting impact on the region's economics. This suggests that important institutional continuities mark the region's political dynamics. The article concludes by examining these continuities.
The volume includes the papers presented at the CIL 2014: The International Conference of Humanities and Social Sciences - Creativity, Imaginary, Language, Craiova, 16-17 May 2014 (www.cilconference.ro).
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