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cio[ogy of Knowledge 1
fl P i1!.rg.r9, g.!ry9"n J o h n Whit_e .a nd .M i ch a e I you n s
untverstty ot London Institute of Education -
John White
The.sociology of knowle_dge is now an extremely influential branch of
study in ojrr colleges of Education and other inriiiuiioni Ar'r[, kno*.
several of our rnutual acqudintances in the eouciiionat'w*ro huu"
::r,_o,5-P:_qivings about its centrar theses. tt is noi ruipii.ing'iii.i ,unv
of these critics are philosophers, for the theory rs i; miny *ry, .
philosophical one and rhus open to ph.ilosophildt "t air.ng".'' My o*n
,^"_T."1. ifl ry19,!ino io draw you into a diatosue oi tnii rino'Ir-", ho*"uur.
only,partly philosophical. T-hgy are also m6rat or potiti"it. ri .J.r, to
me that the central claims of the educationalversions or trre soiiolbgy of
knowtedse are.tikerv to read ih; i;"il;; *r.,o uooptin"riiit"r"rior.
contusrons which can only do harm to their pupild. l'm sure that you
will resist this contention'most forcefully. t-ikb most'oi ,r, vou uru
yJlilgl-".11r-.I9!,f ldgp" propasated oniy becausJ vorl.lili ir*y .,"
t)\ey q ?.prave edug,ationat practices, not worsen tl-rem. We can'both
agree right.at the.beginning, I think, that we both have the welfare of
chrtdren at heart. .lt is no do.ubt important to you, therefore, as it ii to me,
that the claims of the sociology'ot knowledg6 ihourd o.ii,d;.rshiy
tested, to see if they are inteueciualty_ adequaiel rueiGr otirsl'g'iv"en our
common commitment, could possibly want these ideas io"become
widely accepted if they were shown to'be unsoun.t.- eqrirrv,6oir,' ot us
would in all consistency be delighted at their turtrrer prip.g';ti* itirrJ,z
pass the test.
Let me see, first, if l've, gpJlour position straight, ln your essay in
Knoyvleloe and contror..(i97i) you object to t-he werr-(nJwn-ihtisis.
originating from paul Hirst. thai a central onj".tire oi tr.r" scnoot
curriculum should be the initiation of children'inio varioui ,i";#-;i
knoryledge', on the grounds that ,,the pro6fem wiif, thJir'lina ot
critique ,is that it appears to be based on an absolrtisi "on"-"ptiorit"j
:et,pf distinct forms of knowledge which correspond ctosjtv-io trre
tradrtronal areas of the academic curriculum and thLs justify, ratr,eitr,Jn
examine, .what are no more than the socio-hisioricrt'"o',iitrrcls of a
pa(icular,time (p23)". your objection, r take it, is noi onrv io ,-iirstian
account, Fgt tg any cunicular theory which argues tr,at crriu,ren should
acquire o{gctive knowledge. in any of its fo"rms. rni, ir b""il;t I
g:lfy-",J:! l9t9 Fqt there is no such thins as objective knowtedge.
r rus rs Deeause what counts as 'knowledge' can never be more thln
4
what particulbr social groupg label as such. Hence the comment ebout
''socio-historicat constr-ucts'.in the passage quoiuu. :wi,iierli'is hetd to
Pj-_ I ,Vp" .of objective. knowtebse-jmaiHemitici oi- pf,vJior. -toi
:11il"-:,^11ll9y jle studied in our universities today_can o-nty
-Ue
a-n
arDrtrary construct of a social group: not only might 6ther soCiii'grorps
have q.uite other forms of knowledge, but, more iirportinttv, tneie coufO
never be any wa.y of.telling whether: the views oi.ov dii. purty *"ru
true or false, rational or. irrationar. This is beiiuse ir-,.rJ 5Jn 'n. nu
,criteria of truth or rationality outside the ;ociat 6;;;6: ' ."'' .-"' '
This is, I take.it, ths cenrral .thesis. lts eduiational implications jre
lmmense. The most obvious is that t.u"nJrs irJ ;;[il;;i;i;;
l1:T::lr:,r -f-qg-y tqil! they are introoucins. "r,iioi";'i,i o'olective
:^rl:l:,g,l1o_Ts-T, ,Jt?y can be d9i.ng nothing more thereby than"
rnooctnnatrng them .rn the canons which dominant social groups cal/
obj,ective'. ,Hence the stogan. closely associiteA with ih; ;;;#i ,i;;
oT rRe socrotogy ot knowledge, that an 'academic curriculum, is simply
llg impg?ltion, of ,'middle-ctass,values,. ffre obvior"-qu"rt;;n th,.n
,anses: \wnat should teachers be teaching if they are to aVoid it,is tor*
of imposition 74* don't know what vor/inswe.iJ'tiiJqrJs'ti* is. r,m
nor ar ail crear what moves are open to you within the theoiy yo, "rporr".
But.it is at rhis point that 'nv ni""ur-iri,,'iitl"r ioduiir-;; tri.ffili" ,or,
acute. A consistent apptication of_ the theonr;ili ;r;i; t";.i .ttu;
lg:."1..'l:,^yi.l l, j"ttisir" ;-lt ,ttil;i io teach cniroren irrings tike
nrsrory, scrence, mathematics, literature, i.e. anything that can be'tarred
with the retativist brush.. EVen much of what go.' b;i; ili;il';il;;;;
education must be,esrailv suspect. sinceli i" t**rligl'iriol".tiru
then statements li ke' Red i nd ia ns l ived i n tigwam;, ;;,;"ri#i'ii;i; i;;;
into butterfties' cannot be objectivelv [no*n] But if ,u t .-r,iiiii"d"g';]
what is [ef1 ? rsn'tth.ere a ddngerthatvourthe-orKrisr.,i rbr;ieachers
rn a srare o1 utter perprexity, not knowing which way toiurn for the best) ?
'..,.
But.I must not expand.too much on this morar difficurty, since we,vb
oJoviousry ggt to see whether or not the theory itself stinds ,p. -itri,
,1."?9:.I:^t919i19,{rre wetI-known ,setf_referentia11 oOiectipn iorh;"tia";ij
{ rt truth and farsity do not ex-ist.in any absorute sen9p. tl.ren oovioubiv trie
thesis about the relativity.of all knowledge cannot b'e true in ir,iJr"nr*,,
Yet you clearly believelt is true and wan"t others to uo JJ. buiin wnat
sense. now, dg you believe it is true ?. To what ir it, ir"rir.' iuiriv.'zl' .'
I have another direct questior.(What are your grounds for the thesis that
no knowledge ls objective ? rn a ,eceni r.iuii"[ lerni-nri'vo,r'ii..,priua
that those who hold an.objectivity view of knowledge,muJt'o-etieve tnat
'knowJedg6 'is certain. " Sincq. 6i, rTou iaiO.:fcnowj;,j;;";:il;l,rt ,l
!g{a i n-l i rna si ne.vo u had scientif ic rrypbin es iJ i n ;i ;;-_ii, is' ie moves
an rr,ponanr prop'trom. the.-objectivity thesis. But why ? was I right to
H:?,tffiJ,,;:#iil:"fl?flxil"{g,flJir:il,r*yE.fifl llti"ii",iLff :f
C".t^l,t o*o- t2dl^;{ ;
the objectivity of knowledge without believing that all known pro-
positions must be ceftain, at least in the sense of being logically immune
irom doqbt ? I don't see why not. But perhaps you don't meal by
'certain','logically immune from doubt' 7 ln any case, I must leave itto
you to defend your denial of objectivity in your own way.
One last point: in the seminar you also seemed to see a connexion
between ihe bellef that knowledge is objective and the belief that
knowledge is external to the individual and. if possessed by him, must
be imposbd on him. This, too, seemed to have educational implications,
sir:nilar to those already discussed: knowledge must be the imposition
of something alien on to the child; it must be wrongfully depriving him
of his intellectual autonomy. What is there in the argument as it stands ?
'l think it is true that the objectivist position implies that there are external
constraints on the knowing subject: if I know that p,-Where 'p' is any
proposition, then 'p' must be true. and its truth [s independent of
whitever I may believe. I cannot know that the earth is flat unless there
is a fact outside my consciousness, i.e. the fact that the earth is flat, which
makes what I believe true. Could knowledge be otherwise? ls there
an implication in your position that there need not be anlz constraints on
the knowing subject ? ls this perhaps your way out of the educational
impasse mentioned earlier ? That is, would you argue that in .order to
be free of the so-called 'objective' knowledge which is in reality only
imposed by social groups, the individual (and, in particular, the school-
child) must adopt a more radical relativism, making his knowledge
relative to himand not to anything outside him ? Do you see educational
salvation in the individual's construction of what is going to-co_unt as
knowledge for him ? But what becomes of knowledge. now ? Does it
make senle to talk of knowledge as an individual construction ? How
could one then distinguish between a person's merely believing that the
moon is made of green cheese and his knowing that it is ? Couldn't this
proposition, on ihis theory, be a bit of constructed knowlqdge for
someone or other (despite what would generally be held to be conclusive
evidence that it wds false) ? How, on this constructivist view, could one
distinguish between discovery and creation ? Or would one deny the
distinction ?
Michael Young
I see two thrusts to your argument which are closely linked. Firstly your
philosophical doubis aboul a theory of knowledge a-s social-as the
produci of men's active engagement in their history, and of their attempts
io organise their."relations*with nature and with others which give
concr6te meariing to their hfumanity-that for me is the thesis of a
sociology of knowledge. Secondly you feel that were such a notion
taken s6iiously by-teaahers, they would be led to a state of confusion,
resignation and despair, thus harming the children whose realisation as
full-human beings we both share as a commitment.
6
uke yoq l, gee these as at root politieal.and moral questionsr-:thus if one
starts'with a primary concern with change, it is in'as(ing what mignibe *
thg sig.nificance of.any idea for.the.possibitity of chang!. ttrat t sie'mv
critgria of ,a good theory-that js.what, !n your words, itanding tr," tdit
would mQan for me. , Let me elaborate in relation to my unoer-standing
of your comments.
Many teachers, particularly in urban schools, confront all kinds of
dilemmas in their day 19 day activities-whether ano on wrrat gr;unJi
to 'select' children, and how to evaluate children's work without aenrTing
its significance in its own .(the. child's terms) are but two. ftrii niani
children are harrned by their school experien6e is also undeniable. This
however is not a situation created or. overcome by socioiogists oi
philosophers, but rather one recognised and ultimat6lv overc6me bv
teachers' and pupils' 'praxis', and it must be to such ,braxis, that ourJ
enquiries address themselves and to which they may oi may *t h;,;;
relevance. ,
,ii*
v'l want to argue.that your position and in particular your theory of
knowledge is fundamentaily conservative, and inimical io 'tne
qosglbilities of change to the kind of society and educational'possibilitiei
that l.believe.you espouse. ln holding to some version of 'a 'formilof
knowledge' thesis, you sustain a hierarchy between theory twtreitrei
. philosophy.or sociology) and practice (teaching), as theory c'ontinues
to provide the criteria in.terms of.which practitioners judge thbir achieVe_
ments. [n.separating knower from known, and, kiroriledge fiom.the
context of its use, you confirm for teachers their sense that-they can:not
be the authors of.theirown speecft-'167e in the universities produce, they
rerprod u ce kn owled ge'-a nd ca n not th e ref o.re p rori ae. ioith" poss i oi t iiv
of teachers as agents of change.
, v-
t) " ftre alternative position from which I argue is to see knowledqe as
constituted by tl"re actions- of men in educa-tion.i .nottr,"i-;;iii;;r".;il I
. to s,ee these settig.gs as located in our history. Thus we can attehbt tor
-understand the oiigins of the present in the-past, a present which'thus
becor'.nes potentially transcendable through oirr aetiohs with others. Thls
. I agree is neither a comfortable nor familiar doctrine, and one reaction,
and.one only. is the sense of confusion and despair you describe; all oi
us, I think, are frightened of recognising.that we are'resoonsible for our
own actions. But this is no negative thing.(To recognise, as you put it,
thal there can be no criteria of truth or raiiohality ou'iside of men is not
a,denial of the possibility of these critegia Oui i'humaniring, ot thurn,
_ through. locating them in our.actions, not our methods) teicners, an.d
1,,*ti, vou and Itoo, have no option in the end butto accept iesponsibiliiyfoi
r ' I what we claim to know and make available to othdrs; the distinition 1
r between indoctrination and introduction:wr,l"iiy"u;;; ;.rri;';;;i; /
just that problem. So.ciologis*s have sometimeb crudely characterised
'academic curricula,as jimposing middle- class values' in away I too find
" -ni:1.91i,1s-.f:l lg* can we.ascribe a fixed sociat atribute to a play or
'-ri{ewfiDnian physics, say ? you follow this with the question',Wr,it
should a teacher be teaching ?' and claim that a "onrlrttni-iiplication
p- of recognising knowleds.e qi social is to give up "rervilring ile usuuiry
know as 'knowledge'. It is here that r leer vlru- t url" m6ri'reriouiiv
misunderstood what I and others have said or wiiti.n.-ii"1,'rv i do not.
?_?!!oi!:, recog.nise the separation of .theory, tiom its-a6pfi"itioni
iteachers' act,vities, too, are theoretical. To argue that knowleasJ i;
,:?^"i{.,ir^t:,.19-y:-tl.j it-is in the various process6s of reading, sefe6ting
erc..prrs oI wntlng that we. generate our sense of what 6literaturel
similarly we select some ordeii.ngb of our world and some conceptions
gl gur past. and through invoking these meanirgi;" si*rJni. to ou,
distinctions as to what 1g mgtfgmgti9s. physicJ,iJ t irt6rv. i[" poi^t]oi
teaching isthat it is in.the tight of this're6ognition ttriii6lcr.,Jrirrvoe
able with chitdren to chafienge the poritics oT. ilh; t,;J[iiJitu, onu
particular selection as knowledge. Ibccept tnat tor teich;;. t; ;;. them-
selves a.s active agents does nbt of itsdrf cr-range th; *,;rl,i, fi it does
present itas changeable. your moral anxieties(p 4) aie generiied, r wouiJ
argue,from'a fundamentaily deficitview ot teain#'cipr"itiel-iJiheorise
about their world and.to change it. The question a,r*t i;;;k is how
do wq prgyid_e for this possibility tor tea'crreri-in tr,e pol,ttili of their
everyday life ?
r,- You s-o^o.n t-o,raise the pertine.nt question that if all knowledge is social,
then so ts the recognition that 'all knowledge is social,." Consider
, however what might be.inv-otved in rejecting;;; y;;;;;;'to,fn" id"u
, of .kno.wledge being sociar ? what concept-of mah o, oi r,Lrln 'r.'ffi
is implied ? This seems important becausi it is I iake ii tioml"iiere tnat
,you.generate your critique. .your position then seems to ac."pt tr,e
lpossibility.of treating knowledge'as independeni oi-*inl--ft,is ii
idescribed by- Marx as an.aspect-of alienatidn, i sitlation'in'which the
separation of man from his knowing about the *;;iJEi;e;ili'i', .'t]"i
of human nature, rather than of men-in pariicular t isiori"al iiit-umstances
which are transcendable in human praiis.
I You will note that I do not equate social with relative. as you do-l think
we should.try and get the 'rerativism issue' behind ;Jif boi.r-6t.. t "rn
see lrelativist' as a way someone who rras a particulii ;otion'ot trrtr.,
critera describes someone who sees such critdrii ii coni"*iu.i fiutrr*,
of enquiry or argument, but lcannot see it ai'a ilii;;ri[;i,i;r;;;
would (or even could) espouse for themselves. Foi;itt.ilir;:r,.,iu- .tt nrr"
to stand somewhere, and where and with whom'w;;tini;t-uinot oe
relative for us without aenving orirJu"i.'
I You ask for the grounds for rejecting objectivlst theories of knowledge-
lwould want.to say, regarding any sense of oullciive'-ir,.i-r.t"r, to.
wortd external to human activity, that to treat such an external world as
grounds for certainty or objeciive knowredge ii to miir< fi" h-;;";
I
character of what we know. This is a way of saying perhaps that our
grounds are in our purposes and our possibititiei.' t,i tire en-o I iJ; my
onlv srounds in our'common humanity in hlsi;ry.'ril ii; i'oisio,iiitv oi,
realising it through our actions with others.
Two points about chirdrll and rearning..that you raise. A chird rearning
his or her native ranguage engages aciively';ith;i.-"$Jiieice ot*re
world and the tark of others, 5s -he constru'cts rris ;il i;;g;;ge. ri ii
where it is assumed that a chird has no ranguage, or no kndwredge-a
igglure of manv curricurum programmes-ih.i"i'con.6pii""'"t know-
reoge can become an imposition. Knowing cannot be'detiched from
what it is we know.. be.cause. knowing sorietrring, i-i"Eiiii'out*urn
knower and known, is the onty thing l"underriini'ov 6;;ft;;.'O;;
cannot sgpgrale these (knowel and known) any more thun on" ".n
separate individual knowers. This for me niakej vour. qr.itio-n ;ffii
llo* ?, child might become a free learne, irreferirit_f,;* ;l;; do we
rearn tnan_by reratrng our experience to ourselves, and how do we have
a sense of self other than through our relations wiin oihers i
Finally, my problem with your position is that it poses, or appears to,
questions in some kind of univeisal context-free way, as if their intelrigi-
bilitv did not depend 9n my being abrelo aoequatLt;Adi;;i rhem as
particular questions. r wondered-about the co-m;;; ;ii;'tiii'ini,
involved, the notions of reasonabr"n"ui, 'any normar min worio tr,int:
(as in your examples) .nJ th" *iv vo, irse ,we,, whi"fr- "u]r''orii
presuppose some taken for granted consensus; for who are we ? '
John White
l,l:^:ory ll1|yg^, didn't directty chailense my critique of your ealier /
roeas. rt rs these that are currently influential and which ieaa toirre
perplexities I mentioned. I supp_o1e I can't take. iithat tr,L'point. vou
don't take up are unanswerabr6'l trrat wouto-oi ib" ,r"ritSiiope for.
ln any c1se..we do obviousl y seem to cross swords on some crucial
i:;::.::,^j^"^t?:ry ry" can sort out the naiic tne: -vouiii-ie"o,v tnait
"knowredge is social".. Isaywe'seem'to be in dispufe anouitrris. uui'
I'm not clear whether.the diipute is appiient or real until I know rather
more what you mean by the claim in iuestion.
Let me see if I have go-t you straight. yo.u put me in the enemy camp of
those who doubt oI q"rv thri [""*rLoi,IIJ'.J"iir."i[i.'iJnlr, vo,
claim, goes with a fundamentar coniErvatism, marlnJ sociar ano
educationat change more difficurt by sustainins'u hi.;ifthi"6etween
educational theory and practicat teacrring and siparatins -linbw"r. from
5noyyn.., r must say r can't quite folrow the reasoning hele: the words
tumbre flu.ently enough from yourpen on to the page, but when I focui
on a small section of argument, two or three co;n;;i.d ;d;i;;;es say.
J often,.as here, can'tmake qut the logical threadlhat ties-themtogether.
could -yo u perha ps., spel r oui vti i,.il;-" i;; foi}'e ri iii t, r rv iiil'n tr is a
,\ :,
Let me look at this m.ini-argument in more. detaii. rirst, is it true that I
, would deny or doubt f * !!i*t"Og. i. ,i.irf ? We,, what is it to ctaim
this ? You sav that it ls not to ctiim tnat.knowredge is rerative. rt is
true that most of mycritique con."in"i r"iiiiuirr, and r take it from what
you now say that vou don.t want to .rqr. ioith;_;;;;i,*i",i"fiv,"i
knowledge. So kn6wred.g" .;ii b.:r6o=ut. in a different sense. you
sav on p 6 that it means.th"at k."*6-s;-i.', trru pr6iliit"oi ,"n:! u"tir"
engagement in their history and of"trreir atteimbi t";rg;;i;lh;;
rqlations with nature ano wiin oir,uri:'.''i;, not quite sure what it is to
llengage in one's history":. tne *oiiiJ.outa nuu. severar interpretations.
so (once again) I hon6stty oon;i'ti-oi,iiri.t yo, mean untii you spe,
rt out more preciserv. But insofar ir-ir.,e'sJ..;,;i ;r;il il'iii.l"nur",
knowledge ib ouitt up as a re.surt ol iti"rpt. to sorve technorogicar,
social and other huma.n proOlemi,-ifr6ii"if.,i, seems unexceptionable.
whoever wourd rrave'trrousrri ;t#di;;' i li in,s' iI,,Jii.iir"'"l"'.nt ov
the sociat nature or knowied-s., il'.^"pr".r; ;;;;i ,"in"vl,'lr rio..
'Eut it I am on vour side, thatls';ir ii;i;;6';; ""nservatism ino'riiirarcrry
and separating the knower trorn ih" kni,ii i
It looks as if other meanings of the craim must be getting entwined with
the one just mention"o. io, riv oi, b"e irr.r ,,to arguelhat knowredge
is social is to arg.ue .hat it ir in tird r-.ii5u! processes of reading, serecting
etc. bits of writino that we g"nerrG'Ju,. i.n.e of whatrs riterature . ..,
L ln other words pe5pte-aruitiJrirv-i*^iu"th"e titre .knowredge, in different
areas (literary, scientific, etc.) cjnl, foi I ."rtuin part of the body of work
rn each fietd. rhis. l.i:l:_it,S an'empiiicari"ili#, bliiiirlii?oo.o, ,
would guqss. at university teachers.- it-ir,,. ,, correct. then given the
power which university t6achers cJrrentiy have over i"rrooi Eurricula;
one can begin to make sometr,ing olihe';rregjtioi, .ooui"a"',hrylrarchy,
between. e. g., the ea ucitionii tl. "-oiirts'inihe u niversities a,nd teachers.
I've always considered tt'.'iJson oi-iri. tl'0" arong the most interesting
th at co nte m po ra rv soc i ot o g isii ;i ri;;*ril se rr ave-oroi u c-e-i." i:rre o n ty
pitv is that empiri'cartetrSiit,.-rr.il;i;;;, are so few. rf it is craimed
that university historians or phirolophers or whatever regisrate out
certain bona fide enquiries i, t-t.rii rr-ri,'ihun *" need to ask whatth.e
evidence for this is. At this poiiiiirru* 1""r, to be a temptation for the
sociologist to eschew pieiemeai ".piiil'.r enquiries iri favour of a
generar, a prioricraim that u"ioeri", [irii u"r.,.-".'iii"'itir"ii.l in tr..,"
present interpretation. Ilrgt tnowteoge ;i"r be sociar). Rerativism is
the obvious backi n g for trr G. sird" v"ii"nYt want to arg ue rerativisticar ry
however, what arouments _woutd i;, ;; ? b';. i;u"tNni i.hl ."l,
i *
can be proved a 6riol a oi od v6Ji#]t ur.empiricaily true of, say,
British academics today ?-MJu-r;;;i"* rs thar whether or not this
latter empiricar craim ir irriifiui,'i"li.*i"r need -not be guirty of
unfair legislation. A r,istorv olpii##.riiio go out of its way to inctude
10
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I
J
I
t
Namierites as well as Marxists, just as a philosophy department.coufd
include experts on existentialist thoughi as .w'ett'as 'on conceptual
analysis.., Being. committed to a particular form of knowledge-does not
necessarily irnply being cornmi'tted. to -a particular school'of thoughi
within that form. ln the present sense of the term, therefore, t<nowteolge
i9.nqt negesqarily "social" 1 lhoug! it.may often or always be in fact. lf
this is righti isn't the moral from this that we should woik for catnoicittT
within academic discipfines ? ,To seek to undermine them atiogethJi,
which is,the alternative.you seem to favour, seems wholly unjuitiileo. .
what of your mini-argument with which I began ? we have seoarated'/
out two meanings of the claim that'knowledge is social,:
(1) human knowledge is. built up as a result of afiempting to tackle
various perennial problems in human life. " '--':'v --
(2) schools of thought within academic disciplines are identified with
the discipline itself. , '. . ,
(1) we c.an dismiss as uncontentious. on interpretation (2) it onhl1.
follows that my position is conservative if I hotd trat ontv certain ,
Iegislated accounts of what knowledge is should continue to oominite in
academic circles. I do not hold this. The 'catholicity'view wrriCh t ao
hold does not entail conservatism. Neither does it eritail that ,cuoemL,
dictate what teachers should do. As for the "separation of the knoweiri
from the known", I don't quite know how to talie tnis onu, i umfutiili. "
Obviously the terms are logically inseparable: if something iJ known
there must be a knower and vice-versa. The'catholicity'viiw doesn;t
entail separability in this sense. But possibly you have 'ro.ething ;iie
in mind ?
Generally, do you still feel that there is anything seriously at issue
between us ? I am not at all sure that there is.
Michael Young
Let me try and reconstruct your argument. The recognition that all
knowledge is social is true but trivial-knowledge ariies from men's
attempts to tackle a variety of huma.n problems. Ttiis you *outo accepil
and go on to say "but who wouldn't ?"; and "so what l-OoeJihii
have any implications at all ?" .None,.y_ou would argue, that in any wa)1
necessarily follow-so, where is the difference between us z yoti then
go on to argue that I invoke another, for you, contingent implication of
knowledge being social; (this you predent as a k'ind of 'aciaemicit
conspiracy.theory, which. cannot be justified empirically). Having
claimed to show"that my thesis is a contingent and riot a n66essdry on6
following logicalty from the premise 'knowledge is sociat', it muitlbi
you.be empirical; in that I haven't and indeed cannot provide an
Let us go back to your statement "knowledge is built up as the result of
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-- attempts to sorve.... human probrems"., This wourd seem to rocate
knowledge in man s. activity 6 ;;rir;, better his lot, transform his
", environment, etc. This has the impiicaiion tfraioui crii.iir'tor"f.nowing
are not empiricar testabirity (excepi for those groups foiwhd; empiricar
testabiritv is criticar to their'notidns ot-hur# Gh;ile;ijl'ou't r,rr.n
betterment. we then need to .st, ooes tr,u maintenance of the separate-
ness of academic disciprines contribut; io such.an iiml'ii-vou sav it
does. then anv critique of these oiJciplir", ii ;i".atqu.ie'at{Jmpts to
solve human probrems'.can be oismlssEd as rerativisu in otherwords as
a faiture to recognise thar some toimioihu;;'k;;il.d'r%'in ror"
wavs betrer than others- Mv question i on *r,ii g;;;;;;'d;';"u. justify
these academic disciplines,' b'ecause'ir,"-v cunnot be self_justifyrng, or
erse knowredge is something otr,eithin'your.statement that I quote.
lf you don't sive your qlognos, in"n- i c.',i lJsiti;li';iy ;,j,]i. t'r,at you
are given them (the disciprines) a kino of a priori. uiexaminabre.
unchanseabre status-where th6n oia irrev "oi.,"-'iioL'l'in o*re.'
.-words I see a contradiction in -vorr irirr.nt. Either you accept the
'knowledge is sociar'.statement; ui voi rrv vou do. in which case it
fo l l ows th ar a n y knowredge m a y 6" i n', *.ti sf a ctory,attem pt, to i m p rove
the human lot-though 1t may frave wialspread credibility (in which
case it becomes a or-Lirosoph"i"r or so.iol;si;:; ;;[ i;";L;.'tion rr..,"' claims mactr for it) :'or you. 'oo ,ot,-in ri6i.r, "u..e you can ciaim a priori.
starus for forms of knowredge or academiq-dil6i;,1i";.l"oetensiote
-position.but fundamenrailv an-eritist one. |.;;i il;;;io rrUE"rtt,.t
rny.p,osition sorves things of itserf: it has as rsee it certain probrems
which might be worth dlscussing. Hum.n outt.iri;i ffi;i;ttraight_
forward, unambiguous notion. "tneviiioiv.peopre,s ioii, ti ii ait.r.
which means that questions of tnowfeOge-;ff;;#;;lisv u*
unavoidabry poriticar, both becaus" th.r-ur" resolved in practice not
theory. and because questions of varuei u,io r.inaiii;;;"iy lre'i,ivorrea.
Just a thought about,your 'cathoricity' view of academic disciprines.
The problem as far as-r can see, is trrii'it piuruppor", a commitment to
(p 11) 'a particutar form of rcnowredslr 1p{.91r;#rv IoY j[l',ii]i, vou
woutd not be catholic). which is timit-ed t.i oitrJi"nt iiniJii""nqrirv
within a form of knowredge. This ieeri io retain tor.v,irin"" Iight to
legistate a prioriwhether s-5.meon"-i. i pri"iio.* "i , aiirl[nt ."hoor ot
thought within a form, of knowredge,'-oi-outsioe the form artogether.
whv ? The question rhen is how"do vorlriiitv "uih.;iliil?i;;x in ir,
including and excruding aspects ? M;y# in terms of contriouting to .
more humane worrd-thus both catrrotii;ity ano commitm.;;;;iforrn.
of .knowtedge' thesis are themseiu"s -".iniing;;i';;;';;fl"nl on .
variety of contingent circumstances.- l- oerslonalJy *ortj-uJ"upt .
catholicitv notion and throw out a 'form of i<nowred{., onl,ii,i-u"gr", ,v
cath o I icitv wo u Id acce pt rh e r i ker i hooa otlome ;i ;i ;"ir;;'s ;""rtrui n g
a'form of knowledge'commitment. ro-ao otherwise would be to claim
that my conception of inteilectuat woitrr (*h.E.l"pr.,,'rlroJhv o,
sociolosv, etc.) had a monoporv ot trre roaas tb . uuii.r. I""iliii*r.ri"r.r
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is just the 6litist position which I would want to reject.
To return to your final point, about whether there are things seriously at
issue between us. I think there are, and potentiarty conitructiveivio.
Moreover, if there are not for either of us, I think that is far more serious,
because I do not think we could be coming to grips with each others;
arguments at all.
Footnote
of this dialogue will appear in the Spring 1976.
issue.
