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International organizations and
crisis management
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
In times of crisis, international organizations (IOs) are often called upon for help. Such crises
may have both domestic and transnational features. In 2012 the domestic revolt in Syria,
which had started the previous year, escalated and the United Nations (UN) was asked to help
work towards a permanent solution. When in 2011 the situation in Somalia caused the popu-
lation to fl ee across the border, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was
instrumental in providing shelter and food for those in need. Another example is the involve-
ment since 2008 of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
the European Central Bank (ECB) in trying to solve the ongoing European sovereign debt
crisis. The involvement of IOs in times of crisis comes as no surprise, since IOs are usually
founded to meet trans-border problems. Many governments, but also public opinion and civil
society actors, therefore naturally turn to IOs for solutions, all the more so when a situation
occurs for which no obvious intergovernmental, i.e. exclusively between states, solution
seems within reach.
Three developments cause states and other global actors to turn to IOs in ever more policy
areas: the end of the Cold War, globalization and increased regionalization. While Western
and Eastern blocs used IOs for their own ends in their Cold War battles, rendering many IOs
ineffective, after the end of the Cold War IOs increasingly came to be seen as a vehicle for
solving global problems. Globalization, particularly salient since the mid-1980s, brought
home the message that various policy issues have closely related domestic and global dimen-
sions and that problems in one area can spill over into another. For instance, the growth of
Asia’s economic strength has set in motion a drive to obtain resources in Africa. Subsequently,
the exploitation of natural resources entails consequences for the environment. Increased
regional cooperation, itself often a response to globalization, has strengthened supranational
institutions through the role of law, particularly in the EU, thereby creating a situation in
which not only member- states but also citizens can apply for ‘IO assistance’.
In this new global context, events frequently occur which are labelled a ‘crisis’, be they in
the realms of traditional security (inter- state confl ict), new security (intrastate confl ict, refu-
gees, internally displaced persons), the economy (fi nancial crisis), the environment (natural
disasters, man- made emergencies such as oil spills), health (spread of viruses) or sheer human
survival (hunger, shelter). The impact of such crises and the expectations with regard to IOs
325
IOs and crisis management
have increased because of the infl uence of (inter)national media and the development of new
information technologies such as various kinds of social media. This raises the question of
which role IOs actually play during such crises. Oddly, the literature scarcely pays systematic
attention to this matter. Although many studies of IOs discuss the role IOs play in emergency
situations, few focus on the extensive literature on crisis management and crisis decision
making. Equally, the abundant collection of crisis studies barely takes notice of IOs. This
chapter seeks to build a bridge between the two fi elds. It describes the essential concepts of
IO and crisis, identifi es the major developments in the IO and crisis literature and demon-
strates the importance of combining these fi elds of study in order to grasp the role of IOs in
today’s globalized crises.
International organizations and international crisis defi ned
The term IO is often used for what properly should be called an intergovernmental organiza-
tion. This refers to an international treaty between sovereign states establishing an organiza-
tion with specifi c agreed- upon tasks to deal with a specifi c issue, usually of a transborder
nature. It minimally comprises a collective mechanism for adopting decisions among the
member- states and a secretariat assigned to implementing these decisions. An IO thus
possesses a certain problem- solving capacity that may be relevant during international crises.
In degrees that vary across IOs, member- states have delegated their sovereign powers to the
secretariats, least so in intergovernmental bodies such as the G7/8 or G22 (Bayne and Putnam
1987) and most in the EU, where the Commission and the ECB exclusively decide upon and
implement, respectively, competition and monetary policies. Because of their international
legal status and the prominent role of states, IOs differ from non- governmental organizations,
which may be important players when IOs are involved in crisis situations.
An IO’s precise role, in fact the extent to which it possesses ‘agency’, varies a great deal
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 20–27). International organizations can act as platform, forum
or agent. Conceived of as a platform, an IO provides the stage on which member- states
display their positions to domestic or international audiences and continue their inter- state
struggles. The UN during the Cold War comes close to this description. Looked upon as a
forum, an IO is still dominated by its member- states, their preferences and their mutual
power relations, but the secretariat might serve as a broker both in tabling certain issues and
in helping member- states to fi nd acceptable solutions. Member- states may subsequently dele-
gate the implementation of these to the IO. Seen as an agent, the IO secretariat can be an
effective power player itself, sometimes even promoting international policies that confl ict
with the preferences of powerful member- states (Reinalda and Verbeek 1998). An IO may
thus play different roles in anticipating, preventing or solving an international crisis. Even a
leadership role seems possible.
Although frequently used, the term ‘international crisis’ is diffi cult to defi ne. Three issues
need to be addressed. First, objectivistic notions of crisis should be d isting uished f rom subjec-
tivistic ones. The former refer to a situation in which the researcher seeks to determine the
extent to which a social system is on the verge of collapse (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000:
4–5). When applying a subjectivistic notion, the researcher starts from the perception of
certain actors that a crisis is imminent or has occurred. This could involve a perceived threat
to the actor’s vital values and interests, a perceived uncertainty about events and their
consequences or a perceived lack of time to take decisions (Hermann 1969).
Second, what constitutes a crisis may differ between actors and across time. The literature
on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis mostly speaks of a threat to, and thus a crisis for, the United
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
326
States (US). In the Cuban perception of the crisis, however, it dates back to the 1961
US-instigated Bay of Pigs invasion and persistent rumours about a new invasion. To Cuba,
persuading the Soviet Union to install missiles was a solution to the perceived US threat
(Nathan 1992). Moreover, for some actors a perception of crisis may present an opportunity
to further their interests. One should thus be open to the possibility that an IO contributes to
the framing process which determines the dominant perspective on a crisis. Similarly, one
should remain alert to the fact that an IO may perceive a situation as a threat to, or opportu-
nity to further, its organizational interests.
Third, several terms are used interchangeably; in particular, crisis, disaster and emergency.
Disaster often refers to crisis- like situations that have their origin in natural events, such as
earthquakes and tsunamis. Emergency is often linked to a situation of human suffering that
most of the time can be explained, at least partly, by human choices, such as famine in defor-
ested or confl ict- ridden areas or the quick spread of viral diseases. For the purpose of this
chapter, all situations are relevant to the extent that various actors defi ne the situation as a
crisis, as described earlier.
Literature on international organizations: absence of crisis
The bulk of the literature on the role of IOs originates in international relations (IR) and
international law. The management literature pays little attention to international bureaucra-
cies. Until the end of the Cold War and the advent of globalization, most studies of IOs and
crises concerned their role in inter- state confl icts. Since then the emphasis has shifted to issues
of ‘new security’, in particular intrastate confl ict and its transborder repercussions. In addi-
tion, increased attention is being paid to the role of IOs in the global political economy. The
existing literature allows for some striking observations. First, the notion of crisis is hardly
ever discussed. Rather, what the problematical situation looks like is taken for granted. The
role IOs may play in defi ning and tabling a crisis is thus overlooked. This is remarkable, since
the agenda- setting capabilities of IO secretariats, even of the UN Secretary- General, have
long been recognized. Over the past decade studies of new security issues and the global
political economy have bridged this gap, through their interest in early warning systems that
IOs develop in order to anticipate major crises or monitor so- called creeping crises (e.g.
Bussiere and Fratzscher 2006).
Second, most attention is paid to the effects of IO action. This is true for studies in most
domains. Studies of IOs and inter- state crises tend to focus on an IO’s contribution to four
aspects of the relevant crisis: de- escalation and termination of the crisis, isolating the problem,
reducing its intensity and advancing a defi nitive solution (Haas 1983). The results are mixed
and diffi cult to interpret. The alleged success of the UN in contributing to a defi nitive solu-
tion to violent confl icts in Angola, Cambodia and Namibia in the 1980s seems more due to
the stalemate and the poor prospect of quick gains for the warring parties than to UN actions.
However, because the UN offered a face- saving opportunity to end hostilities, it contributed
a key element in solving these confl icts that no other global agent could provide (Berridge
1990). International organization presence in confl ict situations may help stop hostilities and
prevent the confl ict from spreading, but may thereby render a defi nitive solution more diffi -
cult when the confl ict becomes ‘frozen’, as has been the case in Cyprus since 1974 (James
1989). This suggests that IOs may not always be the solution, but can also be part of the
problem, an element that is often overlooked.
Studies of new security crises have a similar inclination to focus on IO effects. Because
superfi cially the nature of a crisis often seems obvious, there is a tendency to
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IOs and crisis management
focus on practical effectiveness; for example, providing food and shelter and disseminating
information on the risks of a pandemic. The danger of such a focus is that the problem is taken
for granted, but its political dimensions are neglected. Successfully housing and feeding refu-
gees may reinforce the status quo ‘at home’ which caused these people to seek refuge else-
where in the fi rst place. The role IOs may, or may not, play in identifying and addressing the
root causes of the problem might thus remain in the background. This cannot be said of some
of the literature on IOs and major problems in the global political economy. Here we fi nd a
scholarly debate on the extent to which IOs such as the World Bank and the IMF are them-
selves agents in a larger whole (the so- called ‘embedded liberal political economy’) and thus
may be part of the cause of regular economic and fi nancial crises, rather than the ‘fi refi ghters’
who solve these crises. Such studies often take an objectivistic approach to crisis and speak of
the crisis of the global economic system (e.g. Chorev and Babb 2009).
Third, IO studies barely pay attention to the internal dynamics during a crisis. Sometimes the
memoirs of major international civil servants give an idea of an IO’s internal policy- making
process during a crisis, but these are rare. Exceptions include UN Secretary-General Boutros-
Ghali’s (1999) account of UN decision making during the Yugoslavian civil war of the 1990s,
and former IMF Executive Director De Beaufort Wijnholds’ (2011) insider perspective on IMF
policies during the monetary crises of the 1990s and 2000s. The best academic examples include
Barnett’s (2003) description of the UN’s (lack of ) response to the imminent Rwanda genocide
in 1994. His analysis of the UN’s cognitive biases and emphasis on routine procedures served as
a stepping stone for Barnett and Finnemore’s (2004) constructivist theory of dysfunctional IOs.
Applying a ‘small group’ perspective in order to pinpoint cognitive biases, Woods (2004)
explains how IMF and World Bank teams failed to tackle the 1994 Mexican peso crisis.
Fourth, what permeates through the literature is that an IO’s authority during crises is a
very precarious and feeble asset. In general, IOs derive their authority from their mandate,
their technical expertise and observing the informal rule that they should avoid turning
member- states into their enemies. The mandate of the UN on security issues has gradually
expanded over the years. In the 1940s and 1950s the UN sometimes served as a forum for
states to display their differences during a crisis. Major states used it to put pressure on smaller
states (e.g. the US using the UN to force the Netherlands to give up the Dutch East Indies).
Many states looked upon the UN as a nuisance. After the deployment of the UN Emergency
Force to save the faces of the United Kingdom (UK) and France during the 1956 Suez Crisis,
the UN mandate was extended to include peacekeeping. Despite fi erce resistance, particu-
larly from France and the Soviet Union (because of the UN intervention in the Congo,
1960–64), this has evolved into peace enforcement and eventually the Responsibility to
Protect (R2P), which allows the UN to interfere in the domestic realm of sovereign states (in
2011, put into practice in Libya).
Although the application of R2P still requires approval by the Security Council, the
normative foundation of UN authority to act during crises has expanded widely since 1945.
It has been accompanied by a gradual increase in the authority of regional organizations,
notably the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Arab
League and the EU, which now enjoy greater authority to propose, and engage in, crisis
intervention. The expansion of the UN mandate to R2P has strengthened UN authority in
another way too. An IO’s authority is partly based on the principle that it is impartial or
neutral. This is best embodied by the International Red Cross, which cares for all victims in
a confl ict, but the principle is valid for all IOs. When IOs went against their interests,
member- states would persistently try to discredit them by accusing them of partiality. The
acceptance of peace enforcement and R2P now makes it easier for an IO to side with
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
328
threatened civilians without losing authority. However, its authority may be reduced because
of a dominant perception of IO failure, as happened during the Yugoslav civil war and the
Rwanda genocide.
Finally, IOs continue to have to avoid turning important member- states into their enemies.
From this perspective, a crisis may pose a threat to an IO’s authority and therefore to its long-
term viability, and thus may become a crisis for the IO itself. This was already obvious during
the Cold War. Fighting the Korean War (1950–53) under the UN banner and inventing the
idea of peacekeeping in 1956 incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union, provoked a major
fi nancial crisis for the UN and almost brought about its collapse. The so- called politicization
of the UN system in the 1970s and 1980s discredited this system in the eyes of its major
contributors, the US and the UK. From a principal–agent perspective, the principals (the
member- states) monitor their agents (IOs) and may decide to take back the authority they had
previously delegated to them.
Sometimes, however, the threat comes from unexpected sides, when IOs have to compete
with other IOs to maintain their authority. In the 1970s the oil crisis triggered a Western
response in the form of the Financial Support Fund, but this caused intense rivalry between
the IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (Cohen 1998).
In the 2000s the IMF was increasingly considered to be obsolete and faced competition from
new international credit facilities such as the Chiang Mai Initiative and the Fondo
Latinoamericano de Reservas. Here we come across an important general omission in the IO
literature: the tendency to not see an IO as an agent with distinct interests and preferences. In
this, the crisis literature, which focuses on ‘existential threats’, may prove relevant.
Literature on crises: absence of international organizations
Crisis management is an ill- defi ned research fi eld. This refl ects the heterogeneity of the fi eld,
with scholars scattered over a variety of different disciplines such as management studies,
organizational theory, political science and psychology (Boin 2006). The reasons for studying
crises vary accordingly. The most common perspective taken is that crisis (management) has
a value in itself as a political and societal event. Others study crises because they are external
shocks that pose challenges to established systems, and to help trigger policy reforms and
organizational learning (Baumgartner and Jones 2002). Finally, crises can be seen as more-
intense and focused forms of everyday organizational processes (Stern 2001).
On the whole, however, research addressing the characteristics of new security crises and
the role of IOs in their management is lacking. Despite an increasing interest in the trans-
boundary nature of crises and crisis management (Rhinard et al. 2006; Boin 2009; Galaz
et al. 2011), existing research mainly focuses on single crises which are managed in one
nation, policy sector or organization (Weick and Sutcliffe 2007). The dominant time perspec-
tive applied by most crisis management studies has also hampered a linking up with the IO
literature. The former describe crisis management as a sequential process taking place within
a specifi c and confi ned organization, which is expected to perform fi ve functions: early
warning, sense making, decision making, meaning making, termination and accountability
and learning (Boin et al. 2005). In contrast to the preoccupation with long- term effects in the
IO literature, crisis management research has focused on management as such and, in doing
so, has largely ignored more long- term and structural effects. Finally, the crisis management
literature has been dominated by case studies of dramatic and single events, such as the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Allison 1971), the Three Mile Island incident (Perrow 1984) and the Bhopal
gas tragedy (Shrivastava 1992).
329
IOs and crisis management
This prompts the question as to what extent fi ndings from the crisis management literature
can be applied to the organizational structure and environment of IOs. Four major insights
from crisis management have a bearing on the role of IOs during crises: centralization,
leadership, information management and learning.
The centralization hypothesis
One of the most debated issues has been the trade- off between centralized and decentralized
responses. The commonly held position amongst scholars examining crisis management,
especially in the fi eld of security studies, has been that crises tend to centralize leadership at
the highest organizational levels. Centralization has the benefi t of shortening lines of authority
and information, thus ensuring a swift response (Hermann 1963). Scholars stressing the
surprise effects inherent in crises have contested the centralization hypothesis (’t Hart 1993):
surprising events are better managed by those close to the event, who can ensure speed and
fl exibil ity. From this perspective, centralization r isk s creating bottlenecks in decision- making
procedures and information fl ows. This juxtaposition of centralization and decentralization
in current research simplifi es the complex relations inherent in individual organizations in
terms of leadership styles, mandates and structures. This is particularly true when it comes to
IOs, which display very varied characteristics with regard to these issues.
Leadership
The popularity of the centralization thesis explains the predominant interest in leaders and
their decision- making abilities during crises. The classical crisis management literature
mainly focused on the US and explored the role of the president, his advisors and the bureauc-
racy (Allison and Zelikow 1999). This strand is also characterized by cognitive research on
how stress and cognitive biases affect leaders’ decision making (Janis and Mann 1977).
Scholars who have studied the dynamics of small exclusive advisory groups have pointed to
conditions under which the advantages of technical expertise and deliberative discussion
could easily slide into dysfunctional ‘groupthink’ modes ( Janis 1982). Studies focusing on the
organizational environment of leadership point to bureau- political tendencies, which may
result in dysfunctional interagency rivalry (Rosenthal et al. 1991).
Information management
One of the key tasks of crisis managers is information management, especially in environ-
ments with many different actors. Information management can be roughly divided into
internal and external communication. The former refers to the information that actors need
to appreciate early warnings, make decisions and engage in implementation and learning.
Information fl ows depend on the institutional contexts, which range from centralized struc-
tures with controlled processes to decentralized organic responses that evolve as the crisis
unfolds (Smith 2012). Coordination is rarely the result of a leader’s deliberate attempt to
create order, but rather emerges through a system characterized by informal channels, norms,
behavioural patterns and agreements. However, in order to make such organically evolved
structures function effectively actors need to be able to identify sources of information, to be
willing to share information and to have developed a reasonable level of trust (Buzzanell
2010; Peterson and Besserman 2010). Regarding external communication, the classical crisis
communication literature has focused on rhetorical strategies aimed at reducing blame
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
330
(Coombs 2011). Coordination of information, both internally and externally, are crucial for
the ability of IOs to manage and sustain legitimacy in times of crisis. However, most studies
of crisis communication have been conducted in single organizations, mostly corporations,
rather than in multi- governance organizations such as IOs.
Learning
The crisis management literature has paid considerable attention to the lessons that may or may
not be learnt in the aftermath of a crisis. Key discussions within this fi eld have been related to
who learns and what is learnt. An often referred to distinction is between single and double loop
learning. The former relates to superfi cial changes in policies and routines, whereas the latter
invo lve s the prof ou nd a lter at ion o f p rev iou s b el ie fs a nd va lues (A rg yr is and Schö n 19 78 ). Le ar nin g
further may take place before a crisis erupts, during it or after the crisis (Smith and Elliott 2007).
Although acute crisis episodes often produce double-loop learning effects, crises happen only
rarely. Organizations thus face the challenge of fi nding ways to institutionalize such learning
effects. Behavioural learning takes place when the organization internalizes lessons through
standard operating procedures and planning documents. Cognitive learning occurs when lessons
are embedded in the minds of organization members (Deverell and Olsson 2009). Learning in
multi- level governance environments, which consist of a multitude of actors with different insti-
tutional baggage and loyalties, may raise new issues that have remained untouched so far.
International organizations and crises in the twenty- fi rst century
The meaning of security has been broadened to include many more interrelated transborder
issues than violent confl ict alone, such as climate change, transferable diseases, human rights
and depletion of resources, as was recognized in the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration. As a
result, many more events than previously can be framed as a crisis. Because globalization and
regiona lization have reduced the policy autonomy of governments, states increasingly look to
IOs to solve problems. This is a double- edged sword: success may bring praise to IOs, but
failure could put their reputation at risk. This development is reinforced by two additional
factors. The fi rst is the growing infl uence of (inter)national media, which contribute to
framing events as crises and which, by monitoring the performance of IOs, affect their
standing in the world. The second factor is the risk that IOs themselves, because of height-
ened expectations and their expanded mandates, become increasingly part of the process of
framing events as crises, thus raising the stakes for themselves as organizations.
Despite this growing IO involvement, their problem- solving capacity and leadership
potential have not always kept pace. Here the dilemma between centralization and decentrali-
zation may play a role. The agencies of IOs on the ground have developed clear emergency
scenarios, as the UNHCR has in refugee crises, while at the same time, the crisis provides a
push towards centralization of decision making, bringing IO leadership to the fore. At such
moments the IO’s reputation will be at stake. Its leadership will then walk a tightrope, as it
needs to act effectively on the ground without alienating its major member- states. It is thus
vital that an IO portrays itself as a neutral, impartial actor, better yet as a technical problem
solver, rather than as an actor who through its choices can be accused of taking sides. However,
this need to avoid partiality may hamper timely and effective operations on the ground.
In this chapter, we identify three potential trajectories for future research to merge the IO
and crisis management literature: the symbolic dimension of crisis, power struggles during
crises and learning processes.
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IOs and crisis management
The symbolic dimension of crisis
The rise of a new communication landscape characterized by an increase in non- state actors,
global transparency and interconnectedness makes the symbolic aspects of crisis management
more salient than ever before. Globalization has increased the proneness to crises of contem-
porary global politics: effects are felt more rapidly and stakeholders expect quick and effective
responses from policy makers. These conditions contribute to a sense of urgency and time
pressure. In such circumstances, turning to an IO can be an effective strategy for policy
makers so as to convey the impression of decisiveness (Boin et al. 2005). However, it leaves
IOs with the huge task of dealing with a crisis while facing high expectations. Thus, the
engagement of IOs in crises is a double- edged sword, as it leaves them in a position where
they will be either blamed or praised. For example, the European Commission, as a suprana-
tional regulative body, is particularly vulnerable to blame games from the member- states
when things go wrong (Hood 2002). During the 1990s the Commission under Jacques Santer
faced a series of scandals related to mismanagement, among other things for its management
of the BSE (mad cow disease) crisis, eventually forced its resignation.
Crises do not only constitute a threat, but, when managed and framed successfully, they
can also be an opportunity to gain political legitimacy and to push through pet policies (Boin
et al. 2009). From an IO perspective, well- managed crises are likely to boost reputation,
provide additional resources and strengthen mandates. For example, during the 2003 SARS
crisis, the World Health Organization (WHO) managed to turn the challenge posed by a
non- focal, multi- country outbreak of a hitherto unknown disease into an organizational
success, by framing the crisis as a severe threat and pushing non- compliant member- states
into releasing information and cooperating. Similarly, the European Commission eventually
managed to turn the BSE debacle into an institutional achievement: three years after the BSE
crisis, the common market caused a new food safety crisis, when inadequate controls in the
animal feed industry exposed the food chain in Belgium to dioxin. This time, the Comm ission
took all measures available to respond in a speedy and resolute manner, perceiving the crisis
as an opportunity to prove that it could face up to the situation and take action. Afterwards,
a Commission representative judged that the dioxin crisis ‘was not a real health crisis [most
of the contaminated food had already been consumed by that time] but a crisis of confi dence
and therefore the Commission had to react as if it was a real crisis’ (Olsson 2005: 138). In
doing so, the Commission managed to use the crisis as a way of promoting its institutional
value as the defender of a properly functioning common market. Crises thus play an impor-
tant role in understanding ‘the ongoing processes of legitimization, de- legitimization and
re- legitimization’ (’t Hart 1993: 40). In an era of globalization and media- zation the framing
abilities of IOs become essential in the processes of acquiring the legitimization needed to
continue to be an actor who can be counted on. International organizations will then be
crucial actors not only for managing crises, but also for defi ning events as crises.
However, IOs do not always exploit opportunities to promote their self- interest. For
example, in the 1990s the UNHCR had a chance to expand its mandate, but chose not to. The
organization was formally responsible for giving shelter to refugees, i.e. individuals who cross
national borders. When so- called failed states, such as Sudan, suddenly had massive numbers
of internally displaced persons, the UNHCR had the opportunity to obtain a formal expan-
sion of its mandate and indeed was invited to do so by some of its major member- states. The
organization was internally divided and in the end opted for a pragmatic solution, in deciding
to help internally displaced people on a case- by-case basis (Freitas 2004). This example makes
it clear that understanding an IO also requires looking into its internal power struggles.
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
332
The struggle for power
The crisis management literature suggests that, at heart, crises are political events dominated
by power struggles and politicization (Boin et al. 2005). How such battles are played out
depends on many factors, including organizational and leadership dynamics. When looking
at the role IOs play in crises, their mandates provide the basic structure for their ability to
operate in a crisis. However, for a fuller insight, the incorporation of informal practices
embedded in their organizational culture is required.
In general, the crisis management literature highlights organizationa l aspects such as deci-
sion making and information processing, which can contribute to a better understanding of
an IO’s real capacity to act in times of crisis. Crises provide good opportunities to examine ad
hoc responses, personal contacts and informal practices. International organizations are of
particular interest here due to their complex structures, with secretariats, expert involvement
and member- state infl uences. In the IO environment, we can expect bureau- political
struggles to take place between IOs and member- states, between member- states themselves
and between IOs, but also within the various departments of the IO. The character and
outcome of these processes have important implications for how crises are framed and
managed. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had developed a
standard operating procedure with regard to peacekeeping that prevented it from appreci-
ating the warning signals sent by UN peacekeepers in Rwanda in 1994 that genocide was
about to take place. Instead, DPKO stuck to its idea of ‘normal ethnic unrest’ and its rule
never to take sides but remain receptive to all parties involved (Barnett and Finnemore
2004: 121–55).
There is limited knowledge on centralization and decentralization processes and how
these impact on IOs’ capacities to take action (for the EU see Boin and Rhinard 2008). Is
power centralized by member- states tightening control and infl uence, leaving IOs to
function merely as platforms, or is power decentralized, providing room for manoeuvre for
IOs to take on an agent role? Further, which circumstances give rise to centralization versus
decentralization and with what effects? For example, the European Commission has a
well- developed system of committees consisting of national experts who provide expertise on
technical issues. These committees serve as a link between the Council and the Commission
and provide forums for negotiation, often characterized by technical rather than politicized
approaches to various policy problems. There are three types of executive committee:
consultative (which can only consult on issues), administrative (which can block decisions)
and prescriptive (with the power to approve decisions). During the 1999 dioxin scandal the
prescriptive Standing Veterinary Committee consisting of member- state experts played an
important role, not foremost as experts, but rather as political member- state representatives in
the crisis decision- making process.
Other examples show how IOs can take leadership roles in times of crisis. One of the
reasons for the WHO’s success during the SARS crisis was that it managed to put interna-
tional political and economic pressure on non- compliant member- states such as China. The
WHO’s travel advice for Hong Kong and Guangdong forced China into action and resulted
in cases being reported on a national basis. By independently issuing this travel advice, the
WHO took a leadership role, which was a break with previous practices when such measures
were taken in concert with affected countries. A large part of the WHO’s success over the last
decade can be attributed to new information technologies, used for early warning, thus estab-
lishing its independence from offi cial governmental reports (Galaz 2009). Instead of passively
waiting for governments to provide the organization with information, the new legally
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IOs and crisis management
binding International Health Regulations (IHR), launched in 2000, gave the WHO the
mandate to work proactively and independently in collecting information. An important
component of the proactive approach was the setting up of GOARN, the Global Outbreak
Alert and Response Network (Van Baalen and Van Fenema 2009).
In order to manage crises effectively, IOs ultimately depend on their member- states’ will-
ingness and resources. For example, the European Commission can use its regulative power,
but has no resources of its own and depends on member- states to act in accordance with its
decisions. In the same way, the WHO depends on its member- states for implementation.
Even though the management of SARS was considered a success, it also highlighted a system
that ultimately depends on member- states’ ability and willingness to respond to a public
health threat. In this specifi c case, Canada lacked the capacity to do so and China lacked
willingness. Thus the potential mismatch between member- states’ local decision- making
capacities and the IO level, which requires coherence, may constitute the largest challenge to
an IO’s effectiveness during a crisis.
Learning and reforming
Crises do not end abruptly, but most often are followed by lengthy processes during which
responsibility is assigned and reforms are undertaken. However, which lessons to draw and
which reforms to implement remains a strategic process. In line with the notion of crisis
exploitation, crises can provide a powerful rationale for promoting certain reforms and
refuting others (James et al. 2011). For example, SARS functioned as a trigger for speeding
up the process of revising the IHR, which were fi nalized in 2005. Under the new IHR,
WHO members have the responsibility to develop and maintain the capacity to detect, report
and respond effectively. SARS was thus a milestone in the process leading from state- centric
responses to a WHO-centred global health governance structure. Similarly, the UN’s impo-
tence in preventing genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the 1990s resulted in
the development and adoption of the R2P principle in 2005. The international community
now has, under certain conditions, an obligation to act to protect civilians (which has raised
expectations regarding IOs).
Reforms and institutional change do not necessarily entail true learning. First, learning in
multi- level structures is complicated due to the number of actors involved. Different actors
are likely to draw different lessons from the same crisis. Second, learning puts high demands
on organizational openness and trust, which hardly ever exist in highly politicized contexts
dominated by prestige, high political stakes and blame games (Smith and Elliott 2007). For
example, in the wake of the food crises during the 1990s the European Commission seized
the opportunity to launch a proposal to set up a joint European supranational food agency.
Eventually its proposal was watered down to establishing an advisory agency, with the main
responsibility for food safety remaining at national level. Similarly, the R2P principle has
introduced the possibility for the international community to intervene in strictly
domestic situations. As a consequence it can be expected that IOs will be more involved in
domestic issues in the future, risking a backlash from member- states seeking to reassert
control. Indeed, when the UN Security Council in 2011 invoked R2P to condone a no- fl y
zone over Libya in order to protect Libyan civilians, China and Russia were incensed
when, much to their chagrin, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization interpreted the
mandate as a licence to remove the Gaddafi regime from power. As a result China and Russia
throughout 2012 persisted in their refusal to adopt a similar resolution with regard to the
Syrian civil war.
Eva-Karin Olsson and Bertjan Verbeek
334
Conclusion
One observation stands out: it is high time that the IO and the crisis management literature
met. International organizations are often involved in global and local crises, and their
involvement can only be expected to increase. Moreover, they are organizations that operate
in politically highly sensitive settings, yet often have the capacity to deal with acute problems
on the ground. The crisis management literature has long studied organizations similar to
IOs, but only rarely investigated IOs themselves. They thus miss the unique aspects of
organizations operating in an inter- state environment. Similarly, the IR literature has
refrained from accessing the crisis management library, at the expense of ignoring interesting
organizational inroads that could be made into explaining IOs’ behaviour. Both disciplines
can profi t from each other’s expertise. International relations studies can obtain a better
grasp of IO crisis performance by investigating the centralization–decentralization paradox
recognized in the crisis management literature. Similarly, they might come closer to a better
understanding of the conditions of IO leadership: crises provide a window of opportunity to
be decisive, show effectiveness and thus gain reputation. The IR literature also should be
open to the possibility that IOs may not be mere agents responding to a crisis, or states’
instruments to respond to a crisis, but may themselves contribute to the framing of an event
as a crisis.
The crisis management literature might profi t from IR studies, particularly by appreci-
ating the specifi c implications of an inter- state environment. This context causes an IO to
develop standard operating procedures and cognitive biases that are closely related to the
notion of sovereign states. Future research should be directed at assessing to what extent these
factors (centralization–decentralization, IO leadership, the context of the inter- state system)
vary across crises in different issue areas (the spread of diseases may well provoke different
outcomes to the occurrence of genocide). A s IOs ca n be expected to be i nvolved i n ever more
global and local crises, knowledge of such variation will be vital.
Recommended for further reading
Terry (2002), Barnett and Finnemore (2004), Boin et al. (2005) and Boin et al. (2013).
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