Seven Decades of ‘Development’, and Now What?

Abstract

Year 2015 is slated as a year of transformation to address unprecedented political, ecological, social, gender and economic inequities. UN negotiations are underway to produce new sustainable development goals (SDGs). The paper argues that ideas matter in the conceptualisation of development agendas, which in turn depend on power constellations within and between the first UN—the member states, the second UN—the UN secretariat and agencies, and the third UN—civil society. The paper tracks past development decades and examines whether the SDGs can and will be as visionary as the UN Charter adopted in 1945, which created moral pressure for institutional and policy change. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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SEVEN DECADES OF ‘DEVELOPMENT’,
AND NOW WHAT?
GABRIELE KOEHLER*
Munich, Germany
Abstract: Year 2015 is slated as a year of transformation to address unprecedented political,
ecological, social, gender and economic inequities. UN negotiations are underway to produce new
sustainable development goals (SDGs). The paper argues that ideas matter in the conceptualisation
of development agendas, which in turn depend on power constellations within and between the first
UN—the member states, the second UN—the UN secretariat and agencies, and the third UN—civil
society. The paper tracks past development decades and examines whether the SDGs can and will be
as visionary as the UN Charter adopted in 1945, which created moral pressure for institutional and
policy change. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Keywords: MDGs; SDGs; development; policies; three UNs
‘Important and costly measures are taken after a disaster. There are few exceptions to
this rule.’(Emmerij et al., 2001: 173)
Genuine shift in policy does not happen unless there is ‘a fundamental alteration in
global power relations or crises out of which new institutional forms are forged’
(Hulme & Wilkinson, 2014: 182)
‘The stars are aligned for the world to take historic action to transform lives and
protect the planet.’(UN SG, 2014: 7)
The political stakes are high, but so are the opportunities –perhaps once–in–a–
generation –for genuine transformation. (Adams & Luchsinger, 2015: 1)
1 SEVEN DECADES OF ‘DEVELOPMENT’
Year 2015 is often presented as the year for genuine transformation. But genuine
transformation needs considerable pressure, a disaster that shakes the confidence of the
*Correspondence to: Gabriele Koehler, Habsburger Platz 6, 80801 Munich, Germany.
E-mail: gkoehler50@hotmail.com
Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of International Development
J. Int. Dev. 27, 733–751 (2015)
Published online in Wiley Online Library
(wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/jid.3108

international community, or a radical shift in power constellations. Could 2015 become the
year in which the world community becomes aware of the crisis—or even—disaster facing
humanity and the planet in terms of unprecedented political, ecological, social, gender and,
last but not least, economic inequities? Are power constellations realigning? Is this a
situation similar to the one 70 years ago, when those countries that had voice at the time
coalesced to create a more humane international order, establishing the United Nations
(UN) in reaction to the social and economic chaos of the Great Depression and the
unspeakable horrors of World War II?
1
Or more optimistically, as the UN Secretary General
(SG) remarked in a recent report: are ‘The stars …aligned for the world to take historic
action to transform lives and protect the planet’(UN SG, 2014: 7)? Whether shaken by
the disaster of profound inequity, or enlightened by an opportunity for a stellar multilateral
commitment, the question is whether a fundamental policy shift will materialise in 2015.
The UN’s founding remit was to create peace, well-being and economic stability. The
UN Charter, adopted in 1945, has human rights and dignity at its heart and covers all
aspects of what then was termed ‘social progress and better standards of life’—today
generally termed in concepts of human development or well-being. The Charter’s article
55 encapsulates a vision of
‘higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social
progress and development; solutions of international economic, social, health and
related problems; and universal respect for and observance of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion’
(UN, 1945).
The goals of the Charter were visionary at a time when many societies were colonies and
oppressed, many economies war-ravaged or exploited, and the majority of the world’s
population was confronted with hunger, poverty, unemployment, a lack of decent housing
and restricted access to health and education. The Charter goals created moral pressure for
institutional and policy change.
We are now in seventh decade of development agendas launched by the UN system,
which all should be measured against those aspirations of the UN Charter. Development
agenda setting began with the analyses and early development cooperation activities of
the UN in the 1950s. These were followed by four international development decades,
two poverty eradication decades (PEDs) and a 15-year millennium development goal
(MDG) agenda.
Unfolding currently is a second 15-year development agenda—which for the first time
seeks to address the world as a whole and moves away from a developed-developing country
schism. As a coincidental result of global conference choreography, six major multilateral
processes are underway in 2015. These are the review of the MDGs andthe conceptualisation
of a new development agenda: a reconfirmation of the Beijing Platform of Action (Beijing
plus 20), the climate change negotiations, a commitment to complete the Doha Round of
international trade negotiations, the discussions on financing for development and UN reform
(Women’s Major Group, 2015; Mackie & Williams, 2015).
2
Ideally, these six strands would
converge, normatively, conceptually and policy-wise, in the proposed new development
1
The creation of the League of Nations in 1919 was a similar, powerful reaction to an immense disaster—World
War I.
2
The UN secretariat and the President of the GA tend to refer to only three of these processes: Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), financing for development and climate change. See, for example, http://www.un.
org/pga/190115_statement-stocktaking-session-post-2015/
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agenda. That would mean that all the bases of sustainable human development in dignity
would be covered. But at thismoment, it is unclear whether the agenda willbe comprehensive
and ambitious and meet its transformative remit; it is even unclear, whether it will be adopted
in a meaningful form such as a UN general assembly (GA) resolution. That will depend on
inter-country dynamics and the constellation among ‘the three UNs’—the member states,
the UN secretariat and civil society.
Why would a ‘good’, transformative development agenda even matter? UN
resolutions are not binding; they merely mature into soft law if a sufficient number
of countries follow the proclaimed principles. The reason this paper looks into
development agendas comes from the assumption that ideas do matter, and
accordingly, it is important which ideas are put forward in international discussions
and which ideas, at least at the aspirational level, guide policy decisions. The UN
secretariat has the remit to act on the ideational plane, even if final texts are whittled
down as they are negotiated.
The paper concentrates on intent: the conceptual and policy content of the successive
development agendas and the goals they have formulated over the past seven decades of
development. It finds a remarkable linearity in the development agenda texts, with
seemingly piecemeal changes from one decade to the next—that then surprisingly result
in a completely different agenda at the end of the line.
But of course, it would be Hegelian, or simply naive, to restrict oneself to the ideational
level. Real-world economic and political power functions as a gatekeeper that determines
which ideas are presented in the international arena in the first place. This process is a
function of interactions and power relations among the three UNs and subsets within these.
The defining texts that agreed in the development decades are not simply a result of North–
South divides in the first UN. They are shaped by internal dynamics within member states
of the North and the South, respectively, constellations within the UN secretariat and
power relations within the third UN. Moreover, the interface, relations and power
constellations between the first, second and third UNs and their changing sub-components
over time influence negotiated outcomes. In other words, they are subject to the internal
dynamics of each UN as well as the dynamics among them.
Moreover, real-world politics is what ultimately decides which ideas and policy choices
are deemed acceptable, taken to heart and, in some fashion, implemented. The paper
therefore also explores the context in which development decades are negotiated and
adopted.
3
It looks at the shifting influence of the actors that make up the UN community.
Following Jolly et al. (2009), one can distinguish three UNs. The ‘first UN’is the
member states of the UN, ‘an arena in which states pursue their national interests’
(Emmerij et al., 2001: 118); the ‘second UN’is the UN secretariat and the UN agencies,
with their heads of agency and staff. The ‘third UN’refers to affiliated but independent
players who influence UN thinking as well as decisions—non-governmental organisations
(NGOs), external experts, scholars, consultants, independent commissions and other
individuals who regularly engage with the UN (Weiss & Jolly 2009; Jolly et al., 2009:
32–37). Increasingly, the business community or private sector is considered as a part of
this third UN.
4
The underlying perspective of this paper is that the interface and the power
relations between the three UNs, and subsets within these groups, ultimately determine
how ‘real’an agenda becomes internationally.
3
A third level would logically be the outcomes of such decisions. They are, however, beyond the scope of this
paper.
4
This has not gone uncontested.
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The paper is divided into four sections. The first looks at the four international
development decades, which resembled each other intellectually. The second looks at
the ‘interlude’of the social summit plan of action and its PEDs and the MDGs, which
marked a gradual departure from a Keynesian and ‘statist’approach. The third section
explores the emerging new development agenda—the SDGs. For each phase, the paper
sketches the concepts and underlying economic theories, and the political circumstances
that accompanied each. In a closing section, it makes a guess how the current political
and economic constellation might play out. Against the background of the long history
of development agendas, the paper assesses whether, in 2015, a transformational shift—
promised in various statements regarding the next development agenda (High-level Panel
Report, HLPR, 2013; UN SG, 2014)—is possible, given the state of play within and
among the three UNs.
2 THE FIRST DEVELOPMENT ERA AND ITS CLEAR AGENDA
Conventionally, reviews of development agendas begin in the early 1960s, when the UN
announced the development decade, and many development cooperation agencies were
created within the UN system and in governments (Köhler, 1996; Stokke, 2009). However,
development work had actually already begun in the 1950s. This ‘decade zero’derived
from the UN Charter, notably its preamble and article 55 mentioned earlier. As early as
1951, the UN Secretariat commissioned a study on ‘Measures for the economic
development of underdeveloped countries’(UN, 1951; Emmerij et al., 2001: 175; Jolly,
2005). Its starting point was the immense unemployment and underemployment in
developing countries, and its object the government policies needed to reduce these. The
publication addressed the concentration of land ownership and placed a focus on the need
for public finance to fund education, health and other public services. Economic growth,
productivity and technology were identified as keys to development, leading to a call for
increases in savings and capital formation (Emmerij et al., 2001: 32–34). Easily
recognisable, the analysis is based in the Keynesian approach, which was the unrivalled
economic theory of the era. It informed policies pursued at that time in and by the major
powers, the US and UK, in the re-emerging post-fascist countries, such as Germany or
Japan, and in the newly independent countries of the South. In the Soviet Union, arguing
from a Marxist background, there was a similar statist and capital formation orientation.
Because of the pre-eminence of Keynesian thinking, there was a certain degree of
convergence among ‘first’and ‘second’UN and the intellectuals of the ‘third UN’in the
1950s, and differences were around theoretical nuances, not about policy applications.
Thus, despite some controversies over theory within the UN secretariat and among
reviewers (Toye & Toye, 2004), the then predominance of the UN as an intellectual leader
enabled the report’s rapid dissemination.
This and related publications also set the analytical stage for all of the subsequent,
development decades, which, however, over time whittled down the core objectives of
employment and economic development.
By the late 1950s, early 1960s, the international policymaking context had changed. The
dynamics of anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist movements created a set of newly
independent countries with strong cohesion politically and common economic interests.
They also benefited tactically from the East–West tensions. Numerically, UN membership
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doubled from 51 countries in 1945 to 100 in 1960. The new nations coalesced
economically and politically around the Bandung agreement, and governments were
driven by a commitment to ‘development’. In the industrialised countries, there was a
mixture of guilt over the effects of colonialism and a self-interest in preparing and opening
new markets. Thus, there was a compulsion from both from the South and the North to pay
attention to development.
As a result of these dynamics, the development decade, adopted by the UN GA in 1961,
was led by the UN secretariat, but in coalition with the US government, which was keen, at
that time, to be in control of UN activities. The pertaining resolution was adopted despite
the cold war context, thanks to the pressure from the newly established ‘developing
countries’. The idea of introducing a global framework has been described as ‘ahead of
its time’(Emmerij et al., 2001: 45; 48; Stokke, 2009: 157ff).
The declared objective of that first development decade was to help low-income
countries achieve ‘development’—within one decade. Like the publication on measures
for economic development, it reflected a Keynesian approach to development, putting
much emphasis on economic growth—aspiring to a minimum annual growth rate of
5% in aggregate national income—and introducing interventions to transfer capital from
developed to developing (‘underdeveloped’) countries. It placed the onus of
development on the state, with objectives such as the maximum mobilisation of domestic
resources; the formulation of development plans for social as well as economic
development; the improvement of administrative machinery and incentives for effective
implementation; a redirection of science and technology to focus on national problems;
an increase of export earnings through the increase of manufactured and semi-
manufactured goods; and an increase flow of capital to developing countries (UN GA,
1960; UN Intellectual History Project, 2010). But the decade also noted the importance
of ‘well-being and happiness not only of the present generation but also of the
generations to come’(UN GA, 1970, art 4).
Surprising to a 2015 reader is the implicit assumption conveyed by that first
decade’s document that ‘development’would be achievable within a decade. Indeed,
planning for a second development decade began already in the mid-1960s (Stokke,
2009: 155). Economic growth achieved the 5% target in a fair number of low-income
countries by the late 1960s but was considered insufficient (Jolly et al., 2009: 259;
Stokke 2009: 156f).
The UN GA announced a second international development decade in 1970 (Stokke,
2009: 157 ff). Conceptually, it was similar to but more extensive than the first. It
reconfirmed macroeconomic growth targets but at an accelerated rate of 6% per annum
and 3.5% per capita. It again made the case for development planning and the
improvement of administrative machinery (UN GA, 1970). Like the first decade, it
was also about achieving ‘well-being and happiness not only of the present generation
but also of the generations to come’(UN GA, 1970, art 4). The decade document
included ‘social’goals—employment, education, health, nutrition and participation. It
noted that ‘The ultimate objective of development must be to bring about sustained
improvement in the well-being of the individual and bestow benefits on all’
(UN GA, 1970, art 7). Gender equality was a distinct component. Conversely, poverty
is mentioned only once.
For the conceptual lineage of development decades, it is useful to note the social policy
components of the early development decades, because the MDGs have at times been
presented as having been the first to introduce this issue—the MDGs merely paid more
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attention to the social dimensions of development, but they did not discover social policy.
5
Similarly, the notion of sustainable development—at times erroneously portrayed as a
notion created in the Rio plus 20 Conference in 2012—surfaced in the 1970 development
decade, which in turn influenced the UN conference on the human environment in
United Nations (1972) (Emmerij et al., 2001).
6
And in 1974, the UN GA adopted the
new international economic order (NIEO; UN GA, 1974), which called for a radical
readjustment in global trade, investment and capital flows. In effect, it called for equity
between nations—albeit using different languages. Fast forwarding to the SDGs, they,
after a long silence, echo that concern but without referring to the NIEO.
The third UN development decade (1981–1990; UN GA, 1980) reiterated the demand
for a NIEO and institutional and structural changes in international economic relations
(UN GA, 1980, art 17; Stokke, 2009: 174f). For the first time, there was an explicit call
for the eradication of poverty (art 7) and hunger (art 93), and a commitment to food
security (art 86). It raised the issue of a ‘fair distribution of benefits’(art 43). As its
predecessors, it features an extensive section on policy measures (art 52 to 168), covering
international trade, industrialization, food and agriculture, energy, transport, financial
resources for development—and, as a new feature—the regulation of transnational
corporations. It continues the tradition of quantified goals, such as a 7% average annual
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate; a 7.5% annual rate of expansion of exports;
or a gross domestic savings to reach 24% of GDP by 1990 (UN GA, 1980).
The decade text dedicated a section to environmental and ecological soundness and the
funding of environmental management (art 156 f). It also called for a rapid increase in
official development assistance, citing the 0.7% official development assistance (ODA)/
gross national product goal that had been introduced in 1970. Other goals and objectives
5
In fact, similarities between the second development decade and the MDGs are striking, although these never
referred to the development decade texts:
(1) Each developing country should formulate its national employment objectives so as to absorb an increasing
proportion of its working population in modern-type activities and to reduce significantly unemployment and
underemployment.
(2) Particular attention should be paid to achieving enrolment of all children of primary school age, improvement
in the quality of education at all levels, a substantial reduction in illiteracy, the reorientation of educational
programmes to serve development needs and, as appropriate, the establishment and expansion of scientific
and technological institutions.
(3) Each developing country should formulate a coherent health programme for the prevention and treatment of
diseases and for raising general levels of health and sanitation.
(4) Levels of nutrition should be improved in terms of the average caloric intake and the protein content, with
special emphasis being placed on the needs of vulnerable groups of population.
(5) Housing facilities should be expanded and improved, especially for the low-income groups and with a view
to remedying the ills of unplanned urban growth and lagging rural areas.
(6) The well-being of children should be fostered.
(7) The full participation of youth in the development process should be ensured.
(8) The full integration of women in the total development effort should be encouraged.Resolution adopted by
the General Assembly 2626 (XXV). International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations
Development Decade http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2626.htm
6
The 1994 Human Development Report worked with the terms sustainable human development and sustainable
development (UNDP, 2014: 13 ff.)
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of the strategy were to attain, by the year 2000, full employment, universal primary school
enrolment
7
and a life expectancy of 60 years as a minimum, with infant mortality rates no
higher than 50 per 1000 live births (UN Encyclopaedia). Conceptually and in its policy
recommendations, it was the most elaborate and aggressive of the development decades.
Unfazed by the lack of convincing progress in economic development, as defined in its
own terms, and despite the end of the cold war and the complete change in the international
political and ideological environment, in 1990, the UN GA adopted the international
development strategy for the fourth UN development decade (1991–2000). It appears as
the last of the proclaimed development decades. It tenaciously remained overall Keynesian
in its policy orientation. The resolution committed
‘to speed up the pace of economic growth in the developing countries; devise a
development process that meets social needs, reduces extreme poverty significantly,
develops and uses people’s capacity and skills, and is environmentally sound and
sustainable; improve the international systems of money, finance, and trade;
strengthen and stabilize the world economy and establish sound macroeconomic
management practices, nationally and internationally’(UN GA, 1990).
It called for the eradication of poverty, hunger, adult illiteracy and lack of basic
education for women and addressed ‘runaway population growth’in developing
countries. It again contained the notion of ‘sustainable’development and noted the
catastrophic deterioration of the environment by short-sighted development projects
(UN Encyclopaedia).
Poverty and sustainability became more central to the argument; growth remained the
means to achieve this. It argued this would require strenuous efforts to increase domestic
savings, raise investment and investment returns, hold down inflation, exercise monetary
and fiscal discipline, maintain realistic exchange rates and allocate resources more
efficiently. It also recommended that developing countries try to raise their rate of
industrialization by 8–10% and increase their annual food production by 4%. All of these
are policies addressing the role of the state. Presaging the MDGs, the decade also called for
‘outcome-oriented national strategies and programs’and time-bound targets for poverty
reduction. It reiterated the ODA target of 0.7% (UN Encyclopaedia).
In sum, the four development decades were largely identical to each other with respect
to their underlying economic theory, but poverty and the environment enjoyed increasing
attention in their evolution. Did these ideas matter? And what were the power dynamics
that underpinned the particular policy stance of these development decades?
In 1970, another 26 countries had achieved political independence, become nation
states, and staked their claims in the UN and the GA. They cohered around the need for
what today might be termed affirmative action to redress the outcomes of colonialism
and imperialism. A Keynesian notion of a strong role for the state, and the need for growth,
investment surges, and redistribution matched this requirement well. The industrialised
world too had recovered from wartime devastation and destruction, in general with a
reliance on Keynesian macroeconomic policies. For them, post-war reconstruction had
resulted in economic booms with high investment, innovation surges and good GDP
growth rates. Thus, in the early 1970s, the developing countries were at the height of their
geopolitical power, while the industrialised world was ready to make political concessions
7
The employment goal was watered down substantially in the MDGs and universal primary school enrolment
postponed to 2015.
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to the ‘third world’. It was hence not difficult to adopt progressive aspirations and
emphasise the role of government. The Keynesian bent corresponded to mainstream theory
applied by most governments.
The tables turned in the course of the 1970s, however (Toye, 1987). The oil price tripled
in the early 1970s. There was a global recession and considerable levels of inflation. A debt
crisis struck especially the oil importers among the new nations. The least developed
countries formed a separate grouping in 1971, highlighting the divergent interests among
the countries of the South, in part symbolised by the creation of Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries. By the 1980s, globalisation driven by the interests of large
corporations began to take hold (Jomo, 2006). Income inequality began increasing
drastically at this time (Emmerij et al., 2001: 173; Piketty, 2014). The 1980s saw the
gradual emergence of powerful corporate interests. Corporate globalisation (Roy, 2005)
or ‘globalisation under hegemony’(Jomo, 2006) shaped the need to dismantle barriers
to international trade, foreign direct investment, international finance or intellectual
property rights—in short, a new international economic governance emerged (Jomo,
2006) quite contrary to the one envisaged by the NIEO, and not in sync with a Keynesian,
statist view on economic development requirements.
As a result of the changes in power relations within the first UN, by the 1990s,
neoliberalism in economic and development policy thus became the predominant ideology.
In the arena of theories, the economic crises were increasingly attributed to what was now
considered misguided Keynesian policy; it was blamed for the debt crisis, inflation and the
lack of economic growth. A backlash against government interventionism led to electoral
majorities for conservative parties in the US and the UK. Their economic allegiances
ushered in the neoliberal counter-revolution (Toye, 1987; Emmerij et al., 2001: 120).
Increasingly, over the 1980s, the industrialised countries shifted decisions on
economic development, policymaking and financial support to the International financial
institutions (IFIs) where they have more direct control, because of capital-based voting
structures. The UN system did not receive and does not have the means to provide
adequate technical, let alone financial, support to developing countries. The IFIs in turn
played a role in ‘dramatically promoting economic globalisation’(Jomo, 2006: 17)—at
terms which were not a priori in the interest of the South.
By the early 1990s, the independence movements in and dissolution of the Soviet Union
further tilted international dynamics to the North and to an economically conservative
neoliberalism. Politically, there was a further weakening of the developing countries, as
the collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the geopolitical power of the West, removed
the East–West bargaining chip, and appeared to justify anti-statist and anti-Keynesian
policy positions.
All of these trends gradually led to a weakening of developing country power, combined
with a retraction from Keynesian economics. Despite the changing international
ideological environment, the UN secretariat—the second UN—and the GA stuck to their
Keynesian outlook. This persistence can be considered as a good thing, if one agrees that,
without a productivist approach and without placing employment and decent work at the
centre of development policy, the income and wealth gaps between rich and poor people
within countries, and the productivity gaps among countries, will never be breached
(Chang, 2002; Gore, 2013; Montes, 2015 forthcoming). However, the tenacity with which
ideas which were no longer mainstream were upheld further removed the second UN from
its original ideational leadership. This is because ideas alone, without real-world power
backing, do not carry the day.
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3 THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT ERA AS A STEPPING STONE
The Keynesianist fourth development decade was still in place, nominally, while a second
strand began to emerge in international development agenda setting. A series of UN summits
during the 1990s marked a return, at the second UN, to a more explicit call for social—as
opposed to simply economic—justice and human rights, ideals from the UN Charter, which
had been obscured during the decades of the Cold War. But this period also ushered in a
gradual move towards a neoliberal approach. Of these summits, the Copenhagen Social
Summit of 1995 can be seen as a stepping stone—between the productivist approaches of
the development decades and the market-oriented approach of the MDGs.
The Social Summit forcefully argued for the expansion of productive employment and
reduction of unemployment,
8
in addition to a strong and much needed focus on social
development, gender equality, environmental concerns and social integration (UN, 1995:
29ff). Human rights and the eradication of poverty became featured elements of the
strategy.
But the Summit’s plan of action illustrates the turning tide. On the one hand, it posits that
‘Poverty
9
is inseparably linked to lack of control over resources, including land,
skills, knowledge, capital and social connections. …The eradication of poverty
cannot be accomplished through anti-poverty programmes alone but will require
democratic participation and changes in economic structures in order to ensure
access for all to resources, opportunities and public services, to undertake policies
geared to more equitable distribution of wealth and income, to provide social
protection for those who cannot support themselves, and to assist people confronted
by unforeseen catastrophe, whether individual or collective, natural, social or
technological’(UN, 1995: 42).
It also situates productive work and employment as ‘central elements of development as
well as decisive elements of human identity…. Adequately and appropriately remunerated
employment is an effective method of combating poverty and promoting social integration’
(UN, 1995: 57). The action plan, very much like the development decades, conveys a
detailed list of policy measures to address income generation, urban and rural poverty.
However, the solutions presented rely on the market, on self-employment and on
microlevel measures such as microcredit, as opposed to active labour market policies or
the much-needed restructuring of international economic systems. It gives the impression
that it accepts globalisation: it is does not seek to fundamentally alter the patterns of
dependence, as was the case with the earlier development decades. The document elevates
basic social services to a keystone in anti-poverty processes. There is a shift to safety nets
10
8
To understand the ‘Copenhagen’position, it is necessary to note that the Summit was initiated and led by the
International Labour Organization (ILO), explaining the strong focus on employment. It is also noteworthy that
the 1994 UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Report, which was directed very much
at the World Summit on social development, elaborated the notion of sustainable development. The terms human
development and the concept of human security, featured also in this UNDP Report, did not make it into the
Copenhagen outcome document.
9
Similar to and broadening the analysis of the early development decades, it described poverty as characterised by
a variety of factors: ‘lack of income and productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger
and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; increased morbidity
and mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination
and exclusion …(and) a lack of participation in decision-making and in civil, social and cultural life.’(Social
Summit 1995: 41).
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(UN, 1995: 49; 53; Emmerij et al., 2001: 115). Thus, the World Summit action plan is
clearly a stepping stone to the apolitical directions of the MDGs.
Two PEDs
11
followed from the Social Summit.
12
They veer back to the development
decades. Employment and the role of the state remain central. In terms of policy proposals,
for example, they call for
‘…effective institutions for the provision of public goods to the general population
and the productive sector; pro-employment growth for decent work in a fair global
economic environment; social protection and integration; and an effective
international partnership’(UN SG, 2009).
The second—and currently still ongoing—PED has as its main objective ‘full employment and
decent work for all’. It commits to poverty eradication by 2017. The time horizon is that of a
decade, rather than the 15 years of the MDGs. These are more policy focused and ambitious
goals than cutting poverty by half, as was the remit of the subsequent MDGs, or eradicating
$1.25 poverty by 2030, as the SDGs are proposing (OWG, 2014). In that respect, the PEDs
are in the tradition of the development decades. Perhaps that is why these two decades have
not found any mention in the ongoing international discourse on development.
What drove the gradual shift in the 1990s? The PEDs continued to present a Keynesian
approach. While, in the first UN, many governments became neoliberal and pro-capitalism,
the second UN, by fortuitous circumstances, retained or regained some of its moral
positioning. The texts reflect coalitions and voting powers in the UN GA, in the sense that
the resolutions were adopted by the member states. However, the decade ideas no longer
had much influence on steering policies towards employment or social justice. There
was a growing disconnect between real-world policy decisions and development thinking
in the UN. While gaining much aplomb in the political human rights sphere through the
UN summits, the secretariat had become irrelevant for development policymaking. So
the UN—the second UN—needed to recapture the ideational plane. It did this with the
Millennium Declaration and the MDGs.
If one counts the PEDs, the Millennium Agenda and the MDGs constituted the sixth
development ‘decade’, overlapping with the first PED. There were multiple strands of thinking
in the year 2000—such as those of the PED versus the Copenhagen action plan. As the review
of the development decades has perhaps illustrated, the MDGs were by no means entirely new
in terms of an interest in the social dimensions of development, nor in the method of listing out
goals and targets.
13
The MDGs moreover did not derive only from UN Summits of the 1990s
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation for Development (OECD) list but built also on
elements of the early development decades (OECD DAC, 1996).
The Millennium Declaration was adopted by the UN GA (UN GA, 2000), but, unlike
the development decades and the PEDs, the MDGs did not have a GA resolution; the
10
‘Establishing appropriate social safety mechanisms to minimize the adverse effects of structural adjustment,
stabilization or reform programmes on the workforce, especially the vulnerable, and for those who lose their jobs,
creating conditions for their re-entry through, inter alia, continuing education and retraining. ’Social Summit,
2015: 59
11
First United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997–2006; Res. 50/107; UN GA, 2009; Res.
62/205).
12
The PEDs are managed by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA).
13
Counting from 1960, the UN introduced roughly 50 economic and social goals that are quantified and time-
bound, and cover ‘four main categories: acceleration of economic growth in developing countries; improvements
in human welfare; moves to sustainable and equitable development; and support for these efforts by the expansion
of international development assistance.’Weiss and Jolly, 2009. Also see Jolly et al., 2005.
742 G. Koehler
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goals were presented to the GA by the UN SG (2001). The MDGs moved from the
decade to a 15-year time horizon, with measurement taking the year 1990 as the
reference year, so that the period actually covers 25 years—from 1990 to 2015—an
entire generation. More importantly, the MDGs confirmed the conceptual shift that had
begun, at the UN, with the Social Summit, from employment, productivity and
redistribution to poverty alleviation through safety nets. The poverty and hunger goals
advanced to the forefront, and employment was added in as an afterthought—perhaps
the strongest deviation from the development decades. As is more than well rehearsed
(Fukuda-Parr, 2010; Gore, 2013), the seven developmental MDGs are tilted towards
the social sectors of health and education, and have a shallow goal on the environment.
The eighth goal, meant to guide the North–South cooperation, is fuzzy. Policy was
absent from the MDGs (Nayyar, 2011). Hence, they opened the door wide for the
neoliberal agenda that was already taking root via the policy prescriptions of the IFIs
(Fukuda-Parr, 2010).
The—surprising—momentum with which the Millennium Declaration took off had
much to do with shifting dynamics in the second and third UNs. Building on the regained
moral authority in the rights-based arenas of discourse, the UN secretariat reconnected
with the ideals of the UN Charter (see, for example, UN SG, 2005; also see UN GA,
2005). The third UN—NGOs—by this time had become a vocal force in the multilateral
dynamics. And a new player had joined the scene—the private sector. The private sector
was initially approached by the UN, in form of the global compact as a code of conduct,
and to gain access to private sector funding.
14
In 2000, this made for a strong UN secretariat. But the progressiveness on human rights
and social justice was juxtaposed with a meek, acquiescent position on poverty. Poverty
eradication was replaced by poverty reduction. Conceptually, neoliberalism had made its
subcutaneous entry into the second UN’s discourse: many analysts have criticised the
MDG design as neoliberalism under a pretty cover (Fukuda-Parr, 2010). And the MDG
outcome has even been decried as a ‘lie’or a ‘scandal’(Hulme & Wilkinson, 2014; Pogge,
2014), pointing to the huge surge in income and wealth inequalities, which intensified during
the MDG era, with MDG activities—inadvertently—obscuring the bigger, darker picture.
In the first UN, the situation has been in flux. Since the 11 September 2001 terrorist
attacks, US unilateralism has become highly assertive, transforming international relations
(Jomo, 2006: 19). The massive financial crisis of 2007/2008—indeed, a disaster that called
for bold measures—briefly weakened the conservative North, strengthened the G77 and,
for an interlude, reinstated Keynesianism.
15
This tendency has since been reeled back in
most of the industrialised countries. On the other hand, within the first UN, a new South
is emerging, comprising middle-income economies that are forming new coalitions
(UNDP, 2013). The IBSA coalition (India, Brazil and South Africa) and its extension,
the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS; Li & Carey, 2014), are the most
pronounced examples. A new radicalism has also been heard at the G77 and China, for
instance, in the Santa Cruz Declaration of 2014 that resonates with Keynesian ideas and
a call for a radical restructuring of the world economy (G77, 2014).
Looking back at these six and half decades of ‘development’, what is the assessment? At
the conceptual level, the four development decades and the two PEDs adhered to an
14
Subsequently, the private sector has been active in ‘capturing’the UN. See Zammit; 2003, Zumach, 2015.
15
Initially, this was in an adulterated form of state responsibility for bank rescues and then in the form of anti-
cyclical deficit spending.
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internally coherent development paradigm, while each decade integrated or emphasised
new elements, such as the focus on poverty or the concern with the environment, with
an accent moving from the economic to the social. The decades ushered in incremental
change and piecemeal adjustments—as opposed to transformation (Hulme & Wilkinson,
2014: 182). In terms of policy, since the mid-1990s, one observes a shift from a Keynesian
approach with a focus on employment and capital formation to a neoliberal discourse
around a laissez-faire notion of development. This was a function of the transition of power
from the South to the North and from the second UN to the first.
But each era also has undercurrents flowing in a different direction that surface and
resurface despite changes in the overall direction of an agenda. One example is the
discourse on rights and dignity of the 1990s, which marked a return to the progressive tone
of the 1945 Charta, and is now emerging as a strong element in the SDG proposal. Another
example is the current recognition of the many facets of development, economic, political
and ecological, in a way echoing the first development decade, when the UN SG had
acknowledged that ‘Development is growth plus change; change, in turn, is social and
cultural as well as economic, and quantitative as well as qualitative’(UN SG, 1962: 2f.).
The current approach also is related to the remit of the 2005 UN Summit, which pulled
together economic, political and environmental as well as crisis and governance concerns
(UN GA, 2005). Even though earlier agenda positions are generally not referenced, the
recurrence of ideas suggests that there are always nuances and fissures in the overall
development philosophy projected by the second UN.
What does this mean for the next development agenda?
4 THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS—A TRANSFORMATIONAL
SWING?
In 2015, what are the prospects that the UN can agree on a new, progressive, egalitarian
and rights-based development agenda, which would encompass an effective approach to
eradicating poverty, by reinstating the need for a role of the state and space for public
goods and services, the need for a productivity policy and a focus on employment? Will
the rhetoric of ‘five big, transformative shifts’(High-level Panel Report, HLPR, 2013: 7
ff; UN SG, 2014) become real? Is the energy devoted to formulating a new agenda
worthwhile, or is it merely distracting from work that could be carried out elsewhere, for
instance, within countries and communities, to effect real transformation? And is this a
moment with ‘a fundamental alteration in global power relations or crises out of which
new institutional forms are forged’(Hulme & Wilkinson, 2014: 182)?
The first UN, represented by the Open Working Group comprising 70 countries,
proposed and tabled 17 SDGs in mid-2014 (OWG, 2014; Dodds et al., 2014). They were
drawn up, in protracted negotiations, using the outcome document of the 2012 Rio plus 20
Summit on sustainable development as the point of departure (UN, 2012). The SDGs are
far more comprehensive than the MDGs. Human rights, governance, the environment, and
economic and social development are recognised as interconnected, the way they were
perhaps intended in the UN Charter (Ivanova & Escobar-Pemberthy, 2015).
There are a number of conceptual improvements in the SDG proposal (OWG, 2014), as
compared with the MDGs. Firstly, the social dimensions of development around education
and health are cast in a more rights-oriented way, by moving towards a notion of
universalizing access. Secondly, there is a broadening of issues beyond social
744 G. Koehler
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development, with policy areas that address the importance of industrialization—perhaps
better called industrial strategy—and productivity. The SDG draft refers to value chains
and the necessity of retaining value added in the producing economies. Peaceful societies,
political rights and good governance have their own goal. There are several specific goals
on climate change and the environment. The two most striking goals are the call for
equality in and among countries, and for sustainable production and consumption. This
time, the text presents more than an incremental change—and again, as with the MDGs,
it offers an approach that builds on earlier development decades—without acknowledging
them. For example, the multidimensional poverty understanding of the PEDs makes a re-
appearance. That the SDGs are to apply to all countries is a major accomplishment, as it
moves the discourse away from the patronising North–South dichotomy. The development
agenda is becoming more explicitly holistic at the conceptual level. So in some respects,
there is progress—at the conceptual level.
Conversely, at the policy level, the development agenda is becoming more and more
‘pointillist’. It touches all the bases and conveys an image of all the areas that need to
be addressed, but it touches them precisely without connecting them. Synergies that would
be required for policy to be holistic, and effective, are not made out. Contradictions or
conflicts among goals are not discussed.
16
By contrast, the four development decades and the PEDs had a coherent, Keynesian-
inspired policy framework, with reasons for the lack of (economic) development built into
the logic. The third development decade in particular was adamant about globally
generated inequities and proposed pertaining remedies. The PEDs prioritised employment
as the antidote to poverty.
But the proposed SDGs—like the MDG agenda before them—are skirting the question
of policies.
17
The question of how—by which policies—‘sustainable development’would
be achieved has remained outside the perimeters of the discourse.
To understand the SDG design and make informed guesses on its viability again calls for
a look into the current international political situation. The first UN, the governments of the
world, at this point in time are struggling with the economic, social and political effects of
unbridled financial capitalism and a protracted global recession. Some of these effects have
weakened governments’effectiveness and their credibility. In 2015, malnutrition continues
to affect almost one billion people, and roughly 1.5 billion are multi-dimensionally poor
(UNDP, 2014: 19). Income and wealth inequality are at unprecedented extremes
(Milanovic, 2011; United Nations, UN, 2012; Cimadamore et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014;
OXFAM, 2015). The share of capital and labour in global gross national income has shifted
over the past decades to the benefit of capital (Milanovic, 2011; Ortiz et al., 2012).
Registered unemployment is expected to rise to above 211 million over the next 5 years
(ILO, 2013), and massive youth unemployment affects countries across the globe. Austerity
programmes are cutting down social expenditures in many countries (Ortiz & Cummins,
2013). These trends make countries enter a race to the bottom.
Environmental catastrophes, ultimately due to global warming, affect high-income and
low-income countries alike and the poor in these countries the most. The appalling
16
For example, the goal aspiring to sustainable production and consumption clashes with the economic growth
goal, if the latter is not explained in a differentiated manner.
17
Discussions are very much concentrated on two issues. One is on content: the issue of finance, or means of
implementation, which adversarially situates the low-income versus the middle-income and high-income
countries. The other is methodological, with many negotiation efforts devoted to monitoring and accounting for
progress by creating a viable set of indicators.
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situation of global public goods—security threats and the missing resources for public
health—points directly to the lack of government capacity (Mackie &Williams, 2015).
Not a single country has achieved the gender equality goals agreed in 1995. Not one of
the least developed countries has achieved all the MDGs (UNCTAD, 2014). The BRICS
are falling short in the policy domains of employment and environment management.
The ‘North’is predominantly conservative on economic issues, as a result of energy
security interests and world power competition. There is the nivellating effect of a joint
European Union (EU) position
18
that requires consensus across the region’s 28-member
states. Political catastrophes in many countries have increased the number of fragile states.
Conversely, a number of G77 developing countries are economically strong, having
experienced sound GDP growth rates, and some have seen an increase in sovereign wealth
funds, partly as a result of high commodity prices during the past decade. A considerable
number of non-OECD countries have emerged as development cooperation players. There
is the rise of new country groupings, such as IBSA with strong social policy convictions
and experiences to share, and the BRICS offering new funding instruments. Politically,
leftist governments hold office in several Latin American countries. Some of the large
developing country democracies are voicing eloquent opposition to neoliberalism
(de Aguiar Patriota, 2015); one observes the advance of an at least notionally rights-based
social policy agenda in South Asia (Koehler and Chopra, 2014). This could serve to
outweigh conservative trends, but it remains to be seen whether the first UN will actually
converge around a trajectory of transformational change.
New constellations, and self-selecting political alliances, have become policy players at the
global level. These include the BRICS on the one hand and the G7 on the other; both groups
are expected to formulate an SDG policy stance at their respective 2015 summits.
19
The
BRICS may offer a bargaining chip in the form of the BRICS Bank that could advance the
financing for development agenda in the interest of the low-income countries. The G7 are more
likely to defend their political control of financial markets and the IFIs, and their ideological
push for austerity, but might also decide to offer more ODA or climate adaptation finance as
an act of seeming goodwill. The accession of several OECD countries to the Chinese-led Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank suggests reconfigured alliances among the lower-income and
higher-income countries. The first UN is in motion (Dodds et al., 2014).
The second UN—which could be a leader in the development agenda process—is
fragmented and compartmentalised (Hulme & Wilkinson, 2014; Browne & Weiss, 2014). It
has been weakened by the new political blocs—such as the BRICS—and by the unbureaucratic,
informal style offered at discourse fora such as the Davos World Economic Forum. The UN
Secretariat has chosen to be a turntable for ideas and proposals, as opposed to leading the
SDG discussion. In his synthesis report to the GA, for instance, the UN SG throws the
responsibility for transformation to the member states. ‘I urge Governments and people
everywhere to fulfil their political and moral responsibilities’(UN SG, 2014: 7). The UN
Secretariat appears to have decided not to be the visionary force shaping the new agenda.
20
18
The EU was formative for the MDGs because of influential progressive development cooperation ministers in
several of EU member states in the early 2000s. But the region has since veered to the right, and the EC towards
open neo-liberalism. The EU-Presidency in 2015 lies with Latvia and then Luxembourg, suggesting that
politically conservative countries will be heading the European consensus building process.
19
G7 in Germany in June 2015; BRICS in Russia in July 2015. These summits will just precede the Financing for
Development Summit in Addis Ababa.
20
This lack of courage is partly due to conflicts over roles and responsibilities for ‘development’within the UN
system, such as between the UN Secretariat and its DESA, and UNDP.
746 G. Koehler
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In the third UN, the constellation is mixed. Because of public pressure, commitment and
effective lobbying,
21
the presence and influence of civil society in multilateral discussions
have grown exponentially, from roughly 100 NGOs in the 1970s to 4000 in 2013 (Bissio,
2014: 195f). The nine ‘major groups’representing NGOs, local authorities, indigenous
peoples, women, youth and children, trade unions, agriculture and business, (https://
sustainabledevelopment.un.org/majorgroups/women) have become acknowledged
partners in the negotiating process on the post-2015 agenda. They have been able to gain
access to negotiations with the exception of informal sessions where member states are the
sole interlocuteurs.
22
Also in the third UN, however, the large-scale private sector
23
has become an accepted
partner and is effectively pushing for its corporate interests (Zumach, 2015: 129ff). It is
visibly advocating for public–private partnerships. In light of the concentration of
economic wealth and political power in the corporate private sector, there is a risk that their
presence overrides the progressive trends of not-for-profit NGOs. If one follows the view
that corporate globalisation (Roy, 2005) or hegemonic globalisation (Jomo, 2006) is at its
peak, the challenge within the third UN is obvious.
5 CONCLUSION: AFTER SEVEN DECADES OF ‘DEVELOPMENT’, NOW
WHAT?
The second and third UNs have promised a paradigm shift for this new round of
development. The first UN—the member states—would need to agree to ‘(i)mportant
and costly measures’(Emmerij et al., 2001: 173). If one looks at the might of the super
powers, and the dominance of global capitalism, it would be illogical to expect a
change.
However, UN member states, the UN secretariat and civil society are not monolithic,
there are many different objective interests and there is space for normatively driven
alignments. If the systemic lack of decent work, the enormous wealth gaps and the
irreversible stress on the environment are recognised as a disaster, perhaps there is a real
chance for a fundamental shift. If progressive groups within the first, second and third
UNs coalesce effectively, there is a case for optimism. The promise made 70 years ago
in the UN Charter could begin to materialise. Ideas might win in the end.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express sincere thanks to Charles Gore and two anonymous referees for
probing comments and pointers that made me think and re-think.
21
And, one should add, building on a large degree of self-exploitation: the not-for-profit Civil Society
Organisations (CSO) sector is systemically underfunded.
22
Another expression of this is that the UN Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), March 2015, is
expecting 1100 NGOs. This is although the CSW decided to forego the Summit that would have been due this
year, 20 years after the Beijing Conference. (email Bette Levy).
23
The private sector also includes small and medium enterprises, which play a different role in their economies
and internationally, frequently providing larger employment in relation to investment, and more prone to drawing
on local resources. The private sector designation, however, does not distinguish between scale and operations,
and large transnationals tend to dominate global discussion in their own interest.
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