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Rezension zu: Martin Jacques. When China rules the world: the Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London, 2009)
... The academic literature approached the debate on the possible change in the role of hegemon from different points of view in the field of International Political Economy (IPE) and International Relations (IR). In summary, the debate is divided between those who perceive China as a possible hegemon capable of challenging US leadership (Jacques, 2008;Lee, 2018;Mahbubani, 2020;Dalio, 2021;Moyer et al., 2023) and those who maintain that US hegemony remains solid and resilient (Winecoff, 2020;Schwartz, 2021). Other perspectives propose a multipolar (Vlados, 2020) or bipolar system (Xuetong, 2020) and even raise the possibility of peaceful coexistence (Arrighi, 2007). ...
... The academic literature varies in its perspective on this question: some predict that China will be the new hegemon (Jacques, 2008;Lee, 2018;Mahbubani, 2020;Dalio, 2021). In contrast, others believe in US resilience (Winecoff, 2020;Schwartz, 2021), and some suggest a multipolar (Vlados, 2020) or bipolar system (Xuetong, 2020), or even peaceful coexistence (Arrighi, 2007). ...
... emphasize that globalization has leveled the economic playing field between developed and developing nations, highlighting the emergence of Asia and China as the new global economic epicenter.Jacques (2008),Mahbubani (2020), andMoyer et al. (2023) go a step further, suggesting that this phenomenon could lead to China becoming a hegemonic power soon. Similarly, Lee (2018) underscores China's leadership in disruptive technologies, such as artificial intelligence, which could propel the country to the top world power.Xuetong (2019Xuetong ( , ...
Since 1978, China's economy has undergone a profound transformation, transitioning
from a largely rural structure to a global powerhouse in technology and economy. This
shift has instigated academic debate regarding whether China could replace the US as the
leading global economic power. This thesis develops a dynamic structural methodology,
offering a novel and more in-depth perspective that overcomes the limitations of classic
approaches, which focus solely on material capabilities. The objective is to discern
whether China is overtaking the US regarding global economic dominance or if this trend
will materialize shortly. To this end, an exhaustive comparison of the individual
capabilities of both nations in critical areas such as production, technology, trade, and
finance is conducted, as well as network analysis of global financial and technological
interconnections. This approach provides a detailed insight into each country's structural
power and future predictions based on the network growth mechanisms ("the fit get
richer" and "the rich get richer"). The findings reveal that although China has significantly
enhanced its capabilities, surpassing the US in certain aspects, it is still far from
dethroning the US hegemony, which maintains its dominance thanks to its structural
power in the financial and technological realms.
... This is because the definition of modernity tends to be Eurocentric, assuming that there is only one modernity which must have its roots in Europe (Klein, 2013: 279), and one way of being in modernity, which is through adopting Western values, institutions, beliefs, such as the free market, the rule of law, an independent judiciary and representative government (Jacques, 2009, pp. 9, 415). These assumptions refer to a cultural evolutionary view based on the Enlightenment idea of history as linear progress, and assume that modernization is a singular, linear-development model whereby Western-style modernity should be naturally spread across the world, legitimated and popularized as universal values, and adopted by the Others in order to reproduce the success of the West (Jacques, 2009;Lal, 2000). It is a view which has been popularized by some scholars like Rostow (1960), Hayek (1960Hayek ( , 1979, Fukuyama (1989), and Segal (1998), as the following quotation shows: ...
... (Segal, 1998) Just as with likening Asian values to past Victorian values, Asians are seen as being far behind on the road to "Westernistic civilization". They have to "become more open, more plural, more democratic: in short, more 'Westernistic'" (Segal, 1998), and be trapped in a binary traditionmodernity scheme (Jacques, 2009;Klein, 2013: 281). ...
This thesis focuses on the meaning of Chinese music subcultures, such as metal, rap, punk, and rock, and how the meaning is shaped by the influences of the Chinese context, individual practices, and musical affect.
... The civilizational state has two distinctive attributes. First, the longevity of Chinese civilization (Jacques 2012;Xia 2014). Despite the frequent vicissitudes of dynasties, Chinese civilization remains consistent. ...
... Second, there is a lack of explicit boundaries, reflecting the comprehensiveness of the Imperial Chinese state (Jacques 2012;A. Y. King 2018). ...
In this monograph, Lili Yang compares core ideas about the state, society, and higher education in two major world traditions. She explores the broad cultural and philosophical ideas underlying the public good of higher education in the two traditions, reveals their different social imaginaries, and works through five areas where higher education intersects with the individual, society, the state, and the world, intersections understood in contrasting ways in each tradition. The five key themes are: individual student development in higher education, equity in higher education, academic freedom and university autonomy, the resources and outcomes of higher education, and cross-border higher education activities and higher education’s global outcomes. In exploring the similarities, Yang highlights important meeting points between the two world views, with the potential to contribute to the mutual understanding and cooperation across cultures.
... The civilisational state has two distinctive attributes. Firstly, the longevity of Chinese civilisation (Jacques 2012). Secondly, there is a lack of explicit boundaries, reflecting the comprehensiveness of the Imperial Chinese statethe 'no other' idea of tianxia (Jacques 2012;Zhao 2009). ...
... Firstly, the longevity of Chinese civilisation (Jacques 2012). Secondly, there is a lack of explicit boundaries, reflecting the comprehensiveness of the Imperial Chinese statethe 'no other' idea of tianxia (Jacques 2012;Zhao 2009). ...
The idea of the public good of higher education is closely related to the political, social and educational cultures in which higher education is embedded. It varies across contexts. However, widely used notions of the 'public' aspects of higher education, including the concepts of economic public goods and private goods, conventionally assume Anglo-American state/society/university assemblages. Anglo-American (and more generally, Western) discourses and terms are dominant in scholarship on public policy and higher education. This creates obstacles and lacunae in comparative studies, and employing solely Anglo-American notions can be especially problematic in non-Anglo-American contexts. This paper attempts to move beyond the conventional approach by conducting a lexical-based comparison of the Chinese and Anglo-American approaches to the public aspects of higher education. It identifies and explores key concepts of the public good of higher education in both the Chinese and English languages, establishing similarities and differences. The comparison contributes to a more balanced understanding of the public roles of higher education, illuminates new aspects of 'public', and may facilitate mutual understanding between scholars and between the Chinese and Anglo-American higher education systems.
... The integration of literary style cartoon represents the 'city of flower' brand of guangzhou with an air of cultural sophistication and technological innovation that light up the new fashion of traditional culture and tourism. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping proposed that China promotes an overall strategic initiative of great rejuvenation for creating glories of nationalism (Mahbubani, 2012;Jacques, 2012). Hanfu represents a Chinese national identity (Leibold, 2010). ...
Against the digital backdrop, this research investigates the intersemiotic translation strategies of hypertext-based bilingual cultural publicity websites, seeking to address the intricacies of meaning-making in digital environments. It aims to probe into the efficient intersemiotic translation strategies regarding the intersection of Social Semiotics and translation studies. The case study explicates how to deploy hypertextual devices that adapt to target users' cultural norms and aesthetic preferences. The translation strategies (i.e. user-centered approach, compensation, addition, interdiscursive presentation, omission, and transcreation) were drawn on how hypertextuality facilitates dynamic navigation and intercultural communication. The findings indicate the application of multimodal discourse analysis in translation studies by revealing the potential of intersemiotic translation in promoting cross-cultural communication, digital literacy, and user experience in the digital sphere. The study contributes to the existing research by shedding light on the extension of research scope to multimodal translation, building a more holistic approach to website translation practice of cultural institutions.
... Many who study Confucian moral tradition and philosophy would similarly envision the family as a microcosm of society and politics and a model for state governance (Park, 2011;Park & Shin, 2006). Jacques (2009) put things into the context of Chinese culture and wrote: ...
... According to Jacques (2012),an examination of the external drivers of the US decline suggests that the rise of new global powers, particularly China and Russia,has contributed to the weakening of the US global hegemony. These two Eurasian giants had previously held positions of superpowers: China till the midseventeenth and Russia till the late 20th century. ...
For over half a century, the United States has been the most powerful state globally, dominating key global issues stemming from global politics, geoeconomics, and geostrategy. Following the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international system moved from bipolarity to unipolarity, with the United States becoming the global hegemon. Since the early 1980s, China has emerged as a global power, challenging the longstanding hegemony of the United States. China's rise has coincided with a period of relative decline of the U.S., marking for the first time in decades sustained opposition to its interests, primarily from China. This paper therefore seeks to examine the rise of China amid the decline of U.S. hegemonic power and its implications for international security.The study relies on qualitative data predicated on secondary sources, employing offensive realism as its theoretical framework. The paper reveals a measurable decline in the United States hegemonic power, preventing it from single-handedly dictating global affairs. Also, internal, and external factors contribute to the decline of the U.S. hegemonic status. The research recommends that China prioritize forming alliances with more powerful countries to enhance its ability to challenge the United States. Additionally, it suggests that both countries should critically assess the risks involved in their respective strategies to balance each other.
... It speaks to a place already known, understood, and owned. It offers a starting point different from a narration of Taiwan's pastpresent-future that treats Taiwan's eventual incorporation into a singular Chinese sovereignty as somehow inevitable-part of the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War (Jacques, 2012). That is despite the historical reality that no Chinese regime ever exercised sovereign control or extended practical jurisdiction over many of the sovereign Indigenous peoples and territories of the archipelago, including Tayal territories. ...
This research deals with issues of Indigeneity and autonomy in Taiwan by notionally turning things inside‐out. We aim to contextualise international geopolitics and local polity by considering the Tayal people, one of 16 nationally recognised Indigenous groups living in northern Taiwan. We reject the conventional geopolitical lens of Great Power claims as the only and best way to understand contemporary Taiwan and chooses to refocus and rescale the geopolitical lens. We seek to reconsider Taiwan’s history, geography, and territory by reference to the conceptual lenses that apply to Tayal peoples’ experiences. The research methods employed include geographical fieldwork, literature reviews, and archival studies. The research acknowledges Tayal people’s custodianship over their territory and provides an in‐depth discussion on the colonial history and geography of Taiwan. In the process, we unsettle what is taken‐for‐granted and rescale erasure, violence, and resistance in Indigenous Taiwan. In building a Tayal ‐centred positionality, we reframe geopolitical dynamics as connections within territories and across boundaries rather than as disputes over deeply contested boundaries. Neither Tayal people nor other Indigenous peoples in Taiwan ever ceded their sovereignty. Regardless of any broader geopolitics shifts, Tayal territory remains just the way it always has— Tayal territory.
... A growing number of scholars hold the view that China's rapidly growing economic might poses a real threat to US hegemony. If the US decline could not be halted China would soon lead Asia and gradually the whole world (Halper, 2010;Friedberg, 2011;Jacques, 2012;Dobson, 2009;Mahbubani, 2008). Cox (2012), however, refers to the structural advantages the US and its Western allies enjoy (compared to China's) as safeguards that guarantee continued US dominance in the world. ...
This article investigates China’s prospects of assuming a global leadership role in a postAmerican world. It disputes the position of a growing group of American scholars who strongly defend America’s lead role in global politics and advance the argument that there is no alternative to US leadership of the current world order. On the contrary, this article argues that the sense of a relative decline in US power, exacerbated by China’s rise as a gigantic economic power in recent years, threatens to displace the US as the global leader. It concludes that Beijing may not, however, aim to redesign and reconstruct a new world order altogether, as its interests are best served within the framework of the existing post-war world order. In other words, China’s selfinterests would dictate it to lead the world while maintaining the basic structure of the USengineered post-war world order
... Najbardziej widocznym instrumentem chińskiej dyplomacji publicznej są Instytuty Konfucjusza (Jacques, 2009). Pierwszy Instytut powstał w 2004 roku w Seulu, a do 2020 roku powstało ich ponad 500 na wszystkich kontynentach Weigl, 2009, s. 40). ...
The modern power of China is based on its traditional sources: the size of the territory and demographics, the scale of the economy, strong army and soft power (culture, values, foreign policy, public diplomacy). China, by building its hegemony, showed that only a state with significant resources is able to be a leader in the modern world. The basic condition is the balanced development of individual power resources, because only then can long-term hegemony in the modern world be achieved and maintained. It is important for the world whether China will gain hegemony by overthrowing the existing world order, or whether it will try to maintain the existing order by building its leadership on its basis.
... Apart from that, benefit is also recognized as modernization of logistics sector (Szunomár et al, 2020). There are argumentations that through this kind of behaviour China is creating the geopolitical order in which it will be the gravitation centre and the actor who will dictate the rules of game ( Jacques, 2009). However, China is guided by economic reasons, because through infrastructural development it is speeding up the flow of its goods, services and capital not just towards and amongst these states, but towards EU as well. ...
... Furthermore, the China's rise can be explained from its unique traditional culture. Martin Jacques (2009) notices that the role of the state is omnipresent and omnipotent, as manifested in providing assistance to private enterprises, managing state-owned enterprises, promoting the internationalization of the RMB, and becoming the architect of an economic strategy that has driven China's economic transformation. The collapse of neoliberalism from the Anglo-American model will make the Chinese model even more pertinent to many countries. ...
... China has grown increasingly confident in its economic model, a confidence catalysed by the failure of the Western financial system in 2008. 2 However, as a number of recent studies have argued, China's growing confidence is not only a result of its current status, but also due to the fact that it does not view itself as a rising power to begin with, but a returning power, and this will significantly impact its behaviour in the international system (Jacques, 2009;Schuman, 2020). This history can help inform China's motivations in engaging in vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19, as well as its desire to compete with the United States in the provision of global public goods more generally. ...
With contributions from leading experts in the fields of anthropology, communications, disaster studies, economics, epidemiology, Indigenous studies, philosophy and sociology, this expansive book offers a diverse range of social science perspectives on the COVID-19 pandemic, providing critical insights into what a research agenda for COVID-19 and society resembles across different fields of study.
... 12 Power transition theory is a dynamic theory of power precisely because its ability to account for the variety of outcomes of conflict and cooperation in a regional system (Tammen et al. 2017a, b). This highly successful theory therefore emerges as an ideal choice for application to the BRI in the quest to explain its characteristics and development against the backdrop of the rise of the PRC and mounting debate about an armed conflict or a new "Cold War" between the PRC and the USA, most likely in East Asia (Navarro and Autry 2011;Friedberg 2012;Jacques 2012;Roy 2013;Pillsbury 2016;Allison 2017;Mahbubani 2020). While not acknowledged openly, these expositions, for the most part, tend to rely on the logic of the power transition. ...
Since its launch in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) quickly has become the cornerstone of foreign policy for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under Xi Jinping’s leadership to project China’s new-found economic influence through networks of infrastructure, trade, and investment deals. Considerable scholarship about the BRI has focused on China’s motivations, domestic politics, strategic culture, policy instruments, and the perceptions, effects, and implications across various countries and regions. While competing IR paradigms and levels of analysis have been applied to analyze the BRI and its impact, little research has examined the complex causal mechanisms of the BRI in a comprehensively visualized and rigorous way. How, for example, does the BRI look in the context of power transition theory? Is this time-honored theory, which focuses on the dynamics of capabilities, able to explain the characteristics of BRI, notably its impact upon policies and outcomes at the regional and international levels? Through the prism of systemism, this paper seeks to answer such questions. The systemist approach, which emphasizes the graphic portrayal of cause and effect, is well suited to the task of comparing and evaluating theoretical arguments about developments such as the BRI. A visualization of power transition theory is used to obtain insights about the likely direction of China’s BRI in terms of the USA and China as leading states and rivals faced with the challenge of managing conflict short of war in East Asia.
... China has grown increasingly confident in its economic model, a confidence catalysed by the failure of the Western financial system in 2008. 2 However, as a number of recent studies have argued, China's growing confidence is not only a result of its current status, but also due to the fact that it does not view itself as a rising power to begin with, but a returning power, and this will significantly impact its behaviour in the international system (Jacques, 2009;Schuman, 2020). This history can help inform China's motivations in engaging in vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19, as well as its desire to compete with the United States in the provision of global public goods more generally. ...
The COVID-19 pandemic has turbocharged world history while ravaging global populations. From digital transformations of work and education, to the development, clinical testing and distribution of new vaccines in unprecedented timeframes, adapting to the virus has driven structural shifts at breakneck speed viewed historically. Perhaps one of the most significant structural shifts the pandemic has accelerated is the growing geopolitical and economic tensions between China and the U.S., with some asking whether it marks the end of U.S. hegemony as leader of the post-war liberal international order (Lake, Martin, & Risse 2021; Norrlöf, 2020).
Tensions between the United States and China arise over differences between their economic models, and these have been amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic, as both countries have sought to use vaccine diplomacy to shore up their international soft power. This has resulted in competition to produce and distribute vaccines separately rather than cooperatively, threatening to result in a less efficient global vaccination outcome. Why has vaccine diplomacy become a proxy for great power rivalry? This chapter addresses tensions arising from China’s state capitalism, which has grown to be second largest economy in the world, a global manufacturing power, and a direct technological competitor with the U.S.
It is suggested that China’s historical status as a returning power is an important context for understanding China’s motives and behaviour in challenging U.S. broadly, as well as during provision of global public goods – in this case COVID-19 vaccines. Conceptual insights will be drawn from comparative capitalism grounded in institutional political economy, which theorizes the role of institutions, culture and history in determining the emergence of variations of capitalism. This framework reveals the deep socio-economic roots of today’s clash of economic systems. This chapter aims to provide insight into historical and institutional factors driving this clash with the goal of supporting a research agenda for global cooperation on the provision of vaccines as a global public good.
... For eksempel argumenterMahbubani (2020, s. 85-86) for at Kina har et «powerful antimilitary DNA». Se ogsåKang, 2007Kang, , 2010Jacques, 2009;Johnston, 1995; Kissinger, 2011 for videre diskusjon rundt Kinas egenart. ...
Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
... Informed analysts vary widely in their general characterisations of Chinese wants, needs, fears, perceptions and beliefs. At one end of the spectrum are what we might call 'China risers' who see Chinese leaders as confident, ambitious, obsessed with restoring China's historical greatness and determined to recreate a 'Middle Kingdom' order that would reduce neighbouring countries to tributaries or vassals (Danner & Martín, 2019;Jacques, 2009;Mearsheimer, 2010). At the other end are what we might call 'regime pessimists' who see Chinese leaders as vulnerable and panicked by threats to Communist Party rule (Chang, 2001;Pei, 2012Pei, , 2013. ...
This book brings together a unique team of academics and practitioners to analyse interests, institutions, and issues affecting and affected by the transition from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the world’s economic and strategic centre of gravity, in which established and rising powers compete with each other. As a strategic space, the Indo-Pacific reflects the rise of geo-political and geo-economic designs and dynamics which have come to shape the region in the early twenty-first century. These new dynamics contrast with the (neo-)liberal ideas and the seemingly increasing globalisation for which the once dominant ‘Asia-Pacific’ regional label stood.
Robert G. Patman is one of the University of Otago’s inaugural Sesquicentennial Distinguished Chairs, and his research interests concern international relations, global security, US foreign policy, great powers, and the Horn of Africa. Publications include Strategic Shortfall: The ‘Somalia Syndrome’ and the March to 9/11 (Praeger, 2010) and co-edited books titled China and the International System: Becoming a World Power (Routledge, 2013); Science Diplomacy: New Day or False Dawn? (World Scientific, 2015); and New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future (World Scientific, 2018). He is currently writing a volume called Rethinking the Global Impact of 9/11 (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
Patrick Köllner is Vice President of the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Director of the GIGA Institute for Asian Studies, and Professor of political science at the University of Hamburg. His Asia-related and comparative work has been published in journals such as Democratization, Japanese Journal of Political Science, Journal of East Asian Studies, The Pacific Review, and Politische Vierteljahresschrift. Recent co-edited publications include Comparative Area Studies: Methodological Rationales and Cross-Regional Applications (Oxford University Press, 2018) as well as special issues on think tanks in East Asia (Pacific Affairs, 2018) and on political transformation in Myanmar (Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 2020).
Balazs Kiglics is a recent Ph.D. graduate and Teaching Fellow in the Languages and Cultures Programme at the University of Otago, New Zealand. His thesis explored the role of values in contemporary Japanese elite perceptions of Japan–China relations. He has worked as Coordinator of the annual Otago Foreign Policy School since 2015. He has co-edited the volume New Zealand and the World: Past, Present and Future (World Scientific, 2018). His research interests include Japanese studies, international relations of the Asia-Pacific, and intercultural communication.
... Kong, it was found that separate L2 self images exist with regard to the learning of both English and Mandarin , corroborating results that demonstrated the "psychological distinctiveness of L2 and L3 ideal selves" (Ushioda, 2017, p. 478). In addition to this, in a study of Hong Kong students' motivation to learn different target languages, it was found that the affective and integrative dimensions of the language learners differed between the many target languages, in particular, English and Mandarin (Evans, 2010;Jacques, 2012). For the sake of clarification in this thesis, Cantonese will be used to refer to the dominant language that is widely spoken of citizens of Hong Kong and Mandarin will be used to denote the national language of ...
The field’s current understanding of L2 motivation is largely reliant on explicit self- reports (e.g. questionnaires and interviews). While such means have provided the L2 motivation field with a wealth of understanding, the underlying assumptions are that such attitudes take place in a conscious manner and that such representations are adequate. Recent developments have discussed these limitations and have called for a more in-depth and holistic understanding of the motivational psyche of L2 learners (e.g. Al-Hoorie, 2016a; Dörnyei, 2020). This thesis seeks to address this research lacuna by arguing for the inclusion of an implicit dimension into L2 motivation research, using the case of Hong Kong as an illustration. This thesis is first made up of a systemic literature review which provided an empirical understanding of the unprecedented boom in published studies that occurred between 2005 – 2014. Studying the dataset that was made up of 416 publications allowed for an understanding of the L2 methodological and theoretical trends in the literature. While there were several key findings from this empirical review, specific to this thesis, the most significant lies in the identification of the lack of an implicit dimension in the field. Consequently, this shaped the premise for this thesis, namely to set forth the case for a subconscious dimension of L2 motivation research. The selection of Hong Kong as a research location was motivated by its unique linguistic landscape. In order to better understand the situation, a qualitative pilot study that sought to determine Hong Kong’s viability as a location for unconscious motivation research was carried out. The qualitative results show that indeed, Hong Kong is loaded with ethnolinguistic tension. Regarding the participants’ attitudes towards the three languages, Cantonese was found to be synonymous with the Hong Kong identity and English was seen as a superior language that was associated with prestige and professional opportunities. In comparison, Mandarin held little relevance to the participants’ everyday lives. Upon further investigation, it was found that Fear of Assimilation was the main reason behind the participants’ lacklustre attitudes towards Mandarin. Overall, this qualitative pilot study offered an insight into the complexities underscoring Hong Kong’s unique, and loaded, linguistic environment; confirming Hong Kong’s suitability as a research location for this implicit line of research.
... The notion of a 'Rising China' implies a more proactive foreign policy (Qin, 2014;Yan, 2014) that inexorably will change the global economy, geopolitics, ideas and values. Some scholars have been debating the so-called 'China Model' and the potential alternatives for the 'Western model' (Breslin, 2011;Ferchen, 2013;Zhao, 2010); others are focusing on a Beijing Consensus and its potential diffusion Kennedy, 2010;Ramo, 2004); others prefer the notion of a 'civilization state' (Jacques, 2009) or a 'civilizational sate' (Zhang, 2012) to characterize China. Recently, Vangeli (2018) applied the concept of symbolic power/domination to understand the role of China at the 16+1 Forum, and others connected the new Silk Road with a kind of soft power (Kickbusch et al., 2018). ...
Drawing on Qin Yaqing’s notion of relational power, this article analyses how, why and through what mechanisms Chinese international initiatives diffuse Chinese ideas and practices and facilitate the projection of its power in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In an era of crisis of multilateralism and neoliberal globalization and confronted with the global COVID-19 crisis, Chinese cooperation with a politically fragmented region that has for long been dominated by the United States has involved the deployment of bilateral, minilateral and multilateral relationships from the foundation of the China–CELAC Forum and the extension of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to embrace LAC up until the relaunching of the Health Silk Road. Adaptive processes of multilevel cooperation and the projection of soft power contribute to the emergence of a hybrid geopolitical landscape
... The external drivers of the American decline are associated with the rise of new great powers, especially China and Russia. In some respects the emergence of these new great powers is less about their rise than their restoration; for the two Eurasian giants had held the position of super powers in the past; China till the mid-Seventeenth and Russia till the late 20 th century (Jacques, 2012). From their perspective, or some other actors, Beijing and Moscow may be merely asserting to regain what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. ...
The dynamics of global power politics have been consistently changing from multipolar to bipolar and lastly the unipolar structure in the past century. Washington proclaimed an overriding leadership role for itself and started enjoying its unique status of uncontested hegemony in the global politics. The rest of the nations; neither alone nor collectively could challenge the American worldwide supremacy. However, the American unilateralist approach in various international political issues ensued insecurity and even annoyance in some of the regional powers like; China and Russia. Therefore, in the past couple of decades the emergence of new power centers, particularly the rising China and the resurging of Russia and their strategic alignment; and the relative decline of the US; clearly indicate that the American hegemony shall no more exist. The dynamics of international politics are undoubtedly heading towards the transition of the world system to a multipolar world order; where besides the US, China and Russia will play a significant role.
... Perhaps the most consequential expression of the evolving international order has been the dramatic re-emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC/China) as the most important economic and strategic actor in East Asia. Indeed, so rapid has China's ascent been that many observers expect it to play an increasingly prominent global role in keeping with both its material importance and the ambitions of its increasingly powerful and assertive leader, Xi Jinping (Jacques 2009). The implications of China's rise are considered in more detail in what follows, but the point to make at the outset is that China is but the most dramatic expression of an international system in flux; some of the seemingly foundational pillars of the old order are often too internally divided to act effectively on the international scene-for example, the European Union, and to a lesser extent, ASEAN-or seek to pursue potentially destabilising, nationalistic policies-especially Russia. ...
It is not only the possible relative decline of the United States as the bedrock of the so-called ‘rules-based international order’ (RBIO) in the Trump era that has caused consternation in Europe and Asia. The international system has also been shaken by a number of rising powers that are often less wedded to the norms and principles of the old RBIO. Changes in the underlying structures of the international order, as well as the ideas and practices that were associated with American dominance, present a major challenge for policymakers everywhere. This chapter compares the responses in Europe and East Asia to similar challenges because they highlight the different historical circumstances and capacities that will shape policies of adjustment in both regions. Geopolitical and newly important geoeconomic forces are both constraining and empowering different actors in a period of dramatic transformation.
... 144-145) Obviously, this is a viewpoint that strikes hardest at a raw nerve of the West. The author of this book sold 250,000 copies through his personal website and the volume was translated into 11 different languages (Jacques, 2019). ...
... Such a goal involves promoting not only a country's tourism and organizational infrastructure, but also its national pride and self-esteem, as well as-at least in part-its official politics. In turn, international organizations such as FIFA-and to some extent also global institutions such as UNESCO or UN-are interested in promoting an exchange of "modernity" among all participants, and a stronger convergence of geopolitically "competing modernities" (Jacques 2012;Stuenkel 2015), that is, different social, societal, and political interpretations of what a "good modernity" and modernization process is and should be. In fact, in principle, these organizations believe that in such a way they are also promoting mutual respect, communication, understanding, and interconnection. ...
This chapter analyzes the men’s Football World Championship 2018 as a case of imaginal politics with the aim of supporting Chiara Bottici’s theory and demonstrating the increasing contextual political influence of international entertainment events. Indeed, in times of globalized media and universal real-time connectedness, such events consist of proto-ideological imaginaries—or “charged images”—as well as sports competition. In particular, various fans’ national cultures efficiently elucidate the resulting impact on the newly important global-local (or, “glocal”) interface. They also shed light on current key political developments, such as the return of symbolic and tribal politics in times of “peak globalization,” de-globalization, and re-nationalization. The chapter is divided into three distinct parts. Part 1 covers the political connotations of football events and their exploitation. Part 2 deals with fans’ culture as an example of the current re-connection between tribal elements, that is, the return of “Political Tribes” and resulting “tribal politics”—as defined for example by Amy Chua—de-globalization and national-regional-local identification patterns with sports teams. These three dimensions are connected owing to their clear joint focus on imaginal politics, and to the political attempts for their integration. Part 3 draws several conclusions.
The past fifteen years have witnessed several key developments in Asia against the shifting global geopolitics: the rise of China as the second largest economy in the world when China overtook Japan in 2010; the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 which has significantly expanded China’s influences in Southeast Asia and among the region’s ethnic Chinese population; and the intensified diplomatic and technological competitions between the US and China under both the Trump and Biden Administrations. Drawing upon a case study of Singapore and Southeast Asia in general, this chapter examines the following questions pertaining to the rise of China and its impact upon the Chinese communities in the region: (1) How have the growing economic ties between China and Southeast Asia, facilitated significantly by the BRI, impact upon the local Chinese communities (in Singapore)? (2) What are the patterns of the Chinese business communities’ and voluntary associations’ engagement with the BRI; (3) What are the Singaporean government’s positions with regard to their ethnic Chinese communities’ renewed interests in their ancestral homelands?
The article is devoted to the concept of “civilization state” as a direction in the development of civilizational theory. It analyzes the history of scientific application of the concept of civilization, the content, composition and structure of civilizations, historical and geopolitical determinants of the confrontation between the West and Russia, the deepening of the civilizational confrontation “West - Russia” in the 21 st century, the phenomena of “nation state” and “civilization state”, the civilizationally determined trends of transformation of the modern world order. Initially used to describe the social and political life in different countries, at the turn of the 19 th - 20 th centuries civilization theory became an independent scientific direction. Its breakthrough achievement was the understanding of history as a multitude of local civilizations with unique specificity. The analysis of the content, composition and structure of local civilizations, their subsystems and elements united into unique integral conglomerates became a promising direction of civilization research. Historical and geopolitical determinants of the confrontation between the West and Russia, its deepening in the 21 st century are explored. Particular attention is paid to “nation states” and “civilization states” as terms widely used in contemporary civilizational theory, reflecting different civilization-determined ways of domestic and foreign policy behavior of the states. Assumptions are formulated about their further coexistence and interaction, upcoming transformations of the world order, and the new stage in the development of civilizational theory.
The rise of China constitutes a challenge for the U.S. hegemonic aspirations. However, Washington reacts to it rather belatedly and with restrain. Up until the mid-2020s, the United States did not consider the preventive use of force as a means to deter its competitor. On the contrary, it maintained intensive economic ties with China, contributing to its further strengthening. The article argues that the U.S. policy towards China reflects the optimism within the U.S. leadership regarding the long-term preservation of the foundations of its international standing. In other words, the United States does not perceive itself a declining power; rather, it believes that China will not be able to compete with it in the forceable future. In this regard, the U.S. has pursued primarily a delaying strategy, combining restrained pressure with unwillingness to either escalate or make significant concessions. The U.S. optimism proceeds from the prevailing uncertainty in international relations about the relative balance of power among great powers and the unclear prospects of future shifts in national capabilities. Under these conditions, Washington relies on ideological convictions in the superiority of its political, economic and social model over its competitors and appeals to the past patterns of great power rivalry. This study covers the period from the late 2000s to the mid-2020s. The article begins with a theoretical justification of the origins of optimism of weakening powers. Then, it examines changes in balance of power between the U.S. and China based on traditional indicators of national capabilities. Following this, the article explores the arguments against the U.S. decline and summarizes official assessments of threats to U.S. global standing. Finally, it traces the comparative roles of accommodation, coercion and restraint in the U.S. policy towards China. The analysis envisages an adjustment in the conceptual understanding of the dynamics of great power rivalry. It demonstrates that the lack of reliable information does not necessarily lead to intensifications of rivalries (as suggested by the “security dilemma”), but can also limit confrontation.
Dünya ekonomisinde önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilen 1500 yılından sonra yaşanan gelişmeler, uzun tarihsel süreç içerisinde farklı zamanlarda farklı bölgelerin ön plana çıkmasına neden olmuştur. Mesela 1500 yılında dünya ekonomisinin merkezi Asya, bölgenin en güçlü ekonomileri Çin ve Hindistan iken; Merkantilizm ile başlayıp yaklaşık 300 yıl sonra Sanayi Devrimi ile devam eden bir süreçte dünya ekonomisinin merkezi yavaş yavaş Asya’dan Avrupa’ya, ekonomik güç ise Çin ve Hindistan’dan Birleşik Krallık’a geçmiştir.
Guided by the cultural game theory, WGTICC and cultural analysis model, this study has found such game intentions and communication strategies as shaming the invited counterpart versus correcting the host calmly, turning a debate into a Q&A versus using the Q&A as a meaningful presentation, and getting ready to listen versus demonstrating courage, sincerity, and cogency have been adopted during the 3 rounds of debate, thus illustrating and expanding the third assumption in the water and game theory from a win-loss to a win-loss-win result. In terms of cultural roots, Fox Business News, as an example of Western media, has been shifting from objective, accurate, and fair journalism ethics to unilateralism, catalyzed by prioritizing the US interests. In contrast, the Chinese media, like CGTN, have been reshaping themselves for survival and performance employing and developing multiple online platforms while converging with social media.
Bu çalışma, uluslararası siyasette medeniyet merkezli yaklaşımın, son çeyrek yüzyılda Batılı olmayan devletlerin siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri yükselişinin ardından daha belirgin hale geldiğini tartışmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, değişen uluslararası siyasi dengelerle birlikte Batı-dışı dünyanın, kendini ve çevresini yeniden tanımla isteği duyduğu gözlemlenmektedir. 20. yüzyılda göz ardı edilen din ve kültür gibi normatif olguların, medeniyet kavramı aracılığıyla devletlerin gündeminde yeniden su yüzüne çıktığı, Batı-dışı devletlerin dini ve kültürel kimliklerini adeta yeniden keşfettiği ve Batı dünyası ile olan ilişkilerini gözden geçirdiği görülmektedir. Bu medeniyet merkezli siyaset, Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında yeni kavramsallaştırmaların önünü açmış ve Türkiye, Çin, Rusya, Hindistan gibi devletlerin medeniyet devletleri olarak betimlenmesi sonucunu doğurmuştur. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma yükselen medeniyet merkezli yaklaşımı ve medeniyet devleti yaklaşımını tahlil etmeyi amaçlamaktadır.
India-Pakistan traditional enmity is one of the significant features of South
Asian politics characterized by Ballistic Missile and nuclear weapon rivalry.
Changing dynamics of Asian milieu largely driven by momentous
advancement of US-India strategic partnership and its retort through politics
of economic corridor are commencing a New Great Game in Asian Region.
This is leading to modify the strategic provisions of India and Pakistan
where pursuance of energy from Central Asian Region is largely seen as an
important approach to ensure security and strategic advantages. Likewise
American support to Indian pursuit of influence in the region and its
Connect Asia policy are concocting the imminent threats for Pakistan and
other major regional players which would bring a new breadth of conflict
between India and Pakistan. India recent active diplomacy and enhanced
interaction with Central Asian Republics (CARs) would advance an economic rivalry as this will contend Pakistan’s energy and security
interests in the region. This study expounds that rivalry over the energy
resources of Central Asian states between India and Pakistan would play
over a broader extra regional scenario as these resources are conclusive for
security schemes of New Delhi and Islamabad. Security reservations and
strategic interests of both states are extended to maintain their influences
and counter influences towards maintaining economic ties with Russia,
Afghanistan, Iran and most significantly Central Asian states. This research
further identifies that apart from Indian-Pakistan perpetual conflict as
nuclear weapon rivals in South Asia; discernment of strategic influence
based on zero sum conception combining with energy rivalry will extend
their animosity and conflict towards Central Asia and will bring challenges
of incorporating peace and prosperity to establish a wider economic zone
connecting the two regions. The principal argument of this paper is that
unless the strategic and security provisions of India and Pakistan as two
significant regional player of South Asia are linked with their economic
interests, the complementary economic collaborations between South Asian
and Central Asian regions cannot be magnificently achieved.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) can be used by sovereign states for strategic goals, including as a mechanism for exploitation, technology transfers, espionage, and political influence. The EU’s recently adopted foreign investment screening regulation (the Regulation) is a response to fears that state-led investment could strategically exploit the openness of the common market. The Regulation applies the concepts of ‘security’ and ‘public order’ as guidance to Member States restricting FDI. However, these concepts have no clear definition, raising concerns they may be abused for protectionist purposes. This article aims to contribute to the debate on whether these screening concepts are a reasonable response to state-based investment threats. It does so by taking a ‘threats-based’ approach to identifying relevant FDI risks for Member States’ economic and national security. China, the world’s second largest and heavily state-capitalist economy, is considered a key justification and yardstick for the EU’s new investment screening measures. Hence, identifying risks relating to Chinese FDI is a good starting point for assessing the Regulation. Drawing on institutional analysis of China’s economy, this article identifies unique threats arising from the country’s rule-by-law socialist system of governance, where traditional public–private distinctions are heavily blurred, if not obliterated. The nature of those risks suggests that the undefined concepts of ‘security’ and ‘public order’ are reasonable to achieve the goals of the Regulation. Furthermore, a threats-based approach to screening Chinese FDI leans towards a presumption of risk for sensitive sectors, for both SOEs and nominally private firms, due to deep institutional public–private linkages.KeywordsFDI screeningState capitalismChinaEUGeoeconomicsNational security
This chapter aims to analyse the participation of China in the World Economic Forum (WEF), popularly known as the Davos Forum, an independent international organization committed to improving the state of the world by engaging world leaders from different domains on the informal discussion of “themes that matter.” The Chinese leader has assumed in the WEF a position of defender of economic globalization, the opening of markets, and harmonious practices among states. However, from Chinese rhetoric and reality, there seem to be discrepancies. The main objective of this chapter is thus to look at this dissonance and to reach some conclusions. The authors consider that Xi Jinping’s speeches at the Davos Forum are above all an instrument of soft power, trying to show a positive image of the country, the success and superiority of its economic model and its values, while taking the lead in diplomatic influence. The chapter begins with an introduction, followed by a general description of China’s participation in the international economic architecture. Afterwards, the main features of the World Economic Forum are analysed, as well as China’s participation in this international organization. Before the final remarks, focus will be made on the dissonance between rhetoric and practice in China’s participation at the WEF.KeywordsChinaWorld Economic ForumGlobalizationPoliticsEconomic governance
The collapse of the Soviet Union and socialist commonwealth contributed to the reconstruction of integrity of the World-System. These changes became a major global transformation of the second half of the XX century. Then there was an opinion that over time the model of liberal capitalism would be established in all countries. However the restoration of the integrity of the global world did not lead to shaping of its homogeneity. New contradictions emerged both between developed and developing countries and within the core countries of the World-System. All of this undermined stability of the system and contributed to the gradual distraction of the unipolar world order. Russia initially tried to be integrated into the new world reality and become the main partner of the USA as a center of the World-System. However the plans of the United States and its allies did not provide that Russia would retain its role as an important and independent actor in world politics. As a result, Russia’s integration into the West did not take place. Nevertheless having made the transition to an independent policy not subordinated to the USA and its allies Russia could not claim to create alternative global social project as the Soviet Union had. To do this Russia had neither resources nor attractive idea for the rest of the world. As China began to turn into economic superpower it seemed that Beijing was not going to offer the world its own social project alternative to liberal capitalism but it claimed only to take place in existing global system corresponding to its economic impact. Situation was changed after the USA in the middle of the 10-th felt in China a serious rival and moved to the policy of deterrence of it. China began to work out its own model of the world order. Now in comparison with the past many experts suppose that Chinese model of the social and political order may be used by other developing countries. Will this lead to emergence of the new global project alternative to the Western liberal capitalism and to distraction of integrity of the World-System? Will there be a new global transformation as a result of current processes? This article is devoted to the analysis of probable prospects of these tendencies of the world development.
India is currently one of the countries that is showing massive economic growth, even according to Goldman Sachs projections in 2050 India will be in the third position as the country with the largest economy in the world. Economic growth is certainly supported by various sectors, one of which is a large workforce base which is then channeled through migration activities which eventually form a diaspora known as Non-recident Indians (NRIs) and Person of Indian Origin (PIO) with a total number of 30,995 .729 inhabitants and spread in 210 countries in the world. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the main destination country of migration for NRIs and PIOs after the United States and Pakistan, based on existing data the number of NRIs and PIOs in the UAE in 2017 was 3,500,000. The Indian government then used NRIs and PIOs in the UAE to make a significant contribution to India's development as a country of origin including remittances and foreign direct investment (FDI).
China is set to become the world’s largest economy. As the country becomes richer, it is likely to become more influential in foreign and military affairs. This raises the question as to the impact that an increasingly ascendant China would have on the rest of the world, including whether the West will continue to maintain the supremacy that it has enjoyed over the last centuries.
This is the Editorial Note to a journal special issue on: China's rise and the West
This paper briefly discusses the essence of the US-China
competition in Africa and introduces a principial
categorization to group their respective interests in Africa.
It is about what US and China individually want or seek to
achieve in Africa, through their own tools and policies
towards the continent. For that, we thought,
understanding these elements and dimensions will enable
the students of International Relations in general and of
great power politics, in particular, to better elucidate the
post-cold war international system dynamics especially, in
the developing world. The principal categorization,
through the case of the DRC, helps understand why the
US-China competition is overall moderate.
China needs a long-time peaceful and cooperative environment, and it has no intention to overthrow the existing basic international system. China supports a multiple world with different cultures, political systems and social structures based on the principle of mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. The relationship between China and the United States seems enter into a sensitive and dangerous time. We need new mind set and wisdom to handle such a complex and important relationship. China’s rise is a significant event in our world. The quick rise of China changes China itself and also changes the region and the world. Due to these changes, the relations between China and the outside world are undergoing significant restructuring. It is crucial to manage the changes smoothly so as to realize a peaceful age.
This article discusses the prospects of the Chinese renminbi (RMB) to expand its sphere of influence and become a full-scale reserve world currency. The methods used in the article are retrospective analysis and graphic analysis. The work is divided into three sections. The first section provides a broad overview of modern reserve currencies. The second part characterizes RMBs shaping as a reserve currency, as well as inner and outer factors that influence its status. The third section includes information about RMBs current status and its perspectives for being a reserve currency in the future. The article argues that currently RMB has already become a regional reserve currency in Asia-Pacific. Chinese government continues to make steps towards international expansion of RMB, yet these steps cannot make RMB one of the leading world currencies together with USD and EUR in the nearest decade.
The fact that "South-South" countries managed to avoid severe collapse in the global financial crisis (2007-2008) as happened in U.S. and EU, is a contradiction when the "South-South" at the same time are often disadvantaged in trade patterns. As the study of chaotic Asian crisis (1997-1998), many countries (on "South-South") are actually very disadvantaged in its main Doha Round of WTO rules, are struggling hard to optimize the productivity that can be achieved. Happened a wide selection of radical economic policies that have been and will run various countries. On one hand, there are policy options isn't enough if associated process of building solution-based collective recession settlement between states. In other words, as an effort to evaluate the regulation of international trade policy in the WTO, while adjusting needs a sense of justice for the country "South" for a dozen years caving in on WTO rules, present mometum significant change rules. Plan of Bali Round (2013) is expected to be generated in the WTO meeting in this year. Where the round is expected to not only adapt to today's trade map no longer dominated by the countries like US, EU countries, etc. But give justice a far greater for developing countries that are represented in the "South-South".
Sejak reformasi China yang dilakukan oleh Deng Xiaoping pada tahun 1978 dan dilanjutkan oleh Xi Jinping yang lebih aktif pada tahun 2013, dengan membentuk jalur ekonomi sutra baru Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) dengan tujuan menciptakan kerjasama dan interdependensi serta harmoni pada tatanan kawasan Asia-Pasifik dan Global. Landasan BRI ini adalah salah satu bentuk romantisasi sejarah pada masa dinasti Han dengan jalur ekonomi sutra lama. Akan Tetapi kepentingan BRI terhadap negara-negara partner menjadi ancaman tersendiri dengan adanya �Debt trap� atau jebakan Utang yang dilakukan oleh China alih-alih bantuan infrastuktur. Sehigga BRI adalah salah satu model �Tributary system� gaya baru ala Dinasti Ming-Qing yang dimana jebakan utang adalah salah satu pengabdian diri pada China sebagai negara inti. Hasil analisis menjelaskan bahwa pengaruh terhadap Timor Leste menjadi ancaman dengan meningkatnya utang sebesar 13 persen pada tahun 2016, namun dibantah oleh Timor Leste dan China sendiri yang dimana jebakan utang adalah konstruksi subjektivitas dari kekhawatiran AS dan sekutu terhadap dominasi China.
This book examines the development of bilateral energy relations between China and the two oil-rich countries, Kazakhstan and Russia.
Challenging conventional assumptions about energy politics and China’s global quest for oil, this book examines the interplay of politics and sociocultural contexts. It shows how energy resources become ideas and how these ideas are mobilized in the realm of international relations. China’s relations with Kazakhstan and Russia are simultaneously enabled and constrained by the discursive politics of oil. It is argued that to build collaborative and constructive energy relations with China, its partners in Kazakhstan, Russia, and elsewhere must consider not only the material realities of China’s energy industry and the institutional settings of China’s energy policy but also the multiple symbolic meanings that energy resources and, particularly, oil acquire in China.
China’s Energy Security and Relations with Petrostates offers a nuanced understanding of China’s bilateral energy relations with Kazakhstan and Russia, raising essential questions about the social logic of international energy politics. It will appeal to students and scholars of international relations, energy security, Chinese and post-Soviet studies, along with researchers working in the fields of energy policy and environmental sustainability.
India–China relation is witnessing its worst phase after the 1962 War. Recent aggression by the Chinese forces in the Galwan valley and killing of at least 20 Indian soldiers have posed serious security concerns for India. This article studies nature of threat China poses to India’s security and the latter’s choices to respond to it. In doing so, this article explores the theories of the balance of power, balance of threat and of balancing behaviour associated with realism. It argues that China is a threat to India’s security in the South Asian region as well as to its larger economic and geopolitical interests in world politics. Current realities of world politics restrict India’s choices, and if it has to survive and find its rightful place and increase influence in world affairs, it has no choice but to balance Chinese behaviour and not the power. This is a shift from the Waltzian analysis, which focuses on the balance of power. This article argues that when states do not have adequate internal capabilities to balance a state, they need not necessarily align with the threat (bandwagon) or with another great power to counter the threat. In an interconnected world, they have the choice to balance the behaviour of states that pose a threat by performing soft balancing. India has the choice to balance Chinese behaviour by making a regional alliance in the Indo-Pacific region, and it will be in India’s interests to carry out soft balancing. This article problematizes the proposition suggested by Rajesh Rajagopalan, in India’s Strategic Choices: China and the Balance of Power in Asia, that, to balance China, India should align with the United States. This article concludes with the argument that alignment with the United States is a perilous affair, and it shall give rise to greater insecurities. The more favourable alternative for India is to balance Chinese behaviour through soft balancing via Indo-Pacific.
Статья одной из первых в российском китаеведении применяет методы психографического анализа при изучении китайского общества. В работе рассмотрено восприятие двух образов Китая – современного и будущего – в сознании граждан КНР. В ходе полевого исследования в Китае создана база из 189 рисунков, среди которых выделено 785 образов. Эти образы были распределены по 14 контекстам (“природа”, “война”, “политика”, “культура” и др.). Во время сбора рисунков респонденты дополнительно опрашивались авторами вербальным способом для более глубокого понимания рисунков и адекватного выделения образов. Исследование показало высокие ожидания среди граждан КНР от будущего уровня жизни, веру в разрешимость экологической проблемы и опасения по поводу старения населения Китая. В образах будущего превалируют технологии и потребление. Вопреки ожиданиям авторов, образы, напрямую ассоциирующиеся с социализмом или коммунизмом, в рисунках граждан КНР практически отсутствовали. Особое внимание в исследовании уделено образу Китая на внешнеполитической арене и роли российско-китайских отношений. В восприятии граждан КНР Китай, обладая огромным потенциалом и превосходством над многими странами, является мирным государством. Россия не играет значимой роли, но отмечается как важный геополитический игрок и стратегический партнер, а не союзник Китая. Исследование выявило расхождение между рисунками, касающимися роли Китая в мире, и их объяснениями. Респонденты изображали Китай больше и мощнее других стран, однако вербально отрицали тезис о том, что Китай стремится стать “номером один”. То же можно сказать и про образ России как партнера: вербально респонденты отмечали важность отношений двух стран, при этом на большинстве рисунков Россия была изображена примерно так же, как и другие соседи Китая.
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