Article

La cláusula de rescate anticipado en las emisiones de deuda privada

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Abstract

En una parte significativa de las emisiones de deuda privada, las empresas suelen incluir una cláusula de rescate anticipado a su favor que les permite amortizarla anticipadamente en un momento futuro, según unas condiciones predeterminadas en el contrato de emisión. En este artículo se analiza la raison d¿être que justifica la existencia de esta cláusula en muchas de las emisiones de renta fija privada, a través de las funciones que cumple y las servidumbres que conlleva.

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