Content uploaded by Kernaghan Webb
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Kernaghan Webb on Sep 05, 2019
Content may be subject to copyright.
A preview of the PDF is not available
Voluntary Codes: Private Governance, The Public Interest and Innovation
Abstract
This volume analyzes the various ways that voluntary codes are used to regulate private sector behaviour, and the implications of this form of regulation, when compared with more conventional regulatory approaches.
... In combination with a growing and widespread mistrust towards manufactures' selfclaimed environmentally friendliness (Harrison, 2008), eco-labels were seen as a salvation to consumers' scepticism and a forceful response that would help and guide people in their daily purchase decisions. ...
... Since they do not contain any active ingredient (biocide), they are not subject to any registration or approval procedure similar to their biocidal counterparts. Nevertheless, paint products have to fulfil REACH requirements 43 , regulations on Volatile Organic Compounds, VOCs (2004/42/CE), as well as regulations of the labelling directive and classicisation (EC No. 1272/2008, packaging and labelling of dangerous substances i.e. negative information labelling requirements in the form of warnings (Watermann et al., 2004;Ytreberg et al., 2010). The mechanical antifouling methods are not subject to any approval process nor comprehensive labelling requirements. ...
... As communities of practice, technical communities' primary contribution to governance lies in the development of subdisciplines themselves via research output, the development of standards. Voluntary codes of conduct Johnson (2018), Webb (2004) represent another form of behavioural standardisation and self-regulation among technical communities across different technology sectors. Standards represent critical governance instruments due to their effect on research and development, coordination, production and market penetration of technologies Tassey (2000). ...
The emergence of quantum information technologies with potential application across diverse industrial, consumer and technical domains has thrown into relief the need for practical approaches to their governance. Technology governance must balance multiple objectives including facilitating technological development while meeting legal requirements, normative expectations and managing risks regarding the use of such technology. In this paper, we articulate a variety of idealised governance models and approaches for synthesising these complementary and sometimes competing objectives. We set out a comparative analysis of quantum governance in the context of existing models of technological governance. Using this approach, we develop an actor-instrument model for quantum governance, denoted the ‘quantum governance stack’, across a governance hierarchy from states and governments through to public and private institutions. Our model sets out key characteristics that quantum governance should exhibit at each level in the stack, including identification of stakeholder rights, interests and obligations impacted by quantum technologies and the appropriate instruments by which such impacts are managed. We argue that quantum governance must be responsive based on (a) the state of technology at the time; (b) resource and economic requirements for its development; and (c) assessments and estimates of the near-term and future impacts of such technology. Our work provides a pragmatic introduction to quantum governance by (a) specifying a taxonomy of governance actors and instruments and (b) providing examples of how different stakeholders within the stack might implement governance responses to quantum information technologies. It is intended for use by stakeholders in government, industry, academia and civil society to help inform their governance response to the quantum technology revolution.
... Where national and international regulation of significant global social and environmental problems has been absent or weak, an array of voluntary, self-regulatory, shared governance, and private arrangements has begun to fill the policy void (Howlett 2000;Haufler 2001;Gunningham et al. 2003;Ruggie 2004;Hay et al. 2005). The interdisciplinary literature that has emerged to describe, understand, and explain the rise of these mechanisms includes rich descriptions of corporate social responsibility (CSR) (Vogel 2005), industry self-regulation (Webb 2002), political consumerism (Micheletti et al. 2003), voluntary instruments, and public-private partnerships (Rosenau 2000;Börzel & Risse 2005). In addition, large-N (Prakash & Potoski 2006) and historical case studies (Boström 2003;Gulbrandsen 2005;Sasser et al. 2006) have addressed why specific types of private authority emerged, and why firm-level support for such mechanisms often varies within and across sectors. ...
When humanity, with an armed ship, went from Northern Europe to Africa to take its own kind to America for slavery;
And when opium was forcibly imported into a country and despite the resistance of the oppressed rulers, he started a war to force that country to import opium in the name of free trade;
Or when he cut off the hands of the people of another country for the crime of not working on the products belonging to their country;
All of these have been happened behind the concept of legal personality and under the title of Multinational Corporation.
Now, in the present age, the story of selfishness of modern reason has only changed its face and it still remains in another form.
It is not an exaggeration to say that all environmental pollution and climate changes, privacy violations, work-related rules, and human rights violations are caused by the direct activities of companies or by their products.
Now, the answer to the question of what should be done in front of these economic giants, which have become much more evolved than their predatory ancestors, is apparently not easy.
The global compact is one of the numerous answers that emerged with the invention of the direct confrontation between the United Nations and the corporation, and in the words of Kofi Annan:
You, the business leaders, and we, the United Nations, initiate a global compact of shared values and principles which will give a human face to the global market.
The following article explains and defends the philosophy of the global agreement.
This chapter reviews the interrelation between collaborative governance (CG) and regulation and the way CG principles are reflected in the development of regulatory theory. CG is a governing method involving government and nongovernment partners. The use of CG can be found in many policy areas. The method is also used in regulation and in various models that can be framed as “collaborative regulation” (CR). Despite the close connection between CG and CR, they are discussed separately in the literature and without any reference as to how the two are interrelated. The regulatory literature is also missing an analytic overview of the roots and development of CR and its relation with voluntary regulation models. The chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature.
This study examines the governance approaches applying to Ontario’s municipal water management activities and observes an environmental policy convergence occurring in two different dimensions: across the drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater aspects of municipal water activities with respect to governance approaches, and federal, provincial, and municipal governments in terms of drawing on private management system standards to supplement conventional regulatory requirements. This study supports the proposition that municipal water governance approaches are developed within a context that includes both state-based requirements and non-state marketoriented standards such as ISO 9001 and ISO 14001, and this context facilitates convergence and calibration between and among state-based and private governance at the public policy level adopted by municipalities. In addition to increasing use of private environmental management systems (EMSs) by Ontario municipalities as methods of addressing operational challenges they face Canadian courts are also referencing EMS in their decisions. This article suggests that EMS standards such as ISO 14001 can be useful supplements to state regulations, and this supplementing would not be characterized as supplanting or substituting conventional state-based regulation, but rather as a form of practical and conceptual ‘bridge’ between public and private forms of regulation.
Die dritte Generation der Äquatorprinzipien (EPs) enthält erstmals explizite Verweise auf John Ruggies ‚Protect, Respect and Remedy‘ Framework sowie die UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Grund genug, die EPs einer kritischen wirtschaftsethischen Analyse zu unterziehen. Die hier vorgelegte Argumentation schließt an die sogenannte Transnationalisierungs- sowie ‚Business and Human Rights‘ Debatte der vergangenen Jahre an und macht Gebrauch von der Unterscheidung negativer und positiver Pflichten sowie von impact- versus leverage-basierter Verantwortung. Während Ruggies Ansatz einem negativen und impact-basierten Verantwortungskonzept nahesteht, fordert der vorliegende Aufsatz einen positiven und leverage-basierten Ansatz auch und insbesondere für die EPs und die sie implementierenden Finanzinstitute. Die hier vorgestellten Reformmaßnahmen sollen helfen, die bisherigen Schwachstellen der EPs zu beheben und die Grundlage für eine kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung der EPs auf dem Weg hin zu einem positiven und leverage-basierten Verantwortungskonzept zu legen.
The story of technology and law has often been about the law lagging behind innovation. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) instruments, because of their transnational amenability, responsiveness to change and non-binding nature, have been increasingly deployed to fill the perceived governance gap. This chapter examines the various CSR frameworks that guide or govern online service providers (OSP), such as search engine providers, social networking providers, payment providers, and e-commerce platforms. It will focus on three influential initiatives: the United Nations Guiding Principles, the European Commission ICT Sector Guidance and the Global Network Initiative. The core question for OSPs, as with any company, is how do we make them accountable for their human rights impact? This entails analysis of some of the following questions. What value, if any, do such CSR frameworks offer to the protection of human rights online and what are their drawbacks? Relatedly, how do we know if these CSR frameworks are a success? What factors lead to the conclusion that CSR, in a given situation or sector, is an ill-suited device where more traditional legal measures are needed?
The failure of governments and international institutions to effectively address significant global social and environmental problems has created a policy void that an array of voluntary, self-regulatory, shared governance and private arrangements are beginning to fill (Andrews 1998; Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton 2003; Harrison 1998; Howlett 2000; Rosenbaum 1995; Rosenau 2000; Ruggie 2004; Webb 2002). Despite increasing scholarly attention to these new policy arenas, most current research conflates these initiatives with what is arguably the most conceptually distinct and authoritative form of non-state global governance to arise in the last 50 years: non-state market driven (NSMD) governance systems (Cashore 2002). Their purpose is to develop socially and environmentally responsible practices in the marketplace by creating incentives and disincentives, through market supply chains, often through the use of a label that signals compliance to pre-established standards. Their distinctiveness is especially notable along two dimensions. First, they include governance institutions with decisionmaking and compliance mechanisms. Second, contrary to the vast majority of voluntary or self-regulatory initiatives, NSMD governance systems reject state sovereign authority, turning instead to markets (firms, consumers, as well as affected societal actors) for legitimacy to govern.
Since its operational launch in 2000, the United Nations Global Compact has attracted a good deal of both support and criticism. The Compact represents the world’s largest network-based voluntary corporate citizenship initiative.1 The term ‘corporate citizenship’ is adopted here from the literature as a descriptor for a voluntary change of business practices to meet the responsibilities imposed on firms by their stakeholders.2 It is, however, outside the scope of this chapter to undertake a careful delineation of its similarities and differences with ‘corporate responsibility’. Although progress has been made in terms of the large number of business and non-business participants (now numbering 7,300) and improvements in business practices have been presented (McKinsey3 concludes that nine out of ten participants are doing more towards the Compact’s principles than they were 5 years ago), this progress also brought about a lot of criticism, largely from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), academics and the wider press. Thérien and Pouliot,4 for instance, argue that the Compact fosters a ‘pro-market spin’ that breaks with the UN’s traditional position and thus is eroding its legitimacy in the long run. Amnesty International5 complains about the missing accountability of the initiative and asks for a more rigorous assessment of whether participants are really complying with the principles. In a more radical way, Sethi argues that the Compact ‘provides a venue for opportunistic companies to make grandiose statements of corporate citizenship without worrying about being called to account for their actions’.6
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.