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A Macro Political Examination of the Partisan and Ideological Divide in Aggregate Public Concern over Climate Change in the U.S. between 2001 and 2013

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Recent individual level analyses have detailed a progressive polarization between political parties in public concern and understanding of climate change. These micro political analyses are limited by the data and time-scale available in the use of a single surveying organization and instrument. In this paper, we employ macro political analysis of all relevant polling data available on the Roper iPoll Database to develop reliable and valid measures of aggregate public concern over the issue of climate change across a 13-year time-period. Aggregate public opinion is analyzed and separated by political ideology and party identification using Stimson‟s (1999) method for pooling multiple polls. Through statistical analysis of six measures of aggregate public opinion trends, we find significant differences between trends in public concern across political and ideological lines, and find that the political right and political left have not only become more polarized on the issue of climate change between 2001 and 2013, but that the populations are not moving as parallel publics as previous literature suggests they might.
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A Macro Political Examination of the Partisan and
Ideological Divide in Aggregate Public Concern over
Climate Change in the U.S. between 2001 and 2013
Joanna K. Huxster (Corresponding author)
Department of Sociology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA United States
E-mail: jkh49@drexel.edu
Jason T. Carmichael
Department of Sociology, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
E-mail: Jason.carmichael@mcgill.ca
Robert J. Brulle
Department of Sociology, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA United States
E-mail: rbrulle@gmail.com
Received: November 1, 2014 Accepted: November 24, 2014
doi:10.5296/emsd.v4i1.6531 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/emsd.v4i1.6531
Abstract
Recent individual level analyses have detailed a progressive polarization between political
parties in public concern and understanding of climate change. These micro political analyses
are limited by the data and time-scale available in the use of a single surveying organization
and instrument. In this paper, we employ macro political analysis of all relevant polling data
available on the Roper iPoll Database to develop reliable and valid measures of aggregate
public concern over the issue of climate change across a 13-year time-period. Aggregate public
opinion is analyzed and separated by political ideology and party identification using Stimson‟s
(1999) method for pooling multiple polls. Through statistical analysis of six measures of
aggregate public opinion trends, we find significant differences between trends in public
concern across political and ideological lines, and find that the political right and political left
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have not only become more polarized on the issue of climate change between 2001 and 2013,
but that the populations are not moving as parallel publics as previous literature suggests they
might.
Keywords: Climate change, Public opinion, Political polarization
1. Introduction
Individual-level analyses have detailed a progressive polarization between political parties in
public concern about climate change (Guber 2013, McCright 2011), but these analyses are
often plagued by limitations in the availability of repeated survey items that track this issue
over time. We have overcome previous limitations by developing separate quarterly measures
of concern over global climate change by both party affiliation and political ideology utilizing
Stimson‟s method of constructing aggregate public opinion measures (Stimson 1999). This
aggregate measure of climate change concern is based on data from 69 surveys administered
between 2001 and 2013. These measures present us with a significant divide between the
political right and the political left. We also show that polarization in climate change concern
has grown over the 13-year time period, and that these populations are not moving as “parallel
publics” as previous literature suggests (Kellstedt 2003, Enns and Kellstedt 2008).
In a 2014 Gallup Poll, 83% of Democrats and only 38% of Republicans expressed concern over
climate change, and several individual-level analyses detailed this progressive polarization
(Guber 2013, McCright 2011, Krosnick et al 2006). There is, however, a great deal of variation
in the data collected at the individual-level. For example, in Pew Research Center‟s 2014 report,
50% of Republicans indicated concern over climate change, with Democrats at 81%. While
there has been some important work in this area, the existing analyses are limited in time-scale,
to a single data source, and by question wording. McCright and Dunlap (2011) for instance,
report an increase in political polarization on the subject of climate change but their study uses
only annual data and relies exclusively on questions derived from Gallup polls. Guber (2013)
also finds a polarization in climate change concern, but her analyses only examine changes
across three cross-sectional polls administered at 10-year intervals, again drawing only from
Gallup. While these individual-level studies do help identify the polarized nature of the debate
about climate change, the data limitations from which they suffer beg for a more robust
examination.
To remedy this problem, we utilize the “policy mood” approach developed by James Stimson
to construct six separate climate change indices. With these indices, we present a robust
indicator of the quarterly shifts in climate change concern between 2001 and 2013,
disaggregated by party affiliation and political ideology, as well as for the overall population.
Unlike prior studies in this area, this approach will allow us to incorporate all of the available
U.S. national public opinion polls on climate change rather than relying on just one poll or
organization. We compare these groups, and conclude with observations on the utility of these
measures and areas for future research. This type of aggregation allows us to tell a more
complete story than do individual-source analyses, by including a diverse set of survey items
on climate change concern derived from multiple polling organizations, with questions
administered multiple times per year.
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1.1 Macro Politics and Aggregate Analysis
There are two different approaches to the measurement of public opinion. The first and most
common is the analysis of micro politics. Based in psychology, this approach analyzes the
individual-level characteristics that produce variations in specific attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors through the use of survey research. The second approach to the study of public
opinion is known as macro politics. Instead of focusing on the individual, the unit of analysis is
public opinion data aggregated to some larger unit (typically, the entire country). This approach
focuses on the structural conditions that may drive changes in aggregate public opinion over
time (Erikson et al 2002, Stimson 2004). Given that this research aims to study macro-level
phenomenon and the movement of U.S. public concern over climate change across time, a
macro political approach is more appropriate for this analysis (Keele 2007).
Periodic surveys of public opinion related to climate change have very recently been
developed
1
, but many years will pass before these measures provide sufficient cases to estimate
shifts using time-series techniques. In addition, these surveys will do little to capture data from
the past due to inconsistencies in question wording and survey administration. In 2012, Brulle
et al developed the first valid trend measure of this subject, the Climate Change Threat Index
(CCTI), for the years 2002 through 2010 using Stimson‟s “Policy Mood” analysis (Brulle 2012,
Stimson 1999). In his research, Stimson developed an algorithm to measure “policy moods”
over time by using all existing survey data related to a particular social issue to construct a
longitudinal index of public opinion.
Stimson‟s “Policy Mood” analysis and algorithm have been effectively applied to a number of
topics in sociology and political science (Kellstedt 2003, Kellstedt et al 2008, Brulle 2013,
Ramirez 2013, Krosnick 2006). There are several advantages of this aggregate approach over
individual-level analyses. By developing an aggregate “Policy Mood”, the Stimson algorithm
can provide more accurate measures of issue or policy concern because it can utilize all the
available survey data about a particular subject. The use of an algorithm to mathematically
standardize data across multiple polling organizations has the advantage of minimizing the
influence of researcher discretion in their specific survey item selection, and allows the
measure to be invariant with respect to differences in question wording across polling
organizations (Stimson 1999). A more complete explanation of Stimson‟s methodology and
algorithm can be found in the Methods section of this paper.
1.2 Parallel Publics
The literature on aggregate public opinion measures posits that “parallel publics” exist, and
that for some portions of the public, opinion is stable and fixed mainly by social and
ideological identities (Enns and Kellstedt 2008, Brulle 2012, Kellstedt 2010). However,
micro-political literature also shows a widening partisan divide on the issue of climate change,
which indicates that individuals may be responding differently to media coverage and political
cues depending on their own political beliefs. Furthermore, recent studies show that
1
See the Six Americas Project at the George Mason University Center for Climate Change Communication
(http://www.climatechangecommunication.org/) and the work of Jon Krosnick
(http://climatepublicopinion.stanford.edu/).
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self-identified liberals and democrats are more likely than political conservatives to report
beliefs consistent with the scientific consensus about climate change (IPCC 2013), and that the
ideological and partisan gap in climate change beliefs has increased significantly between 2001
and 2010 (Guber 2013, McCright 2011). A macro-political approach to this question, which has
not been explored prior to this study, will allow for the testing of the existence of “parallel
publics” on this subject.
Building on this literature, we seek to use a more robust, aggregate-level analysis to ask the
following questions: 1) Does the gap in concern over climate change between Republican and
Democrats (or Conservatives and Liberals) increase between 2001 and 2013?; and 2) Do the
ideological and partisan groups move as “parallel publics” in their climate change concern over
this 13-year time period? We answer these questions using Stimson‟s algorithm to calculate a
public mood using all available polling data since 2001. Doing so will help improve our
understanding of the ideological divide in climate change beliefs by applying a more vigorous
and reliable measure of public opinion.
2. Methods
In applying Stimson‟s methodology, survey marginals for responses of interest are compiled
from all relevant questions, making each nationwide survey a single data point. These data
points can then be analyzed over time, using Stimson‟s algorithm.8 The algorithm examines the
relationship between the marginals, and places each survey on a common metric of ratios by
comparing the survey marginal for a question with itself across time. The algorithm then
averages the questions across question and time using backward and forward recursion, filling
in missing data along the way (Kellstedt 2010). This develops a measure of central tendency,
creating a comparable metric for each survey question. The resulting variations in the metric
are used to measure the “policy mood.” One important advantage of this methodology is that
existing data can be used to calculate any missing data, for example, in a year in which no
survey was asked during a particular quarter. This aspect of the methodology solves a historical
problem in measuring public opinion over time with traditional social research methodologies.
To measure and examine public opinion on climate change we constructed several time-series
using data drawn from the Roper Center iPoll database. The database was searched for poll
questions containing the words “climate change” or “global warming” and questions were
selected from the search results that asked respondents to assess the level of threat they
perceive from climate change. Our search identified 20 different questions from 8 different
polling organizations that asked about climate change. For the majority of these polls,
respondents were asked to indicate their political ideology and/or their party affiliation. Using
this political identification data, combined with questions related to climate change, we were
able to calculate both an Ideology Climate Change Threat Index (ICCTI) and a Party Climate
Change threat Index (PCCTI).
2
Between 2001 and 2013, the ICCTI included 65 surveys, which were administered to 88,711
2
In ideological identification questions where respondents were given a choice between extreme and average ideology (e.g.
very liberal and liberal), the two choices were combined.
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respondents, and the PCCTI included 69 surveys, administered to 95,981 respondents
3
. The
inclusion of these survey questions creates a comprehensive and robust sample of all climate
change surveys conducted in the United States. A list of the specific questions, dates
administered, survey marginals, and polling organizations can be found in Table S1, and the
variable loadings for the commonality estimates can be seen in Table S3, both in the
supplementary material accompanying this article online. The method of data collection for
each survey variable was consistent across all of the administrations, insuring the
comparability of the survey marginals across the time period
4
. The survey marginal scores
were processed through Stimson‟s algorithm using the WCALC program
5
to calculate the
ICCTI and PCCTI on a quarterly basis. For the ICCTI this included three indices for
conservatives, liberals, and all respondents. For the PCCTI the three indices were for
Republicans, Democrats, and all respondents. Using these separate series, we are able to make
meaningful comparisons about public concern over climate change separated by political
identification between 2001 and 2013.
The distribution of the surveys including climate change concern questions used for the PCCTI
and ICCTI are shown in Table S2 in the online supplementary material. It should be noted that
in 2004, only three questions were available from the database, and these were all asked in the
first quarter of the year. The data from the other three quarters are interpolated by averaging
survey marginals from the first quarter of 2004 and from the first quarter of 2005. The use of
the Stimson algorithm allows for this missing data to be interpolated and filled in, but it should
be noted that the measurement is not as robust for 2004 as it is in other years.
A two-tailed, Pearson correlation was performed to determine whether the ICCTI and the
PCCTI were comparable given the small differences in the included survey administrations
(Table 2). We find that the PCCTI and ICCTI were highly correlated with an r value of .990,
and a significance at of p< .001.
3. Results
A longitudinal measure of public climate change concern was constructed by applying the
Stimson algorithm to the polling data drawn from the Roper iPoll database. The demographic
data from these surveys was used to create two indices for all respondents (PCCTI and ICCTI)
6
, and one index each for Republicans, Democrats, conservatives, and liberals. Descriptive
statistics for the indices are shown in Table 1 and the graphed indices over the 13-year time
period can be seen in Figure 1.
Table 1 and Figure 1 show distinct separation between the political left (Democrats and liberals)
and the political right (Republicans and conservatives) in the mean aggregate scores and the
trend across the time series. The significance between the two political and ideological
3
The ICCTI only includes 65 of the 69 surveys because five of the surveys did not ask respondents about their ideological
positions.
4
All of the polling organizations except for Yale/George Mason used telephone surveys for each administration of their
survey. Yale/George Mason administered all of the variables included in this study online.
5
The WCALC program is available online at http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/
6
Two separate indices were created for party identification (PCCTI) and political ideology (ICCTI) because 4 of the surveys
did not ask respondents about their ideological identification
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extremes, and the apparent increase in the gap between these extremes, are analyzed below to
answer the research questions.
With the comparability of the PCCTI and ICCTI established in the Methods section, Pearson
correlations were run between all of the indices (Table 2). The results show that the liberal and
Democratic indices vary together (r=.876, p<.001), as do the conservative and Republican
indices (r=.905, p<.001). It appears that public concern about climate change is not influenced
by whether one measures climate change „mood‟ by party or by political ideology. There is,
however, a sizable difference (Figure 1) between the political left and political right in their
climate change concern. The correlations presented in Table 2 show that a statistically
significant difference in climate change concern exists between Republicans and Democrats
(.083, p>.05) and between conservatives and liberals (r=.055, p>.05). When we compile all
available polling data since 2001, it is clear that climate change has been exceptionally
polarized for both party affiliation and political ideology.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the U.S. climate change threat indices based on party
affiliation and political ideology.
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
Std. Deviation
Overall PCCTI
40.03
54.46
45.61
4.13
Republicans
18.84
34.04
25.31
3.76
Democrats
52.25
69.46
59.38
4.98
Overall ICCTI
40.31
53.27
45.27
3.81
Conservatives
22.15
40.33
30.53
4.27
Liberals
54.49
69.30
60.70
4.82
Table 2. Pearson correlations
Reps
Dems
ICCTI
Cons
Libs
Overall PCCTI
.603**
.739**
.990**
.662**
.708**
Republicans
-
.083
.616**
.905**
.001
Democrats
-
-
.735**
.179
.876**
Overall ICCTI
-
-
-
.662**
.702**
Conservatives
-
-
-
-
.055
Liberals
-
-
-
-
-
**p<.001 (two-tailed). Correlations of interest for addressing research questions in bold.
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Figure 1. U.S. climate change threat indices based on party affiliation and political ideology,
quarterly from 2001 to 2013.
To further analyze the relationship between the political right and the political left, we calculate
a set of gap scores indicating the difference between our CCTI scores for party and ideology.
Figure 2 shows partisan and ideological gaps for the climate change threat indices across the
time period. A larger gap between groups suggest a greater divide in concern on the issue of
climate change, while smaller gap numbers suggest that the groups are closer in opinion. We
see from Figure 2 that the gap in 2013 was twice that of 2001, indicating that climate change
concern has grown substantially more politically polarized. Also, we see that the gap between
Republicans and Democrats is consistently higher than it is between liberals and conservatives
To test the difference in the movements of the indices, and determine whether these groups
move in parallel, several statistical analyses were employed. Tests of the difference of means
reveal that the CCTI for Liberals, Mliberals = 60.70, is higher than the average concern amongst
Conservatives, Mconservative = 30.52 (t=34.78, p<.001). A similarly significant gap also exists
between Democrats and Republicans. Descriptive statistics also reveal that those on the right of
the political spectrum appear to be more willing than those on the left to change their position
over time about climate change. Specifically, the range of movement for Conservatives (18.2)
is larger than the range for Liberals (14.8).
While a substantial gaps can be seen in Figure 2 between the positions of those on the political
left and those on the political right, we must rely on statistical evidence to determine whether or
not these separate trends move in parallel. A simple t-test reveals that the mean gaps between
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political parties and between the political ideologies are statistically significant in each year
from 2001 through 2013 (in each year the gap was significant at the p<.001 level or greater).
Figure 2. Gaps in the U.S. climate change threat indices based on party affiliation and political
ideology, quarterly from 2001 to 2013.
4. Discussion and Conclusion
Utilizing Stimson‟s algorithm and “policy mood” technique, we find that individuals on the
political left and the political right had significantly different levels of concern for climate
change between 2001 and 2013, and that the polarization between these two groups has
increased over this time period. In particular, the mood measure of the political right dropped
by nearly half between 2007 and 2010. Since 2006, Liberals and Democrats showed more
concerned, while Republicans and conservatives were less concerned in 2013 than they have
been since the beginning of our time-series. Our findings of a growing partisan and ideological
divide in public climate change concern are further supported by simple calculations of the gap,
or the difference between partisan and ideological average threat index scores. The increase in
the partisan gap between 2001 and 2013 supports the assertions about the polarization of the
climate debate made in much of the recent literature, but does so using a more appropriate and
methodologically stronger, aggregate-level approach (Guber 2013, McCright 2011, Brulle
2012, Kellstedt et al 2008).
Several statistic analyses were employed to determine whether or not the political left and the
political right move in parallel for these measures. We find a significant gap between the
political left and the political right in the difference of mean, a difference in the range of motion
in public concern, and statistically significant mean gaps in each year of the study. These
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findings challenge arguments made in previous literature in which aggregate opinion measures
from subsets of the population move in parallel across groups (Kellstedt 2003, Enns and
Kellstedt 2008, Kellstedt et al 2008). Our findings indicate that for climate change concern
across party lines, this does not hold true.
Using Stimson‟s “policy mood” technique allowed for the inclusion of more survey data, from
a more diverse set of polling organizations than previous scholarship has been able to utilize
without such an approach. Our more robust mood measure disaggregated by the political right
and left allowed us to precisely track the increase in polarization on this issue. We also found
that climate change concern over time moves independently between the political right and the
political left. Future scholarship should work to reveal what factors influence the concern of the
different, politically divided populations, and to uncover ways of moving the public past the
partisan sorting and the resulting stalemate on climate change in the U.S.
Acknowledgement
We thank the Gallup organization and the Pew Research Center for their assistance in obtaining
additional demographic data not available on the Roper iPoll database.
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Supplementary Material
Table S1. Survey Questions used in the Partisan and Ideology Climate Change Threat Indices
Variable Name
Dates Administered
Survey
Variabl
e
Source
Not in
ICCTI
I'm going to read you a list of environmental problems. As I read each one, please tell
me if you personally worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, only a little,
or not at all. First, how much do you personally worry about...the 'greenhouse effect'
or global warming?
March 2001, April 2001,
March 2002, March 2003,
March 2004, March 2006,
March 2007, March 2008,
March 2009, March 2010,
March 2011, March 2012,
March 2013
Q12
Gallup Poll (AIPO)
Do you think that global warming will pose a threat to you or your way of life in your
lifetime?
March 2001, March 2002,
March 2006, March 2008,
March 2009, March 2010,
March 2012, March 2013
Q38
Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll
Thinking about what is said in the news, in your view is the seriousness of global
warming--generally exaggerated, generally correct, or is it generally
underestimated?**
March 2001, March 2002,
March 2003, March 2004,
March 2005, March 2006,
March 2007, March 2008,
March 2009, March 2010,
March 2011, March 2012,
March 2013
Q64
Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll
Which of the following statements reflects your view of when the effects of global
warming will begin to happen? They have already begun to happen. They will start
happening within a few years. They will start happening within your lifetime. They
will not happen within your lifetime, but they will affect future generations. They will
never happen.
March 2001, March 2002,
March 2003, March 2004,
March 2005, March 2006,
March 2007, March 2008,
March 2009, March 2010,
March 2011, March 2012,
March 2013
Q71
Gallup/CNN/USA
Today Poll
And in the next 10 years, how likely are you to be personally affected by the following
threat?...Very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, not at all likely...How likely are
you to be personally affected by the effects of global warming?
June 2005, June 2007, June
2008
Q2
Transatlantic Trends
Survey
June 2007
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(I am going to read you a list of possible international threats to the United States in
the next 10 years. Please tell me if you think each one on the list is an extremely
important threat, an important threat, or not an important threat at all.)...The effects of
global warming
June 2005, June 2006
Q999
Transatlantic Trends
Survey
Do you think global warming is an environmental problem that is causing a serious
impact now, or do you think global warming isn't having a serious impact?
September 2003, May 2006,
August 2006, January 2007
Q34
CBS News Poll
Do you think global warming is an environmental problem that is causing a serious
impact now, or do you think the impact of global warming won't happen until
sometime in the future, or do you think global warming won't have a serious impact at
all?
June 2001, April 2007, October
2007, December 2007,
February 2009, April 2010,
August 2010, October 2010
Q35
CBS News/New York
Times Poll
How important is the issue of global warming to you personally--extremely important,
very important, somewhat important, not too important, or not at all important?
March 2006, April 2007, July
2008
Q46
ABC
News/Time/Stanford
University Poll
March
2006
If nothing is done to reduce global warming in the future, how serious of a problem do
you think it will be for the United States--very serious, somewhat serious, not so
serious or not serious at all?
March 2006, June 2007,
September 2007
Q47A
ABC
News/Time/Stanford
University Poll
March
2006
Scientists use the term 'global warming' to refer to the idea that the world's average
temperature may be about five degrees Fahrenheit higher in 75 years than it is now.
Overall, would you say that global warming would be good, bad, or neither good nor
bad? If Good, ask: Would you say it would be very good or somewhat good? If Bad,
ask: Would you say it would be very bad or somewhat bad? If Neither, ask: Do you
lean toward thinking it would be good, lean toward thinking it would be bad, or don't
you lean either way?
April 2007, July 2008
Q58
ABC
News/Washington
Post/Stanford
University Poll
In your view, is global warming a very serious problem, somewhat serious, not too
serious, or not a problem?
June 2006, July 2006, January
2007, April 2007, April 2008,
April 2009, May 2009,
September 2009, October
2010, November 2011,
October 2012, March 2013
Q53
Pew News Interest
Index/Believability
Poll
I'd like to ask you about priorities for President [Obama/Bush] and Congress this year.
As I read from a list, tell me if you think each should be a top priority, important but
lower priority, not too important or should it not be done….Dealing with global
warming
January 2007, January 2008,
January 2009, January 2010,
January 2011, January 2012,
January 2013
Q30
Pew Research: Center
for the People and the
Press
Environmental Management and Sustainable Development
ISSN 2164-7682
2015, Vol. 4, No. 1
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13
I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for the US. Do you
think that...global climate change is a major threat, a minor threat or not a threat to the
well being of the United States?
November 2009, November
2013
Q32
Pew Research: Center
for the People and the
Press
(As I read a list of possible long-range foreign policy goals which the United States
might have, tell me how much priority you think each should be given.)...Dealing with
global climate change...Do you think this should have top priority, some priority, or no
priority at all?
October 2005, September
2008, November 2009, May
2011, November 2013
Q33E
Pew Research: Center
for the People and the
Press
Do you think global warming is a problem that requires immediate government action,
or don't you think it requires immediate government action?
July 2006, January 2007, April
2010, October 2010
Q63
Pew Research: Center
for the People and the
Press
How worried are you about global warming?
November 2008, January 2010,
June 2010, May 2011,
November 2011, March 2012,
September 2012, April 2013
QYM1
Yale and George
Mason
How much do you think global warming will harm you personally?
November 2008, January 2010,
June 2010, May 2011,
November 2011, March 2012,
September 2012, April 2013
QYM2
Yale and George
Mason
Six Americas Poll - % Concerned or Alarmed
November 2008, January 2010,
June 2010, May 2011,
November 2011, March 2012,
September 2012, April 2013
Q99
Yale University
I am going to read you a list of possible threats to the vital interests of the United
States in the next 10 years. For each one, please tell me if you see this as a critical
threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all.... Global
warming
June 2002, June 2006
Q9
CCFR Survey of
American Public
Opinion and U.S.
Foreign Policy
June 2002,
June 2006
Is the following something that you worry about a lot, is this something you worry
about somewhat or is this something you do not worry about?...Global warming
September 2006, March 2008
Q13
Public Agenda
Confidence in US
Foreign Policy Index
Poll
** Due to the wording of this question, the survey marginals used for this item were for the response “generally underestimated” to get a
positive measure of concern
Environmental Management and Sustainable Development
ISSN 2164-7682
2015, Vol. 4, No. 1
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14
Table S2. Distribution of Surveys including climate change concern questions used in the PCCTI and ICCTI
PCCTI
ICCTI
YEAR
Number of Surveys
Number of Questions
Number of Surveys
Number of Questions
2001
3
6
3
6
2002
2
5
2
5
2003
2
4
2
4
2004
1
3
1
3
2005
3
5
3
5
2006
9
11
7
8
2007
10
12
9
11
2008
8
14
8
14
2009
6
9
6
9
2010
8
9
8
9
2011
6
10
6
10
2012
5
9
5
9
2013
5
11
5
11
Total
69
108
65
104
Table S3. Variable Loadings and Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Cases
Dim 1 Loading
Mean
Std. Deviation
Q12
13
.961
31.538
4.466
Q13
2
-1.000
36.000
3.000
Q2
2
1.000
35.500
5.500
Q34
4
.984
65.500
4.031
Q35
10
.624
42.941
7.793
Q38
8
.563
35.125
3.018
Q46
2
1.000
49.000
3.000
Q47A
2
1.000
64.500
5.500
Q53
11
.875
40.000
4.954
Environmental Management and Sustainable Development
ISSN 2164-7682
2015, Vol. 4, No. 1
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15
Q58
2
1.000
39.000
1.000
Q64
13
.164
31.769
3.285
Q71
13
.893
53.769
3.445
Q99
8
.879
42.375
3.672
Q999
2
1.000
42.500
3.500
Q30
7
-.500
30.000
4.440
Q32
2
-1.000
44.500
.500
Q33E
5
.922
38.400
5.200
Q63
3
.679
63.000
3.742
QYM1
8
.798
54.375
3.967
QYM2
8
.338
33.750
4.841
Dimension 1 Information
Eigen Estimate 1.44 of possible 2.4
Pct Variance Explained: 60.04
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