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The Soviet Military Views Operation Desert Storm: A Preliminary Assessment

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$ZYIAITAQV
VIEWS
'9IPAION
DESERT
STORM:
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'4NARY'ASSESSMENT
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The
Soviet
Military
Views Operation
Desert
Storm:
.A
Preliminary
Assessment
UNCLASSIFIED
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Blank, Stephen J.
13a.
TYPE
OF
REPORT
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COVERED
J14.
DATE OF
REPORT
(Year,
Month.
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TO
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1991/09/,
3 37
16.
SUPPLEMENTARY
NOTATION
17.
COSATI
CODES
18.
SUBJECT
TERMS
(Continue
on
r.
c,'
4
necessary
and
identify
by block
number)
FIELD
GROUP
SUB.GROUP
Operation
Desert
Storm;
Soviet
Analysis; Soviet
military;
military
strategy
19.
ABSTRACT
(Continue
on
reverse
if
necessary
and
identify
by
block
number)
Operation
Desert
Storm,
the
U.S.
led
military
alliance
against Iraq's seizure
of
Kuwait in
1990-91,
is
undergoing examination by military
analysts across
the
globe.
The
war occurred
at
the same time
as
the
domestic crisis
over reform
of
the
Sriiet
system,
and
especially
its
military,
was
moving
to
a
peak. Accordingly,
the
Soviet
military discussion
of
the
war
reveals both
the
fissures
between
reformers and
conservatives
in
early
1991
and
the
'lessons
learned'
by
Soviet
observers concerning
modern
and
future
war.
Inasmuch
as
this
study
was
completed
before
the
August
revolution
that
followed
the
failed
coup
of
August
19,
it
might
seem
that such
discussions
are
forever
irrelevant. But
the
stra-
tegic
problems
confronting
the
military
and
its
civilian critics will
not
simply
go
away due
to
the
revolution,
though
major
changes
certainly
are
occurring
and
will
occur.
Accordingly
the
professional
Soviet
military
and
its
civilian
commanders will necessarily sooner or
later
have
to
respond
to
the
challenges
of
war
'in
the
third
dimension'
and
high-tech
con-
ventional
strike
systems
one
way
or
another.
Given
the
sophistication
of
Soviet
military(ove
20.
DISTRIBUTION
/AVAILABILITY
OF
ABSTRACT
21.
ABSTRACT
SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION
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USERS
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OF
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(Include
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Marianne
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DO
Form
1473,
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6
Previouseditlonsare
obsolete.
SECURITY
CLASSIFICATION OF
THIS
PAGE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
thinking
and
its
lasting importance
for
military
strategy and
policy,
the
outcome
of this
continuing learning
process
cannot
but
have
important
repercussions
for
U.S.
military
thinking
and
policy.
UNCLASSIFIED
I!
t
THE
SOVIET
MILITARY
VIEWS
OPERATION
DESERT
STORM:
A
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT
Stephen
J.
Blank
Av~qoxa
10
a
r
I~
)~
I.RA&I
.1 .a .. _ .. ..
J l
tia.o..
.. ._
'Vflstribitleu/
September
23,
1991
Avallaiiatty
Codee
Avail
aaxfst
DLt
Speial
The
views expressed
in
this
report
are
those
of
the author
and
do
not
necessarily
reflect
the
official
policy
or
position
of
the
Department
of
the
Army,
the
Department
of
Defense,
or
the
U.S.
Government.
Comments
pertaining
to
this
report
are
invited
and
should
be
forwarded
to:
Director,
Strategic Studies Institute,
U.S.
Army
War College,
Carlisle
Barracks,
PA
17013-5050.
Comments also
may
be
conveyed
directly
to
the author
by
calling commercial
(717)245-3234
or
AUTOVON
242-3234.
II
Ii
FOREWORD
Operation
Desert
Storm,
the
U.S.
led
military
alliance
against
Iraq's
seizure of
Kuwait
in
1990-91,
is
undergoing
examination
by
military
analysts
across
the
globe. The
war
occurred at the
same time as
the
domestic
crisis over
reform
of the
Soviet
system, and
especially
its
military,
was
moving to
a
peak.
Accordingly
the
Soviet
military
discussion
of the
war
reveals
both the
fissures
between
reformers
and
conservatives
in
early
1991
and
the
'lessons learned'
by
Soviet
observers concerning
modern
and
future
war.
These
'lessons'
herald
the
advent
of
'future war'
involving
long-range
conventional
strike
systems deployed hundreds
or
thousands
of miles
away
from
the target
and
the
crucial
impact these
systems
will
have.
Soviet
military observers contend
that
this
war's
course
and
outcome
validate
the
forecasts
made
a
decade or
more ago
by
Marshal
Ogarkov
and his
disciples
and
confront
the
Soviet
Union
with
major
new
threats that consign
it
to
technological
and
hence
strategic
inferiority
if it
does
not
meet
those
challenges.
The
lessons
that Soviet
observers
claim
to
learn from
this war
also
call
into
question
many
of
the
innovations
of the
Gorbachev
era
such
as
defensive'doctrine.
Inasmuch as
this study was
completed
before
the
August
revolution
that
followed
the
failed
coup
of August
19,
it
might seem
that
such
discussions
are
forever
irrelevant.
But
the
strategic
problems
confronting
the
military
and
its
civilian critics
will not
simply
go
away
due
to
the
revolution,
though
major
changes certainly
are
occurring
and will
occur.
Accordingly
the
professional Soviet
military
and
its
civilian
commanders will
necessarily
sooner
or later
have
to
respond
to
the
challenges of
war
'in
the
third
dimension'
and
high-tech
conventional
strike
systems
one
way
or
another.
Given
the
sophistication
of
Soviet
military
thinking
and
its
lasting importance
for
military
strategy
and
policy, the
outcome
of
this
continuing
learning
process
cannot
but
have
important
repercussions
for
U.S.
military
thinking
and
policy.
KARL W. ROBINSON
Colonel,
U.S.
Army
Director,
Strategic
Studies
Institute
i
THE
SOVIET
MILITARY
VIEWS
OPERATION
DESERT
STORM:
A
PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS
Introduction.
Analyzing Soviet 'lessons
learned'
from
Operation
Desert
Storm
at
present
resembles
shooting at
a
moving
target.
This
is
because
the
largely
secret
professional Soviet
analysis
of
the
war
is
currently
underway. The
Soviet
learning
process
will
last
for
many
years,
as
military writers
use
those lessons
for
partisan
purposes
or
forecast
future
trends
in
warfare,
often
in
the
same
work.
We
too
are
at
a
very
early
stage
in
assembling
and
processing
reports
and
information
from
the
theater.
Soviet
reports
and
observations
will
thus
be
even
more
partial
and
fragmented
than
ours.
Nevertheless
these
preliminary assessments,
largely
through
the spring
of
1991,
suggest
lines
of argument
that
will
surely appear
later
in
greater depth, detail,
and
sophistication
in
Soviet
military
media.
The
grave
Soviet
economic-political
crisis
and
its
impact
upon
military
budgets, force
structures,
and
strategic
planning
will
also
force analysis
of
this
war's
lessons. Attempts
to
use
the
war's assessments
to
protect
a
service,
collective
military,
or
reform
interest
will
certainly
continue.
And
the
very
fact
that our
victory
was
a
combined
arms
one
that
also employed
space
assets,
EW
(electronic
warfare),
and
a
healthy
dose of
covert
and
deception
operations will
lend some
credence to
both
reformers
and
military
modernizers.
In
other words,
future
analyses
will
likely
either derive
from
the
initial
results
of
these
analyses
or
will
attack
them.
The
entire
process
should
open
up new
opportunities
for
analyzing
how
Soviet
military
planners assess
modern
war
and
their
own
needs,
and make
Moscow's defense
policy
process
more
transparent.
The
War
and
Military
Reform.
Early
Soviet
commentary
on
Operation
Desert
Storm
may
be
divided
ioto
two
categories:
polemical
and
professional.
The
polemical analyses
relate
to
the intense
domestic
struggles
over
reform
in
general,
and
military
reform
in
particular,
during
early
1991.
The
professional
commentary
analyzed
Operation
Desert
Storm
to
learn
lessons
concerning
both
conventional
and
local
war
(i.e.,
war
in
a
single
state,
generally
in
the
Third
World).
The
same
article
may
contain
both
types
of
argument
because operational
analysis
and
threat
assessment
often
serve to
justify
appeals
for
budgetary
allocations
to
the military
as
a whole,
or
to a
particular service.
The
polemical
literature
mainly
extrapolated
specific
lessons
about
the
value of
a
professional
army
versus that
of
a
Soviet-type
conscript
army, and
on
the
performance
of Soviet
equipment,
tactics,
and
strategy
in
Iraqi
hands.
Indeed,
the
Soviet
press
polemics reached
the
level
of
a
veritable
'civil
war'
according
to a
KGB
publicist.
1
Soviet
reformers
hailed
the
decisive
U.S.
victory
as
their victory over
the
military
and
right-wing
forces
opposed
to
reform
in
domestic
and
foreign
policies,
e.g.,
support for
dictators
like Saddam Hussein.
2
Reformers
like
Sergei
Blagovolin,
head
of the
military
department
of
the
influential
Institute
for
World
Economy
and
International Relations,
claimed
the
war
validated their
calls
for
reform.
Blagovolin stated
that,
It's
simply
impossible
to
continue to
reject
the idea
of
deep military
reform
from
bottom
to top.
(The
Gulf
War)
plays
in
our favor
because
it's
absolutely
clear
that
these sophisticated
weapons
can't
be
used
with
high
efficiency
without
an
adequate
level
of
preparation
of
personnel,
and
also
demand
a
new
kind
of
commander.
3
Other
reformers
echoed
this view.
They
also
criticized
the
poor
quality
of
Soviet weaponry
and
personnel
and
stated
that
the
war
will
force
Moscow
to
create
a
professional
army
composed
of
troops
able
to
handle
modern
sophisticated
weaponry.
Other military
reformers
go
further
and
claim
that
the war's
outcome
invalidated
the
traditional
Soviet
strategy of
using
2
infantry
and
hugh
armored
forces
backed
up
by
massed
artillery
firepower.
Iraq,
they
maintain,
fought
according
to
Soviet
rules
and
teaching
that
are
incompatible
with
contemporary
military requirements.
4
Still
other critiques
of
the
Soviet
military
go
beyond
claiming
that
'Iraq
did
everything
according
to
the
prescription
of
the
Soviet
General
Staff'
(a
clearly
polemical
exaggeration for
internal
political purposes)
to
charge that Soviet equipment
actually
worsens
each
year
and
that
the
human
composition of
Soviet
armed
forces
is
no
better
than Iraq's.
Soviet
forces,
using
the
same equipment
and
doctrines,
and
plagued
with
comparable
shortcomings
in
'the
human
factor,'
must
perforce
be
reorganized.
5
Somecivilian
critiques
accurately
foretold the
lines
of
the
military
response. That response
took
the
form
of
arguing
that:
*
Iraq
suffered
from
technological
inferiority
vis-a-vis
the
allies
and did
not
have
state
of
the art
weaponry.
*
Arab
fighting
men
and
officers
are
no
good, hence their
morale
is
poor.
*
Iraqi
strategy
was
poor
and
badly
implemented.
6
And
this is
exactly
how
defenders
of
the
military argued
their
case
(this excludes
the
ridiculous articles
by
General
Filatov,
editor
of
Military-Historical
Journal,
that
the
offensives
had
bogged
down
and
that the allies
would
lose
the war).
7
No
Soviet
analyst disputes overall
Western
technological
superiority.
But
some
are
at
pains
to
redeem
the
'honor'
of
individual
Soviet
weapon
systems
or
alternatively
to
downgrade
American
ones
like
the
Patriot,
the
Abrams
M-1
Tank,
or
the
M-16.
Soviet
military
media
even
resorted
to
getting
testimonials
from
Syria's
defense
minister
attesting
to
the
quality
of Soviet
systems.
8
He
was
not
alone.
Marshal
Yazov
said that
the
Soviet
T-62
tank
outperformed
the
M-1
in
desert
warfare.
9
Lower-level
commentators
repeated
that
assessment
and
expanded
it
to
aircraft
as
well.
10 In
all
cases
they stated that
Iraqi
equipment was
generally
older
than
allied
equipment
and
that
it
was
maldeployed
by
Saddam
Hussein,
or
not
set
up
for
the
kind
of
warfare employed
by the
allies.
3
SCUD
missiles
were
also
altered
to
reach
Israel,
thus
decreasing
their accuracy
and
impact.
1
The
quality
of
the
Iraqi
soldier
and
his
officers
also
came
in
for
deserved
criticism
in
these
articles.
12
Finally,
in
all
cases,
the
defenders
of
Soviet
military
equipment
and
strategy
opined
that
the West
used
the war,
like
past wars
in
the Middle East,
for
giving
new
weapons
systems
that
are
changing
the nature
of
modern
war
a
final
operational
test.
These
weapons
range
from
anti-ship
missiles, to
helicopters,
to
reconnaissance
and
reconnaissance
strike
systems
(RUKs
in
Russian).'
3
Accordingly
they
discern
two
strategic
threats
as
a
result
of
the
war.
They
are
the
actualization
of
a
revolution
in
military affairs
due
to
conventional
high
precision
munitions
and
RUKs, as
Marshal
Ogarkov
foretold,
and
second,
the
prospect of
a
permanent
U.S.
military presence
in
the
Middle
East.1
4
The
latter
threat
takes
the
form
of
a
permanent
U.S.
presence,
mainly
naval
and
air,
in
the Gulf,
control
over
oil
supplies
that could
be
used
later
as
energy
blackmail
against
a
USSR
forced
to
import
oil,
or
indirectly
through pressure
on
Europe or
Japan's
trade with
Moscow,
and
the
continuing
high
level
of arms
transfers
to
Middle
Eastern
states.
What
particularly
disturbs
Soviet
planners
is
the
proximity
of
such
threats
and
arms
transfers
to
an
inflamed
Soviet
Transcaucasia
and
Soviet
Central Asia, which
could
be
embroiled
in
an
anti-Western,
or
anti-Soviet
fundamentalist
assault,
or other
scenarios
aimed
at
breaking
up
the
USSR.'
5
These
threat assessments
link
overtly
polemical
defenses
of
traditional
military
policies-including
suspicion
if
not
hostility
towards
America-to
more
professional
analyses
of
the
war's
lessons.
16
Professional
Lessons.
Threat
assessments
of
the
war
connect
purely
polemical
and
political
arguments
about
the
war's
lessons
to
more
professional
ones,
and
illuminate
current
Soviet security
preoccupations.
Many
professional
analyses
are
also
politically
motivated.
They
often
represent
efforts
to
secure
support
and/or
funding
for
various
services
of the
armed
forces
4
-
or
favored
weapons
systems.
Officers
and
analysts
proceed
by
extrapolating
lessons
from
this,
or
other
recent
wars, or
by
developing threat
assessments
based
on
analysis of
Western
policies, strategies,
and/or
weapons.
The
Gulf
War
is
no
exception.
However,
at
the
same time
these
analyses,
though
frequently
partisan,
also
have
a
strong
component
of
professional attempts
to understand the
war's lessons
as
the
analyst
sees
them.
It
is
both
impossible
and mistaken
for
us
to
divorce interest
from
analysis,
and
simply
see
these
arguments
exclusively
as
mirror
images
of
American
service
rivalries. Though
we
have
long
known
of
existing service
rivalries within the
Soviet
armed
forces,
17
the
staff
culture
and
structure
of
military
planning precludes
a
simple
equation
of
interest
with
analysis,
or
a
facile denigration of
analysis
as
merely
competition
for
assets,
resources,
and
influence
over
policy
and
strategy.
For
example,
two
very
opposed
analysts,
Marshal
Akhromeev
and
Blagovolin,
view
this
crisis
as having
restored
to
currency
the
possibility
and
concept
of
regional
conflict
and
local
war.
Our
military
victory
apparently
contradicts
the
new
thinking's
claim
that only
political
means
can
be
used
to
resolve
conflicts.
Military
resolution
of
such
conflicts
is
still
necessary
as
a
last resort.
Implicitly
this
line
also
questions
the
validity
of
defensive
doctrine
as
Moscow must,
at
least
hypothetically,
be
ready
to
preempt
an
aggressor.
Both
men
could
easily
subscribe
to Akhromeev's
framing
of
the
point:
Today
the
thesis
on
war
and
on
the
continuation
of
politics
is no
longer
generally
valid.
It is
only
partly
valid-regarding
regional
military
conflicts
such as
the
war
in
the
Persian
Gulf
that
has
just
ended, and
similar
conflicts.
By
the
way, experience
has
shown
that
today's
regional
conflicts
cannot
be
definitively
resolved
by
military means
alone.
18
Other
analysts
believe
the
war
justifies
their
view
that
ballistic
missile
proliferation threatens
the
superpowers
and
other
states,
particularly
in
the Middle
East.
Therefore
both
superpowers
should
go
beyond
efforts
to
stop proliferation
to
erect
a
workable
nonproliferation
regime.
Both
sides
need
to
5
build
a
'high-precision'
ABM
defense
across
Southern
Europe
(including
the
USSR).
For
Davydov
that
program
means
creating
joint
U.S.-European-Soviet
security structures
against
Third
World
missile
proliferation
as
soon as
possible.
19
Here
the
wish is
father
to
the
thought,
the
wish
being Soviet
participation
in
the
Atlantic Alliance
and
joint
SDI
with
the
United
States.
20
Davydov implicitly shares
with
many
military
analysts
the
view
that
the
war represented
a
testing
ground
or
laboratory
for
new
weapons
and
operational
concepts,
for
instance
ballistic
missiles
employed
by
Third
World
states.
Chief of
Staff
Moiseyev
is
only
the
most
prominent
military
figure
to
see
the
war
as
a
testing
ground.
2'
An
armored
warfare
specialist,
Lt.
General Lyaschenko
told
Western
reporters
that
he
and,
by
implication,
his
superiors
were
strongly
impressed
by
the
coalition's
antitank
weaponry,
particularly
the
precision
antitank
rocketry
fired
by
Apache
Helicopters
and
the
A-1
0
aircraft.
Others
cite
a
broad
range
of
systems:
Tomahawk SLCM's, the
SLAM
(Standoff
Launched
Attack
Missile)
air-to-surface
missile,
the Lynx
helicopter
missile
system,
E-8
spy planes,
fuel-air
bombs, and
so on.
22
Commentary
on
the
air
war also points
to
new
weapons
systems
and
their
integration
into
mutually
synergistic
systems.
Other
Soviet
observers,
focusing
on
the
ground
war,
or
on
its
overall
combined
arms
aspect,
evince
concern for
their
general planning based
on
the
allied
success.
Many were
impressed
by
NATO's
superior
capability
to
project
power.
The
successful
diversion
of
over 200,000
troops
plus support
systems
and
supplies
to
a
distant
theater
in
a
short time
is
an
important
capability that
Moscow
lacks.
23
Other
such
analyses
unabashedly
campaign
for
funds
based
on
the war's
supposed lessons. This
is
particularly
true
in
the
observations of
Admiral
Kapitanets,
First
Deputy
CINC
of
the
Navy.
He
not
only
views
the
Gulf
War
as a
laboratory of
new
concepts,
but
also
expects
it
to
add
to the
U.S.
Navy
and
armed
forces' drive
to
establish
worldwide
naval
dominance.
24
Despite
such
unabashed
service
boosterism,
Soviet observers
have
reason to
take
note
concerning
U.S.
sealift, airlift,
naval
air, and
SLCM
capabilities,
as
well
as the
Marines'
amphibious
capability,
even
though the
latter
was only
used
as
a
diversion.
6
Concern
about
U.S.
and Western
amphibious
capabilities
reflects
a
larger
fear
of
the
threat of
deployment
of
highly
mobile
forces
in
a
manner
that forces
the defense
to
spread
its
forces.
Many
Soviet
analysts expected
a
major
amphibious
operation
to
liberate
Kuwait.
They
viewed
such
operations
in
the
context
of
a
broader
all-arms operation including
EW.
One writer
predicted
that
a
ground
operation would
develop
in
accordance
with
all
the rules
of
modern
battle.
Extensive
use
would
be
made
of
maneuvering
and
flanking forces,
both
amphibious
and
vertical,
and
possible
diversionary attacks
upon
one
or
more
fronts
oraxes.
Marines
would
mount
an
assault
landing
operation
simultaneously
with motorized
infantry
and
armored
formations to
break through,
breach,
outflank,
and
ultimately
envelop
Iraqi
forces.
This
ground
operation would
receive
support
from
strategic
and
tactical
army
aviation,
and
carrier
aviation.
25
Another article
expected
amphibious
landings
as
part
of
a
broader ground
offensive.
This
scenario
embodied
features
that,
to
Soviet
writers,
typify
post-1945
amphibious
landings.
Landings
vary
with the
combatants'
aims
and
strategic
purposes;
but there are common
features
in
such
disparate
assaults
like
Inchon
and
the
Anglo-French
Suez
operation
in
1956.
Pre-invasion
Maskirovka
measures
were
taken
as
large
parties
were readied
for
landings
on
equipped
coastlines
or
directly
in
ports
as
in
those
operations.
Much
thought
was
given
to
pre-operational
action
to
gain
decisive superiority
over
the
defenders.
The
author stressed
the
prospect
of
simultaneous
air
and
sea
landings
with
more
and more
storm
groups
landed
from
helicopters. Aviation's
role
in
such
landings
has
grown
dramatically
in
order
to
land
forces
who
can
rapidly
seize
key
points
and
secure
the
coastline.
The
growing
emphasis
on
landing
storm
groups
or
subunits
from
helicopters
or
hovercraft
has
developed
along
with
enhanced
capabilities
for
placing
up
to
2000-2500
men
ashore.
Placement
of
2-3
battalions
of
marines
reinforced
by
tank
regiments,
2-3
artillery
batteries,
1-2
antiaircraft batteries,
armored
equipment,
and armored
tank
and
engineer subunits
has
become
a reality.
Marine
brigades,
operating
as
an
independent
operational-tactical
landing
force,
can
be
landed
with
a
minimum of
equipment
in
2-3
hours.
26
7
Bath
these articles
on
amphibious
operations proved
to
be
only
speculative.
Nonetheless
they
both
emphasized
the
combined
arms,
fixed wing,
rotary
wing,
and
naval
aspects
of
such landing
operations.
While
this
may
represent
Soviet
mirror-imaging
of
the
concept
of
c
,bined
arms
operations,
the
literature
on
the
ground war
a -
uggests
that
these
are
really
Soviet
concepts of Air/Lar
r-.tle
(they
now
use
the
term,
too)
for
amphibious
operations.
One
pre-invasion
analysis
explicitly
tied
together
amphibious
landings
with
an
'Air/Land
Battle'
combined
arms
operation.
The
author
predicted
a
double
envelopment
operation
on
land,
a
maneuver
of
forces
and
fire,
vertical
and
horizontal attacks
from
the
air
and marines,
frontal
assaults
by
mechanized
and
tank
forces, envelopments
and
flanking
movements.
27
Still
another
forecast accurately expected
the
main
blow
to
come
from
the
west,
but
predicted
a
landing
of
up
to
a
Marine
division
on
the
coast
of
Kuwait,
with
both
operations
being
supported
by
powerful air
strikes
on
Iraqi
positions.
Here
Air/Land
Battle meant
deep
strikes
through the
front
and
the
rear
to
block
Iraqi
forces
from
moving,
break
them
up,
and
isolate
them
so
that
artillery
and
aircraft
could finish
them
off.
That
would
reduce
the
likelihood
of
infantry
battles
with
high
casualties.
28
So
taken
were
some
Soviet writers
with
the
prospect
of
a
marine
landing
that
they
invented
an
amphibious
assault
by
Marine
subunits
to
liberate
Kuwait City,
a
landing
in
the
city itself
by
Special
Operations
Forces, and
the
Marines'
capture
of
Faylakh
Island
40
miles
to
the south.
According
to
this
observer,
"Characteristically,
from
the
beginning
of
operation
'Desert Storm'
the
assault
troops
were
working
out
combat
operations
under
urban
conditions.
'29
Why this
inaccurate
report
appeared
cannot
be
determined.
One
possibility
is
that
it
testifies
to
the
fear
of
amphibious
landings
on
the
Baltic
or
Black
Sea
Coasts
followed
by
warfare
in
unstable
republics
that
has
recently
gripped
Soviet
commanders'
imaginations.
This
alleged 'threat'
has
led
them
to
place four former
armored
divisions
and
their
equipment
in
their
Naval
Infantry. Although
this
took place after
the
negotiation
of
the
CFE
treaty
in
1990
and
violated
it,
Soviet
sources
unanimously
date their
heightened
interest
in
this
so
called threat
from
1987.
8
In
general,
Soviet
commentary
on
the combined
arms
nature
of the war
not
only
illustrates
concern
over
Air/Land
Battle,
it also reveals
differences
in
services'
approach
to
modern
conventional
warfare.
Admiral
Kapitanets'
stress
on
the
bleak
future
for
non-American
navies
exemplifies
a
view
stressing the
navy's
primacy.
Similarly
Col.
General
A.
Pavlov,
before the
land
war,
criticized
the
delay
in
launching
it,
and
showed
a
preference
for
the traditional
Soviet
combined
arms
approach.
3°
Pavlov
mistakenly
credited
Iraq
with
superior
capabilities
in
concealment
and
C2
to
deceive allied
air
forces
about
its
missiles'
location.
Some
writers
also
criticized
the
allies
for
not
launching
a
blitzkrieg
as
in
the Six-Day
War
and
for
adopting
a
more
protracted
campaign-here
again
showing
a
tendency
to
mirror-image
their
own
preference
for
blitzkrieg
type
operations.
But
most
truly professional
Soviet
commentary
on
the
war
focused
on
the
critical lessons
of the
air
war
and
its
linkages
with
EW
(as Moscow
uses
the
term)
and
the
advent of
the
reconnaissance-strike
system
as
a
reality,
not
just
an
analytical
concept.
The
Revolution
in
Warfare
and
Desert
Storm.
The
most
professional
analyses
tied
together
air,
air
defense,
EW,
space,
and
high-precision
weaponry
as
harbingers
of
future
wars.
They vindicated
Marshal
Ogarkov's
forecasts
in
the
1980s
about
future war
due
to
the
scientific
technological
revolution
in
warfare.
The
more
professional
post-war Soviet
commentary
on
the
war
and
allied
strategy
increasingly
focused
on
the force
multipliers provided
by
high-tech
systems
and
networks. Many
of
these articles
were
also political because they
aimed
to
strengthen
the
Soviet
air
defense forces (Voiska
PVO).
While
a
consensus
exists
concerning
the
air
operation
and
related
subjects,
there
also
exist
substantial
differences
of
opinion concerning these
factors' future
significance.
This
fact
must
be
kept
in
mind
because these
doctrinal
struggles
will
likely continue
in
future
analyses
and
debates
over force
structures
and
allocations.
There does
seem
to
be
agreement
that
the
allies
obtained
operational-tactical,
if
not
strategic,
surprise
in
the
air.
This
success
is
variously
attributed to allied
disinformation
tactics,
or
more
often
to
the
intensive
9
Bogdanov evaded
traditional
concerns
to
assign
priority
ranking
for
a
separate
service
in
combat.
Though
he
concedes
the
ground
forces'
determining
role
in
achieving
the
ultimate
goals
is
still
valid,
he
agreed
that
objective conditions
are
pushing
aircraft
to
the fore
as
the
most
long-range
and
maneuverable
means
of
struggle.
36
His
real
objective
is
to
devise
flexible
force
packages
using
all
arms,
including
space
and
EW,
optimized
for particular theaters.
Then
the
interaction
of
a
force
package's
component parts,
its
system's
performance, will
be
of
decisive
importance. Bogdanov
here
aligns
his,
and
presumably
at
least
a
part
of
the
General
Staff's,
thinking
with
preexisting views
that
the
USSR
must
move
into
space, automated systems,
electronics,
and
so
on
to
optimize
its
force
structure
and
embrace
the
intellectualization
of
warfare
and
weapons
systems.
3
7
The
issue
goes beyond
recognizing that
EW's
failure
means
that
the
Air Defense
Force
cannot
perform
its
mission.
38
Bogdanov
took Ogarkov's
forecasts
about
science
and
technology's
impact
upon modern
warfare
at
least a
step
further
if
not
more.
He
postulates
an
objective
pressure
for
Moscow
to
move
into
these
'new
frontiers'
lest
it
be
utterly
vulnerable
to
conventional attacks
or
local
wars
on
its
periphery.
He
also
says
the war
will
not impel
serious
correction
to
the
official
General
Staff
military
reform
program.
39
That
is
because
the
program
is
oriented towards
achieving
the
goals
implicit
in
his
analysis.
However,
the
apparent
U.S.inclination
to resolve
local
wars
by
force,
or
the
threat
of
force,
does
have
an
impact
on
Soviet military planning
because
'it
will
oblige
us
to
take
a
more
considered attitude'
towards reducing Soviet
armed
forces.
40
Other
Soviet
observations
about
the
air
war
in
the
immediate
post-war
phase
also
moved
from
analysis
to calls
for action
at
home.
Those
calls
were
more
connected
than
Bogdanov's
to
particular
service's
needs. Yazov
and many
observers
agreed
that
the
air
defense
needs
serious
attention
and
presumably investment
to
withstand
any
surprise
or
unexpected aggression.
This
is
the
case
even
as
other forces'
decline.
41
But
Yazov
denied
that
the war
signified
some
sort
of
revolutionary
departure
from
the past.
However
the Chief
11
'
of
the
Air
Forces'
Main
Staff,
Lt.
General
A.
Malyukov,
used
the war to
distance
himself
from
both
Bogdanov
and
Marshal
Yazov. Malyukov's
writings
hint
at
rivalry between
the Air
Force
(VVS)
and
Air
Defense Forces
in
strategic assessment
and
competition
for
scarce funds.
Malyukov
reverses
much
of the
usual Soviet approach
to
operational
analysis
by
claiming
that
the
air
operation
or
air
war
alone
secured
the
major
objectives.
He
conceives the
air
operation
to be the
systematic
interaction
of
aerial
platforms
and
their backup,
support,
and
maintenance systems.
He
duly
called for
optimizing
the
balance
of
the
Air
Force
between
combat
and
support
means,
charging
that
NATO
has
resolved
this
problem.
He
thus
criticized
the military procurement
system
that
long
placed
undue
priority
upon
turning
out
weapons
and
relegated
operational
and
technical
backup
systems
to the
background.
Now
it
is
clear that
the
latter
have
material,
direct,
and
immediate
bearing
on
the
effectiveness
of
combat equipment.
For
example,
military
transport
aviation,
long
a
weakness
of
Soviet forces,
is
needed
for
both
peacetime
and
wartime
operations, as
the
war showed.
42
Not
only
must
this
balance
exist
within
the
Air
Force, there
also
must
be
upgraded
pilot
training,
logistical support,
and the
integration
of
air
power
technology
and
firepower
with
effective
command
and
control.
Unusual
for
a
Soviet
commander,
Malyukov
also
criticized
Iraqi
commanders
for
relying
excessively
on
ground
forces
and
downgrading air
while
the allies
raced
forward
to
new
concepts
of
war.
43
Malyukov
criticized
Yazov's
(arid
Moiseyev's)
more
traditional
approach.
Clearly
he
favors
phasing
state-of-the-art
systems
into
the
Air
Forces
where
possible
so
that existing
systems
are
not
denigrated
excessively.
In
sum
he
argued
for
a
balanced
but
modernizing
R&D
effort
through
a
reformed
procurement
system
that
will
proportionately
balance
old
and
new
weapons.
His
articles,
therefore,
apparently
signify
both
a
critique of
the
procurement
system,
and
discord
with
Yazov,
Moiseyev,
and the Army, who
maintain
more
traditional
approaches.
They
still
see
ground
forces
as
king
of
the
battlefield
and
the
tank
as
its
queen, or
else
are
wedded
to
the
existing
procurement
structure.
44
12
General
Tretyak,
the
CINC
of
the
PVO
forces,
also
called
for
continued
modernization
of,
and
investment
in,
his
forces.
He
warned
that
failure
in
technological
competition
would
place
Soviet
security
in
a
situation
similar
to Iraq's
which
stopped
developing
its
air
defenses
with
visible
and
tragic
results.
45 He
stressed the
new
stealth
technology:
the
F-1
17
fighter,
Cruise
missiles
(HARM,
Tomahawk), powerful
jamming
equipment,
special
EW
aircraft,
AWACS,
OTH
radars,
space
based
reconnaissance,
and
precision-guided
munitions
as
threats
and
fundamentally
new
strike
platforms
directed
against
Iraq
and
potentially
the
USSR.
46
Tretyak,
like
Malyukov
and
Bogdanov, claims
this
war
demonstrated the
systems
that
Ogarkov
foresaw, but unlike
them
demands
that investment
go
to
the
PVO
forces,
not
the
Air
Force.
In
the
roundtable where
he
spoke,
Tretyak's
subordinates
added
equally
revealing
'lessons'
of
the
war.
Major
General
A.N.
Dubrov mentioned
the
need
to
reduce
redundant
air
defense
C2
organs
and large
strategic
formations
as
part of
the
overall
reduction
in
forces
of
the
PVO and
Soviet
military.
But
he
warned
that
the
war shows
that
a
reduction
in
control
organs
must
take place only
where
strict
vertical subordination
of
all
troop
organs
to
command
decisions
continues.
Dubrov
wishes
to
retain
traditional
C2
structures
by
tying
reduction
of
control
organs
to
simultaneously
increasing
the
pool
of
automated
control
systems,
their
modernization,
and
introduction
into
troop
formations.
47
Other
participants
of
the
roundtable
used
the war
against
civilian
reformers,
thus tying
professional
to
political
analyses.
Soviet
Analyses
of
Future
War.
In
virtually
all
of
the
public analyses
there
is
little
mention
of
Iraqi
strategic failures.
Few
military analysts
are
willing,
and
evidently
few
civilian
ones
are
able,
to
explain why
Iraq
performed
so
badly.
For
the
most
part the
arguments
follow
the
lines
mentioned above.
This
attempt
to
provide
a
sanitized
picture
of Soviet weapons'
capabilities
and
of tactical
and
strategic
concepts
recalls
the
similar
Soviet response to
the
1982
Israeli-Syrian air
conflict
that
also ended
in
disaster
for
the
USSR's
ally, Syria.
48
Either
the
military
is
unable
or
unwilling
to
grasp
and
certainly
to
disseminate
these
lessons
13
to
the
public
and
its
commanding
officers,
NCOs,
and
soldiers.
The
political
reasons
for
such hesitancy
or
'learned
incapacity'
are
quite
obvious
given
the
intense political
struggle
over
security
policy
in
general
that
coincided
with
the
Gulf
crisis.
More
private
conversations
with
Soviet
officers
at
the
U.S.
Army War
College and National
Defense
University,
in
March
1991,
indicate
more
profound
perspectives.
The Soviet
speakers
at
these
meetings,
particularly
Major
General
Slipchenko
of
the
Voroshilov
Staff
Academy
of
the
General
Staff,
opined
that
Saddam
Hussein
had
no
military
strategy
to
speak
of.
Rather
he
had
a
political strategy.
He
evidently
believed
we
would
not
attack
and
that
even
if
we
did
the
political
pressures
he
could
thereby
generate
would
prevent
an
allied
victory.
Less
convincingly
he
also
said
that
Soviet
analysts
had
predicted
the
course
of
the
war
in
September
1990.
However,
his
operational
analysis
at
these
meetings
and
that
of
Soviet
military expert
John
Hines,
based
on
his
talks
with
Soviet
officers
and
officials, suggest
deeper
perspectives
on
future
war.
Those
analyses
comport
with
the
increased
importance
of
EW,
space,
PGMs,
and
automated
control
systems
as
synergistic
force multipliers.
Their analyses
also
coincide
with
Malyukov's
notion
that
Douhet's
prophecies
concerning
the
independent
air
operation
have
now
come
true.
One must
assume
that
Slipchenko
voiced
the
General
Staff's
conclusions,
which
are
not
necessarily
a
true
reflection of allied
operations
or
lessons.
Slipchenko
stated
that
the
war demonstrated
the changing
nature
of
attack
and
of
warfare
in
general.
The former
stereotype of
a
ground invasion
after
a
3-5
day
air
operation
is
now
unnecessary.
Instead
a
large
automated
air
and
space
force
can
act
alone.
Since
true
aerospace
warfare
is a
reality
as
the
6-week air
war
in
the
Gulf
showed,
in
the
future,
massive
strikes,
including
space
based
attacks,
and
concentrated
land,
sea,
air,
and
space
strikes
against
targets
become
possible.
He
was
impressed
by
the fact that
we
needed
no
surge
in
space
launches
to
achieve
these
strategic
results.
Existing
space
assets
sufficed
to
give
allied
air
forces
the
capability
to
generate
so
many
sorties-a
capability
that clearly
surprised
Soviet
analysts.
In
suppression
of
enemy
air
defense
(SEAD)
14
operations, Radio-Electronic
Warfare
(the
Soviet
term
for
EW),
and
helicopters
can
act decisively
along
with unmanned
strike
systems.
These
combined
arms
strike
systems
can
and
probably
will
target
air
defenses,
bases,
and missile
platforms,
the
rear,
C31
targets, enemy
infrastructure,
and
energy
sources.
Slipchenko went
on
to
say
that
in
the
future,
all
services'
military
targets
will
be
targeted
by
space-based
reconnaissance
and
will
be
hit
by
strikes. This represents
the
reality
of
Ogarkov's
RUK
in
modern
combat. Thus a
new
type
of
conventional
war
embracing
land,
sea,
air,
and
space
is
upon
us.
We need
to
study
how
to
prevent
such
a
war
because
it
will
feature
PGMs,
DEW
systems,
laser beams,
accelerated
robotics,
EW,
artificial
intelligence,
space,
automated
air,
land,
and
naval
systems;
large
troop
formations
and
other
targets
will
be
obliterated.
Automated
platforms
and
strike
systems-Ogarkov's
RUK
system-make
all
targets
vulnerable.
No
longer will there
be
a
front
or
a
rear. Rather
there will
be
targets
and
non-targets
which
can
be
precisely
located.
PGMs
erase
distinctions
between
tactical
and
strategic strikes
and
targets,
and
between
offense
and
defense.
Nuclear
weapons
might
be
used
in
the
final
stage,
either
alone
or
with
ground forces.
Finally
this
war
forces
us
to
rethink
the traditional
concept
of
victory;
i.e.,
demolition
of
enemy
armies,
economy,
and
political systems
by
occupation,
because strike
systems
could
accomplish
most, if
not
all,
of
these
goals
on
their
own.
At
the
NDU
session,
John
Hines
concurred
that
the
war
makes
distinguishing
defensive
from
offensive systems
moot
and
indicated
that
the
new
concept
of
Vozdushnaia-
Kosmicheskaia
Voina
(Air-Space
war)
intrigued
him.
The
Gulf
War
illustrated
the
greater
importance of
accuracy
over
distance
rather
than
mass,
and
the
essential
importance--cited
in
Soviet
works-of
the mobility of fire
platforms
and
systems that
can
only
be
destroyed
by
similar
systems
and
platforms.
The
blinding
of
PVO
forces
by
destroying
C31
targets
is
an
absolutely dominant
requirement.
The
concept
of
an
air
campaign
that blinds
PVO,
suppresses
sortie generation, then
hits
radar
again
in
order to
generate
15
* .,-,'
sorties
against
the
entire
air
force
and
other
high
value
targets
was
carried
out
by
the
allies
even
though
it
originally
was
a
Soviet concept.
Both
Hines and
the
writings
cited
here
strongly
imply
a
fast-eroding
Soviet
confidence
in
their ability
to
carry
this
out, let
alone
ride
out
an
allied
attack.
Hines
confirmed
that superiority
in C3
and
EW
capabilities
could
be
exploited
to
achieve,
at
least,
tactical
surprise
as
in
the
Gulf.
Superiority
in
PGM
technology
could
lead
to strikes
at
nuclear
weapons
or
nuclear
C3
systems
as
part of
a
temptation
to
escalate
by
using
PGMs
preemptively
or
during
intra-war escalation.
This
concern
applies
to
heavily
armed
states
like
the
superpowers.
Hines'
last
conclusion
fits
even
more
into
the
most
sophisticated
Soviet
analyses.
Qualitative
improvements
must
take precedence
over
merely
quantitative
ones
that
trigger
everyone's
fears.
The
single
most
important
area
of
qualitative
competition
is
in automation,
electronics,
C
3,
and
miniaturization.
Reasonable
sufficiency
becomes
insufficient
since
the idea of
enforcing
economies
through
sufficiency of
systems
is
eclipsed
by
the
need
to
compete
qualitatively.
Such
systems
are
very
costly
and
the
USSR
is
particularly
stressed
in
all
areas
of
technological
and
military
competition
now
and
for the
future.
49 If
this
is
the
case,
Hines'
conclusions
also
imply
that defensive
doctrine,
as
suggested
above,
also
can
no
longer
adequately
meet
the
needs
of
Soviet
planners since
sudden long-range
strike systems
can
prevent
the
defense
from
retaliating.
Desert
Storm
and
the Future
of
Soviet Air/Land
Battle.
The
foregoing analyses
rightly
focus
on
the
synergies
of
air,
air
defense,
new
technologies
and
platforms,
the
RUK
concept,
EW,
and
space
as
force
multipliers
and
expand
upon
pre-existing
Soviet
analyses.
50
Those
analyses
all
refer
to
the
multiplier effect these systems
give
to
combat
forces
and
see
them
as
harbingers
of
future
war.
51
Soviet analysts of
modern
combined
arms
operations
that
characterized
the
land
war
in
the
Gulf
also
believe that
a new
type
of
war
is
at hand, a
war
which
Reznichenko, the
author
of
the
Soviet textbook
on
tactics, calls
"Deep
Group
Air/Land
Battle."
This
analytical
trend
appeared
in
articles
about
16 f
deployment
of
the
U.S.
Army
and
on
the
past
and
future
conduct
of
Soviet
Army
operations
that
predated the
war
and
foretold
much
of
its course.
Volouev
asserts
that
the
U.S. Army
expects
that
confrontations
in
a
TVD
(the
Theater of
Strategic
Military
operations-a
purely
Soviet
concept
telling
the
reader
that
the
argument
also
applies
to the
Soviet
Army) will be
highly
mobile
and
aggressive.
The front will
be
fragmented.
Operations
will occur
along
isolated,
separate gaps
in
formations.
PGMs
will
give
combat
operations
the
quality
of
tactical
and
operational
focus
that
blurs
distinctions
between
offense
and
defense, the
front,
flanks,
and
rear.
Combat
operations
will
become
three-dimensional
with width,
depth,
and
height
parameters.
Strategic
systems
will
perform
tactical
missions-something
the
VVS
has
been
particularly
keen
on.
Army
aviation helicopters will
repeatedly
reduce
by
a
factor
of
8-10
the
time
needed
to maneuver
forces
and
assets
on
the
battlefield.
Air/Land
Battle
will
become
a
means
of
destroying
and
defeating
larger enemy
formations
in
depth.
The essence of
"Air-Land
Battle"
lies
in
highly
mobile
combat
operations
of Army
formations,
coordinated
by
objective,
place
and
time
and
conducted
jointly
with
supporting
tactical
aviation while
using
the
entire arsenal of combat resources
and
electronic warfare
in
the
interest
of
engaging
the
enemy
over
the
entire depth
of
his
operational
disposition
and
defeating
him
in
detail.
52
The
concept
of
Air/Land
Battle
presupposes
the
comprehensive
coordination
of
efforts
and
forces, air,
airmobile,
air
assault,
special
operations,
and
psyops
combined
with fire
strikes,
PGMs,
and
massed
use
of
EW
assets.
"The
joint
and
coordinated
use
of
them
creates
an
opportunity
not
only
to
compensate for
the
weak
points
of
each
of
them
but
also
to
obtain
an
additional
mutually
intensifying
effect.
"
Volouev
stressed
the
importance of
airmobile
assault
forces,
which
can
move
re'neatedly
in
helicopters.
The
use
of
'mobile
areas'
for
operations
by
them and
special
forces
can
disrupt
enemy
C3,
cut
off
supplies,
cripple
platforms,
impede
the
advance
of
reserves
and
place
heavy
psychological
burdens
on
troops.
53
Volouev
clearly
foretold
many
aspects
of the
land
operation
that
took
place
about
6-7
month
4s
later, true
despite
the
fact
that
17
he
probably was
listing
desiderata
for
the
Soviet
army,
not
just
observing the
U.S.
Army.
This
is
due
to
the
fact
that,
as argued
in
Appendix
A,
our operations there,
whether
or
not one
calls
them
Air/Land
Battle,
clearly
resemble
much
of
current Soviet
operational
guidance for
theater-strategic operations
and
offensives-a
guidance
that
Soviet
writers
now
also
call
Air-Land
Battle.
That
does not
vaiidate
Slipchenko's
claim
about
a
1990
forecast
of
the
war,
but
does
suggest
possible
operational
and
perhaps
even
strategic
congruence
in
superpower thinking.
Reznichenko's
article
on
past
and
future
Army
operations
also
outlines
the
Soviet
concept
of
Air-Land
Battle
before
Desert
Storm
began.
His
concern is
to
improve
the
viability
of
Soviet
armed
forces'
performance
on
the
defensive.
Using the
1941
example
of
when
strategic
surprise
was
inflicted
upon
Soviet forces,
he
finds that
the
causes
for
failure,
then as
now,
go
beyond maldeployed
troop
units
or
poorly
prepared
positions
and
fortifications.
Soviet
troops,
he
stresses,
were
not
aligned,
c-ther
in
small
or
large
strategic
formations,
to
take
full
account
of
Germany's
deep
strike
capability.
Rifle
divisions,
which
had
a
decisive
role
in
defensive
formations,
had
an
extreme
lack
of
striking
power,
and
insufficient
mobility,
anti-air,
and
antitank
capability.
He
stresses
that these
points
still
retain
exceptional
importance.
One
could easily
cast
the
United
States
and
Iraq
as Germany
and
Russia
respectively
and
validate
his
argument.
For
offensive operations
he
emphasizes
the
contemporary
importance
of
reliable
fire
engagement
of
the
enemy
and
creation
of mobile
groups
to
break
through.
Today
mobile
formations
enjoy
a
much
higher
maneuver
potential
than
motorized rifle
divisions
do
and
can
be
used
as
assault
landing-amphibious
or
army
aviation
units-airborne
and
heliborne forces.
54
Air
defense's
heightened
role
visibly
derives
from
the
experience of
local
wars
and
it
and
antiballistic
missile
defense
are
no
longer support
measures
but
are
important
parts
of
the
combined
arms
battle
and
operation.
55
He
also
outlines
six
fundamental
trends
in
the development
of
operational
art
and
tactics
that
can
be
presently discerned.
Among them
are
the
increased
spatial
scope of combined
arms
18
battle
and operations because
airspace
can be used
for
deep
maneuver
and
deep
strikes.
Fire
engagement
and
the wide
use
of
aircraft
to
accomplish unit
and formation
combat missions
are
now
commonplace. Combat
is
inconceivable
without
long-range
delivery
of
fire.
Local
wars
have
demonstrated
a
sharp
increase
in
the
importance
of
ECM
against
radio-frequency objects.
Thanks
to
wide
deployment
of
electronics
and
PGM's,
"ECM
becomes
one
of
the
basic
components
of
the
battle
and
operation
called
upon
to
disrupt
enemy command
and
control
and
weapon
control.
t"
Forces'
maneuver
capabilities
have
reached unprecedented levels
and
led
to
the need
to
train
officers to
display
initiative
and
to
formulate
a
new
theory of the
tactics
of
combined
arms
battle,
"tactics
of
the
deep
group
Air-Land
Battle."
This
combines
all
the
new
elements of
war:
ECM
(electronic attack
[in
the
original]), PGMs,
including
aircraft,
tactical
airborne
assault
forces,
raiding detachments
and
special
forces,
decisive
actions
by
combined-arms units
and
subunits simultaneously
from
the
front,
flanks,
and rear.
This entails,
Not
a
breakthrough
in
narrow
sectors of
a
front with
combat
formations
of
subunits
and
even units
essentially
in
a
linear
alignment,
which
we
often
observe
in
field
training
exercises,
but
the
simultaneous
deep
strike
along
axes
by
several
small
groupings
(emphasis
in
original),
including
subunits
and
units
of
different combat
arms
and
army
aviation
(and on
maritime
axes
also
of
the
naval infantry),
coordinated
laterally
and
in
depth.
56
Reznichenko
too
foresaw
much
of
the
strategy
and
operational
art
of
Desert Storm
and
future
war. Moscow
sees
that
we
have
carried
out
its
force
and
operational
art
requirements
for
deep
strike
under
the
rubric of
Air/Land
Battle.
"Moreover,
we
are
doing
it
better than
they
cot
ild
now
or
for
a
long
time
to
come"
(emphasis
author).
The
technological
revolution
in
warfare
has
led
to
Soviet inability
to
compete
at
the
strategic conventional
level
no
matter
how
powerful
its
doctrinal process
is.
Accordingly
future
Soviet
security
planning, based
on
the
capabilities
revealed
by
this
war,
faces
a
bleak and
literally
unpredictable
future.
57
Where the General
Staff
and
MOD
cannot
determine
what
their
resources
and
assets will
be
nor
19
the level
of their
future
control over
them,
due
to the
current
domestic
crisis,
doctrinal
development
and
force
planning
are
impossible.
The
threat
may be
known,
but
the means
to
defeat
it
cannot
even
be
imagined.
That
is
the
situation
today.
Our
victory
in
the Gulf
only adds
to
Soviet defense planners'
burdens. The
standards
with
which
their
own
thinking
tells
them
they
must
compete
and
thus
the
threat
to
Soviet
security
appear
ever
more
insuperable.
For
the
foreseeable future
the
only
means
by
which reliable
Soviet security
in
a
probably
shrunken
USSR
may
be
guaranteed
are
collective security
and
nuclear deterrence.
To
a
military
which
has
already tried
both
strategies
between
1933-63
and
found
them
wanting,
this
is
indeed
a
chilling conclusion.
Conclusions.
On
the
basis
of the
preceding evidence
the
following
conclusions
seem
warranted.
*
At
the
war's
start,
civilian
reformers
attacked military
procurement
policy, force structure,
and
doctrine
and
sought
to
professionalize
the
armed
forces
and
demilitarize
security policy
and
the
economy.
Some
also
advanced
their
own
ideas
about future
force
packages,
notably
a
joint
superpower
SDI
regime
against
Third
World
states
like
Iraq.
However,
they
soon
apparently
dropped
out
as
military
analysts
came
to
dominate
the media.
This
suggests
that
before the
August
1991
coup,
civilian
reformers
were losing the
battle
to
establish
direct
institutional
control
over
the General
Staff
and
the military
on
professional
military issues.
The
prospect that
the
new
9+1