Content uploaded by Tuncay Babali
Author content
All content in this area was uploaded by Tuncay Babali on Jun 21, 2015
Content may be subject to copyright.
147
T
hanks to the recent gas crisis be-
tween Ukraine and Russia, a global
ratio of tight supply and high demand, and the
location of oil and gas markets in some of the
most volatile regions of the world, the geopoli-
tics of energy has made a spectacular return
to the international political agenda. Both Eu-
rope and the key transit countries at the cross-
roads of Eurasia such as Ukraine and Turkey
have learned the hard way the importance of
more systematically incorporating energy se-
curity into foreign policy. For too long these
two tracks have been separate, and the energy
and foreign policy worlds have hardly spoken
to each other. Now countries are increasingly
committing themselves to pursuing energy se-
curity as part of their national security agenda.
A broad assessment of the foreign policy di-
mensions of energy security is at the center of
many nations’ new foreign and security calcu-
lations. For many countries, energy security is
already a top foreign policy priority. Turkey is
Turkey has become an important
east-west and north-south gas and
oil transit route and an energy hub,
thanks to the Turkish straits, and
the existing and proposed pipelines
that run through its territory.
Economic opportunities, however,
can present diplomatic liabilities.
In a tough and complicated
region, Turkey nds itself caught
between the interests of competing
superpowers and regional players.
As the world’s 16th largest economy,
Turkey’s thirst for energy will only
increase. Satisfying this thirst
requires not only diversication of
sources and routes, but also good
relations with all neighbors, in
addition to traditional partners.
An analysis of Ankara’s options and
new foreign policy vision shows that
Turkey has little choice but to use
greater caution and engagement.
Following its own national interests
and security concerns will drive
Turkey to new openings in Syria,
Iraq, Iran, Armenia and other CIS
countries. Energy will be one of the
main pillars of Turkey’s policy of
engagement and integration in the
region.
ABSTRACT
Insight Turkey Vol. 12 / No. 3 / 2010
pp. 147-168
Regional Energy Equations
and Turkish Foreign Policy:
e Middle East and the CIS
TUNCAY BABALI*
* Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Af-
fairs, tbabali@yahoo.com
TUNCAY BABALI
148
one of them. e new Turkish foreign policy outlook envisages that the country
can work for a world in which the interests of energy consumers and producers
are increasingly aligned rather than apart. At the same time, based on the example
of Russia, it is clear that energy initiatives can signicantly advance a country’s
broader foreign policy agenda.
As energy geopolitics gains prominence, Turkey has been experiencing vari-
ous energy and foreign policy challenges, such as the Russian- Georgian war of
August 2008, problems encountered with Azerbaijan as a result of the initiation of
rapprochement with Armenia, and Turkey’s eorts to deepen energy cooperation
with Iran amidst the Iranian nuclear stando. To address these new challenges,
Turkey has no choice but to adopt a new proactive energy diplomacy more in
line with its own interests, rather than following strictly the requirements of its
traditional alliances.
Turkey’s Changing Foreign Policy Vision and Energy Connections
Turkey’s new activism in the Middle East, the CIS and other regions is a fully
rational and pragmatic attempt to seize the new opportunities presented by glo-
balization and regional reordering. With the Europeans virtually absent from key
geopolitical issues in the region and the new Obama Administration just starting
to chart its new course of action in Iran, Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, Turkey is
emerging as a self-condent and balancing actor trying to nd solutions through
mediation and facilitation in many foreign policy issues1 such as between Israel-
Syria, Bosnia and Serbia, Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran and
the P5+1.
e Turkish foreign policy elite sees engaging the immediate geopolitical
neighborhood as complementary, rather than contradictory, to Turkey’s more
traditional Western strategic alignments. A case in point is Iran. Turkey believes
that without a dialogue there will be no chance to convince Iran to cooperate with
the international community, and especially with the P5+1, based on the interna-
tional commitments asked by the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Four main principles2 are driving Turkey’s new foreign policy goals of security,
stability and prosperity in the region through the establishment of sub-regional
institutions and cooperation-integration schemes to mitigate political conicts
and dierences. e characteristics that Turkey wants to see in the emerging re-
gional and global orders are as follows:
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
149
1) Regional security and freedom for all, which requires a common understanding
of what ‘security’ entails.
2) Inclusive, high level political dialogue and negotiation through newly estab-
lished strategic council meetings of cabinet ministers, and joint cabinet meetings
with neighboring countries like Syria, Iraq, Russia, Greece and possibly Azerbai-
jan in the future.
3) Economic interdependence is seen as the best way to sustain peace. ere are
new drives for abolishing visa requirements with some Middle Eastern and CIS
countries including Russia.
4) Multilateral inclusiveness which suggests that if Europe wants to remain politi-
cally relevant and culturally vibrant, and avoid the clash of civilizations, Muslim
Turkey must be in the EU.
Based on these principles, Turkey has adopted a policy of “zero problems with
neighbors” in formulating its regional policies. Furthermore, according to Minis-
ter of Foreign Aairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, these relations must be transformed into
“maximum mutual-interest-based ones”3 that are interdependent and integrated,
in order to best preserve peace and promote prosperity.4 In this vision, reducing
the relevance of borders is treated as an instrument of fostering regional peace.
is is the rationale behind the rapproachment policy and the protocol signed
with Armenia in October 2009.
Economics proves to be one of the main drivers of Turkey’s new foreign policy.
Eurasia and the Middle East present excellent entrepreneurial opportunities for
the Turks, notably in areas where the West lags behind.5 And economic links can
spill over into the political arena: relations with Russia were developed because
of business relations and strong lobbying in Turkey. Such trade links have helped
propel Turkey to become Europe’s sixth largest economy with a market of 75 mil-
lion people. As the state minister responsible for economy, Zafer Çağlayan, men-
tioned in his presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS) on May 20, 2010, trade with neighbors has doubled six times over the past
seven years. For instance, the share of imports from Turkey’s near and extended
neighborhood rose from 23.6% in 2002 to 35.5% in 2008. During the same period,
the EU’s share in Turkey’s imports dropped from 54.7% to 40%.6 Between 1999
and 2008, however, the EU consistently accounted for 56% to 58% of Turkey’s
exports, which makes it a crucial economic partner.
While growth stalled in 2009, between 2002 and 2008, the Turkish economy
grew almost 6% annually. Its per capita GDP has almost tripled in the last six
150
years.7 Indeed, Turkey is projected by OECD to be the third fastest growing coun-
try aer China and India by 2017.8 In summary, Turkey’s new foreign policy is
no longer reactive, but rather proactive and visionary. Energy cooperation is cer-
tainly seen as the key policy with which to promote interdependency and deepen
relations between Turkey and its neighboring countries.
Regional Energy Equations and Foreign Policy:
More Interrelated an Ever
Energy is one of the pillars of Turkey’s re-emergence as a regional geopolitical
force. Turkey’s energy strategy has three main thrusts: (1) to ensure a diversied,
reliable, and cost-eective supply for domestic consumption; (2) to liberalize its
energy market; and (3) to become a more eective key transit country and energy
hub between the energy-producing countries to its east and the energy-consum-
ing countries to its west.
To succeed in its energy strategy, Ankara needs reliable suppliers for its do-
mestic market, especially for its gas market, and for cross-border projects like
the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector (TGI), Nabucco,9 and the trans-Caspian
pipeline. Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq and Turkmenistan are potential suppliers, but Iran
and Iraq are politically problematic. While Azerbaijan is the only readily available
source, Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia has proven to be politically costly
and an impediment to progress on key energy project developments such as the
Shah Deniz Phase II and TGI projects.
One also has to draw attention to improved coordination among bureau-
cratic institutions in conducting Turkey’s energy diplomacy. e increased activ-
ism in Turkey’s energy diplomacy over the past year is not a coincidence. In May
2009, Ahmet Davutoğlu became Turkey’s new foreign minister. In the meantime,
Erdoğan appointed his energy advisor and MP Taner Yıldız as the new energy
minister. Yıldız, knowing the value of coordination with the Ministry of Foreign
Aairs during his long years in advisory position, immediately acknowledged the
renewed spirit of cooperation and coordination between the two ministries.
e foreign and energy ministries are now better coordinating their policies
thanks to the strong consensus between the two ministers regarding the energy
issues and with both favoring more input from the Ministry of Foreign Aairs
(MFA) into the making of Turkey’s energy diplomacy. Geopolitical issues and in-
ternational security strategy including international energy security mainly fall
within the jurisdiction of the MFA. is inter-ministry cooperation is the key to
TUNCAY BABALI
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
151
the eectiveness of the current and future energy diplomacy. Bringing together
the technical and domestic expertise of the energy ministry and the geo-strategic
vision and policy making ability of the MFA provides a unique ability to pursue
Turkey’s national interests and vision of regional stability more eectively.
e Middle East
Iran
While Iran is Turkey’s second largest gas supplier aer Russia, Ankara’s energy
and business dealings with Tehran have never been easy. Iran oen demands com-
paratively higher prices while gas quality and quantity oen fall below the agreed
terms. Iran currently only supplies Turkey with a little over half of its contracted
9.6 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas a year (6.16 bcm in 2007, 5.8 bcm
in 2008).10 In both January 2007 and January 2008, Tehran slashed gas exports to
Turkey in the face of high Iranian domestic demand.11
Ankara and Tehran have also come to loggerheads over Iran’s failure to re-
spect commercial contracts. In May 2004, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
forced the expulsion of the Turkish construction consortium TAV from Tehran’s
airport, despite a 15-year service contract. at same year, the Iranian government
also cancelled Turkcell’s successful bid to enter the Iranian cell phone market. Last
but not least, there are political impediments to Turkey pouring large-scale invest-
ments into Iran, given Iran’s current tensions with the international community
over its nuclear activities. Indeed, Iran could become a conict zone if diplomacy
and sanctions fail in the near future.
Still, under Prime Minister Erdoğan’s administration, there has been a renewed
drive for an energy partnership with Iran. In July 2007, both countries signed a
memorandum of understanding (MoU) by which the two sides agreed to build
2,200 miles of gas pipelines (one from the South Pars eld, the other from Turk-
menistan to Turkey, forming a land connection from Turkmenistan’s easternmost
and richest gas elds). ese are costly, decades-long endeavors which require a
long-term engagement. And there are still many unknowns in the details. Financ-
ing all these projects is going to be a big challenge. If completed, these projects will
transport up to 40 bcm of gas annually to Europe via Turkey.
Iran and Turkey have also agreed to increase cooperation in electricity genera-
tion. In this context, they plan to construct natural gas power stations in Eastern
Anatolia, where power shortages take a heavy toll on the local economy, especially
during the long winter months. e latter investment is supposed to be spear-
152
headed by the two countries’ private sec-
tors, so that the sanctions on Iran would
be inapplicable.
Despite these prospects, Turkey’s
talks with Iran, particularly regarding
development in the South Pars gas eld, have been far from conclusive. For exam-
ple, according to a November 17, 2008 MoU (a continuation of the rst MoU of
July 14, 2007), the Iranian side agreed to give the development rights of the 22nd,
23rd and 24th phases of the South Pars eld in the Persian Gulf to TPAO under a
service contract.12 But two years later, the details of this agreement are still to be
worked out by the relevant institutions. Several meetings of the Working Group
that was established for this purpose have been convened. However, no agreement
has been reached regarding the details mentioned in the MoUs.
Since Turkey’s energy policy aims, among other things, at contributing to
Europe’s energy supply security, Ankara believes that these eorts, albeit in the
longer term, will provide an impetus to the Nabucco and other East-West en-
ergy pipeline projects. Iranian gas is certainly one of the options that might feed
these alternative supply sources. Azeri gas by itself will not be sucient for the
later stages of the so-called Fourth Corridor. e Shah Deniz gas, Iraqi gas, and
the trans-Caspian connections will thus continue to be vital, and Turkey’s Iran
initiative is by no means an alternative to the above sources. On the contrary, it
is Turkey’s vision that progress in its Iranian negotiations will help to accelerate
development of these important supply sources.
ere is no doubt that Turkish-Iranian energy cooperation has angered previ-
ous US administrations because it undercuts American eorts to isolate the Is-
lamic Republic over its deance of four UN Security Council sanctions seeking
suspension of its uranium enrichment program.13 Nonetheless, Erdoğan has re-
peatedly stressed that Turkey’s cooperation with Iran is intended only to diversify
Turkish energy supplies. It would be “out of the question to stop imports from
either country [Russia or Iran],”14 Erdoğan said following the Georgian war, espe-
cially as Turkey’s energy needs grow by almost 5% per year.
Nuclear energy might emerge as an area of cooperation between Turkey and
Iran if and when Iran gets its civilian nuclear power station. e same Russian
company (Rosatom, the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation) that provides
fuel to Iran is also slated to construct Turkey’s rst nuclear power station. Turkey
stands with the US, the EU and the UN in support of diplomatic eorts to stop
the Iranian government from developing nuclear weapons capabilities. e low-
TUNCAY BABALI
It seems clear that Turkey will
be a continuing interlocutor in
nuclear negotiations with Iran
in the coming future
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
153
enriched uranium (LEU) exchange deal
(1,200 kg LEU in exchange for 120 kg of
highly enriched uranium) that Turkey
reached on May 17, 2010 together with
Iran and Brazil complies completely with
that commitment. It seems clear that
Turkey will be a continuing interlocutor
in nuclear negotiations with Iran in the
coming future.
Energy development projects can take years to put into operation; hence, en-
gagements with Iran today are important for Turkey and other nations in order to
secure their long-term energy needs. None of the countries dealing with Iran on
energy matters can aord to wait until the Iranian sanctions have run their course.
Turkey hopes and believes that one day the international political situation with
regard to Iran will change. And on that day, Turkey wants its companies operating
in the energy eld to be ready to accelerate their activities in that country.
Iraq and Qatar
Since the rst Gulf War, Iraq has been the single most important country in
terms of aecting Turkey’s own national security. e future of Iraq, and preserv-
ing territorial integrity and sovereignty of that country with sustainable security
and stability were thus the most important foreign policy priority for Turkey.
Over the past two years, there has been a general shi away from confrontation to
cooperation between Ankara and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).15
rough the initiation of Strategic Council meetings with the central government
in Iraq, Turkey has been able to discuss a wide range of issues and signed 48 agree-
ments with Iraq, ranging from energy to bilateral trade, and from security to water
issues. Ankara’s vision is to increase the economic integration with that country,
along with Foreign Minister Davutoğlu’s main principles of Turkish foreign pol-
icy. e PKK is the main concern for Turkey and the isolation and marginaliza-
tion of the PKK in Northern Iraq was Turkey’s main goal during this policy shi.
Ankara considered economic integration with Iraq essential for preventing the
region from devolving into a safe haven for the terrorists.
Turkey has two main problems with Iraq. In the short-term, the security situ-
ation in Iraq and the dispute between the KRG and the central government in
Baghdad over the distribution of petrodollars mean that Ankara must proceed
cautiously with regard to energy investments in Iraq. In the long term, investing
Ankara’s energy diplomacy
in Iraq has aimed at reaching
two goals: enhancing political
goodwill between both states,
while also securing additional
gas for the transit projects
through Turkish territory
154
in Iraqi energy projects will enrich the Iraqi Kurds, promoting their interdepen-
dency with Turkey – their only outlet and market for energy resources. Turkey has
been promoting the development of a gas pipeline through its territory as a means
for enhancing relations with the KRG.16 is is one illustration of the complex
nature of Ankara’s energy policies. In this respect, Ankara’s energy diplomacy in
Iraq has aimed at reaching two goals: enhancing political goodwill between both
states, while also securing additional gas for the transit projects through Turkish
territory.
e MoU that was signed between the Turkish Ministry of Energy and the
Iraqi Ministries of Oil and Electricity on August 7, 2007 constitutes an important
basis for Turkey’s energy relations with Iraq. On July 10, 2008 Prime Minister
Erdoğan became the rst Turkish prime minister to visit Iraq in 18 years. During
that visit, both sides concurred on cooperating in the eld of energy by establish-
ing partnerships between Turkish (TPAO, BOTAŞ) and Iraqi companies as well as
transporting Iraqi natural resources to the world markets through the most viable
export routes. To this end, they also agreed to upgrade and expand the existing
capacity of the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline, and to build a pipeline network to
transport natural gas from Iraq to international markets via Turkey.
According to the Common Political Declaration signed during Erdoğan’s visit
to Iraq, a High Level Strategic Council was set up. is joint Council of Ministers
rst convened during Erdoğan’s visit to Baghdad on October 15, 2009.17 Its focus
will be to deal, among other things, with energy issues. is platform also gives
an opportunity for the two countries’ ministers of energy to have more frequent
contacts.
A part of the natural gas to be produced, rst from Iraq’s Akkas eld and later
from the Mansuriyah eld east of Mousul, has been allocated for Syria, and the
remaining amount is designated to be used domestically and allocated to the Arab
Natural Gas Pipeline Project (ANGP). Turkey is working to convince the Iraqi
government that oil and gas resources can and should be developed in parallel.
is would be in the best interest of the Iraqi people and government. e sign-
ing of a MoU between BOTAŞ, TPAO and Shell in November 2008 has also been
a positive step forward along this policy line. ere are some rumors that the
ANGP might operate from north to south, aer connecting with the Turkish grid.
Turkey deems it crucial that the gas ows from south to north.
Private Turkish companies have already made huge investments in North-
ern Iraq, specically in the KRG areas and the elds of Tak Tak, Khor Mor and
TUNCAY BABALI
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
155
Chemchemal. e eorts of companies like Genel Energy of Turkey, Dana gas of
Norway, and Nabucco’s chief operating company OMV in the area make it highly
pertinent to develop a direct connection to Turkey from Northern Iraq, and to
strive for a gas pipeline parallel to the existing Kirkuk-Yumurtalik oil pipeline.
Turkey has strived to develop energy relations with other countries in the Mid-
dle East as well.18 In August 2009, Emir of Qatar, who has developed personal rela-
tions with Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and worked
on several foreign policy issues of mutual concern, such as during the Lebanon
war of 2006 and Middle East Peace process, discussed extensively energy coopera-
tion with President Abdullah Gül. Imports of gas from Qatar have constituted one
potential area of cooperation. ere are discussions in the works; for example, the
prospect of piping liqueed natural gas (LNG) to Turkey. If Turkey secures its deal
with Iran on the development of the South Pars phases 22-24, and runs a pipeline
across the Iranian mainland to Turkey, Qatar has indicated interest in connecting
to this pipeline. Iraq route is also in calculations. However, given the moratorium
on agreeing to any additional LNG contracts until 2016, when Qatar nishes its
own evaluation stage, securing new supplies from the Qatari market is very un-
likely for Turkey. To complicate matters further, Qatar’s contracts with Romania
Energy cooperation is certainly seen as the key policy with which to promote interdependency and
deepen relations between Turkey and its neighboring countries.
Photo: AA, Fırat Yurdakul
156
TUNCAY BABALI
to supply LNG through the Turkish straits may turn into a very contentious issue
between Turkey and Romania.
Similar to Qatar, Turkey has been eyeing to develop closer energy cooperation
with Kuwait. Again, either through a pipeline over Iraq or enhancing bilateral
cooperation through investments in Turkey’s energy infrastructure, Turkey wants
to add Kuwait to the list of partners. e construction of a renery in Ceyhan
is only one example aimed at attracting Kuwaiti cooperation and investment. In
addition, since there is a new gas pipeline in Iraq coming from the rich gas elds
of the south to Baghdad, Turkey is trying to convince the Iraqi government that
this major pipeline should continue towards the north, thus enabling the potential
for Kuwaiti and Qatari gas (and maybe a parallel oil pipeline) to increase their
throughput capacity.
e CIS
Azerbaijan
As a response to Turkey’s April 2009 announcement reestablishing diplomatic
and economic relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan signed a gas contract with Rus-
sia, pledging to export a limited amount of gas (500 mcm) in 2010, with the future
upper limit le undened for now. is has raised Ankara’s concerns about lling
the Nabucco pipeline with enough gas.
Furthermore, in October 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed a historical accord
stipulating a schedule for resuming diplomatic and economic relations. Since the
very beginning of the process, Baku has been suspicious about Ankara’s policy
to open its border and establish diplomatic relations with Yerevan without rst
addressing the contentious issue of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Using energy as
leverage, Azerbaijan’s president has gone so far as to state that Turkey has been
receiving gas through the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline (BTE, also known as
the South Caspian Pipeline) at one third of European prices from the Shah Deniz
Phase I since July 2007.
Recent events have opened the way for Turkish overtures toward Azerbai-
jan. Turkey and Armenia have not sent diplomatic protocols to their respective
parliaments for ratication. is is largely over the row between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. Moreover, the US Senate
Foreign Relations Committee’s March 4, 2010 decision to label the 1915 killings of
Armenians as “genocide” also means that Armenian-Turkish talks are not likely
to be revived anytime soon. e frozen Turkish-Armenian relations and the ensu-
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
157
ing presidential announcement regarding the suspension of protocols have posi-
tioned Ankara to win over Azerbaijan. In fact, Turkey and Azerbaijan concluded
their gas transit and price agreement in June 2010.19
Russia and the emergence of a North-South energy axis
Energy cooperation—both in gas and oil—forms the basis of Russo-Turkish
economic relations. For over two decades, growing Turkish energy demand has
relied heavily on Russia, with Turkey guring among the three largest clients for
Russian gas. Turkey depends on Russia for almost two-thirds of its gas imports
(24 bcm)20 via the Western and Blue Stream pipelines, and about a third of its
demand for crude oil.21 Moreover, Turkey is the third largest importer of Russian
coal, spending $710 million in 2007 alone.22 Should Turkey not tap other major
supplies from Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Turkmenistan, then the Russian share of Tur-
key’s gas supply might increase to 80 percent by the early 2020s.
e leaders of both Turkey and Russia have encouraged further bilateral co-
operation. On December 5-6, 2004, then Russian President Vladimir Putin paid
a visit to Turkey, the rst by a Russian head of state since 1972. During the visit,
Putin and then Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer signed a joint declaration
of cooperation which characterized bilateral relations as a “multilateral strength-
ened partnership.”23 From then on, there have been multiple high-level exchanges
featuring prime ministers and presidents from both countries. Among other is-
sues, the opening of the Blue Stream pipeline and the nuclear cooperation were
dealt with at these meetings.
During President Medvedev’s latest visit to Turkey in May 2010, Russia’s previ-
ous commitments to other energy projects turned into reality. Medvedev charac-
terized relations between the two countries as a “strategic partnership.”24 And the
countries jointly initiated a long-awaited agreement for a nuclear energy power
plant in Turkey to be built by a Russian-led consortium. Also, Russia agreed to sup-
ply crude oil to the TPAO Samsun-Ceyhan oil pipeline (SCP) project. Separately,
the Russian state-controlled natural gas monopoly Gazprom has announced that
it is in talks with Turkish energy companies for natural gas storage and distribu-
tion projects in Turkey.
Gazprom also indicated that there will be a 25% volume reduction in favor
of Turkey to avoid costly “take or pay” contractual obligations as demand and
consumption has been lower than previously agreed in recent years. During the
Medvedev visit both sides also agreed to abolish visa requirement for visits lasting
less than a month.
TUNCAY BABALI
Despite this progress in Turkish-Rus-
sian relations, however, the hydrocar-
bon resource transit through the Turk-
ish straits creates serious problems for
Turkey. Even as Moscow demands the
fulllment of the 1936 Montreaux Con-
vention’s guarantee of “free and unin-
terrupted passage” through the Turkish
straits, Russian ocials and energy companies are aware that the current volume
of trac through the Bosporus is unsustainable. e solution depends on the use
of alternative oil export options that bypass the straits.
e Turkish Ministry of Natural Resources and Energy sees the implemen-
tation of gas transit projects to third markets through Turkey as a means to
strengthen Turkish-Russian energy cooperation. e Blue Stream I and the an-
ticipated second phase of this natural gas pipeline are the primary components of
a north-south axis alternative transport strategy.
Russia’s August 8, 2008 invasion of Georgia, however, complicated Turkish
strategy. Nonetheless, continued progress in bilateral relations and frequent high-
level visits to Russia have mitigated complications that might have erupted out
of this war. Erdoğan walked a very tight rope during the crisis, explaining to the
Turkish daily Milliyet, “It would not be right for Turkey to be pushed toward any
side. Certain circles wanted to push Turkey into a corner either with the United
States or Russia aer the Georgian incident... We will act in line with what Tur-
key’s national interests require.”25 As Erdoğan’s top foreign policy advisor Ahmet
Davutoğlu explained, “You can’t say that Turkish-Russian relations can be like
Danish-Russian relations, or Norwegian-Russian relations, or Canada-Russian
[sic] relations. ... Any other European country can follow certain isolationist poli-
cies against Russia. Can Turkey do this? I ask you to understand the geographical
conditions of Turkey... We don’t want to pay the bill of strategic mistakes or mis-
calculations by Russia, or by Georgia.”26
e future of Turkish-Russian energy relations and the north-south corridor
depend largely on Moscow’s vision of energy security for Europe and the world.
Some analysts assert that Russia still has the ability to hold many of these energy
projects hostage.27 Although Russian ocials oen point out that during the Cold
War they did not stop supplying oil to the West, Moscow’s use of energy as a
trump card against Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and the Czech
Republic calls into question its reliability as an energy supplier. ese instances
158
e future of Turkish-Russian
energy relations and the north-
south corridor depend largely
on Moscow’s vision of energy
security for Europe and the
world
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
only serve to further legitimize Turkey’s pursuit of alternative supply routes while
stressing the need to positively engage Russia and promote interdependency.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan
Despite facing setbacks with their most notable expansion options, Kazakh-
stan, Turkmenistan and others found alternative transportation corridors when
renewed cooperation emerged between Russia and Turkey. Relations between
Turkey and Russia have undergone a transformation from strategic competition
into cooperation in elds such as energy, construction and tourism.28 anks to
expanding and deepening economic and energy relations between Turkey and
Russia, Central Asian countries no longer fear antagonizing Russia as they deepen
relations with Turkey. Now extending the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) and the
BTE pipelines across the Caspian Sea is a much more feasible option.
Turkey has proven itself an eective mediator between Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan. In November 2008, Turkish President Abdullah Gül managed to con-
vince Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev to pay the rst ever visit to Turkmenistan.
Together with Turkmen President Berdimuhamedov, a trilateral summit was
held in Turkmenistan to address the issue of a rapprochement. Two committees
on political and energy issues were established, with Turkey playing a facilitat-
ing role. Nevertheless, plans to use Central Asian gas to supply Nabucco via a
trans-Caspian pipeline have not progressed. Not only are there legal and technical
(and thus costly) impediments to building this underwater pipeline, Turkey is also
contending with Russia’s immense inuence over the Central Asian states. e
new Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline provides Turkmenistan more leverage and
incentive to push for a western route more aggressively, which might be possible
in the wake of the June 2010 deal between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
anks to Turkey’s eective energy diplomacy in the region, Kazakhstan’s as-
pirations now have new hopes. In February 2008, Kazakhstan’s state oil and gas
company KazMunayGas (KMG) purchased the Batumi oil terminal outright
from the Danish-led Greenoak Group and its partners. Greenoak will continue
to manage both the oil terminal and the recently modernized port of Batumi for
KMG. e terminal, with an annual capacity of at least 15 million tons of crude
oil and oil products, can also become a point of origin for tanker oil deliveries29 as
a source for the SCP.
e announced delays in the development of Kazakhstan’s Kashagan eld ben-
et Kazakhstan in two ways.30 Firstly, the Kazakh government can pressure the
consortium to increase KMG’s share in the project, and secondly, the increase
159
TUNCAY BABALI
in the price of oil boosts the nation’s rev-
enues. By 2013 a subsea gas pipeline can
be built between Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan, presenting Kazakhstan an op-
portunity to consider its own subsea oil
pipeline connected to the BTC.31 To that
end, on October 2, 2009 in Baku, KMG and SOCAR, the Azerbaijan state oil com-
pany, signed an agreement to jointly conduct a feasibility study on a trans-Caspian
project that would originate in Kazakhstan.32
e BTC’s continued commercial viability hinges on its access to Kazakh oil.
Whereas the BTC’s projected lifespan is 40 years, the reserves at the Azeri-Chirag-
Guneshli (ACG) oshore elds in the Azerbaijani sector of the Caspian Sea are al-
ready projected to decline starting in 2015. With a rapidly depleting source of oil,
the BTC will become increasingly reliant on Kazakh oil from the Kashagan region
whose production is fortuitously set to increase at that time. Given these facts, the
Turkish route seems the most likely one to be chosen in the future.
Kashagan production (“early oil”) is ocially scheduled to start in late 2011,
and the consortium must soon decide on a suitable export route. Apparently the
best way to transport this early oil is to use tankers and barges from Aktau to
Baku. To this end, in February 2009, the governments of Kazakhstan and Azer-
baijan agreed to set up a $3 billion oil transport system across the Caspian Sea that
will be fully operational by 2012, suggesting that this is planned for the Tengiz
and Kashagan developments. 33 KMG announced that the network will initially
be able to ship 500,000 barrels of oil a day, and the operation of the Kashagan
oileld by 2013 will increase this to 1.2 million bpd.34 ese developments make
the expansion of the BTC capacity, rst to 1.2 mbpd and then to 1.6 mbpd, all the
more relevant.
Turkey strongly supports transportation options that bypass the highly con-
gested Turkish Straits. It has long argued that the Samsun-Ceyhan Pipeline is the
most commercially viable and strategically convenient alternative proposed so far.
e Italian company Eni is fully nancing the joint project with Turkish Çalık
Energy, and construction is set to begin in 2010. With an annual capacity of 60-70
million metric tons (1.2-1.4 million bbl/d), the company also sees oil in its Ka-
zakh, Kashagan and Karachaganak elds as a start to the pipeline throughput.35
Despite Turkey’s persistence in seeking support for the SCP, Moscow has con-
tinually opted to support other bypass options such as the BAP (the Bourgas-
160
Russia views Nabucco as a rival
project to the South Stream gas
pipeline as it follows a similar
gas-delivery route to Europe
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
Alexandropoulos Pipeline through Bulgaria and Greece). However, the new Bul-
garian government has put the BAP project on hold. To compound the challenge,
Turkey hosted a summit to sign the Intergovernmental Agreement for the Nab-
ucco gas pipeline project in Ankara on July 13, 2009. Russia views Nabucco as a
rival project to the South Stream gas pipeline as it follows a similar gas-delivery
route to Europe. Hence, three weeks aer this summit, Putin paid an ocial visit
to Turkey for the signing of a record number of protocols.36 Both PMs declared
that Turkey and Russia were ready to steer in a new period of cooperation, par-
ticularly in the energy eld.37
Among the ambitious plans was an agreement to establish a working group
that would discuss the SCP project in detail. As stipulated in the agreement, Tur-
key would allow Russia to carry out a feasibility study for the South Stream to pass
through Turkey’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) exchange of Russian commit-
ment to supply crude oil to the SCP.
e Russian government’s new oer could be interpreted as a reaction to the
growing publicity and revival of Nabucco, aer the signing of the IGA in July
2009. Nevertheless, on October 19, Turkey, Italy and Russia signed a MoU regard-
ing Russian participation in the SCP and stipulated the commitments of the three
partners.38 is new development paved the way for enthusiastic Kazakh com-
mitment to the SCP. During Kazakh President Nazarbayev’s October 2009 visit,
Turkey signed a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” with Kazakhstan indicating
its intention of joining the SCP.39 Addressing his Turkish counterpart in Ankara,
Nazarbayev added that Turkey’s balanced policy towards Russia and China in-
creases its inuence in Central Asia.40 Kazakhstan’s deal with Turkey is seen as one
that will cement the latter’s role as a transit hub for oil and gas.
e SCP makes perfect sense for Kazakhstan and gives exibility to the coun-
try’s export potential. As mentioned above, the westbound route oers several
options for oil shippers from Kazakhstan. ey can either use the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline via Georgia, the pipeline to Supsa, or the railways to Batumi and Poti on
Georgia’s Black Sea Coast (in addition to the Azerbaijani-owned Kulevi terminal
near Poti). e SCP is geographically and environmentally the best option to en-
able the utilization of all these routes.41
Trends to Watch: Future Determinants of Turkish Energy Diplomacy
Energy relations between Turkey and its neighbors, Russia, Iran, Iraq and
Azerbaijan, are headed toward a paradigm shi that will include accelerated and
161
TUNCAY BABALI
diversied cooperation with producers (Iran and Russia) and transit and con-
sumer countries (mainly in Europe). e main question and challenge is: will this
intense energy diplomacy lead to a shi towards a more balanced energy partner-
ship to avoid over-dependency and lost opportunities?
Opportunity and dangers with new energy diplomacy and
some structural changes
As Turkey develops its energy diplomacy with its neighbors, it will be subject
to several opportunities, but also challenges. Until recently, Turkey’s previous en-
ergy cooperation with various partners focused on specic individual projects and
over particular issues. e new trend of package deals symbolizes a shi to more
complex and integrated energy relations raising the risks and deepening the coop-
eration perspectives for the future. As mentioned above, Gazprom has long been
interested in Turkey’s domestic gas distribution and storage opportunities. Dur-
ing Putin’s August visit to Ankara, to reap these opportunities Gazprom signed
a protocol with AKSA on investing in domestic gas distribution market,42 and
negotiated with the Turkish authorities on the construction of an underground
gas storage facility in Tuzgölü (a salt lake in mid Anatolia). e latest proposal was
recently reiterated during President Medvedev’s May visit to Turkey. Details of the
agreement yet to be nalized.
However, Gazprom’s interest in Turkey’s domestic market creates opportuni-
ties and serious concerns (over-reliance issue) for the future shape of the domestic
market in Turkey. It is a well known fact that Gazprom has been eyeing to expand
its role in supplying the Turkish domestic market through direct contracts with
potential wholesalers. New legislative changes created an awkward situation that,
while the Turkish gas sector monopoly BOTAŞ holds its monopoly situation it also
has been signing new purchase contracts. Although BOTAŞ has been suggesting
that market will be opened for private distributors, its poor performance so far
kept the market liberalization far behind the schedule. Nonetheless, Gazprom has
already made some headway in acquiring controlling stake in Bosphorus Gas,
which has taken over part of BOTAŞ’s import contract with Gazprom.
In addition to the over-reliance issue, an additional concern was that deeper
cooperation on the South Stream project through allowing the feasibility study
might ultimately lead to the merger of Nabucco with South Stream or through
Blue Stream II. Such a development ultimately could derail the whole Fourth Cor-
ridor idea and remove Nabucco as priority project in Turkish energy policy for-
mulation.
162
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
However, the election of a pro-Russian president in Ukraine and his push for
dropping the South Stream altogether in favor of using Ukraine as the main Rus-
sian transit route may annul these concerns.43 Such concerns have not yet led to
the reluctance for cooperation. However, they might have eased the pressure on
Turkey’s side to cooperate more on the South Stream and allow domestic access
to Gazprom. In a nutshell, re-balancing and a recalibration of Turkish-Russian
energy relations is still in the making and far from over. And, of course, the risk of
dependency based gas relations will be here to stay and dicult to balance.
Nuclear energy has been one central area of intense cooperation between Tur-
key and Russia. During Putin’s August 2009 and Medvedev’s May 2010 visits, the
Turkish government felt strong pressures to approve Russian participation in the
construction of Turkey’s rst nuclear power plant worth of 20 billion$ (initial es-
timate). e two countries have already been working on joint nuclear energy
cooperation through a working group focusing on technical matters. Aer the
visit of President Medvedev, it is highly unlikely for Turkey to backtrack from the
commitment to award the project to Russia –in the form of bilateral agreement
subject to Turkish Grand National Assembly’s approval.
Nonetheless, awarding the rst nuclear power plant to the Russians and the
second one through a March 2010 MoU to the South Koreans does not make
much sense in terms of cost eectiveness and sustainability of the fuel supply.44
Operating two dierent nuclear power plants with two completely dierent tech-
nology and maintenance issues (cost and technical requirements) may not be the
best way to proceed. e fuel supply to these two plants will also be a challenge
and not cost eective since each will require dierent suppliers with dierent op-
erating rules. Besides, the Russian reactor proposed for the project has not been
given safety approvals by European institutions.45
e rise of private sector and energy-lobbies
ere is a growing trend of interest in energy sector among Turkey’s tradi-
tional conglomerates such as Koç and Sabancı Holdings. Reecting, Turkey’s
growing trade with its neighbors, Russia in particular, quite naturally new kind
of Turkish entrepreneurs have emerged as a viable force that could shape bilateral
energy relations as well as Turkey’s foreign energy diplomacy. However, these
newcomers to the sector have wide range of areas of business interests other than
the traditional ones, including media. is might be a regional phenomenon if
we take into consideration the Greek example of reecting the pro-Russian ar-
guments in some of the media outlets which had extensive business relations
163
TUNCAY BABALI
164
with Russia, during the 2009 Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis that aected the South
East European countries the most. It is too early to tell whether this is a danger,
an impetus to Turkey’s energy interests or a regional phenomenon, but worth
watching for. For instance, Ciner Holding has been actively lobbying to build
Turkey’s rst nuclear power plant with Russian partnership. Çalık Holding has
been the main proponent of partnering with Russian companies to ll its pro-
posed Samsun-Ceyhan projects. Lobbying on energy matters by Turkish busi-
nesses has extended to Iraq as well. Genel Energy has already invested hundreds
of millions of dollars to the elds of Khor Mor and Tak Tak in Northern Iraq. e
company has also formed a partnership with Nabucco’s main operator OMV of
Austria with the anticipation of selling its gas to this priority pipeline for Turkey
which suers additional supply sources aer phase one. e company became a
more relevant actor, particularly aer KRG secured a deal with Iraqi government
launching partial crude oil exports through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline in
mid-2009.
Private company lobbying for energy projects with foreign partners could be
considered as an indication of a healthy competition and Turkey’s growing eco-
nomic role in its region. ey shed light about existing projects and their implica-
tions for the general public. However, direct links between these groups and the
ocials might alienate people and raise questions about the primacy of private
over national interests. It will be reasonable to expect that international and na-
tional energy companies will continue to struggle for capturing better deals and
projects via political connections. Such competition might have more of a nega-
tive eect overall, by leading the institutions involved in the making of Turkish
energy policy to undertake wrong decisions or misevaluate Turkey’s options. If
this competition is not regulated properly, it might come to hinder the healthy
evolution of the future domestic energy market in Turkey.
Conclusion
In both regional and global energy equations and foreign policy calculations,
Turkey’s energy strategy and the exibility oered by the east-west and north-
south routes make Turkey one of the most viable and desired partners for both
energy rich Russia, Caspian and the Middle Eastern countries and the energy
hungry markets in Europe. e BTC connection, the SCP project, and the po-
tential Nabucco connection can make the Fourth Corridor to Europe more than
an “aspiration;” to the chagrin of critics, it will be a reality.46 e emerging north-
south axis, more cooperation and new pipeline opportunities with Iraq, Iran and
the almost nished Arab natural gas pipeline also play into further integration
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
and interdependency in the regions sur-
rounding Turkey. Such integration is the
sole way to mitigate political dierences
and defuse conicts.
As of now, neither the regional coun-
tries nor any of the major powers have
nalized major energy projects and strategies. However, the mere discussion of
these possibilities changes not only the region’s geo-economics but also its geo-
politics. Both the Caspian Basin oil and gas producers and the Western powers
have wanted oil and gas export pipelines from that region that bypass Russia.
However, at the same time, they have ruled out Iran as an alternative transit route.
Following the successful completion of the BTC and BTE pipelines, and the rst
leg of the Turkey-Greece-Italy gas interconnector, the US-Turkish “east-west en-
ergy corridor” concept envisions extending these pipelines east to Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan via the Trans-Caspian pipeline and west to Europe via the Nabucco
pipeline. is would, for the rst time, allow the EU to buy Caspian gas without
a Russian intermediary. However, the recent paradigm shi in Turkish foreign
policy shows that the discussion of alternative energy strategies may bring old
allies into conict while encouraging old enemies to cooperate. Turkish-Russian
and Turkish-Armenian relations are cases in point. e recent intensity in Turk-
ish-Russian-CIS-Middle East energy negotiations needs to be viewed through the
increasingly multidimensional nature of Turkey’s energy diplomacy. is trend
for intensity is likely to accelerate in the near future.
Turkey’s long-term energy development is important to the US and Europe,
even if the West remains from time to time upset at the short-term implications
of Ankara’s dealings with the CIS and the Middle East. e diversication of new
energy supply routes remains crucial not only to Turkey’s development but also
to the West’s energy security. Turkey’s new energy diplomacy activism should be
seen as a redenition of its self-interest in the energy business. Rather than merely
following Western energy security goals in a loyal and unquestioning manner,
Turkey is weighing all options in the new geopolitical landscape. Finding the right
balance and bringing all of Turkey’s interests – including its longstanding rela-
tionship with the West – into harmony is going to be a challenge in the future.
ere is a fundamental mistake frequently made by some analysts and policy-
makers in the West who assume that post-Cold War Turkey follows the general
policies of the Western institutions such as the EU enlargement, election pro-
cess of the new secretary general for NATO, and the Western policies on Iranian
Diversication of new
energy supply routes remains
crucial not only to Turkey’s
development but also to the
West’s energy security
165
TUNCAY BABALI
nuclear issue or the Caucasus. Another mistake oen made by the Europeans in
their dealings with Turkey is that they oen think that Turkey’s territory is part
of their own, so that they can, for instance, attempt to sign contracts with Iran on
gas purchases without even consulting with Turkey, while at the same time being
hesitant to open the energy chapter negotiations with Turkey. Turkey deserves to
have a stand-alone policy, and its possible contribution and nuanced value should
be holistically examined. e underlying question should now be: “How can we
in the West make use of Turkey’s new vision of engagement and active diplomacy
to achieve security, prosperity and stability in its region?”47
Instead of being perceived as a perennially peripheral country that sits on the
outer margins of the EU, NATO or Asia, Turkey needs to be seen as a “central coun-
try” – a main contributor and collaborator towards the peace and prosperity of the
region. Energy collaboration is the best way to establish this new paradigm.
Endnotes
1. İbrahim Kalın, “Is the West losing Turkey?” Today’s Zaman, November 5, 2009.
2. Ahmet Davutoğlu, from his keynote address during the “Turkish Diplomacy and Regional-
Global order in the Early 21st Century,” Istanbul, May 15, 2010.
3. For an excellent summary of the new foreign policy approach of Turkey, see: Ahmet Davutoğlu,
the Speech Delivered at the 28th Annual Conference on US-Turkish Relations Organized by ATC-
DEIK: “Turkey-US Relations: A Model Partnership, Global and Regional Dimensions”, Washington
DC, June 2, 2009.
4. Improving relations with neighboring states and playing an increasingly leading role in the
Middle East and CIS region seems to be based on real political inuence and economic and energy
interests, rather than prestige and nostalgia for the old Ottoman Empire, as some suggest. First and
foremost it is a correction of an anomalous situation of non-interaction in the Middle Eastern issues.
Turkey is returning to its traditional strategic environment.
5. Rod Nordland, “Rebuilding Its Economy, Iraq Shuns U.S. Businesses,” e New York Times,
November 13, 2009.
6. Mehmet Karlı, “A reality check for Turkey’s economic depth,” Presentation given at the follow-
ing meeting: “Turkey’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World,” Oxford University, May 1, 2010.
7. Since Turkey started to use European standards in statistical calculations there was posi-
tive eects to the sudden increase in GDP size. See: http://www.treasury.gov.tr/irj/portal/
anonymous?guest_user=treasury.
8. Egemen Bağış, “A Win-Win relation: Turkey and EU,” speech delivered at the Harvard Univer-
sity’s Kennedy School of Government on September 24, 2009.
9. Turkey and the EU’s long-standing, high priority project, the Nabucco gas pipeline, aims to
bring natural gas from the Caspian basin to Europe. It has gained increasing importance, as Europe’s
gas demand will exceed 700 bcm by 2020. BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2008 and 2009;
World Energy Outlook 2008, IEA. On July 13, 2009, four EU countries (Austria, Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria) joined Turkey in signing an agreement to construct the 31 bcm/year capacity pipeline
by 2014. “Europe Gas Pipeline Deal Agreed,” BBC, July 13, 2009.
166
Regional Energy Equations and Turkish Foreign Policy: e Middle East and the CIS
10. “Trade Movements 2007 by Pipeline,” in BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2008, p. 30.
11. Reuters, January 1, 2008.
12. According to the July 2007 MoU, the details of all the above items should have been worked
out by the relevant institutions within four to six months. However, consecutive negotiations, in-
cluding the one that took place during Iranian President Ahmedinejad’s visit to Turkey on August
14-15, 2008, have failed to produce any results. e renewed MoU also committed both sides to -
nalize the details within twelve months; however, it also failed because of the Iranian side’s insistence
on “buy-back” and “re-sale” modalities. Finance was also a major hurdle.
13. Milliyet, September 28, 2007.
14. Gareth Jenkins, “Turkey Determined to Press Ahead with Iranian Gas Deal,” Eurasia Daily
Monitor, October 5, 2007.
15. Tuncay Babalı, “Turkey Courts Iraq’s Energy-Rich Kurds” Jane’s Islamic Aairs Analyst, UK,
March, 2009.
16. Iraq and Turkey intended to renew the oil transit agreement through the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik
pipeline-main oil pipeline from Iraq, which expired in early March 2010. A new agreement was
reached on March 31, 2010. It will be valid for 20 years.
17. On October 15, Turkish and Iraqi ministers met in Baghdad under the High-Level Strategic
Cooperation Council to discuss opportunities and obstacles between the two countries. During the
meeting 48 agreements were signed, ranging from combating the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
to energy cooperation and water resources. Iraq is Turkey’s second biggest export market outside
Europe; it received $3.4 billion-net worth of goods in the rst eight months of 2009 (trade volume
was over 4 billion in 2009), an increase of 48 percent over the same period in 2008, according to the
Turkish statistics oce (Hürriyet Daily News, October 16, 2009).
18. Tuncay Babali and Samil Sen, “Security Concerns in the Middle East for Oil Supply: Prob-
lems and Solutions” Energy Policy, Vol. 35, No. 3, (2007), pp. 1517-1524.
19. Şaban Kardaş, “Turkish-Azeri Deal may Herald New Competition in Southern Corridor,”
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, No. 115, June 15, 2010.
20. BOTAŞ, Annual Report 2007, p.49; BOTAŞ “Natural Gas Sale and Purchase Agreements,
Natural Gas Pipeline Activities,” in Portrait of BOTAŞ Activities; BP, BP Statistical Review of World
Energy 2008, p.30. In 2008, Russia exported 38 bcm to Germany and 22.4 bcm to Italy.
21. Turkey imports approximately 6 million barrels of oil (7 million tons) annually from Russia.
22. Bill Powell, “Just How Scary is Russia,” Fortune, September 15, 2008.
23. Axis Information and Analysis news service, August 21, 2005.
24. Turkey and Russia signed 17 agreements on May 12, 2010 to enhance cooperation in energy
and other elds, including pacts to build Turkey’s rst nuclear power plant and furthering plans for
the SCP and a gas storage facility. Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey’s Pact with Russia Will Give It Nuclear
Plant,” e New York Times, May 12, 2010.
25. Bülent Alirıza, “Turkey and the Crisis in the Caucasus,” Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Turkey Project (Washington, D.C.), September 9, 2008.
26. “Turkey’s Top Foreign Policy Aide Worries about False Optimism in Iraq,” Council on For-
eign Relations, September 19, 2008.
27. “Turkey: Eyeing Central Asian Energy Ties,” Stratfor Intelligence Service, September 3, 2008.
28. For a discussion of the transformation of relations between Turkey and Russia see Tuncay
Babali, “Turkey at the Energy Crossroads”; Hasan Kanbolat, “Towards a New Era in Turkey-Russia
Relations,” EurasiaCritic, (September,) 2009.
167
TUNCAY BABALI
29. Vladimir Socor, “Azerbaijan Can Rescue the Odessa-Brody Pipeline,” Eurasia Daily Monitor,
Vol. 5, No. 96, May 20, 2008.
30. Tuncay Babali, “Prospects of Export Routes for Kashagan Oil” Energy Policy, Vol.37, Issue
4, (April, 2009).
31. Babali, ibid.
32. “Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan Sign Documents on Trans-Caspian Project and New Pipeline,”
Trend Capital, October 3, 2009.
33. Financial Times, November 17, 2008.
34. “Azeris, Kazakhs Sign Deal on Oil Transportation,” AP, February 25, 2009.
35. Hurriyet Daily News, May 15, 2006.
36. Needaz.Ru, November 3, 2009.
37. For Putin’s visit to Turkey see Anadolu Ajansi, August 6, 2009.
38. RIA Novosti, October 19, 2009.
39. “Kazakhstan, Turkey Form Strategic Partnership,” Reuters, October 29, 2009.
40. Farkhad Sharip, “Moscow Watchful Over Kazakh-Turkish Partnership Agreement,” Eurasia
Daily Monitor, Vol. 6, No. 199, (October 29, 2009).
41. Tuncay Babali, “Expanding Western Energy Export Route for Kazakhstan,” Oil, Gas, Energy
Law Intelligence, Vol.8, Issue 2, (March, 2010).
42. AKSA is among the key players in Turkish gas distribution.
43. Ukraine stands to lose the most from South Stream, as this plan will replace some gas transit
through the Ukrainian system. Some critics argue that Gazprom is using South Stream as leverage
to gain better terms with Ukraine. Energy analyst Vladimir Socor has suggested that new President
Victor Yanukovich may believe he can stave o the prospect of South Stream, replacing Ukraine
as the main gas conduit to Southeast Europe by making Russia a shareholder in the Ukrainian gas
transit system. Presentation by Vladimir Socor at Black Sea Security Executive Program at Harvard
Kennedy School, April 20, 2010.
44. Hürriyet, January 15, 2010.
45. Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey’s Pact With Russia.”
46. John C.K. Daly, “Turks Eye Carrying Kazakh Oil,” UPI, May 12, 2008.
47. Tuncay Babali, “Losing Turkey or Strategic Blindness,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 8, No.3,
(Fall, 2009).
168
