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United in Goals, Divided on Means: Opinion Leaders Survey Results and Partisan Breakdowns from the 2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Opinion on US Foreign Policy

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  • Langer Research Associates
  • Chicago Council on Global Affairs

Abstract and Figures

Partisan disputes among US policymakers seem to be growing by the week, whether on negotiations with Iran, immigration reform, or climate change. To what extent are these divisions unique to foreign policy leaders? How much do they also reflect polarization among the American public? To examine these questions, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs revived its tradition of conducting tandem surveys of the US public and foreign policy opinion leaders in its May–July 2014 survey. Across party lines, the results reveal that the US public and leaders largely agree on the general direction of US foreign policy. But entrenched partisan mindsets and polarization present significant challenges to addressing today’s major foreign policy issues. The results underscore several common foreign policy goals across party lines that are bound to get lost once the divisive 2016 campaign begins. Policymakers should set a higher bar and advance shared priorities while working to bridge their differences.
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CHICAGO COUNCIL SURVEYS
United in Goals, Divided on Means
Opinion Leaders Survey Results and Partisan Breakdowns from the
2014 Chicago Council Survey of American Opinion on US Foreign Policy
By Dina Smeltz with Joshua Busby, Gregory Holyk, Craig Kafura, Jonathan Monten, and Jordan Tama
OPINION LEADERS FINDINGS
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs is an independent, nonpartisan organization. All statements of fact and expressions of opinion con-
tained in this report are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
or of the project funders.
Copyright © 2015 by The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
This report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by sections 107 and 108 of the US
Copyright Law and excerpts by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher. For further information about
The Chicago Council or this study, please write to The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 332 South Michigan Avenue, Suite 1100, Chicago IL,
60604, or visit The Chicago Council’s website at www.thechicagocouncil.org.
2014 Chicago Council Survey Team
Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Craig Kafura, Research Associate, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Joshua Busby, Associate Professor of Public Affairs, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs,
University of Texas Austin
Gregory Holyk, Research Analyst, Langer Research
Jonathan Monten, Lecturer in Political Science, University College London
Jordan Tama, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University
Foreign Policy Advisory Board
Ivo Daalder, President, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Michael Desch, Chair and Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Notre Dame
Daniel Drezner, Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School of Tufts University
Peter Feaver, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University
Bruce Jentleson, Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, Duke University
Ellen Laipson, President and CEO, The Stimson Center
Tod Lindberg, Research Fellow, The Hoover Institution
James Lindsay, Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations
Thomas Mann, Senior Fellow, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institution
Benjamin Page, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making, Northwestern University
James Steinberg, Dean, Maxwell School of Syracuse University
Michele Wucker, Vice President, Studies, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
The 2014 Chicago Council Survey was made possible by the generous support of The John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation, the Robert R. McCormick Foundation, the Korea Foundation, the United States-Japan
Foundation, and the personal support of Lester Crown and the Crown family.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 3
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ...................................................................................4
Introduction ..........................................................................................5
US role in the world ...................................................................................6
Top goals and threats .................................................................................7
Defending allies, US military superiority, climate change, Iran, protecting jobs, and immigration ...7
Goals particular to Republicans .................................................................8
US military superiority ..................................................................8
Iran’s nuclear program ..................................................................9
Goals particular to Democrats ................................................................10
Limiting climate change ..............................................................10
Goals particular to opinion leaders ............................................................10
Defending allies ...................................................................... 10
Goals particular to the public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Protecting American jobs and reducing US oil dependence ..............................10
Immigration .......................................................................... 11
Attitudes toward military intervention ...............................................................11
Support for military force to combat terrorism ................................................. 12
Defending allies .............................................................................12
Preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons ..............................................13
Military intervention in Ukraine ...............................................................14
Peacekeeping ................................................................................14
Leader and public attitudes on the United Nations and multilateralism ................................15
Support for treaties. .......................................................................... 15
Support for UN decision making .............................................................. 15
Shared support for economic engagement ........................................................... 16
Globalization and trade ......................................................................16
Foreign economic aid ........................................................................16
Conclusions ......................................................................................... 18
Appendix ...........................................................................................20
Methodology ....................................................................................... 26
4 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Executive summary
Partisan disputes among US policymakers seem to be
growing by the week, whether on negotiations with
Iran, immigration reform, or climate change. To what
extent are these divisions unique to foreign policy
leaders? How much do they also reflect polarization
among the American public?
To examine these questions, The Chicago Council
on Global Affairs revived its tradition of conducting
tandem surveys of the US public and foreign policy
opinion leaders in its May–July 2014 survey. Across
party lines, the results reveal that the US public and
leaders largely agree on the general direction of US
foreign policy. But entrenched partisan mindsets and
polarization present significant challenges to address-
ing today’s major foreign policy issues. The results
underscore several common foreign policy goals
across party lines that are bound to get lost once the
divisive 2016 campaign begins. Policymakers should
set a higher bar and advance shared priorities while
working to bridge their differences.
>Whether they describe themselves as Democrats,
Republicans, or Independents, foreign policy lead-
ers and the public generally agree on the most crit-
ical foreign policy threats, including cyberattacks,
terrorism, and nuclear proliferation.
>Leaders and the public both endorse continued US
international engagement and support the US mili-
tary presence abroad.
>Both groups see preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons, combating international terrorism, and
securing adequate supplies of energy as top foreign
policy priorities.
>Majorities favor drone strikes, assassination of
individual terrorist leaders, and air strikes against
terrorist training camps and facilities.
>Majorities among the public and leaders say that
globalization is mostly good and favor free trade.
This consensus may be surprising given current
headlines. But the survey results also underscore clear
partisan differences among leaders and the public on
how to achieve foreign policy goals.
>Republican leaders and Republicans among the
public emphasize US military superiority and
strength as key elements of foreign policy. For
example, majorities of Republicans among both
groups consider US military superiority to be a
very important goal compared to fewer than half
of Democrats.
Republicans alone favor the use of ground
troops to attack terrorist training camps and
support maintaining long-term military bases in
Guantanamo Bay.
Majorities of both Republican leaders and the
Republican public support military force to pre-
vent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.
>Democrats, by contrast, are more supportive of
multilateral approaches.
Majorities of Democrats, compared to minori-
ties of Republicans, favor working through the
United Nations and using US troops for hypo-
thetical peacekeeping enforcement in Syria and
between Israel and the Palestinians.
While Democratic leaders oppose the use of
force to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear
weapon, the Democratic public supports the use
of force in this case.
Democrats are also more concerned than others
about climate change.
>Independents, like Democrats, generally prefer to
avoid the use of military force in most situations.
As with Democratic leaders, climate change
is also one of the leading goals among
Independent leaders.
Independent leaders are closer to Republicans
in prioritizing US military superiority, while the
Independent public is closer to Democrats.
On multilateral approaches, Independents
fall in between the views of Democrats and
Republicans.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 5
United in Goals, Divided on Means
Introduction
The Chicago Council has long been interested in mea-
suring the differences between public and leadership
opinion on foreign policy issues, tracking the extent to
which policy reflects public preferences, and identi-
fying potential gaps between leadership and public
understanding. From 1978 to 2004 the Council asked a
sample of “foreign policy leaders” a subset of questions
from the Chicago Council Survey on American public
opinion. These studies proved vital for researchers
seeking to understand the relationship between public
opinion and the views of policy leaders.
In 2014 The Chicago Council revived this tradition
and once again conducted a survey of foreign policy
leaders in tandem with the 2014 public survey. Using
an online platform and a sample modeled on past
Chicago Council leadership surveys, the Council asked
hundreds of foreign policy leaders questions about
pressing US foreign policy issues in the world today.
The Chicago Council leadership sample represents
a broad spectrum of those who are likely to influence
US foreign policy because of their expertise and/or
current or past roles in government or influential orga-
nizations. These 668 opinion leaders include persons
working in Congress and executive branch agencies;
fellows at top foreign policy think tanks; academics at
the top universities for international relations; leaders
of internationally focused interest groups and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs); leaders of labor
unions, religious organizations, and multinational
corporations; and members of the media writing on
international issues. Throughout this report, the terms
foreign policy leaders, opinion leaders, and in some
cases, just leaders, are used interchangeably.
The results show that on many issues the opinions
of foreign policy opinion leaders and the American
public coincide, though not always to the same degree.
Both the public and leaders emphasize the importance
of US leadership in the world, see common goals and
threats, support the US military presence abroad, favor
signing international treaties on a host of issues, and
support globalization and free trade.
Yet the results also highlight fundamental partisan
differences in the preferred ways to achieve foreign
policy goals, including whether the United States
should project its power through military strength or
by working through multilateral organizations and
instruments. On average, the partisan gaps between
opinion leaders are twice the size of those between
the public, especially when it comes to the use of US
troops abroad, US policy on Iran, and US participation
in a variety of international treaties. This difference
most likely reflects greater policy awareness, stronger
attitudes, and more consistent partisan inclinations
among opinion leaders.
Aside from partisan differences, the data reveal a
few cases in which foreign policy opinion leaders are
not in sync with public concerns. The public is much
more concerned than leaders about the bread and
butter issues of US job security and dependence on
foreign oil. This is a traditional divide, which has been
seen in the Council’s previous leader/public surveys.
Leaders are much more concerned about protecting
allies’ security. There are also some more specific
disconnects between the public and leaders within
partisan groupings on the issues of immigration, Irans
nuclear program, and international treaties.
The results highlight fundamental partisan differences
in the preferred ways to achieve foreign policy goals.
On average, the partisan gaps between opinion leaders
are twice the size of those between the public.
The Chicago Council leadership sample represents a
broad spectrum of those who are likely to influence US
foreign policy because of their expertise and/or current
or past roles in government or influential organizations.
6 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
1. US role in the world
Shared desire for strong US leadership and
active international role
While many headlines over the past year have argued
that the United States is in decline, both the American
public and foreign policy leaders believe that the Unit-
ed States is the most influential country in the world
today. On a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the most
influential, the public rates the United States an aver-
age of 8.6. Leaders from all parties rate US influence
an average of at least 9.0 (Republicans and Indepen-
dents, 9.0; Democrats, 9.2). China ranks second to the
United States in terms of global influence among both
the public and leaders, with the public rating Chinas
influence at an average of 7.4, Republican and Dem-
ocratic leaders rating it 8.0, and Independent leaders
rating it 8.2).
With influence comes leadership: large majorities
of leaders and the public say that strong US leadership
in the world is at least somewhat desirable. But there
is a great difference between leaders and the public
in degree or emphasis. At least six in ten leaders (57%
of Independent leaders, 70% of Democratic leaders,
and 90% of Republican leaders) say it is “very desir-
able” for the United States to exert strong leadership
in world affairs, compared to just over one-third of the
public (37%).
Similarly, a much larger portion of leaders (94%
Republicans, 97% Democrats, 92% Independents) than
of the public (58%) thinks it will be best for the future
of the country if the United States takes an active
part in world affairs. While six in ten members of the
public continue to support taking an active part, this
is among the lowest readings in recent years.1 A fol-
low-up question reveals that many who say the United
States should stay out of world affairs think the United
States needs to focus on its own domestic problems
before taking on international concerns. Still, majori-
1. For a discussion of these results among the public, see Foreign
Policy in the Age of Retrenchment by Dina Smeltz and Ivo Daalder,
with Craig Kafura.
Large majorities of leaders and the public say that strong
US leadership in the world is at least somewhat desirable.
Leader Survey Methodology and
Limitations
This report is based on a leadership survey conducted
between May and July 2014 among 668 foreign policy
opinion leaders from executive branch agencies, Congress,
academia, think tanks, the media, interest groups and
NGOs, religious institutions, labor unions, and business.
While the survey team worked hard to design a sample
that would reflect broad networks of policy leaders on
both sides of the aisle, as in previous Chicago Council lead-
ers surveys, the final sample included a disproportionate
number of Democrats (46% Democrat, 17% Republican,
37% Independent). For a comparison with previous Chicago
Council leader samples, see Methodology, page 28. For this
reason, the leader results are shown by partisan affiliation
and not as an overall leader average.
To more closely reflect the composition of previous
Chicago Council Survey leaders surveys, these data were
weighted by target sample group to reflect the propor-
tional representation of leader groupings within previous
leader samples (see Methodology, table 8, for subsample
group sizes of past Chicago Council leadership studies).
Using these past weights required the exclusion of a “mili-
tary” group also surveyed in 2014, as this group was not in-
cluded in previous Chicago Council leadership studies. In
addition, low response rates from business, labor, and reli-
gious leaders required heavily overweighting them.
Therefore, individuals using these data for their own re-
search purposes should use caution in interpreting the re-
sults from these small subgroups on their own.
While this leader survey should not be interpreted to
reflect the views of elected officials, the respondents are
influential members of their organizations, and many who
are currently outside government service have held posi-
tions in government in the past. Additionally, while this
survey’s sample was carefully and thoughtfully construct-
ed to sample the full range of foreign policy opinion lead-
ers, it cannot be directly compared to a scientifically
executed public opinion sample (such as the 2014 Chicago
Council Survey) in terms of margin of error or other famil-
iar survey statistics. Despite these limitations, The Chicago
Council on Global Affairs is confident the results will shed
light on the views of opinion leaders and improve the dia-
logue around US foreign policy and policymaking. For a full
accounting of survey methodology, please see page 24.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 7
ties of the public have supported active participation
in world affairs over the past four decades.
For their part, US policy leaders underestimate
public support for international engagement. When
asked to estimate what proportion of the US public
supports playing an active part in world affairs, on
average, opinion leaders guess that less than half the
public favors an active part (42% among Republican
leaders, 43% among Democratic leaders, 45% among
Independent leaders). This misperception among
opinion leaders helps feed the ongoing myth of
American isolationism.
2. Top goals and threats
Key differences on defending allies, US military
superiority, climate change, Iran, protecting
jobs, and immigration
The results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey show
that the goals for US foreign policy that rank highest in
importance are the same among both opinion lead-
ers and the public. Majorities say that preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons (73% public, 78% Repub-
lican leaders, 73% Democratic leaders, 72% Inde-
pendent leaders), combating international terrorism
(61% public, 84% Republican leaders, 63% Democratic
leaders, 52% Independent leaders), and securing ade-
quate supplies of energy (66% public, 72% Republican
leaders, 52% Democratic leaders, 61% Independent
leaders) are “very important” goals. Leaders and the
public also share the same lowest-rated goals. No more
than four in ten say that promoting and defending hu-
man rights in other countries, protecting weaker na-
tions against foreign aggression, and helping to bring
a democratic form of government to other nations are
“very important” goals (Appendix, table 1A).
A similar trend is clear on the question of threats
to US vital interests. Majorities view cyberattacks on
US computer networks (69% public, 69% Republican
leaders, 61% Democratic leaders, 67% Independent
leaders), international terrorism (63% public, 69%
Republican leaders, 54% Democratic leaders, 52%
Independent leaders), and the possibility of unfriendly
countries becoming nuclear powers (60% public, 68%
Republican leaders, 56% Democratic leaders, but only
44% Independent leaders) as “critical” threats. The
public and leaders also tend to converge on the least
critical threats, which include disputes between China
and its neighbors, the continuing conflict in Syria,
the lack of a peace agreement between Israel and the
Palestinians, and economic competition from low-
wage countries (Appendix, table 2A).
Across party lines, there is a great deal of agree-
ment on US policy toward Asia, specifically China.
Only minorities consider the development of China
as a world power to be a critical threat to the United
States (41% overall public, 40% Republican leaders,
27% Democratic leaders, 29% Independent leaders).
At least six in ten members of the American public and
The Rise of China
In dealing with the rise of China’s power, do you think the
United States should... (%)
78
63
87
72
86
66
67
22
34
13
25
14
31
29
Undertake friendly cooperation and engagement
with China
Actively work to limit the growth of China’s power
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 1
The results of the 2014 Chicago Council Survey show
that opinion leaders and the public rate the same
goals for US foreign policy as most important.
8 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
at least eight in ten foreign policy leaders across party
lines think it is better for the United States to under-
take friendly cooperation and engagement with China
than to actively work to limit Chinas growth (figure
1). In addition, solid majorities of both the American
public and leaders support US government plans to
“pivot” diplomatic and military resources away from
the Middle East and Europe and more toward Asia
(61% public, 79% Republican leaders, 85% Democratic
leaders, 61% Independent leaders).
Beyond these similarities, the results on preferred
goals and perceived threats show several clear partisan
differences as well as some divisions between leaders
and the public.
Goals particular to Republicans
US military superiority
Majorities of Republicans among the public and leader
samples say that maintaining US military superiority
Table 1
US Military Presence
Do you think that the US military presence in Asia/the Middle East increases or decreases stability in the region?
(% increases)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Asia 98 66 87 63 78 60 62
Middle East 94 66 65 56 63 48 56
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Table 2
Long-Term Military Bases
Do you think the United States should or should not have long-term military bases in the following places?
(% should have)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
South Korea 94 70 88 61 79 63 64
Germany 70 62 71 53 51 57 57
Japan 92 60 80 50 62 58 55
Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba 78 67 20 42 32 49 51
The Philippines 84 56 67 47 67 52 51
Kuwait 71 55 55 47 45 42 47
Afghanistan 52 50 31 42 30 38 43
Turkey 73 47 65 40 60 43 43
Australia 72 44 61 38 53 43 42
Iraq 45 49 18 40 24 35 41
Pakistan 21 43 18 40 16 31 37
Poland 86 39 53 32 53 39 37
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 9
is a “very important” foreign policy goal (64% Repub-
lican public, 84% Republican leaders), compared to
just under half of Democrats (41% Democratic public,
46% Democratic leaders). Independent policy lead-
ers more closely resemble Republicans, while Inde-
pendents among the public are closer to Democrats
(54% Independent public, 43% Independent leaders)
(Appendix, table 1A).
On projecting American military power abroad,
a large majority of foreign policy leaders (including
nearly all of Republican leaders interviewed) say the
US military presence in the Middle East and Asia
increases stability in these regions. A smaller majority
of the overall public (just half of the Independent pub-
lic) agrees (table 1).
Specifically, solid majorities of foreign policy lead-
ers and smaller majorities of the public support US
military bases in several allied countries, including
South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Germany.
Majorities of foreign policy leaders, but only minori-
ties among the public, favor bases in Turkey, Australia,
and Poland. In each case Republican leaders are
the most supportive. A majority of Republican and
Democratic leaders and nearly half of their respective
publics approve of bases in Kuwait, and solid majori-
ties of Republicans and half of the Independent public
approve of bases in Guantanamo Bay (table 2).
While there is only minority support for estab-
lishing long-term bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan,
Republican leaders stand out in their solid support
for the Afghan war. Three-quarters (77%, compared to
30% of Democratic leaders and 34% of Independent
leaders) say the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting.
Among the public, no more than a third feel that way
(34% Republican public, 25% Democratic public, 23%
Independent public).
Though more tepid than the example of
Afghanistan, Republican leaders also tend to say that
the war in Iraq was worth fighting (53% vs. only 3%
of Democratic leaders and 14% of Independent lead-
ers). Among the public, Republicans are more likely
than Democrats or Independents to say the Iraq war
was worth fighting, but this is still a minority view
(40% Republican public, 22% Democratic public, 20%
Independent public). While not majorities, Republican
leaders and the Republican public are somewhat
more likely than their Democratic and Independent
counterparts to approve of US military bases in
Iraq (table 2).
Iran’s nuclear program
Many more Republican than other leaders see Irans
nuclear program as a “critical” threat, placing it at the
top of the threat ranking among Republican leaders
(figure 2 and Appendix, table 2A). Republicans leaders
stand alone in this level of concern (75% Republican
Many more Republican leaders than other leaders see
Iran’s nuclear program as a critical threat, placing it
at the top of the threat ranking among Republicans.
Republicans stand alone in this level of concern.
Threats to the Vital Interests of the
United States
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest
of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one,
please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an
important but not critical threat, or not an important
threat at all. (%)
Iran’s nuclear program
66
30
58
31
51
58
75
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 2
Republican leaders stand out in their solid support for
the Afghan war. Three-quarters (77%, compared to
30% of Democratic leaders and 34% of Independent
leaders) say the war in Afghanistan was worth fighting.
Among the public, no more than a third feel that way.
10 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
leaders, 30% Democratic leaders, 31% Independent
leaders). Despite these divisions among leaders, there
is more cross-partisan concern among the public (66%
Republicans, 58% Democrats, 51% Independents). The
American public is also far more likely than Demo-
cratic and Independent leaders (and somewhat more
likely than Republican leaders) to favor military force
to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon (see
page 13 and Appendix, table 3A).
Goals particular to Democrats
Limiting climate change
Nearly nine in ten Democratic foreign policy lead-
ers and a much smaller majority of the Democratic
public deem climate change to be a “very important”
US foreign policy goal (84% Democratic leaders, 54%
Democratic public) (figure 3). This is reflected in the
perception of climate change as a “critical” threat.
Both Democratic leaders and public consider climate
change to be a “critical” threat, with Democratic lead-
ers showing a much larger majority than the Demo-
cratic public (79% Democratic leaders, 51% Democrat-
ic public) (figure 3). In fact, climate change ranks as
the leading foreign policy goal and threat among Dem-
ocratic leaders. By contrast, no more than a quarter of
Republican leaders or public consider climate change
to be a “very important” goal or a critical” threat.
Independents are divided on this issue. Independent
leaders (50%) are more inclined than the Independent
public (40%) to see climate change as a “very import-
ant” goal and as a “critical” threat (53% Independent
leaders, 35% Independent public).
Goals particular to opinion leaders
Defending allies
Foreign policy leaders are more likely than the public
to consider defending US allies’ security a top priority,
especially Republican leaders (38% overall public, 77%
Republican leaders, 53% Democratic leaders, 38% In-
dependent leaders). In addition, majorities of leaders
are willing to send US troops to defend South Korea,
NATO’s Baltic allies, and Israel if they came under
attack, though majorities of the public are opposed in
these cases (see pages 11–14, and Appendix, table 3A).
Goals particular to the public
Protecting American jobs and reducing oil dependence
For their part, more members of the American public
than leaders think protecting the jobs of American
workers should be a “very important” foreign policy
goal (76% overall public, 37% Republican leaders, 38%
Climate change ranks as the leading foreign policy
goal and threat among Democratic leaders.
Climate Change
Please select whether you think that it should be a
very important foreign policy goal of the United States,
a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an
important goal at all.
Climate Change
Large numbers of immigrants and
refugees coming to the US (% critical threat)
Controlling and reducing illegal
immigration (% very important goal)
16
55
4
21
9
42
39
20
61
4
35
9
50
47
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
Please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an
important but not critical threat, or not an important
threat at all.
Climate change (% critical)
Limiting climate change (% very important)
20
12
79
51
53
35
35
24
22
84
54
50
40
41
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
Climate change (% critical)
Limiting climate change (% very important)
20
12
79
51
53
35
35
24
22
84
54
50
40
41
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure X
Please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an
important but not critical threat, or not an important
threat at all.
Climate change (% critical)
Limiting climate change (% very important)
20
12
79
51
53
35
35
24
22
84
54
50
40
41
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 3
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 11
Democratic leaders, 40% Independent leaders). The
same is true for reducing US dependence on foreign
oil (74% overall public, 52% Republican leaders, 46%
Democratic leaders, 44% Independent leaders) (Ap-
pendix, table 1A). These issues are important to more
members of the public of all political stripes than to
leaders. In fact, a slight majority of Americans say
they would support using US troops to ensure the oil
supply. Republican leaders agree (71%), compared to
24 percent of Democratic leaders and 33 percent of
Independent leaders (Appendix, table 3A). Despite
these pocketbook concerns, Americans are generally
positive about globalization and free trade agreements
(see page 16).
Immigration
There is also a gap between the public and leaders on
attitudes toward immigration. Though still less than
a majority, the overall public (47%) is much more
likely than leaders (no more than 20%) to consider
controlling and reducing illegal immigration a “very
important” foreign policy goal (figure 4). A strong ma-
jority of Republicans among the public (61%), howev-
er, do consider this goal “very important”—three times
as many as Republican leaders. Similarly, more mem-
bers of the overall public (39%) than leaders (no more
than 16%) are concerned about the possibility of large
numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the
United States as a critical threat, again with large parti-
san differences. Public concern about an immigration
threat is concentrated mostly among Republicans and
Independents (55% Republican public, 42% Indepen-
dent public, 21% Democratic public).
3. Attitudes toward military intervention
In principle, solid majorities of the US public and
leaders support the use of US troops to deal with
humanitarian crises, to prevent a government from
committing genocide, and to combat terrorism . Be-
yond these items, there are several significant opinion
gaps between leaders and the public, especially in
situations that call for the defense of a US ally or using
military force against Iran (see Appendix, table 3A).
In some cases, leaders differ significantly by party
affiliation. Republicans are more likely than Democrats
to support the use of US troops to defend US allies.
Democrats are more likely than others to favor partici-
pation in peacekeeping missions. Independent leaders
are closer to Democrats on these questions, though
they more closely resemble Republican leaders when it
Immigration
Please select whether you think that it should be a
very important foreign policy goal of the United States,
a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an
important goal at all.
Large numbers of immigrants and
refugees coming to the US (% critical threat)
Controlling and reducing illegal
immigration (% very important goal)
16
55
4
21
9
42
39
20
61
4
35
9
50
47
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
Please select whether you see this as a critical threat, an
important but not critical threat, or not an important
threat at all.
Large numbers of immigrants and
refugees coming to the US (% critical threat)
Controlling and reducing illegal
immigration (% very important goal)
16
55
4
21
9
42
39
20
61
4
35
9
50
47
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 4
The public is much more likely than leaders to
consider controlling and reducing illegal immigration
a “very important” foreign policy goal.
12 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
comes to defending Israel against an attack and send-
ing peacekeeping forces to Syria. Generally speaking,
the partisan gaps among leaders are larger than the
partisan gaps among the public.
General agreement on support for military
force to combat terrorism
This survey was conducted before the battle against
the Islamic State hit the headlines, but even then
American opinion leaders and the US public shared
significant concerns about the need to combat terror-
ism (Appendix, table 2A). Majorities of both groups
describe international terrorism as a “critical” threat
(63% overall public, 69% Republican leaders, 54%
Democratic leaders, 52% Independent leaders). To
combat that threat, majorities across party lines
among both leaders and the public favor drone strikes,
assassinations of individual terrorist leaders, and air
strikes against terrorist training camps and facilities
(Appendix, table 4A). A majority of leaders across
political lines (but only 33% of the public) favors
leaving some US troops in Afghanistan beyond 2014
for training, anti-insurgency, and counterterrorism
efforts (figure 5).
There is more differentiation on sending ground
troops. A modest majority of the overall public
(56%) and a larger majority of Republican leaders
(71%) say they would support US ground troops
attacking terrorist training camps and facilities (as
do 54% of Independent leaders). Only a minority
of Democratic leaders (40%) favors the use of US
troops to attack terrorist training camps and facilities
(Appendix, table 4A).
More willingness among leaders to use force to
defend allies
Reflecting public-leader differences on the importance
of defending allies, majorities of leaders compared to
minorities among the public favor sending US troops
to defend allies in Asia and Europe. Roughly two-thirds
or more of all leaders favor using US troops to defend
South Korea and to defend NATO’s Baltic allies if Rus-
sia attacks. Majorities of Republican and Independent
leaders say they would support using US troops to de-
fend Israel if attacked by a neighbor (Democratic lead-
ers are divided). On each of these, Republican leaders
are particularly committed. In addition, Republican
leaders are the only ones willing to use US troops to
defend Taiwan if it is attacked by China (figure 6).
US Troops in Afghanistan
Currently the United States is scheduled to withdraw
combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Do
you think that the United States should... (% should)
Withdraw all troops from Afghanistan
before the end of 2014
Bring all troops home as scheduled by the end of 2014
Leave some troops in Afghanistan beyond
2014 for training, anti-insurgency and
counterterrorism activities
2
21
8
24
14
32
26
7
35
35
48
23
38
41
91
43
57
28
63
30
33
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 5
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 13
Greater willingness among public to use force
against Iran
For the public, high concern about nuclear weapons
in the hands of unfriendly countries translates into
a willingness to use force against Iran. Seven in ten
members of the overall public (77% Republican public,
65% Democratic and Independent publics), support
sending US troops to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear
weapons. Among leaders, only Republicans support
the use of force against Iran (64% Republican leaders,
31% Democratic leaders, 35% Independent leaders)
(Appendix, table 3A).
While the survey was conducted before the April 2,
2015, framework agreement between Iran and the
United States that “shuts down” Irans path to nuclear
weapons in exchange for the lifting of economic
sanctions, the survey did ask about the November
2013 interim international agreement with Iran
that reduced economic sanctions in return for Iran
restricting development of its nuclear program. The
American public, regardless of political affiliation,
and Democratic and Independent leaders favored
Support for the Use of US Troops
There has been some discussion about the circumstances
that might justify using US troops in other parts of the
world. Please give your opinion about some situations.
Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)
87
If North Korea invaded South Korea
75
If China invaded Taiwan
If Israel were attacked by its neighbors
If Russia invades a NATO ally like
Latvia, Lithuania, or Estonia
29
29
26
57
52
48
41
59
44
45
90
50
64
41
67
43
44
24
80
53
73
44
77
46
47
62
25
45
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 6
Interim deal with Iran
As you may know, the US and other countries have
reached an interim deal with Iran that eases some of
the international economic sanctions against Iran.
In exchange, the deal requires that Iran accept some
restrictions on its nuclear program but not end it
completely and submit to greater international inspection
of its nuclear facilities. Do you favor or oppose this interim
agreement? (%)
Favor
41
54
96
72
86
59
62
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 7
14 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
the interim agreement (62% overall public, includ-
ing 54% Republican public, 96% Democratic leaders,
86% Independent leaders). However, only a minority
of Republican leaders favored the interim deal (41%)
(figure 7).
Military intervention in Ukraine
At the time this survey was fielded, Russia had already
annexed Crimea, but the fighting had not yet escalat-
ed to eastern Ukraine. Russias territorial ambitions
were only perceived as a critical” threat by minorities
(38% public, 32% Republican leaders, 23% Democratic
leaders, 29% Independent leaders) (Appendix, table
2A), though public opinion of Russia was at its lowest
level since the end of the Cold War, falling to a chilly 36
out of 100. In any case, support for using US troops if
Russia invades the rest of Ukraine is limited to about a
third of the public (30%). Leaders also tend to oppose
the use of US troops against Russia, though a higher
percentage of Republicans than Democrats or Inde-
pendents favors using US troops against Russia (46%
Republican leaders, 30% Democratic leaders, 28%
Independent leaders (figure 8).
Peacekeeping if a peace agreement is reached
between Israel and the Palestinians
An exception to the pattern of greater Republican sup-
port for the use of troops abroad is on peacekeeping
missions. More Democrats support using troops for
such operations than Republicans, with Independents
falling in between. Majorities of Democratic and Inde-
pendent leaders and six in ten Democratic members of
the public favor participating in a multinational peace-
keeping force to enforce a peace agreement between
Israel and the Palestinians (59% Democratic public,
83% Democratic leaders, 64% Independent leaders,
45% Republican leaders)(Appendix, table 3A).
Peacekeeping if a peace agreement is reached
in Syria
If a peace agreement were reached in Syria, majorities
of those with Democratic leanings (54% Democrat-
ic public and 61% Democratic leaders) support US
participation in a peacekeeping mission (Appendix,
table 3A). Outside the context of peacekeeping, only
17 percent of the public and no more than 20 percent
of leaders support sending US troops to Syria (Appen-
dix, table 5A).
Diplomacy and sanctions are by far the most
favored options to address the Syrian conflict. Two
in three members of the American public and over
90 percent of leaders favor increasing economic and
diplomatic sanctions on Syria. A large majority of
Republican leaders and about half of other leaders and
the public favor enforcing a no-fly zone (48% public,
80% Republican leaders, 52% Democratic leaders, 55%
Independent leaders). Leaders are much more likely
than the public to support arming Syrian rebels (25%
public, 73% Republican leaders, 55% Democratic lead-
ers, 45% Independent leaders). Leaders are much more
likely than the public to favor accepting Syrian refu-
gees into the United States (at least seven in ten lead-
ers versus 42% overall public) (Appendix, table 5A).
Use of US Troops
There has been some discussion about the circumstances
that might justify using US troops in other parts of the
world. Please give your opinion about some situations.
Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)
If Russia invades the rest of Ukraine
96
46
36
30
27
28
29
30
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 8
Two in three members of the American public
and over 90 percent of leaders favor increasing
economic and diplomatic sanctions on Syria.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 15
4. Leader and public attitudes on the
United Nations and multilateralism
Broad support for treaties with exception of
Republican leaders
Attitudes toward peacekeeping discussed in the
preceding section reflect broader preferences toward
working in a multilateral context. The overall public
and most leaders support US participation in interna-
tional treaties and working through the United Na-
tions. But on this set of questions, Republican foreign
policy leaders stand in stark opposition to prevail-
ing support.
Solid majorities of Democratic and Independent
leaders and the public favor US participation in inter-
national treaties to regulate trade in small arms and
light weapons, establish rights for people with disabil-
ities, address climate change by reducing greenhouse
gas emissions, and establish a comprehensive set of
rules governing the oceans. The Law of the Sea treaty
is the only one to capture majority approval among
leaders who align themselves with the Republican
Party; majorities of Republican leaders oppose the
other three treaties.2 A majority of the Republican pub-
lic supports the treaties, though in smaller portions
than other partisans (especially the climate change
treaty) (figure 9).
Greater resistance among Republicans to UN
decision making
Solid majorities of Democrats and more modest
majorities of Independents agree that “the US should
be more willing to make decisions within the United
Nations even if this means that the United States will
sometimes have to go along with a policy that is not
its first choice.” Only 30 percent of Republican leaders
and just under half of the Republican public agree with
this idea (figure 10).
When asked about specific UN activities, the pub-
lic—especially those identifying as Democrats—is
more positive than foreign policy leaders in its assess-
ment of how well the UN is resolving conflicts through
negotiations, authorizing the use of force to maintain
2. Leaders, but not the public, were also asked about treaties con-
cerning the International Criminal Court and a nuclear test ban. Six
in ten leaders with Republican affiliation (58%) and large majorities
of Democratic (96%) and Independent (87%) leaders support US
participation in a nuclear test ban. Only half of Republican leaders
support the ICC, compared to a full majority of Democrats (49%
Republican, 85% Democrat, 77% Independent).
Treaties and Agreements
Based on what you know, do you think the United States
should or should not participate in the following treaties
and agreements? (% should)
23
35
35
37
41
43
9
33
Climate Treaty
33
61
95
79
80
61
68
37
67
87
86
73
73
76
63
83
100
85
94
81
83
43
54
97
86
82
70
71
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 9
16 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
international peace and security, and imposing sanc-
tions to punish countries that violate international law.
Majorities of Democrats (among both leaders and the
public) rate the UN positively on preventing nuclear
proliferation, compared to minorities of other parti-
sans (Appendix, table 6A).
On other UN activities, public and leader views
align more closely. At least half of the American public
and leaders rate the UN positively on protecting and
supporting refugees, sending peacekeeping troops to
conflict zones, leading international efforts to combat
hunger, and protecting cultural heritage. Democrats
are most likely to rate the UN positively, while
Republicans are less inclined to do so. Independents
are generally in between (Appendix, table 6A).
5. Shared support for economic
engagement
Globalization and trade solidly supported
There is broad consensus among the public and opin-
ion leaders on issues touching globalization, trade,
and free trade agreements. Despite the consequences
of the 2008 economic crisis, two-thirds of the overall
public and even larger majorities of leaders say that
globalization is “mostly good” (65% overall public,
98% Republican leaders, 87% Democratic leaders, 90%
Independent leaders). Asked about trade agreements,
half of the overall public and a majority of leaders
favor free trade agreements that offer programs to
help those who lose their jobs (50% overall public, 61%
Republican leaders, 78% Democratic leaders, 77% In-
dependent leaders). Only 14 percent of the public (as
well as 37% Republican leaders, 5% Democratic lead-
ers, and 16% Independent leaders) favor trade agree-
ments without programs for those who lose their jobs.
Compared to much smaller portions of leaders, three
in ten members of the public oppose trade agreements
altogether, with roughly similar proportions among
partisan groups (figure 11).
Finally, both leaders and the public support the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP) being negotiated with the European Union
(62% overall public, 100% Republican leaders, 74%
Democratic leaders, 81% Independent leaders) and
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) being negoti-
ated with 12 Pacific nations (63% overall public, 91%
Republican leaders, 72% Democratic leaders, 83%
Independent leaders).
Greater endorsement of foreign aid from
leaders than public
Similar to past Chicago Council Survey results, foreign
policy opinion leaders are more likely than the Ameri-
can public to see the benefits of economic aid to other
nations. Majorities of leaders favor maintaining or ex-
panding economic aid to foreign countries, compared
to just a third of the overall public (figure 12).3 Leaders
are also more likely than the public to support increas-
ing economic aid to Ukraine (15% overall public, 52%
Republican leaders, 56% Democratic leaders, 55%
3. Asked about military aid to other countries, a majority of the
public (59%) prefer to cut back spending, along with Democratic
(55%) and Independent (61%) leaders. Half of Republican leaders
(50%) favor maintaining current levels of military aid.
Making Decisions within the UN
Please select whether you agree or disagree with the
following statement: When dealing with international
problems, the United States should be more willing to
make decisions within the United Nations even if this
means that the United States will sometimes have to go
along with a policy that is not its first choice. (%)
Agree
30
45
78
74
58
54
59
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 10
Democrats and Independents agree that the US should
be more willing to make decisions within the United
Nations. Republican leaders and public disagree.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 17
Lowering Trade Barriers Such As Tariffs
Which of the following three positions comes closest to
your point of view about lowering trade barriers such as
tariffs? (%)
I favor agreements to lower trade barriers provided
the government has programs to help workers who
lose their jobs.
I favor agreements to lower trade barriers, but I
oppose government programs to help workers who
lose their jobs.
I oppose agreements to lower trade barriers.
57
63
61
43
78
58
77
48
50
37
19
5
10
16
14
14
2
33
18
27
7
33
31
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent public
Independent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 11
Spending on Economic Aid to Other Nations
Below is a list of present federal government programs.
For each, please select whether you feel it should be
expanded, cut back, or kept about the same.
(% for economic aid to other nations)
Expand
Cut back
Keep same
57
63
12
3
38
11
25
4
6
40
67
15
49
26
66
60
47
25
44
30
46
25
27
Republican leaders
Democratic leaders
Republican public
Overall public
Democratic public
Independent publicIndependent leaders
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Figure 12
18 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Independent leaders) and African countries (21% over-
all public, 27% Republican leaders, 61% Democratic
leaders, 50% Independent leaders). A larger majority of
foreign policy leaders than the public also favor help-
ing poor countries develop their economies as a way to
combat terrorism (66% overall public, 93% Republican
and Democratic leaders, 92% Independent leaders).
Conclusions
In general, more foreign policy leaders express sup-
port for US international involvement than the public,
especially when it comes to committing US troops to
defend allies, supporting a contingent of US soldiers
to stay in Afghanistan for counterterrorism activities,
providing arms to Syrian rebels, and maintaining
levels of foreign aid. But the public is generally sup-
portive of international involvement as well, despite
its greater focus than leaders on bread and butter
issues and its deeper reservations about deploying US
troops abroad.
Though they differ in degree, both the American
public and leaders emphasize the importance of US
leadership in the world, see many foreign policy goals
and threats similarly, support the US military presence
abroad, and favor globalization and free trade.
>Whether they describe themselves as Democrats,
Republicans, or Independents, the American public
and leaders support strong US leadership in the
world and support the US military presence abroad.
>Majorities favor drone strikes, assassinations of
individual terrorist leaders, and air strikes against
terrorist training camps and facilities.
>Majorities across the board support the “pivot” to
Asia and cooperation with rather than contain-
ment of China.
>At least six in ten members of the public and at least
nine in ten leaders say that globalization is mostly
good. Both groups also favor free trade and back the
TPP and TTIP.
Foreign policy leaders, though not the public, also
agree on defending allies, using US troops in several
conflict zones, and maintaining foreign aid.
>Leaders from all parties are committed to using US
troops to defend allies in Europe and Asia, keeping
troops in Afghanistan to work on counterterrorism
activities, arming rebels in Syria, and providing
foreign aid.
While this consensus may be surprising given cur-
rent headlines, the results highlight differences in
the preferred ways to achieve foreign policy goals,
including whether the United States should project its
power through military strength or by working through
multilateral organizations and approaches. These
preferences are related to fundamental differences in
partisan outlooks.
Republican leaders and the Republican public
emphasize US military superiority and strength as key
elements of foreign policy.
>Majorities of Republicans say that maintaining
military superiority should be a top priority (64%
Republican public, 84% Republican leaders), com-
pared to just under half of Democrats.
>Republican leaders and the Republican public favor
the use of US troops to prevent Iran from obtaining
a nuclear weapon (Democratic leaders are opposed,
though the Democratic public is in favor). Irans
nuclear program ranks as the leading threat among
Republic leaders.
>While majorities across the board favor using
drones, air strikes, and assassinations to combat
terrorism, Republicans are the only ones who favor
the use of ground troops to attack terrorist training
camps and facilities.
>Republicans alone support maintaining long-term
military bases in Guantanamo Bay.
Democrats alternatively emphasize multilateral
approaches such as peacekeeping, working through
the United Nations, and participating in internation-
al treaties. Democrats are also more concerned than
others about climate change.
>Majorities of Democrats, compared to minorities
of Republicans, favor working through the United
Nations and using US troops for hypothetical
peacekeeping enforcement in Syria and between
Israel and the Palestinians.
>Majorities of Democrats favor—compared to a
majority of Republican leaders who oppose—inter-
national treaties that regulate the small arms trade,
establish rights for people with disabilities, and
address climate change by reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 19
>Eight in ten Democratic leaders and half of the
Democratic public consider climate change a “criti-
cal” threat facing the United States. In fact, the lead-
ing threat for Democratic leaders is climate change.
By contrast, no more than a quarter of Republican
leaders or the Republican public view climate
change that way.
>Democrats support the 2013 interim agreement
with Iran that partially restricts Irans nuclear pro-
gram in exchange for some easing of the interna-
tional sanctions.
>A majority of Republican leaders oppose the
interim agreement, though a majority of the
Republican public favors the agreement.
Those who describe themselves as Independents
generally fall in between Democratic and Repub-
lican views.
>Independent opinion leaders broadly resemble
Democratic leaders in their attitudes toward mili-
tary matters such as maintaining US military supe-
riority, the appropriate use of force, and leaving
troops in Afghanistan for training and counterter-
rorism operations. The Independent public aligns
with Democratic public views on the use of force,
but is closer to Republicans on the importance of
US military superiority.
>Independent leaders are least likely of all lead-
ers to say that defending allies is a “very import-
ant” goal and are generally least likely to support
bases overseas.
>On the interim agreement with Iran, Independent
leaders are closer to Democrats in supporting
the deal. The Independent public also favors the
deal, falling in between levels of Democratic and
Republican public support.
>On multilateral approaches, Independent lead-
ers are roughly midway between Democratic and
Republican viewpoints on making decisions within
the United Nations. Both Independent leaders and
the Independent public support international trea-
ties, largely in contrast to Republican leaders.
>Like others, Independents support free trade and
globalization.
>The attitudes of Independents on climate change
fall in between the views of other partisans. As with
Democratic leaders, climate change ranks as one of
the leading threats for Independent leaders (second
only to cyberattacks).
Aside from partisan differences, the data reveal a few
cases where opinion leaders’ views do not align with
public concerns.
>Among leaders, no more than four in ten consider
protecting American jobs to be a “very important”
foreign policy goal. At most, half of leaders say that
reducing US dependence on foreign oil is a “very
important” goal. But these are among the leading
priorities for the public. Between seven and eight
out of ten Americans emphasize these concerns.
>Leaders, regardless of party affiliation, do not con-
sider reducing illegal immigration to the United
States to be a “very important” foreign policy
goal. Neither does the Democratic public. But a
majority of the Republican public (and half of the
Independent public) feels that immigration should
be a high priority.
>In many cases the partisan gaps are wider among
policy leaders than among the public, especially
on issues concerning Iran, climate change, military
bases, and international treaties. This is not too
surprising, given that foreign policy leaders are bet-
ter informed on these issues and therefore express
stronger attitudes.
In sum, this study shows that the foreign policy issues
that polarize parties today—how to deal with Iran, the
role of the UN, climate change, and the importance of
US military superiority—will be challenging to resolve
given the entrenched partisan mindsets among both
opinion leaders and the public. But there are also
many examples of agreement on the larger goals for
US engagement overseas. It is worth drawing attention
to these shared objectives as the country enters into a
new election cycle that will undoubtedly exploit areas
of political difference rather than consensus.
20 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Appendix
Table 1A
Goals for US Foreign Policy
Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you
think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy
goal, or not an important goal at all. (% very important)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Protecting the jobs
of American workers 37 76 38 79 40 73 76
Reducing US dependence
on foreign oil 52 79 46 71 44 74 74
Preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons 78 67 73 78 72 71 73
Securing adequate
supplies of energy 72 62 52 70 61 64 66
Combating international
terrorism 84 62 63 65 52 56 61
Maintaining superior
military power worldwide 84 64 46 41 43 54 52
Controlling and reducing
illegal immigration 20 61 4 35 9 50 47
Protecting the interests
of American business
abroad
60 46 21 46 37 40 44
Combating world hunger 26 25 40 57 40 38 42
Limiting climate change 24 22 84 54 50 40 41
Defending our allies'
security 77 38 53 37 38 37 38
Strengthening the United
Nations 8 27 31 50 30 31 37
Promoting and defending
human rights in other
countries
18 23 40 40 42 30 32
Protecting weaker
nations against foreign
aggression
39 24 20 31 24 20 25
Helping to bring a
democratic form of
government to other
nations
11 12 14 20 6 17 17
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 21
Table 2A
Threats to US Vital Interests
Below is a list of possible threats to the vital interest of the United States in the next 10 years. For each one, please select
whether you see this as a critical threat, an important but not critical threat, or not an important threat at all. (% critical
threat)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Cyberattacks on US
computer networks 69 72 61 70 67 64 69
International terrorism 69 66 54 61 52 61 63
The possibility of
unfriendly countries
becoming nuclear powers
68 66 56 60 44 55 60
Iran's nuclear program 75 66 30 58 31 51 58
US debt to China 19 56 22 40 39 47 47
Violent Islamist groups in
Afghanistan and Pakistan 52 51 45 48 37 40 47
The development of China
as a world power 40 46 27 38 29 37 41
The possibility of the
Taliban returning to power
in Afghanistan
55 39 20 45 17 36 41
Drug-related violence
and instability in Mexico 6 45 22 38 25 35 40
Political instability in the
Middle East 26 43 51 39 34 38 40
Islamic fundamentalism 72 48 35 35 44 38 40
Large numbers of
immigrants and refugees
coming into the US
16 55 4 21 9 42 39
Russia's territorial
ambitions 32 48 23 35 29 34 38
Climate change 20 12 79 51 53 35 35
Economic competition
from low-wage countries 18 25 17 27 22 29 27
Lack of a peace agreement
between Israel and the
Palestinians
1 29 17 27 28 22 26
The continuing conflict
in Syria 23 25 27 27 20 21 24
Border disputes between
China and its neighbors 33 20 15 19 20 18 19
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
22 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Use of US Troops Abroad
There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using US troops in other parts of the world.
Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of US troops... (% favor)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
To deal with
humanitarian crises 69 69 78 74 73 69 71
To stop a government
from committing
genocide and killing
large numbers of its own
people
59 76 83 75 72 63 71
To stop Iran from
obtaining nuclear
weapons
64 77 31 65 35 65 69
To ensure the oil supply 71 62 24 53 33 49 54
To be part of an
international
peacekeeping force
to enforce a peace
agreement between
Israel and the
Palestinians
45 46 83 59 64 41 50
If North Korea invaded
South Korea 80 53 73 44 77 46 47
If Israel were attacked
by its neighbors 57 52 48 41 59 44 45
To be part of a
peacekeeping force
to enforce a peace
agreement in Syria
48 38 61 54 47 38 44
If Russia invades a NATO
ally like Latvia, Lithuania,
or Estonia
90 50 64 41 67 43 44
If Israel bombs Iran’s
nuclear facilities and Iran
were to retaliate
against Israel
48 54 25 40 38 36 43
If Russia invades the rest
of Ukraine 46 36 30 27 28 29 30
If China invaded Taiwan 62 25 45 24 29 29 26
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Table 3A
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 23
Table 4A
Actions to Combat Terrorism
In order to combat international terrorism, please say whether you favor or oppose each of the following measures.
(%)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Working through the
UN to strengthen
international laws
against terrorism and to
make sure UN members
enforce them
89 76 94 84 92 74 78
US air strikes against
terrorist training camps
and other facilities
100 82 78 67 74 68 71
Assassination of
individual terrorist
leaders
97 80 69 68 70 65 70
The National Security
Agency collecting
telephone and Internet
data to identify links to
potential terrorists
87 76 66 69 67 60 67
Helping poor countries
develop their economies 93 60 93 75 92 63 66
Drone strikes to carry out
bombing attacks against
suspected terrorists
93 76 62 58 59 56 62
Attacks by US ground
troops against terrorist
training camps and
other facilities
71 66 40 57 54 49 56
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
24 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Table 5A
US Policy in Syria
Would you support or oppose the United States doing each of the following actions with respect to Syria. (% support)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Increasing economic and
diplomatic sanctions
on Syria
97 63 93 77 94 62 67
Enforcing a no-fly zone
over Syria, including
bombing Syrian
air defenses
80 55 52 49 55 42 48
Accepting Syrian
refugees into the
United States
71 27 86 55 78 40 42
Sending arms
and supplies to
antigovernment
groups in Syria
73 28 55 28 45 21 25
Sending troops into Syria 10 20 3 20 5 11 17
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 25
Table 6A
United Nations
Do you think the United Nations is doing a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad job at the following.
(% very or somewhat good)
Republican
leaders
Republican
public
Democratic
leaders
Democratic
public
Independent
leaders
Independent
public
Overall
public
Sending peacekeeping
troops to conflict zones 60 56 71 71 55 56 61
Protecting the cultural
heritage of the world 48 56 73 72 62 55 61
Protecting and supporting
refugees around the
world
56 49 78 66 67 52 57
Leading international
efforts to combat hunger 48 57 74 65 66 51 57
Authorizing the use of
force to maintain or
restore international
peace
and security
14 46 29 63 22 44 51
Resolving international
conflicts through
negotiations
11 43 35 61 27 43 50
Imposing sanctions to
punish countries that
violate international law
23 42 43 61 29 47 50
Preventing the
proliferation of
nuclear weapons
15 40 54 61 40 46 50
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
26 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
Methodology
Leadership sample construction
The Chicago Council Survey team compiled the 2014
Chicago Council Leaders Survey sample using a variety
of sources, drawing most heavily upon the Leader-
ship Library (LL), a subscription-based online data-
base that includes contact information for leaders in
various sectors, including businesses, Congress, the
executive branch, interest groups, labor unions, the
media, NGOs, and think tanks. Since the LL has limited
information for policy leaders in some sectors and
does not cover other sectors, particularly academics,
military officers, and religious leaders, other supple-
mental lists were used.
Academics
A list of 828 academics at 25 universities in the Unit-
ed States whose research focuses on international
relations was compiled by the Teaching, Research &
International Policy (TRIP) project from the College
of William and Mary. The 25 universities were based
on the top programs in international relations in the
United States.
The universities included were American
University, Columbia University, Cornell University,
Duke University, George Washington University,
Georgetown University, Harvard University, Johns
Hopkins University, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, New York University, Ohio State
University, Penn State University, Princeton University,
Stanford University, Tufts University, University of
California–Berkeley, University of California–Los
Angeles, University of California–San Diego, University
of Chicago, University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign,
University of Michigan–Ann Arbor, University of
Minnesota–Twin Cities, University of Rochester,
University of Wisconsin–Madison, and Yale University.
Business leaders
Using LL, contact information was obtained for vice
presidents, presidents, or CEOs and individuals with
a job function that is classified as “international”
and who are employed by one of the 1,000 largest
US companies.
Congressional aides
Using LL, congressional employees in the database
classified as having the expertise of “international
affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense,” with one of the
following job titles were included: chief counsel, chief
of staff, clerk, committee staff member, deputy chief of
staff, legislative assistant, legislative director, or profes-
sional staff member.
Executive branch officials
Using LL, employees of the Defense Department,
Homeland Security Department, or State Department
holding the position of deputy assistant secretary, as-
sistant secretary, undersecretary, or deputy secretary,
or with the word “senior” in their title were included.
Also included were employees of any other federal
department with the position of deputy assistant sec-
retary, assistant secretary, undersecretary, or deputy
secretary and listed with a job function classified as
“international”; members of the White House National
Security staff with the position of assistant to the presi-
dent, special assistant to the president, senior director,
or director; and US ambassadors.
Labor leaders
Using LL, individuals employed by a US labor union
with the word “international” or “president” in their
job title were included. To supplement the labor list
generated by LL, the Department of Labor’s list of
labor unions in the United States with more than
100,000 members was used as a reference to add the
presidents and vice presidents of each union that met
these criteria.
Members of the media
Using LL, individuals employed by news media or-
ganizations and classified as having the expertise of
“international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” were
included. This was supplemented with a similar search
of CISION, a media database containing contact infor-
mation and areas of focus for media personnel around
the world. Media personnel sourced from CISION
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 27
were listed as working on international issues and/or
foreign policy.
NGO and interest group personnel
Using LL, individuals holding the position of vice pres-
ident or president at an organization classified as an
“international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” NGO
or interest group were included. In addition, any NGO
or interest group employee with a job function listed
as “international” or whose expertise was classified as
“international affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” at
these organizations was included (NGO and interest
group personnel were grouped together because some
of the groups listed as interest groups in LL would be
considered by many people to be NGOs, and some
of the groups listed as NGOs would be considered by
many people to be interest groups.)
To supplement this NGO and interest group list,
the online Charity Navigator database was used to
develop a list of leading nonprofit organizations that
focus on international issues with a budget above
$13.5 million. This included organizations in the fol-
lowing categories:
>International peace and security (23 organizations)
>International development (71 organizations)
>Humanitarian relief supplies (34 organizations)
>Foreign charity support (16 organizations)
Presidents and vice presidents at these organizations
were targeted for inclusion in the survey list, though
vice presidents for administration, fundraising, and
other nonpolicy fields were excluded.
Religious leaders
The religious leader list was based on the Chicago
Council’s 2004 list of religious leaders in the United
States, updated to account for changes in positions in
the intervening period. This was supplemented with
a list provided by Valerie Nash of Religions for Peace
as well as names from Times 2013 list of the 25 most
influential evangelicals in America. We judged the rep-
resentativeness of this list based on the broader pat-
terns of American religious life, as reported by Pews
Religious Landscape Survey, part of the Pew Religion
and Public Life Project. As the original combination of
lists under-represented Catholic leaders, we manually
added the heads of archdioceses within the United
States. This brought the sample list into balance with
Pew’s Religious Landscape Survey data.
Think tank experts
Using LL, individuals employed by think tanks and
classified as having the expertise of “international
affairs/foreign affairs” or “defense” were included in
the sample. This think tank list was supplemented with
top US think tanks in international security, inter-
national development, and international economics
from the University of Pennsylvania’s 2013 Think Tank
Rankings. This produced a list of 27 institutions. Of
these, four were excluded: the Atlas Economic Re-
search Foundation, the Berkeley Roundtable on the
International Economy (BRIE), Human Rights Watch
(HRW), and the National Bureau for Economic Re-
search (NBER). Atlas and NBER are networks, rather
than think tanks; BRIE is a research project, but not a
research institution; HRW is primarily an NGO.
The final list of 23 think tanks targeted for addi-
tional inclusion were: the American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), Brookings
Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Cato Institute, Center for a New American
Security (CNAS), Center for American Progress,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
(CSBA), Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), German
Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), Heritage
Foundation, Hoover Institution, Hudson Institute,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, RAND
Corporation, United States Institute of Peace (USIP),
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs,
Center for Global Development (CGD), Institute
for Policy Studies (IPS), International Food Policy
Research Institute (IFPRI), James A. Baker III Institute
for Public Policy, and the Stimson Center (FNA Henry
L. Stimson Center).
The supplemental list was then constructed using
contact information for fellows, vice presidents, and
presidents of these organizations. Vice presidents for
administration, fundraising, and similar areas were
excluded, as were fellows whose research was primar-
ily focused on domestic policy.
Military representatives
In addition to the above groups, the Council also
surveyed 517 alumni of the National War College. This
28 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
group differs from other sample groups in two key
ways. First, this group was not included in past Chi-
cago Council leadership surveys. Second, the military
portion of the survey sample was not constructed in
the same manner as the other lists. Instead, a request
for participation in the survey was sent on June 11,
2014, to alumni of the National War College (NWC)
from Col. Gene Russell, executive director of the
National War College Alumni Association. This group
cannot be accurately described as a military sample
(because it did not include active enlisted members)
nor as a veteran’s sample (because veterans included
would only be those that attended NWC). For these
reasons, this group’s results were not included in this
report’s analysis. We invite other researchers to explore
this data, which will be made publicly available on The
Chicago Council’s website.
Fielding the 2014 Chicago Council
foreign policy leaders survey
The 2014 Chicago Council Leaders Survey was fielded
using an online survey platform. A series of emails was
sent to target opinion leaders, with the first fielding
email sent on May 19, 2014. From July 7 to July 16,
follow-up calls were made to business leaders, labor
leaders, and religious leaders. The final fielding email
was sent on July 28, 2014. The survey was closed on
August 1, 2014.
Most survey solicitations came from Ivo Daalder,
president of The Chicago Council on Global Affairs,
with a few exceptions. Emails sent to the executive list
after June 5 were signed by Dina Smeltz, senior fellow
for public opinion and foreign policy at The Chicago
Council. Emails sent on June 16 and June 26 used
different interlocutors for two lists. Messages to the
religious list were signed by William Inboden, execu-
tive director of the William P. Clements, Jr. Center for
History, Strategy, and Statecraft at the University of
Texas-Austin. Messages to the business list were signed
by Michael Moskow, senior fellow on the global econ-
omy at The Chicago Council and former chairman of
the Chicago Federal Reserve.
To avoid requesting the participation of those
who had already completed the survey, each suc-
cessive email excluded those recipients who had
been recorded as clicking on the link contained
within the email.
Labeling partisan identification
Respondents in both the public and leadership surveys
were asked a multistage party identification question.
The first stage of that question (1010, below) is the
basis for the partisan groupings in this and in other
Chicago Council Survey reports.
>Question 1010: Generally speaking, do you usually
think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?
A broader, seven-category partisan identification is
possible through the use of the second stage of the
question (questions 1015-1025, below). However, this
also decreases the sample size of each specific group is
therefore not used in this report.
>Question 1015: Would you call yourself a strong
Republican or a not very strong Republican?
>Question 1020: Would you call yourself a strong
Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
>Question 1025: Do you think of yourself as closer to
the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?
Overall, the partisan composition of the 2014 leader-
ship survey resembles past surveys, as evident in table
7. Please note that prior to 1998, leadership surveys
did not ask the partisan affiliation of respondents from
Table 7
Partisan Composition of Past Chicago
Council Leadership Surveys (%)
Republican Independent Democrat
2014 16 38 46
2004 23 32 45
2002 28 31 41
1998 28 29 41
1990 22 34 44
1986 27 36 36
1982 23 38 39
1978 23 41 35
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 29
Congress or executive-branch agencies. The numbers
reported in table 7 reflect the remainder of the respon-
dents. For other questions about the partisan identifi-
cation of respondents, please contact the authors.
Leaders survey weighting and
aggregation
Because there is no comprehensive listing of foreign
policy opinion leaders from which to sample, there
are a number of possible approaches to weighting
and aggregating data from the different professional
categories surveyed. We chose to weight each group
to reflect sampling results of earlier Chicago Council
leaders surveys (see table 8 for response numbers over
the years).
One alternative approach would be to weight each
respondent group equally. While this does not sig-
nificantly affect the overall results, it also would have
precluded a methodologically rigorous comparison
of 2014 results to previous Chicago Council lead-
ers surveys.
Based on these numbers, the average sample size
(374) across various iterations and the historic average
proportion by group can be calculated. While this may
Table 8
Past Chicago Council Leaders Surveys Respondent Numbers by Group
Past Samples Average 2004-wt 2004 2002 1998 1990 1986 1982 1978
Administration/
Executive Branch 26 41 41 34 24 24 22 11 23
Business 55 38 38 38 63 63 62 63 55
Educators 63 75 75 75 62 62 54 56 54
House of
Representatives 38 69 45 44 39 28 29 39 42
Labor leaders 29 32 32 32 28 32 29 28 19
Media 57 59 59 59 57 57 49 52 65
Private foreign
policy groups 20 29 29 21 17 20 17 17 18
Religious leaders 48 51 51 50 47 47 41 42 58
Senators 19 31 20 21 20 22 19 14 16
Special interest
groups 21 25 25 23 22 22 21 19 16
Total 374 450 415 397 379 377 343 341 366
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Table 9
Comparison of Group Responses Historic
and 2014 Leader Surveys
Average
size of past
samples
Final 2014
sample
size
Difference Weight
Factor
(Past)
Academics 63 272 209 0.43
Business 55 22 -33 4.17
Congress 57 44 -13 2.20
Executive
Branch 26 98 72 0.51
Labor 29 13 -16 3.95
Media 57 72 15 1.44
NGO/IG 21 41 20 0.80
Religion 48 20 -28 3.07
Think
Tanks 20 86 66 0.39
Total 374 668
The Chicago Council on Global Affairs
30 - UNITED IN GOALS, DIVIDED ON MEANS
not reflect anything more than the typical number of
respondents in the past (and not reflect any wider cri-
teria such as numbers or influence), using past weights
is at least consistent with Chicago Council tradition.
However, low response numbers from business, labor,
and religious leaders requires heavily overweighting
them and, in turn, giving lower weight to respon-
dents from academia, think thanks, and the executive
branch (see table 9).
Methodology for the 2014 Chicago
Council Survey of Americans on US
foreign policy
This report is also based on the results of a public
opinion survey commissioned by The Chicago Council
on Global Affairs. The 2014 edition of the survey is the
latest in a series of surveys on American attitudes on
US foreign policy going back to 1974.
The public survey was conducted from May 6 to
29, 2014, among a representative national sample of
2,108 adults, including an oversample of 311 Hispanic
respondents and was fielded in both English and
Spanish. The margin of sampling error for the full
sample is +/- 2.5, including a design effect of 1.46. This
margin of error is higher when comparing subgroups
such as partisan affiliations. A full listing of questions
asked in the 2014 Chicago Council Survey is available
online at www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/
chicago-council-survey-data.
The public survey was conducted by GfK Custom
Research, a polling, social science, and market
research firm in Palo Alto, California, using a ran-
domly selected sample of GfK’s large-scale nationwide
research panel, KnowledgePanel®. The survey was
fielded to a total of 3,905 panel members, includ-
ing 759 in the Hispanic oversample, yielding a total
of 2,243 completed surveys. Of the total completes,
1,914 were from the main sample (a completion rate
of 61%) and 339 were from the Hispanic oversample
(a completion rate of 45%). The median survey length
was 37 minutes.
Of the 2,243 total completed surveys, 142 cases
were excluded for quality control reasons, leaving a
final sample size of 2,108 respondents.
Respondents were excluded if they failed at least
one of three key checks:
>Respondents who completed the survey in 10 min-
utes or less.
>Respondents who refused to answer half of the
items in the survey or more.
>Respondents who failed three or four of
the following:
>Completed the survey in 10 minutes or less.
>Did not accurately input “4,” refused, or skipped
the question that was specifically designed to
make sure respondents were paying attention.
(“In order to make sure that your browser is
working correctly, please select number 4 from
the list below.”)
>Refused one or more full lists that included five
items or more (of which there were 22 such lists).
>Respondents who gave exactly the same answer
(“straight-lined”) to every item on one of the four
longest lists in the survey (Q5, Q7, Q50 or Q55).
Prior to April 2009, the panel was recruited using
stratified random digit dialing (RDD) telephone sam-
pling. Now the panel is recruited using address-based
sampling (ABS) to cover the growing number of cell-
phone-only households (approximately 97% of house-
holds are covered this way). Currently, 40 percent of
panel members are recruited through RDD, 60 per-
cent with ABS.
For both RDD and ABS recruitment, households
(i.e., all eligible adults in the household) that agree
to participate in the panel are provided with free
Internet hardware and access (if necessary), which
uses a telephone line to connect to the Internet and
the television as a monitor. Thus, the sample is not
limited to those in the population who already have
Internet access.
The distribution of the sample in the web-enabled
panel closely tracks the distribution of United States
Census counts for the US population 18 years of age
or older on age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, geographical
region, employment status, income, and education.
To reduce the effects of any nonresponse and non-
coverage bias in panel estimates, a poststratification
raking adjustment is applied using demographic dis-
tributions from the most recent data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
The poststratification weighting variables include
age, gender, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and education.
This weighting adjustment is applied prior to the
selection of any sample from the KnowledgePanel and
represents the starting weights for any sample [11].
THE CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS - 31
The following benchmark distributions were utilized
for the poststratification weighting adjustment:
>Gender (male, female)
>Age (18-29, 30-44, 45-59, and 60-plus)
>Race (white non-Hispanic, black non-His-
panic, other non-Hispanic, 2+ races non-His-
panic, Hispanic)
>Education (less than high school, high school, some
college, college degree or more)
>Household income (less than $10K, $10-25K, $25-
50K, $50-75K, $75-100K, $100K-plus)
>Home ownership status (own, rent/other)
>Census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
>Metropolitan area (yes, no)
>Internet access (yes, no)
>Primary language by Census region (non-Hispanic,
Hispanic English proficient, Hispanic bilingual,
Hispanic Spanish proficient)
Comparable distributions are calculated using all
valid completed cases from the field data. Since study
sample sizes are typically too small to accommodate
a complete cross-tabulation of all the survey variables
with the benchmark variables, an iterative proportion-
al fitting is used for the poststratification weighting
adjustment. This procedure adjusts the sample back to
the selected benchmark proportions. Through an iter-
ative convergence process, the weighted sample data
are optimally fitted to the marginal distributions. After
this final poststratification adjustment, the distribu-
tion of calculated weights is examined to identify and,
if necessary, trim outliers at the extreme upper and
lower tails of the weight distribution. The poststrati-
fied trimmed weights are then scaled to the sum of the
total sample size of all eligible respondents.
For more information about the sample and sur-
vey methodology, please visit the GfK website at
www.gfk.com/us/Solutions/consumer-panels/Pages/
GfK-KnowledgePanel.aspx.
For more information about the Chicago Council
Survey, please contact Craig Kafura, research associate,
at ckafura@thechicagocouncil.org.
332 South Michigan Avenue
Suite 1100
Chicago, Illinois 60604-4416
www.thechicagocouncil.org
The Chicago Council
on Global Affairs, founded in 1922,
is an independent, nonpartisan organization
committed to educating the public—and influencing
the public discourse—on global issues of the day.
The Council provides a forum in Chicago for world
leaders, policymakers, and other experts to speak
to its members and the public on these issues. Long
known for its public opinion surveys of American views
on foreign policy, The Chicago Council also brings
together stakeholders to examine issues and offer
policy insight into areas such as global agriculture,
the global economy, global energy, global cities,
global security, and global immigration. Learn more at
thechicagocouncil.org and follow @ChicagoCouncil.
... Recent studies have also found that the American public sees relatively little difference in the foreign policy positions of the two parties (Kertzer et al. Forthcoming), and that most foreign policy elites across the two parties share broadly similar internationalist outlooks (Smeltz et al. 2015;Hicks et al. 2018;Busby et al. 2020). In addition, many foreign policy debates are marked by both intra-and inter-party divisions (Prather 2016;Rathbun 2016). ...
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