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Basic Individual Values: Sources and Consequences*
Shalom H. Schwartz
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem and National Research University—Higher School of
Economics
Schwartz, S. H. (in press). Basic individual values: Sources and consequences. In D. Sander
and T. Brosch (Eds.), Handbook of value. Oxford: UK, Oxford University Press.
* Preparation of this chapter was partly supported by the HSE Basic Research Program
(International Laboratory of Sociocultural Research).
Abstract
This chapter presents the dominant theory of individual values in social psychology and
sociology. Values are broad motivational goals that express what is important to people. The
chapter identifies ten basic, motivationally distinct values that people in virtually all cultures
implicitly recognize. It then presents the circular continuum that captures the relations of
conflict and compatibility among these values and explicates the dynamics underlying this
near-universal structure. Although the nature of values and their structure may be universal,
individuals differ substantially in the importance they attribute to the values. The chapter
presents mechanisms through which values influence decisions and behavior. It clarifies how
trade-offs between relevant competing values underlie behavior and attitudes, often outside
conscious awareness. It then illustrates how specific value priorities relate to numerous
behaviors and attitudes. It concludes with an overview of the origins of individual differences
in values and of value stability and change.
Key words: value priorities, value conflict, value compatibility, circular motivational
continuum, value features, value-behavior relations, value-attitude relations, value stability
and change
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Introduction
Values have been a central concept in the social sciences since their inception. For both
Durkheim (1893) and Weber (1905), values were crucial for explaining social and personal
organization and change. Values play an important role not only in sociology, but in
psychology, anthropology, and related disciplines as well. Values are used to characterize
societies and individuals, to trace change over time, and to explain the motivational bases of
attitudes and behavior.
Despite the widespread use of values, many different conceptions of this construct
have emerged (e.g., Boudon 2001; Inglehart 1997; Kohn 1969; Parsons 1951; Rokeach
1973). Application of the values construct in the social sciences has suffered, however, from
the absence of an agreed-upon conception of basic values, of the content and structure of
relations among these values, and of reliable empirical methods to measure them (Hitlin and
Piliavin 2004; Rohan 2000).
This chapter presents the current, dominant theory of individual differences in values
in social psychology and sociology that has addressed these issues (Schwartz 1992). For this
and related theories, value is in the eye of the beholder, not in the object of perception
(Rokeach 1973; Inglehart 1997). Values are broad motivational constructs that express what
is important to people. Based on their values, individuals view different acts, objects, people,
and events as more or less valuable. People’s values are central to their identities and
concepts of self (Hitlin 2003; Rokeach 1973)
The Schwartz theory concerns the basic or core values that people in all cultures
recognize. It defines values as desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that
serve as guiding principles in people’s lives (cf. Rokeach 1973; Kluckhohn 1951). It
identifies ten motivationally distinct values and specifies the dynamic relations among them.
Some values conflict with one another (e.g., stimulation and security) whereas others are
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compatible (e.g., conformity and tradition). The "structure" of values refers to these relations
of conflict and congruence among values. Values are structured in similar ways across
culturally diverse groups. This suggests that there is a universal organization of human
motivations. Although the nature of values and their structure may be universal, individuals
and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to the values. That is,
individuals and groups have different value “priorities” or “hierarchies.”
This chapter explicates the theory of personal values and describes the distinct values
it identifies. It examines why the pattern of relations among different values may be
universal. It discusses mechanisms through which values influence decisions and behavior,
brings examples of the relations of value priorities to behavior and attitudes, and provides an
overview of the origins of individual differences in values and of value change.
The Theory of Value Contents and Structure
Defining Basic Values
When we think of our values, we think of what is important to us in life. Each person holds
numerous values (e.g., achievement, security, benevolence) with varying degrees of
importance. A particular value may be very important to one person but unimportant to
another. The value theory adopts a conception of values that specifies six main features
implicit in the writings of many theorists:
(1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they become
infused with feeling. People for whom independence is an important value become aroused if
their independence is threatened, despair when they are helpless to protect it, and are happy
when they can enjoy it.
(2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. People for whom social order, justice,
and helpfulness are important values are motivated to pursue these goals.
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(3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty, for example,
are values that may be relevant at work, in school, in the family, in sports, business, or politics.
This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually
refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
(4) Values serve as standards or criteria. Values guide selection and evaluation of actions,
policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth
doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values. But the impact of
values in everyday decisions is rarely conscious. Values enter awareness when the actions or
judgments one is considering have conflicting implications for different values one cherishes.
(5) Values are ordered by relative importance. People’s values form an ordered system of
priorities that characterize them as individuals. Do they attribute more importance to freedom or
equality, to novelty or tradition? This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms
and attitudes.
(6) The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior
typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church might express
and promote tradition, conformity, and security values at the expense of hedonism and
stimulation values. The tradeoff among relevant, competing values guides attitudes and
behaviors (Schwartz 1992, 1996; cf. Lewin 1947). Values contribute to action to the extent that
they are relevant in the context (hence likely to be activated) and important to the actor.
The above are features of all values. These features tell us nothing, however, about
the substantive content of values--what different types of values there are. What distinguishes
one value from another is the type of goal or motivation that the value expresses. Dictionaries
include thousands of specific value concepts. There are therefore significant theoretical and
practical advantages to identifying a limited set of basic values that various human groups
recognize and use to form priorities. The value theory defines ten broad values according to the
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motivation that underlies each one. Presumably, these values encompass the range of
motivationally distinct values recognized across cultures. According to the theory, these values
are likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universal
requirements of human existence with which they help to cope. These requirements are needs
of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction, and
survival and welfare needs of groups.
People cannot cope successfully with these requirements of human existence alone.
To cope with them, people must articulate appropriate goals, communicate with others about
them, and gain cooperation in their pursuit. Values are the socially desirable concepts used to
represent the goals mentally and the vocabulary used to express them in social interaction.
From an evolutionary viewpoint (Buss 1986), these goals and the values that express them
have crucial survival significance.
The Motivational Content of Basic Values
I next define ten basic values in terms of the broad goals they express, note their grounding in
universal requirements, and mention related value concepts. To make the meaning of each
value more concrete and explicit, I list in parentheses a few of the value items used to
measure it.
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.
Security values derive from individual and group survival requirements (cf. Kluckhohn 1951;
Maslow 1965; Williams 1968). There are two subtypes of security values. One serves
primarily individual interests (e.g., avoiding danger), the other wider group interests (e.g.,
strong country). (social order, personal safety, national security).
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm
others and violate social expectations or norms. Conformity values derive from the
requirement to inhibit inclinations that might disrupt and undermine smooth interaction and
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group functioning. Virtually all value analyses mention conformity (e.g., Freud 1930; Kohn
and Schooler 1983; Morris 1956; Parsons 1951). (obedience, politeness, honoring parents and
elders)
Tradition: respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's
culture or religion provides. All groups develop practices, symbols, ideas, and beliefs that
represent their shared experience and fate. These become sanctioned as valued traditions that
symbolize the group's solidarity, express its unique worth, and contribute to its survival
(Durkheim 1912/1954; Parsons 1951). They often take the form of religious rites, beliefs, and
norms of behavior. (respect for tradition, humble, devout)
Tradition and conformity values are especially close motivationally, sharing the goal
of subordinating the self in favor of socially imposed expectations. They differ primarily in
the objects to which one subordinates the self. Conformity entails subordination to persons
with whom one is in frequent interaction—parents, teachers, bosses. Tradition entails
subordination to more abstract objects—religious and cultural customs and ideas.
Benevolence: preserving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one identifies
personally (the ‘in-group’). Benevolence values derive from the basic requirement for smooth
group functioning (cf. Kluckhohn 1951; Williams 1968) and from the organismic need for
affiliation (cf. Korman 1974; Maslow 1965). Most critical are relations within the family and
other primary groups. Benevolence values emphasize voluntary concern for others’ welfare.
(helpfulness, honesty, loyalty, love)
Benevolence and conformity values both promote cooperative social relations.
However, benevolence values provide an internalized motivational base for such behavior. In
contrast, conformity values promote cooperation in order to avoid negative outcomes for self.
Both values may motivate the same helpful act, separately or together.
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Universalism: understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of
all people and for nature. This contrasts with the in-group focus of benevolence values.
Universalism values derive from survival needs of individuals and groups. Recognizing these
needs only ensues after encountering others beyond the extended primary group and after
becoming aware of the scarcity of natural resources. People may then realize that failure to
accept others who are different and to treat them justly can lead to life-threatening strife and
that failure to protect the natural environment can lead to the destruction of the resources on
which life depends. Universalism values entail concern for the welfare of those in the larger
society and world and for nature (justice, equality, world peace, protecting the environment)
Self-Direction—independent thought and action—choosing, creating, exploring. Self-
direction values derives from organismic needs for control and mastery (e.g., Bandura 1977;
Deci 1975) and interactional requirements of autonomy and independence (e.g., Kluckhohn
1951; Kohn and Schooler 1983; Morris 1956). (creativity, freedom, curious, independent)
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life. Stimulation values derive from
the organismic need for variety and stimulation in order to maintain an optimal, positive,
rather than threatening, level of activation (e.g., Berlyne 1960). This need probably relates to
the needs underlying self-direction values (cf. Deci 1975). (variety, excitement, adventure)
Hedonism: pleasure or sensuous gratification. Hedonism values derive from
organismic needs and the pleasure associated with satisfying them. Theorists from many
disciplines (e.g., Freud 1933; Morris 1956; Williams 1968) mention hedonism. (pleasure,
enjoying life, fun)1
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social
standards. Competent performance that generates resources is necessary for individuals to
1 Happiness is not included as a basic value, despite its importance, because its motivational direction
is not distinct. People pursue happiness through seeking to attain whichever distinct goals they value
highly (Sagiv and Schwartz 2000).
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survive and for groups and institutions to reach their objectives. Many sources mention
achievement values (e.g., Maslow 1965; Rokeach 1973). My conceptualization of
achievement values emphasizes competence as defined by prevailing cultural standards,
thereby obtaining social approval. (ambitious, successful, capable, influential)2
Power: control or dominance over people and resources. The functioning of social
institutions apparently requires some degree of power differentiation (Parsons 1951). Most
empirical analyses of interpersonal relations, both within and across cultures, yield a
dominance/submission dimension (Lonner 1980). To justify this fact of social life and to
motivate group members to accept it, groups must treat power as a value. Power values may
also be transformations of individual needs for dominance and control (Korman 1974).
(authority, wealth, social power)
Both power and achievement values promote maintaining or gaining advantage for
self. However, achievement values seek the prestige or status that others confer in response to
performance, whereas power values seek control of resources to exercise influence
independent of others (cf. Hays 2013). Achievement values (e.g., ambition) emphasize
actively demonstrating successful performance in concrete interaction, whereas power values
(e.g., authority) emphasize attaining or preserving a dominant position within the more
general social system.
The Dynamic Structure of Value Relations
The central postulate of the value theory is that values represent a circular continuum of related
motivations, like the circular continuum of colors, rather than a set of discrete motivations.
Figure 1 portrays the circular structure of relations among the values. Each value is a fuzzy set
that blends gradually into the adjacent values. Substantial evidence supports dividing the
motivational circle into ten values (e.g., Fontaine et al. 2008; Schwartz and Boehnke 2004), but
2Achievement values differ from McClelland's (1961) achievement motivation. Achievement
motivation concerns meeting internal standards of excellence. It is expressed in self-direction values.
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doing so is actually a scientific convenience. It is sometimes more effective to divide the circle
into four broader values or into as many as 19 more narrowly defined values (Schwartz et al.
2012). Research in over 80 countries, using five different measuring instruments, largely
confirms the circular motivational continuum (Cieciuch et al. 2013), although it is not always
possible to discriminate all of the values (e.g., Davidov et al 2008).
(Figure 1)
Why do values form this [near-] universal structure? There are several dynamic sources.
A first organizing principle is that actions in pursuit of any value have consequences that
conflict with some values but are congruent with others. For example, pursuing novelty and
change (stimulation values) typically conflict with preserving time-honored customs
(tradition values). In contrast, pursuing tradition values is congruent with pursuing conformity
values. Both motivate actions of submission to external expectations.
Actions in pursuit of values have practical, psychological, and social consequences.
Practically, choosing an action alternative that promotes one value (e.g., participating in a cultic
rite—stimulation) may literally contravene or violate a competing value (obeying religious
precepts—tradition). Psychologically, the person choosing between such actions may also
sense that the alternative actions are cognitively dissonant. And social sanctions may ensue
when others point to practical and logical inconsistencies between an action and other values
the person professes. Of course, people can and do pursue competing values, but not in a single
act. Rather, they do so through different acts, at different times, and in different settings.
Viewing values as organized along two bipolar dimensions lets us summarize the
oppositions between competing values. The second circle from the center of Figure 1 shows
these dimensions. The ‘openness to change’ versus ‘conservation’ values dimension captures
the conflict between values that emphasize independence of thought, action, and feelings and
readiness for change (self-direction, stimulation) and values that emphasize order, self-
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restriction, preservation of the past, and resistance to change (security, conformity, tradition).
The ‘self-enhancement’ versus ‘self-transcendence’ values dimension captures the conflict
between values that emphasize concern for the welfare and interests of others (universalism,
benevolence) and values that emphasize pursuit of one's own interests and relative success and
dominance over others (power, achievement). Hedonism shares elements of both openness to
change and self-enhancement, but it is typically closer to openness to change.
A second principle that organizes the value circle is the interests that value attainment
serves. Values on the left of Figure 1 primarily regulate how one expresses personal interests
and characteristics. Values on the right primarily regulate how one relates socially to others
and affects their interests.
Relations of values to anxiety are a third organizing principle. Values in the bottom
part of the circle are based in the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the
self (Schwartz 2006, 2010). Conservation values (bottom left) emphasize avoiding conflict,
unpredictability, and change by submission and passive acceptance of the status quo. Power
values (bottom right) emphasize overcoming anxiety by actively controlling threat. In
contrast, values in the top part of the circle are relatively anxiety free, expressing growth and
self-expansion. Self-transcendence values (top left) emphasize promoting the welfare of
others. Openness to change values (top right) emphasize autonomous, self-expressive
experience. Achievement values do both: One may control anxiety by meeting social
standards and doing so may affirm one’s sense of competence.
This third aspect of the value structure relates to Higgins’ (1997) two basic self-
regulation systems. One system regulates avoidance of punishment and focuses people on
preventing loss. Security needs, obligations, and the threat of loss trigger this system. Values
in the bottom part of the circle, most centrally security and conformity, motivate this type of
self-regulation. The second system regulates pursuit of rewards and focuses people on
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promoting gain. Nurturance needs, ideals, and opportunities to gain trigger this system.
Values on the top of the circle, most centrally self-direction, motivate this type of self-
regulation.
This aspect of the value structure also relates to the distinction between intrinsic and
extrinsic motivation (e.g., Ryan and Deci 2000). Values in the bottom part of Figure 1 largely
express extrinsic motivation: Attainment of these values is contingent on obtaining social
approval and material rewards (power and part of achievement), on meeting the expectations
of others and avoiding the sanctions they may impose (conformity, tradition), or on receiving
protection and care (security). Values on the top largely express intrinsic motivation:
Behavior based on these values is rewarding in itself, providing satisfaction or pleasure
through expressing autonomy and competence (openness) or nurturance and relatedness (self-
transcendence).
Evidence is beginning to accumulate that a biological substratum underlies the
psychological processes that account for the motivational value circle. Research by Brosch
et al. (2011) suggests that basic neural reward mechanisms may mirror decision-making
on the two major value dimensions of self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement and of
openness to change vs. conservation. When individuals engaged in a donation task or a
GO/NOGO task, activation of different parts of the brain reflected individual differences
in value priorities on each dimension.
Relating Value Priorities to Other Variables
Most past research on antecedents and consequences of values examined empirical relations
between a few target values and a particular background variable, attitude, or behavior (e.g.,
obedience and social class—Alwin 1984; equality and civil rights--Rokeach 1973). The value
theory enables us to treat peoples’ value systems as coherent structures and, thus, to
systematically relate the full set of values to other variables. Conceiving values as organized
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in a circular motivational structure implies that any background variable, behavior, or attitude
that is especially congruent with one basic value (e.g., military intervention with power)
should also be relatively congruent with the adjacent values (security and achievement) but
conflict with the opposing values (universalism, benevolence, and self-direction). Thus, the
entire integrated structure of values relates systematically to other variables.
A second implication of the circular motivational structure of values is that
associations of values with other variables should decrease monotonically in both directions
around the circle from the most positively to the most negatively (or least positively) associated
value. That is, the order of associations for the whole set of ten values follows a predictable
pattern. If a background variable, trait, attitude, or behavior correlates most positively with one
value and most negatively with another, the circular value structure largely determines the
pattern of associations with all other values.
The data in Table 1, based on representative national samples from 27 countries,
illustrate this pattern. The table lists the values in their order around the circular structure of
value relations (cf. Figure 1). The correlations for age, gender, and education exhibit both
features of value relations. Adjacent values have similar associations with the background
variables and the associations of the values tend to decrease monotonically in both directions
around the circle from the most positively to the most negatively associated value. The
integrated structure of values facilitates theorizing about relations of the whole set of value
priorities to other variables. If theory identifies the values likely to relate most and least
positively to a variable, the circular motivational structure suggests the specific pattern of
positive, negative, and zero associations for the remaining values.3
(Table 1)
The integrated structure provides a template that reveals “deviations” from the
expected pattern. For example, security values relate more strongly to gender than expected
3 See Schwartz (2006) for theorizing about relations of values to age, gender, and education.
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based on the circular order. An evolutionary explanation of this deviation might suggest that
women differ more from men in their priority for security than for the other conservation
values because women need to protect themselves and their infants during the vulnerable
period of early child rearing. This maximizes their return on their heavy investment in
pregnancy, nursing, and caring for infants. A social role explanation might suggest that
women’s smaller size, lower status, and greater dependence on others’ support in most
societies make them more vulnerable than men and raise security concerns. Deviations are
especially interesting because they direct us to search for special conditions that enhance or
weaken relations of a variable with values (Schwartz 1996).
Mechanisms Linking Values to Behavior
Although many factors typically influence any specific behavior, values are often an
important contributing factor. Several mechanisms link values to behavior (Bardi and
Schwartz 2003; Schwartz 2009). First, in order for values to exert influence they must be
activated. Values that are more accessible are more likely to be activated. Because values that
are more important are more accessible (Bardi 2000), they are more often activated and exert
more influence. Activation experiments are particularly important because they show that
values can cause behavior (cf. Sagiv et al 2011).
Second, values must be experienced as relevant to the behavior in question. Because
basic values are abstract, their relevance is often not obvious. People may see equality, for
example, as relevant to discrimination based on gender but not on weight. Abstract values
relate more consistently to people’s behavior if they know specific ways to express them in
real-life situations (Maio 2010). Experiments show that values influence behavior more
strongly when people have previously thought about tangible or typical applications of those
values.
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Third, values influence behavior because they motivate people to pursue valued goals.
For example, people vote for parties whose platforms facilitate attaining the values they
cherish and against parties whose platforms threaten these values (Caprara et al. 2006). Put
differently, people’s values determine the valence they assign to the consequences of any
action. Actions are more attractive to the extent that they promote or protect valued goals.
High-priority values are central to the self-concept. Sensing an opportunity to attain them sets
off an automatic, positive, affective response to actions that will serve them. Sensing a threat
to value attainment sets off a negative affective response.
Value-based assessments of potential choices typically occur outside conscious
awareness. They tend to enter awareness when the alternatives entail high costs or have
conflicting implications for values one cherishes. ‘Value-expressive behaviors’ are behaviors
primarily compatible with one value and incompatible with the opposing values in the circle
(Bardi and Schwartz 2003). Values predict them well. Power values predict manipulative
behaviors and stimulation values predict risky behaviors, for example. But values predict
‘value-ambivalent behaviors’, behaviors compatible with mutually conflicting values, more
poorly (Lönnqvist et al. 2013). For example, the conflicting values of conformity and
stimulation might both motivate agreeing to friends’ pressuring to skydive, making it difficult
to predict.
Fourth, value importance influences behavior through planning (Gollwitzer 1996).
The more important a value, the more likely people are to form action plans to express it.
Planning focuses people on the pros of desired actions rather than the cons. It increases
people’s belief in their ability to reach a valued goal, their persistence in the face of obstacles
and distractions, and their belief in the desirability of the goal. By promoting planning, value
importance increases value-consistent behavior.
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Finally, values influence behavior by affecting what people attend to and perceive and
how they interpret situations. People attend more to the aspects of situations that threaten or
offer opportunities to attain cherished values. Depending on their value priorities, they may
perceive a job offer as an opportunity for greater self-direction or as a threat to security. They
may interpret such an offer as a chance to help their family or a chance to gain power. Each
perception or interpretation promotes a different line of action.
Values as Predictors of Behavior and Attitudes
The circular value structure implies that, if values on one side of the circle motivate a
behavior or attitude, values on the other side of the circle oppose it. A study of voting in the
Italian national elections of 2001 illustrates this. Two main coalitions, center-right and center-
left, contested the election. The center-right emphasized policies compatible with power and
security values—entrepreneurship, the market economy, security, and family and national
values. These policies conflicted with the opposing universalism values that call for
promoting the welfare of others, such as the weak and poor, those most likely to suffer from
market-driven policies. In contrast, the center-left advocated policies compatible with
universalism values—social welfare, social justice, equality, and tolerance even of groups
that might disturb the conventional social order—policies incompatible with pursuing
individual power and security values.
For citizens who recognized these policy differences, the political choice was a trade-
off between power and security values on the right and universalism values on the left.
Supporting the center-right vs. center-left should therefore correlate most positively with
people’s priority for power and security values and most negatively with their priority for
universalism values. The value circle implies an integrated pattern of correlations that should
decline from most positive for power and security values to most negative for universalism
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values in both directions around the circle (cf. Figure 1). This pattern was confirmed in a
sample of adults from the Rome region.
Column 1 of Table 2 lists the point-biserial correlations of voting for the center right
with the 10 values, controlling gender, age, income, and education. The correlations were
most positive with power values and most negative with universalism values and decreased
going around the circle from power to universalism in both directions. Figure 2 portrays the
pattern for voting graphically, a sinusoidal curve that reflects the motivational continuum of
values. To put the strength of these correlations in perspective, note that individuals’ income,
occupation, education, gender, marital status, and age all correlated less than .08 with voting.
Moreover, values explained almost three times as much variance in voting as did the Big 5
personality traits (Caprara et al. 2006).
(Figure 2)
Numerous studies of observed behavior in laboratory games also illustrate the trade-
offs between competing values in guiding behavioral choice. Typically, the consequences of
a behavior promote the expression or attainment of one set of values at the expense of the
opposing values in the circle. To understand and predict the behavior, we must consider the
importance of the values the behavior thwarts as well as those it promotes. Whether a
behavior occurs depends on the relative priority of the competing values that a person
experiences as relevant.
In the first published laboratory game that applied the value theory (Schwartz 1996),
pairs of participants chose among three alternatives for allocating money between self and a
partner. Each received the amount of money they allocated to self plus the amount their
partner allocated to them. The cooperative choice entailed sacrificing a little of what they
could gain and giving the maximum possible to their partner. The other two choices were not
cooperative. They entailed maximizing either one’s own absolute or relative gain.
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Both players were from the same group, but did not know their partner’s identity.
Benevolence values were more relevant to cooperation than universalism values in this
setting because cooperation was more a matter of decency and thoughtfulness than of
commitment to social justice. Power values, opposed in the circle, were most relevant to
noncooperation because they emphasize competitive advantage and legitimize maximizing
own gain at the expense of others. The correlations for cooperation in column 2 of Table 2
and in Figure 2 reveal the expected pattern. Benevolence correlated most positively with
cooperation, power most negatively, and correlations with the other values showed the
sinusoidal pattern corresponding to their order around the value circle.
(Table 2)
Another way of analyzing the data demonstrates clearly that trade-offs among
competing values guided behavior. Splitting the sample at the medians on benevolence and
on power values and crossing these sub-samples yielded four groups. In the group that
valued benevolence highly and gave low importance to power values, 87% cooperated. This
was twice the rate in any other group (35%-43%). Thus, eliciting a high level of cooperation
required both high priority for values that promote cooperation (benevolence) and low
priority for values that oppose it (power).
Lönnqvist et al. (2013) reviewed relations of values to prosocial behavior in
monetarily incentivized strategic interaction games in 42 samples from China, Finland,
Germany, Israel, and the West Bank. The games included prisoner's dilemma, ultimatum,
trust, gift exchange, and dictator games. Participants were randomly paired with an unknown
other. The researchers expected universalism values to predict higher levels and power values
to predict lower levels of prosocial behavior. They also expected these effects to be stronger
for the roles in which the prosocial option was clearly value-expressive (cooperator, trustee,
and dictator roles) rather than value-ambivalent (proposer, responder, and truster). The value-
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behavior correlations confirmed these expectations across the 42 studies, although only
universalism was a significant predictor in the regressions. In the dictator game, they
measured the refined values (Schwartz et al. 2012) in order to clarify the aspects of
universalism and power values that influenced prosocial behavior. This revealed that the
narrowly defined ‘universalism-concern’ and ‘power-resources’ predicted more strongly than
the broader universalism and power values.
Next, I describe one study that examined the consequences of individual differences
in value hierarchies on various self-reported and other-reported behaviors. I then provide an
overview of the wide variety of other studies that reveal how trade-offs between opposing
values shape behavior and attitudes. Bardi and Schwartz (2003) investigated everyday
behavior among young Israeli adults in three studies. They generated ten sets of 6-10
behaviors that they presumed would express each one of the ten basic values (e.g., sunbathe
for hedonism, watch thrillers for stimulation). Participants rated how frequently they had
performed each behavior in the past year, relative to their opportunities to perform it. In
studies 2 and 3, intimate partners or close peers also rated participants’ behavior. The
behavior indexes were the averaged frequency ratings of the behaviors expected to express
each value.
Column 3 of Table 2 lists the value-behavior correlations for the 10 values. The mean
correlation across values was .49 (sd = .11) for self-reported behavior and .25 (sd =.09) for
other-reported behavior. Although almost all correlations were significant, the magnitude of
the correlations varied considerably. Correlations were weakest in the security, conformity,
benevolence, and achievement domains. The values in these domains were either especially
important or the behaviors were especially frequent in the sample. Value importance or
behavior frequency might produce normative pressure to conform to the values and
behaviors. Correlations were strongest for tradition and stimulation, domains in which the
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values were relatively unimportant and the behaviors infrequent in this sample. Bardi and
Schwartz (2003) interpreted these findings as suggesting that yielding to normative pressure,
even when a behavior opposes one’s own values, weakens value-behavior relations.
According to the value theory, basic values underlie and shape virtually all voluntary
attitudes and behaviors. Attitudes or behaviors grounded positively in (i.e., motivated by)
values on one side of the motivational circle and negatively in values on the opposing side
should be predictable by the trade-off between these opposing values. Table 3 presents a
sampling of the heterogeneous assortment of behaviors whose relations to values have been
studied. Table 4 presents a sampling of attitude-value relations in the literature. The tables
specify the opposing values implicated in the trade-off that guides each behavior or attitude
and the number of different countries or cultures in which the topic has been studied.
(Tables 3 and 4)
To clarify the tables and illustrate the reasoning used to understand or predict the
observed value trade-offs, I explicate the first behavior in Table 3, political activism. Data
were from representative national samples in 26 countries that participated in the first three
rounds of the European Social Survey (2002-2007). Individuals reported whether they had
taken each of seven political actions during the past year (e.g., contacted a politician, signed a
petition, participated in a demonstration, boycotted a product). The index of political activism
was the number of actions taken. A hierarchical linear modeling analysis, controlling key
socio-demographic variables, revealed that the strongest positive value predictor of activism
was universalism, followed by self-direction and stimulation. The strongest negative
predictor was conformity, followed by tradition and security. The last two columns of Table 3
present this trade-off, ordering the values by their importance.
What was the rationale for this trade-off? During this period, the main ideological
goals of European activism were social justice, tolerance, protecting the environment and
20
peace, goals central to universalism values. Self-direction values promote independent
thought and action and therefore active pursuit of one’s principles. Activism also expresses
stimulation values through opportunities for challenge and risk. Conformity, security, and
tradition values oppose political activism because they call for preserving the status quo,
accepting normative expectations, and avoiding risk and change. Activism most directly
contravenes conformity values in its challenge to conventional or established practices. Both
the order of the value circle and reasoning about the motivations for activism support the
observed order of associations.
In the case of risky sexual behavior, the values involved in the trade-off deviate
somewhat from the expected pattern. This merits comment because such deviations point to
complexities in the motivation for a specific behavior or attitude. Goodwin et al. (2002) asked
respondents in five East European countries whether they had engaged in sex with multiple
partners during the past six months without using condoms. Hedonism, stimulation, and the
non-adjacent power values correlated most positively with such behavior. Universalism,
benevolence, and non-adjacent security values correlated most negatively. Moreover, power
and security values, which are adjacent in the circle, related to risky sexual behavior in
opposite directions.
This set of findings identifies two independent value trade-offs that might motivate
risky sexual behavior. For some, deciding whether to engage in risky sexual behavior
involves the trade-off of pleasure and excitement (hedonism and stimulation) versus risk to
their own safety (security). For others, it involves a trade-off of dominating others (power)
versus concern for their dignity and welfare (universalism). For still others, both trade-offs
may influence their decision. When, as here, adjacent values relate to an attitude or behavior
in opposite ways or non-adjacent values relate to them in similar ways, we can infer that the
attitude or behavior has multiple, independent consequences.
21
Origins and Change of Value Priorities
When do children begin to discriminate the ten basic values and organize them into the
motivational value circle? And when do group differences in value priorities (e.g., education,
religion, sex) begin to emerge (see also Boer & Boehnke, this volume)? Several studies have
shown that the adult patterns are quite well established by adolescence (e.g., Daniel et al.
2012; Schwartz 2012) and even, to a large extent, in late childhood (e.g., Bilsky et al. 2013;
Cieciuch et al. 2013). A recently developed picture-based method to measure the 10 basic
values (Doering et al. 2010) makes it possible to address these questions with children as
young as seven years old.
Doering, et al. (submitted) analyzed values data from over 3000 children from six
countries. Regarding the value structure, the sample in every country differentiated the four
higher order values and ordered them as adults do. Moreover, at least 7 of the 10 values were
differentiated in all but one country. Values that were not differentiated were intermixed with
adjacent values in the motivational circle. Thus, children apparently experience the
motivational compatibilities and incompatibilities among the values in much the same way as
adults do, but the more detailed structure is still in the process of emerging. Note that the
value structures observed among children and among adults refer to the group level. They do
not characterize every individual.
Regarding value hierarchies, the pan-cultural location of benevolence and
universalism as most important in adult samples and power as least important (Schwartz and
Bardi 2001) also emerged in the children’s samples. Regarding sex differences, in all
countries, girls attributed higher priority to self-transcendence values and boys to self-
enhancement values, paralleling adult differences around the world (Schwartz and Rubel
2005). Sex differences for conservation and openness to change values were smaller and less
22
consistent, also as found among adults. Whether sex differences mainly reflect evolutionary
or socialization and social role effects is uncertain, but they already emerge in childhood.
What do individual differences in value priorities come from? Initial evidence
suggests that inborn sensitivities affect some values. Hibbing et al. (in press) bring
evidence that political conservatives, who consistently prioritize conservation values
(Piurko et al. 2011), exhibit heightened sensitivity to negative stimuli. Tritt, Inzlicht, and
Peterson (in press) argue, instead, that conservatives are particularly responsive to arousal
in general. Thus, those who give higher priority to conservation versus openness to change
values may be more physiologically sensitive to negative or arousing features of the
environment (Schwartz in press). Both Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1992) view some
values as transformations of needs into goals that can be regulated cognitively. Individual
differences in temperament or in the intensity of needs might therefore give rise to
differences in value priorities.
There is also some evidence for genetic influences on basic values. In a study of
adult twins in Australia, Schermer et al. (2008) obtained reliable heritability estimates for
the importance of conformity (.38), tradition (.38), and benevolence (.28) values, but not
for the importance of the other seven values. Knafo and Spinath (2011) examined genetic
influences on value priorities for two bipolar dimensions of values in 7 to 11 year old
German same-sex twins. They estimated heritability of .49 for power/achievement vs.
benevolence values and of .34 for conformity/security vs. self-direction/stimulation
values for both sexes. These estimates based on children may underestimate the
importance of genetic influences on value priorities because heritability often increases
with age (Plomin et al. 2001). Reliably establishing the genetic influences on the 10 basic
values demands further research.
23
Both genetics and continuity in people’s experiences may contribute to the relative
stability of value priorities over time. In adult samples, stability of value importance averages
about .6 over a year (summarized in Bardi and Goodwin 2011; Schwartz 2005) and stability
of value hierarchies (profiles) averages .59 over eight years (unpublished data). Yet, value
priorities do change. Race, ethnicity, gender, social class, education, occupation, family
characteristics, age cohort, religion, immigrant status, economic and political systems all
affect value priorities (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Schwartz 2007; Schwartz et al. 2000). These
sources produce value change by influencing people’s life experiences and the opportunities
their life circumstances afford.
Adaptation to different life experiences and circumstances leads to value change and
through it to value differences among individuals and groups. Typically, people upgrade the
importance they attribute to values they can readily attain and downgrade the importance of
values whose pursuit is blocked (Schwartz and Bardi 1997). For example, people in jobs that
afford freedom of choice increase the importance of self-direction values at the expense of
conformity values (Kohn and Schooler 1983). Upgrading attainable values and downgrading
thwarted values applies to most, but not to all values. The reverse occurs with values that
concern material well-being and security. When such values are blocked, their importance
increases; when they are easily attained, their importance drops. For example, people who
suffer economic hardship and social upheaval attribute more importance to power and
security values than those who live in relative comfort and safety (Inglehart 1997). However,
because people often choose the circumstances they experience (careers, majors, spouses,
etc.) based on their value priorities, these circumstances do not promote value change (Bardi
et al. 2014).
Socialization intentionally shapes life experiences to induce value change. Socializers,
in families and organizations, seek to transmit their own or their preferred values. The
24
success of their efforts depends on the target no less than on the socializer (Knafo and
Schwartz 2008). Desired value changes are more likely to occur if the target perceives them
accurately and identifies with the socializer. Several socializer characteristics affect whether
the experiences they shape will influence targets’ values. These include socializers’ warmth,
the clarity and consistency of their expectations, and the example they provide. As central
aspects of the self, however, basic values tend to resist change.
Conclusion
The value theory identifies ten basic, motivationally distinct values that people in virtually all
cultures implicitly recognize. The theory applies to adults and children from around the
world, though we do not know whether it applies in isolated tribal groups. Especially striking
is the emergence of the same circular structure of relations among values across countries and
measurement instruments. People everywhere experience conflict between the values at the
poles of the higher order values, openness to change values versus conservation and self-
transcendence versus self-enhancement. Conflicts between specific values are also near
universal. The dynamic processes suggested to account for the observed circular structure
may point the way toward a unifying theory of human motivation.
Values influence most if not all motivated behavior, though people are often unaware
of this influence. I have identified various mechanisms that link values to behavior. The
magnitude of influence by values can be substantial for value-expressive behaviors and in the
absence of normative pressure in the environment. It is trivial for value-ambivalent behaviors
and under strong normative pressure. The value theory makes clear that behavior entails a
trade-off between competing values. Behaviors typically have positive implications for
expressing, upholding, or attaining some values, but negative implications for values across
the circle in opposing positions. People tend to behave in ways that balance their opposing
values. Consequently, the order of positive and negative associations between any specific
25
behavior and the ten values tends to follow the order of the value circle. The theory provides
a framework for relating the integrated motivational system of ten values to behavior that
enriches analysis, prediction, and explanation of value-behavior relations.
This chapter presents many examples of the relations of value priorities to a wide
variety of behaviors and attitudes. The literature contains many more examples (see also Jiga-
Boy et al., this volume). Value priorities also relate systematically to other personality
variables. Among those studied are social desirability, authoritarianism, social dominance,
subjective well-being, and the Big 5 personality traits. The proliferation of behavior, attitude,
and personality studies testifies to the fruitfulness of the values theory.
Little is known about possible genetic and biological underpinnings of value
priorities. The circular motivational structure of values emerges during childhood, but we
have yet to learn how early this occurs and what factors influence its emergence. These are
among the more challenging topics for future research.
26
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Table 1 Correlations of Values with Age, Gender, and Education in Representative National
Samples from the 27 Countries in Rounds 1 and 2 of the European Social Survey
Value
Age
(N=79,700)
Gender (Female)
(N=80,050)
Years of
Education
(N=79,200)
Security .25 (27) .12 (27) -.20 (27)
Conformity .33 (27) .03 (17) -.18 (27)
Tradition .34 (27) .09 (27) -.25 (27)
Benevolence .13 (26) .16 (27) .01 (6)†
Universalism .17 (27) .12 (27) .07 (21)
Self-Direction -.08 (25) -.06 (25) .23 (27)
Stimulation -.38 (27) -.09 (27) .16 (27)
Hedonism -.32 (27) -.07 (22) .10 (27)
Achievement -.27 (27) -.12 (27) .10 (27)
Power -.10 (26) -.13 (25) -.02 (17)
All correlations differ from zero, p<.001, 2-tailed, except benevolence x years of education.
The number of countries whose correlation is in the signed direction appears in parentheses.
Due to missing data, the number of respondents varies slightly around the indicated Ns.
34
Table 2 Correlations of Value Priorities with Behavior
Vote for center-right
vs. center-left
Italy
Cooperation in a
laboratory game
Israel
Behavior across contexts
Israel
self-report other-report
ValuesAN=2849BN=90 N= 293 N=141
Power .14** -.37** .52** .25**
Achievement .08** -.19* .38** .20**
Hedonism .01 -.18* .55** .29**
Stimulation -.03 -.08 .64** .35**
Self-direction -.08** .06 .47** .29**
Universalism -.28** .32** .51** .24**
Benevolence -.18** .38** .43** .18*
Tradition .07** .12 .70** .42**
Conformity .10** .01 .40** .18*
Security .20** -.08 .31** .10
AValues are corrected for scale use (see text).
BNs vary slightly due to missing data.
**p < .01, *p < .05, 1-tailed.
35
Table 3 Significant Value Trade-offs Underlying Behavior
Behaviora
# countries
or cultures
studied
Positively
related
values
Negatively
related
values
Political activism (7 actions: e.g., boycotting) 26 UN/SD/STbCO/TR/SEc
Participation in sports (in last 12 months) 18 ST/HE SE/TR/CO
Attendance religious services 30 TR/CO SD/ST/HE
Work for voluntary/ charitable org. 23 BE/SD/UN SE/PO/CO
Environmentally friendly behavior 11 UN/BE PO
Drug use frequency 6 ST/HE BE/CO
Risky sexual behavior (multiple partners, no
condom)
5 HE/PO/ST UN/BE/SE
Choosing economics or business major 2 PO/AC BE
Delinquent behavior
Choice of medical specialty—general practice
3
2
ST/HE
BE
BE/CO
PO
Adopting technological innovations 2 ST/SD SE/TR/CO
Prosocial behavior 3 UN/BE PO
Creative behavior (artistic, verbal) 2 SD/UN/ST SE/TR/CO
Consumer choices: red meat
fair trade products
1
1
PO
UN/SD
UN
PO/AC/SE
Interpersonal violence 2 PO/HE UN/BE/CO
SD = self-direction, ST = stimulation, HE = hedonism, AC = achievement, PO = power, SE =
security, CO = conformity, TR = tradition, BE = benevolence, UN = universalism
aSources available from the author.
bValues are ordered from most to least positive
cValues are ordered from most to least negative
Table 4. Significant Value Trade-offs Underlying Attitudes
Attitudea
# countries
or cultures
studied
Positively
related values
Negatively
related
values
Opposition to accepting immigrants 28 SE/CObUN/SDc
Interpersonal trust 30 BE/UN SE/PO
Importance of work in life 20 AC/PO TR/BE/UN
Subjective political efficacy 20 SD/ST SE/CO/TR
Importance high income in choosing job 26 PO/AC UN/BE
Importance job security in choosing job 26 SE ST/SD
36
Importance promotion chances in choosing job 26 AC/PO UN/BE
Importance chances for initiative in choosing
job
26 SD/ST CO/TR
Readiness to work with out-groups: majority
group
1 UN/SD TR/SE/CO
Right-wing authoritarianism
3 SE/CO/TR/PO UN/SD
Egalitarian gender attitudes 1 UN/SD/BE PO/TR
Worry about meaning in life 4 UN/BE/TR ST/HE
Music preferences (jazz and rock vs. pop) 1 UN/BE SE/CO/TR
Preference for community sharing vs. market
pricing social relationships
1 BE/UN PO/AC
Identifying with one’s nation 3 TR/CO/SE SD/ST/HE
SD = self-direction, ST = stimulation, HE = hedonism, AC = achievement, PO = power, SE =
security, CO = conformity, TR = tradition, BE = benevolence, UN = universalism
aSources available from the author.
bValues are ordered from most positive
cValues are ordered from most negative
Figure captions
Figure 1. The circular motivational continuum of ten values in the Schwartz (1992) theory.
Figure 2. Correlations between value priorities and three behaviors.
37
38
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
PO
AC
HE
ST
SD
UN
BE
TR
CO
SE
Correlations
VALUES
