Conference Paper

Selfish Mental States (or "What Can the Selfish Goal Model Do for The Belief-Desire-Intention Model?")

Authors:
To read the full-text of this research, you can request a copy directly from the author.

Abstract

Huang and Bargh propose that goals can activate and regulate action beneath the threshold of conscious perception. Further, they claim that goals can regulate behavior autonomously and selfishly (think “Selfish Gene”), thus the name Selfish Goals. Conceived this way, selfish goals can make sense of a wide range of behaviors including, but not limited to inconsistent, adaptive, self-destructive, and automatic behavior. One thing we can learn from Bargh and colleagues selfish goals is the explanatory power of granting certain properties to mental entities (e.g., being automatically activated, consciously inaccessible, autonomous, and selfish). In what follows, I will show how adopting these properties into folk models of action can allow us to increase the descriptive and explanatory power of the such models. In other words, if beliefs, desires, and intentions can be consciously inaccessible, autonomous, and selfish in the ways that Bargh and colleagues propose certain goals can be, then the folk model of action can explain more than it could otherwise.

No full-text available

Request Full-text Paper PDF

To read the full-text of this research,
you can request a copy directly from the author.

ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any citations for this publication.
ResearchGate has not been able to resolve any references for this publication.