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A critical assessment of the scholarship on violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period
Abstract
This article provides an in-depth literature review of the different trends and debates in the English academic literature on the violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period. This literature review is separated into three major debates and focused on four major themes that consistently appear in the study of violent conflicts in the North Caucasus: nationalism and identity (grievance), criminality and opportunism (greed), repression (revenge and trauma), and religion (radicalization). The first debate concentrates on the structural factors explaining mass mobilization in the North Caucasus following the end of the Soviet Union. The second debate underscores the role of religious radicalization in mobilization patterns in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, as well as its potential links with other conflicts (Afghanistan and Syria) and the importance of suicide bombings. Finally, the third debate focuses on the study of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, the development of the Caucasus Emirate, and the diffusion of insurgent violence across the region. The article concludes by underlining the need to engage on a larger theorization of violent mobilization in the North Caucasus seeking to integrate structural, organizational and individual variables linking the global dynamics and local specificities of the region.
... Incluso aunque haya poderosas razones internas por las que vaticinar que una organización va a desaparecer, podrían existir factores contextuales que reactivasen el conflicto: la aparición de otros focos violentos en territorios fronterizos con Chechenia (Holland, Witmer y O'Loughlin 2017); la creación de nuevos grupos armados, como la filial del Estado Islámico en Rusia; o la persistencia de las causas estructurales (corrup-ción, impunidad, represión, ausencia de bienestar social, etc.) que contribuyen a acelerar la radicalización (Janeczko 2014;Ratelle 2015). De ese modo, es necesario considerar otros elementos de contraste -más allá del número de atentadosantes de afirmar el debilitamiento de la violencia yihadista en el Cáucaso. ...
Este artículo tiene como objetivo aportar datos complementarios, fiables y replicables sobre el conteo de víctimas provocadas por las guerrillas del Cáucaso norte, para explicar su actual debilidad. La metodología empleada es el análisis de contenido de todas las publicaciones realizadas entre 2010 y 2019 en su órgano oficial de propaganda, Kavkaz Center. Esto se complementa con un análisis del contexto histórico. Se concluye que existe una coincidencia general en el aumento y la disminución de las variables producción propagandística y víctimas causadas a lo largo del tiempo. Por tanto, el escrutinio de la propaganda de las guerrillas ayuda a conocer su vigor con mayor certidumbre que si solo se tiene en cuenta el número de ataques perpetrados. Replicar el análisis en otros contextos permitiría conocer si puede establecerse una norma en ese sentido.
... For the post-Soviet period, the literature on the conflicts in the North Caucasus has been surveyed by Ratelle who points out that it has revolved around four themes: "grievance, greed, trauma, and radicalisation" (2015). Three debates have structured publications on these themes: (i) the causal role of identity, nationalism, and greed in the conflicts of the 1990s; (ii) the role of Islamist radicalization in mobilization patterns after 1999; and (iii) the patterns of violence diffusion in the North Caucasus and the role of counter-terrorism (Ratelle 2015). In this article, the focus is on radical Islamism. ...
Insurgents in the North Caucasus switched from the al-Qaeda-affiliated Imarat Kavkaz to the Islamic State after 2014. Although this transition was partially the result of Imarat Kavkaz's military defeat, it has also settled two decades of tension over ideology. It signalled the victory of Salafi-jihadism over a nationally rooted (radical) Islamism and led to a break between the insurgents and the Caucasian context. This de-territorialization of grievances for the war has in turn increased the threat of radical Islamist violence for Russia.
... We must admit, however, that the Russian operation to resolve the conflict in North Ossetia/Ingushetia did not attract the same level of criticism from the international community as its coercive actions in Chechnya and Dagestan later did. This much is confirmed, among other sources, by the detailed overview of the scholarly literature on conflicts in North Caucasus by Jean-François Ratelle (Ratelle 2015), and by the overview of Western literature by Galina Yemelianova (Yemelianova 2015). The main reason for this is the legal nature of the application of force as a "police operation in a country's own territory" that recognizes the relatively (though not fully) neutral nature of the interference of the central authorities to resolve a conflict between two constituent entities of a highly multinational area of the country. ...
This article provides a comparative analysis of the legal grounds for the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces in a series of conflicts in the Caucasus, namely in the disengagement between North Ossetia and Ingushetia (1992–1994), South Ossetia/Georgia (1992–2008), Abkhazia/Georgia (1994–2008), and in the Russian–Georgian War of 2008. The difficulties in codifying certain actions from the point of view of international law are detailed. The article discusses whether the political and military actions of Moscow in various Caucasian conflicts were driven and interconnected by one and the same logic, or were purely ad hoc fixes. Cases where Russia’s actions have been legitimized by securing mandate from a regional intergovernmental organization are differentiated from cases where it has acted on the basis of intergovernmental agreements, as well as from the application in certain cases of Article 51 (“the right of individual or collective self-defence”) of the UN Charter. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the deployment of the Russian Armed Forces abroad is considered in the context of, and in comparison with, a series of cases where force has been used in conflicts by coalitions under a UN mandate, as well as by NATO and some Western powers.
Purpose
The aim of the paper is to identify the characteristics of terrorist risks in the regional aspect by using the example of the Russian Federation.
Design/methodology/approach
The cluster analysis revealed four groups of regions that differ in the level of terrorist risk. Then, based on comparison of regression analysis results for the selected regions and the country as a whole, a characteristic of factors contributing to and preventing terrorism was presented.
Findings
The research results showed that the main problems affecting the growth of terrorism, both at the national and regional levels, are the low level of economic freedom, as well as high political instability, crime rates, corruption and digital globalization processes. Therefore, when developing and implementing a counter-terrorism policy, more attention should be paid to these areas.
Originality/value
Assessing terrorist risk across national regions is a relevant problem. The identification of patterns in the commission of terrorist attacks and their regional distribution are of great importance for national counter-terrorism strategies.
This article reviews and discusses the Russian foreign policy towards several countries in the Post-Soviet Space (Tajikistan, Ukraine and Georgia), and the Middle East (Syria). The Russian policy towards its near abroad shows elements of both (neo-)realism and constructivism. A realist perspective of Russian foreign policy seems evident as Russia pursues its own national (or imperial) geopolitical interest. However, it may not explain the Russian interventions satisfactorily. Analysing Russia’s intervention in these conflicts, it is important to look also at Russia’s own geopolitical vision; i.e. how Russia views the world, notably its near abroad, and Russia’s place, role or even mission in it. Russia has reacted to the NATO and European Union (EU) enlargements in its (former) geopolitical spheres of influence and has helped its ally Bashar Assad remain in power in Syria. The conflict in Ukraine is not irrelevant to that in Syria and the Russian experience in Chechnya and Tajikistan may have codetermined Russian intervention in Syria.
Terrorism connected to the North Caucasus has been pervasive in Russia between 1992 and 2018. Based on an original dataset, this article presents statistics on rates of terrorist attacks outside of the North Caucasus, their geography and targets, and the tactics used. It argues that terrorism by North Caucasian insurgents has retained a strategic logic despite their conversion to radical Islamism. Accordingly, the erosion of its strategic logic was the principal factor that determined the end of North Caucasian terrorism is a case that allow analysts to examine.
This is the first article to systematically examine the factors that have led to the considerable weakening of the North Caucasus insurgency since 2013: the selective targeting of the insurgents’ support base, the deployment of elite counter-insurgent force and army in special operations, the infiltration of insurgent groups and their decapitation, and the departure of the North Caucasians to the Syrian Civil War. Scrutinizing how these factors have reduced the regional insurgency, the article also points to their shortcomings that have, as the article shows, since 2014 contributed to an increase in insurgency-related violence in the region. First, the risk of severe penalization notwithstanding, many locals, driven by the locally embedded codes of retaliation and hospitality, as well as by the sympathies toward the insurgents, have continued to provide support to the insurgents and to put up resistance to the incumbent forces. Second, with elite counter-insurgent force limited in numbers and increasingly deployed outside of Russia, a considerable part of counter-insurgency operations has again been conducted by local police, infamous for incompetence and corruption. Third, while decapitation has failed to put an end to insurgent groups, these groups’ infiltration has become harder than previously due to the insurgent groups’ increasingly selective recruitment policies. Fourth, the falling numbers of North Caucasian volunteers to the Syrian Civil War has provided more recruits to the jihadist groups operating in their home region. The article concludes that the North Caucasus insurgency is likely to survive in the years to come.
This article assesses the successes and setbacks of Moscow’s policy of counterinsurgency and beyond. It challenges the general consensus in scholarship positing that military successes associated with Chechenisation have been obtained against the backdrop of Chechnya’s increasingly autonomous status within Russia, considered by some as a case of ‘systemic separatism’. The article tracks how four key mechanisms (Chechnya’s institutional design, internal opposition to the Kadyrov clan, the tradition of blood feud among kadyrovtsy—initially Chechen paramilitary forces named after both Kadyrovs, gradually transformed into seemingly regular Ministry of Interior (MVD) units—and Chechnya’s economic dependency on Moscow) have enabled Moscow to maintain control over Chechnya while simultaneously allowing its elites to consolidate power within the republic.
Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? The conventional wisdom suggests that it does—Stathis Kalyvas cites dozens of studies and historical cases where collective targeting of the noncombatant population provoked greater insurgent violence. But others have pushed back against this claim. These scholars have made significant advances that allow us to understand and explain when, why, and how the world's militaries have used indiscriminate violence against noncombatants with shocking regularity. This study builds on these contributions. We use interviews we conducted with ex-combatants and eyewitnesses of the Chechen wars to provide a critical reexamination of the current theoretical debate concerning indiscriminate violence. In doing so, we argue that treating the concept of indiscriminate violence as an essentially random counter-insurgency tactic obscures the important distinction between random and retributive indiscriminate violence deployed against civilians. The distinction raises crucial questions of location and timing that have hindered efforts to evaluate the efficacy of indiscriminate violence in irregular war.
This article examines how the so-called post-Soviet de facto states are conceptualized and discussed within the wider context of Western English-language social and political sciences, including inter-disciplinary Russian, Slavonic, East European and Eurasian area studies. It outlines the main theoretical models and methodologies utilized in the analysis of this phenomenon, and identifies their respective benefits and shortcomings. The article posits that there is considerable unevenness between various theoretical paradigms in terms of their explanatory clarity and their relationship with empirical reality. I argue that Western academic discourse on the post-Soviet de facto states, and on post-Soviet politics more generally, has been increasingly shaped by mono-theoretical determinist models with heavy reliance on deductive quantitative research methods and secondary sources in English language and non-academic analytical reports. A corollary has been a considerable deterioration in the epistemological quality of the discourse on de facto states, and on occasion its politicization.
In September 1999, Russian troops, purportedly responding to warlord Shamil Basayev’s incursion into the neighboring republic of Dagestan, moved into Chechnya. From the outset, the “second” Chechen war1 was marked by extreme violence, most of which was directed at civilians. Grozny, the capital, sustained five months of heavy bombardment, while the inhabitants took shelter in cellars or risked their lives attempting to flee the city.2 Accounts of summary executions, arbitrary arrests and torture in “filtration camps” began to appear as soon as Russian forces entered Grozny in February 2000; these activities were so widespread and systematic that talk of war crimes and crimes against humanity was not unwarranted.3 Despite the so-called “normalization” process that began in 2003, the violations continued; the “Chechenization” of the conflict has done little more than gradually transfer responsibility from federal troops to pro-Russian militias led by Chechnya’s strongman, Ramzan Kadyrov.4
Three U.S. geographers analyze the temporal and spatial trends of 17,438 violent events in Russia's North Caucasus region from August 1999 to July 2011, demonstrating that the diffusion of conflict away from Chechnya intensified during the period 2007-2011, as levels of violence rose in neighboring republics. An increasing number of casualties are civilians in Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria, the three republics that are the focus of the paper. Employing multiple methods of spatial pattern analysis and geographically sensitive regression models, the authors examine the spatial fragmentation of violence from the perspective of rebel groups operating in the three republics. The analysis documents how the incidence of violence varies dramatically over space (i.e., reflecting the influence of urbanization, strategic location, and physical geographic factors such as elevation and extent of forest cover). Although violence in the North Caucasus region as a whole has declined in absolute terms over the past four years, the authors show how new geographies of violence are developing in the region, underscoring the emergence of republic-based insurgent operations against the various organs of the Russian state. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: H560, H770, O180. 9 figures, 3 tables, 1 appendix, 103 references:
The Chechen Conflict is the most fatal and protracted conflict in the post-Soviet space. While it is the most discussed conflict there, it is also the least understood. Many contradicting accounts of it exist, and still many questions remain unanswered. One reason is that the nature of this conflict has changed over time. Unlike what many - particularly Western - analysts think, it is not a religious conflict. It began as an ethno-nationalist separatist conflict but only later was it infiltrated by extremist Salafis/Wahhabis. At this moment a war is going on between the local Chechen and the central Russian governments against the Salafi/Wahhabi Emirate of the Caucasus. Chechnya is the only autonomous region in Russia in which a separatist movement had been successful. The possible reasons are the peculiarities of the Caucasus; especially its mosaic type of ethnogeographic configuration and the traumatic past of many of its peoples. Another important factor in the explanation of such a separatist conflict in Chechnya - and nowhere else in the North Caucasus - is the fact that only in Chechnya has a titular minority enjoyed a dominant demographic position. This paper also discusses issues such as the nature of Islam in Chechnya and the Russian geopolitical codes.
For the first time, a military expert on both Russia and insurgency offers the definitive guide on activities in Southern Russia, explaining why the Russian approach to counter terrorism is failing and why terrorist and insurgent attacks in Russia have sharply increased over the past three years.
The Insurgency in Chechnya and the North Caucasus: From Gazavat to Jihad is an comprehensive treatment of this 300 year-old conflict. Thematically organized, it cuts through the rhetoric to provide a contextual framework with which readers can truly understand the "why" and "how" of one of the world's longest-running contemporary insurgencies, despite Russia's best efforts to eradicate it.
A fascinating case study of a counterinsurgency campaign that is in direct contravention of U.S. and Western strategy, the book also examines the differences and linkages between insurgency and terrorism; the origins of conflict in the North Caucasus; and the influences of different strains of Islam, of al-Qaida, and of the War on Terror. A critical examination of never-before-revealed Russian counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns explains why those campaigns have consistently failed and why the region has seen such an upswing in violence since the conflict was officially declared "over" less than two years ago.
This book illuminates one of the world's most troubled regions from the perspective of a Russian intellectual, examining the evolution of the war in Chechnya that erupted in 1994, and untangling the myths, long-held resentments, and ideological manipulations which have fueled the crisis. In particular, it explores the key themes of nationalism and violence that feed the turmoil there, combining extensive interview material, historical perspectives, and deep local knowledge. The book sheds light on Chechnya in particular and on how secessionist conflicts can escalate into violent conflagrations in general.
This book draws on several years of field research, as well as hermeneutic global politics and analysis of empirical source material, in order to shed light on contemporary violence. Drawing on interpretive approaches to international relations, the book argues that founding events and multiple contexts informed the stories used by different members of the Kosovan and Chechen movements involved, respectively, in conflicts with the federal authorities in Serbia and Russia. The book examines why elements within the Kosovo Liberation Army and the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria employed regional and local strategies of war in the Balkans and the North Caucasus in the late 1990s. Using post-positivist analysis, the book unravels the complex relationship between regional politics and trans-local accounts of identity, social networks and narratives, globalisation and visual aspects of contemporary security. These themes, together with criminality and emotionality, draw attention to the complex dynamics within the armed resistance movements in Kosovo and the North Caucasus, and the road to war in these regions at the end of the twentieth century.
This book shows the impact of twenty-first-century security concerns on the way Russia is ruled. It demonstrates how President Vladimir Putin has wrestled with terrorism, immigration, media freedom, religious pluralism, and economic globalism, and argues that fears of a return to old-style authoritarianism oversimplify the complex context of contemporary Russia. Since the early 1990s, Russia has been repeatedly analysed in terms of whether it is becoming a democracy or not. This book instead focuses on the internal security issues common to many states in the early twenty-first century, and places them in the particular context of Russia, the world's largest country, still dealing with its legacy of communism and authoritarianism. Detailed analysis of the place of security in Russia's political discourse and policy making reveals nuances often missing from overarching assessments of Russia today. To characterise the Putin regime as the ‘KGB-resurgent’ is to miss vital continuities, contexts, and on-going political conflicts that make up the contemporary Russian scene. The book draws together current debates about whether Russia is a ‘normal’ country developing its own democratic and market structures, or a nascent authoritarian regime returning to the past. Drawing on extensive interviews and Russian source material, it argues that the growing security factor in Russia's domestic politics is neither ubiquitous nor unchallenged. It must be understood in the context of Russia's immediate history and the growing domestic security concerns of many states the world over.
In this book John Dunlop provides an understanding of the background to the Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994, tracing events from 4,000 BC to the time of the invasion. The historic encounter between Chechens and Russians, first during pre-Petrine, and then with imperial Russia, is carefully examined. The genocide and oppression endured by the Chechens under the communists is discussed in detail. The convulsive 'Chechen Revolution' of 1991, which brought General Dzhokhar Dudaev to power, is described, as are internal developments within Chechnya during 1992–4. The author traces the negotiation process between the Russian Federation and secessionist Chechnya, elucidating the reasons for the breakdown of the quest for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
The contribution presents a reflection on the rationales of violence that emerge in post-war Chechnya, on the basis of cases of abduction, illegal detention, ill treatment and torture reported by victims or their relatives in the recent years. The main hypothesis is that, if war is still present in the way different forces and people are acting, the main rationale of violence can be now understood in a more general framework of law enforcement brutality as observed elsewhere in Russia. This leads to understand present State violence in Chechnya as embedded in systemic "Russian" features exacerbated by a very recent war experience and on-going situation of fear and closure. The contribution will also look at the way the problem is addressed by Human Rights organizations that try to resort to the judiciary in combating those violences.
Told from the perspective of its former Foreign minister, this is a uniquely candid account of Chechnya’s struggle for independence and its two wars against Russia which will revise our understanding of the conflict and explain how it continues. Features new insights, intimate portraits of key personalities and a foreword by Zbigniew Brzezinski. © Ilyas Akhmadov and Miriam Lanskoy, 2010. All rights reserved.
This book presents a revisionist view of the sources of nationalism, the relationship of the nation to culture, and the implications of nationalism and cultural heterogeneity for the future of the nation-state. It accepts the now-standard view that national identities are not inherited traits but constructed communities in order to serve political ends. But the resulting national identities do not emerge from some metaphorical plebiscite as had been suggested by some; rather they result from efforts by people to coordinate their identities with people who share at least some cultural traits with them. Coordination leads to powerful social and cultural ties that are hard to unravel, and this explains the persistence of national identities. Understood as the result of coordination dynamics, the implications of national homogeneity and heterogeneity are explored. The book shows that national heterogeneity is not, as it is sometimes accused of being, a source of hatred. Nonetheless, there are advantages to homogeneity for the production of public goods and economic growth. Whatever the positive implications of homogeneity, the book shows that in the current world, classic nation-states are defunct. Heterogeneity is proliferating not only due to migration but also because small groups in many states once thought to be homogeneous are coordinating to demand national recognition. With the prohibitive costs of eliminating cultural heterogeneity, citizens and leaders need to learn how best to manage, or even take advantage of, national diversity within their countries. Management of diversity demands that we understand the coordination aspects of national heterogeneity, a perspective that this book provides.
The Chechen crisis is a complex phenomenon, and there are many aspects of it that cannot be understood to this day. The conflict does not have a simple explanation, and each side has its own truth. However, a scholarly analysis of events makes it possible to draw a number of general conclusions. Major Factors of the Crisis. The August 1991 events in Moscow, when a conservative group led by the State Committee for the State of Emergency (SCSE) tried to seize power and force Mikhail Gorbachev to moderate his programme of reforms, was followed soon after by the dissolution of the USSR. This gave the multinational people of the Chechen-Ingush Republic a unique chance to replace the communist bureaucracy with a democratic system of power by peaceful constitutional means, and to define the status of the republic by means of a national referendum. It also made possible an acceptable form of relations with the Russian Federation, through which Chechnya might gradually acquire real economic and political independence in the framework of a renewed federal union of equal nations and republics of the new democratic Russia. However, this way of resolving the aggravated problem of power and sovereignty proposed by the democratic community of Chechnya did not suit certain political structures in Moscow or in the republic itself. As a result, the Chechen-Ingush Republic and its political elites found themselves at the epicentre of the Russian leadership’s struggle with the union centre (representing the Soviet Union) over the division of power and property.
Terror in Chechnyais the definitive account of Russian war crimes in Chechnya. Emma Gilligan provides a comprehensive history of the second Chechen conflict of 1999 to 2005, revealing one of the most appalling human rights catastrophes of the modern era--one that has yet to be fully acknowledged by the international community. Drawing upon eyewitness testimony and interviews with refugees and key political and humanitarian figures, Gilligan tells for the first time the full story of the Russian military's systematic use of torture, disappearances, executions, and other punitive tactics against the Chechen population.InTerror in Chechnya, Gilligan challenges Russian claims that civilian casualties in Chechnya were an unavoidable consequence of civil war. She argues that racism and nationalism were substantial factors in Russia's second war against the Chechens and the resulting refugee crisis. She does not ignore the war crimes committed by Chechen separatists and pro-Moscow forces. Gilligan traces the radicalization of Chechen fighters and sheds light on the Dubrovka and Beslan hostage crises, demonstrating how they undermined the separatist movement and in turn contributed to racial hatred against Chechens in Moscow.A haunting testament of modern-day crimes against humanity,Terror in Chechnyaalso looks at the international response to the conflict, focusing on Europe's humanitarian and human rights efforts inside Chechnya.
A remarkable collection of essays, considering every angle of the Chechen conflict.
This is the first comprehensive and comparative examination of Islamic radicalisation in the Muslim regions of the former Soviet Union since the end of Communism. Since the 1990s, the ex-Soviet Muslim Volga-Urals, Caucasus and Central Asia have been among the most volatile and dynamic zones of Islamic radicalisation in the Islamic East. Although partially driven by a wider Islamic resurgence which began in the late 1970s in the Middle East, the book argues that radicalisation is a post-Soviet phenomenon triggered by the collapse of Communism, and the break-up of the de facto unitary Soviet empire. The book considers the considerable differences in perceptions and manifestations of radical Islam in the republics, as well as the level of its doctrinal and political impact. It demonstrates how the particular histories of the regions' Muslim peoples - especially the length and depth of their Islamisation - have influenced the nature and scope of their radicalisation. Other significant factors include the mobilising power of the global jihadist network, and most significantly the level of social and economic hardship. Based on extensive empirical research including interviews with leading members of the political and religious elite, the Islamist opposition as well as ordinary muslims, the book reveals how unofficial radical Islam has turned into a potent ideology of social mobilisation. It identifies the different dynamics at work and how these relate to each other, assesses the level of foreign involvement and evaluates the implications of the rise of Islamic radicalism for particular post-Soviet states, post-Soviet Eurasia and the wider international community. © 2010 Galina Yemelianova for selection and editorial matter. All rights reserved.
The Caucasus mountains rise at the intersection of Europe, Russia, and the Middle East. A land of astonishing natural beauty and a dizzying array of ancient cultures, the Caucasus for most of the twentieth century lay inside the Soviet Union, before movements of national liberation created newly independent countries and sparked the devastating war in Chechnya. Combining riveting storytelling with insightful analysis, The Ghost of Freedom is the first general history of the modern Caucasus, stretching from the beginning of Russian imperial expansion to the triumph of nationalism after the Soviet Union's collapse. In evocative and accessible prose, Charles King reveals how tsars, highlanders, revolutionaries, and adventurers have contributed to the fascinating history of this borderland. Based on new research in multiple languages, the book shows how the struggle for freedom in the mountains, hills, and plains of the Caucasus has been a perennial theme over the last two hundred years-a struggle that has led to liberation as well as to new forms of captivity. The book sheds light on the origins of modern disputes, including the ongoing war in Chechnya, conflicts involving Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, and debates over oil from the Caspian Sea and its impact on world markets. Ranging from the salons of Russian writers to the circus sideshows of America, from the offices of European diplomats to the villages of Muslim mountaineers, The Ghost of Freedom paints a rich portrait of one of the world's most turbulent and least understood regions.
Widespread media interest into the Chechen conflict reflects an ongoing concern about the evolution of federal Russia. Why did the Russian leadership initiate military action against Chechnya in December 1994 but against no other constituent part of the Federation? This study demonstrates that the Russian invasion represented the culmination of a crisis that was perceived to have become an increasing threat not only to the stability of the North Caucasus region, but also to the very foundations of Russian security. It looks closely at the Russian Federation in transition, following the collapse of the communist Soviet Union, and the implications of the 1991 Chechen Declaration of Independence in the context of Russia's democratisation project.
Exploring the case study of the Moscow-led counterinsurgency in Chechnya, this article shows the crucial importance of cultural knowledge understood in an ethnographic sense in terms of patterns of social organization, persisting value systems, and other related phenomena – in the relative success of the eradication of the Chechnya-based insurgency. Using a range of first-hand sources – including interviews by leading Russian and Chechen experts and investigative journalists, and the testimonies of eyewitnesses and key actors from within local and Russian politics – the article explains the actual mechanisms of Moscow's policy of Chechenization that have sought to break the backbone of the local resistance using local human resources. To this end, the study focuses on the crucial period of 2000–2004, when Moscow's key proxy in Chechnya, the kadyrovtsy paramilitaries, were established and became operational under the leadership of Akhmad Kadyrov, which helped create a sharp division within Chechen society, reducing the level of populace-based support for the insurgents, thereby increasing support for the pro-Moscow forces.
This article fills the gap in existing scholarship on asymmetric conflict, indigenous forces, and how socio-cultural codes shape the dynamics and outcomes of conflict transformation. Specifically, it identifies three key socio-cultural values commonplace in honorific societies: retaliation, hospitality, and silence. As sources of effective pro-insurgent violent mobilisation and support from among the local population, these values provide insurgents with an asymmetric advantage over much stronger incumbents. Using the case studies of the two Russian counterinsurgencies in Chechnya, the article shows the mechanisms on the ground through which Moscow’s deployment of indigenous forces against insurgents helped to stem the tide of conflict, reversing the insurgents’ initial advantage in terms of asymmetry of values.
This article posits that the remnants of archaic sociocultural norms, particularly the honour-imposed custom of retaliation, play a crucial role in the process of insurgent engagement in Russia's autonomous republic of Dagestan. Through a series of interviews with former insurgents, this study outlines two retaliation-centred mechanisms: “individual retaliation” and “spiritual retaliation” in order to explain the microcosm of motives behind insurgent activity in Dagestan. In doing so, this study problematizes the role of Salafi/Jihadist ideology as the main impetus for insurgent violence. Reversing the traditional causal link between violence and religion, this study also demonstrates that the development of Jihadist ideology is a by-product of insurgent mobilization rather than its cause.
The article addresses the issue of recognition in the case of the Russo-Chechen conflict. The main hypothesis is that the denial of recognition played a central role in the way a political conflict developed into an armed war. We tackle the recognition issue from two points of view: firstly, we analyse how not recognising the conflict as a war impacts on the conflict development itself. Secondly, we try to show how identity issues are exacerbated by exo-labellisations, while historical and colonial background are set aside as secondary stakes. In conclusion, we question the quest for justice for crimes perpetrated against civilians as the main surrogate for recognition in a post war situation where neither transitional justice nor reconciliation policies have been implemented.
Drawing upon a range of ethnographic sources, this paper proposes an alternative micro-level explanation of the Jihadization process of the Chechen insurgency in that it explores individual motivations for recruitment into Jihadist units in interwar Chechnya (1996–99). First, it shows that enrolment into Jihadist units was sought by Chechen males who attempted to challenge the established forms of social organization. Second, it illustrates that membership in Jihadist units served as a means of providing security, particularly so for the members of weakened clans who found themselves increasingly discriminated against by their ethnic kin, and incapable of ensuring protection for themselves within the established clan-based networks. In both cases, the Jihadist ideology per se seems to have been of little or no real concern as regards prospective recruits to the Jihadist units.
We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. Rebellion may be explained by atypically severe grievances, such as high inequality, a lack of political rights, or ethnic and religious divisions in society. Alternatively, it might be explained by atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization. While it is difficult to find proxies for grievances and opportunities, we find that political and social variables that are most obviously related to grievances have little explanatory power. By contrast, economic variables, which could proxy some grievances but are perhaps more obviously related to the viability of rebellion, provide considerably more explanatory power.
This article seeks to assess the role of political ethnography in the study of civil war, and more particularly research which focuses on the micro-dynamics of violence. By focusing on the representations put forward by econometric and structural research about civil war, this article underlines the importance of fieldwork research and political ethnography in deepening and broadening our understanding of violence in civil war. By using the author's personal immersion experience in the conflict zone of the North Caucasus, this article highlights how structural variables, such as political grievances and marginalization, depict an incomplete image of participation in rebellion by focusing on the onset of violence and not on its sustaining factors. This article argues that in order to complete a micro-dynamic turn in the study of violence, one has to theorize the commonalities of life trajectories amongst individuals who decide to rebel against their marginalization by focusing on the role of nonphysical violence in civil wars.
This article examines the transformation of the Chechen conflict from a predominately nationalist to jihadist struggle, and compares the similar changes that took place in the Kashmiri insurgency. Using global jihadist strategy and ideology, and the accompanying influence of Al Qaida, both conflicts are shown to have taken on a new ideology and to have expanded beyond previous areas of operation. In both instances, the political leadership wrapped themselves in the mantle of political Islam (Islamism) as ensuing violence led to rapid socioeconomic transformation and social breakdown, thus allowing foreign jihadists to exert power and take up/divert the cause. In the past few years, two main groups originating in Chechnya and Kashmir have taken on Western targets and become more indoctrinated in Al Qaida's global jihadist ideology: the Caucasus Emirate (CE) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The opportunist franchising strategy of Al Qaida could come to play a role in the future of both groups, especially if the CE is able to coalesce into a more unified front. More importantly, the global jihadist attributes of the CE must begin to garner the same attention in the Western world as that of LeT.