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Voluntary simplification as an alternative to collapse
Abstract
Purpose
– This paper aims to re-examine Tainter’s dismissal of the voluntary simplification strategy. Joseph Tainter argues that “sustainability” is about problem-solving and that problem-solving increases social complexity. But he also argues that social complexity requires energy and resources, and this implies that solving problems, including environmental problems, usually demands increases in energy and resource consumption, not reductions. For this reason Tainter argues that voluntary simplification – the strategy of choosing to reduce consumption – is not an available means of solving the problems of civilisation.
Design/methodology/approach
– This paper briefly outlines Tainter’s theory of diminishing returns on complexity and lays out his arguments against voluntary simplification. The critical sections of the paper examine those arguments and find certain ambiguities in them that open up space of voluntary simplification.
Findings
– Part of my disagreement with Tainter turns on differing notions of “sustainability.” Whereas Tainter seems to use sustainability to mean sustaining the existing civilisation, the author uses sustainability to mean changing the form of civilisation through voluntary simplification, insofar as that is required for humanity to operate within the carrying capacity of the planet. By exposing the indeterminate, value-laden nature of what constitutes a “problem” and what constitutes an appropriate “solution,” it becomes clear that some societal problems can be dissolved rather than solved, that problems have various solutions and that a society’s available energy supply can be redistributed to achieve voluntary simplification while still solving existing and ongoing problems.
Originality/value
– Given that Tainter seems to accept that his own conception of sustainability will eventually lead to collapse, the author feels he is wrong to be so dismissive of voluntary simplification as a strategy for potentially avoiding collapse. It is, the author argues, our only alternative to collapse, and if that is so, voluntary simplification ought to be given our most rigorous attention and commitment, even if the chances of success do not seem high at all. This paper provides a new analysis of the voluntary simplification strategy and shows that it holds more promise than Tainter appreciates.
... TEQs could therefore act as a vital support for the controlled reduction of socio-political complexity via processes of 'voluntary simplification' and economic 'deintensification' (the result of these processes being 'degrowth' or controlled contraction in the scale of the physical economy [17,18]). We therefore distinguish voluntary simplification from the similar term 'voluntary simplicity', with the latter generally referring to individuals consuming less within existing structures, and the former referring to a reconfiguration of systems and structures to manage, or actively induce, reduced socio-economic complexity [19]. Structural voluntary simplification, in this sense, would likely require cultural voluntary simplicity, but the converse need not be true. ...
... While we fully endorse the goal of transitioning to RE, we contend it is plausible that a full transition would entail 'energy descent' relative to the availability of energy services in developed regions of the world today [20][21][22][23][24]. Given that the degree of socio-political complexity, in Tainter's sense, that can be maintained by a society is dependent on available resources, reduced energy availability is likely to drive significant deintensification of economies, and with this, reduction in socio-political complexity, whether enforced through circumstances that overwhelm human agency, or voluntarily embraced [19,25]. As discussed in the introduction, even if energy services are not supply-constrained, other biosphere impacts resulting from continued exercise of physical power at the current historically extreme level must at some point force a confrontation with the need for contraction in human energy conversions, and hence with the prospect of reducing socio-political complexity. ...
This paper reviews and analyses a decarbonization policy called the Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs) system developed by David Fleming. The TEQs system involves rationing fossil fuel energy use for a nation on the basis of either a contracting carbon emission budget or scarce fuel availability, or both simultaneously, distributing budgets equitably amongst energy-users. Entitlements can be traded to incentivize demand reduction and to maximize efficient use of the limited entitlements. We situate this analysis in the context of Joseph Tainter’s theory about the development and collapse of complex societies. Tainter argues that societies become more socio-politically and technologically ‘complex’ as they solve the problems they face and that such complexification drives increased energy use. For a society to sustain itself, therefore, it must secure the energy needed to solve the range of societal problems that emerge. However, what if, as a result of deep decarbonization, there is less energy available in the future not more? We argue that TEQs offers a practical means of managing energy descent futures. The policy can facilitate controlled reduction of socio-political complexity via processes of ‘voluntary simplification’ (the result being ‘degrowth’ or controlled contraction at the scale of the physical economy).
... Global economic futures, then, are likely to reflect reducing socio-political complexity (Alexander 2014;Floyd 2013). Values of sufficiency, rather than unlimited growth, are likely to provide more reliable foundations for resilient economies and societies (Floyd 2012b). ...
Economies across the globe face increasing energy-related costs that stand to play pivotal roles in shaping future societies. The geophysical characteristics of stock-limited conventional primary energy resources play a central role here, with constrained gross production and diminishing energy return on investment (EROI) translating to declining marginal productivity of capital, increasing production costs, and expenditure on energy reducing consumers’ discretionary purchasing power. This cost pressure is compounded by the increasingly urgent need to internalize presently externalized environmental costs associated with fossil fuel production and use, especially those due to atmospheric GHG emissions. The view that renewable energy sources will, over time, both replace an expanding proportion of existing fossil fuel energy supply and displace future growth exerts an increasing influence on both energy-specific and broader economic policy at all levels. It is typically assumed that such a transition will mitigate increasing costs related to both resource and environmental limits. Growth in renewable energy supply is itself, however, subject to constraints associated with a) high capital cost; and b) rapidly diminishing marginal return on effort as “best first” development opportunities are exploited within resource limits determined by natural energy flows. Whereas energy demand patterns have, until recently, had significant scope to dictate supply, globally we are entering a world in which supply-related characteristics will increasingly shape energy demand expectations, and hence the economic scope for human societies.
Voluntary simplicity (VS) is a lifestyle focused on seeking a simple life by reducing consumption and other practices. This systematic literature review aims to analyse and critically discuss the state of the art of VS. This review provides a categorization scheme of VS and analyses: the number of studies and year of publication; journals, number of citations and research areas; study location; VS definitions; types of studies; and research methods. By providing a map of existing research, the paper contributes to the clarification of the VS construct and to the assessment, synthesis and identification of research gaps, and opportunities for further research. VS implications for theory, practice and policy are discussed within the context of consumption/anti‐consumption.
This authoritative but highly accessible book presents the reader with a powerful framework for understanding the critical role of the energy return on investment (EROI) in the survival and well-being of individuals, ecosystems, businesses, economies and nations. Growth and development are fundamental and ubiquitous processes at all scales, from individuals to food crops to national economies. While we are all familiar with the concepts of economic growth and living standards as measured by gross domestic product (GDP), we often take for granted the energy use that underpins GDP and our expectations for year-on-year growth. In this book, you will learn how these measures of “progress” are completely dependent on the balance that can be achieved between energy costs (inputs) and gains. Nothing is made or moved without an energy surplus, and it is the EROI of available energy sources more than any other single factor that determines the shape of civilization.
Nearly all politics and economics assume that policy and market forces are the levers upon which future outcomes will hinge. However, this book presents many examples of historical and current events that can be explained much more clearly from an energetic perspective. In addition, a future scenario is developed that gives a central place to EROI in assessing the potential of governmental and private initiatives to substitute so-called renewable energy sources for diminishing stocks of fossil fuels. When cheap fossil fuels are no longer available in the abundance needed to mask economic problems and power business as usual, it will be EROI more than the plethora of “green” technologies that creates the boundary conditions for a sustainable future.
Purpose
Slaughter has proposed futures in which interior human development matches that of technological development as the best prospect for avoiding catastrophic collapse through overshoot of the Earth's carrying capacity. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance of the primary energy resource context in making sense of the prospects for such futures, and to consider how subtle changes to conceptual models for understanding the nature of human development can offer alternate pathways for proceeding in light of the fundamental limits this imposes.
Design/methodology/approach
Conceptual models for the relationship between energy and social complexity are reviewed, and proposals for connecting social complexity with interior human development are discussed. Popular models of interior human development are critiqued in light of recent clarifications relating to Integral Theory; and specific reconceptualisations are proposed.
Findings
Technological and interior human development are intimately linked. There are important interdependencies between energy and social complexity that must be taken into account in establishing expectations for the way that these realms might evolve together. This presents significant challenges for realising on a society‐wide scale development of the nature commonly associated with Integral Theory. However, alternative ways of conceptualising such development offer fresh opportunities for confronting the spectre of environmental and social breakdown.
Originality/value
The implications of models relating social complexity and resource context are extended to questions of human interior development; the unit of development is extended from the individual in relative isolation to the organism‐in‐environment.
Abundant supplies of oil form the foundation of modern industrial economies, but the capacity to maintain and grow global supply is attracting increasing concern. Some commentators forecast a peak in the near future and a subsequent terminal decline in global oil production, while others highlight the recent growth in 'tight oil' production and the scope for developing unconventional resources. There are disagreements over the size, cost and recoverability of different resources, the technical and economic potential of different technologies, the contribution of different factors to market trends and the economic implications of reduced supply. Few debates are more important, more contentious, more wide-ranging or more confused. This paper summarizes the main concepts, terms, issues and evidence that are necessary to understand the 'peak oil' debate. These include: the origin, nature and classification of oil resources; the trends in oil production and discoveries; the typical production profiles of oil fields, basins and producing regions; the mechanisms underlying those profiles; the extent of depletion of conventional oil; the risk of an approaching peak in global production; and the potential of various mitigation options. The aim is to introduce the subject to non-specialist readers and provide a basis for the subsequent papers in this Theme Issue.
Declining production from conventional oil resources has initiated a global transition to unconventional oil, such as tar sands. Unconventional oil is generally harder to extract than conventional oil and is expected to have a (much) lower energy return on (energy) investment (EROI). Recently, there has been a surge in publications estimating the EROI of a number of different sources of oil, and others relating EROI to long-term economic growth, profitability and oil prices. The following points seem clear from a review of the literature: (i) the EROI of global oil production is roughly 17 and declining, while that for the USA is 11 and declining; (ii) the EROI of ultra-deep-water oil and oil sands is below 10; (iii) the relation between the EROI and the price of oil is inverse and exponential; (iv) as EROI declines below 10, a point is reached when the relation between EROI and price becomes highly nonlinear; and (v) the minimum oil price needed to increase the oil supply in the near term is at levels consistent with levels that have induced past economic recessions. From these points, I conclude that, as the EROI of the average barrel of oil declines, long-term economic growth will become harder to achieve and come at an increasingly higher financial, energetic and environmental cost.
The future is not what it used to be because we can no longer rely on the comforting assumption that it will resemble the past. Past abundance of fuel, for example, does not imply unending abundance. Infinite growth on a finite planet is not possible. In this book, Jörg Friedrichs argues that industrial society itself is transitory, and he examines the prospects for our civilization’s coming to terms with its two most imminent choke points: Climate change and energy scarcity. He offers a thorough and accessible account of these two challenges as well as the linkages between them.Friedrichs contends that industrial civilization cannot outlast our ability to burn fossil fuels and that the demise of industrial society would entail cataclysmic change, including population decreases. To understand the social and political implications, he examines historical cases of climate stress and energy scarcity: Devastating droughts in the ancient Near East; the Little Ice Age in the medieval Far North; the Japanese struggle to prevent –fuel starvation— from 1918 to 1945; the –totalitarian retrenchment— of the North Korean governing class after the end of Soviet oil deliveries; and Cuba’s socioeconomic adaptation to fuel scarcity in the 1990s. He draws important lessons about the likely effects of climate and energy disruptions on different kinds of societies.The warnings of climate scientists are met by denial and inaction, while energy experts offer little guidance on the effects of future scarcity. Friedrichs suggests that to confront our predicament we must affirm our core values and take action to transform our way of life. Whether we are private citizens or public officials, complacency is not an option: Climate change and energy scarcity are emerging facts of life. © 2013 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
The Limits to Growth standard run scenario produced 40 years ago continues to align well with historical data that has been updated in this paper, following a 30-year comparison by the author. The scenario results in collapse of the global economy and environment, and subsequently the population. Although the modelled fall in population occurs after about 2030 – with death rates reversing contemporary trends and rising from 2020 onward – the general onset of collapse first appears at about 2015 when per capita industrial output begins a sharp decline. Given this imminent timing, a further issue this paper raises is whether the current economic difficulties of the global finan cial crisis are potentially related to mechanisms of breakdown in the Limits to Growth standard run scenario. In particular, contemporary peak oil issues and analysis of net energy, or energy return on (energy) invested, support the Limits to Growth modelling of resource constraints underlying the collapse, despite obvious financial problems associated with debt.
Overconsumption in affluent societies is the root or contributing cause of many of the world's most pressing problems, including environmental degradation, global poverty, peak oil and consumer malaise. This suggests that any transition to a sustainable and just society will require those who are overconsuming to move to far more materially 'simple' lifestyles. The Voluntary Simplicity Movement can be understood broadly as a diverse social movement made up of people who are resisting high consumption lifestyles and who are seeking, in various ways, a lower consumption but higher quality of life alternative. Recently a multi-national online survey was launched for the purpose of gaining empirical insight into this 'post-consumerist' social movement, and this study provides the most extensive sociological examination of the movement available. After situating the Voluntary Simplicity Movement in theoretical context, this article presents a foundational analysis of these new survey results.
Economic growth over the past 40 years has used increasing quantities of fossil energy, and most importantly oil. Yet, our ability to increase the global supply of conventional crude oil much beyond current levels is doubtful, which may pose a problem for continued economic growth. Our research indicates that, due to the depletion of conventional, and hence cheap, crude oil supplies (i.e., peak oil), increasing the supply of oil in the future would require exploiting lower quality resources (i.e., expensive), and thus could occur only at high prices. This situation creates a system of feedbacks that can be aptly described as an economic growth paradox: increasing the oil supply to support economic growth will require high oil prices that will undermine that economic growth. From this we conclude that the economic growth of the past 40 years is unlikely to continue in the long term unless there is some remarkable change in how we manage our economy.
For more than a century, oil has been the engine of growth for a society that delivers an unprecedented standard of living to many. We now take for granted that economic growth is good, necessary, and even inevitable, but also feel a sense of unease about the simultaneous growth of complexity in the processes and institutions that generate and manage that growth. As societies grow more complex through the bounty of cheap energy, they also confront problems that seem to increase in number and severity. In this era of fossil fuels, cheap energy and increasing complexity have been in a mutually-reinforcing spiral. The more energy we have and the more problems our societies confront, the more we grow complex and require still more energy. How did our demand for energy, our technological prowess, the resulting need for complex problem solving, and the end of easy oil conspire to make the Deepwater Horizon oil spill increasingly likely, if not inevitable? This book explains the real causal factors leading up to the worst environmental catastrophe in U.S. history, a disaster from which it will take decades to recover. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012. All rights reserved.
The ubiquity of the commitment to economic growth, which Purdey refers to as the growth paradigm, is extraordinary. National governments around the world are seized of the same objective. Major international institutions such as the UN, the WTO, the World Bank, IMF and OECD, powerful international organizations such as regional trading blocs and multinational corporations - even civil societies of all kinds enthusiastically pursue a larger economic pie. This book examines the deep origins and rise to prominence of the commitment to economic growth. It explains why, despite the diversity of regime types, levels of development, cultures and other divisions typical of international relations, all major actors in the modern global polity pursue an identical political priority. Purdey critically examines the growth paradigm highlighting its normative foundations and its environmental impact, especially climate change. Using a neo-Gramscian approach, Purdey re-engages the 'limits to growth' controversy, identifying the commitment to growth as a form of utopianism that is as dangerous as it is seductive. By illuminating and interrogating the history, politics and morality of the growth paradigm, this book shifts the terrain of the limits debate from instrumental to ethical considerations. It will be of interest to students and scholars of political economy, international relations, environmental studies and ethics.
It was 9:15 p.m. on April 20, 2010, and the captain of the Deepwater Horizon was entertaining heavyweights from British Petroleum (BP) and Transocean, by showing off the computers and software at his disposal. After the Captain welcomed his visitors on the bridge, Yancy Keplinger, one of two dynamic-positioning officers, began a tour while the second officer, Andrea Fleytas, was at the desk station. The officers explained how the rig’s thrusters kept the Deepwater Horizon in place above the well, showed off the radars and current meters, and offered to let the visitors try their hands at the rig’s dynamic-positioning video simulator. One of the visitors, a man named Winslow, watched as the crew programmed-in 70-knot winds and 30-foot seas, and hypothetically put two of the rig’s six thrusters out of commission. Then they set the simulator to manual mode and let another visitor work the hand controls to maintain the rig’s location. While Keplinger was advising about how much thrust to use, Winslow decided to grab a quick cup of coffee and a smoke. He walked down to the rig’s smoking area, poured some coffee, and lit his cigarette.
The possibility of 100% renewable supply of European energy is analysed in terms of the amount of redundant plant required to cope with the intermittency of wind and solar energy, and the limited biomass potential. It is concluded that the capital cost would be unaffordable, and that biomass resources are insufficient.
Purpose
The discussion of climate change and energy problems is generally based on the assumption that technical solutions are possible and that the task is essentially to determine the most effective ways. This view relies heavily on the expectation that renewable energy sources can be substituted for fossil fuels. The purpose of this paper is to improve on an earlier attempt to estimate the investment cost that would be involved in deriving total world energy supply from renewable sources.
Design/methodology/approach
This discussion improves on an earlier attempt to estimate the investment cost that would be involved in deriving total world energy supply from renewable sources. It takes common assumptions re future energy demand and estimates of future output and capital costs of major renewable energy sources and explores four strategies for supplying global energy demand in 2050.
Findings
This paper finds that the greenhouse and energy problems cannot be solved by action on the supply side, i.e. by technical developments which promise to provide quantities taken for granted in energy‐intensive societies. This general “limits to growth” perspective is that these and the other major global problems can only be solved by action on the demand side, i.e. by moving to ways, values, institutions and systems which greatly reduce the need for materials, energy and ecological resources.
Research limitations/implications
Confidence in the conclusions is limited mainly by the lack of evidence at this point in time on the actual difficulties set by the problem of integrating the intermittent sources, and the resulting need for redundant plant.
Practical implications
Each of the four strategies explored requires large amounts of redundant plant to be able to cope with the intermittency problem. Each leads to total system capital costs which are well beyond affordable levels.
Social implications
The findings add to the general “limits to growth” case that solutions to the global energy and other sustainability problems cannot be achieved within consumer‐capitalist society but must be sought via dramatic reductions in production, consumption and GDP. This would require radical system change from the commitment to growth, market systems and affluent lifestyles, to what is described as The Simpler Way.
Originality/value
It does not seem that this approach has previously been taken to the specific issue of the potential and limits of renewable energy. Little or no attention has been given to the thesis that global sustainability and justice require transition to some kind of Simpler Way.
The article discusses the theory 'The Simpler Way' propounded by Ted Trainer to deal with global problems. His essential premise is that overconsumption in the most developed regions of the world is the root cause of our global predicament, and upon this premise he argues that a necessary part of any transition to a sustainable and just world involves an adoption of materially far 'simpler' lifestyles by the over-consumers. Trainer's vision of The Simpler Way can only be understood in relation to his diagnosis of the global situation, which arises out of the 'limits to growth' analysis. While the figures and statistics on resource depletion and environmental degradation are well known, Trainer maintains that their significance is not generally acknowledged or fully understood. Before examining the alternative proposed by Trainer, his critical perspectives on technology and renewable energy will be outlined, as his claims on these subjects contradict widely held assumptions.
It is against recent experiences of proliferative consumption of the earth’s resources that planners and politicians must confront the challenge of Peak Oil over the coming years. With so few examples of Peak Oil available worldwide, this paper explores the realities of this in Cuba after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989; the so-called Special Period, which decimated the country’s imports of energy, food, and other vital supplies. Drawing on primary research collected in Cuba during 2008, this paper examines the policy responses implemented by Cuba in the field of transport, spatial planning, agriculture, and energy, in order to stimulate debate about how western countries and cities might respond to future losses of global resources. Despite the Cuban situation being politically different from other countries, and the loss of resources during the Special Period more abrupt and unplanned, it is argued that there is still considerable scope for a wider application of the concepts to other towns and cities, if not countries and cultures. Published
The current discussion of climate change and energy problems is generally based on the assumption that technical solutions are possible and that the task is essentially to determine the most effective ways. This view relies heavily on the expectation that renewable energy sources can be substituted for fossil fuels. Australia is more favourably situated regarding renewable sources than almost any other country. This discussion attempts to estimate the investment cost that would be involved in deriving Australia's total energy supply from renewable sources. When provision is made for intermittency and plant redundancy it is concluded that the total investment cost is likely to be unaffordable.
The common view of history assumes that complexity and resource consumption have emerged through innovation facilitated by surplus energy. This view leads to the supposition that complexity and consumption are voluntary, and that we can therefore achieve a sustainable future through conservation. Such an assumption is substantially incorrect. History suggests that complexity most commonly increases to solve problems, and compels increase in resource use. This process is illustrated by the history of the Roman Empire and its collapse. Problems are inevitable, requiring increasing complexity, and conservation is therefore insufficient to produce sustainability. Future sustainability will require continued high levels of energy consumption to address converging problems.
This paper begins by reviewing the empirical studies that have examined the correlation between income and self-reported happiness. While the scholarly debate is far from settled, the weight of evidence suggests that once people have their basic material needs adequately met, the correlation between income and happiness quickly begins to fade. This has been called the ‘income-happiness paradox,’ because it contradicts the widely held assumption that more income and more economic growth will always contribute positively to human wellbeing. After reviewing the empirical literature, the analysis proceeds to consider the various explanations for this so-called ‘paradox,’ and it also considers what implications this paradox might have for people and nations that are arguably overconsuming. The paper concludes by outlining what will be called an ‘economics of sufficiency.’
Historical knowledge is fundamental to sustainable development. Recent research implicates the development of complexity in systems of problem solving as a primary cause of societal collapse. Diminishing returns to problem solving limited the ability of historical societies to resolve their challenges, and will limit the ability of contemporary societies to address global change. The solutions to this dilemma lie within 1.(a) knowledge of our historical position in a system of evolving complexity2.(b) the further development of energy to finance problem solving.
Is more economic growth the solution? Will it deliver prosperity and well-being for a global population projected to reach nine billion? In this explosive book, Tim Jackson a top sustainability adviser to the UK government makes a compelling case against continued economic growth in developed nations. No one denies that development is essential for poorer nations. But in the advanced economies there is mounting evidence that ever-increasing consumption adds little to human happiness and may even impede it. More urgently, it is now clear that the ecosystems that sustain our economies are collapsing under the impacts of rising consumption. Unless we can radically lower the environmental impact of economic activity and there is no evidence to suggest that we can we will have to devise a path to prosperity that does not rely on continued growth. Economic heresy? Or an opportunity to improve the sources of well-being, creativity and lasting prosperity that lie outside the realm of the market? Tim Jackson provides a credible vision of how human society can flourish within the ecological limits of a finite planet. Fulfilling this vision is simply the most urgent task of our times. This book is a substantially revised and updated version of Jackson's controversial study for the Sustainable Development Commission, an advisory body to the UK Government. The study rapidly became the most downloaded report in the Commission's nine year history when it was launched earlier this year. In 2017, PWG was published in a second, substantially revised and re-written edition that updates the arguments and considerably expands upon them. https://www.cusp.ac.uk/pwg/
Sustainability is value laden, and achieving sustainability is constrained by conflict and inefficient problem solving. Sustainability requires minimizing the costs of both constraints. This article outlines a framework for sustainability that recognizes divergent values, improves the productivity of debate, and suggests how to reduce sustainability costs.
In the cosmology of Western industrial societies, “progress” results from human creativity enacted in facilitating circumstances. In human history, creativity leading to progress was supposedly enabled by the development of agriculture, which provided surplus energy and freed people from needing to spend full time in subsistence pursuits. Applying this belief to the matter of sustainability today leads to the supposition that we can voluntarily reduce resource use by choosing a simpler way of life with lower consumption. Recent research suggests that these beliefs are deeply inaccurate. Humans develop complex behaviors and institutions to solve problems. Complexity and problem solving carry costs and require resources. Rather than emerging from surplus energy, cultural complexity often precedes the availability of energy and compels increases in its production. This suggests that, with major problems converging in coming decades, voluntary reductions in resource consumption may not be feasible. Future sustainability will require continued high levels of energy consumption.
Voluntary simplicity - otherwise known as ‘downshifting’ or just ‘simple living’ – is an anti- consumerist way of life that opposes the high consumption lifestyles prevalent in consumer societies today and voluntarily embraces ‘a simpler life’ of reduced consumption. As a practical matter, this living strategy characteristically involves providing for material needs as simply and directly as possible, minimizing expenditure on consumergoods and services, and generally seeking non-materialistic sources of satisfaction and meaning. Variously defended by its advocates on personal, social, human- itarian, and ecological grounds, voluntary simplicity is predicated on the assumption that human beings can live meaningful, free, happy, and infinitely diverse lives, while consuming no more than an equitable share of nature. That, at least, is the challenging ideal which seems to motive and guide many of its advocates and practitioners. This paper examines the nature of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement, including its various definitions, justifications, and practices.
This article outlines the sociological, ecological, and economic foundations of a macroeconomics ‘beyond growth,’ focusing on the idea of degrowth. Degrowth opposes conventional growth economics on the grounds that growth in the highly developed nations has become socially counter-productive, ecologically unsustainable, and uneconomic. Stagnating energy supplies also suggest an imminent ‘end of growth’ (Heinberg, 2011). In response to growth economics, degrowth scholars call for a politico-economic policy of planned economic contraction, an approach which has been broadly defined as ‘an equitable downscaling of production and consumption that increases human well-being and enhances ecological conditions’ (Schneider et al, 2010, p. 512). After defining growth economics and outlining the emerging case for degrowth, this article considers the feasibility of a macroeconomics beyond growth and sketches an outline of what such a macroeconomics might look like as a politico-economic program.
Degrowth scholars and other growth skeptics have done a considerable amount of important work exposing the many defects inherent to the dominant macroeconomics of growth (Kallis, 2011; Latouche 2009; Jackson 2009; Victor 2008; Daly 1996). In recent years a growing body of literature has also emerged exploring what structural changes could be undertaken to facilitate the emergence of a degrowth or steady-state economy (Alexander 2011a, Jackson 2009; Hamilton 2003). Very little has been written, however, on what role social or cultural evolution may need to play in providing the necessary preconditions for such structural change. The neglect of this issue is problematic for two main reasons. First, it seems highly unlikely that a degrowth or steady-state economy will ever arise voluntarily within cultures generally comprised of individuals seeking ever-higher levels of income and consumption (Hamilton and Denniss, 2005). Accordingly, before growth economics can be overcome, this significant cultural obstacle must be acknowledged, confronted, and somehow transcended. Secondly, even if notions of degrowth or steady-state economics were to gain widespread acceptance within a culture, it seems highly unlikely that a degrowth or steady-state economy would arise voluntarily unless people had some idea of what needed to be done at the personal and community levels to bring about such an economy (Trainer, 2010; Hopkins, 2008). In other words, it is not enough merely to offer a critique of existing structures of growth; it is equally important to explore the question of how one ought to live in opposition to those structures. This paper engages some aspects of these complex issues by looking into what role social movements may have to play in creating the preconditions needed for a degrowth or steady-state economy to materialize. More specifically, this paper examines the potential of the Voluntary Simplicity Movement to socially reconstruct law to that end.
Samuel Alexander challenges the neoliberal premise that the overriding objective of a property system is to maximize economic growth, and explores an alternative post-economic-growth property paradigm. In such a system, property rules would be designed to achieve more specific welfare-enhancing objectives, such as protecting the environment or eliminating poverty, treating growth in GDP (or lack thereof) as a by-product of secondary importance. The author then analyzes whether such a post-growth system can be justified, what it might look like, and whether its legal realization could be achieved without abrogating existing property rights.
Sustainability or collapse follow from the success or failure of problem-solving institutions. The factors that lead to long-term success or failure in problem solving have received little attention, so that this fundamental activity is poorly understood. The capacity of institutions to solve problems changes over time, suggesting that a science of problem solving, and thus a science of sustainability, must be historical. Complexity is a primary problem-solving strategy, which is often successful in the short-term, but cumulatively may become detrimental to sustainability. Historical case studies illustrate different outcomes to long-term development of complexity in problem solving. These cases clarify future options for contemporary societies: collapse, simplification, or increasing complexity based on increasing energy subsidies.
Social complexity and sustainability emerge from successful problem solving, rather than directly from environmental conditions. Social complexity develops from problem solving at all scales from local to national and international. Complexity in problem solving is an economic function, and can both support and hinder sustainability. Sustainability outcomes may take decades or centuries to develop. Historical studies reveal three outcomes to long-term change in problem-solving institutions: collapse, resiliency through simplification, or continuity based on growing complexity and increasing energy subsidies. The slow development of complexity in problem solving makes its effects difficult to perceive, especially over short time periods. Long-term social sustainability depends on understanding and controlling complexity. New strategies to mitigate or control complexity are offered.
Peak oil theory predicts that oil production will soon start a terminal decline. Most authors imply that no adequate alternate resource and technology will be available to replace oil as the backbone resource of industrial society. This article uses historical cases from countries that have gone through a similar experience as the best available analytical strategy to understand what will happen if the predictions of peak oil theorists are right. The author is not committed to a particular version of peak oil theory, but deems the issue important enough to explore how various parts of the world should be expected to react. From the historical record he is able to identify predatory militarism, totalitarian retrenchment, and socioeconomic adaptation as three possible trajectories.
Environmental disasters. Terrorist wars. Energy scarcity. Economic failure. Is this the world's inevitable fate, a downward spiral that ultimately spells the collapse of societies? Perhaps, says acclaimed author Thomas Homer-Dixon - or perhaps these crises can actually lead to renewal for ourselves and planet earth. The Upside of Down takes the reader on a mind-stretching tour of societies' management, or mismanagement, of disasters over time. From the demise of ancient Rome to contemporary climate change, this spellbinding book analyzes what happens when multiple crises compound to cause what the author calls "synchronous failure." But, crisis doesn't have to mean total global calamity. Through catagenesis, or creative, bold reform in the wake of breakdown, it is possible to reinvent our future. Drawing on the worlds of archeology, poetry, politics, science, and economics, The Upside of Down is certain to provoke controversy and stir imaginations across the globe. The author's wide-ranging expertise makes his insights and proposals particularly acute, as people of all nations try to grapple with how we can survive tomorrow's inevitable shocks to our global system. There is no guarantee of success, but there are ways to begin thinking about a better world, and The Upside of Down is the ideal place to start thinking.
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The Biggest Wake Up Call in History
- R Slaughter
Less is More: Ancient and Modern Voices Raised in Praise of Simplicity , Inner Traditions
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Energy return on investment
- C Hall
- D Murphy