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Hacia la seguridad convergente. Escenarios de transformación y cambio en la defensa y la seguridad hemisférica y global
Abstract
http://www.plazayvaldes.es/upload/ficheros/indice_89.pdf.
Madrid
Cátedra Servicios de Inteligencia y Sistemas Democráticos, de la Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, e Instituto de Inteligencia Juan Velázquez de Velasco de Investigación en Inteligencia para la Seguridad y la Defensa, de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
Issn : 1887-293X-n10
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The military profession is inherently stressful and is getting more so for U.S. troops, who are deploying more often and for longer periods of time on missions that are multifaceted, changeable, and ambiguous. Such stressful conditions can lead to a range of health problems and performance decrements even among leaders. But not everyone reacts in negative ways to environmental stress. Most people remain healthy and continue to perform well even in the face of high stress levels. While much attention in recent years has focused on identifying and treating stress-related breakdowns such as post-traumatic stress disorder, scant investment has gone toward the study of healthy, resilient response patterns in people. This paper focuses attention on mental hardiness, an important pathway to resilience. Research over the past 25 years has confirmed that psychological hardiness is a key stress-resilience factor. People who show high levels of psychological hardiness exhibit greater commitment (the abiding sense that life is meaningful and worth living), control (the belief that one chooses and influences his or her own future), and acceptance of challenge (a perspective on change in life as something that is interesting and valuable). We begin with an essential first step: clarifying the major stress factors that are salient in modern military operations. Next, we give a brief summary of the theory and research behind the hardiness construct. Finally, we provide a number of suggestions for how to increase hardiness and stress resilience in organizations, primarily through leader actions and policies. By setting the conditions that increase mental hardiness, leaders at all levels can enhance human health and performance, while preventing many stress-related problems before they occur.
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This 2003 book develops the idea that since decolonisation, regional patterns of security have become more prominent in international politics. The authors combine an operational theory of regional security with an empirical application across the whole of the international system. Individual chapters cover Africa, the Balkans, CIS Europe, East Asia, EU Europe, the Middle East, North America, South America, and South Asia. The main focus is on the post-Cold War period, but the history of each regional security complex is traced back to its beginnings. By relating the regional dynamics of security to current debates about the global power structure, the authors unfold a distinctive interpretation of post-Cold War international security, avoiding both the extreme oversimplifications of the unipolar view, and the extreme deterritorialisations of many globalist visions of a new world disorder. Their framework brings out the radical diversity of security dynamics in different parts of the world.
The U.S. military faces an era of enormous complexity. This complexity has been extended by globalization, the proliferation of advanced technology, violent transnational extremists, and resurgent powers. America's vaunted military might stand atop all others but is tested in many ways. Trying to understand the possible perturbations the future poses to our interests is a daunting challenge. But, as usual, a familiarity with history is our best aid to interpretation. In particular, that great and timeless illuminator of conflict, chance, and human nature--Thucydides--is as relevant and revealing as ever. In his classic history, Thucydides detailed the savage 27-year conflict between Sparta and Athens. Sparta was the overwhelming land power of its day, and its hoplites were drilled to perfection. The Athenians, led by Pericles, were the supreme maritime power, supported by a walled capital, a fleet of powerful triremes, and tributary allies. The Spartan leader, Archidamius, warned his kinsmen about Athens' relative power, but the Spartans and their supporters would not heed their king. In 431 BCE, the Spartans marched through Attica and ravaged the Athenian country estates and surrounding farms. They encamped and awaited the Athenian heralds and army for what they hoped would be a decisive battle and a short war. The scarlet-clad Spartans learned the first lesson of military history--the enemy gets a vote. The Athenians elected to remain behind their walls and fight a protracted campaign that played to their strengths and worked against their enemies. Thucydides' ponderous tome on the carnage of the Peloponnesian War is an extended history of the operational adaptation of each side as they strove to gain a sustainable advantage over their enemy.
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The Copenhagen school's theory of securitisation has mainly focused on the middle level of world politics in which collective political units, often but not always states, construct relationships of amity or enmity with each other. Its argument has been that this middle level would be the most active both because of the facility with which collective political units can construct each other as threats, and the difficulty of finding audiences for the kinds of securitisations and referent objects that are available at the individual and system levels. This article focuses on the gap between the middle and system levels, and asks whether there is not more of substance there than the existing Copenhagen school analyses suggests. It revisits the under-discussed concept of security constellations in Copenhagen school theory, and adds to it the idea of macrosecuritisations as ways of getting an analytical grip on what happens above the middle level. It then suggests how applying these concepts adds not just a missing sense of scale, but also a useful insight into underlying political logics, to how one understands the patterns of securitisation historical, and contemporary.
The paper makes the liberal argument for intervening by force to end or prevent serious human rights abuses. It relies on twin assumptions of liberal moral and political theory: that the primary purpose of governments is to protect human rights, and that victims of grievous injustice are entitled to outside help. Humanitarian intervention is legitimate when it is directed at suppressing human rights abuses and complies with the doctrine of double effect. The paper considers and rejects well-known objections: that interventions undermine respect for international law, that interventions are comissive acts and thus more objectionable than non-interventions because these are simple omissions, that humanitarian interventions are objectionable because they kill innocent persons, and that humanitarian interventions undermine global stability. Finally, the paper discusses the libertarian objection that humanitarian interventions are illegitimate because governments do not have the right to send persons to fight for the liberty of foreigners. It concludes that this objections has some force against conscription but not against the use of a voluntary army.
We argue that certain provisions of alliance treaties can signal credible commitments to a peaceful relationship among members and establish institutional mechanisms that promote the settlement of disagreements through peaceful negotiation. Nonaggression, peaceful dispute settlement, military institutionalization, and permanent organization provisions should increase the duration of peace between alliance members; we test our hypotheses with a duration model. The analysis generally supports our expectations except that alliances that create permanent organizations, even those specifically established to arbitrate disagreements, are associated with shorter durations of peace. We conclude with some implications of our argument for the study of military alliances and international institutions more broadly.
Are binding international agreements only valuable as matters stand (rebus sic stantibus), or are pacts respected in good faith regardless of changing circumstances (pacta sunt servanda)? In this article, we examine this question with respect to military alliance agreements, and we find that alliances are more likely to be abrogated opportunistically when one or more members experience changes that affect the value of the alliance, for instance a change in international power, a change in domestic political institutions, or the formation of a new outside alliance. We also find, however, that controlling for such changes, factors that affect the costs of breaking commitments (for example, democracy and issue linkage) reduce the probability that leaders will abandon their alliances in violation of their terms. We evaluate our argument empirically on a sample of bilateral alliances formed between 1816 and 1989 using competing risks duration analysis and find support for our hypotheses.
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