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Might we be Calling Problems Seen in Autism Spectrum Conditions: ‘Poor Theory of Mind,’ when Actually they are Related to Non-Generalised ‘Object Permanence’?
Abstract
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) and the delayed development of object permanence is often not questioned, and is rarely understood. The following paper attempts to explore this idea and suggests reasons for why such development is delayed and the possibility that certain difficult behaviours seen in children with ASC are less likely to be connected to having poor theory of mind and more connected to lacking generalized concepts of object permanence.
... The theory of mind theory of autism fails to account for the sensory hypo-and hyper-sensitivities, restricted interests, insistence on sameness and savant skills of many autistic individuals, focusing heavily on what could be considered one half of autism's diagnostic criteria (Frith and Happé 1994). Additionally, it often fails to attend to the autistic voice, and has been criticised for being based on misunderstandings of the autistic social inference processes (Milton 2012(Milton , 2014a) and sensory differences (Lawson and Dombroski 2015). Weak central coherence theory also does not account for all findings in sensory processing. ...
... The model tries to minimise prediction error from a very flexible self-model by acting on the world to enforce the restricted environments in which that self-model effectively reduces prediction error. This would explain the particular and focused energy with which some autistic individuals engage in their chosen areas of expertise, and also the insistence on sameness and learned routines, which are highly predictable (Lawson and Dombroski 2015). As such, in the world that an autistic individual creates for themselves, if it could be perfectly controlled and isolated, this model (Fig. 3) would predict that they would be better at self-modelling than the neurotypical model in its own created environment. ...
The stereotype of autism spectrum conditions (ASC or ‘autism’) focuses on the social and communicative elements of the diagnostic criteria. In this review, we step back from autism as a social and communicative disorder and focus on the autistic self. The autistic self is a key component of the condition which has nevertheless received comparatively little attention. We provide a taxonomy for experimental paradigms in the cognitive sciences that aim to address questions related to the self. We articulate reasons based on domain-general cognitive mechanisms, autobiography and historical conceptions for why the self might differ in ASC. We conclude with elucidating the implications of a predictive processing account of autism on conceptualising the autistic self and how this fits with existing literature, with a focus on context sensitivity, model complexity, learning, integration, active inference and precision. This opens up large scope for future research on unique differences in the autistic self, which could be extended as a framework for understanding the condition as a whole in a new and unified way.
Poor Theory of Mind (ToM) (or difficulties imputing mental states to self and others) [1], (See also [2-5]) is often blamed for certain responses and behaviour in autism. However, the Theory of Mind Task Battery requires an understanding of language, the use of cognitive skills, as well as the child's motivation and attention to complete. All of these factors are either weak or under-developed in individuals with autism suggesting that this is not the best means to measure one's understanding that other people have their own thoughts, plans, beliefs, or point of view. Behaviours like strong defiance, insistence on sameness, fear associated with sudden change and severe anxiety may be related to difficulties seeing beyond the 'now' [6]. This paper suggests that some of the stress and anxiety in the autism population may actually be due to delayed object permanence (OP) (knowing something may still exist even if it is out of sight), which can appear as poor ToM. This delay in establishing OP is governed by single focused attention. For more information on this concept see: Lawson, W. (2011) The passionate mind, JKP:London. Although ToM and OP are defined differently, this paper aims to show the relationship between them and how one concept can influence the other using examples in everyday life to illustrate how poor OP is associated with single focused attention, which detracts from the bigger picture.
Difficulties in visual attention are often implicated in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) but it remains unclear which aspects of attention are affected. Here, we used a multiple object tracking (MOT) task to quantitatively characterize dynamic attentional function in children with ASD aged 5-12. While the ASD group performed significantly worse overall, the group difference did not increase with increased object speed. This finding suggests that decreased MOT performance is not due to deficits in dynamic attention but instead to a diminished capacity to select and maintain attention on multiple targets. Further, MOT performance improved from 5 to 10 years in both typical and ASD groups with similar developmental trajectories. These results argue against a specific deficit in dynamic attention in ASD.
Normative-IQ individuals with autism are capable of solving explicit social cognitive problems at a level that is not matched by their ability to meet the demands of everyday social situations. The magnitude of this discrepancy is now being documented through newer techniques such as eye tracking, which allows us to see and measure how individuals with autism search for meaning when presented with naturalistic social scenes. This paper offers an approach to social cognitive development intended to address the above discrepancy, which is considered a key element for any understanding of the pathophysiology of autism. This approach, called the enactive mind (EM), originates from the emerging work on 'embodied cognitive science', a neuroscience framework that views cognition as bodily experiences accrued as a result of an organism's adaptive actions upon salient aspects of the surrounding environment. The EM approach offers a developmental hypothesis of autism in which the process of acquisition of embodied social cognition is derailed early on, as a result of reduced salience of social stimuli and concomitant enactment of socially irrelevant aspects of the environment.
The authors conclude from a range of literature relevant to the autistic condition that atypical strategies for the allocation of attention are central to the condition. This assertion is examined in the context of recent research, the diagnostic criteria for autism in DSM-IV and ICD-10, and the personal experiences of individuals with autism including one of the authors of the article. The first two diagnostic criteria are shown to follow from the 'restricted range of interests' referred to in the third criterion. Implications for practice are indicated.
"Weak central coherence" refers to the detail-focused processing style proposed to characterise autism spectrum disorders (ASD). The original suggestion of a core deficit in central processing resulting in failure to extract global form/meaning, has been challenged in three ways. First, it may represent an outcome of superiority in local processing. Second, it may be a processing bias, rather than deficit. Third, weak coherence may occur alongside, rather than explain, deficits in social cognition. A review of over 50 empirical studies of coherence suggests robust findings of local bias in ASD, with mixed findings regarding weak global processing. Local bias appears not to be a mere side-effect of executive dysfunction, and may be independent of theory of mind deficits. Possible computational and neural models are discussed.
This study examined brain electrical responses as a physiological measure of speed and specificity of attentional shifting in eight adult males with autism. Subjects were required to shift attention between rapidly flashed targets alternating between left and right visual hemifields. When targets were separated by less than 700 ms, steady- state brain electrical response in both hemispheres was augmented and background EEG decreased for rightward shifts as compared with leftward shifts. At longer separations, persons with autism showed no modulation of background EEG, and high variability in steady-state response. These results contrast with those in normal controls, where in each hemisphere separately steady-state response increased and background EEG descreased for shifts directed contralaterally to that hemisphere. Group differences were significant at p < 0.04 for the steady-state response and p < 0.0001 for the background EEG. Lack of hemispherically independent modulation in autism may reflect the operation of a non-specific mechanism of sensory gating.
Does motivational interest increase gamma synchrony across neuronal networking to enable computation of related sensory inputs that might lead to greater social understanding in autism spectrum conditions (ASC)? Meaning, is it possible/likely that in autism because individuals process one aspect of sensory input at any one time (therefore missing the wider picture in general) when they are motivated/interested or attending to particular stimuli their attention window is widened due to increased gamma synchrony and they might be enabled to connect in ways that do not occur when they are not motivated? This is my current research question. If gamma synchrony is helping with the binding of information from collective sensory inputs, in ASC, when and only if the individual is motivated, then this has huge potential for how learning might be encouraged for individuals with an ASC.
Recent evidence suggests that 4.5- and even 3.5-month-old infants realize that objects continue to exist when hidden. The goal of the present experiments was to obtain converging evidence of object permanence in young infants. Experiments were conducted using paradigms previously used to demonstrate object permanence in 5.5-month-old infants and 6.5-month-old infants. In one experiment, 3.5-month-old infants watched a short or a tall carrot slide along a track. The track's center was hidden by a screen with a large window in its upper half. The short carrot was shorter than the window's lower edge and so did not appear in the window when passing behind the screen; the tall carrot was taller than the window's lower edge and hence should have appeared in the window but did not. The infants looked reliably longer at the tall than at the short carrot event, suggesting that they (a) represented the existence, height, and trajectory of each carrot behind the screen and (b) expected the tall carrot to appear in the screen window and were surprised that it did not. Control trials supported this interpretation. In another experiment, 4.0-month-old infants saw a toy car roll along a track that was partly hidden by a screen. A large toy mouse was placed behind the screen, either on top or in back of the track. The female infants looked reliably longer when the mouse stood on top as opposed to in back of the track, suggesting that they (a) represented the existence and trajectory of the car behind the screen, (b) represented the existence and location of the mouse behind the screen, and (c) were surprised to see the car reappear from behind the screen when the mouse stood in its path. A second experiment supported this interpretation. The results of these experiments provide further evidence that infants aged 3.5 months and older are able to represent and to reason about hidden objects.
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