Social Movements

Full text

Social Movements
Edited by
Mrigendra Bahadur Karki
Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies
2012

Acknowledgement
This volume is an outcome of the International Conference on Social Science
Methodology: A Special Reference to Social Movements that was organized
on 15-17 November, 2011 by Policy Discourse on Contemporary Issues on
Social Exclusion and Social Inclusion (PODCISESI), a collaborative
programme between Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), Tribhuvan
University (TU) and Social Inclusion Research Fund (SIRF), SNV/The
Netherlands Development Organization in Nepal. SIRF was set up in 2005 by
the Government of Nepal and Royal Norwegian Embassy (RNE) in
Kathmandu. Thus, I am grateful to RNE for providing generous financial
support which made it possible to carry out all activities of the PODCISESI
programme including the organisation of International Conference and
publication of this volume.
I owe a great debt to the the advisory committee, paper contributors,
discussants, chairs and participants, for their invaluable time and support for
the conference. Similarly, I would like to express my great thankfulness to
the executive director of CNAS, Nani Ram Khatri, ex-executive director
Yagya Prasad Adhikari, managing editor Dilli Raj Sharma, editorial board
members of the journal, faculties and administrative staff of the Centre.
Similarly, my special thanks goes to Manju Thapa Tuladhar, Lead Advisor of
SIRF for her timely suggestions and feedbacks. I would also acknowledge
Sita Rana Magar, Swasti Pradhan, Sanjeeb Chaudhary, and SIRF Secretariat
for their invaluable support. Finally, I am grateful to the English editor of this
issue Govinda Tumbahang and PODCISEI members Eman Udaya and Sajana
Bista without their support it would not have been possible to disseminate our
findings of the International Conference across the national boundaries.
The Editor

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (SMs)
Mrigendra Bahadur Karki
The German sociologist Lorenz von Stein first engaged with the notion of
'social movement' in his book History of the French Social Movement from
1789 to the Present (1850).1 In this work, he diffused an idea, centering Marx
and Hegel’s notion of class conflict as a continuous, unitary process by which
the whole working class gained self-consciousness and power (Tilly 2004).
Politicians, intellectuals, activists used very term and concept
idiosyncratically according to Ziraksadeh (2006:4), to convey the
heterogeneous movement meaning and ideologies across the spaces and time.
Since an elusive conception, it has reified avenues from irrational to rational
throughout history across regimes, intellects and public discourses. The
horror of the French revolution and outrage of the crowd, McCarthyism in
the USA, Fascism in the Italy, and Nazism in the Germany immediately after
the Second World War all presented negative examples for students of SMs
(see Tarrow 1998). Consequently, these theorists depicted SMs in a
derogatory way, focusing predominantly on their childish, immoral, and anti-
democratic features (Ziraksadeh 2006:6).
Similarly, Melucci (1996) portrays the theoretical differentiations
between Europe and the United States and says that in reaction to the
structural functionalist model in USA, three major perspectives emerged:
collective behaviour (in its interactionist version), resource mobilization and
political process positing the question of ‘how’ collective action emerged and
was carried out. With the different methods positing of ‘why’ SMs in Europe
questioning the Marxist theory, there developed the New Social Movements
(NSM) theory. The same is true of Nepal. During the Rana and Panchayat
periods, SMs and activisms had negative perceptions. But, today they are
supposed to have positive.
Although no satisfactory definitions of social movements have yet been
formulated (Oberschall 1997), they are readily provided in most text-like
treatments of the topic (Trarrow 1998, della Porta and Diani 2004). Social
movements theories according to Snow, Soule and Kriesi (2004) is a
collective or joint action which contains change motives (although these are
not necessarily comparable to sports and rock fans, who tend to roar and
applaud in unison). It has change-oriented goals or claims; it performs some
extra – or non-institutional collective action has some degree of organization;
and a degree of temporal continuity. Of course, these are overlapping and to
some extent, inter-connected notions. Thus, they define social movements as
i

…collectivities acting with some degree of organization and
continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for
the purpose of challenging or defending extant authority, whether
it is institutionally or culturally based, in the group, organization,
society, culture, or world order of which they are a part…. (Snow,
Soule and Kriesi 2004:11).
Similarly, Diani defines SMs and comments on their relationship to
formal organizations as follows:
It is difficult to grasp the nature of social movements, neither they could
be reduced to specific insurrections or revolts, but rather resemble strings
of more or less connected events, scattered across time and space; they
cannot be identified with specific organizations either, rather, they consist
of groups and organizations, with various levels of formalization, linked
in patterns of interactions which run from the fairly centralized to the
totally decentralized, from cooperative to the explicitly hostile. In another
word, social movements are complex and highly heterogeneous network
structures (Diani 2003:1).
SMs of all types and times with all features, e.g. claim, protest, sporadic,
centralized and change, could be summarized under the following points: i)
informal networks based on; ii) shared belief and solidarity, which mobilize
about; iii) conflictual issue through; iv) the frequent use of various forms of
protest (della Porta and Diani 2004:16). To come to this definitional point,
scholars have gone through various intellectual stages in history. In the
beginning, during the last century, sociological theories of ideology and
later, theories of organization and rationality dominated as perspectives from
which to address issues of SM (Johnston, Larana, and Gusfield 1994). In the
late sixties and early seventies, two principal theoretical models in particular
evolved: the Marxist model and the structural-functionalist model. However,
reactions to those theoretical lacunae developed in both settings: collective
behaviour (in its interactionist version), resource mobilization, and the
political processes perspective developed in response to the structural-
functionalist model in the United States and the ‘new social movement’
evolved in response to the Marxists model in the Europe (della Porta and
Diani 2004). Garner and Zald (1985:138) and della Porta Diani (2004: 341)
claim that protest and contentious collective action are ultimately “politics
by other means,” and that SMs were merely one of the options that
ii

challengers could draw upon to pursue their policy outcomes and their quest
for membership in the polity.
Marx and class consciousness
As said earlier, the scholarly work of SMs was initiated with the work of
Marx/Engels/Hegel both in European and North American traditions (Tarrwo
1998, Cossley 2003). However, more specifically in the USA, SMs emerged
more empirical, scientific and to a degree, empiricist frame (Crossley
2003:10). For Marx, SMs are outcome of society’s structural development,
particularly at the economic level. Individual choice or agency, cultural
resources, political context, according to Marx and his colleague Engels, are
undervalued resources or phenomena. Marx and his followers believed that
collective action arose in the state of ‘high capitalism.’ Marx writes in his
Communist Manifesto:
The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the bourgeoisie,
replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by their
revolutionary combination, due to association… The real fruit of a battle
lies, not in the immediate result, but in the ever-expanding union of the
workers (Tucker in Tarrow 1998: 11).
He explores the initiation of collective actions under the contentious
dialectical relationships of ‘bourgeoisie’ and ‘proletariat’ in the blooming
industrial environment. This theory failed to foresee the advent of ‘capitalist
democracy’ (Ibid: 12) as currently enjoyed in Europe and the USA. High
capitalism did not produce two classes, the bourgeoisie and
labour/proletariat, but enhanced varieties of roles, duty and responsibilities.
These conditions created different identity groups – gender, ethnicities, races,
regional groups, cultural groups – irrespective of class consciousness beyond
the Marxist theory. This led, within the European stream of SM traditions, to
the emergence of NMS theory.
New social movements
NSM theory, the structural paradigm approach of the European scholars,
argues that the new movements are the result of increasing domination of the
system over the life. It developed, as its theorist claim, in response to the
limitations of, or as a critique on resource mobilization and Marxist theories
to explain collective action (Shefner 1995). The NSM pose a direct challenge
to Marxist theories on what should be their most secure terrain – their process
to identity to identify the main lines of social division and conflict and to
explain the broad contours of historical change in the advanced capitalist
iii

world (Steinmetz 1994:176). According to Somerville (1997), these
proponents of the NSM approach address the shifting character of post WWII
Western capitalism and critique the conventional Marxist approach of
economy centric views.
This theory, developed after 1968, worked outside formal institutional
channels and emphasized lifestyle, ethical, or ‘identity’ concerns rather than
narrowly defined economic goals (Calhoun 2000:154). Alberto Melucci
(1988: 247), for instance, cited feminism, the ecology movement or 'greens'
the peace movement, and the youth movement. Others added the gay
movement, the animal rights movement, and the antiabortion and pro-choice
movements. These movements were allegedly new in terms of their issues,
tactics, and constituencies. Above all, they were new by contrast to the labor
movement, which was the paradigmatic 'old' social movement, and to
Marxism and socialism, which asserted that class was the central issue in
politics and that a single political economic transformation would solve the
whole range of social ills. They were new even in comparison to
conventional liberalism with its assumption of fixed individual identities and
interests. The NSMs thus challenged the conventional division of politics into
left and right and broadened the deviation of politics to include issues that
had been considered outside the domain of political action (Scott 1990).
Collective behaviour
Collective behaviour theory, developed in pre 1970s by non-Marxist
sociologists, is an approach originating from the structural functional school.
The properties of this approach, unlike the class conflict emphasized by
Marxist/Hegelian theories (Tarrow 1998, Crossley 2002, della Porta and
Diani 2004), include grievances, fads, panics, and other forms of social
hardships. Beyond Le Bond’s classical work on crowd psychology (Tarrow
1998), it seeks the meaning of phenomena. Theorists of this approach, for
many years, conceived of movements outside the normal social institutions as
part of a construct that came to be called ‘collective action’ (Tarrow
1998:14). It focused on individual panic, which made it possible to trace its
intellectual genesis linking to Durkheim’s theory of ‘anomie’ in which
individuals, unhinged from traditional roles and identities, sought new
collective identities through personal reintegration in movements (Durkheim
1951, and Hoffer 1951 in Tarrow 1998:14).
Crossley (2002:11) convincingly summarizes four major points of the
collective behaviour approach. Collective behaviour
iv

i. portrays movement emergence as a reflex response to ‘grievances,’
‘deprivations,’ ‘anomie,’ ‘structural strains,’ or other such forms of
hardship. The stereotypical collective behaviour theorist believes that
objective hardships are both a necessary and a sufficient cause of protest
and movement formation;
ii. portrays the protest and movements triggered by these hardships an
irrational psychological responses, manifestations of ‘mob psychology’
or collective hysteria;
iii. portrays those who become involved in these ‘mobs’ as (previously)
isolated individuals who are often not very well integrated into society;
iv. lumps SMs together with other assorted forms of ‘collective behaviour,’
such as fashions, crazes and panics, without any due consideration for
their distinctness and ‘properly political’ nature.
From the structural functionalist school, Smelser (1962) quoted in della
Porta and Diani (2004), paid particularly great attention to the study of the
collective behaviour for social change. According to this school, SMs are
result of malfunctioning social subsystems, especially in the state of post
rapid growth of social transformation in society. Within social systems, all
sub-systems cannot advance at an equal pace during the over-rapid
transformations, and consequently a position of ‘lag’ appears in the structure.
Thus, collective behaviours emerged in interaction within the social system.
It is a purely organic formulation of the structural-functionalist approach;
other approaches correctly shared his version of collective action as crisis
behaviour (della Porta and Diani 2004).
Nevertheless, the interactionist version of collective behaviour theory,
particularly as described by Smelser quoted in della Porta and Diani (2004),
has recognized SMs as gradual social processes. It has supported to explore
new facts and causation of SMs. Thus, it occupies a significant space in the
changing conceptualizations of social movements: i) deviated or breakdown
behaviour to a meaningful activity or purposeful phenomena, ii)
methodologically, it valued empirical studies, iii) it stressed the processes of
symbolic production and of construction of identity. Nevertheless, there are
also flaws in this approach. First, many theorists defined SMs as purposeful
phenomena, whereas collective behaviour theorists paid more attention to
unexpected dynamics, such as circular reactions, than to deliberate
organizational strategies or, more generally, to strategies worked out by
actors. Second, the focus of the approach on empirical analysis of behaviour
means that studies are often limited to a description, albeit detailed, of a
v

particular reality, without devoting much attention to the structural origins of
conflicts which subsequently well up in particular movements (Ibid).
Resource mobilization
Resource mobilization theory (RMT), an alternative interpretation of SM
developed in the early 1970s, the intellectual roots of which are a blend of
McCarthy and Zald’s entrepreneurial mobilization theory and Olson’s theory
on logic of collective action (Jenkins 1983), arose to fill an intellectual gap of
the then earlier theories focused on the role of grievances and relative
deprivation in social movement mobilization. However, according to Tarrow
(1998), Lenin visualizes the components, leadership and organization, of
RMT. One line of those earlier theories over-emphasized to the role of
grievances, marginality, alienation and relative deprivation in generating
social movements. However, empirical studies failed to capture the reciprocal
relationship between the rise and fall of social movements with increases and
decreases in relative deprivation and grievance factors in American society
(McCarthy and Zald 1973).
Olson (1971) proposed the idea through a book 'the logic of collective
action that unless individual incentives are visualized, rational actors will not
contribute to the production of collective goods. This very theory is implied
in the SM participation, even though it examines only why individuals do not
participate in a movement, and does not justify how and why an individual
joins the collective action, activism and SMs. Nevertheless, there is
consensus among many SM theorists that this book led to a landmark shift
into intellectual engagement in further studies on collective actions, SMs, etc.
Olson’s conception of the relationship between ‘individual incentive’ and
‘collective good’ is contiguous notion of the karma theory. Olson’s
conception, however, is entirely economic whereas the notion of ‘individual
incentive’ in karma theory is non-economic or ‘soft’ motives to join activism
(Karki 2010). As Shah (2004) observes, ‘name keeping’ is a prominent
motivational factor of activist recruitment in Nepal. Shah, who, from his
Ph.D. fieldwork at rural Nepal found that at a deeper level, activists’
motivation to get involved in activism is directly related to an increase in
prestige through keeping one’s name (prestige) forever, even after the death.
Moreover, to achieve moksha (salvation) or prosperous life in rebirth is an
additional motive to join activism in Nepal (Karki 2010).
vi

Political process theory
In SM literature, political process theory, which is mainly concerned with
the relationship between institutional political actors and protest, focuses on
the political and intuitional environment. In challenging (or resisting) a given
political order, SMs interact with actors who enjoy a consolidated position in
such an order. The concept which has had the greatest successes in defining
the properties of the external environment relevant to the development of
SMs is that of political opportunity structures (della Porta and Diani 2004).
Most importantly, RMT expanded the conception and constituencies of SMs.
Prior to it, SMs were traditionally seen as extensions of more elementary
forms of collective behaviour, and as encompassing both movements and
personal change, e.g. religious sects, cults, and communes and those focused
on institutional change, e.g. legal reforms and changes in political power
(Jenkins 1983)). RMT have, in contrast, seen SMs as extensions of
institutionalized actions and have restricted their focus to movements of
institutional change that attempt to alter ‘elements of social structure and/or
the reward distribution of society’ (McCarthy & Zald 1977:1218), and they
organize previously unorganized groups against institutional elites (Gamson
1975:16-18), or represent the interest of groups excluded from the polity
(Tilly 1978, 1979).
The growth of social movements is a global phenomenon these days
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), which has come to be regarded as
permanent component of western democracies (della Porta and Diani 2004),
but I think these are omnipresent. This volume explains differential SMs
perspectives.
Special issue
The special issue of Contributions to Nepalese Studies focuses on SMs. Of
the five articles, three are foreign cases and two are Nepalese. Kiyoshi Abe
analyses the post-9/11 global situation the situation how people are under
surveillance across the world. He argues the implication of surveillance is
unknown but state authorities are repeatedly stressing on its importance. As
he claims a new sort of social movements that aims to criticise surveillance
per se and the paper tries to investigate what sort of relationship exist
between 'structure' and 'agency' of surveillance in contemporary societies.
While analysing the paper on Cyber Activism in Mainland China: the
Internet as a Tool and Method for Social Mobilization, Khun Eng Kuah-
Pearce presents that the economic advancement and subsequent emergent of
modernization in the main land China the Internet has been generating social
vii

movements. Internet is a medium and agency to understand people each other
in China according to Kuan-Pearce. She also presents how cyberactivism has
been transformed into real life activism in their fight against social injustice
and social inequality.
Bal Krishna Mabuhang highlights the social diversity and discrepancies
and attempts to analyse how monolithic nation-state developed through a
political process. He reviews pluralism theory, the Maoist insurgency and
Second People's Movement in his paper After Liberalism, Marxism –
Leninism and Maoism What Next 'Ism' Does Nepalese Fate Adhere To?
Similarly he discusses on Constituent Assembly and state restructuring from
indigenous nationalities perspectives. Marit Haug discusses the role of
Norwegian social movements to develop Norway from economically poor
country to one of richest countries of the world. While discussing the paper
Norwegian Social Movements; Studies of Their Contribution to An
Egalitarian Society Haug claims that social movements helped Norwegian
society to get transformed into an egalitarian society. She also highlights on
social movement's research methodology. Meeta Singh Pradhan examines the
influence of ascribed social identities of caste and ethnicity, on participation
in local level collective action programs through her paper Who Participates?
The “Penalty” of Caste and Ethnicity on Participation in Local Level
Collective Action Programs. She discusses the embedded values of Nepali
society that has been excluding a huge mass on the basis of core institutional
order.
Notes
1. However, there is no consensus within academics to trace out the history of SMs.
Oxford dictionary of sociology (2009:704) presents "the term social movements
was first used by Saint-Simon in France at the turn of the 18th century, to
charecterise the movements of social protest that emerged there and later
elsewhere, and was applied to new political forces opposed to the status quo".
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x

CONTENTS
Articles
How can we Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social
Movements? Contradiction and Co-Existence Between Technological
Structure and Human Agency in Surveillance
Kiyoshi Abe 1-14
Cyberactivism in Mainland China:
The Internet as a Tool and Method for Social Mobilisation
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce 15-34
After Liberalism, Marxism- Leninism, and Maoism What Next 'Ism' does
Nepalese Fate Adhere to?

Balkrishna Mabuhang 35-83
Norwegian Social Movements; Studies of Their Contribution to an
Egalitarian Society
Marit Haug 85-98
Who participates? The "Penalty" of Caste and Ethnicity on Participation in
Local Level Collective Action Programs
Meeta Singh Pradhan 99-136

CONTRIBUTORS
Kiyoshi Abe is Professor at the Graduate School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin
University. He has been interested in the critical sociology of media and
communication. His publications include ‘Everyday Policing in Japan: Surveillance,
Media, Government and Public Opinion’ in International Sociology 19 (2) 2004, ‘The
Myth of Media Interactivity: Technology, Communications and Surveillance in
Japan’ in Theory, Culture & Society 26 (2-3) 2009. E-mail: kiyabe922@gmail.com
Marit Haug is research director at the department for international studies at the
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research. Her research interests include
local governance and civil society, social inclusion and gender issues, as well as
humanitarian aid. Lately her research work has been mainly in Nepal and Sri Lanka
where she has studied decentralization and social inclusion as development strategies
and practices. Marit can be reached at marit.haug@nibr.no.
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce is an anthropologist and associate professor at the
Department of Sociology, University of Hong Kong. Her primary research areas are
Chinese Diaspora, religion (Buddhism), politics and philanthropy and gender. She is
the author of two books 'Rebuilding the Ancestral Village: Singaporeans in China'
and 'State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards A Reformist Buddhism'.
E-mail: kekuah@hku.hk
Balkrishna Mabuhang is the Associate Professor in the Central Department of
Population Studies, Tribhuvan University in Kathmandu. He has been teaching and
actively involving in research activities since 1994. He is author of articles 'Ethno-
demographic analysis of Nepal', 'Parliamentarians' Perceptions on Population in
Nepal', and 'Nepalese Women's Perception on Abortion'. E-mail:
hangmu2003@yahoo.com
Meeta S. Pradhan, PhD. received her doctorate in Sociology (Social Demography)
from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, USA in 2011. She is currently
involved in a number of research initiatives as a Social Scientist in Nepal. Her
research interests are related to poverty alleviation, gender and social equity. E-mail:
meetasp@gmail.com

Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012), 1-14
HOW CAN WE RESIST THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE
THROUGH SOCIAL MOVEMENTS? CONTRADICTION
AND CO-EXISTENCE BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL
STRUCTURE AND HUMAN AGENCY IN
SURVEILLANCE
Kiyoshi Abe
Abstract
After the events of 9/11, the tightening of surveillance in every aspect of
social life has become a common trend in many countries. While the
governments of all nations repeatedly stress the importance of maintaining
national security through surveillance, the actual result of these policies are
not clear enough to persuade many of the fundamental questions regarding
their implication. As a result skepticism and cynicism concerning the
surveillance policies prevail among the general public of many nations.
It is not easy for sociologist to discern a new sort of social movements
that aims to criticize surveillance per se. The reason why is, as the paper will
clarify, that on many occasions the resistance against the surveillance are
enacted at not collective but individual level of activities. Therefore, even
though we can see variety of anti-surveillance in society, it is traditional
sense of meaning.
Considering the socio-political conditions surrounding the surveillance
technology and its application, the paper tries to investigate what sort of
relationship exist between 'structure' and 'agency' of surveillance in
contemporary societies.
Introduction: Surveillance Studies and the 'Movements' in Surveillance
What is now referred to as 'surveillance studies' is becoming more recognized
among the academic communities (Lyon 2007). One of the reasons why is
that after the 9/11 the issue of 'security' (in broader sense of meaning)
become the paramount task for each nation-state to tackle. Under the Socio-
political situation that some scholars describes as 'emergent' or 'exceptional'
(Bigo and Tosoukala 2008), the deep concern for potential risk of terrorist
attacks that threatens the safety of people 's daily life seemed to be shared
among not only political leaders but also larger public in general. As a result,
governmental policies to implement tighter surveillance were smoothly
Copyright © 2012 CNAS/TU

2 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
accepted and legitimized in many countries (Abe 2004; Lyon 2003). After the
9/11, the practice of surveillance in many areas of society became an
indispensable part of our everyday life.
Facing to the socio-political transformation occurred after the 9/11, the
practitioners and specialists who engage in research of security were
compelled to examine the practicalities of surveillance with respect to public
safety and the national security through surveillance. In the academic world,
research on surveillance has been carried out in the variety of fields
(sociology, criminology, political studies, legal studies, cultural studies, and
so on) long before the 9/11 (Lyon 2007). However, it can be fairly said that
after the 9/11 those researches on surveillance have been more organized and
institutionalized especially in North America and Europe.
As it is often commented in journalistic discourses, after the 9/11 we have
seen the drastic rise of surveillance in a variety of areas of our society (Webb
2007). On the one hand, new surveillance policies were often doubtlessly
accepted by the purpose of ascertaining security against the threats posed by
potential terrorist attacks. But on the other hand, the excessive surveillance
done by the state and government has been criticized by civil activists who
questioned the legitimacy of surveillance policies from the normative
viewpoint of liberty, privacy and human rights. However, immediately after
the 9/11, it seemed that the public opinion and sentiment were inclined to
accept tighter surveillance in spite of taking the risk of limited freedom (Bigo
and Tosoukala 2008).
Now, after the decade since the 9/11, we are witnessing dynamic
movements concerning with the security and surveillance in contemporary
societies. At the present, we can see not only the enforcement of tighter
surveillance aiming at security, but also the rise of suspicion and criticism to
those surveillance policies put in place by the state.
Keeping the above-mentioned situations with respect to security and
surveillance in contemporary societies, it can be said that it is needed for the
surveillance studies to pay close attentions towards 'social movements' in its
broader sense of meaning (Chester and Welsh 2011). As there emerges a
variety of movements that regard surveillance as a problem, we should
examine what sort of socio-political relevance those movements have in the
field of surveillance studies.
Globalization of Surveillance and the Rise of Comparative Studies
While we can see several common trends that have globally pervaded after
the 9/11, there is a variety of differences and uniqueness in practicing

How Can We Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social Movements? 3
surveillance in each nation-state (Zureik et al. 2010). Every nation-state is
keen to ascertain its national security and public safety in facing the potential
threat of globalized terrorism (Bigo and Tosoukala 2008). At the same time
each nation-state has its own distinctive historical trajectory concerning how
it introduced and implemented the surveillance policies (Murakami Wood
2009). Therefore, we can see not only similarities but also differences of the
surveillance measures enacted after the 9/11 in each nation-state.
To grasp both global similarities and national/regional difference,
researchers of the surveillance studies have recently engaged in comparative
researches focusing on areas other than North America and Europe where the
surveillance studies were born (Zureik et al., 2010). Thanks to such
comparative researches, we can get rich information about how differently
surveillance policies are introduced and implemented by the governments and
accepted by the public in each nation-state. Considering the facts that the
surveillance has become more and more globalized after the 9/11,
comparative research is indispensable for researchers to fully understand both
effects and limits of the globalized surveillance.
However, in making such comparison, it seems that the basic conceptual
frameworks used by leading academic are very 'Western'. In other words, the
comparison is done through applying the traditional-Western theory and
method to the studies focusing on 'the Rest'. Here we can see the potential
danger of academic Imperialism in the hegemony of Western theory and
method which are unconsciously reproduced through comparing 'the West' to
'the Rest' in most cases. Even if the academic motive and orientation of
comparative research might be scientific and objective, the 'political'
consequence of the present comparative research could be viewed as
academic communities (Hall 1992).
If we regard such potential risk lurking in the global comparative research
on security and surveillance, we should be careful not to commit to
reproducing it. As long as the academic Imperialism by 'the West' persists,
the 'the Rest' is only depicted as 'Others' without their own voice being heard
(Spivak 1998; Abe 2011b).
Rising of Critique of Surveillance in Everyday Life
As the surveillance became tighter and more prevalent around the world (an
example being the tightening of security checking at the national boarders
and airports), there emerged deep concern about the violation of privacy of
individual citizen (Zureik and Satler 2005). Needless to say, for the
proponents of surveillance the objective of surveilling larger populations is

4 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
ascertaining the security of nation and state. To realize such a purpose, the
target of surveillance should be more inclusive and non-exceptional so that
they can depict any sort of potential risk and eliminate it. As easily expected,
this kind of reasoning and practice with respect to tighter surveillance
logically bring about serious conflict with the ideal of privacy of individual
citizen (Bennett and Rabb 2006).
As the government stressed the paramount importance of security in such a
situation of 'exceptional and emergent' as the aftermath of the 9/11, many
people were persuaded to accept the limited privacy for the purpose of
realizing security. However, it doesn't necessarily mean that the public
concern about the violation of privacy has totally gone. As time went by
since the 9/11, the public's worry about privacy and suspicion of
government's policy of surveillance become more prominent in North
America where the tighter surveillance was practiced in the name of public
safety national.
As the tradition of surveillance studies shows (Lyon, 2007), the concept
of privacy has been critically reconsidered among scholars engaging in
research in surveillance. They pointed out that the concept of privacy is too
individualistic (privacy as right of individual) to critically interrogate the
socio-political conditions that bring about tighter surveillance in a society.
Moreover, critics said that as the concept of privacy is the historical product
of Modern Western Liberalism, it is not necessarily adaptable to socio-
political contexts other than Western societies like US and Canada.
Accepting the theoretical critique of the concept of privacy, many scholars of
surveillance studies have endeavored to invent a new normative ground from
which they can critically investigate the percent conditions and future
prospect of rising surveillance in society.
The sociological perspective of 'social sorting' is a conceptual tool
through which researcher can critically assess the consequences of
surveillance of the people (Lyon 2003). Contemporary surveillance relies on
the practice of gathering, sorting and retrieving huge amounts of personal
information. It does not necessarily target concrete individuals. Rather, such
surveillance mainly focuses on the 'data-double' constructed from digitalized
information of individual persons (Lyon 2001). Therefore, it can be said that
potential risk of violating the privacy of individual citizen is reduced because
the target of interrogation is not concrete person but abstracts data of
anonymous individual (data-double of person). However, those practices of
surveillance function of mechanism of 'social sorting'. Through collection and
analyzing personal data of individuals, they can categorize people into each

How Can We Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social Movements? 5
category basing on the data. as critics pointed out, social sorting enacted
through surveillance affect the way of life of those who are surveyed (Jenkins
2000 and Lyon2003).For example, those who are categorized as 'risky group
of ethnic minority' (after the 9/11, 'Muslim Male' is a typical category of
potential terrorists) have a face more trouble of being discriminated in their
daily life then other ethnic category (like 'White Male'). So, theoretically
even though the potential of violating the privacy of individual Muslim man
doesn't happen through social sorting (actually it does often happen), it
doesn't mean that surveillance causes no problems for people. On the
contrary, the surveillance as social sorting discriminates some group of
people basing on the categories constructed by the collected data and
information about individual (Gandy 2010).
Contradiction of Surveillance and Privacy /Liberty
It often happens that collecting of personal information about individuals
(citizen, customer, consumer, etc.) is enacted without due notice to or full
consent from those whose information are processed through practice of
surveillance. While there are laws to protect personal data and regulate its
usage, how to lawfully deal with personal information in practical occasions
is the controversial matter in many nation-state. Moreover, even if the
personal data protection laws exist, there are many causes of misuse, abuse
and fraud in the treating of personal information. Therefore, it is fair to say
that the risk of violation of privacy caused by collecting of personal
information is very probable even in the institutionally democratic countries
like Japan (Abe 2004).
As many critics correctly warned (Lyon 2003), the potential risk of
violating privacy through tighter surveillance policies became much bigger
that ever after the 9/11. To engage in 'War on Terror', the US government and
its allied nations quickly introduce and implemented new surveillance
policies through which government aimed to collect huge amount of
information about 'potential suspects' of terrorist attacks (Webb 2007). The
government appealed the necessity of such policies to the public saying that
the targets of surveillance are the dangerous 'suspects', not the decent
'ordinary people'. However, collecting personal information should be done
for everybody regardless of beings suspicious or not. In other words,
collection of personal data should not be random or selective so that it
contributes to ascertaining the higher security through surveillance. Ironically
enough, it can be said that the surveillance is 'fair' and 'neutral' in not
preferring the target in data collections. It logically means that the risk of

6 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
misuse of personal information and violation of privacy is serious problem
not only for 'them (usual suspects)' but also for 'us (ordinary citizen)'.
One of the characteristics seen in the present way of collecting personal
data of individuals is the close collaboration between the state/government
and private corporations (Lyon 2003). As is well known, private companies
are so eager to collect data of potential consumers for maximizing their
profits. For that purpose, private companies store, sort and analyze a huge
amount of data about consumption collected through their transactions with
customers, as a result, companies can identify what kind of person on might
be from the viewpoint of marketing strategy (Gandy 2006).
It is apparent that the databases possessed by private companies are also
very useful for the government in surveilling the populations. Thanks to the
collaboration, the government utilizes the databases of private companies so
that it can get more precise information about individuals (how much money
he/she has in bank accounts, how often he/she flies abroad, what sort of
purchase history he/she has, and so forth). Connecting the databases of public
sectors to those of private ones, the state/government can get enormously rich
and precise information for each individual (date - double) even though they
have no totally integrated Super Databases. As Haggerty and Ericson
correctly once pointed out, the contemporary surveillance is rather rizhomic
'assemblage' than the huge system (Haggerty and Ericson 2000).
Facing to the rise of collecting of personal information in almost every
aspect of citizen's daily life, activities of civil movements have problematized
the excessive usage of personal data by both government and private
companies (Bennett 2008). They claim that the sorting and processing of
personal data by the state and private companies threaten the privacy of
citizen/consumers. It is a serious problem, they proclaim that citizens are not
fully informed about how those data used for what purpose. Moreover,
because the personal information collected, sorted and analyzed for the
purpose of security contains the political opinion and activities of each person
(for example the commitment to social movements), it has risk of violating
the liberty of each citizen. Here we can see a sharp contradiction between the
tightening of surveillance and the civil value of privacy and liberty
guaranteed by the constitution.
Co-Existence of Surveillance and Choice/Freedom
While the public's concern regarding increased surveillance is emerging
especially with respect to the potential risk of violating privacy/liberty of
citizen, it seems that the majority of population somehow accepts the

How Can We Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social Movements? 7
governmental policies. One reason of that is that judging the balance between
security and liberty they regard the present degree of surveillance to be
inevitable so as to prevent the potential risk of future terrorist attacks from
occurring. The trade-off between the national security and the individual
liberty was often mentioned in legitimizing the introduction of new
surveillance measure after the 9/11 (Abe 2004; Bigo and Tosoukala 2008;
Lyon 2003). However, that conceptual framework is to be carefully
discussed.
The reason why the majority of population seems to be not so negative to
the collection of personal data by private companies can be interpreted as
following: Many customers seem to be aware of the danger of privacy
violation caused by collecting, storing and sorting of personal data for
marketing profits for private companies. However, those marketing strategies
also enable companies to give premium to consumers (for example giving
'special premium' to loyal consumers). Therefore, as far as they can get some
merits with respect to consumption, most customers don't care about the
potential risk of violation of privacy. It can be said that after calculating the
merit (consumer's gain) and then demerit (citizen's loss) consumers 'wisely
choose' to take the risk.
Here we can depict a sort of co-existence of surveillance and consumer's
choice. In case of surveillance enacted by the state or other political
authorities, the violation of liberty caused by collecting of personal
information is relatively easy to predict for citizen. So, people are often
aware of the crucial danger of misuse or fraud of collected personal
information. Contrast to this is the case of surveillance enacted by private
organization, consumers seems to be more 'tolerant' for the risk of excessive
surveillance. Thanks to the marketing strategies of companies enabled by
surveillance of customers' profiles, consumers can enjoy rich variety of
choice in purchasing commodities they want. As far as such 'consumer
choice' is guaranteed, the risk of violating privacy and liberty can be
relatively ignored for the majority of consumers. Therefore, even though the
private company's surveillance of potential consumer becomes bigger and
subtler in its operation (Gandy 2006), there seems to be little concern or
discontent to it compared to their of the state. However, as mentioned before
in this paper, the personal data collected through private companies are
actually used by the state and the police, the potential risk of violating or
limiting the civil liberty caused by the private company's surveillance is not
low at all.

8 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
'Resistance' to Surveillance: How Relevance is the Techno-Cultural
Practice of Counter-surveillance?
In the academic discourse of the surveillance studies, the concept of privacy
is not naively accepted as a critical tool for criticizing the surveillance (Lyon
2007). However, the word of privacy is most common term used in
questioning and criticizing the surveillance by the journalistic discourse and
public discussions. We can see globalized movements that question the
legitimacy of tighter surveillance introduced by the governments after the
9/11 for example 'Privacy International' and American Civil Liberties Union'
(Bennett 2008). Political discourse basing on the ideal of privacy is easy to
understand for many people who live under the condition of prevailing
surveillance. The aim of those movements seems to be inclined to protecting
the right of individual from intrusions by the state. It is quite natural and
logical, if we remember the conceptual origin of the privacy. The most
important thing for the ideal of privacy is that each citizen should be
protected from the state's authority. The right of privacy has been considered
as an indispensable tool for citizens in the face of the state's authority. In that
context of political power relationship (authoritative state vs. liberal
individuals) the liberty of citizen can be gained by limiting the power of the
state. This reasoning is the typical ideal of 'liberal individualism'. Basing on
it, the 'protection of privacy' movement seems to aim at ascertaining the
liberty of citizen by limiting the intrusive power of the state as much as
possible.
Needless to say, such a liberal political orientation is very important
because any sort of state has potential risk of intruding on individual citizen,
even in cases of liberal-democratic state. Ascertaining the liberty of
individuals against the state is indispensable task for the people to live in a
liberal society.
However, it seems that the 'privacy protection' movement against
surveillance is not sufficient enough to fundamentally question the logic of
surveillance at its political-philosophical level.
As many scholars have pointed out, the development of digital media
technology enable the state/government and private company to implement
more advanced surveillance for their own purposes (Lyon 2009). But at the
same, the technological innovations brought out a variety of chances for users
of the communication and information technologies (ICTs) to 'see' and 'watch
out' for those who surveil them. For example, the police usually watch
protesters demonstrating on the streets even though those demonstrations are
legally authorized. They often take photos and videos of participants in

How Can We Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social Movements? 9
demonstration for collecting personal information about those who commit
protest movements. However, nowadays it is quite common for not only the
police officers but also the members of protest movements to bring video
cameras with them in marching on the streets. The purpose for protesters to
take videotapes of the police activities is nothing but preventing the police
from violating their movements. Such a practice of 'policing the police'
(Seneviratne 2010) is a typical example of the counter surveillance enabled
by technological innovation like compact handy video-cam recorders.
Utilizing the website, it is not difficult for protesters to circulate the video
footage they took to large number of people on the Web.
As Thomas Mathiesen once pointed out, we are living in a 'viewer society'
where not 'panopticon' but 'synopticon' is the mode of gazing that defines the
visual power relationship in society (Mathiesen 1997). In contrast to societies
regulated by the idea of panopticon where 'the few watch the many', thanks to
the development of media technologies we are witnessing the emergence of
the synoptic society where 'the many watch the few'. While many scholar
have critically reviewed Mathiesian's discussion on 'viewer society' and
'synopticon' (Lyon 2007), his proposal that we are not only watched by the
powerful but also can watch out from them is very suggestive in considering
the practice of counter surveillance in the era of the Internet. Political and
military secrecy that were formerly completely hidden from public's gazes
are becoming more transparent on the Web. The controversial practice of
WikiLeaks is the most famous example of counter surveillance of the
powerful authorities.
The concept of 'surveillance' is also useful in investigating how and in
what way innovations of media technologies enable the ordinary people to
critically surveil the powerful (Mann 2004). Steve Maan's experimental
practice of wearing and implanting the digital media on/in his own body
shows the potential of how we can utilize surveillance technologies for not
repressive but liberating purpose. Maan's concept of surveillance implies 'to
watch from below' while the surveillance means 'to watch from above'. His
artistic practice suggests critical and liberating potential we can get through
appropriating the digital technologies that are often exploited by the powerful
for the purpose of surveillance from above.
Hille Koskela explores potentials of the webcam for users in the context
of empowerment of subjectivity (Koskela 2004). Her concept of
'exhibitionism' is relevant in investigating how can experience of 'being seen'
function on the Web where users can expose their privacy to anonymous
other of their own free will. Usually the experience of 'being seen' in relation

10 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
to the surveillance means that one is put in the weak and fragile status in
contrast to that of who 'see' them (Kohm 2010). However, Koskela discerns
the empowering potential for subject in the exhibitionism on the Web.
Through pressing the private images of themselves, users of webcam resist to
the preexisting social norms that Koskela names 'regime of order' and regime
of shame'. While she recognizes that not all private webcams are to be
regarded as empowering, the exhibitionism performed by the Internet users
utilizing private webcams shows an alternative relationship among
surveillance, technology, visibility and power to that analyzed in the
traditional surveillance studies. Koskela stresses the theoretical significance
of the 'empowering exhibitionism' enacted by users of webcams in research
on the resistance to surveillance.
The Methodological Problem: How to Combine the Analysis of the
Structure and the Agency?
In tradition of modern sociology the relationship between 'individual' and
'society' has been one of the most central topics in the academic discussions.
How is the society possible through the interactions among individuals?
What sort of individual is constituted in different society? How does the
society change in relation to the practice of individual living in it?
Complicated relationship between individual and society are the most
debated theme in the discourses of modern sociology.
To grapple with such intellectual tasks, it is required that the sociology
has its own methodologies to grasp the complicated relationship between
individual and society. In other words, it is expected that the sociological
inquiries should be the both 'micro' and 'macro' analysis of social phenomena.
Max Weber's classical formulation of the sociological methodologies
distinguishing 'interpretation (Verstehen)' form 'explanation' typically
illustrates what are the most significant methodological issues for modern
sociology (Habermas 1990). While the 'explanations' mainly focuses on the
objective, law like aspect of social institutions, the 'interpretation' aims to
clarify the subjective, symbolically constructed meaning of social actions.
Through combining the interpretation with the explanation, the scholar of
sociology can get more scientifically precise and accurate analysis of modern
societies.
Though a lot of criticism and reconsiderations have been carried out in the
academic communities since the birth of modern sociology, an important part
of the traditional formulation of sociological methodology is still valid. In
case of the surveillance studies, the methodological discussion basing on the

How Can We Resist the Rise of Surveillance through Social Movements? 11
tradition of modern sociology is especially relevant. The reason for this is:
Firstly, the surveillance is very sociological phenomena in that it drastically
transforms the relationship between individual and society. Secondly, even
though the surveillance is implemented through governmental policy and
legal legislation, how it functions in a society is not fully analyzed by the
viewpoint of policy and legal studies alone. The way the surveillance is
'lived' in a society is nothing but sociological matter. Thirdly, while the effect
and influence of technology is enormously important in considering
surveillance, it is not correct to believe that the technology determines how
the society transforms itself as a result of it. The relationship between
surveillance and social transformation is not only a technological but also
socio- political matter to discus. Keeping above-mentioned points in mind it
is apparent that the sociological research on surveillance should consider
such methodologies in taking account of both micro macro levels of society.
In the words, the 'explanation' on the structure and the 'interpretation' of the
agency are to be methodologically integrated in researching surveillance.
Looking back at the intellectual trajectories of the surveillance studies,
however it is difficult to say that those methodological tasks have been
successfully accomplished. On the contrary, it seems that there are many
cases in which separated rather than integrated methods are uncritically used
in investigating the socio-political phenomena with respects to surveillance.
Very roughly speaking, the methodological problems in surveillance
studies are summarized as following; On the hand, the researches aiming at
policy and legislation of surveillance tend to take the micro-oriented
methodology to explain how and in what aspect the surveillance affect the
society as a whole. On the other hand, there are studies focusing on
acceptance and practice of surveillance by the clients that are inclined to rely
on the micro-oriented methods so as to clarify their own experiences. The
researches paying attentions to technologies of surveillance try to incorporate
both micro aspects of surveillance in its discussion. However, many of those
researches are not sufficiently immune from the technologically deterministic
view in considering the effects of surveillance in society. Needless to say, the
above-mentioned mapping is excessively simplified for the purpose of
discussion here.
Methodological problem seen in the surveillance studies is more
prominent in case of research on surveillance and resistance to it. As
mentioned early in this paper, nowadays the resistance to surveillance is
becoming one of the most significant topics in these studies (Gillimore 2005,
Koskela 2004, and Maan 2004). However, it may be judged that the

12 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
methodology used in those studies is often too narrowly micro-oriented in its
analysis. Certainly many of the ethnographical researches on surveillance
have shown how user of new digital media pragmatically accept and
strategically utilize the surveillance technologies for their own purposes. It
might be not so inappropriate to regard those activities of media users as
'resistance' at the micro level relate to and affect the conditions of
surveillance at the micro level. In other words' how truly resistance the
practice of agency can be is the most important point to discuss with respect
to the structural power relationship engendered by surveillance.
Recent research on the resistance to surveillance are very important in that
it can go some way in correcting the pessimistic view of technological
determinism in considering the socio-political effe3cts of surveillance for the
societies. As is often criticized before, the intellectual standpoint of the
technological determinism wrongly excludes the socio-cultural aspects of
technologies (Abe 2011). However, it doesn't necessarily mean that the
technology deeply affect how the people behave the condition of
surveillance. Therefore, incorporating the macro-oriented methodology
aiming at the structural dimension of surveillance into the research on the
resistance to surveillance at the macro level is urgently needed. The research
on the resistance to surveillance is more comprehensive when we incorporate
such methodologies. Unless, it has to face the criticism of being 'culturalisitc
voluntarism' in its celebration of individual's practice and interpretation at
only subjective dimension of counter surveillance.
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Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012), 15-34
CYBERACTIVISM IN MAINLAND CHINA:
THE INTERNET AS A TOOL AND METHOD FOR
SOCIAL MOBILISATION1
Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce
Abstract
In Mainland China, the penetration of global capitalism has ushered in a new
era of rapid modernization and development. It has opened up China to the
rest of the world and at the same time, it enabled the Mainland Chinese to
tap into new ideas that circulate in the global world. China’s modernization
is made possible as a result of the rapid increase in infrastructure and
telecommunication. Today, China is seen as one of the most advanced region
in terms of its wired connections. The internet has become an indispensable
part of daily life of the individuals, especially the educated and the youthful
generation.
Development which brings enormous growth and wealth to the nation
also has its costs. It has resulted in an increasing wealth gap and many
experienced economic and social inequality. This coupled with a high level of
corruption and nepotism has led to a heightened level of dissatisfaction
among its population. Modern Chinese youth with their knowledge of western
liberal ideas and values have increasingly rejected a statist control way of
functioning but instead break out and challenged the state by creating protest
spaces for themselves to push for their agenda.
This paper will explore the Internet as an important platform and method
for social mobilization of like-minded individuals. It will also investigate how
cyberactivism has been transformed into real life activism in their fight
against social injustice and social inequality.
Chinese State and Civil Society in the Making
In our earlier work on Social Movements in China and Hong Kong: The
Expansion of Social Space, we argued that there are emerging voices from
various social strata of the Chinese population who are embracing different
sets of social values that differ markedly from the old Communist state and
ideology. And that these voices are contributing to the transformation of the
society as a whole. We argued that these emerging social forms and voices
revealed a struggle between economic and social forces (Kuah-Pearce and
Copyright © 2012 CNAS/TU

16 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Guiheux, 2009: 15-16). At the same time, we also agreed with Touraine’s
conceptualization that the emergence of individualized movements is
coterminous with the rise of individual autonomy and individualism. Unlike
what Putnam has argued, as the fragmenting western countries was brought
about because of the collapse of the various social institutions, we contended
that the erosion of the Chinese society was the deliberate attempt by the
Chinese State and Party that prevented autonomy (Kuah-Pearce and Guiheux:
17). Hence, unlike the breaking up of the western society, we argued then
that in China, the society has yet to be produced. Today, my personal view is
that the civil society is now in the making and is progressing rapidly as we
witnessed a proliferation of social protests and social movements throughout
the country – in the urban, rural and cyber settings.
At the turn of the 20th century and into the present 21st century, China has
become a global economic powerhouse. It has superseded Japan as the world
second largest economy and predicted to overtake the United States in the
foreseeable future. Along with its encouragement of foreign investment, there
is also the inflow of foreign and local talents. In addition to expatriates, we
have the return migrants, commonly called the haigu2, leading to a brain gain
today as America and Europe continued to suffer from economic downturn.
This influx of personnel has brought along not only technological talents but
significantly, ideas of liberalism, democracy, rights and justice.
As China opens its doors in the economic sector, modern technology and
telecommunication have become important ubiquitous tools to further the
speedy development of China. The massive and rapid development of a wired
society has become the hallmark of modernity as well as economic
sustainability. Lerner in his book on the “The Passing of Traditional Society”
argued that the developing world was impatient as they wanted the hardware
in terms of institutions, infrastructure and technology but not the software as
western ideologies referring to liberal ideas, rights of all kinds, ideas of
autonomy, etc would constitute a challenge to the state (Lerner, 1958: ix).
This is also the case in 21st century China where western ideas of
development, sustainability, financial prudence, etc are wanted but ideas of
liberalism, democracy, rights, individualism, etc are not welcome. These
latter constituted an alternative platform that will challenge the state in its
control over its citizenry.
However, the Chinese saying of “paper cannot wrap a fire” (zhi bao
buliao huo 纸抱不了火) is very apt here in expressing how the citizenry
looks at their pace of development and modernization. The fervour expressed
by individuals in relation to the entrepreneurial spirit has flowed down to

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 17
migrant workers and professionals. Along with these economic activities,
there is also a heightened flow of information among the citizenry, aided by
the rapid development of telecommunication and the cyberspace technology.
What we are witnessing today is the spontaneous reactions of the individuals
coming together to fight for a cause that they are passionate about and of
which they considered themselves or others as victims of state persecution,
social injustices and corporate greed.
So this leads us to another issue of how we view the Chinese individuals?
As China moves into the 21st century, what we are witnessing is the growth
of individualization among its citizens. There are two strands of movement
within the masses. The first, as described by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim
(2002) is the emergence of the individualized self where the concern is one’s
individual welfare that led to the breakdown of social and familial structure
as well as the social and moral ethos of the community. This form of
individualization has led to extreme self-centredness and a decline in
morality of the mainland Chinese today where nobody wishes to become a
good Samaritan anymore for fear of being implicated by others for their good
deeds (Yan 2009). Yan provided the example that a good Samaritan being
extorted by the person whom he or she helped during an accident. This
person would then demand payment for injury caused and threaten to report
the incident to the police if payment is not forthcoming. This resulted in
bystanders watching accidents that occurred and not helping for fear of being
implicated (Yan, 2009). The interrogation of the morals of the Chinese
individuals caught up in the rapidly modernizing China become great concern
for the Chinese state and the society as they viewed the declining state of
morality among these individuals (Kleinman, A., et al, 2011).
The second, along with the rise of middle class, is the focus on
individualized non-economic needs and individuals coming together as a
group to defend “specific spheres of life” (Calhoun, 1995: 184). These
individuals, some are professionals while others are housewives, unemployed
workers, students and retirees constitute an important force to reckon with as
they have the ability to organize and galvanise the public to their cause
(Kuah-Pearce and Guiheux, 2009: 14). The causes are often issue and context
specific and relevant at the prevailing time. To Calhoun, these individuals are
concerned with “identity politics” (Calhoun 1995: 175; also Kuah-Pearce and
Guiheux, 2009: 15) and such form of social mobilization for a particular
cause at a point in time have provided an alternative space for expression.
Social movements, although still at its infancy, have increased in scope,
size and intensity. Today, we see the flowering of these movements, big and

18 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
small, almost on a daily basis within the Chinese polity. These movements
could be found in local villages, regional cities and the key financial cities
throughout China. From the protests against the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre to
kidnapping of children, child labour, tainted milk and toys, confiscation and
eviction of village homes and corrupt practices, we could see small groups of
placard holding women, young people, workers, and others donning the
streets and protesting against these different aspects of political and socio-
economic failings.
The appearance of these protesters in front of a government bureaucracy,
police station, hospital and the streets was increasingly attributed to the
growth of people’s voices, minsheng (民声) as well as people’s judgment,
minshen (民审) who were no longer willing to accept the official explanation
of events that which affected their everyday life and the lives of the ordinary
people. They wanted their voices heard and they wanted to be the judge of
these events that either affected them directly or obliquely. Taking to the
streets was but one way of expressing their voices and especially,
increasingly using the local, national and global media to their advantages.
However, such actions required some form of organization and today, the use
of the internet has become the key to social mobilization.
Internet as a Tool and Method for Social Mobilisation
The use of the internet has created new ways of expressing people’s voices
and people’s judgment to a new China that is emerging not only as an
economic powerhouse but also a powerful force to contest with. Unlike the
traditional form of protest organizing, today, the internet with the click of a
button will send out information instantaneously that inform people of the
location and actions for protesting purposes. Today, as we see the actual
protest actions in different villages and cities of China taking place, we can
be assured of the fact that the mobilization and gathering of these individuals
that eventually forms social movement groups is made possible because of
the use of the internet. Hence, the internet has become an important tool for
social mobilization. Tai argued that the internet has become a way of
democratizing communication, enable voices to be heard and led to the rise
of civil society (Tai, 2006).
Apart from the actual protest movements, increasingly it is the people’s
voices and judgments on the internet that become an important force for the
local and central government not only to take notice but to act. The
cyberspace has become an important platform for the people to express their
voices and virtual protest space.

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 19
The Social Media Network Scene in China
According to China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC): China
Internet Development Statistics Report (2001 Mid-term), there were 485
million internet users as of July 2011 (http://micgadget.com/13849/cnnic-
china-internet-development-statistics-report-2011-mid-year/) . The Xinhua
English news reported in September that the number of internet users in
China has passed the 500 million mark in 2011
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-09/29/c_ 131167919.
htm). Of those using the internet, the breakdown of uses is as follows: home
network internet users — 390 millions; mobile internet users — 318 millions
and microblog users — 195 millions.
Virtual or Net voices, wangsheng (网声) are expressed by the netizens,
wangmin (网民) through various social media sites and within the last few
years, weibo (微博) (sina weibo and tencent weibo), the microblog equivalent
of twitter has become the most popular and superseded other popular Chinese
chat and social media sites such as QQ IM, Qzone, Pengyou, Baidu and
Sohu. The sina weibo site reported over 250 million registered members with
90 million daily posts by October 2011. It reported that 76% of the users
were between the ages of 19 -30 years and held a diploma. Besides, about
equal number of men and women used this platform. It reported 58% were
male users (http://techrice.com/2011/10/26/sina-weibo-hits-250-million-
registered-users-plans-spin-off-exclusive/). The tencent weibo site reported
200 million registered members and 112 million active members (http://
news.ichinastock.com/2011/06/tencent-weibos-accelerating-growth-200-
million-users-115-million-active/). Like Twitter, Weibo enables users to read
and send short messages online immediately and this has gained instant
popularity in China because of the ease and speed in its usage. In short, very
apt in its expression “information at one’s fingertips”, weibo has transformed
the way Chinese view, obtain, use, transmit and communicate information.
Here, time and speed is the essence. No longer do the Chinese need to
transmit information through the highways and the byways, now it is through
the cyberway and the result is instantaneous.
One point to note here is that the internet users often have multiple
accounts and served various websites simultaneously and on regular basis.
They have the ability to switch from one site to another with ease and many
do so to check on information as well as to send information and
communicate with others. The use of weibo and other local and international
internet platforms have enabled the individual Chinese citizens to utilize

20 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
cyberspace for all kinds of uses – from daily gossips by women to political
activism (Kuah-Pearce, 2008a and 2008b). It is the latter that we are most
interested in.
As we are aware, China, despite its open door policy and rapid economic
growth, continues to be very guarded in its treatment of political development
and the political events. The Chinese media continued to be under strict
control in order to ensure politically correct reporting. At the same time,
political movements including all kinds of protest movements are subjected
to heavy surveillance and control. Likewise, street gatherings are also
subjected to monitoring. On dates which are politically sensitive, public
places would be subjected to heavy policing. For example on the eve and the
day of the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, one is guaranteed of the presence of
police in the Tiananmen Square.
Despite this, we witnessed the sporadic gathering of people to protest for
a variety of issues. And today, there is an increase in the frequency of these
protest groups. Many of these protests today are relatively small scale
protests with several tens rather than hundreds of people. These individuals
are protesting against food or policies that affect their life. For example, the
protests against the selling of substandard and tainted milk powder that
resulted in brain damage and even death of children; the force eviction of
village homes by property developers in collusion with the village officials
have led to exposure of corruption and collusion. What started as localized
protests, have ended up grabbing the attention of the central government and
forcing the government to act against the protesters. When such events
happened, the weibo users started weibo-ing each other and this formed a
force to mobilize the netizens to gather and protest. At the same time, weibo
also facilitated flows of ideas and condemnation of such practices. Such
online views often called for government actions to punish those involved in
corrupt practices. When voices became numerous in the hundreds of
thousands and millions, it became too vocal for the government to ignore and
forced it to act on these issues.
The cyberspace is a very fluid space and because of the speed which it has
been able to transmit information, it has become a more effective space for
mass mobilization and protest organisation. Besides, the internet users are
also fluid in terms of the use of these spaces. They could easily move from
one internet space to another and from one microblog to another. It is a
common knowledge that netizens follow many websites and are registered
users of multiple webspaces. When one internet site became too “hot” and is
blocked by government authority, these netizens would simply scroll to

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 21
another site for information and continue their weibo-ing. The existence of
numerous sites, foreign and local made policing almost impossible. Because
of the footloose nature of the netizens, it has become very difficult for the
Chinese government to do online policing, control and censorship despite
installing Great Firewall to screen unwanted information, delete posts and
ban search words. Despite attempts to control the cyberspace, online
activisms continues unabated. At the same time, some of these online
activisms have been transformed into real world activism.
Today, the number of internet users has swelled to over 2 billion globally.
In Asia alone, there are over 922 million users, representing 44% of the world
internet users. In China, there are over 495 million users, representing 23% of
the world internet users (http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/ world-
overview/34-world-usage-patterns-and-demographics). The fact that all these
users are interconnected through their use of the various internet sites and
microblogs meant that messages posted on these internet sites or microblogs
will be guaranteed a large audience by the millions that transcend social and
political boundary enabling those within the country and outside to know of
the issues discussed and also the call for action.
In the following, I will provide three examples to illustrate how the
internet and microblogs worked to provide a space for communication and
mobilized the netizens for social activism as well as the obstructions faced by
these online activists in an increasingly highly monitored and controlled
cyberspace.
Case I: Jasmine Rally in February, March 2011
In the spring of 2011, there has been a proliferation of political activities in
the Arab world, culminating with the toppling of the authoritarian regime of
Tunisia, Egypt and most recently Libya. At around the same time, since mid-
February 2011, probably inspired by Jasmine Revolution in the Arab world,
there emerged online messages calling on people to take stroll in Beijing,
Shanghai and other big cities in China. According to the SCMP, these
messages first appeared on overseas social networking sites such as Twitter
and Boxun. After the initial appearance, these messages were blocked from
viewing in mainland China. Subsequently, these messages appeared in other
websites such as Facebook and Google blog. These messages called for
people to step up and express their discontent and display their grievances
caused by inflation, rising house price, loss of justice and other
dissatisfactions against the authorities and big corporations in mainland
China (SCMP, March 1, 2011)

22 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
A message posted on the Facebook under a username “China’s Jasmine
Revolution” called for a stroll in Beijing’s Wangfujing and People’s Square
in Shanghai at 2:00 pm on Sunday 6 March 2011. This Facebook message
asked individuals or groups to either take a stroll or eat at a fast food
restaurant such as KFC or Macdonald. The code of action for 6 March 2011
was to order the set meal No 3 at the KFC or Macdonald. This message was
purportedly sent by organizers of pro-democracy protests although there was
no name attached to it. In an email reply to SCMP, one purported organizer
said the over 80 people in Hong Kong helped put up the Facebook page
(SCMP, March 1, 2011).
Another anonymous post from blogspot also called for a stroll in 35 major
cities in mainland China and the gathering place in Beijing was moved to
Xidan, another popular shopping place in Beijing (SCMP, March 1, 2011).
On 5 March, an open letter appeared on Boxun, targeting all major
universities across mainland, Hong Kong and Taiwan, and called on the
students to step up and take a stroll on the main campus square, in front of the
administration building of their respective university. The recipients of this
open letter included Peking University, Tsinghua University, Renmin
University, Fudan University, Sun yat-sen University and Xiamen University.
The message read as “we, as organizers of the rallies, are also your peers and
participants in the rallies, and we are your alumni and as young as you”
(SCMP, March 6, 2011).
From the very beginning, the Chinese government was cautious of such
online calls. It took immediate measure to prevent such messages appearing
on mainland-based online forums and Weibo. The words “Jasmine” and
“stroll” were blocked from appearing on the websites. So, if you attempt to
type in these words, a blank will appear. Thus, in mainland China, only
individuals who were able to circumvent the internet block would have read
the message and the call for taking a stroll at the designated spots. For the
majority of internet users, they were unaware of the call for Jasmine rally. As
such, only a small scale protest occurred in Beijing and Shanghai on 20 and
27 February 2011 and paled in comparison with the “Jasmine Revolution” of
the Arab World. It was reported that on 20 February, there were a handful of
protesters carrying banners, holding Jasmine flowers and chanting slogans.
On February 27, there were more people appearing at the specified time and
at the designated place. When the street was cordoned off by the police, many
people expressed they did not know what happened (SCMP, Feb 28,
2011).Because of the loose nature of this kind of protest movement, it was

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 23
difficult for the police to identify the protesters from the pedestrians and
regular shoppers, hence making it almost impossible to make arrests.
Case II: Organizing Civil Investigation Group: the Case of Qian Yunhui
Background of Qian Yunhui and His Death
If the above case reveals a failed attempt of organising real world protest, the
case revolving the death of Qian Yunhui demonstrates the power of online
activism.
Qian Yunhui （钱云会), was an elected village chief. He was found dead
under the wheel of a truck on the morning of December 25, 2010 in Yueqing
(乐清), Zhejiang province. A post appeared at noon in a Yueqing online
forum, describing Qian was overpowered by five men and crushed by the
truck. It soon spread to other online forums and became a heated topic. The
horrific picture, showing Qian’s torso under the wheel of the truck, first
appeared on Tianya online forum in the afternoon. According to the New
York Times, the initial post attracted about 20,000 comments within 36 hours,
but it was soon deleted (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/29
/world/asia/29china.html). The picture and message of Qian’s death spread to
weibo quickly. In the most popular Sina Weibo (新浪微博), in just five days
following Qian’s death (from December 25 to December 29), there were
464,564 postings on weibo citing the name of Qian Yunhui.3
While the accident was widely circulated in the internet, the official
version of Qian’s death was categorized as a “traffic accident” and appeared
in the official Yueqing website (乐清网) on the day of Qian’s death.
This official view of regarding Qian’s death as a traffic accident caused
an uproar among the netizens who responded angrily on the internet. Qian’s
death instantly became a dominant online event at the end of 2010. Netizens
were suspicious of the death of Qian and many were of the view that Qian
was murdered by local authorities (SCMP, Dec 29, 2010).
Prior to his death, Qian had been petitioning for six years to get proper
compensation for the villagers as a result of the land loss due to state
acquisition. Because of his action, Qian was detained three times by the local
officials and was just released in July 2010 (http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/12/29/world/asia/29china.html). After his release, in August 2010, a
post in Tianya bearing his name of Qian Yunhui reflected on the process of
illegal land acquisition by the Yueqing authority. Due to these facts, the
internet users believed that the Yueqing authority killed Qian to silence his
voice on the internet and his protest actions.
As a result of this murder, the netizens started to voice their views on the

24 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
internet and the microblogs challenging the local authorities’ conclusion of
Qian’s death. They queried Qian’s death by examining and asking the
authorities over the following questions: Why was it that the brand new
sidewalk camera failed to work at that moment of Qian’s death? Why was the
witness detained by the Yueqing police? What was the true identity of culprit
and why at that moment, did he drive the truck in the wrong direction, and
did he brake? Why was the culprit taken away by the police so swiftly within
five minutes? Was this because it was planned and the policemen were
already there waiting for the accident? Why was it that Qian was crushed
precisely on the neck? All these questions pointed to the fact that the netizens
felt that the “accident” was a deliberately staged one to kill Qian
(http://news.ifeng.com/ society/special/leqingchehuoshigu/).
In addition to voices of the netizens, the traditional media such as
Southern Weekly also reported on the suspicious circumstances surrounding
the Qian’s death (http://www.infzm.com/content/53959).
These various voices and reporting added pressure on the Yueqing local
authorities to act and appease the public. They arranged a news conference on
December 27 and attempted to answer some of the questions posed by the
netizens (http://www.infzm.com/content/53959). But it reinstated that Qian
died in a car accident and that it was not a murder case. The press conference
not only did not appease the general public but it rather brought along fresh
criticisms. In online forum and weibo, netizens criticized the official
explanation as a sloppy cover up and demanded further investigation. Bowing
to online pressure, on 27 December, the Yueqing authority opened an official
weibo account named “ping an yue qing () and promising to post
latest progress on investigation of Qian’s case for public viewing. It also
welcomed the supervision of the netizens for this case
(http://weibo.com/u/1909545300).
The criticisms online were so strong that on the early morning of 28
December 2010, the Wenzhou municipal party committee appointed the
Wenzhou public security bureau to intervene and further investigate on the
causes surrounding Qian’s death – whether it is a murder and traffic accident
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2010-12/30/c_12934476.htm).
On 29 December, Wenzhou authority arranged for another news
conference and the deputy director of Wenzhou public security accepted an
interview from the most powerful traditional media, CCTV. The Wenzhou
authority selectively responded to the question of netizens and reiterated that
Qian died in a traffic accident, not murdered by others
(http://society.people.com.cn/GB/13845607.html).

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 25
However, the response of the deputy director further reinforced the distrust
towards the Chinese authority and reduced its credibility in the eyes of the
public and the netizens. The latter continued to challenge the official
conclusion of Qian’s case as a traffic accident. Unhappy with the official
reason, the netizens started an online campaign, calling for the formation of a
third-party independent civil investigating group to handle this case
(http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2010-12/30/c_12934476.htm)
From Online Activism to Real Life Activism: Independent Civil
Investigating Group
From the existing and searchable records,4 on 28 December, the bloggers on
the internet advocated the formation of a civil investigating group to look into
Qian’s death. One weibo blogger, Wang Gongquan, voiced the need to
organize a third party civil group to investigate Qian’s death
(http://weibo.com/u/2832257452). On the same day, another popular Weibo
blogger, Xiaoshu also advocated it (http://news.xinhuanet.com/it/2010-
12/30/c_12934476.htm). Within two days, from 28 to 29 December, there
were about 3300 posts on Sina weibo discussing the need to form an
independent investigating group or public observation
(独立调查或公民观察). As a result of this online activism, three civil
investigating groups were formed to investigate this case and the findings
were placed on Sina weibo microblog (weibo.com). In this sense, online
activism has facilitated the formation of real world activism.
First Group: Wang Xianshan Investigating group: This group comprised of
Wang Xiaoshan and Dou Hanzhang, both are popular Sina Weibo Bloggers.
Wang is a column writer and Dou is a Finance commentator. They arrived in
Yueqing on 30 December. They contacted local authorities and asked to see
the camera record of the truck’s driving path, the photograph of the scene,
and made a request to talk with the security guards who were on the scene on
that date. (http://shehui.daqi.com/article/3040777.html). During the
investigation, Wang Xiaoshan posted the latest findings, the details of their
contact with local authorities and so on. But Wang was pessimistic about the
independent investigation. He wrote in his Weibo blog:
In the current situation of China, independent investigation was
nonsense…. Our group was only a low grade netizen observing group
(低端网友围观团), we represented only ourselves
(http://shehui.daqi.com/article/3040777.html).
In the end, he concluded in the weibo that:

26 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
It is entirely impossible to count on us to investigate the truth…..What I
could ensure was that I did not lie. I did not have any conclusion (after the
investigation), I could not find evidences to support a murder conclusion,
nor could I find the witness who saw the occurrence of the traffic accident.
I had a suspicion, but I could not say a word without proof
(http://shehui.daqi.com/article/ 3040777.html).
Like Wang, Dou Hanzhang also reported the details and the findings in
his personal Weibo, but made a different conclusion. On January 4, he posted
to conclude that Qian had died in a traffic accident.
Group 2: Xu Zhiyong Investigating Group: This group composed of Dr. Xu
Zhiyong, a lawyer Pengjian and other three citizens. This group was formed
on December 28 and reached Yueqing on 29. They reported that they have
visited more than 20 villagers who had come to the scene on the day of
Qian’s death, talked to Qian’s mother and sister. They also managed to talk to
Qian Chengyu, a witness of Qian’s death, and interviewed villagers about the
process of their long year petition for getting proper compensation, analyzed
the videos shot by villagers and the police and so on. In the end, they came
up with a conclusion: Qian died in a traffic accident. The report was posted
on Xu Zhiyou’s blog on 31 December, 2010
(http://www.kaixin001.com/repaste/7069278_3885628774.html).
Group 3: Yu Jianrong Investigating Group: This group was composed mainly
of academics, led by Yu Jianrong, a professor of Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (社科院) and also a popular weibo blogger. They registered a new
account in Sina Weibo for this investigation under the name of “Academic
Citizens’s Yueqing Observing Group (学界公民乐清观察团)
(http://news.ifeng.com/society/special/leqingchehuoshigu/content-
2/detail_2011_01/01/3867107_0.shtml). This account, however, could not be
read now. On December 28, Yu posted that he was invited by another popular
blogger Xiaoshu to organize a civil investigating group. He wrote that
without the cooperation of Wenzhou authority, the independent investigation
could not be carried out. On December 29, Yu posted that Yueqing police
station welcomed them to investigate the Qian’s case. Thus, on December 31,
this group reached Yueqing. Yu talked to Qian’s father, son and daughter, and
also communicated with the local authority. During his investigation, he kept
the public informed through posting on his personal weibo
(http://news.ifeng.com/society/special/leqingchehuoshigu/content-
2/detail_2011_01/01/3867107_0.shtml). This group spent about three days in
Yueqing. In January 2, 2011, Yu made his conclusion in weibo: “Under the

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 27
situation that key evidences and witness cannot be approached, as non
professional criminal investigators, it is not realistic for us to judge whether
Qian died in a traffic accident or was murdered by others”
(http://weibo.com/yujianrong?key_word= 钱云会&is_search=1).
Their conclusions were unsatisfactory to the public. These celebrities
were criticized. Rumors began to spread online that these independent
investigators were taking bribes from the Yueqing authority. Some began to
reflect on and discuss whether organizing independent investigating groups
was a feasible method of resolving conflicts in the current situation of China
(http://www.21fd.cn/a/yijianzhongguo/2010/1231/17539.html). Despite the
criticism, it is significant to note that online voices and activism could
sometimes lead to real world activism, even though for this particular case,
the outcome has not been satisfactory.
Case 3: Dalian Protest - A Spontaneous Protest against Chemical Plant
This protest was mainly directed at the Fujia plant in Dalian, a city in
Liaoning province. It represented an investment worth more than 60 billion
yuan and is one of the biggest producers of PX, a toxic chemical, in China.
The controversy revolved around the location of the plant. The Fujia plant
was located in 20 kilometers outside of the city center, so close that it posed a
danger to the life of Dalian people. Scientists said that chemical spill would
damage the central nervous system, liver and kidney and so on. In addition,
the plant was operating before getting environmental approval (SCMP, Aug
20, 2011).
On August 8, 2011, typhoon Muifa breached a dyke, the local emergency
headquarters proposed for evacuation once leak happened. Later, even though
the threat of the dyke breach was controlled and toxic chemical leak was not
found, Fujia plant has drawn the attention of traditional media
(http://paper.people.com.cn/jhsb/html/2011-08/09/content_892763.htm).
In fact, the debate on the Dalian PX project appeared on popular online
forum, such as Tianya, as early as 2009 (http://www.lifeweek.com.cn
/2011/0826/34723_5.shtml). However, it became an event only in August
2011. On August 8, the journalists from CCTV attempted to enter into the
plant to report the dyke breach, but they were stalled and beaten by the staff
of the plant. Even with the coordination of local authorities such as the head
of police station of Jinzhou district and associate secretary chief of Dalian,
the journalists could not approach the site of the breached dyke. The
chairman of Fujia plant even made a statement to his staff “(if) let one
journalist in, you become dead men”. On August 9, 2011, traditionally

28 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
influential media such as Jinghua times (京华时报), Southern weekly
(南方周末), Xinhua reported the incidence. On the same day, Dalian
authority revealed the case of Fujia plant and discussed its relocation in
public (http://paper.people.com.cn/jhsb/html/2011-8/9/content_892763.htm).
With the reporting on conventional media, the concern with the threat of
PX project resurfaced on popular online forum. Numerous messages were
posted on online forums and Weibo encouraging individuals to go for a stroll
in Peoples’ Square on August 14, 2011 (weibo.com, retrieved 6/12/2011).
These messages were soon deleted. “Stroll” became a banned search word on
some websites. However, in Sina Weibo, QQ and MSN, the message
continued to spread. From existing records on Sina weibo, it was still
possible to find “taking a stroll” written on some of their blogs. For example,
the weibo blogger騎牜看迣屆 wrote “CCTV has compromised…. People
should not be weak, people should resist. At 10:00 am, August 14, I must
attend.” (http://weibo.com/u/2293672580).
Another blogger named Memory of the Blue Sea and Blue Sky
(记忆中的碧海蓝天) stated that:
“I will go on August 14, because I want to stand up for my coming son. In
the future I can tell my son, your mother and father help to repel PX, (we)
make some contributions, so now you enjoy good environment. If Dalian
were destroyed, would you still have a home even if you paid off the
mortgage? Do not make yourself regret when things cannot be changed.
For Dalian, please make your contribution, stand out. The government is
not against our activity” (weibo.com, retrieved 6/12/2011).5
The details of the stroll, such as time and place were specified on the
online posts. South China Morning Post reported that some people got the
information on the stroll from MSN and they went with friends. Due to this
online preparation, people were well prepared and appeared on the designated
time of protest. Many people carried with them masks, T-shirts, banners and
posters (SCMP, Aug 20, 2011).
On December 14, thousands of people flooded into People’s Square, the
designated protesting space according to those online posts. People marched
down the streets and petitioned in front of municipal government. Protesters
chanted slogans and sang national anthem. The mayor of Dalian, Tangjun
came out to appease the protesters, but when he failed to give a definite
answer on the deadline for relocating the plant, protesters shouted “get out”.
Protesters requested that 1) Fujia plant should be shut down immediately; 2)
the time of relocation be announced; 3) those responsible for the leak be
investigated and penalized; and 4) mass media be allowed to report the event

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 29
(http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-08-15/040022990238.shtml).
In the afternoon, scuffles occurred between demonstrators and riot police,
but did not escalate into violent attack. The Dalian government made a
decision that Fujia plant should stop operation immediately and move out of
Dalian as soon as possible, but still it did not reveal the relocation place and
time. At night, more riot police with shields and batons came to the scene;
they cordoned off the street and broke up the crowds. They arrested some
demonstrators, but most of them were soon released after taking records.
Some were detained for a short time (SCMP, Aug 20, 2011).
On August 14, the government prohibited reports of Dalian’s protest in
traditional and online media and that mass media should only cite the report
from Xinhua news. Terms such as “stroll” and “Dalian” continued to be
banned from appearing on the search engine online. Despite such censorship,
pictures about Dalian’s protest could still be seen in some online forums, and
influential media such as Sanlian Lifestyle Weekly () still
reported on it (http://www.lifeweek.com.cn/2011/0826/34723_8.shtml).
Dalian’s protest was considered as one of the few cases where grassroots
movement achieved its purpose and the government made concession to the
people’s request. This success is made possible because of the ability of the
individuals to use the internet and microblog spaces to fight for their cause.
Internet as a Framework to Understand Modern Social Movements
From the above examples, it is possible for us to view the internet as both a
tool for the citizenry to forage information, communicate and organize social
activism both online and on the ground.
It is possible to establish the following propositions:
The Internet as a Tool for the Emerging Civil Society: The internet users
are savvy in technological knowledge and are able to use the internet for a
variety of purposes from gathering information to communicating and
disseminating knowledge as well as mobilizing socio-political activism.
Many of these netizens have multiple accounts on the internet platforms and
microblogs and they use them interchangeably and regularly.
a) Netizens made use of multiple internet platforms and microblogs to
mobilize individuals to stage protest movements in the cyberspace
and on the ground.
b) The speed of the transmission of information and call for action
through the cyberspace and microblogs has enabled speedy
participation and activism. This has become a successful means for
social activism as evidenced by the spring revolution of the Arab

30 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
world and various protest actions in mainland China.
c) Unlike the earlier forms of protest movements that have visible
presence in the forms of an aggregate of protesters on the ground,
the internet and microblogs online organizing has now shifted its
focus to loosely organized individuals in the crowd yet not seen as
an aggregate group of protesters. This strategy of mingling with the
crowd and yet sending a message to the political leaders as well as
avoiding the monitoring attention of the police in big cities has
become a new tactic on the part of the netizens to get their voice
heard and at the same time intermingle with the local crowd.
d) Messages posted on the internet and microblog sites are not bound
within a polity. In fact they are borderless so long as one has access
to the internet and knows how to surf. Because of this globalised
nature of the internet, social mobilization is not confined to within
the citizenry of a nation, but also those in the global world. So, the
participation of online activism sometimes becomes viral globally
with participation from individuals in all parts of the world. Even as
social activism is grounded in actual locality, it is not uncommon to
see online support coming from netizens throughout the world. In
this sense, the social actions of the local citizenry take on a global or
transnational dimension.
e) Local protest movements take on a global dimension with
participation from local citizens and global citizens as well. As we
explore and understand the emergence of civil society in places such
as China, we are also witnessing an expansion of global civil society
on the cyberspace. It is the support from the global civil society that
lends confidence to the local civil society to enact mass mobilization
and social and online activism.
The Internet as a Social Science Methodology: A second aspect of the
internet is that it could also be used as a social science methodology to assist
us to gather information on social movements and patterns of social
mobilization in China and globally. It is possible to establish the following
propositions:
a) The cyber-platform has also become a significant method for social
sciences research. Through the collection of a variety of data for a
particular topic – such as on social movement – we can build up a
profile of how members view certain issues in a society and how
they go about mobilizing the netizens to act either on the cyberspace

Cyberactivism in Mainland China 31
or in real space.
b) By employing the necessary softwares, extensive data for certain
topics could be gathered to enable researchers to establish profile
and understand trends on a comparative basis of the subject under
study. In this sense, the Internet serves as a depository of knowledge
and especially knowledge of current events.
c) One of Social Sciences methodologies increasingly is that of
qualitative data collection. Various internet platforms and
microblogs are indeed voices of the people and through the
systematic study of these voices, one is able to build up a profile of
how a group of people thinks, views and reacts to certain cultural,
social, political and economic issues.
d) Through participating and observing the actions in these internet
platforms and microblogs, social scientists have also embarked
increasingly on Public Sociology, Public Anthropology, etc where
the academia meets the public and through such interaction, social
scientists not only attempts to understand the society but also to
become a part of the society.
Conclusion
The emergence of the internet and various social networking sites like
Facebook, Twitter, Weibo and Tencent makes communication simpler and
enables social mobilization to take place not only quicker but also enables the
message to reach out to mass audience, then enabling mass participation. As
such, the internet and microblogs such as Twitter and Weibo have emerged as
new tools for individuals that aim to challenge political status quo, fight for
social injustices and transform the social, political and economic landscapes.
In this sense, we enter into the era of “Twitter Revolution” and “Weibo
Revolution”. The Internet is now regarded as an important tool for social
mobilization and organizing social protests.
At the same time, the availability of the internet and microblogs has also
enabled social scientists to dip into these sources not only for information
gathering but also to delve into the voices of the people and understand their
quest for actions and interaction. It also enables social scientists to engage in
a participatory role through their communication and interaction with the
netizens instead of merely observing their actions and monitoring their
voices. In this sense, the Internet enables the social scientists to rethink their
methodological approach to the studies of their subjects in modernity.

32 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Notes
1. The author is grateful to her research assistant Jin Hong for help with data
collection. This paper was first presented at the International Conference on
Social Science Methodology: A Special Reference to Social Movements in
Kathmandu, Nepal. The author wished to thank the organizers for their support in
this research.
2. For a discussion of haigui, see Guo, S.B. (2010) on return migration.
3. Data retrieved from Sina weibo database on October 13, 2011.
4. Due to the sever internet control, some radical post may be deleted by Sina.
website secretary, and because of limits of display set up by sina, not all existing
weibo can be seen.
5. This account has been permanently deleted.
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Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012), 35-83
Copyright © 2012 CNAS/TU
AFTER LIBERALISM, MARXISM – LENINISM AND
MAOISM WHAT NEXT 'ISM' DOES NEPALESE FATE
ADHERE TO?
Balkrishna Mabuhang

Abstract
This article is divided into four major parts. First part highlights the social
diversity and discrepancies along with the efforts to build a monolithic nation
state. The second part tries to review the theoretical discourse on pluralism
and its derivatives Nepal has perceived to be, and experienced on political,
ideological, and social enigmas. Third part reveals the major discrepancy on
Maoist insurgency and popular Second People's Movement. And fourth part
sheds light on Constituent Assembly, state restructuring, and conclusion.
Social Diversity with Discrepancies
Despite its heterogeneity, Nepal is neither a melting pot like America1 nor is
like People's Republic of China which is trying to maintain the homogeneity
with an overwhelming majority (96%) of Han nationality. Rather, we are
closer to the Republic of India in terms of its spatial proximity, social and
cultural accessibility and diversity in languages, Indigenous Nationalities
(INs), and religions. Despite of profound ethno-demographic and linguistic
diversities concentrated in different geographical locations, and watersheds of
multiculturalism, Nepalese Nation State building project could not envisage
them as fundamental premises. However, states that are enriched by different
languages, cultures, religions and traditions are to consider diversities as
opportunity (Majeed et al., 2008). Both neighbouring countries, China and
India, have accommodated their diversities to the fullest extent, no matter
what political system they are practising.
In Nepal, there are 5 Development Regions, 14 zones, 75 districts and
many other local units; none of them is identified with social, cultural,
linguistic and regional sentiments and population not least in nomenclature.
Development, minus socio-cultural values, of the last six decades could not
address the development destitute; nor could the socio-cultural groups who
were marginalized against national integration be protected. The present
structure was introduced in 1972, followed by the one in 1982, during the
autocratic Panchayat regime. The process of subdivison of the country into

36 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
five development regions: Eastern, Central, Western, Mid- Western and Far
Western by creating a series of north-south growth axes or development
corridors to tie-in the economy of Tarai with that of the hills (Gurung,
2005a). However, at the moment, many development experts argue that the
present structure, a five-regional development model can promote
complimentarily between the two topographical economies by facilitating
movement of trade, labour, and capital. The essence of making a vertical unit
which comprises Tarai, hill, and mountain, Bohora (2003) argues it mirrors
the major river basins of Nepal and thus will make development of water
resources easier by minimizing hill versus Tarai conflicts in sharing the
benifit. However, Nepal has the least significant experience in working with
reciprocity in the development sector between mountain, hill and Terai region
in the last 6 decades. In fact, the current regional structure was purely a
conception of the elite and development experts in the ruling hierarchy; it
was not a grass root demand, which is so prime in designing the units and
subunits of the state. The ruler centric performance of the structure showed
that it was designed neither for devolution of political power to the people
nor for addressing any grievances of the marginalized socio-cultural groups
(Sharma, 2007).
Despite their alleged Indian background, administrative terminologies and
place names of the early Lichchavi period were mainly in non-Sanskrit
language (cited in Bista, 1991). However, this was subsequently replaced by
Sanskrit in a very tricky way, since Casteism has played a predominant role
in the governance of Nepal. During Panchayat era, Hindu nation state
ideology was imposed in such a way that even the existing names of
mountains, places, rivers, and even individuals' were replaced by those names
that were very alien to local culture, and inhabitants. For example,
'Chamchamlungma' (Limbu languages) is called Mt. Sagarmatha (Sanskrit),
similarly Mt.Phaktanglungma to Mt.Kumbhakarna, Mt. Chen-chenlungma to
Mt. Kanchanjangha and so forth (Chemjong, 1964). One interesting feature
we can visualize in the travelogue of Late Dr. Harka Gurung (2007) on
suffixes to the names of rivers, mostly, in the hill area is that, they end with '-
wa' in the eastern part of Nepal, with '-di' in central part, and with '-gad' in the
mid and far western parts. The words- 'wa' in Limbu language, 'di' in Magar
language, and 'Gad' in Khas language, all stands for water or springs. But the
river names follow from east to west: Mechi, Koshi, Bagmati, Narayani,
Gandaki, Rapti, Bheri, Seti, Karnali, and Mahakali; all sound feminine and
they mostly stand for Hindu deities. In this way, were chosen also the names
of political units after the names of mountains, places and rivers. The central

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 37
authority in Kathmandu, decided everything without consulting the local
inhabitants. So, despite their apprehension, the INs could not stand against
the State during the autocratic Panchayat regime. The nomenclature of sub-
states was also indifferent to interests of local inhabitants.
On the other hand, the process of state building resulted in ethnic
stratification (Hagen, 2007). During the State- building process, many ethnic
groups lost land to high-caste Hindus, as was the case for the Limbus of far
eastern Nepal in the nineteenth century (Caplan, 1970). There are numerous
similar cases found in different groups. According to 2001 Census, Chepang,
a small hill IN group accounts for about 50000 population concentrated in the
mid-hill and is divided into 5 districts, followed by Raji with 2399 population
divided into three districts and Thami with population 22,999 divided into
two districts. Even in Tarai, Dhimal has 19,537 population divided into two
districts, and Tachpuria with 13,250 population is divided into two districts.
Similarly, Hayu with 1,821 population is divided into two districts, and
Hyolmo with 570 population in central mountain is also divided into two
districts. The worth noting point in this narration is that the State while
building its sub-states, deliberately overlooked the existence of such
multicultural groups. There was no consultation with INs, ethnic groups,
linguistic and cultural groups and local inhabitants. The State tried to disperse
the multicultural population guided by a unitary set of thinking; also it often
considered social diversity the constraint for developments, and this all
contributed to inhibit the existence of acquired identities.2 There are some
groups of INs, such as Kumal, Bhujel and Kusunda; linguistically called
potentially endangered, endangered and moribund respectively, who are well
neither well off economically, nor represented politically or advanced
educationally.
There are 100 caste/ethnic groups, the National Census 2001 reported.
Out of them, only 18 groups are demographically visible, that is each exceeds
more than 1 percent of the total national population according to 2001
national census and cumulatively they account for more than 81 percent of
the total population. It shows the remaining 88 caste/ethnic groups, though
numerous in numbers, accounts for less than 19 percent population
(Mabuhang, 2009). Of the larger groups, Chetri of hill origin accounts for
15.8 percent of the national population, followed by hill Bahun (12.7 %),
Magar (7.1 %). Tharu (6.8 %), Tamang (5.6 %), Newar (5.6 %), Muslim (4.3
%), Kamai (3.9.0%), Yadav (3.9%). Rai (2.8 %), Gurung (2.4 %), Damai (1.7
%), Limbu (1.6 %), Thakuri (1.6%), Sarki (1.4%), Teli (1.3%), Chamar
(1.2%), and Koiri (1.1%) and so on. There are interesting tendencies Nepali

38 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
ethno-demography shows. On the one hand, hill Hindu highest caste group
Bahun accounts for the second largest population, but is not concentrated in
any geographical area, is rather spread across Nepal especially in the hill
region. On the other extreme, the lowest stratum of Hindu, Dalit group that
includes like Bishwokarma, Pariyar, Mijhar, Wadi and Gandharva - does not
concentrate on any particular geographical location. It is also spread across
the country especially in hill region. In contrast, INs are concentrated in
particular geographical points in all regions- mountain, hill, and Tarai. The
former two- Bahun and Dalit- are of the same stock, and are a dichotomy in
the Hindu hierarchical value structure, whereas, the latter groups do not
belong to this cultural structure.
Historical Legacy of Nepal
Most states grew round a nucleus and expanded by conquest and
aggrandizement; the case of Nepal was no different (Gurung, 1986). Until the
mid-18th century, the territory presently occupied by Nepal was a congeries of
diverse political units. The valley, popularly known as Nepal khaldo was
inhabited by Newar community and was surrounded by the largest group
Tamang in between Budhi Gandaki in the west and Dudhkoshi in the east. From
Dudh Koshi to Arun river, there are more than a dozen of different Kirati
offshoots, historically known as Nau lakh Kirati (nine hundred thousand Kirati)

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 39
by number and as Koich and Khambus nomenclature. Beyond Arun river, up to
Tista river, the area was popularly known as Limbuwan However, the Sughauli
treaty signed between Nepal Government and the East India Company in 1816
maintained the Mechi river, the eastern border of Nepal. So, Limbuwan was
divided into two modern nation states, Nepal and India. Political organizations
were loosely formed of tribes with some confederations.
Das Limbuwan (of Ten Limbus chiefdoms) was well established during the
medieval period in far eastern part of present day Nepal (Chemjong, 6th edition
2003). West of Nepal Valley, the Magar inhabited Gandaki basin in the lower
hill with a confederation of Bahra Magarat (Twelve States) mainly along lower
Kaligandaki, followed by the higher region occupied by the Gurung with a
league of Gyu Rong (Nine Chiefs), later supplanted by the Ghale from Manang.
Bahra Magarat disintegrated with the penetration of Khasa Thakuri from the
west and Sen Thakuri from the south. By the 18th century, the Gandaki basin had
at least 24 (chaubisi) petty states led by Thakuri chiefs. Gorkha was the eastern-
most lordship in direct contact with the Nepal valley. The Khasam realm built in
Karnali basin extended to a large area west of the Gandaki, except the northern
belt of snows (Jadan), had a homogenous Khasa population. The Khasa Mallas
of Jumla had an imperial tradition from 11th to 14th century including Kuman,
and Purang in Tibet. Apart from this the southern part comprised about 18
percent of land that was covered up by dense forest known as charkoshe jhadi,
where more than a dozen INs, including different types of subgroups of Tharu,
and other ethnic groups inhabited fighting the endemic Malaria disease.

40 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Let us begin with the well chanted saying of Prithvinaran Shaha, "...if
everyone is alert, this will be a true 'Hindustan' of the four jats (caste), greater
or lesser, with the thirty- six classes (Stiller, 1968)." There are different
versions of it, but it depends on how one perceives the Nepalese society and
interprets it (Mabuhang, 2011). Prior to emergence of Prithivinaran Shah,
Sen Dynasty overran different strata of both inner Tarai and Tarai, stretched
from west to east and that they were competed for the Hindu Pati (Head of
Hindus) was prevalent among them (Stiller, 1968:13). According the
Chronicles of Sen Dynasty, they came from Chittaur of India. Despite King
Prithvi Narayan had subjugated all Sen kindoms of petty states ( Baishi and
Chaubisi), he had a mission to create an Ashali Hindustan (Hindu's true holy
land) with four Vernas- Brahman, Chhetri, Baishya and Sudra and 36 Jats
(denomination of each verna), means either the plurality within the Hindu
custom and cultural realm or beyond it, is not clear. Prime Minister Junga
Bahadur Rana introduced Muliki Ain (Civil Code) in 1854 based on the
casteism to enforce Hindu culture and values through statutory provisions in
the society. King Mahendra scrutinized some direct discrimination, made
sure that some traditional practices and belief system were maintained,
however, the legal instruments' jurisprudence was to be Hindu values and
ethos (Hofer, 1979). The discrepancy persistently exists even today though
Nepal was declared a Secular, Federal and Republic State by the first meeting
of Constituent Assembly. It was not joyful for those who were in status quo,
however, when CA became unable to promulgate the constitution of new
Nepal, there is a debate if the CA decisions would be commendable or not.
An Enigma of Hindu Nation State Building
The early 19th century, European idea was that a nation requires a state to
express its will (Burghart, 1993). Nation states of West Europe attempted to
create culturally homogenous polities, which are harmful to the very idea of
diversity (Oommen, 2008). Nepal was built as a nation of only Hindu cultural
values and ethos against numerous INs, cultural and linguistic groups. So, it
was a nation- state based on a faulty premise. A partyless Panchayat system
which was propounded by King Mahendra lasted for 30 years because it was
taken for granted to express Hindu values: religion, culture, language, and
country code in the name of a system devised based on its own soil and
water. However, as fundamental aspects of Panchayat, which King Mahendra
envisaged, was what the Europeans adopted in the early 19th century that a
nation requires a state, but this served the interests of only the Khas Arya
group. Nepali nation was also designed to serve the interest of an ethnic

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 41
group characterized with Hindu King, Hindu religion, language, culture, and
ethos against others. This was a recurrent theme the Rana Period (1846-
1951) enhanced by adopting the country code (Muliki Ain). In contrast,
democracy and freedom of culture, language, and belief in every sector
invoked the ideology of secular state as well. The debate on the issue of
Hindu religious kingdom versus secular state which pertinently occurred in
political discourse prior to and during the drafting of the 1990 constitution
showed that the tradition was still very much alive (Whelpton, 1997).
It is quite common to regard 'Nepali nationalism' as simply a borrowing
from the nineteenth century European ideology. According to Worsely,
'Nationalism is also a form of ethnicity... it is the institutionalization of one
particular ethnic identity by attaching it to the state' (cited in Oommen, 2012).
The Nepali nationalism is also strongly felt by those whose language, culture,
symbols, and heroes are taken care of by the State. They are fully articulated
in education, media, bureaucracy, and culture, costumes, and help create a
self-conscious of nationalism. The curriculum, textbooks, and reading
materials from the primary school up to higher secondary school are found
unfriendly to the pupils of INs (Mabuhang et al., 2005).
Though the Gorkha chiefdom was expanded to a larger nation, it couldn't
retain 'Gorkha' as the name of largely extended nation state. Rather, it
borrowed the name of 'Nepal' from 'Nepal Mandal' that confined Kathmandu
Valley in the core dwelled by Newar INs, and its periphery. The language of
Gorkha was called Gorkha Bhasha (language) until 1909 (cited in Burghart,
1984). The National official News paper is still called Gorkha- Patra (Paper
of Gorkha). But, ironically Gorkha rulers accepted the name Nepali for their
language, instead of retaining Gorkha Bhasha. One plausible reason is that
Nepal was much bigger, civilized, and it had a long history, and all this was
an attraction. Consequently, the country received the name Nepal and the
language was called Nepali and also it was given the state of lingua franca
among the multilingual speakers of Nepal. Another plausible reason could be
that Gorkha showed cruelty while attacking Kathmandu; so, it may have
come as a gesture to heal the pain. Gorkha rulers adopted both the name of
country and the name of the language along with deities that 'Nepal' had
traditionally in Kathmandu valley. When Nepali became the lingua franca, it
was imposed upon as the medium of the school level education across the
country including Kathmandu valley. Not only did the imposition of Nepali
language force the multilingual people to receive education in the second
language, but also it began the process of acculturating them into Hindu

42 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
culture and values. One interesting case of conversion through education is
instantiated here.
In Humla district, the people from the villages of Barain, Buwa, Kallasa,
Kuti, Puma, and Nepka have given up their Tibetan culture (Lama, 1993). It
was during the Panchayat reign that, in the name of national integration, King
Mahendra pushed Hinduism deep into the northern belt. Lama shared the
story of his own experience:
"I was one of the boys who went to Mahendra Jana Jagriti Pathsala
(Mahendra Public Awareness School) in my village Todpa. In the year
1965, my teacher Sita Ram Paudyal changed my name from Tshewang
given by the village Lama to Chhakka Bahadur.
Many Tibetan (Tibeto Burman language family) speakers that inhabited
the hills gave up their cultural heritage and took up Hindu way of life.
This process was introduced across the country. For example the real
name of poet and Chancellor of Nepal Academy, Mr. Tilbikram Nembang
was Ojhahang Nembang in Limbu language. Similarly, the real name of
former Ambassador for Japan, Ganesh Hyonzan was Phurba Hyonzan in
Tamang language. The case analysis of the educational profile of Panchthar
district in eastern Nepal, illustrates that there are 371 schools. Out of them,3
schools named after Hindu deities account for 206 (55.53 %), followed by
Hindu literary words (29.9 %), Limbu literary words (11.9 %), Buddhist (2.0
%), and Rai (0.5 %). Meanwhile, Panchthar is one of the core districts of
Limbuwan, where Limbu population inhabits dominantly (40 %), followed
by Rai (14 %), Bahun (12.5 %), Chetri (10.7 %) and so forth. This gives a
glimpse of phenomenon of Hindu nationalism imposed upon the
multicultural people of Nepal.
Even after declaration of the republican state, when the Vice- president of
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal took an oath in Hindi language with
Dhoti, Kamij costume4, it was seriously raised among the hill Nepali
linguists. Although his mother tongue is Maithili and it is quite common to
speak Maithili in his resident and he served as the Justice in Supreme Court
in Nepali language; how dare he go against Nepali language? His taking oath
in Hindi was dubious. The reason was that the party nominated him as a
candidate of VC, but he raised the issue Hindi to be recognized as the
regional lingua franca in Tarai-Madhes. However, Hindi songs are quite
common during Hindu religious functions and marriage and other functions
and party events both even in rural and city areas among the hill people. One
instance, Madhesi people often take as an example of behaviour of hill people

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 43
is how they welcome the elect Indian Idol- 2007, Mr. Prashant Tamang from
Darjeeling district. He was supported by many hill groups. People from
Darjeeling district, Sikkim, Nepal and many other places voted
overwhelmingly for Prashant in the contest.
Responding to a petition against the Vice-president Jha, Supreme Court
ruled against the Vice-president and asked him to take oath in official
language. However Jha rejected the verdict and argued that if all the
languages spoken in Nepal 'are given due respect' he can consider re-taking
oath. The Vice President position became vacant by charging him that he
could not perform any duties in capacity of the Vice President and was not
entitled to special security and privileges. After six month off duty Vice-
president was reactivated from 7 February, 2010, after he took a fresh oath of
office and secrecy in Nepali language,5 and national dress6- labeda Suruwal,
Coat, and Topi). Taking oath in mother tongue other than Nepali is permitted
after a recent amendment in current Constitution.
This is all the by-product of mono ethnic nationalism tried to establish in
Nepal for the last almost a century long history. It really shows a
manoeuvring the State did to homogenize different cultural groups into
Hindu religion and culture. Also, the state tried to homogenize all languages
into hill Nepali language. However, there is a counter argument also. The
local elites had to learn the ruler's language and at least display Hindu
symbols in order to prove loyal and be treated on an equal footing with
emerging Hindu elites (cited in Gellner, 1997). And it is also a phenomena
well established with regard to Sanskritization where social mobility and
opportunity grasping are necessary to come into the mainstream from the
perspective of periphery (Rex, 1976).
As the counter movement against Hindu Nation State comprises three
major streams namely INs movement, Madhesi movement, and Dalit
movement along with religious minorities are persistently challenging the
mono-ethnic nation state. Of them, INs issue is cropping up with distinct and
different identities than the Hindu nation state since 1991. There are three
words confusingly used in Nepali language: Jat (caste), Jati (Ethnic), and
Janajati (Nation). The third one is popularly used in both neighbouring
countries, like 'Nationalities' in People's Republic of China, and Tribal
Communities in Republic of India. There are other three words: Adibashi
(Indigenous), Aprabashi (Migrant), and Mulbashi (Main inhabitant) are also
become important in Nepal since 1993.7 However, both neighbouring
countries do not accept the word Indigenous in their context. Gurung (1996)
argues that Nationalities (Janajatis) is used now a days instead of Ethnic

44 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
(Jati), where as Adibashi (Indigenous) is also used in place of Nationalities.
Adibashi is related to time frame where as Janajati is related to community or
a cultural group. The third one Mulbashi (Main Inhabitant) is also in the
discourse instead of Adibashi (Indigenous). It is argued that all mongoloid
stock of socially, culturally, and racially different groups are indigenous, but
not Janajatis and Adibashis. Because these two words connote the meaning of
nomad or migrant, Chairman of Mongol National Organization (MNO)
argues. However, this is not fit epistemologically, since there is not an issue
of main (mul) and branch (hanga). From Hindu four- fold point of view there
might be mul (four verna), and hanga, (thirty six caste), but when we talk
about the dichotomy of Hindu four-fold system and INs, then this does not
exist. He stresses that Adibashi/ Janajati implies the migrant, nomads, as
Gypsies does in Europe (cited in Hagen, 2005). However, Adibashi/ Janajati
word has been used persistently in the last three decades and the State also
has recognized them as "Adibasi/ Janajati"-
"by removing all sorts of existing economic and social inequalities and to
set up and develop their healthy social life based on justice and morality,
thus consolidating the national integrity, and preserving such peoples'
identities and cultural diversity by developing their language, literatures,
arts, scripts, religions, and cultures and by creating special opportunities
for their education, well-being and employment (NFDIN, 2003)."
However, Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) defined Indigenous
Peoples as Nationalities (Janajatis) in 1991:
...a community with its own mother tongue and traditional culture but not
falling under the traditional four-fold varna of Hindu Varna system
(NEFEN, 1991).
As an inference, we can summarize that the mono- ethnic nation state
building is ended with the aspiration of people who fought for democracy and
accommodation of diversity in a larger national8 state. In order to synchronise
the issues that were left as legacy of the mono-ethnic nation state, a newly
emerging federal state needs to accommodate them in an innovative way.
Pluralism
John Hick, the most famous philosopher, is advocating a religious pluralist
position. Hick argues that we should view all of the great world religions
(e.g. Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism) as providing equally
efficacious paths to the same Real because all have an altruistic message at

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 45
their core (Meeker, 2007:193). He argues that but not all religions are 'true' in
the more common propositional sense because they obviously assert contrary
views. However, Hick argues that being nice to everyone does not require
being right about everything. He contends that people of all religions view
the Real through their own peculiar cultural lenses, which are influenced by
historical precedents, environmental conditions, and so on. The Real is thus
constructed in the image of the particular cultures of the adherents. In Hick's
own words:
'religious exclusivism and religious pluralism are of different logical
kinds, the one being a self-committing affirmation of faith and the other a
philosophical hypothesis'.
Despite the separation of church and state in America, religion and
politics have long influenced each other in ways direct and indirect (Elshtain,
2003). This theme was advanced by Alexis de Tocqueville, who argued that
the nation's religiously formed democratic optimism was something new
under the political sun, for it led, in practice, to the associational enthusiasm
he observed when he toured America during the Jacksonian era. That church
and state in America are in fact separate means. America has secular
government - but it does not mean that American society is a secular society.
Reacting to the nativism of the Americanization movement Kallen (1970
[1924]) initiated the philosophy of "cultural pluralism" that would eventually
be embraced enthusiastically by liberal reformers of his time and, years later,
would become a dominant shibboleth of both liberals and conservative
intellectuals on ethnicity and minority issues (quoted in Elshtain 2003). In
Kallen's racialist formulation, individual people in America are inherently
members of groups and ethnic stratification is culturally (if not genetically)
rooted, making it absurd to argue for the kind of unity that assimilationist
vision argues. By the 1990's "multiculturalism" became the term of choice for
those advocating a vast range of pluralist positions, from those wishing to
acknowledge the demographic diversity of American society to those wishing
to over-turn a Eurocentric hegemony. Very similar kind of notion the
Neplease pluralists also resemble. They don't like to say Hindu a religion;
rather, it is the 'Sanatan' (tradition) practices in the region of Brahmputra
river in the east to Indus in the west. The Hindus no more look apart from the
other people of Nepal than a tree does from its trunk (Sharma 1997: 490). In
contemporary Hinduism we find attempts to broaden the meaning of
Sanatana Dharma as the eternal Hindu religion and to also embrace the
religious traditions of the Jains, Buddhists, Sikhs, and all the traditions of

46 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Hinduism (Dimitrova, 2007). But it is also a tricky manipulation that all
practices including Buddhist come under the Hindu. It simply tries to mess
with the different philosophy and value of a particular submerged into
another.
Pluralism is a multi-faceted concept. Conn (1973) postulated at least four
distinct ways in which the term pluralism has been used. First, "value
pluralism" is one way in which societies exhibit several competing value
systems; and societies do not have value pluralism when they are of
'ideational consensus'- acceptance of a common symbol structure, that is,
agreement not only on broad principles but also on the terms in which these
principles will be expressed. Second, "Cultural Pluralism" refers to the
existence of multiple cultural groups within a society. Due to cultural factors
and economic or status factors that arise in connection with modernization,
society constitutes multiple groups. Referring Haug (1967), Conn argues that
young nations may experience the existence of pluralism in a society
covering large sparsely populated areas, engaged chiefly in agriculture and
the poor. Their governmental functions are still shaky and unstable, as
literacy rates are low and various interest groups that struggle confusedly for
dominance tend to increase the intensity of more plural polity. Third,
"Structural Pluralism" focuses on the structure of political system in which
the number of issues are raised and resolved with the notions of decentralized
decision making. And lastly, "Social Pluralism" where the diversity arising
from modernization characterizes the society with diverse interests that are
allowed to organize and compete with each other formally and informally for
rewards. Socially pluralists societies allow organizational interests and
competition independently as an intermediary body between government and
citizen.
Now, of much concern here is what to do for social pluralism with
democracy. Though it is complex, there are four ways of relationship Conn
proposed between social pluralism and democracy:
• First, Social Pluralism socializes the individual to democratic norms.
• Second, it increases the exposure of individual to political questions
and helps increase participation.
• Third, it provides alternative leaders for democratic systems. and
• Fourth, it provides alternative policies for democracies.
As Manley (1983) says, 'even inside the pluralist school, serious doubts
have arisen about the theory's ability to explain the American system: the

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 47
relationship between pluralism and such central issues of democratic theory
as equality, distributive justice, and peaceful social change.'
A close reading of James Madison (or, for that matter, Marx) shows that
there is no necessary contradiction between groups and class. Madison treats
groups as subdivisions of the broad social division between those with and
without property, but after the rise of socialism and class analysis in the
nineteenth century, pluralism and class analysis were pitted against each
other. Toward the end of his pioneering study of groups, Bentley (1908) took
up the question of class and made it clear that group theory was intended as a
critique of class theory. In Bentley's view, Marx's theory of class struggle
was a crude form of group theory. The failure of the so-called proletariat to
unite behind a common interest and seize power proved Marx wrong, in
Bentley's view (cited from Manley, 1983). Indeed, Bentley (1908, p. 467)
says, "A proletariat class, such as Marx and Engels conceived it, simply did
not exist." It indicates something different notion in the context of Nepali
society where more than 90 percent people rely on their subsistence economy
which is basically agriculture. Every household is the unit of society, and
every clan has a distinct and different affinity than an ideology. Sometime
people feel awkward when members of a clan annoy each other on political
or ideological matters.
Multiculturalism
The term multiculturalism was first introduced in Canada in 1971 as part of
the government's policy to deal with the two main communities in the
country- the English speaking settlers and the French speaking counterparts
(Kymlicka, 1995). Since then this concept has taken on new dimensions and
today it is used to discuss issues of diversity as a result of race or ethnicity,
class, gender, culture, and sexual preference. Multiculturalism is considered a
leftist political ideology that sees all cultures, their mores and institutions, as
essentially equal (Kumar, 2011). There is not any hierarchy between and
among cultures; they is simply different. Multiculturalism represents a new
kind of universalism– one where integration of individuals into the state is
not predicated on a total disengagement from particularistic community ties.
Rather, people are included into the nation state as members of diverse but
equal ethnic groups. And the state recognizes that the dignity of individuals is
linked to the collective dignity of the community to which they belong. A
multicultural society needs a broadly shared culture to sustain it. Since it
involves several cultures, the shared culture can only grow out of their
interaction and could both respect and nurture their diversity and unite them

48 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
around a common way of life. Typically, multiculturalism here is a social
doctrine that distinguishes itself as a positive alternative for policies of
assimilation, connoting a politics of recognition of the citizenship rights and
cultural identities of ethnic minority groups (Kymlicka 1995; C. Taylor 1992)
and, more generally, an affirmation of the value of cultural diversity.
Ideas of multiculturalism and minority rights have been 'internationalized'
in two distinct ways (Gellner 2001). First, a discourse of multiculturalism is
circulating amongst elites who participate in international networks of
activities, scholars, and policy makers. Through these networks, a certain
way of talking about ethnocultural diversity is being diffused around the
world, premised on principles of tolerance and ideals of Justice. Within this
discourse, minorities are seen, not as problem to solve or a threat to be
neutralized, but as legitimate members of the state whose identity and culture
must be respected (Kymlicka et al. 2005). Second, formal international
standards of minority rights are being adopted by international organizations
such as the UN, the World Bank, and the ILO. These organisations have
attempted to codify minimum standards for the behaviour of states in relation
to their minorities, and to establish mechanism to monitor state compliance
with them.
Kymplicka raises the question what do we mean by Western models of
multiculturalism and minority rights? He put on three important aspects the
western democracy has been observing: Minority Nationalism, Indigenous
Peoples, Immigrant Groups and Metics (temporary migrants). In the context
of Nepal, diversity especially concerned with identity, autonomy, is related
either with Minority Nationalism or Indigenous Peoples. So these two aspects
are discussed here.
Minority Nationalism
Will Kimlycka (2005) argues:
The first concerns the treatment of sub-state/ minority nationalisms, such
as the Quebecois in Canada, the Scots and Welsh in Britain, the Catalans
and Basques in Spain, the Flemish in Belgium, the Germans in South
Tyrol in Italy, and Puerto Ricans in the US. In all these cases, we find a
regionally concentrated group that conceives of itself as a nation within a
larger state, and mobilizes behind nationalist political parties to achieve
recognition of its nationhood, either in the form of an independent state or
through territorial autonomy within the larger state.

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 49
Most of the states felt that to have a regional group with a sense of distinct
nationhood was a threat to the state. So various measures the nation states
made to erode this sense of distinct nationhood, including restricting minority
language rights, abolishing traditional forms of regional self-government, and
encouraging members of the dominant group to settle in the minority groups
homeland, so that the minority becomes outnumbered even in its traditional
territory. In contrast, Majeed et al. (2008) argue that diversities are not to be
considered as a burden but as an asset that states can build upon.
Unfortunately, however, diversity is often considered by politicians as a
problem that states have to accommodate. On the contrary, one has to
consider diversities as an opportunity for states that are enriched by different
languages, cultures, religions, and traditions. It doesn't mean that
accommodation of diversity will bring peace in a state rather it would
contribute to sustainable development as well.
In India, during the colonial period the British considered religion to be
the primary marker of difference in Indian society; so they set policies
towards religious communities. Over time, they introduced some limited
democratic institutions and a concept of civil society, community and caste
identities granted recognition in a number of state institutions like the army,
the law and the franchise (Kumar, 2011:29). The Congress defended the
notion of a pluralist society and a neutral state based on equal citizenship.
However, Congress also promised recognition and protection for religious
communities and non-discriminatory state policies at the same time. It also
rejected the British view that India was not a nation and articulated a secular
and inclusive nationalism in which there would be equal respect, equal
opportunities and equal liberty for all, regardless of their religious affiliations
or social location.
All countries just mentioned have accepted the principle that these sub-
state national identities would endure for indefinite future, and that their
sense of nationhood and nationalist aspirations would be accommodated in
one way or other. This accommodation had typically taken the form of what
we could call 'multinational federalism'. It was creating a federal or quasi
federal subunit in which the minority group formed a local majority, so that it
could exercise meaningful forms of self government.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, only Switzerland and Canada
had adopted this combination of territorial autonomy and official language
status for sub-state national groups. In two broad patterns of cultural
diversity, Kymlicka (1995) argues, 'nation' means:

50 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
"...a historical community, more or less institutionally complete,
occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and
culture. A 'nation' in the sociological sense is closely related to the idea of
a 'people' or a 'culture'- indeed, these concepts are often defined in terms
of each other. A country which contains more than one nation is,
therefore, not a nation- state but a multination state, and the smaller
cultures form 'national minorities'. The incorporation of different nations
into a single state may be involuntary, as occurs when one cultural
community is invaded and conquered by another, or is ceded from one
imperial power to another, or when its homeland is overrun by colonizing
setters."
Cultural diversity may arise from individual and familial immigration
where such immigrants often coalesce into loose associations which
Kymlicka says 'Ethnic Groups':
"..which typically wish to integrate into the larger society, and to be
accepted as full members of it. While they often seek greater recognition
of their ethnic identity, their aim is not to become a separate and self-
governing nation alongside the larger society, but to modify the institution
and laws of the mainstream to make more accommodating of cultural
differences."
Oommen (2008) argues that 'national minorities':
"have historically legitimate claims to an ancestral homeland; as in the
case of Scotish and Welsh peoples in Great Britain or an adopted
homeland, as in the case of the French in Quebec in Canada and the
Spanish and Portuguese peoples in Latin America.....the national
minorities only when viewed in the wider context of the federal polity but
they are usually majorities within their homeland."
In regard to ethnification and destruction of diversity, Oommen argues:
Ethnification is a process through which the link between territory and
culture is attenuated, and the possibility of a nation sustaining its
integrity is put into jeopardy.
There are at least six different types9 of ethnification Oommen pointed
out. Similarly he also analysed the ethnification is a process through which
some collectivists are defined and perceived as outsiders. There are at least
four contexts in which this happens:

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 51
1. When the mainstream cultural community in a multination or poly-
ethnic state asserts that it constitutes the nation, and that others
should be assimilate in the interests of the "nation"- Waspization in
US, Russification in the former Soviet Union, and Hanization in
China
2. Even, when a collectivity belongs and lives in its homeland, it may be
perceived as cultural outsider because of its actual or attributed
association with conquest and colonization. Hindu view Muslims
and Christians who are natives of India as cultural outsiders, and not
as part of the nation.
3. When descendants of a people may be defined as aliens and driven
out, even after they have been in a country for several centuries-
Turks in Bulgeria.
4. A people may be driven out of their ancestral homeland because their
religion is different, for example the Zoroastrians and Baha's of the
Persian Gulf earlier and the Hindus of Kashmir valley recently.
Indigenous Peoples
Indians and Inuit in Canada, the Aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New
Zealand, the Sami of Scandinavia, the Inuit of Greenland, and Indian tribes in
the US have been in the struggle of recognition and self-identification, self
development and right to self determination. In the past, all these countries
had the same goal and exception that IPs would eventually disappear as
distinct communities, as a result of dying out, or intermarriage, or
assimilation (Kymlicka, 2005). Various policies adopted to speed up this
process, such as stripping IPs of their lands, restricting the practice of their
traditional culture, language, and religion, and undermining their institutions
of self-government. However, there has been a dramatic reversal in these
policies, starting in the early 1970s. Today all of the countries just
mentioned accept, at least in principle, the idea that indigenous peoples will
exist in the indefinite future as distinct societies within the larger country,
and that they must have the land claims, cultural rights (including recognition
of customary law) and self government rights needed to sustain themselves as
distinct societies. Indigenous peoples were considered as the temporary
society in the late 60s. When ILO Convention 107 urged the member states to
adopt the necessary policy measures to bring such temporary societies into
the main stream that extremely hurt native peoples or indigenous peoples
across the world. By virtue of their struggle and genuine argument,

52 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
international community became ready to update the instruments, so as ILO
formed a task force to study about the Indigenous Peoples.
All accumulated issues are now identified with social identity that polity
less likely spelled out in the history. However, the federalism compliment
with social diversity and identity issue too is less likely to be discussed in the
Nepalese political discourse.
Ideology and Democracy
An ideology is:
- an organized collection of ideas, "scientific ideas";
- it can be thought of as a comprehensive vision;
- as a way of looking at things, as in common sense and several
philosophical tendencies, or a set of ideas proposed by the dominant
class of a society to all members of the society. The main purpose
behind an ideology is to offer change in society through a normative
thought process.
- Ideologies are systems of abstract thought applied to public matters
and thus make this concept central to politics,
- Every political tendency entails an ideology whether or not it is
propounded as an explicit system of thought.
- Positive characteristics like vigour and fervor and negative
characteristics like excessive certitude and fundamentalist rigor.
Organizations that strive for power will try to influence the ideology of a
society to become closer to what they want it to be.
Political organizations (including governments) and other groups (e.g.
lobbyists) try to influence people by broadcasting their opinions.
When most people in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget
that there are alternatives to the status quo, we arrive at the concept of
hegemony (Wikipedia).
The term ideology usually refers to a systematic, elaborated and delimited
system of thought, like political ideologies or religious doctrines (Schmid,
1981). In macro-sociology Marxist as well as liberal, ideology is often
considered as a level or instance of a social formation, or as a social
subsystem. Then ideology is opposed to other levels or subsystems, like
economy or politics, and refers to a particular institutional space.
Liberal Democracy and Nepalese Polity
What view should liberals take of the internal practices of non-liberal
religious and cultural minorities within liberal democracies? This issue has

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 53
divided liberal opinion into two main camps (Crowder, 2007). In one camp
are those who see liberalism as standing primarily for the autonomy of the
individual person; and in the other, there are those who identify liberalism
with maximal toleration of the beliefs and practices of different social groups.
This debate raises fundamental issues in liberal political theory, and it has
attracted a variety of contributions from leading theorists since the 1980s.
Among the most significant of those contributions was the exchange between
Will Kymlicka (pro-autonomy) and Chandran Kukathas (pro-toleration) in
the early 1990s. However, both arguments are complementary to each other
rather than contradictory when we take their perspectives in case of Nepal.
Autonomy is the prime question for those groups who are distinct and
different and have been discriminated and excluded for the last two and a half
century. But they are still living in their traditional homeland with dominant
population even tolerating the predominance of Hindu high caste. Now the
rights of those excluded and marginalized groups, despite their overwhelming
demography and the territory belonging to them, have begun to be claimed
with the advent of democracy. Now, the challenge is whether liberal
democracy would be able to manage it, and the suppressed group would have
the space to stand on equal foot with the dominant groups. So, the 'table' is
begun to turn and toleration is synchronically shared among the groups who
are sharing the table. And it is also important to have a degree of tolerance to
be a pluralist. Yet, the political parties dominantly brought up in mono-ethnic
nationalism are still conservative and reluctant to be accommodative.
In this crucial juncture, Nepalese polity might take an unwanted
discourse- extreme left and right. One is arguing, first for freedom,
democracy and accountable government through parliamentary democracy,
and second is arguing for development, prosperity, and of course accountable
government through democratic centralism, but there does not seem to appear
any meeting point. It is an outcome of the discourse gone through dream of
Liberalism, Marxism and so on. In promotion of both democratic and
communist perspective, from 1930s to 1960s, an increasing number of
Nepalese studied in India and imbibed the discourses of nationalism,
Maxism, and civil rights which flourished there (Gellner, 2001). There are
several political changes that have taken place, and in every time more or less
an old regime would be abolished with the popular support through people's
movements hoping that a change would take place along with newly adopted
system. With greater hopes of freedom, Nepalese people fought agianst Rana
oligarchy and that ended in 1951 with the active leadership and semi-armed
struggle against the Rana regime amidst the 20th century. The commitment

54 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
made by B.P. Koirala, founder of the Nepali Congress (NC), on the eve of
establishment of NC said:
.. It is so pity that Nepalese don't have their organization that fought for
modernity, but All Indian Organization (Akhil Bharatiya Sangathan)
needs to be formed by incorporating Nepalese with overarching aim to
fight for accountable- government and freedom of India.10
NC was founded in 1947 by Nepalese dissident exiles in India as Nepali
National Congress (Whelpton, 1993). Many dissidents had also been active in
the Indian Nationalist Movement and in adopting the organisation's basic
principles: combination of socialism and parliamentary democracy as its goal
and Gandhian non-violence as its tactics. Later, the name was changed to
Nepali Congress in 1950 when it was amalgamated with Nepal Democratic
Congress, an organization set up by estranged members of Rana family. It is
to be taken in notice that NC was premised on three pillars: modernity,
accountability, and liberty. Also to be noticed here is that the political parties
along with King Tribhuvan were committed to promulgate the Constitution
through Constituent Assembly, but they were jeopardized because of a
decade long transition. After carrying out a research into the case of
prolonged transition and the actual situation the nation was facing, Nepali
Congress (NC) leader B.P Koirala in 1958 took a stance against holding a CA
calling it highly unnecessary. So, King Mahendra promulgated Constitution
of kingdom of Nepal with consensual agreement between the monarch and
the political leaders. After which, parliamentary election was held the same
year in which NC secured more than two third majority NC showed that it
was committed to democracy.
Following the aftermath of Rana oligarchy, multiparty democracy ran
with political perplexity whether power lay at Naranhity Durbar (office of
King) or at Singha Durbar (office of Priminister) for a decade. According to
Prasai (2011)11, people began to utter a curse, "May Congress intrude into
your house!." He says, "This was to vent their anger at the party and the
administration for reason that the police gave clean chits to NC activists' who
were arrested for stealing." One of the reasons why rumour spread against
Congress government was due to the campaigning of Yogi Naraharinath,
Chairman of 'Karmavir Mahamandal'. Eventually, King Mahendra seized the
power by arresting elected Prime Minister along with his team by accusing12
that parliamentary democracy was alien to the traditional political culture of
Nepal (Burghart, 1993). The proclamation of Panchayat system's nurtured the
Hindu Religious kingdom against the backdrop of parliamentary system's

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 55
failure. The elected NC government failed to mobilise the administration to
serve the people's interest. With the power interest of the Monarch, the
multiparty democracy was restrained in 1962, and Nepal survived with the
dark age of 30 years. Democracy was crushed for three decades. However,
NC even launched armed insurgency remaining in semi underground
situation. Its top leaders B.P. Koirala, G.P. Koirala and others were in exile.
In 1976, when Indira Gandhi's state emergency had made India a less
congenial place of exile, B.P. Koirala returned Nepal, announcing the cause
of 'national reconciliation' and although court proceedings were started
against him in connection with the party's previous violent campaigns, he was
eventually released.
Panchayat did not envisage diversity under its communitarian principle.
There were 6 class organizations as the sister organizations of non-party
Panchayat system namely Youth, Women, Agriculture, Ex-Army, and
Elderly were organized time to time; but didn't have any arrangement for INs,
Dalit, Madheshi, Muslim, etc. There were dissidents within the Panchas who
were from different INs, ethnic, religious, and regional communities; so they
had an apprehension and worry about their deteriorating situation of identity.
They couldn't express it, since they had accepted the sole authority of Hindu
religious kingdom and authoritative leadership of king. Some social
organizations established during 1950-60, during democratic period, the
Backward Classes Organization established in 1956, included the Gurung
Welfare Organization (Gurung Kalyan Sangh), Tharu Welfare Society (Tharu
Kalyankari Sangh), Kirat League, and Dalit Sangh. With the prohibition of
political parties who were in favour of democracy, Panchayat swept away all
social organizations that could make democracy much more broad-based.
The apprehension of Panchas concerning their communal issues was
expressed covertly, which the Monarchy communicated its angry reactions
through brand names "MaGuRaLi" which meant a combination of Magar,
Gurung, Rai, and Limbu. Later it became larger "SheTaMaGuRaLi" by
adding "SheTa" (Sherpa, Tamang) (Gurung, 1997).
During Panchayat period, King Mahendra was aware that NC was in exile
in India so, one day they might come to take over the power. In order to
neutralize the Indian support for struggle for democracy, King initiated
keeping good relation with China and getting it involved in emergent
political dynamics. He wrote a letter to Chairman Mao Tse Tung through his
envoy Khagendra Jung Gurung (personal conversation with Mr. Gurung).
According to Gurung, King Mahendra gave him an assurance that he might
deliver the Swiss Confederational democracy, if all the national got united.

56 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Since India was accessible to and culturally convenient for Brahmins, so
many relatives of Pundits who visited Banaras especially for religious
purpose allured them for education too. As Soviet Union became an attractive
place for Marxist or communist blocs, many Nepalese youth also were
destined to Russia for the purpose of study and its allies also opened the
avenue for Nepalese to learn technical subjects. In addition, they gained
practical experiences of what communism and socialism can deliver the
people. This phenomenon might be the reason that influenced a significant
number of population with the ideologies of Marxism, Leninism, and
Maoism. Despite State restrictions to read and write books against Monarchy,
books and literature on Marxism, Leninism, Mao Tse Tung and Zuche
Thought were published in Nepali languages sponsored by various
Friendship associations. This discourse largely imparted the ideology of
Marxism, Socialism, and Nationalism to Nepalese readers and intellectuals.
Chin Sachitra (China Pictorial) in Hindi language was abundantly available.
Common people would read stories and see colourful pictorials and indirectly
get influenced as well as influence other people with ideas about communist
state and society. Most of the bookshops freely distributed Chin Sachitra as
the cover for books and copies. Apart from that, walls inside the rooms were
covered up by Chin Sachitra. So people would enjoy watching photographs
of Comrade Mao STe Tung, Chao-enlai, Comrade Chu Teh and so on. Seeing
these great leaders with smiling faces, working with farmers, peasants, and
ethnic minorities emotionally and psychologically embalmed many readers
with feelings that communists regime would be far better than the Monarchy.
In this way, common people were found to be sympathetic towards
communism, especially in the hills.
Marxism and Leninism (ML)
The ideological of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism were taught to peasants
in small hots, in the dark rooms with soundless conversation for fear of life
threats from Rana dictatorial regime about only six decades ago. When Rana
oligarchy was thrown away, and after about a decade Panchayat autocracy
came and more or less the same phenomenon occurred for three decades from
1960-1990. People fought against it and restored the multiparty democracy.
They entertained enormous hopes and thought that it was their dreams come
true. Not quite satisfied with the functioning modality of parliamentary
democracy, then a small tiny fraction of communist party began
phenomenally the same kind of teaching to people by whispering to their ear
against the malfunctioning system. The people's war against feudalism and

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 57
all kinds of forces that suppressed the Nepalese people needed to be crushed
down by armed struggle. However, armed struggle was rather an old and
common strategy of communist groups who believed in societal change
through class struggle.
A radical, Communist Party of Nepal- CPM (ML) was once active in
Jhapa in the seventies. The revolutionaries cut the heads of landlords and
declared to establish the dictatorship of peasants, workers, and proletariat
groups through new democracy as comrade Mao Ze Dung established against
the internal feudalism and external imperialism in the fifties. With the 'Core
Principle' of democratic centralism (Janabadi Kendriyata) extracted from
Marxism, Leninism and Mao Tse Tung thought the CPM (ML) adopted
armed struggle under the broader principle of class struggle established in the
eighties. It made the Panchayat autocracy in the nineties when ML also
joined NC. There were as well so many other organisations involved in the
struggle. ML came out over ground in the aftermath of Panchayat in the
nineties, and become CPN (UML). In reality, Marxist, Leninist, and Mao Tse
Tung thought spread in South Asia, when Naxalites Movement developed in
the seventies in India with the active leadership of Charu Majumdar. ML
originated with the school of Charu Majumdar in Jhapa, but after 16 years,
dissolved into parliamentary democracy following the discourse of Jyoti
Basu of west Bengal incidentally. And now what is on ground is the liberal
democrats that relies on market. Nevertheless Maoist emerged as
revolutionary force and social change agent in the Nepali society. There can
be differing opinions, but the truth is the entire society is passing through a
sociopolitical paradox. And this is a persistent question.
Apart from political commitment and struggle against Panchayat regime,
late 1989 was also characterized by economic hardship caused by the trade
embargo which India had imposed on Nepal. When iron is hot, one has to
beat to bring it into size; political leaders too sped up their movement against
the Panchayat system. The third dimension of the revolution was one of
ethnic and religious conflicts cropped up against the Panchayat (Hoftun,
1993). Though it came lately, it was fundamental to fuel the movement
against the Panchayat autocracy and to get success in the democratic
movement. However, as the saying goes, the morning shows the day, in the
victory day celebration in Open Theatre (Khula Manch), the third rank leader
but with strong hold among party cadres of NC, G.P. Koirala declared that
the first peoples' movement symbolized the victory of all forces including the
Panchas. In such an excited mass meeting, people showed their
dissatisfaction, pelted stones and shouted against him.

58 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Over three decades' long tug of war between democratic forces and Monarch
ended in the nineties, but the descendant of B.P. Koirala in Nepali Congress,
G.P. Koirala never gave attention in creating a dialogue between freedom and
national interest as the two sides of a single coin. Consequently, people at the
grassroots started feeling that multiparty party democracy would not protect
the interests of both the people and country. The leaders kept only chanting
but ever failed to define democracy at the grass roots. It was often said
'infancy' had to face the armed struggle at 6 when Maoist declared the
People's War. Ganesh Man Shingh,13 an iron leader of NC, of Newar ethnic
background, who led the first peoples' movement for the reinstatement of
multiparty democracy, had also shown his dissatisfaction. While he passed
away, he had already quitted the party, and he was charged by his opponents
that he became a communal at the end of his life.
Communism (Nationalism) versus Other 'Isms'
This discourse of communism and other 'isms' engaged both Pancha and non-
Pancha that is NC and Communists camps during Panchayat period of thirty
years. It was believed that the period contributed to the growth of
communism in Nepal. Communists invoked INs largely, and taught them
well that Max, Lenin, and Mao all fought against the high caste/class
chauvinism, so it is a matter of core principle of Communists to go against
Hindu King, Kingdom, and ensure the autonomies for respective
communities. This notion was well established. So INs' understanding of
struggle against monarch was a fight against mono-ethnic nation state and to
achieve the autonomy, whereas that of other groups' was a fighting
spearheaded against feudalism. As a result, INs largely joined the communist
parties, not the congress party. The communist ideology says that any kind of
discrimination and suppression is against the Marxism, so class struggle is
the only strategy to get rid it. So, struggle against Hindu casteism also comes
under the principle of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Tse Tung thoughts. But
very surprisingly, two pro- Marxist Magar leaders left their party in the
aftermath of Panchayat autocracy in the nineties. Leaders Mathwar Singh
Thapa from NCP (Puspalal group), and Gore B. Khapangi from ML, among
others formed a party called National Peoples' Liberation Party (Rastriya
Janamukti Party). Despite their enthusiastic start in building a political party
aiming to address INs issues in the beginning, mostly retired soldiers who
had given their potential skill and knowledge to British Crown and Indian
govenments were found gathered under the active leadership of the two
active post- communist ideologues. It was ironic, since most of the soldiers'
background was either British Gurkhas or Indian Gorkha Rifles, they

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 59
appeared apathetic towards the communists. However, their INs background
and the issue the party raised especially the question of proportional
representation with population in all sectors attracted them. Since, social
exclusion was rampant, the principle party adopted attracted the cadres.
Another interesting phenomenon was that intellectuals of INs' background
seldom joined the party.
There was another initiative to form the party led by INs personalities. It
was mainly of leaders once associated with Panchayat. That was Nepal
Rastriya Janajati Party led by Khagendra J. Gurung, Kajiman Kandangwa
and Bhadra K. Ghale. They manifested that Nepal should adopt federalism
based on ethnic identity. There were 12 units they proposed with names
representing INs, Ethnic groups, and Languages.14 After the promulgation of
Constitution, the party ought to change its name: Nepal Jana Party under the
chairmanship of Bichar S. Kandangwa, since the constitution did not permit
the party with the communal connotation such as Janajati (Nationalities).
Meanwhile, Pashupati Sena was permitted as a political party. In fact,
Janajati community comprised very few intellectuals who didn't join the
polity intended to raise INs issues, though they experienced various kinds of
discriminations. Socio-cultural and political grounds for INs issue were
comparatively poor, since the polity on identity was part and partial of the
major parties. Gurung (1985)15 wrote a monograph on discriminations and
exclusion the State made against Janajati community. It was banned by the
local administration so that very few readers might have an opportunity to
read it. On the other hand, politicians who fought for democracy or new-
democracy would have largely understood that such discriminations would
be healed when Panchayati autocracy ended. So, they didn't go vigorously on
various aspects of democracy and didn't leave their parties. During the last
ten or fifteen years, multiculturalist model has begun to be pushed by ethnic
activists and has begun to receive some, though as limited, official
recognition (Gellner, 2001).
INs intellectuals who were politically also trained felt strong sense of
unity that ultimately lobbies with the state and create awareness about
own socio-economic, cultural, and political rights. So, they organized a
series of meetings jointly with the political invoked Janajati leaders. When
intellectuals differed from the political leaders who were strongly
committed to form political party, the discourse split into two ways: one
went to form a party and second went to form a Federal level organization
of Nationalities. So, Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) was
established in 1991, by representing eight16 INs organizations. NEFEN

60 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
defined INs the community with its own mother tongue and traditional
culture and does not fall under the traditional four-fold Hindu Varna
system. It has plainly declared that those social or ethnic groups who fall
under the Hindu hierarchical ladder are not eligible for becoming Janajati,
because thye need also to have their own territory. Thereafter, the new
word Janajati (Nationalities) was introduced in Nepal for the sake of
Indigenous/ Tribal/ Native/ Aboriginal/ Inuit/ Sami/ or whatever word is
used across the world. In the context of Nepal, the word has meant two
important aspects: one it is distinct and different from the mainstream
group (Hindu Religious Hierarchical Population), and has the territory
from time immemorial and two it felt threat due to State's encroachment
and is in an endangered position. It appealed the international community
to protect their basic human rights as other's are taken into account.
Since the Constitution of Nepal 1990, also expressed certain welfare
measures for Janjati, it became imperative for political parties to form a Task
Force. At the same time, one has to discuss here what democracy really
meant for such a diverse society in religion, language, ethnic groups and
Indigenous INs.17
The light at the end of the tunnel goes to Maoists who set forth the goal of
Republicanism. As a result, the Hindupati-Asali Hindusthan-Hindu Kingdom
constitutionally ended on 28 May 2008. Political parties reached consensus to
turn Nepal into a Federal Republic State. And, it was about 'u' turn for NC to
agree to adopt the change. The other side of the democracy- social diversity,
its cleavages, and stability is often ignored, then to flatter as nations' heritage,
ornament, etc. and interested to talk about individual liberty is the maximum
benefit democracy can deliver.
The general people felt the Constitution of Nepal 1990 did not address the
minimum aspirations they had. Most of those the state killed in Kathmandu
Valley during 1990 movement were Newars who belonged to the local
community and were non-political. Their family members often expressed
dissatisfaction with the political parties for their disregard of victims of the
movement (Ogura, 2006).The belief, expectations, and hopes were
overwhelming that democracy would deliver rights and respect to INs, Dalits,
Muslims, Madhesis and others. However, multiparty democracy went in very
classical way. The classical liberal democratic model and its variants denied
constitutional recognition to distinct communities as bearers of rights, who
placed emphasis on enforceable human rights, including the rights to
individual practice of one's religious, cultural, or linguistic preferences in a
national democratic frame work (Haysom, 2002).

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 61
Though, larger number of left wings somehow joined the reinstated
multiparty democracy, even believing that further amendments to the
constitutional would fix their expectations, the political leaders just remained
glued to the rhetoric that it is the best constitution of the world. The attitude
sent a negative massage to the grassroots. Things did not go as expected. The
Constitution failed to address the tripod of issues: one, INs' issue of
autonomy, Madhesis' issues of regional/ linguistic autonomy; second, Dalits'
issues of end untouchability and special protection measures as a reparation;
and third, other crosscutting issues including religious minorities. One of the
interesting features CPN/UML projects is that it approaches to prolitariat and
peasants' dictatorship, and one day it will reach socialism. One of its INs
community cadres, Biran Rajbanshi, committed suicide18 in the Central
Office of the party simply because while his party was in power, Madhav K.
Nepal was Prime Minister, and Bhim Rawal was the Home Minister, among
others, could not support him by appointing his son, Shambhu Rajbanshi, in a
nominal Jagir (service). It is remarkable here that in every reshuffling of the
government more than 1500 political appointees newly formed government
can replace especially in executive level. And thousands of job seekers can
go into job market at least on daily-wage, contract and temporary basis
through them, but it didn't happen in case of voiceless people, despite their
entire life contribution. However, the party still claims that Marxism and
Leninism is its guiding principle; it is committed to work for proletariat,
peasants and farmers, and it will give special treatment to INs, Dalits,
Madheshi, Muslims, and others.
Maoist Insurgency: A Dichotomy of Class and Identity Issue
Class Issue: A radical leftist group invoked by Maxist, Lennist, and Maoist
thoughts believed that without armed struggle, the feudal institution of
monarchy would not be abolished. With the restoration of democracy in the
nineties and constitutional Hindu Monarchy, many leftist groups joined
multiparty democracy. But, a tiny fraction led by Pushpa K. Dahal
(Prachand) and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, even after joining the parliamentary
democracy in 1992, skewed into armed struggle in 1996. Unlikely, people
believed in the scope of armed struggle, it gained a significant size and made
a devastating effect on the State. Many studies and accounts agree that one of
the reasons behind the armed struggle was that the multiparty democratic
government misused the police force as did the Panchayat autocracy for thirty
years last. The other important reason was INs, Dalit, Muslim, Women,
Madheshi, and other groups could not be satisfied by the democratic

62 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
governance that centred itself in Kathmandu. In fact, for some groups like the
INs, political exclusion increased in the parliament, cabinet, administration
and judiciary after 1990 compared to the autocratic years 1962-90 (Lawoti,
2005). Human Rights Violation was overlooked during Panchayat period.
Annual reports published on Human Rights began to set forth, since the
restored multiparty democracy ensured HR in its fundamental principal.
Following the first half of the decade showed that Human rights violations
increased unexpectedly during 1992- 1996 (INSEC, 1996). Despite the
democratic state delivered some basic rights such as freedom of press,
freedom of assembly, and so on, common people could not distinguish in
their life between the performance of Panchayati autocratic regime and
multiparty democratic system. One of the fundamental aspects of human
rights, such as social, cultural, and groups rights were restrained during the so
called democratic system.
Identity Issue: Under the multiparty democracy, many INs felt a strong sense
of freedom, so they wanted the democratic constitution ensure their group
rights. Bishwanath Upadhyaya, chairman of constitution drafting commission
expressed dismay over the fact that the vast majority of suggestions to the
commission were concerned with issues of regional, linguistic, ethnic, and
religious identity (Hutt, 1994:35). Main discrepancies lay in the identification
of multiple identities relative to social, cultural, linguistic, and regional issues
which Nepal could not address ever since its inception, because the
orientation was dubiously towards Ashali Hindustan not its plurality. Let us
recall back the first people's movement and the cleavages the newly declared
constitution tried to address:
Political parties are free to organise, the proportion of the legislature that
is directly elected is larger than it has ever been, and the power of the
palace, though still substantial, has been greatly reduced. But communal
groups have been granted only minor, non- fundamental concessions.
Though Radio Nepal now broadcasts news bulletins in Hindi and Newari,
full news summaries may only be heard in Nepali or English. Similarly,
Nepali remains the language of government and post-primary education
throughout the kingdom. Some concessions have been made to women's
groups, but these are mostly nominal while the demand for a secular state
forced only one change: the granting of a right to all sects and
denominations to run and maintain their own institutions. The demands of
Tarai organizations have been largely ignored, Human Rights groups have
been more successful: the death penalty has been abolished, there is
protection against discrimination on the basis of religion, race or gender,
and protection against preventative detention. Some of these rights are

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 63
granted only to Nepali citizens, while the constitution itself discriminates
against women in its section on nationality: according to Article 9, the
children of male citizens are considered Nepali by descent, while those of
female citizens must reside in Nepal for 14 years before they can become
citizens (Hoftun, 1993).
In contrast, Sharma (1997) argues:
"Nepal has liked to believe that, despite its cultural diversity, its history
has been marked by an ethnic harmony in a multi-ethnic society, free of
all kinds of ethnic tension. He argues ethnic politics in Nepal first surfaced
in the year leading up to the referendum of 1980. The Nepal Federation of
Nationalities (NEFEN) put on 17 point demand, Sharma doesn't accept
them arguing that NEFEN (Nepal Janajati Mahasangh) and others reflect a
totally different perception of Nepal's political, economic, social, and
cultural processes from that of the Hindu Majority."
Issues of Peasants, Workers, and Proletariat
In reviewing the first five years of the People’s War, Maoist party concluded
that it could not achieve its political objectives by means of a protracted
People’s War alone. So, the leaders decided to adopt a strategy of urban
insurrection, as well as work to mobilize a general public rebellion phrased as
the ‘Prachanda Path’ that referred to a fusion of the Chinese model of the
Protracted People’s War and the Russian model of urban insurrection (Ogura,
2008). In Maoist understanding, People's War (PW) was 80 per cent politics
and 20 per cent warfare (Verma et. al, 2007). Hardly 5 years reached, the
infancy of multiparty democracy, however, faced the major stroke of
Maoists', armed revolution following their decision to go for PW. In the areas
of their influence and dominance, like Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan,
they started attacking landlords and government functionaries and local
leaders of congress party and their voters. In the mean time with the direct
guidance of Central authority, district level administration used excessive
force on the Maoists' local activities. The unleashing of violence by the
Maoists was also retaliation against the severe police action against their
activities under a military operation code named 'Romeo' during 1994-95
(Muni, 2004). The human rights violations made by the state side reported in
human rights reports really shook everyone how inhuman a democratic
regime could go.
The story of conflict is something different. Prior to Maoists' emergence
as an influential force in the remote areas of Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, and
Jajarkot, local leaders of Panchayat entered into NC, and perpetuated the
suppression against the Maoist local cadres. The grudges the Maoist had with

64 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Panchas during Panchayat would have been ended at least with the
restoration of democracy, but the reality turned out differently. Panchas took
refuge in NC and this trickily changed the environment and suppression
continued. NC could not deliver the administration that ensures democracy-
security, freedom, and accountable government. Rather a pattern had been
established: the left would take to the streets against the landlords,
exploitation and so forth and the Congress government would use brute force
to maintain law and order (Thapa, 2003:42). Congress' misuse of the police
force fuelling of the situation spearheaded the armed insurgency. Barsha Man
Pun from Rolpa, one of the deputy Commanders of P W, argued:
We are communists, so we always talk about the class struggle. Firstly, in
our society there are distinct economic classes of rich capitalists, poor
peasants and labourers. Secondly, most of the people in power are Indo-
Aryan high caste Hindus, but very few people from the lower castes and
Janajatis [ethnic groups] are included in the power structure. Thirdly,
people from regions such as Madhes [a plain region bordering with India]
and Karnali [a Himalayan region in western Nepal] have traditionally been
excluded from the power structure. Fourthly, outcaste Hindus and the
Dalits, are still discriminated against, even in the 21st century. And fifthly,
partly because of the Hindu religion, women in Nepal do not have equal
rights with men in relation to property, education, health and so on. We
fought peacefully for these oppressed classes for several years through the
parliament and the street movement. But the government tried to suppress
us by using police force and charging us with thousands of false crimes. In
particular, after Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala of the Nepali
Congress dissolved the House of Representatives because of an intra-party
dispute in July 1994, we concluded that the parliamentary system in this
country cannot work for the betterment of the people. We therefore
decided to quit parliament and boycott the mid-term election in November
1994 (cited in Ogura, 2008).
Largely Kham Magar, INs of remote villages joined the underground
people's movement. One of the reasons they came to join with Maoism is
their lucid and natural behaviour pretty much suited with Mao Tse Tung's,
"Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention".19 The
ideology of the Nepalese Maoist movement is strongly egalitarian and
communalistic: these two features are attractive to the Magars because they
have always stressed the sense of equality and mutual help which prevails
among their group (Lecomte- Tilouine, 2000).
The 'fusion' well chanted by Maoist leaders sounds philosophical and
implies different meanings. Every component of the society understood it

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 65
relative to their plight and concern. Hence, it may have different meanings
for different people. As a result, people joined the movement by sacrificing
their lives and possessions. It was a fusion basically of insurrection between
urban and rural; the political and the armed; caste and class or something
else. It really asked for further study and diagnosis. In spite of this, a lot of
social scientists made efforts towards it. However, the initiatives have not
focused on the root causes of conflict especially focusing on subjugation,
suppression, discrimination, and exclusion of larger proportion of population,
such as INs, Women, Madhesis, Dalits, who were looking for avenues. On
the other hand, over the years, subjugation, exclusion, discrimination and
isolation turned the excluded groups into the peasants, workers, and
proletariat class. So, from both angles, either social discrimination or
economic deprivation, excluded and marginalized population was very much
in combustible condition. Here is an excerpt taken from Ogura's study on
Beni attack, to substantiate the socio-cultural background of combatants.
Table 1: Common Characteristics of Maoist Guerrillas Involved in Beni
Attack in 2004
1 Age
• Most of the armed Maoists were under 25.
• There were many children carrying long guns that
almost reached the ground due to their small height.
• There were some senior “volunteers” over fifty.
2 Gender and ethnic
group/caste
• More than 30 % of the armed Maoists were women.
• Most of the armed Maoists were Dalits (low castes),
Mongoloids and Tharus.
• Most of the volunteers were either Magars or Dalits.
• There were also Kshetris, Bahuns, and Tharus among
them.
• There were many Maoists with black faces20
3 Languages
• The Maoists were speaking some language of
western Nepal.
• They were speaking languages that the people in the
bazaar didn’t understand.
• Some Maoists were speaking a Hindi-like language21
• They were using code language while checking
memos.
4 Equipment and
dress
• Some Maoists were holding communication sets that
looked like cordless phones and communicating
with people elsewhere.
• Armed Maoists were wearing combat dress very
similar to that of the RNA.

66 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
• Most of them were wearing cloth shoes of the “Gold
Star” brand22
• Some Maoists bought “Gold Star” shoes in Beni
bazaar.
• The body of a Maoist was later found, holding new
“Gold Star” shoes that he had just bought in Beni.
5 Volunteers
• Many volunteers were wearing stained clothes. They
looked as if they had not changed their clothes for
many days.
• Some volunteers said that they had been taken for
programmes by force.
• Some volunteers were wearing sandals.
• Some volunteers were cleaning the guns of
guerrillas.
6 People from distant
places, outsiders
• One child said that he had walked seven days to
reach Beni.
• Some volunteers said it took twelve days to arrive in
Beni from their district.
• All of them appeared to have come from outside of
Myagdi district.
• They didn’t know about the topography of Beni.
Some Maoists didn’t even know about the location
of the Kali Gandaki river.
7 Role of the local
Maoists
• Local Maoists made plans about where to set up the
treatment centres.
• Some Maoists were accusing the local Maoists of
bad management.
• Local Maoist leaders including “Pravin” were seen in
Beni bazaar.
8 After death
• Maoists dug holes to bury bodies beforehand.
• They carried bodies as far away as possible from the
front line.
• Some bodies had their right arm raised as if doing lāl
salām (red greeting).
• Some bodies were covered with red party flags and
some were wearing black bands around their heads.
9 Fearless
• They were not afraid to die at all.
• Some Maoists fired towards helicopters from the
ground.
10 Behaviour • They drank beer but no hard drinks.
Source: Ogura, 2004

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 67
Ogura has presented the Beni attack of Maoist in a beautiful manner. When
you read her article, presumably you feel that you are watching a film. The
purpose for which Maoists' caused the Beni attack was strategically important
because they wanted to show their strength which was parallel to that of the
state. And one of its objectives was to give the massage to the state that the
Maoists were approaching to the centre very soon, and similar kind of attack
was supposed to be caused in the east as well. According to Magar:23
"This Beni attack was the last action under the strategy of “unification of
decentralized actions.” Magar reports in the article that “Avinash,” the Third
Battalion Commander of the PLA, told him that they had already completed
the process of decentralized actions, dependent centralization, and unification
of decentralized actions, and were preparing for “highly centralized
attack”(cited in Ogura, 2008).
Most of the fighters were below 25 years. This is proven by the guns the
Guerrilla carried because they were longer than their heights. Culturally,
Nepalese women in the rural areas particularly from Bahun and Chhetri caste
groups did not feel comfortable to be out without their parents or guardians.
Guerrilla consisted of almost one third women, and among them two to three
women were from Bahun and Chhetri groups. In Beni attack, there were
guerrillas largely from Dalit, Magar, and Tharu INs. From the dominant
groups such as Bahun and Chhetri there were comparitively less number of
people. Linguistically they were of Tibeto- Mongoloid group especially from
Kham Magar. Also, there were those who spoke the regional languages of the
Western hill and those who sounded like speakers of Hindi, perhaps they
were the speakers Tharu or Maithili, or Bhojpuri languages. In esssence, the
local residents did not understand them much. These are some very striking
features of Maoist insurgency and of their guerrillas. Maoists were found
reluctant to shed light on these features when a political discussion was held
in the civil society. Late Dr. Harka Gurung shared his perception while a
group of INs intellectuals met him just after a week the Maoists became
public. He said,
"Don't worry about the management of physical weapons, rather you
should cautiously work while you manage the human weapons, I mean
Dalit, Madheshi, INs, along with Youth and Women (Author was present
in the team)."
It was not coincidence that the Maoist strongholds were in west Nepal,
particularly, Rolpa and Rukum, where the Magars are dominant (Thapa,
2003:79). However, the Maoists may mystify it and say the fusion was

68 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
between People's War and Peaceful Political Movement by putting aside the
INs issues along with Dalit, Madheshi, Women and Muslim. This does not
mean a virtual conjunction of these two contenders against the State, which is
semi-feudal for the Maoist and communal for the INs. Despite this objective
difference, the radical struggle of the Maoists is being reinforced by ethnic
liberation front while the civil movement of Janajati has benefited from such
identity formation that had been long suppressed (Gurung, 2005b). But when
Madheshi People's Right Forum (MPRF) broke away from the Maoists and
launched the Madhesh Movement clearly hinted that Maoists are not
sensitive towards the deprivation of identity. However, the socio-economic
marginalization of the mid-western coupled with the "fighting spirit" of local
ethnic communities- especially the "Magar Clan"- triggered the armed
uprising (Pandey, 2005). Kham Magar is a Tibeto- Burman population living
in the mid Western part of Nepal. Historically, linguistically, and culturally
they considered it a nation. People were angry when politicians politicized
their life in the aftermath of the restoration of democracy and the after the
launching of the insurgency.
It is important to mention here that the Leninist discourse on right to self-
determination is asserted by Maoists across the country. It is dogmatic to
advocate the Leninist perspective of right to self- determination up to
secession in the context of Nepal. However, the essence of right to self-
determination is camouflaged with the rhetoric of its misinterpretation in
such a way that people in general do not even want to hear a word about it.
April Movement 2005 and Its Consequences
It is well taken that April Movement did settle the Maoist insurgency by
bringing them into mainstream politics and uprooting the two hundred forty
years' institution of old Hindu Monarchy. It is really the breakthrough Nepali
polity did, but what it yields has become the pertinent question when at the
"Constituent Assembly," all parties agreed as a process to resolve all issues
messed up. Obviously there were many hopes and beliefs, but the
unanswered question at this moment is what was the goal, the mission and
the vision of April Movement for political leaders, indeed. Unlikely the
Captain Maoists along with other major political party leaders seem to be in
confusion. It is well understood that Maoists who fought for 'New
democracy' and when it came in agreement with other forces, it was
imperative to leave the dictatorship of protracted proletariat, peasants, and
farmers; but what about the state restructuring along with federalism where
overwhelming people dream to see, a New Nepal? However, all parties come
to an agreement on Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), and it here where

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 69
there has clearly been expressed identity matters including the class
disparities to have been the vision of the agreement. Article 3.5 of CPA says:
"In order to end discriminations based on class, ethnicity, language,
gender, culture, religion and region and to address the problems of
women, Dalit, Indigenous people, ethnic minorities (Janajtis), Terai
Communities (Madheshis), oppressed, neglected and minority
communities and the backward areas by deconstructing the current
centralized and unitary structure, the state shall be restructured in an
inclusive, democratic and forward looking manner (CPA, 2006)."
The CPA has clearly envisioned the agenda of state restructuring;
however, it could not spell out federalism as such. So Madhesh movement
ruptured, and the state was forced to negotiate with Madheshi People's Rights
Forum (MPRF), and make a negotiation:
"In order to eliminate all forms of discriminations made by the centralized
and unitary state against, inter alia, the Madhesis, indigenous people/
nationalities, Dalits, women, other backward classes, minorities, Muslim
communities and also to create an environment to move forward all
Nepali people including the Madhesis, into a single national mainstream
by restructuring the state into an inclusive democratic and federal
structure;…… While restructuring the state, an arrangement of a federal
governance system comprised of states with autonomy shall be made…"
Accordingly, the Interim Constitution of Nepal 2006 accommodated the
aspirations of diverse groups with the commitment that Constituent
Assembly (CA) would address the issues:
The State of Nepal is mentioned in Article (1).... secular, inclusive and
fully democratic State. Similarly Article (5) about the languages of the
nation in Sub-Article (1) says: all the languages spoken as mother tongues
in Nepal are the national languages of Nepal; Sub- Article (2) says: the
Nepali language in the Devanagari script shall be the language of official
business. However, the use of one's mother tongue in a local body or
office shall not be barred. The State shall translate the language used for
such purposes into the language of official business for the record.
The Interim Constitution has also provisioned for education in mother
tongue for children who are different than Nepali. Article (17), Sub-Article
(1) says, "Each community shall have the right to receive basic education in
their mother tongue as provided for in the law." The clause, 'provided for the

70 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
law' is often found barred that obstructs the state to implement the
constitutional provisions.
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2006 is found to be very positive towards
gender issues. It has enshrined the provisions regarding rights of women in
Article (20):
Sub-Article (1) says, "No woman shall be discriminated against in any
way on the basis of gender." Similarly Sub- Articles (2), (3), and (4)
ensure the right to reproductive health and other reproductive rights.
Physical, mental or any other form of violence against women shall be
punishable by law, and sons and daughters shall have equal rights to
ancestral property. These provisions seem to be greater changes, no matter
how much substantively women may have been benefiting.
One of the severe social problems Nepal has been facing is untouchability
among the so-called low caste community from the Hindu high caste people.
The Interim Constitution has made profound provisions such as, 'right against
untouchability and racial discrimination' in Article (14):
Sub- Article (1) says, "No person shall, on ground of caste, descent,
community or occupation, be subject to racial discrimination and
untouchability in any form. Such a discriminatory act shall be liable to
punishment and the victim shall be entitled to compensation as provided
by the law." Sub- Articles (2), (3), (4), and (5) guarantee the use of
services, utilities available to the public; production or making available
of any goods, services or conveniences, purchasing or acquiring such
goods, services or conveniences; not allowed to purport to demonstrate
superiority or inferiority of any person or a group of persons belonging to
any caste, tribe or origin; or not to justify social discrimination on the
basis of caste and tribe; or to disseminate ideas based on caste superiority
or hatred; or to encourage caste discrimination in any form. The violation
of above mentioned rights shall be punishable in accordance with law.
It clearly reveals the changes between the constitution of 1991 and 2007;
however, people who are overwhelmingly stuck with the forthcoming
constitution didn't see it substantively. The provisions of Interim Constitution
are perceived as provisional.
Constituent Assembly: Social Identity and Federalism
The globalization process has been that the ideological identification of the
centralization of power in the state with the homogenization of social and
cultural differences, a fundamental heritage of the democratic revolutions of

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 71
the 18th century to the modern state, has been undermined by the
redistribution of specific powers and aspects of sovereignty from states to an
increasing number of international regulatory bodies (Turner, 2006). These
changes are contributing to a paradigm shift in the forms of social space-time
(chronotope) associated with the idea of progress and the hegemony of the
modern nation-state. The changes brought by globalization are spread around
and current issue is how to address those issues. Turner suggests that re-
framing this cultural chronotope is called ‘synchronic pluralism’, in which
there is neither a direction of historical time towards the creation of culturally
homogeneous national societies nor are states identified as unique centers of
sovereignty. So, chronotope associated with the new social movements based
on ethnicity, feminism, and regionalism is seen under the broader perimeter
of multiculturalism.
Social scientists have also intensified their longstanding interest in the
concept of identity in recent years (Jenkins, 1996). Sociologists have
pondered and explored the tension between individual identity and the
constraints of social structure. Anthropologists have examined the cultural
expression of identity, its meanings, and how it is maintained at group
boundaries. Social psychologists have focused on the multifaceted and
situational contingent nature of individual identity. They have also identified
social identity as a powerful ingredient in the development of in-group bias
and intergroup conflict (Tajfel, 1981).
Despite the recent emergence of identity politics around the world,
researchers of political behavior have been slow to incorporate the concept of
identity into their empirical studies (Huddy, 2001). This seems odd, given
that demands for group respect and recognition are at the heart of new social
movements that argue for the rights of women, religious minorities, diverse
ethnic and racial groups, and gays and lesbians (Taylor, 1994).
Constituent Assembly is the desire of Nepalese people for the last 6
decades when they got freedom from Rana Oligarchy. However, it didn't
happen at that time. Nepal had a very bad experience then when transition
went up to almost a decade. NC was very much criticized; palace played with
political forces eventually closed the door to CA and parliamentary election
occurred for the first time. After forty five years, politicians agreed on CA
that would make people's constitution by removing the Monarchy that
obscured the CA process at that time. So people were hopeful and
enthusiastic to see their aspirations portrayed in the new constitution.
The manifestos made public by the political parties are expected to guide
them during Constitution making process. Maoist and UML followed by

72 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Madheshi forum and Terai Madhes Domocratic Forum laid the emphasis on
identity. One of the reason why, every political party adoted identity as the
basis of federalism is perhaps its overwhelming base population, as may be
seen in government statistics. INs population accounts for about 37.2 percent,
despite many INs believe that they have been under counted. One interesting
instance we can share here is that prior to Maoist Insurgency, though
strategically important in size, NC and UML were not much sensitive
towards INs, Dalit, and Madheshis issues. But later, NC too was also found
to establish INs Federation within its party structure. When Maoists came
into mainstream politics, NC and UML also formed INs' organizations in
their party, however, they accuse Maoist party of misleading the ideology
from Class to Caste. Similar instance Maoist experienced even during the CA
election. Below is a summary of the various political parties' proposals for
delineating the provinces.
Table 2: Summary of Political Parties' Proposals for Delineating the
Provinces
S.N. Parties Commitment
1 CPN (Maoist) Ethnic make-up, geographical features, linguistic basis and
economic feasibility
2 Nepali Congress National integrity, geographical location and convenience,
population, natural resources and economic feasibility,
interrelationship of the provinces, linguistic/ethnic and cultural
identity, political/administrative perspective
3 CPN (UML) Geographical location, population and ethnic habitation,
mother tongue and language used, cultural characteristics,
administrative convenience, socioeconomic interrelationship
and feasibility capacity, availability of natural resources and
means and history. Constituent units shall be named in way
that will reflect identity ethnically, language, culture and
history. Federal and local units shall be multiethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious, and multicultural.
4 MJAFNepal Geography, ethnicity, language, social, cultural characteristics,
diversity and homogeneity
5 TMLP Geographical similarity, cultural and linguistic, population and
economic similarity, similar climate, similarity in economy
and agriculture
6 Sadbhawana
Party
Language, culture and community
7 RPP Geography, population, caste, cultural identity, natural
resources, economic feasibility.
8 CPN (ML) Mix of caste groups and communal tolerance, stability,

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 73
security and balanced development; mix of the Himal, Pahad
and Terai, economic sustainability, uniformity in ethnicity,
language and culture, similar historical background and
geographical convenience.
9 Jana Morcha
Nepal
Caste, language, population, region and geography, natural
heritage and source of income.
10 CPN (United) Ethnicity, language, cultural concentration and geographical
situation/condition
11 N.Majdoor
Kisan Party
Based on existing zones.
12 Rastriya
Janashakti Party
Natural and geographical characteristics, ethnic, linguistic and
cultural factors, status of economy, resources and
administration
13 Sadbhawana
(Anand Devi)
Geographical specificity, history and culture
14 Rastriya
Janamukti Party
On the basis of geographical region with the majority of one
caste/ethnic group; as far as possible on the basis of religion,
historically inhabited by one ethnic group, on the basis of
language and culture
15 Sanghiya L.
Rastriya Manch
Historical background of ethnicity or language for the
autonomy of a specific region, the ethnic group should be
indigenous to the state concerned.
16 CPN (Unified) Geography, population, caste, cultural identity, natural
resources, economic feasibility.
17 Nepali Janata
Dal
Opportunity for the development of natural resources;
population, language and culture, giving priority to national
unity.
18 Dalit Janajati
Party
National integrity, geographical conditions and convenience,
population, natural resources and economic feasibility,
interrelationship between states, homogeneity in language,
ethnicity, and culture, political and administrative feasibility.
19 Nepa Rastriya
Party
On the basis of ethnicity, language and region, with priority
for indigenous people
20 Chure Bhawar
Ekata Party
Geographical characteristics
21 Nepal Dal Geography and population density
22 Nepal
Loktantrik
Samajwadi Party
Origin of ethnic groups, demography, natural resources,
history, language and culture etc.
Source: UNDP - Constitutional Advisory, Support Unit (CASU) & German Technical
Cooperation (GTZ)
Table 2 clearly shows that parties spelled out social identities- ethnicity,
language, and geographical region as the fundamental basis for federalization

74 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
manifest in their political commitment while they contested the popular adult
franchise election for CA. They were and should be guided by their
commitment in CA logically; however, it did not happen.
It was a good sign that CA composition was inclusive. For the first time
in Nepal's history and perhaps be in Asia, Nepal took positive measures as
regards social inclusion in CA composition. Out of the 601 CA members,
Madheshi accounted for 34.1 percent, followed by INs 33.2 per cent, women
32.7 per cent, Dalit 8.2 per cent, and others 30.2 per cent.24 So, following
this, State Restructuring and Division of the State Power (SRDSP) in CA
decided the basis of federalism to be 'Identity' and 'Capability' unanimously.
But when the Committee decided the federal units by its majority vote, the
CA process entirely stopped, and the different alternative models evolved in
different parties out of the CA process. On this was stuck the CA process,
and ultimately was made to see its demise without promulgating the
constitution. It has led Nepalese polity to a crossroad: hold on to the legacy,
backtrack, or fastforward to the new phase, broad based democracy and
multiculturalism.
Conclusion
In Nepali language the "jati" (ethnic group), the "Jatiya" (Ethnic), and the
"jatiyata" (Ethnicity) are quite often used to connote the Janajati (Nations)
and the janajatiyata (Nationalities) and this is reflected even by foreign
scholars in their writings. In my observation it is just reverse in reality. Often
the mainstream intellectuals are heard to call the Nepali terms jati, jatiya, and
jatiyata 'sensitive,' but why? If it connotes the indigenous groups, I mean
Janajati (Nations), they were never heard sensitive to any matter related to
them or to the State. Of course, the Jati (ethnic groups) are sensitive to any
matters, because they are considered alien to native area and Janajati people.
In every moment, they keep on thinking about their gains, loss, prosperity,
and are often conscious about how to dispel uncertainty. Epistemologically,
genus of ethnic group goes back to people who had left their native place and
got new identity ethnei, ethnic, and ethnicity in a place of destination
(Oommen, 2012; Kymlicka, 1995). I may be bias, but in my observation
comparatively migrants are much sensitive than the natives. So terms are
adversely used for natives even in scholarly work. And I think it is due to the
biasness of the colonial perspective. When native perspective and issues are
concerned, there emerge new terms for example, Janajatis (Nationalities/
Tribes) in Asia including Nepal, Inuit in Hokkaido Japan; aborigines in

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 75
Australia and New-Zealand, First Nations in Canada, Sami people in Europe,
Indians in America and so forth.
There are other words quite contentiously used such as Adibashi/
Anadibashi (Indigenous Peoples), Aprabashi (migrant), and Mulbashi (Main
inhabitant) in Nepal. It is well known and articulated in the literature about
who came from where; but it became problematic when Janatis (nationalities)
claimed group based democratic rights in republican constitution. The
parameter of Adibashi is then taken as a camouflage jacket even for Bahun,
Chetri, Thakuri, and Dasnami. So, a pertinent question now is how long a
resident should be designated as Adibashi (Indigenous Peoples)? Or, are
there any socio-cultural, historical, and territorial evidences to define the
Janajati? Of course, there are many essential characters to become Adibash.
Yet, when we take the cut- off year or point referring to the so-called
unification period of king Prithivinarayan Shah, it does not exceed 240 years.
Meanwhile, Vedic Hindus are here over the last thousand years or so. So,
pre- or post- unification, it does not make any sensible difference when we
talk about the years per se. But when socio-political rights and issues are
concerned with reference to Janajatis, then Hinduwization, Shankritzation,
and Bramanization are the major issues that played a role to exclude them by
subjugating and assimilating or mainstreaming into monoethnic nation state.
Of course, unification is important since Hindupati, Asali Hindustan, Hindu
Religious Kingdom, Hindu culture and ethos are historically taken as the
guiding principle of mainstreaming in mono-ethnic nation-state building
project.
The political discourse through which Nepal came across reveals that in
every movement a ruling party is abolished and rulers are denounced; and
people feel that they are emancipated. But all changes become false
ultimately, and another initiative begins right after the aftermath of the
previous one. It all comes as a never ending game the Nepalese polity is
fighting against. In such dilemma, obviously people, nations see their. One
persistent question is whether we do bear democracy as westerners do; if yes,
the outcome of globally accepted multiculturalism ensuring group based
rights along with individual freedom and liberty needs to be considered as
Kymlicka argues: create 'multinational and polyethnic State,' and it is
possible only through federal political arrangements.
In fact, Nepali State is made of elites rather than of people's
representatives from the very inception. The undefined conflict enduring
from the beginning is in between the elitism and group interests. This is what
is in Bentley's view that Marx's theory of class struggle was a 'crude form of

76 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
group theory.' He further argues that the failure of the so-called proletariat or
of the call 'unite behind a common interest and seize power' proved Marx
wrong. Indeed, Bentley (1908, p. 467) says, "A proletariat class, such as
Marx and Engels conceived it, simply did not exist (cited in Manely, 2010)."
And it is true in the context of Nepali society, where indigeneity and
peasantry is much more prevalent than to be capitalists. Apart from this, of
course, the casteism prevails in the society. The 'revolution' which class
struggle provoked is found volatile. So, the question of 'fusion' between 'Arm
Struggle' and 'Identity Conflict' is pertinently persisting. However, Maoist do
not interpret it this way. So, the question of ideology, if we refer it to the
definition of Wikepedia offers us, it is an organized collection of scientific
ideas with comprehensive vision proposed by dominant class of a society to
all members of the society.' Brahmins are dominant in Nepalese society in
intellectual entrepreneurship so they are able to harvest the fruits as well.
However, what a society looks for in return must be tangibly shown. In a
very abstract way, different 'isms' are interpreted and are applied for their
particular interest. And Maoists are the last ones where there were many
people who fought for everything and found nothing. This illustrates an 'ism'
in their deep heart for which they sacrificed everything. Of course,
democracy has a wide universal and global space than the dictatorial system.
All 'isms' seem already exhausted in Nepal; however, new forces may emerge
with relevant and appropriate ideology in a democratic setting. And it is
imperative, for Nepal to exist as a vibrant democratic state in future.
Notes
1. The Americanization was primarily initiated through the public school system.
New York Superintendent of Schools William Maxwell declared in 1913 that the
“great business of the department of education in this city [is] to train the
immigrant child … to become a good American citizen.”....In 1893, while visiting
an elementary school in a New York City tenement district, Jacob Riis overheard
children reciting a type of a pledge of allegiance to the flag that included the
phrase, “one country, one language, one Flag!” In the New York City public
school system, the use of any other language within or near the schools was
forbidden(http://sdonline.org/48/the-cultural-pluralist-response-to-
americanization-horace-kallen-randolph-bourne-louis-adamic-and-leonard-
covello/)
2. Individual identity may change as s/he prefers to be, so it is likely to be 'ascribed'
one. But collective identity on which s/he has nothing to do, but ancestrally or
traditionally one has got by birth is likely to be acquired, such as race, ethnicity,
mother tongue, etc. However, the importance of individual choice in identity

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 77
acquisition holds even for what we think of as quite fixed characteristics such as
race and ethnicity by virtue of different reasons (Nag, 1995).
3. Information adopted from Dulal (B.S. 2068) and analyzed for the purpose of this
article. Out of 371, there are 279 primary schools (grade 1 to 5), followed by 43
Secondary School (grade 9-10), 42 Lower Secondary School (grade 6-8), 15
higher secondary (grade 11-12), and 2 Campuses.
4. Jul 30, 2009) On July 25, 2009, after a year-long trial, the Supreme Court of
Nepal ruled that Vice President Parmananda Jha's taking of the oath of office in
Hindi, instead of Nepali, on July 23, 2008, was unconstitutional. The two-justice
bench, comprising Chief Justice Min Bahadur Rayamajhi and Justice Balram KC,
stated: "[t]he oath in Hindi stands annulled as it is against the legal provisions…
Since he is responsible for upholding law, the vice-president must take his oath of
office and secrecy in Nepali."
5. http://www.nepalnews.com/main/index.php/news-archive/2-political/4021-jha-
takes-fresh-oath-in-nepali-maithali-to-revive-vp-post.html
6. In 2017 B.S. Daura Suruwal was announced as national dress for men in
government services and other national programs. Daura suruwal took a great
pace of development in those in those years. Very few of Nepali now wear Daura
Suruwal. After 2046 B.S none of the elected or interim governments is able to
define and announce any national the national dress
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Daura-Suruwal)
7. United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations decided 1993 year as
the Indigenous Peoples Year.
8. The National State should refer to such states that consciously nurture cultural
diversity within their territory and endorse cultural pluralism, that is, dignified co-
existence of cultural communities, as a value (Oommen, 20012).
9. (1) A national minority may continue to be in its ancestral or adopted homeland
and yet it may be ethnified by state sponsored colonization, particularly by a
native dominant collectivity.
a. Transforming the oiginal inhabitants of a territory into a minoritized and
marginalized collectivity;
b. Labelling a collectivity in such a way that it has no moral claim over its
ancestral or adopted homeland;
c. Some nations are subjected to ethnification as a result of a division of their
ancestral homeland into two or more state territories,
(2) Denial of fully-fledged participation in the economy and polity to an
immigrant collectivity which had adopted the land in the which it has
migrated as its homeland,
(3) The tendency on the part of a settler collectivity to identify with its ancestral
homeland even after several decades, sometimes even after centuries, of
immigration,
(4) Ethnification occurs when state attempts to integrate and homogenize the
different nation in its territory into a common people.

78 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
(5) If those who migrate to alien lands are denied citizenship rights even when
they become eligible for them, they are ethnified in that they are treated as
strangers and outsiders.
(6) Even when migrants are accepted as co-nationals by the host society, the
former may not want that identity and might wish to return to their homeland.
10. The Searchlight, Patna; 2 October, 1946; Source: Pradeep Giri, Archive of B.P.
Koirala (B.S. 2066) cited in Historical Documents of Nepali Congress, in eds
Gagan Thapa et. al, 2067.
11. Prasai is vehement supporter of Hindu Religious Kingdom and Monarch against
the multiparty democracy. He is continuously writing in opposition to republic
and Maoist( http://www. weeklyblitz.net/1973/nepalese-political-scenarios-1950-
2011
12. Panchayat Democracy enshrined as:
Whereas, the parliamentary system could not prove suitable on account of the lack
of education and political consciousness to the desired extent and on account of its
being out to step with the histoy and tradition of the country and wishes of the
people;
Whereas, even the installation of the government elected by the people could not
impart to the people as sense of participation the administration...
Whereas, the country has experienced that the fulfillment of OUR aim, namely to
conduct the administration of the country on the basis of popular consent and to
achieve the real objective of democracy by associating the people to the maximum
extent possible with the administrative system, which is possible only through the
medium of the Panchayat system which has its roots in the soil of our country and
is capable of growth and development in the climate prevailing in the country.
13. Ganesh Man Shingh did not accept the name of the Congress Party as B.P. Koirala
proposed the All Indian National Congress Party.
14. (1) Khasan, (2) Jadan, (3) Magarat, (4) Tamudhim, (5) Tambasaling, (6) Nepal,
(7) Khambuwan, (9) Limbuwan, (10) Kochila, (11) Mithila, (12) Bhojpur, (13)
Awadh.
15. Hidden facts in Nepali Politics (Nepali Rajnitima Adekha Sachchai).
16. (1) Kirath Yakthung Chumlung (KYC), (2) Kirat Rai Sanskritik Sangh, (3) Tamu
Bouddh Sewa Samittee, (4) Langhali Pariwar, (5) Nepal Bhasha Manka Khala, (6)
Thakali Sewa Samittee, (7) Sunuwar Sewa Samaj (8) Nepal Tamang Gdhedung
17. In most of the writings ethnic groups used for native people of Nepal, which is
western view, but indigenous peoples of Nepal defined themselves as
Nationalities. Task Force formed by Nepal Government for the establishment of
the foundation for the promotion of nationalities, is “that community who has its
own mother tongue and traditional culture and yet does not fall under the
conventional fourfold Varna of the Hindu Varna system or the Hindu hierarchical
caste structure” (NEFIN 2009). Nation or nationality refers to peoples who have
settled in a certain territory, who have their own language and culture, and desire
to self-determination, have trade relationships with each other and are independent

After Liberalism, Marxism – Leninism and Maoism 79
and sovereign (Gurung 2006). According to NEFIN (2009), each indigenous
nationality or Janajati has the following characteristics:
• A distinct collective identity;
• Own language, religion, tradition, culture and civilization;
• Own traditional egalitarian social structure;
• Traditional homeland or geographical area;
• Written or oral history;
• Having "We" feeling—a sense of self-identity
• Has had no decisive role in the politics and government of modern Nepal;
• Who are the indigenous or native peoples of Nepal; and
• Who declares itself as "Janajati"
18. Cadres of the ruling CPN-UML citing the party's apathy in the suicide of veteran
cadre Digendra Rajbanshi and hundreds of relatives and well wishers of the
deceased Rajbanshi and UML activists chanted slogans against the party and
staged demonstrations. Vehicles plying on the highway have been stranded
following the protest. The agitators accused the party of neglecting Rajbanshi who
was actively involved in the party for the past 37 years. Party negligence was the
major cause of his suicide, the agitators claimed. Rajbanshi, 65 had committed
suicide by hanging himself from a plum tree in the premises of the UML
headquarters at Balkhu, Kathmandu. He was staying in the party headquarters in
the hope of finding a job for his son Shambhu, 25 for the past two months. He met
senior leaders of the party and ministers as well but to no avail. He was
disappointed with their responses and ultimately killed himself, a family source
said. He was a colleague of KP Sharma Oli, Radha Krishna Mainali, Biren
Rajbanshi, CP Mainali and Mohan Chandra Adhikari among others during the
Peasants' Uprising in Jhapa during 1970s and was sentenced to six years
imprisonment in Birgunj and Kathmandu on the charge of sedition (The
Himalayan, 18 April, 2010).
19. The three rules: (1) prompt obedience to orders, (2) no confiscation of peasant
property, and (3) prompt delivery directly to authorities of all items confiscated
from landlords.
The eight points were: (1) Be polite when speaking, (2) Be honest when buying
and selling, (3) Return all borrowed articles, (4) Pay compensation for everything
damaged, (5) Do not hit or swear at others, (6) Do not damage crops, (7) Do not
harass females, (8) Do not mistreat prisoners (http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Rules_of_Discipline_and_Eight_Points_for_Attention).
20. It appeared that they smeared their faces with black powder.
21. This may be Tharu or Maithili or Bhojpuri.
22. Popular made-in-Nepal shoes specially for villagers.
23. One of the combatant, I am not sure, but may be Pashang. He is also from Magar
Community.
24. Ironically others category outnumbered, since dominant groups who have a
overwhelming representation didn't want to be recognized with the potential
category of inclusion.

80 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
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Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012), 85-98
Copyright © 2012 CNAS/TU
NORWEGIAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS; STUDIES OF
THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO AN EGALITARIAN
SOCIETY1
Marit Haug
Abstract
This paper offers example of how Norwegian social movements have been
studied; what kind of questions have been asked, which theoretical
frameworks have been applied, and what kinds of data collection strategies
have been played, specifically in relation to democratization, poverty
reduction and the generation of the social capital. Within a generation
Norway emerged from being one of the poorest countries in Europe, with the
high level of emigration, inequality and conflict, to becoming one of the
world's richest and most egalitarian societies. This paper discusses the role
of social movements on this transformation through a review of a few
selected academic studies. The paper starts by tracing the history of social
movements in Norway and describes key features of the traditional
Norwegian organization landscape such as such as high level of
organizational membership, its unique vertical links between national and
local level organizations, and its 'democratized' centralized state with
extensive and deep linkages to mass movements. The studies that are come
from different disciplines; history, economics, sociology and political science
and most are concerned with describing and explaining the formal and
informal relationship between state and society. The paper refers in some
details to two studies of the labour movement and the women's movement that
illustrate the diverse approaches taken. Since the 1990's 'Real time"
organizations have begun to replace social movements and research on these
new forms of organizations and the implications they have for Norwegian
democracy is presented towards the end of the paper. Finally, some
reflections on the relevance of the Norwegian experience for research are
given.
Introduction
Social movements have made a significant contribution to the development
of Norway as a democratic society characterized by high income and gender

86 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
equality. This paper investigates some of the central features of Norwegian
social movements and the perspectives that have been adopted in studying
them. Norwegian social movements and civil society organizations in
general, have exercised considerable influence on policy but they have played
a comparatively small role in delivering services and in implementing
government policies. At the same time the legitimacy of the Norwegian state
has been on the proximity, communication and the mutual influence between
civil society and government at the local and national level, and the capacity
of the state to accommodate new interest groups (Halsaa, Thun et al. 2008).
The close state-civil society relationship has been underpinned by high levels
of trust. These relations between the state and social movements and the role
of social movements in relation to political parties have been common
themes in the study of social movements in Norway.
This paper starts by the social movements in their 19th century historical
context, followed by a presentation of studies that have examined the
mechanisms through which the labour movement contributed to
modernization and equal pay and how the women's movement through a
carefully crafted political strategy gave to new studies on the diminished role
of social movements and how studies have shown their replacement by 'real
time' organization. New challenges to organizational cohesion have resulted
from Norway's increasingly multi-cultural population, and research on the
consequences of multi-cultural population is emerging.
Theoretical approaches to the study of social movements can be
categorized in a number of different ways. An early definition says that a
social movement is 'a purposive attempt of a number of people to change
societal institutions and structures' (Zald and Ash 1966). According to Cohen
and Arato it is this willingness to aim for radical changed characterize social
movements '…the utopian dimension of radical politics can be found only at
the level of collective action' (Cohen and Arato 1992). In sociology, classical
social movement theory dealt with organizations that target the state, and
were geared towards redistribution, or at least change, in the political and
economic areas. these theories were concerned with movements such as
labour movements that had coherent ideologies, a set of collective identities,
and a disciplined bureaucratic organization. 'New social movement theory' on
the other hand is concerned with organizations such as the peace, feminist,
ecology and local-autonomy movements that 'involved in the social
construction of those identities', p.511, (Cohen and Arato 1992). They often
have cultural-as opposed to political-strategies for achieving their objectives
and change often happens through changes in the mindsets of individuals.

Norwegian Social Movements 87
Another distinction that is frequently made is between resource mobilization
theories and political process theories. Resource mobilization theories stress
the organizational forms and modes of communication that are necessary for
collective action, making use of variables such as organization, interests,
resources, opportunities and strategies (Cohen and Arato 1992). Political
process theories are sometimes treated as a separate category and sometimes
subsumed under resources mobilization theories. These theories see the
political opportunity structures in which social movements operate as being
critical to their success or failure. Tarrow defines political opportunity
structure as 'features of regimes and institutions (for example, splits in the
rulings class, political alignments, the presence or absence of influential
allies, the threat or lack of repression, and the changes in any of these) that
facilitated or inhibit a political actor's collective action' (Tarrow 2006).
Lately, grand theories are being dismantled and researches tend to combine
different strands of theory in trying to understand social movements.
Social movements in Norway in the historical context
Today's social movements in Norway need to be analyzed and understood in
their historical context, (Wollebæk, Ibsen et al. 2010) and not as a result of
state-or market failure. Norwegian social movements date to the 1840s when
local associations joined to become nation-wide population movements. The
traditional mass movements were the peasants' movements, the labour
movement, the prohibition movements, the laymen movements, the New
Norwegian language2 movements, and the social and humanitarian
movements (Tranvik and Selle 2007). Movements building was marked by
treat enthusiasm mobilized through mass meetings inspirational leaders.
Participants believed in progress and were optimistic about their future
prospect; knowledge and technology were seen as doors-openers to a better
life (Lorentzen 2010).
Some historians explain the emergence of social movements around the
middle of the 19th century as a result of their complementary to the liberal
state. The 'empty' social space that resulted from the liberal state and the new
individualism were filled by associations. Others emphasize the social void
filled by associations as old organizational forms replaced traditional social
units. Yet others argue that the new associations were instruments to advance
the interests and positions grew into the democratic, electoral state, and
become as integral parts of it (Nerb vik 1999). Associations became learning
ground for politicians and numerous leaders turned into leading politicians.
Associational membership or leadership became the common route to seat in

88 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
parliament. Often the associations became instruments for change and
modernization and concerned remote and rural areas to the national centers.
They also became important platforms for groups that were excluded from
politics. At the same time the dividing line between politics and politically
orientated organizations was often blurred.
The historian Inger Furseth in her PhD on social and religious movements
in the 19th century develops an analytical framework that combines a
resource mobilization framework and a political process framework. She
explains patterns of mobilization and their relationship to organizational
characteristics and more specifically she is concerned with organizational
forms, leadership strategies and specific tactics used by the organizations.
She studies five movements, but is also concerned with 'organizational fields'
and argues that the links among movements and the mutual impacts of
movements on each other increase their impact on society at large. For
example, she demonstrates how the labour movement learnt from the
organizational strategies adopted by the religious movements that preceded
them(Furseth 2002). Rather than taking the more common route of
identifying the conditions for the emergence of a particular movement at a
particular point in time, she asks the questions of how the organizations
allocated resources to achieve their goals; what external factors influenced
the success and failure of the movements; and how they had mainly direct or
indirect interaction among themselves.
Towards the second half of the 19th century, social movements split into
two; a political and a social/civil, yet the political and the social/civil
remained part of the same movement (Lorentzen 2010). So for example; the
labour movement split into the labour Party (in power in Norway today) and
the trade union movement as well as numerous associations linked to these
two power centers. Similarly, the Christian People's Party was established in
1933 and co-existed with numerous missionary societies that established
Sunday schools, youth and children's organizations, and numerous colleges
and universities. Until 1940, Christian organizations delivered social services
in the health sector, care of the elderly, child protection etc. The Christian
People's party continues to uphold value issues such as anti-abortion, a
restrictive alcohol policy, and anti-poverty measures.
The classical Norwegian social-movement organization was based on
membership and was democratically structured. The local and the national
level were hierarchically linked. Although local branches were relatively
autonomous, they were linked to the national political system through clearly
defined channels of communication and social movements were important in

Norwegian Social Movements 89
fostering inclusive social and political mobilization and in turning ordinary
people into 'full-blown citizens' ( sterud, Engelstad et al. 2003). The other
feature of Norwegian social movements was their close integration with the
state (Tranvik and Selle 2003). Selle and Tranvik explain integration as the
result of the 19th century Norwegian national-building project in which a
weak state, in the absence of the other strong social forces with social
movements to plans for a better future (Tranvik and Selle 2007). The deal
that set the place for the next century allowed for state centralization in return
for citizen control. Civil activism has been relatively weak and legitimacy has
been measured by the ability to influence the state. As a result, studies of
social movements in Norway have often taken relations to the state as their
focus.
The public commission appointed to examine the relationship between
power and democracy ( sterud, Engelstad et al. 2003) points a bleak picture
of recent change to associational life in Norway. Throughout the 20th century
social movements had played a critical role in the formation on Norwegian
democracy. The commission argues that the turn of the millennium marked
the end of the dominant position of mass people's movements. Typical of the
years afterwards is the absence of growing, successful people's movements
that aim for social change based on an ideology that foster conflict. In
contrast to social movements, they have the narrow purpose, they are actively
orientated, and they have a weak or no ideological foundation. Personal
satisfaction replaces ideology or making a contribution to a cause. The
personal contribution rather than the organizational effort is important.
Moreover, the new organizations are decentralized, network based, and
localized and the relationship between the organization and its members
resembles the relationship between a consumer and producer. This new
organization landscape is believed to have far-reaching consequences foe
Norwegian democracy. Firstly, social movements become professionalized,
negating organizations that rely less on their numerical strength than on their
expertise and competence. Organizational power and influence consequently
become de-linked from their membership based and organizations rely
primarily on their expertise and networks. Secondly, the hierarchical links
between the local and the national level have become weakened. Due to the
do-linking between numerical and local strength and political influence,
organization influence on politics has become less predictable and more
uncertain. As a result of these changes, the role of organizational society as a
pillar of democracy has weakened ( sterud, Engelstad et al. 2003)

90 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Today there are roughly 2200 nation-wide organizations and around 120000
local associations (CBOs) in Norway whose population is close to 5 million
people. Whereas organization in the welfare sector are fairly dependent on
the state for funding, outside the welfare sectors, social movements have a
long tradition of independence and of generating income from members. A
relatively low share of the population, four per cent of the population, is
employed in the voluntary sector compared to a European average of seven
per cent and Norway (alongside Sweden) boasts the highest percentages of
volunteering per inhabitant in Europe. Approximately half the adult
population takes part in volunteering, spending approximately ten hours per
month. Over 50 per cent of the population volunteers in culture and welfare
organizations, whereas around ten per cent volunteer for each of the
following categories of organizations: welfare, political/humanitarian,
housing/economy and religious/ethnics organizations. Around one third of
organizational income come from the state, private donations are small at
nine per cent, and finally over half is raised through collections, sales and
membership fees carried out by members and supporters by means of
‘dugnad’, which is voluntary work contributions organized around these
specific tasks.
The labour movement
The Norwegian economist Karl Ove Moene investigates the contribution of
social democratic policies to Norwegian affluence and equality. He works
from a historical, economic and political institutional perspective on the
Norwegian labour market and politics focusing on the crucial mechanisms
that generated affluence and equality and the conditions that underpinned
these mechanisms. The conventional view held by economists is that
affluence, consensus, and class homogeneity are prerequisites for social
democracy and that hence the model of social democracy practiced in
Scandinavia is unsuited for export or adaptation to countries marked by
conflict, heterogeneity and poverty. Moene turns this argument on its head
arguing that consensus, homogeneity and affluence are generated by the
social democratic model. He argues that prosperity and equality were
achieved through the mechanism of wage compression achieved through
‘highly centralized wage setting institutions’ (Moene and Wallerstein 2006).
Moreover, his argument is that wage compression could be equally beneficial
in South Africa, Brazil and India as of today, as it was in Scandinavia from
1935 to 1970. Confining his argument to economics, he leaves the question
of the wage compression to social democracy combined ‘the socialist virtues

Norwegian Social Movements 91
of equality and security with the capitalist virtues of economic efficiency and
technological dynamism’ (Moene and Wallerstein 2006).
Today Scandinavia has the most egalitarian salary structure in the world.
This was not always the case. In the 1930s class regional income inequalities
were high, conflict dominated the labour marker and strikes and lock outs
were endemic. Moene’s argument is that the prime driver behind the
combination of modernization and equality achieved in Norway was
‘solidaristic bargaining’ that led to a reduction in wage inequality. The wage
compression resulting from ‘solidaristic bargaining’ has favoured highly
productive companies in the modern sector above companies with low
productivity in the traditional sector. The model has allowed modern sector,
productive companies to invest and expand whilst companies with lower
productivity have been forced to close down as wage costs have become too
high. Hence, it was not Keynesian economics or high welfare spending that
has led to affluence, but the wage compression, in combination with social
security policies.
‘Solidaristic bargaining’ took place within a highly institutionalized
structure in which the labour movement and employers union negotiated at
the central level, as opposed to the local level, to set wages. In 1935 they
entered into an agreement over collective bargaining at the industrial level
and introduced it. The model has been conditioned on inclusive trade unions
that have included poorly paid labourers. The informal sector has been small
in Norway and the issue of organization in the informal sector has been a
stumbling block to a high level of organization, Well-organized employers
have been another crucial component of the model. Moene and Wallerstein
maintain that immediate benefits for those at the bottom were necessary for
the model to work. In this manner, Moene documents the economic
mechanism whereby high levels of participation in the labour movement have
led to greater equality. The economics of 'wage compression' has taken place
within a political institutional framework of routine consultation among
government, unions, and employer representatives through the corporate
channel of political decision-making. His work forms part of a large, ten year
research project located at the University of Oslo on the 'Norwegian' model
which has been designed to unravel the theoretical foundations of the
Norwegian (Scandinavian) model.
The women's movement
Norway is commonly ranked at the top of gender gap indices. This was not
always the case. In the 1960s in comparison with other European countries,
Norwegian women's participation in the labour market was very low. The
large majority of Norwegian women stayed at home caring for their families.

92 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
By the end of the 1970s the majority of women had paid work outside the
home. A seismic shift had taken -place in the role of women in Norwegian
society through the 1970s. According to Halsaa (Halsaa, Thun et.al 2008):
'The 1970s saw an intense growth in groups, network and organization
expressing a new feminist discourse, the New Feminists (Nyfeministene)
(1970) and the women's Front (Kvinnefonten) (1972) being the most
influential new groups. Established women's organizations were
reinvigorated. A new gender discourse was established, with new words such
as sisterhood, liberation, sexism, male chauvinism, and sexual harassment.
Long lasting political institution was formed.
Reasons that have been suggested for the entry of women into the labour
market and political life include a favorable political opportunity structure as
the labour Party who had dominated post-war politics had lost its majority
and was seeking new alliances. Norway was transitioning from an industrial
to a post-industrial society and there was a swift expansion in job in the
service sector that offered plenty of part-time job opportunities. The welfare
state expanded as care became a public not a private matter; and finally, large
oil reserves that spurred economic growth and a demand for fresh labour
supplies also sucked women into the labour market. Access to the state
education fund facilitated women's access to the labour market as women
increasingly took up higher studies. The women's movements also grew
strong at a time of a general radicalization of politics whereby the left parties
in Norway influenced politics in a way disproportionate to their vote base.
There were close links between the women's movements and political parties
on the left and division within the women's movement over the relative
importance of patriarchy versus class.
The women's movements in the 1970s mobilized around diverse issues:
an increase in women's political representation, abortion on demand,
introduction of gender equality legislation, a reduction in gender based
violence, and the campaign to say not to Norwegian membership in the
European Union. The right to control one's own body became the rallying cry
for women in the 1970s in much the same way as universal suffrage had been
at the end of the 19th century. The drive for women's political participation
started by campaign in 1967, was marked by its ability to unite women across
political parties and its ability to attain the support of men, and was also
institutionalized through public funding and paid staff to improve strategies
to increase women's representation. According to Halsaa, 'The feminist
activists' unstoppable focus on the importance of power inside and outside
formal politics is rather unique in a comparative perspective (Halsaa, Thun

Norwegian Social Movements 93
et.al. 2008). The combination of quotas for women in elected assemblies and
in the political parties themselves generated a momentum that lead women to
capture top positions in politics. In 1986 Gro Harlem Brundtland formed the
famous 'women's government' - women making up the majority - creating a
precedent for having at least 50% women ministers in later governments.
Today, the majority of Norwegian political party leaders are women. In many
ways women have emerged as equal to men within the political party system.
In the 1980s and 1990s the women's moment fragmented as women
became active in other arenas and new issues such as the fight against
pornography and prostitution. The 1980s also saw an easing of the party
political division as women across party political divides worked together for
pension right. In the 1990s measures were introduced by political parties to
increase maternity (and paternity) leave resulting in 52 weeks of paid leave
(set at 80% of the pre-birth salary). The latest comprehensive political reform
from 2005 fulfilled the old feminist demand of 'full nursery coverage' for
every child above one.
The FEMCIT study is a comparative study of the intersection of race and
gender on social protest and public policy in Norway, Spain and United
Kingdom. The study asked two main questions: 1) How women's
organizations use political opportunity structure to influence gender policy
and policies on violence against women, and their problem-representations
and claims-making in relation to such policies. Focus is on vertical relation
between women's organization and the state. 2) Relations between ethnic
'majority' and ethnic 'minority' women's organization in the women's
movements. Focus on the horizontal relation among women. The Norwegian
case study that is considered in this paper was carried out at the Center for
Gender Research at the University of Oslo and results are being published in
book form this year. This paper draws on a Working paper that presents main
findings from the Norwegian case (Halsaa et.al. 2008).
The study investigates relations among women from minority and
majority communities as well as their relations with the state. For this paper,
the focus will be on how relations with the state were studied. In the study
two sets of core concept were applied drawn from different strands of social
mobilization theory; the concept of a 'political opportunity structure' and
'discursive farming.' A political opportunity structure framework recognizes
the influence of political institutions on the mobilization, claims making and
outcomes of social movements. Political opportunity structures operate as
'structuring cues' that distribute opportunity and threats, repression and
facilitation, differently across country context. The other emphasize that they

94 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
are interested in relatively stable institutional features of the opportunity
structure; they consider field specific opportunity structure, 'the women's
field being one, and they also stress the need to go beyond national structure
and to take into account international network in the analysis. The authors
add to political opportunity structure the nation of 'discursive opportunity
structure,' by which they mean the 'established nation of who and what are
considered reasonable, sensible and legitimate.' Discursive opportunities
influence the extent to which actors are seen as legitimate by other
organization and by state. The third element in their theoretical framework is
'framing' or 'action-oriented set beliefs that inspire and legitimate the activity
and campaigns of a social movement organization.' Finally, the research team
uses the notion of 'resonance' to refer to whether or not a problem
representation resonates with those in powers (politicians and civil servants)
and thus gains influence and legitimacy. Resonance concerns the
compatibility of the farming of women's issues with the dominant discourse
in the relevant policy area. The authors hence make use of resonance rather
than 'influence' or 'impact' that can be measured. Data for the Norwegian case
was collected from interviews with 31 women's organization and five
interviews with politicians and civil servant, as well as through selective
mapping of legal and policy documents to discover resonance between claims
and proposal by women's organizations and the state's response.
The main findings from the study with regard to the opportunity structure
is
'...women's political mobilization during the 1970's onwards took place
within a political system characterized by favorable institutional
structures, generally speaking. There was a tradition for public funding of
non-governmental organization, hearings and consultations with
established group through a wide system of permanent or ad hoc
committees and councils; a legitimate tradition of lobbing based on a short
distance - symbolically - from those affected by policy changes to the
decision-makers, and a multiparty political system in majority
constituencies - which makes it easier for diverse groups to be represented
than in a different political system', page 197, (Halsaa et.al. 2008).
The study adds 'political will' as an important component of the political
opportunity structure, in addition to components identified in other studies.
The FEMCIT study suggests that in addition to favorable conditions listed
above, and the mobilization and farming of issues among women, the
political opportunity structure was favorable to women's issues at the height

Norwegian Social Movements 95
of mobilization in the 1970s. Nevertheless, women's organizations have not
been well represented in the corporatist system through which the state
consults with representatives of civil society who sit on committees and
advisory bodies.
Civil Society and Social Capital
High level of trust among people and between people and the state are
considered characteristic of the Scandinavian social model. Recent research
on civil society in Norway has raised the question, inspired by Robert
Putnam's work, of the role of civil society organization in generating and
sustaining high levels of trust and social capital and, broader, what has been
the contribution of voluntary organization in creating societies marked by
equality, solidarity and individual autonomy (Sivesind and Selle 2009). This
research has had two points of departure; Putnam's contention that
participation in organization through face-to-face interaction generates trust
social capital (Wollebaek and Stromsnes 2008). According to Putnam,
generalization trust and civic engagements are sown as a result of the
socialization that happens through face-to-face encounters. Second, what are
the implications for trust of the observed shift from nation-wide organizations
working for public benefit to localized self-serving organization? Will a
change toward the latter weaken civil society as incentives for cooperation
weakens? How well positioned are smaller and more localized civil society
organizations in terms of influencing national-decision-making processes?
The research on the first question carried out at the University of Bergen
has been based on a data set from the European Science Foundation's
Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy project that contains data from 13
European countries. The researcher studies 'cross national differences in
voluntary participation and how these are related to trust'. They asked the
question of 'What is the relationship between different types of organizational
societies and resources of importance to democracy? 'What are the effects on
social capital of the intensity and scope of the individual involvement?' On
the importance of face-to-face counters they found that
'It is not face-to-face encounters but awareness of strong and visible
voluntary organization in society that generate belief in the utility and
rationality of collective action. Thus, voluntary organization
institutionalizes rather than generate social capital', p.249, (Wollwbæk and
Stromsens 2008).

96 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Wollwbæk and Selle maintain that social movement contribute to
democratization through offering representation through membership, not
through the generation of social capital via the practice of face to face
interaction (Wollwbæk and Selle 2007). They are argue that 'strong and
visible voluntary organizations demonstrate the utility and rationality of
collective action and provide individual with a collective infrastructure,
which can be activated when needed', p.1, (Wollwbæk and Selle 2007).
In another study carried out at the University of Bergen Wollebæk
investigates another aspect of the structure of civil society, namely the
propensity of civil society organizations to cooperate (Wollwbæk 2008). He
tests the hypothesis that due to a decline in public benefit and conflict
oriented organization and an increase in the number of organization that
benefits member, socities are more consensus orientated. Then, the means,
motives and opportunities for cooperation change and organization become
less likely to cooperate. The team collected data by way of a survey that was
mailed to all registered organizations in the Hordaland region, a total of 4137.
The organization covered a wide range of fields' economy, politics, sports,
language, music and arts, social and humanitarian work, culture and leisure
etc. The study found that
'...the preconditions for cooperation within organization society are
gradually deteriorating. Such developments are likely to weaken the
interconnectedness of voluntary organizations and the potential micro,
meso, and macro benefits of such ties, (Wollwbæk 2008).
The author suggests that a likely outcome is that the capacity of
organizations to mobilize for collective action becomes reduced and that their
ability to generate social capital diminishes.
In combination these findings suggests that the change in organizational
structure, with a tendency towards smaller and more localized organizations,
may result in lower levels of trust and a weaker democracy.
Concluding remarks
State friendly social movements and an inclusive state are often described as
typical traits of the Scandinavian social model. Social movements have
employed political strategies and their legitimacy has to a large extent been
based on their ability to exercise political influence. The linkages between
social movements and political parties have been close, but less well
researched than state-society relations. Norwegian social movements have
contributed to equality among income groups and to gender equality. Today,

Norwegian Social Movements 97
the classical model of social-movements of state relationship that existed
during the 20th century is changing, and new relationship are emerging based
on expertise, ability to network, and to sell ideas to the media, rather than on
numerical strength and geographical outreach.
Notes
1. NIBR would like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its
financial contribution to this paper.
2. The movement to establish 'new Norwegian' based on rural dialects as opposed to
standard Norwegian.
References
Cohen, J.L. and A. Arato. 1992. Civil Society and political theory. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, The MIT Press.
Furseth, I. 2002. A Comparative study of social and religious movement in Norway,
1780s to 1905. New York, Edwin Mellen Press.
Halsaa, B., C. Thun, et.al. 2008. "Women’s movement: constructions of sisterhood,
dispute and resonance." Gendered citizenship in multicultural Europe: The
impact of contemporary women’s movements. Oslo, Centre for Gender
research, University of Oslo and Department of Social Policy and Centre for
Research in Social Policy, Loughborough University.
Lorentzen, H. 2010. "Civil society (Det sivile samfunn)." In I.Frones and L. Kjolsrod
(eds.), Norwegian society (Det norske samfunn). Oslo, Gyldendal.
Moene, K.O. and M. Wallerstein. 2006. "Social democracy as a development
strategy." In P. Bardhan, S. Bowles and M. Wallerstein (eds.), Globalization
and equal redistribution. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, pp.149-168.
Moore, M.P. 2001. "Empowerment at last?" Journal of International Development,
13:3, pp. 321-330.
Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research, draft, November 2011.
Nerbovik, J. 1999. Norwegian history 1860-1914 (Norsk historie 1860-1914). Oslo,
Det norske samlaget.
Osterud, O., Engelstad, et al. 2003. Power and Democracy (marken og demokratiet).
Oslo, Glydendal.
Sivesind, K. H. and P. Selle. 2009. "Civil society and Social Capital in Scandinavia."
In H.K. Anheier, S. Toepier and R. List (eds.), International Encyclopedia of
Civil Society. Heidelberg, Springer, pp.269-274.
Tarrow, S. 2006. "The Profession. Confessions of a recovering structuralists."
European Political Sciences, 5, pp. 7-20.
Tranvik, T. and P. Selle. 2007. "The Rise and Fall of Popular Mass Movements,
Organizational Change Globalization – the Norwegian Case." Acta
Sociologica, 50:1, pp.57-70.
Wollebaek, D. 2008. "The Decoupling of Organizational Civil Society." Voluntas,
19:4, pp.351-371.

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Wollenbæk, D., b. Ibsen, et al 2010. "Voluntary associations at the local level in three
Nordic countries." Nordic associations in a European perspective. Baden
baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
Wollenbæk, D. and P. Selle. 2007. "The origins of social capital." Journal of Civil
Society, 3:1, pp.249-263.
Wollebæk, D. and K. Stromsnes. 2008. "Voluntary organizations, trust and civic
engagement." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 37:2, pp.249-263.
Zald, M. N. and R. Ash. 1966. "Social movement organizations: growth, decay and
change." Social forces, 44:3.

Contributions to Nepalese Studies, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012), 99-136
WHO PARTICIPATES?
THE “PENALTY” OF CASTE AND ETHNICITY ON
PARTICIPATION IN
LOCAL LEVEL COLLECTIVE ACTION PROGRAMS
Meeta Singh Pradhan
Abstract
This study examines the influence of ascribed social identities of caste and
ethnicity, on participation in local level collective action programs, most of
which aim to improve life conditions of people in poor communities. The
framework of social exclusion is used to examine how historically held
values, social norms and practices continue to influence life opportunities
and create barriers for individuals. Analysis of a unique set of survey data
from Nepal shows that one’s caste and ethnicity has a strong and
independent effect on an individuals’ participation in such community level
collective action programs while controlling for a set of individual level
experiences that are known to influence participation. This analysis provides
much needed evidence of disparities in the rates of participation of
individuals in poor communities. This evidence points toward the need for
closer examination of the mechanisms that link social identity and
participation in local level collective action programs in order to build better
accountability in implementation of government policies and programs that
focus on social inclusion, social equity and poverty alleviation.
INTRODUCTION
Around the world, social identities such as race, gender, caste and ethnicity
have been known to influence and shape life experiences, opportunities and
behavior. Disparities in life outcomes related to the quality of life, income,
wealth, education, health, and in political representation occur in different
contexts based on the economic, social, religious, political and ideological
domination of some groups vis-a-vis others (Hughes and Thomas 1998;
Hannum and Xie 1998; Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Stash and Hannum
2001; Buchmann and Hannum 2001; Inglehart and Norris 2001; House 2002;
Burgard 2002; Greenman and Xie 2008). Discrimination based on such social
identities are most often deeply entrenched in societies and they continue to
pose challenges for equitable economic growth, basic human rights and
social justice in many communities around the world. This study examines
the disparities based on ascribed social identities of caste and ethnicity in
Copyright © 2012 CNAS/TU

100 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
participation in local level collective action programs most of which aim
specifically at improving life conditions of poor and marginalized groups of
people.
This study draws on the theoretical framework of social exclusion which
focuses on how formal and informal institutions and practices work in
disconnecting groups and individuals from social relations, and create
barriers for them in their ability to fully participate in the activities which
would be normal and accessible for other groups in the same community
(Silver 1995; Jordan 1995; Sen 2000; Power and Wilson 2000; Bennett
2008). The study examines a residual penalty of social exclusion due to one’s
caste and ethnic identity that overrides other individual characteristics and
experiences that influence one’s ability to participate in, and to access social
and economic capital through local collective action programs in poor
communities. This is of critical importance since changes in poverty
alleviation strategies over half the century have moved the focus towards
increased decentralized decision making, good governance and on basic
human rights to address some of the endemic problems related to exclusion
of groups of people. Yet the escalation of conflict on a global scale stands
out as a stark reminder that the challenges of basic human rights, equitable
access and distribution of benefits for poor, socially and politically excluded
group of people continues to exist in societies throughout the world.
There is a gap in the existing literature in relation to empirical evidence
that caste and ethnic identities are important markers in facilitating
participation of groups of people in community level programs. This is
especially important in contexts where such identities are historically
entrenched in the highly stratified social milieu, and where disparities and
discriminatory practices against particular groups are ‘common knowledge’.
Disparities in distribution and access to resources are most likely addressed
by national laws and macro level policies. But very often there is limited
empirical evidence of disparities in community level programs, particularly
in those very programs that seek to minimize such disparities. This creates a
serious gap in policy feedback, and in program formulation and
implementation leading to uneven and unequal economic growth and social
changes. This study is an attempt to address some of these gaps.
This study uses the context of a south-central region in Nepal to
empirically investigate the effect of caste and ethnicity on rates of
participation in community level collection action programs, or ‘community
groups’. The data comes from a unique combination of individual and
household level surveys, and life history data collected from men, women

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 101
and children in Chitwan Valley in 1996 (Barber et al. 1997; Axinn et al.
1999). This combination of data makes it possible to take a life course
approach to investigate the influence of childhood community level exposure,
effect of parental experiences and the experiences and attitudes of the
individuals themselves, on a particular behavior in adulthood. This helps to
better understand the enduring and powerful influence of ideas and
experiences, in particular, those which can potentially influence rates of
participation of individuals in collective action, and in particular how their
caste or ethnicity influences their behavior. An analysis of these data
provides evidence that caste and ethnicity have highly significant and
independent effects on participation in community level programs.
Theoretical framework
This study builds on the theoretical framework of social exclusion based on
one’s caste and ethnicity to examine its effect on participation in community
group programs at the individual level. The framework focuses on how
formal and informal institutions and practices work in disconnecting groups
and individuals from social relations, and create barriers for them in their
ability to fully participate in the activities which would be normal and
accessible for other groups in the same community (Power and Wilson 2000;
Bennett 2008). Social exclusion refers to both individuals and societies,
signifying “disadvantage, alienation and lack of freedom” for certain groups
relative to others (Gore 1996 in Bhalla and Lapeyere 1997:415). It reflects
the cultural devaluation of people based on ‘who they are’ (or rather ‘who
they are perceived to be’) as well as ‘where they are’ (Kabeer 2000; Kabeer
2006).1 Social exclusion based on ascribed identities initiates from childhood
and the barriers that they create leads toward continuing experiences of
discrimination and disparities in the ability to access opportunities and
influence behavior in adulthood as well.
This study examines social exclusion in a specific social, cultural and
regional context so it is useful to briefly describe the overall context of caste
and of local level collective action in the form of community groups in
locally based development programs. Following this, the paper then first
examines how individual experiences influence participation in community
group programs and secondly, how caste and ethnicity affect opportunities
and constraints that influence individual experiences.

102 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
The Caste System: Hierarchies, Disparities and Diversity
South Asia has been home to the caste system, a distinct, powerful,
hierarchical social structure based on the notions of ritual and occupational
purity and pollution, in which one's identity is ascribed at birth. Linked
intrinsically to the Hindu religious texts, the Dharmashastras, composed
between 600 and 200 BC, this system has been the key principle for social
organization and has proved to be an enduring institution, due to its ability to
continually structure and maintain power relations among different groups.
The caste system is linked with the four varnas, the historical occupational
classification of society, organized in terms of their relative ritual purity: the
Brahmans (priests, teachers and scholars), the Kshatriyas (kings and
warriors), the Vaishyas (traders and businessmen), and the Shudra (peasants,
laborers and service providers). The fifth group, the ‘untouchables’
(occupational, low caste or Dalit) are technically outside of the varna on
account of their ritually defiling occupations. Many castes and sub-castes
(jat) emanate from the varnas (Béteille 1969; Dumont 1980; Ghurye 1996;
Dahal et al. 2002).2
In Nepal, the promulgation of the National Code in 1854 by the Rana
oligarchy solidified the caste system as the primary organizing principle and
the major determinant of social identity. Groups with distinct ethnicities,
cultures, social practices and even religion, were subsumed within the caste
hierarchy by the politically dominant groups as a strategy for nation building.
Orthodox Hindu values and practices were established that protected the
political order and affected life opportunities of different groups of people
based on their castes (Höfer 1979). Gellner et al. (1997), Pradhan (2002),
Guneratne (2002) and others have discussed in varying depths, the
acceptance and manipulation of cultural pluralism by the dominant upper
caste Hindu ruling groups in Nepal for maintaining their political and
economic stronghold. Socially, culturally and linguistically distinct ethnic
minorities and indigenous groups were subsumed within a modified five
tiered caste hierarchy based on their degree of similarity and differences with
the cultural practices of the so called upper caste Nepali-speaking Hindus
(Höfer 1979; Pradhan 2002). This hierarchical ordering provides the rational
for the process of Hinduization of the non-Hindus as they assimilated within
the caste system.3 The 1990 Constitution after the restoration of democracy in
Nepal categorically abolished any form of discrimination based on religion,
race, caste or ethnicity. A ten year long Maoist insurgency culminated in
2007 in the declaration of a secular state, effectively removing the association
between the “Hindu” nation and the dominant caste system. Lawoti (2005)

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 103
argues that the political exclusion of gender, caste and ethnic groups was a
major cause for the “genesis and growth” of the Maoist insurgency. The
current social landscape of Nepal is thus distinguished by cultural diversity
and complexity attested by the census of 2001 which recorded 102 different
caste/ethnic groups (CBS 2002).4
Across South Asia, ongoing everyday life practices based on a history of
socio-cultural hierarchy and patriarchy has left an enduring legacy of deep
seated gender, caste and ethnic differences which perpetuates in the present
21st century. Despite fundamental structural and ideological changes over the
years of colonialism and post colonialism, and the spread of western and
secular ideologies, caste hierarchies have been maintained by affirming
economic and social opportunities to some groups, while creating constraints
for others, under the sanctification of religion and ideology (Sheth 2004).5
Thus, social and cultural segregation has been a cause of enduring poverty
and inequality in the region (ibid: 11).
Local Level Collective Action Programs: Community Groups
The inadequacy of the ‘top-down’, ‘trickle-down’ and ‘modernist’ approach
to social change and economic growth globally brought on support for more
locally embedded approaches that focused on the promotion of local
governance, increased decentralization, participation, decision making, skills
building and collective action of people (Kabeer 1994; Escobar 1995; Leys
1996; Axinn and Axinn 1997; Peet and Hartwick 1999; Dasgupta and Beard
2007). In poor countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America this approach has
become an entry point for distribution of resources, capacity building and
consolidating collective action and social capital as a means to access
fundamental human rights (Coleman 1988). The process often begins with
the strategy of “social mobilization,” described by Biggs and colleagues
(2004) as “an attempt to harness and enhance human capacity; i.e. the
willingness and the potential of local people to help themselves.” This
approach has been widely adopted by donors, governments and non-
governmental organizations. In 2004 the World Bank had a portfolio of US
$7 billion invested globally using the community-based approach (Mansuri
and Rao 2004).
Civic organizations for mutual support have long existed in Nepal and
they have been organized, recognized and valued by communities. Most
customary groups were based on kinship or ethnicity (e.g. the guthis of the
Newars, the rodi of the Gurungs) while others were based on neighborhood
ties that often centered on shared or common resources (e.g. the agriculture

104 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
labor exchange custom of parma, indigenous groups managing local forests,
pastureland and irrigation systems). In more contemporary times, Biggs and
colleagues (2004) estimate the existence of close to 400,000 ‘sponsored’
micro-level groups established to facilitate basic service delivery, poverty
alleviation and social justice, since the inception of the concept in
government policies in 1977 (Shrestha 1999). This study focuses on such
sponsored groups which are separate from customary ethnic or religious
organizations. They focus on different social and economic sectors like
agriculture, livestock, forestry, health, education, income generation, and
credit. Based on their individual needs and interests, and the program
objectives and criteria, individuals within a community are voluntarily
organized into “groups.” External inputs in the form of specific technical
training and tools are provided by the program whose staff also provides
orientations about organization and management.
Community groups vary in objectives, membership criteria and group
size. Membership in “users groups” for instance, is based on the type of
service or resource that individuals and household use, such as drinking
water, irrigation facilities, or community forests. Members are expected to
work collaboratively to design and implement mechanisms to operate,
manage and conserve these resources with technical assistance from the
government service agencies or non-governmental technical staff. These
groups range in membership size from 15 to over 100 households depending
on how many access the resource. For instance, a Community Forest User
Group will constitute of representatives of all households that harvest a
particular patch of forest for household usage (fuel, fodder, building a house
and other household items) and will participate in the conservation and
management of that forest, based on guidelines. Another type of group -
savings and credit groups - can be initiated by at least five individuals who
will save a sum of money on a weekly or monthly basis. Members take turns
to take loans from the group funds; group cohesion, collaboration and peer
pressure work as collateral for the loans.
Critiques of community based efforts have focused on problems with the
processes of group formation, limited access for women and the poorest
segment of the population, the nature and ideology behind the framework of
‘participation’, elite capture and inequity in the distribution of benefits
(Cleaver 1999; Leve 2001; Adhikari 2005).6 In focusing on ‘participation’ in
general, it is also important to acknowledge the literature that has examined
the nature, ideology and controversy behind the concept within the
development industry.7 Though extremely important, this issue is beyond the

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 105
scope of the present study. This study provides insights into how the
exclusion of people based on their social identities that occur through social
and cultural institutions and behaviors continue to endure, despite changes in
the multiplicity of their experiences and affect their rates of participation in
local level collective action.
Individual Experiences, Caste Influences and Participation in
Community Group Programs
In general, individual membership in community groups are based on the
program objectives. Yet at the aggregate level, there is growing recognition
that many programs are not able to reach segments of the target population in
a more equitable manner. Analysis of who is most likely to participate in any
kind of community group has focused on individual and household level
characteristics of participating members. Even within contexts marked by
caste and ethnic stratification, there is limited empirical evidence and
understanding of the mechanisms of caste and ethnicity as an influencing
factor in participation in community groups. In contrast, gender differences in
participation in community groups have received much needed focus, and
factors related to women’s status, measured through their mobility, decision
making capacity and experiences of domestic violence, support of spouse and
other household members have been identified in different contexts (Beard
2005; Steele et al. 2003; Weinberger and Jütting 2001). Participation in
community groups can also be influenced by both structural and ideational
factors. Individual experiences of educational attainment, media exposure,
labor force participation, and exposure to different ideas and ways of life
through travel experiences can be influential in increasing an individual’s
ability to participate in groups.
The following section first discusses how selected individual
characteristics and experiences – such as educational attainment, exposure to
media, experiences of labor force participation and travel experiences can
influence participation in different community groups, and how this influence
can differ for men and women. Additionally, it also discusses how the
acquisition of these very experiences is influenced by structural conditions,
differential opportunities and barriers based on one’s social identity of caste
and ethnicity.
Education: Studies have widely demonstrated that education improves
access to information and knowledge about voluntary programs in most
contexts including community level programs in poor communities.

106 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Individuals with very low levels of education are most often less likely to
have knowledge about community programs and other voluntary programs
(Verba and Nei 1972; Curtis et al. 1992, 2001; Weinberger and Jütting 2001;
Steele et al. 2003). In contexts where many community level programs are
targeted towards poor and marginalized groups, individuals with higher
levels of education tend to have lesser rates of participation since they have
more access to alternate livelihood opportunities (Beard 2005). Gender
differences in educational attainment are also likely to negatively influence
rates of participation for women. But among women with some levels of
education, their increased bargaining and decision making power within the
household has been known to positively influence their rates of participation
in community group programs (Weinberger and Jütting, 2001).
Education has been one of the influential factors driving social and
economic change in South Asia. Aggregate level data from settings where the
social structures continue to be based on historical norms and practices of
discrimination based on gender differences, and caste and ethnic hierarchies,
demonstrate how such divisions continue to have an effect on educational
enrollment, attainment and dropout rates (Hannum and Xie 1998; Hannum
and Stash 2001). The affirmative policies of the government of India for
government jobs and educational opportunities have contributed to improving
the education gap but achievement continues to vary significantly along caste
and ethnic lines (Sheth 2004). The provision of free education at different
levels of school has been an attempt to mitigate class differences and increase
access to educational opportunities in both India and Nepal. But ethnographic
evidence from these countries has shown how the discriminatory behavior by
teachers is a critical deterrent, often preventing children from ‘low castes’
from continuing their schooling or perpetuating discriminatory practices.8
The gender discrimination in educational attainment is well documented
worldwide and for girls and women the intersection of gender and caste can
have even more critical outcomes overall. This critical gap in educational
opportunities and educational attainment thus has had negative effects on life
outcomes based on caste/ethnicity and is also expected to influence
participation in community level activities.
Ideational Influences through Media Exposure and Travel Experiences:
Exposure through media and through travel to larger urban areas are likely to
expose individuals to new information, alternate ways of living and of living
standards, and give rise to aspirations for improving their life conditions.
Messages that come across radios, televisions, print media and cinema are

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 107
not only a source of information but are also a source for diffusion of new
ideas. Radio and television programs in Nepal and India for instance, focus
on rural farming households and spread knowledge and information about
agriculture and livestock programs, new technologies and means to access
those services. Such exposure becomes an important source of information
for individuals about community group activities. The exposure to a different
life style, standards of living, wider opportunities and choice of consumer
items that occurs when travelling outside of one’s neighborhood, especially
to larger urban areas, potentially give rise to aspirations for a better life for
oneself and especially for one’s children. In contexts with high gender
inequalities, women often have restricted mobility resulting in limited
opportunities for travelling. Thus differential exposure to media and in
particular to travel is likely to influence the rates of participation in
community groups differently for men and women.
The mere exposure to one’s exposure to media and experiences with
travel gives rise to an interesting phenomenon of the duality of experiences.
Pigg (1992 and 1993) refers to the influence of ‘modernization’ on
marginalized rural population as they experience social and economic
changes brought about by development activities and programs. They are
confronted by vast differences in what they watch and see, and what goes on
in their actual lives, which makes them accept discrimination as ‘taken for
granted truth’ when the promised changes do not affect them positively. This
is similar to what Bista (1991) might attribute to a ‘fatalistic attitude’. The
exposure to a rich, egalitarian, western or modern life as seen in the television
programs and cinema, are a wide distance from what they experience in real
life. Rural families in India and Nepal who do not own a television often
watch programs at a neighbor’s house, where in many instances they are
expected to observe the rules of purity and pollution by maintaining physical
distance and appropriate seating on the floor. Similarly, while opportunities
to travel to urban areas might be difficult due to the high transaction costs
involved, for those who do travel the experience of seeing the relatively less
overt caste discrimination in urban settings is far from their own experiences
of discrimination within their own social context. Such experiences of social
exclusion help to shape and deepen self perceptions of being socially isolated
and disadvantaged and affect their self-efficacy.
Labor Force Participation: Experience in the labor force, as well as
individual and family economic status is an important factor that influences
individual’s participation in community groups. Studies have shown that it is

108 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
primarily the middle class group which has the highest propensity for
participating in community organizations and this is true in both rich, western
countries and in other relatively poorer countries (Curtis et al. 2001; Beard
2005). There is likely to be variance in the influence of different types of
employment experiences on participation in community groups. For instance,
having a salaried job is likely to be associated with educational attainment
which has a positive influence on participation in community groups.
Explanations for the influence of one’s wealth, assets and income on
participation in community group programs have focused especially on the
opportunity costs for poor individuals. This is especially relevant for those
who rely on daily wage jobs or for women who are heavily burdened by
childcare and domestic chores. Participation in community group programs
has high opportunity costs for poorer individuals due to their limited
resources in terms of time for groups meetings and activities, and money for
membership fees, monthly savings or for loan reimbursements. Due to the
persistent overlap of caste status with poverty, as in other economic, social
and demographic life outcomes, there has been a tendency to attribute much
of the differentials to class rather than to caste status or ethnicity per se
(Subramanian et al. 2006).
Caste and ethnicity also influence access to types of occupation in the
context of South Asia. Caste groups with specific occupational skills such as
tailoring, shoe making, and blacksmithing, have historically faced social and
cultural discrimination due to the dirty and impure nature of the work.9 Yet
even such skills are increasingly being economically displaced by the mass
production of such consumer items which are more attractive and are
available at lower costs in local markets. Other more demeaning jobs, such
as manual scavenging, cleaning sewers, and disposing of animal carcasses are
not only highly exploitative and dangerous but are highly stigmatized. The
historic and often exclusive access to educational opportunities and wider
social and political networks have led to proportionately higher access to
salaried jobs for upper caste individuals. Such jobs are more stable and are
attributed a higher status. The lack of necessary social and cultural capital in
the form of education and social networks create barriers for low caste and
marginalized ethnic groups to access a salaried job and are thus relegated to
daily wage work. Studies have also shown that even among educated
individuals, historical relationships of discrimination and dependence often
continues due to the differential quality and levels of education which
influences the types of salaried employment available for those with
privileged access (Jeffery et al. 2005).

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 109
Thus while individual experiences have an effect on the rate of participation
in community level collective action programs, the acquisition of these very
experiences are influenced by an individual’s ascribed social status of caste.
In addition to gender based differences, the variation in life opportunities and
life outcomes due to social discrimination and exclusion based on caste and
ethnicity, needs to be examined more thoroughly.
Caste and Participation in Community Groups
The nature of the ascribed status of caste groups, complete with ‘rules’ and
‘roles’ associated with each group along the hierarchy, thus has historically
governed the opportunities available and the barriers that must be faced by
individuals and groups. The persistent exclusion of individuals and groups in
the social, economic and political arena can be attributed to three key factors:
(i) the inadequate implementation of legal and policy measures, (ii) the
continuation of ingrained and enduring informal institutions of social norms,
values, beliefs and practices related to caste in day to day life, and (iii) the
internalization of experiences of disadvantage and exclusion by discriminated
individuals and groups.
Formal institutional measures in the form of legal prohibition of caste
discrimination and protectionist and affirmative policies, especially in
education and jobs, have improved the situation in South Asian countries to
some extent. Protectionist policies and affirmative action measures for
“Scheduled Castes” and “Scheduled Tribes” and “Other Backward Castes” in
India, have been initiated since the mid 1950s, for government jobs and
educational opportunities. Affirmative policies in Pakistan focused on the
ethno-cultural and feudal hierarchical identities of communities, while those
in Sri Lanka focused on severe rural-urban and ethnic imbalances. Yet in
both cases the inadequate implementation of such polices led to more strife
than towards a culturally and politically inclusive state (Sheth 2004). Nepal
initiated scholarships for ‘low caste’ Dalit children for primary education and
for girls up to secondary schools in the late 1990s. The Nepali Local Self-
Governance Act of 1996 provides quotas for women and Dalit groups at local
levels of government, but full implementation of this policy has been
severely impacted by the Maoist insurgency. Yet the conflict environment in
Nepal has provided a more conducive context for increased demands for
more inclusive and affirmative policies for low caste and marginalized ethnic
groups in the country. More recently decentralization programs have
introduced quotas for women and other disadvantaged groups in local

110 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
government entities in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan (Dani and de Haan
2008).
Governments in India and Nepal have not been able to enforce the legal
measures instituted to abolish caste discrimination. Strong beliefs and
continuing practices in day to day social lives of the predominantly Hindu
population have changed very slowly. It is especially hard in situations
where the individuals responsible for upholding laws against caste based
discrimination (such as the police, educators) continue to believe in it and
practice it in their daily lives. Informal systems of behavior and values based
on relations of kinship, party affiliation, business interest, caste, ethnicity and
gender, persist especially at the meso and micro levels of the bureaucracy
(Bennett 2008). Marriage practices among the Hindus that follow strict rules
of caste endogamy, for instance, has been one the strongest factors that has
helped in the perpetuation of the system. This situation, combined with what
Bista (1991) posits as a fatalistic attitude towards one’s life and one’s future
have helped in the internalization of such centuries old discrimination among
the low caste and marginalized ethnic groups. The pace of change in cultural
practices, social norms and values has been extremely slow in the wake of
blatant impunity for discriminatory behavior.
Given this context, this study will focus on examining how historically
ascribed identities caste and ethnicity, and the roles and ‘rules’ ascribed to
them prevent and restrict people from participating in community group
programs, net of their individual experiences.
Chitwan Valley: The Study Area
In the mid 1950s, a resettlement plan in Chitwan Valley in south west Nepal
invited migrants from the hills and mountains of the country, and from
neighboring border-states of India, making it one of the most multiethnic,
multicultural, multi-linguistic settlements in the country (Bista 1972; Blaikie,
Cameron and Seddon 2000). Subsequently it became one of the most
Nepalized of all districts of the plains of the Tarai belt with a cultural
tradition that is distinct from the Indian plains.10 The influx of migrants of
multiple caste and ethnic groups very quickly marginalized the indigenous
Tibeto-Burmese population of Tharu, Darai and Kumal who traditionally
practiced shifting cultivation and a gathering economy. The lack of exposure
to a money economy and to the value of land they owned, and ill-defined
landownership policies led the Tharu population to be heavily exploited by
the incoming migrants. Thus many of the Tharus ended up becoming bonded
laborers on the land they once freely roamed (Muller-Boker 1999).

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 111
In the late 1970s, the valley was linked to two major highways of national
importance which facilitated a rapid proliferation of government services,
businesses, markets, and diversified employment opportunities, making it one
of the most important districts for the government of Nepal within a short
span of time (Shivakoti et al. 1999). For most of the older individuals, the
rapid and vast social and economic changes have occurred within their own
lifetime (Axinn and Yabiku 2001).
The district administration office of Chitwan records the presence of over
220 local, national and international non-governmental organizations within
the study area. These organizations are involved in a wide array of activities
ranging from youth sports, religious programs, income generation, micro
credit, women’s empowerment, women’s reproductive health, to programs
that directly support service delivery of government agencies. Most of the
programs use community level social mobilization and group formation as a
strategic approach for the program implementation.
Data and Measures
Data
The study uses data collected by the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) in
1996 which is a large-scale multidisciplinary study designed to investigate
the impact of macro level social changes on micro-level individual behavior.
The CVFS selected 171 neighborhoods with an equal probability, systematic
sample, where neighborhoods were defined as a geographic cluster of 5-15
households. The structured individual survey and the life history calendar
components interviewed every resident between the ages of 15 and 59 with
an exceptional response rate of 97 percent (Barber et al. 1997). A household-
level survey of agriculture practices and consumption patterns was also
conducted in 1,805 households with a 100 percent response rate. This study
uses data from the individual and household surveys as well as from the life
history calendar, which uses an innovative approach in collecting
retrospective data from all respondents (Axinn et al. 1999).
For this study, the sample is restricted to respondents from 151
neighborhoods since prospective demographic data collection is restricted to
these neighborhoods. Men and women between ages 15-54 in 1996 were
selected within these neighborhoods. Respondents above 55 years in age and
those belonging to “other” caste groups were excluded due to the relatively
small number of cases. Thus the analysis reported here is for 4,090
respondents, of whom 2,146 are women and 1,944 are men. Missing data was

112 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
less than 0.4 percent in most cases except for data on parents’ education
which was 1.56 percent. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all the
measures disaggregated by the sex of the respondent.
Table 1: Means and standard deviations of all measures used to analyze
effects of caste/ethnicity on community group participation, disaggregated by
sex, in 1996 in Chitwan, Nepal.
Women(N =2,146 ) Men (N = 1,944)
Mean Standard
Deviation
Mean Standard
Deviation
Participation in Community
Groups Ever
0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38
Caste/Ethnicity
Bahun/Chhetri/Newar
(upper caste) a
0.55 0.50 0.53 0.50
Dalit (lower caste) 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32
Hill Janajati (hill
nationalities)
0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41
Tarai Janajati (plains
nationalities)
0.13 0.34 0.14 0.34
Birth Cohort
1942-51 (Cohort 3, ages
45-54)
0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
1952-61 (Cohort 2, ages
35-44)
0.20 0.40 0.21 0.40
1962-71 (Cohort 1, ages
25-34)
0.25 0.43 0.28 0.45
1972-81 (Cohort 0, ages
15-24)
0.41 0.50 0.36 0.48
Parental and Childhood
Influences
Childhood exposure before
age 12 (0-4)
2.65 1.24 2.82 1.15
Index of parents’ education
(0, 1)
0.34 0.47 0.31 0.46
Index of parents’ work
experience (0, 1)
0.47 0.50 0.54 0.50

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 113
Attitude toward Caste
Relations (1-4 more
egalitarian)
2.17 0.90 2.41 0.87
Wealth
Bari/upland cultivated (0-
112 kattha)
8.34 12.18 7.95 12.32
Khet/lowland cultivated (0-
150 kattha)
15.23 24.76 14.68 24.95
Livestock owned (in
Livestock Units 0-18.5)
3.03 2.50 2.86 2.55
Index of ownership of
consumer items (0–7)
2.54 1.54 2.59 1.54
Individual Experiences
Media exposure ever
(cinema/TV) (0, 1)
0.94 0.24 0.97 0.17
Travel to Kathmandu ever
(0, 1)
0.27 0.44 0.43 0.50
Employment Experiences
Salary work ever (0, 1) 0.05 0.22 0.51 0.50
Wage work ever (0, 1) 0.45 0.50 0.40 0.49
Educational Attainment 3.21 3.88 5.95 4.08
No education 0.53 0.50 0.22 0.41
Primary (grades 1-5) 0.16 0.36 0.21 0.41
Lower Secondary (grades
6-8)
0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42
Secondary (grades 9-10) 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.34
Higher Education (11+) 0.06 0.23 0.20 0.40
1Sum of the presence of schools, market, employers and development
programs within a one hour’s walk during childhood of the respondent before
they were 12 years of age.
2Kattha: a standard Nepali unit of land measurement that is equal to 0.034
hectares.
3Livestock Unit: conversion of livestock into units where 1 livestock unit = 1
water buffalo = 1.2 cows = 4 goats = 5 sheep (Agrawal and Gupta 2005).
4Index of ownership of seven consumer items: radio, TV, bicycle,
motorcycle, cart, have a toilet at home, and have electricity at home.

114 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Measures
Measure of Participation in Community Group Program: The study focuses
on the experiences of any lifetime participation in any community group
program as the outcome and how an individual’s caste and ethnicity influence
it. In the individual survey, respondents were questioned about their
experience in groups by asking: “Have you ever been a member of any other
group, such as a User’s Group, Mothers Group, a group organized by health
volunteers, Rotary club or any other type of association or organization?”
This is a dichotomous variable coded “1” for any experience and “0” for no
experience. While 22 percent of men had prior experience of participating in
any community group, only 13 percent of women had done so by 1996.
Biggs and colleagues (2004) report that data from their study of
‘development groups’ in Nepal depict a spatial bias in terms of the number of
groups per capita in favor of the hills compared to the mountain and the low
lying Tarai districts such as Chitwan, which could account for the relatively
low rates of participation.
A follow-up question was asked to identify membership in the different
types of groups. The respondents mentioned primarily seven types of
community groups, namely women’s groups, youth groups, Small Farmers
Development Program Groups, credit groups, user’s groups, and agriculture
groups.11 Individuals also have multiple memberships in the different types of
groups.
Measures of Caste/Ethnicity: The measure of individual caste/ethnicity is
derived from the question in the individual survey where each individual is
asked about the caste of their father. Married women adopt the family name
of their husband after marriage and children take on the caste of their father.12
The individual interview records more than 20 different caste/ethnic
categories and these are re-coded into four functional categories based on the
prevalent social and cultural categories prescribed by the Hindu caste system
and the National Code of Nepal as described earlier which conjoins caste and
ethnicity into one classification system (Höfer 1979; Bennett et al. 2008).
Bahun and Chhetri, as well as Newar caste/ethnicities, are re-coded into
one category. The first two are customarily upper caste Hindus. The Newars
are a unique ethnic group in that they comprise multiple sub-groups based on
the Hindu caste classification and they also comprise both Hindu and
Buddhist religious followers, and most often have had as much privileges as
the Bahun and Chhetri. They are combined in the same category for this
study since their individual characteristics, such as educational attainment,

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 115
employment experiences, media and travel experiences, in general, are very
similar to the Bahun and Chhetri. This category of Bahun/Chhetri/Newar is
used as the reference category in the analysis.
A second category is Dalit, the so-called “lower caste” and “untouchable”
occupational group which is the most discriminated of caste groups. The next
two categories are the Hill Janajati comprising Tibeto-Burmese
castes/ethnicities from the hills, and the Tarai Janajati which are the
castes/ethnicities from the southern plains. The Tarai Janajati primarily
comprise the Tharu population, who are the original indigenous “forest
dwellers” of Chitwan (Muller-Boker 1999). Individuals from the other
caste/ethnic groups are migrants originally from other parts of the country.
All four measures of the caste/ethnicity of the respondents coded 1 and 0.
Over 50 percent of the study sample is Bahun/Chhetri/Newar, about 10
percent are Dalit and a little over 13 percent are Tarai Janajati.
Measures of Individual Experiences:The study uses five measures of
individual experiences of the respondents which are likely to have
intervening influences on participation in groups – levels of education,
exposure to media, experiences of travel beyond one’s community and two
measures of employment experiences. Separate measures are created for five
different levels of educational attainment of the respondents based on the
public educational system in Nepal – no education, primary (grades 1-5),
lower secondary (grades 6-8), and secondary (grades 9-10) which is
completion of high school. Respondent with educational levels of grade 11
and higher are categorized in the fifth category of high education (grades 11
and above).While overall levels of education are low among both men and
women in Chitwan, there are important gender differences at each level.
Among women in the study sample 53 percent have had no education and
only six percent have had higher education, compared to 22 percent and 20
percent respectively for men.
The effect of media influence on participation in community groups is
measured through a creation of an index. In the individual interview
respondents were asked separate questions if they had ever watched
television and watched a movie at the cinema. Responses to the two
questions were re-coded into an index coded “0” for no exposure to either
experiences and “1” for exposure to at least one out of the two experiences.
Another individual experience of travel to the capital city of Kathmandu is
used as a dichotomous variable coded “0” and “1”. While the majority of
both men and women in Chitwan have had considerable exposure to media,

116 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
only 27 percent of women have travelled to Kathmandu compared to 43
percent of men.
The final individual level experience measure is that of two types of
employment experiences. Respondents were asked separate questions if they
had any experience of salary work and wage work. Both are measured in
1996, with a value of “1” for any experience ever and “0” for no experience.
There is great variance among men and women in their experiences with
salaried work (51 percent of men compared to only 5 percent of women)
while wage work experiences were more comparable.
Controls: In order to accurately estimate the independent influence of
caste/ethnicity on group participation, a variety of individual characteristics
that could potentially confound the relationship are used as controls in the
models. The different measures of the respondents are drawn from the CVFS
individual interviews, the household level interviews and the life history
calendars.
Four birth cohorts of respondents are used as controls - those born
between 1942-51 (cohort 3), between 1952-61 (cohort 2), between 1962-71
(cohort 1) and the youngest cohort born between 1972-81 (cohort 0). They
are used as separate measures with values of 0 and 1 and cohort 1 is used as
the reference category. Birth cohorts of individuals are related to the timing
of the changes in the social context of Chitwan Valley, which is also relevant
to the introduction of programs focusing on community groups.
The life course perspective suggests that events early in the life course
can potentially continue to influence behavior later in life (Elder 1983). Thus
the educational and employment experiences of the respondents’ parents are
constructed from the questions asked in the individual interviews. An index is
created that measures whether either of the parent ever had any education
(“mother ever educated”, and/or “father ever educated”), coded “1” for either
parent ever educated and “0” for neither parent ever educated. Similarly, a
second index was created to measure whether either of the parents had ever
worked for pay (“mother worked for pay” and/or “father worked for pay”),
coded “1” for either parent ever worked for pay and “0” for neither parent
ever worked for pay.
An attitudinal statement related to caste discrimination is also selected as
a control for potential confounding effects. The statement related to caste
discrimination is represented by: “It is better to have no children than to
have a child who marries a spouse of a different caste”. At the individual
interviews, respondents were asked to select their response on a Likert like

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 117
scale ranging from 1 to 4 (from strongly agree to strongly disagree), taken to
represent a scale of increasingly non-discriminatory attitude.
Another set of controls includes the respondent’s exposure to non-family
institutions in their childhood. Four different characteristics of the
neighborhoods in which the respondents lived before age 12 are used to
create an index. Respondents were asked a series of questions to determine
the existence of a number of types of institutions within a one-hour walk
from their home - the presence of schools, markets, employment
opportunities, and the presence of development programs. The index carries a
value of one to four and measures how many of such non-familial institutions
the respondents had exposure to in the neighborhoods of their childhood.
The final key statistical control is related to individual/household wealth
since community group programs are most often designed to focus on low
income and poorer households. Four measures of wealth are selected to
represent the economic status of the respondents and they are derived from
the household level agriculture survey of 1996. Over 86% of individuals rely
on farming yet a majority sharecrops, mortgage, or rent land. Thus the area of
land an individual cultivates is an appropriate measure of their economic
condition. Agriculture land in Chitwan is divided into the dry upland - bari
(or tandi) - and the more valuable, irrigated, fertile low land - khet (or ghol).
Measures of land cultivated are coded in kattha (a standard Nepali unit of
measurement that is equal to 0.034 hectares). Another measure for wealth is
the ownership of livestock where cattle, sheep and goats were converted into
livestock units where 1 livestock unit = 1 water buffalo = 1.2 cows = 4 goats
= 5 sheep (Agrawal and Gupta 2005). The final wealth measure used is an
index of seven consumer items that the household may have: a radio, a
television, a bicycle, a motorcycle, a bullock cart, whether they have a toilet
in their home, and whether they have electricity at home. This index has a
value of 0-7, where the mean number of items in the sample is less than three
items for each individual.13
Analytical Strategy: Logistic regression procedures are used to estimate
multivariate models that measure the odds of participation in any kind of
community groups as a function of the individual’s caste/ethnicity. The
sample is disaggregated by gender and separate models are run for men and
women. Starting with a zero order model, subsequent nested models are
tested, first introducing basic statistical controls, and finally selected
individual experiences are introduced. The following logistic regression
equation given below is used for the analysis:

118 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
()(
∑
+=
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
−kk XBa
p
p
1
ln
)
where, p is the probability of participating in any community group,
)1( p
p
−is the odds of participation, a is a constant term, Bk is the effect of
measures of the respondents in the model which influences the outcome, and
Xk is the value of these independent measures. The odds ratios can be
interpreted as the factor by which one unit change in the independent variable
will increase or decrease the odds of participation in community groups for
each caste/ethnic group, compared to the reference category of the
Bahun/Chhetri/Newar individuals.
The study design of collection of data from 151 neighborhoods
comprising clusters of 5-15 households is useful to study the neighborhood
level effects on various demographic characteristics but in the case of this
study where individual level variances are looked at, there is a potential for
cluster level effects on the estimates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Hence the
models are controlled for cluster level effects, the standard errors are adjusted
for the 151 clusters and the p-values for the odds ratios are based on robust
standard errors that accommodate the potential effects of correlation.
Results
The results from the logistic regressions that test the effect of an individual’s
caste and ethnicity illustrate the enduring influence it has on community
group participation. The results demonstrate that more contemporary
experiences of educational attainment, exposure to television and cinema, and
employment experiences, account for some of the effect in this relationship
for both men and women, yet there is much more that is not accounted for.
The results disaggregated for men and women are presented in Table 2 and
Table 3 respectively. Table 4 presents the results for the pooled sample of
both men and women. The results are presented as odds ratios, the
exponentiated logistic regression coefficients. A coefficient of greater than
one represents higher odds of participation in community groups, and a
coefficient of less than one represents lower odds of participation. The odds
ratios are interpreted as having effects on the rates of participation in
community level collective action programs.

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 119
Caste/Ethnicity, Gender and Participation in Community Groups
Table 1 presented earlier, illustrates the basic descriptive statistics for the
study sample disaggregated for women and men, where important key
differences are seen in their experiences of participation in collective action
programs and their individual experiences of educational attainment, travel
and labor force participation.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the relationship between caste/ethnicity
and participation in community groups for women from the study sample.
Model 1 shows the direct effect of caste/ethnicity where it can be seen that
compared to the reference category of Bahun/Chhetri/Newar, all three other
caste/ethnic groups have much lower odds of participating in community
groups. Being a Dalit woman, for instance, decreases one’s odds of
participation in community groups by 74 percent while for Hill and Tarai
Janajati women it decreases by 52 and 89 percent respectively.
In Model 2 basic controls of birth cohort, parental characteristics,
childhood exposure, caste attitudes and individual wealth are introduced.
Overall, some of these factors increase the odds of participation in
community groups for the three caste/ethnic categories of individuals
compared to the Bahun/Chhetri/Newar category, yet the strong differences
among the three caste/ethnic categories of individuals remain much lower
and statistically highly significant. Cohort differences among women are
interesting to note. Compared to women ages 25-34 years (the reference
category), women born in the older cohorts (ages 45-54 years) and the
younger cohorts (ages 15-24) have lower rates of participation (39 and 70
percent respectively). For the older birth cohorts of women, it is very likely
that there were less opportunities for collective action in the sponsored
community groups since this is a relatively new phenomenon. Moreover it
also likely that those were less likely to participate in activities outside of the
family keeping the deeply divided gender roles among men and women of
their generation. For the younger cohorts (ages 16-24) of women, they are
likely to participate more in youth clubs (particularly prior to marriage) that
focus on cultural and sporting activities, than in community groups that focus
on livelihoods support activities.
As expected, broader childhood exposure to institutions demonstrates a
positive influence on community group participation among women. Women
who grew up in areas with different kinds of institutions such as schools,
markets, employers and development programs, within one hour’s walk,
show higher odds of participation. The influence of childhood exposure and
experiences provide knowledge about alternate opportunities which are likely

120 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
to influence behaviors in adulthood In addition the influence of parents’
education on an individual’s odds of participation is also positive, strong and
statistically significant. Women whose parents have had some educational
experiences have 68 percent higher rates of participating in community
groups.
A measure of individual attitudes towards caste differences was added to
the model to control for any discriminatory attitudes women might have
towards lower caste groups which might influence their participation in
groups with people from different backgrounds. The results show that
women with relatively more egalitarian caste attitudes are seen to have 12
percent higher odds of participating in community groups. In the final control
measure of wealth, the results show that increased amount of bari land
cultivated and, livestock and consumer items owned do not have significant
influence on participation in community groups for women. Increased
amount of cultivation of khet land has a significant and negative influence on
participation rates for them, which could either be an indicator of higher work
burden or that of a relatively higher economic status.
Model 3 illustrates the effects of the potential intervening individual
experiences that are likely to influence community group participation. As
predicted, almost all individual experiences have a statistically significant,
positive influence on increasing participation in community groups and they
reduce the lower odds of participation for all caste/ethnic categories of
women compared to the reference group of Bahun/Chhetri/Newar. Yet, for
women, their caste/ethnicity continues to have a negative, strong, statistically
significant and independent effect on rates of their community participation.
It is important to note that among the different caste/ethnic categories, the
individual experiences of women account for more decreased odds for the
Dalit and Hill Janajati categories (a change of 10 percent) compared to the
Tarai Janajati category comprising the indigenous Tharu women of Chitwan
(a change of only three percent).
As discussed earlier, educational attainment is one of the most important
predictors of participation in voluntary organizations and in community level
groups. Compared to women with no education, those with any level of
educational attainment are associated with higher odds of participation in
community groups, consistent with evidence from other countries
(Weinberger and Jütting 2001; Beard 2005). For women from Dalit, Hill and
Tarai Janajati categories, having a lower secondary (grades 6-8) and
secondary level (grades 9-10) of education have the highest influence in
reducing their negative odds of participation compared to the reference

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 121
category of Bahun/Chhetri/Newar. But in the context of Chitwan, women
with secondary levels of education (grades 9 and 10) have the highest odds
(3.81) of participating in groups compared to those with no education. The
access to information about community based programs, the confidence and
skills needed to communicate with program staff, the wider social capital
they gain through their educational attainment, all appear to better equip them
to participate in community group programs. In the context of more than half
of the women not having any education at all, these results are also indicative
of barriers for women with no or limited education to participate in
community groups.
The influence of media exposure (ever watched TV /movie) and the
experience of travel to Kathmandu, the capital city also increases the odds of
participation for women as expected.14 As discussed earlier, these influences
are likely to be working through the power of exposure to new ideas and new
information that women gain through watching television and movies, and
through travelling to places that are very different from their own
communities, in terms of lifestyle and living standards. Individuals are
introduced to new ways of living, social and economic interactions and living
standards that are very different from their own. This can contribute to
increased aspirations for the kind of life style they see for themselves and for
their children. Participation in community groups, learning to access basic
services, and additional financial and other kinds of resources can provide an
additional opportunity for status enhancement for all individuals, which
would be a strong motivation for joining groups. Women with experiences of
salaried jobs also have statistically significant higher odds of participation
while those with wage jobs also have increased the odds of participation, but
the results are not statistically significant. Participation in community groups
are likely to increase the opportunity costs for women involved in wage labor
due to the need to spend time in group meetings and training which affects
them negatively as wage laborers. Yet even among women with comparable
exposure to all these experiences, their caste/ethnicity are still important
markers in the variances in their rates of participation.
Table 2: Odds ratios from logistic regression models of effects of
caste/ethnicity on participation in community groups for women, ages
15-55 years, in 1996, in Chitwan, Nepal. (N = 2,146)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Caste/Ethnicity
Bahun/Chhetri/Newar
(upper caste) a
- - -

122 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Dalit (lower caste) 0.26*** (-3.89) 0.34**(-2.91) 0.43* (-2.11)
Hill Janajati (hill
nationalities)
0.38*** (-3.39) 0.48** (-2.47) 0.53* (-2.16)
Tarai Janajati (plains
nationalities)
0.11*** (-4.64) 0.13*** (-3.84) 0.16*** (-3.32)
Controls
Birth Cohort
1942-1952 (Cohort 3,
ages 45-54)
0.61+ (-1.79) 0.82 (-0.63)
1952-1961 (Cohort 2,
ages 35-44)
1.03 (0.13) 1.28 (1.11)
1962-1971 (Cohort 1,
ages 25-34) a
- -
1972-1981 (Cohort 0,
ages 15-24)
0.30*** (-5.37) 0.23*** (-5.81)
Parental and
Childhood Influences
Childhood exposure
before age 12
1.21** (2.61) 1.10 (1.25)
Parents’ education 1.68*** (3.26) 1.50** (2.50)
Parents’ work
experience
0.93 (-0.38) 0.92 (-0.41)
Attitude towards Caste
Relations
1.12** (2.26) 1.15 (1.62)
Wealth
Bari/upland
cultivated (in kattha)
0.99 (-1.16) 0.99 (-1.48)
Khet/lowland
cultivated (in kattha)
0.10** (-0.21) 1.00 (-0.35)
Livestock owned (in
Livestock Units)
1.01 (0.45) 1.05 (1.19)
Index of ownership
of consumer items
1.08 (1.43) 1.00 (-0.13)

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 123
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Individual Experiences
Media exposure ever
(cinema/TV)
9.68* (2.22)
Traveled to
Kathmandu ever
1.48* (2.28)
Employment
Experiences
Salary work ever 1.89* (1.95)
Wage work ever 1.07 (0.36)
Educational Attainment
No education ever a -
Primary education
(1-5)
2.02** (2.78)
Lower secondary
(6-8)
1.83** (2.20)
Secondary (9-10) 3.81*** (4.28)
Higher education
(11+)
2.16+ (1.85)
Log Pseudo
Likelihood
-652.89 -620.10 -594.47
Wald χ2 41.33*** 128.70*** 208.46***
Pseudo R2 0.05 0.10 0.14
Estimates are presented as odds ratio, with Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Standard error adjusted for 151 clusters in neighborhoods.
a Reference category.
+p<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis for men. As with the women,
the influence of caste/ethnicity on participation in community groups is
highly significant for men as well. Model 1 presents the estimates of only the
dependent variable and compared to the Bahun/Chhetri/Newar category all
other caste/ethnic groups have much lower odds of participation. Model 2
presents the estimates with the addition of the basic controls and the results
are only slightly different from those for women. Unlike that of women, men
born in earlier cohorts compared to the reference group (born 1962-1971,
ages 25-34) were more likely to participate in community groups. But similar

124 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
to the younger cohort of women, young men were also less likely to
participate in community groups that are mostly focusing on livelihoods
support activities at the community levels.
As for the women, the more number of different institutions men were
exposed to in their childhood, the higher their odds for participating in
community groups as adults. But an important difference for men is in the
influence of parents’ education on their rates of participation. The results are
opposite to that for women but they are not statistically significant. As with
the women, egalitarian caste related attitudes have a positive influence on
rates of group participation for men too and are higher for them at 31 percent.
Additionally, unlike for women, some of the wealth measures - lowland
cultivation and ownership of consumer items - increases the odds of
participation in community groups for men. Men who cultivate more bari
land and have more number of consumer items in their household have
increased odds of participation in community groups. Thus, for men from all
caste/ethnic groups, those with relatively more wealth are more likely to
participate in community groups.
In Model 3 of Table 3, individual experiences are introduced to the model
and it is in these experiences that additional the differences between men and
women can be seen. Men with high education have the highest odds of
participating in community groups compared to those with no education,
whereas for women the odds were biggest for those with secondary
education. Overall, wealthy and more educated men have higher rates of
participation in community level collective action programs. This potentially
signifies the increased access that relatively better off, educated men have on
community level livelihood support activities in line with theories of elite
capture of community resources and of deeply divided gender roles where
men have more power and ability to access those resources. Experiences of
travel to Kathmandu and salary work also increases the odds of participation
in groups for men, as with that for women.
Yet, overall, the most interesting result is that, though the basic controls
and key individual experiences reduce part of the negative odds for
participation for both men and women due to their caste/ethnicity, their social
identity and background continues to have a strong, negative, highly
significant and independent effect on the rates of participation. As with the
women, compared to the Bahun/Chhetri/Newar category, men from Dalit,
Hill and Tarai ethnicities have much lower odds of participation in
community groups (56, 58 and 71 percent respectively); among them the
Tarai Janajati men have the lowest participation rates.

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 125
Table 3: Odds ratios from logistic regression models of effects of
caste/ethnicity on participation in community groups for men, between
ages 15-55 years in 1996, in Chitwan, Nepal. (N = 1,944)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Caste/Ethnicity
Bahun/Chhetri/Newar
(upper caste) a
- - -
Dalit (lower caste) 0.18*** (-4.95) 0.23*** (-4.39) 0.34*** (-3.37)
Hill Janajati (hill
nationalities)
0.27*** (-6.63) 0.33*** (-5.62) 0.42*** (-4.19)
Tarai Janajati
(plains nationalities)
0.19*** (-5.07) 0.21*** (-4.61) 0.29*** (-3.60)
Controls
Birth Cohort
1942-1952 (Cohort 3,
ages 45-54)
2.05*** (3.21) 3.48*** (5.04)
1952-1961 (Cohort 2,
ages 35-44)
2.04*** (4.07) 2.54*** (5.10)
1962-1971 (Cohort 1,
ages 25-34) a
- -
1972-1981 (Cohort 0,
ages 15-24)
0.32*** (-5.76) 0.45*** (-3.73)
Parental and
Childhood Influences
Childhood exposure
before age 12
1.36*** (4.25) 1.25** (2.97)
Parents’ education 0.76 (-1.54) 0.66* (-2.20)
Parents’ work
experience
0.98 (-0.17) 1.2 (1.09)
Attitudes towards
Caste Relations
1.31*** (3.41) 1.11 (1.26)
Wealth
Bari/upland
cultivated (in kattha)
1.01** (2.47) 1.01* (2.09)

126 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Khet/lowland
cultivated (in kattha)
1.00 (0.66) 1.00 (0.25)
Livestock owned (in
Livestock Units)
1.00 (0.50) 1.04 (1.02)
Index of ownership
of consumer items
1.26*** (4.43) 1.14** (2.46)
Individual
Experiences
Media exposure ever
(cinema/TV)
1.20 (0.41)
Traveled to
Kathmandu ever
1.39** (2.26)
Employment
Experiences
Salary work ever 1.71*** (3.69)
Wage work ever 1.11 (0.59)
Educational
Attainment
No education a -
Primary education
(1-5)
1.29 (0.94)
Lower secondary
(6-8)
1.77* (2.04)
Secondary (9-10) 2.92** (3.47)
Higher education
(11+)
4.66*** (5.13)
Log Pseudo
Likelihood
-831.80 -749.26 -708.71
Wald χ2 74.84*** 222.09*** 308.61***
Pseudo R2 0.07 0.16 0.21
Estimates are presented as odds ratio, with Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Standard error adjusted for 151 clusters in neighborhoods.
a Reference category. +p<1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 127
There were strong theoretical reasons for expecting differences among men
and women of different caste/ethnic groups to have different rates of
participation, yet the results were not significantly different. Thus in Table 4
the study sample is pooled together to examine the effects of caste/ethnicity
on rates of participation at the individual level. The estimates in Model 1 are
for the direct effects only where the odds of group participation based on
caste/ethnicity is very strong and significantly lower for Dalit, Hill and Tarai
Janajati compared to the reference group. These results are consistent with
the disaggregated models with all three caste/ethnic groups having much
lower odds of participation compared to the reference group. In Models 2, 3
and 4, individual experiences are introduced to examine their intervening
effects on reducing the caste/ethnic influences as well as the gender
differences. From the results we see that the individual experiences of media
exposure, travel experiences and salary work experience have strong and
positive effects on rates of participation. All three experiences contribute
towards only incremental changes in the influence of caste/ethnicity on rates
of participation. Gender differences are reduced considerably by experiences
of salaried work experience compared to media and travel experiences,
though women continue to have lower odds of participation compared to the
men.
In Model 5, the results of the effects of educational attainment show the
biggest changes in the odds of group participation compared to the other
experiences. As discussed earlier, education has been an important feature in
influencing social and economic changes in poor countries across South Asia
and this is reflected in these results too where differences in the rates of
participation among men and women are mitigated by their educational
attainment. The largest change in the effect of caste/ethnicity on rates of
participation appears to work through the educational attainment of
individuals. Though the odds of participation for the three caste/ethnic
categories are still lower compared to the reference group, educational
attainment works as the most influential intervening factor and in fact remove
any significant differences between men and women in their rates of
participation. Experiences of media exposure, travel, and salaried jobs
reduces the lower odds of participation of women but educational attainment
reverses the relationship and increases the odds of participation for women
though the results are not statistically significant.
In Model 6, all the individual experiences are estimated in the same
model. The effects of caste/ethnicity on the rates of participation change only
marginally for the Dalit, Hill and Tarai Janajati categories compared to

128 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
Model 5 when only the educational attainment of individuals were taken into
consideration. Compared to men with similar levels of education, women
have 12 percent more odds of participating in community groups (though the
results were not statistically significant) given that the rest of the factors
remain the same. Additional tests for interactions between caste/ethnicity and
gender were conducted but the results were not statistically significant, and
therefore are not shown here.15
Table 4: Odds ratios of the effect of caste/ethnicity on participation in
community groups in pooled models of men and women, ages 15-55
years in 1996, in Chitwan, Nepal. (N=4,090)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model
6
Caste/Ethnicity
Bahun/Chhetri/ Newar
(upper caste)a
- - - - - -
Dalit (lower caste) 0.21***
(-5.68)
0.29***
(-4.49)
0.28***
(-4.46)
0.30***
(-4.26)
0.36***
(-3.78)
0.37***
(-3.57)
Hill Janajati (hill
nationalities)
0.31***
(-5.64)
0.39***
(-4.77)
0.38***
(-4.80)
0.40***
(-4.62)
0.46***
(-3.78)
0.46***
(-3.85)
Tarai Janajati (plains
nationalities)
0.16***
(-6.52)
0.19***
(-5.68)
0.20***
(-5.50)
0.21***
(-5.38)
0.25***
(-4.69)
0.25***
(-4.68)
Female 0.49***
(-7.05)
0.57***
(-5.36)
0.60***
(-4.86)
0.79*
(-1.76)
0.89
(-0.88)
1.12
(0.78)
- Other controls not shown -
Individual Experiences
Media exposure ever 3.46**
(2.92)
- - - 2.59*
(2.22)
Traveled to Kathmandu
ever
1.66***
(5.29)
- - 1.39***
(3.28)
Employment
Experiences
Salary work ever 1.93***
(4.84)
- 1.57***
(3.28)
Wage work ever 0.91
(-0.76)
- 1.10
(0.72)
Educational Attainment
No education a - -
Primary education (1-
5)
2.02***
(3.74)
1.82**
(3.13)
Lower secondary (6-8) 2.22***
(4.24)
1.99***
(3.62)
Secondary (9-10) 4.14***
(6.25)
3.58***
(5.37)
Higher education (11+) 5.40***
(7.70)
5.40***
(7.70)

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 129
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model
6
Log Pseudo Likelihood -1486.70 -1388.48 -1381.80 -1380.47 -1349.26 -
1333.98
Wald χ2 138.0*** 350.47*** 398.71*** 438.02*** 443.41*** 516.91*
**
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.17
Estimates are presented as odds ratio, with Z-statistics in parenthesis.
Standard error adjusted for 151 clusters in neighborhoods.
a Reference category.
+p<1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
Conclusions
This study examines the existence of caste and ethnic disparities in
participation in community level collective action programs – community
groups - in the context of Chitwan Valley in Nepal. The study examines how
caste influences the kinds of life opportunities and barriers individuals and
groups face in terms of educational attainment, media exposure, travel and
work experiences and ultimately their participation in community group
programs. The results from this study present strong evidence of a residual
‘penalty’ due to one’s caste and ethnic identity in influencing participation in
local level community group programs, and that this influence is independent
of other individual characteristics and experiences that affect one’s ability or
desire to participate in community activities and access resources. The
framework of social exclusion provides an opportunity to assess how formal
and informal institutions influence the life chances of groups of individuals
based on their social and physical identities such as that of caste and
ethnicity, and how this influence is not necessarily only characteristic of
economic disparities in conditions.
It is important to acknowledge the probability of selectivity playing a role
in this analyses and this context. Individuals with particular attributes may
have been more likely to participate in community group activities,
contributing to the strong association that has been observed here. This study
attempts to address the potential for such reciprocal association by
controlling for demographic and individual experiences, including that of the
childhood context and parental experience, which could potentially have a
spurious relation. Yet the main focus of the analysis is to examine the effect
of caste/ethnicity, an attribute that is ascribed to individuals from birth and
cannot be changed in the social and cultural context of the study area.

130 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
An important contribution of this study lies in its examination of the
independent effect of caste and ethnic identity in determining participation in
community groups. Previous studies have focused on participation in various
types of voluntary associations as a function of individual and household
level characteristics such as gender, education, income, labor force
participation, religion, membership in other groups, urban or rural settings
(Steel et al. 2001; Weinberger and Jütting 2001; Curtis et al. 2001; Beard
2005). However, most of these studies focus on social class - the poor - and
not on the experiences of different caste and ethnic groups across different
class groups. The question of whether similar individual experiences are
adequate enough to break the barriers of social exclusion based on ingrained
and enduring values, attitudes and practices in day to day life, have not been
examined nor understood. Therefore this study points to the need for further
investigation into the mechanisms of how caste and ethnicity in itself can
account for such a strong relationship. The differences in cultural practices of
accumulating social capital among the different caste and ethnic groups
might provide one level of explanation. A better understanding of the
existence and processes of collective action and group cohesion that differ
within the groups also need to be better understood. Attempts to better
understand these cultural differences also need to focus on a better
understand of the formal and informal barriers that particular caste and ethnic
groups face in taking up opportunities that are aimed specifically at equitable
access to and distribution of resources. Additionally, to increase the visibility
of the problems and the barriers of the most marginalized segments of the
population, data collection and analysis that is disaggregated by
caste/ethnicity, in addition to gender, is of critical importance.
Disparities and discrimination based on social identities have been
recognized as a root cause of a conflict not only in the South Asia region but
also around the world. Much of such conflict is a composite of more than
just one cause of discrimination and is compounded by extreme levels of
poverty in most of the poor countries in Asia and Africa for instance. A
critical gap exists in contexts like that of Nepal, in empirical evidence that
not only examines the key associations of caste/ethnicity with life
opportunities but only provides a better understanding of the mechanisms that
lead to the disparities, so that appropriate interventions can be designed to
address the gaps. Thus this study also has serious implications for
accountability in policy implementation by national and local governments.
The effectiveness of legal and policy measures to remove discriminatory
practices and behaviors towards social groups within the national context

Who Participates? The Penalty of Caste and Ethnicity 131
have to be continually assessed with empirical evidence, enriched with in-
depth narratives from the lives of those affected. The invisible penalty
attached to one’s social identity that affects equal life chances and life
opportunities need to be identified and recommendations for measures to
displace them need to be made so that the “disadvantage, alienation and lack
of freedom” faced by some groups of individuals within a society can be
better addressed. Measures of accountability within government structures
and within international agencies that support poverty alleviation, social
justice and basic human rights, need to be put to strong tests.
Notes
1. For additional definitions and perspectives on social exclusion, refer to Sen
(1992), Silver (1995) and Jordan (1996), for background of the concept of social
exclusion and to Kabeer (2000) for the application of the concept to poor non-
western countries since the mid 1990s.
2. Refer to Bista (1972), Höfer (1979), Gurung (1998) and Whelpton (1997) for
details on the complex, cultural diversity of caste and ethnic groups in Nepal
including different accounts of the Nepali varna system and classifications of
different jats.
3. “Hinduization” is the more contemporary term used to emphasize the adoption of
Hindu norms, values, practices and forms by the non-Hindu population. The
concept is a derivation from M. N. Srinivas’s (1966) introductory concept of
inclusion/exclusion called “Sanskritization” a theoretical framework for caste
mobilization which denotes mobilization within the system through the adoption
of ritual values, norms and practices of upper caste Hindus, and rejection of
attributes considered ritually polluting.
4. In 2001, nationally the Bahun and Chettri groups constituted 40% of the total
population, followed by 13% of indigenous Tharu, and seven percent each of
Gurungs and Tamangs in Nepal (CBS 2002).
5. Refer to Dirk (1989) and Bayly (1999) for discussions on how colonialism was
instrumental in strengthening caste divisions in India to consolidate economic and
political power by the British.
6. The dominance of the agenda, programs and activities by the economically,
socially and politically powerful group within a community has been a major
challenge for social mobilization efforts. Evidence of the elite groups in the
community usurping group activities and benefits for themselves, their families
and friends have often disrupted the equitable sharing of benefits (Cleaver 1999;
Beard 2005; Biggs et al. 2004).
7. Weinberger and Jütting (2001) discuss how the participation of the poorest groups
have often been questioned due to the high opportunity costs involved and the
limited existence of social network ties among such individuals. Leve (2001)
presents an important critique on the reality and motives behind the
“participation” and “empowerment” agenda of NGOs and aid agencies. Cleaver
(1999) provides a critical analysis of the concepts underlying participatory
approaches and the myths of the community as a social entity.

132 CNAS Journal, Vol. 39, (Special Issue 2012)
8. Scholars have analyzed how the spread of “western” education during the colonial
and post colonial times actually helped in the reinforcement of hierarchical caste
differences since the upper caste, socially and politically dominant ethnic groups,
had the easiest access to an English education (Bayly 1999).
9. Occupational caste groups are clearly identified by their family names. For
instance a Kami is a blacksmith, a Damai is a tailor and a Sarki is a cobbler. Such
overt identification of one’s caste has made caste based discrimination easier.
10. Nepalization refers to the assimilation process of internalizing and adopting the
cultural practices of the dominant Bahun-Chhetri caste/ethnic groups from the
hills; the process of nation building or national integration in Nepal. Gaige
(1975:216) refers to it as the process of identification with the culture of the
dominant upper caste groups. In the context of Nepal the terms Sanskritization,
Hinduization and Nepalization have similar interpretations.
11. An additional ‘other’ category comprise project specific groups such as literacy
groups, health groups, ethnicity specific groups, advocacy groups, multipurpose
community planning and development groups.
12. In the exceptional cases of inter-caste marriages, the woman and her children will
still adopt the caste of their husband and father. But the prevalence of inter-caste
marriages is still very low in Nepal.
13.Though there is an overlap between caste/ethnicity and wealth, the correlations
between the caste/ethnic groups and the measures of wealth selected for the study
do not have correlations higher than 0.3.
14. The extremely high odds for women with media exposure is due to the fact that
among the women who had participated in community groups less than 1 percent
had no media exposure at all.
15. Tests for interactions between caste/ethnicity and education were also conducted
and the results were significant only for the Tarai Janajati category and not for the
Hill and the Tarai ethnicities. Tharu individuals have very low education rates to
start off with and any level of educational attainment they have contributes to
significant effects on their odds of participating in community groups. For the
other caste/ethnic groups, their levels of educational attainment are relatively
higher hence any increases in educational attainment makes only incremental
differences.
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