Towards an approach to development as missionary role: the category of personhood as addressed by Amartya Sen?

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the role of personhood in development. I will be looking at the extent to which the influential model of development proposed by Amartya Sen does justice to the category of personhood. I will provide an overview of the work of Sen in the area of development and then provide some critical engagement. Drawing from the work of Sen this article provides some pointers or markers towards an approach to development as missionary role. Bosch's phrase "creative tension" provides a key principle for an approach to development.

Full text

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72 Missionalia 42:1-2 (April/August 2014) 72–87
Towards an approach to development as
mission: the category of personhood as
addressed by Amartya Sen?
John Klaasen
1
Abstract
This paper is concerned with the role of personhood in development. I will be looking
at the extent to which the influential model of development proposed by Amartya Sen
does justice to the category of personhood. I will provide an overview of the work of
Sen in the area of development and then provide some critical engagement. Drawing
from the work of Sen this article provides some pointers or markers towards an
approach to development as missionary role. Bosch’s phrase “creative tension”
provides a key principle for an approach to development.
Keywords: Sen, mission, personhood, agency
Introduction
This article is concerned with the role of personhood in development.
Development has been an integral part of the ecumenical church and
specifically the World Council of Churches. In 1961 the World Council of
Churches established the Committee for Specialised Assistance to Social
Projects to provide the mission boards with resources to assist with their
ministry (Van der Bent 1981:69). Within the ecumenical movement
development was a natural flow from the church’s quest to play a relevant
role in the changing environment post World War 2. The churches which
had a long tradition of mission and projects amongst the disadvantaged
played a major role to get the development debate on the church’s agenda
(Dickinson 1991:269). This became evident at the ecumenical conferences
in Geneva (1966), Uppsala (1968) and Nairobi (1975).
I will be looking at the extent to which the influential model of
development proposed by Amartya Sen does justice to the category of
personhood. I am interested in the complex process through which people come
to accept responsibility for addressing their situations. This interest is based on
the intuition that personhood may well be crucial for any notion of
development, precisely in impoverished contexts. Even when people are made
aware of their opportunities and capabilities and where the obstacles thwarting
development are removed, that would not necessarily translate into accepting
responsibility. There is a gap (widely acknowledged in ethical theory) between
1
Dr John Klaasen is a lecturer in the Dept. of Theology and Religion, in the Faculty of
Arts, at the University of the Western Cape. He can be contacted at jsklaasen@uwc.ac.za

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Towards an approach to development as mission 73
knowing what is right and doing what is right. It is here that reflection on the
category of personhood may be crucial. The mission of the church which is
embedded in the missio dei includes development of the individual and
communities. The question that this article addressed is how the church can
faithfully use personhood in light of development. The church has a tradition of
engagement in the development debate especially post World War 2. This article
seeks to identify some of the weaknesses of the development debate and then
make some suggestions how personhood can contribute to the development
debate within the church.
Sen and development
Sen gives us glimpses of the use of personhood in his conceptualization of
his approach. His approach, widely used in both secular and theological
literature, can be summarised with reference to concepts such as freedom,
agent, well-being, capabilities and functionings. I will give an overview of
Sen’s capability approach by explaining his use of these terms. Implicit in
these terms is pointers to the use of personhood. Personhood is more
explicit in the attempt by Sen to apply his capability approach to the
individual and how she can effect personal and societal change. A few
critical remarks will elicit the extent to which Sen makes use of personhood
for development and his neglect thereof. These critical remarks are followed
by an introduction to an approach in theological discourse that can make a
contribution to effective mission in societies where the poverty level are
increasing despite the efforts of institutions such as the Bretton Woods. The
approach concerns the use of “axle” as a metaphor for mission and
specifically that of the role of personhood in development. Such an
approach to mission keep widely accepted antagonistic categories such as
individual and community, church and the world in creative tension.
Development as freedom.
Development is not only about Gross National Product or individual income,
but also about moral behaviour and to this effect ethics is an important partner
of economics for development. This implies that individuals cannot only be
viewed as commodities, but is instrumental in the process of development.
When this is assumed then development is not only about the interpersonal
valuation, but also about the intrinsic value of the individual. Therefore Sen
claims that development is about the freedom the individual has to choose what
is of value to her. He thus defines development “as a process of expanding the
real freedoms that people enjoy” (1999:3).

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74 Klaasen
Freedom is central to the process of development for both the evaluative
reason and the effectiveness reason. In other words freedom is a way of
evaluating progress and this is done by asking the question, whether the
freedoms of people are enhanced. The evaluative role refers to the success of a
society based on the substantive freedom that the members enjoy. He explains
this role by pointing out the differences between the capability approach and
utility (happiness) or libertarian procedural liberty or real income approaches
(Sen 1999:18). Sen includes classical utilitarianism of Bentham which are used
by prominent economists such as Edgeworth, Marshall (1890), Pigou (1920),
Ramsey and Robertson (1952). Utility is viewed as satisfaction or happiness.
Also included in Sen’s distinction of substantive freedom from utility is
desire-fulfilment of modern utilitarianism. Hare (1981), Sidgwick (1874) and
Gosling (1969) provide some of the clearest analysis of the pleasure and desire
as modes of valuation (1999a:1-2).
With regard to the effectiveness reason, the question is whether the
people are free agents. What is regarded as effective development refers to
the choices that people can make about what they value. These choices
pertains both to what effect the individual directly (nutrition and education)
and indirectly (political and civil liberties) (Sen 1999:4-5).
It is worthwhile noting that the capabilities approach is not in
contradiction with the traditional notion of economics, but it does depart
from the notion that economic freedom is the end
2
.The traditional notion of
economics is concerned with commodities and people, including how
people make commodities, how they have control over it, what they do with
it and what they get out of it (1999a:1). Sen points out that while people
might have command over the characteristics or properties of the
commodities, it does not guarantee the enhancement of the development of
the person (1999:6)
3
. For example a person might own a car and possess the
properties that go with owning the car. If the person cannot drive the car
then we cannot judge the well-being of the person by the fact that she owns
a car. Freedom then is the choice to, being able to drive, to choose whether a
car will enhance that which the person value.
Another illustration is Aristotle’s notion of wealth. It is not wealth, but
freedom that enhances our life and foster development. Sen quotes Aristotle’s
words in the Nicomachean Ethics “wealth is evidently not the good we are
2
Here is similarities with the Aristotle’s (flourishing) and Nussbaum’s (quality of life) and
Adam Smith’s (necessities) approaches (24).See Nussbaum and Sen (eds) The quality of
life 1993, “Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political distribution” Oxford
studies in ancient philosophy, 1988 and Smith An inquiry into the nature and causes of
the wealth of nations 1776, Vol2, book5, chapter 2.
3
For a more detailed discussion of characteristics and commodities see Sen, Poverty and
Famines: An essay on entitlement and deprivation, Oxford university press, New York,
1981, pages 24-38.

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Towards an approach to development as mission 75
seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else” (translated
by D.Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, revised edition, 1980), book1,
section 5, p.7). In this sense development has to do with enhancing lives and
freedoms. “Expanding the freedoms we have reason to value not only makes
our lives richer and more unfettered, but also allows us to be fuller social
persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting with-and influencing-the
world in which we live” (1999:14-15). Freedom is about both the processes that
foster freedom of actions and decisions and the opportunities that arise from
personal and social circumstances. Unfreedoms can be a result of inadequate
processes (violation of voting rights or political rights) or lack of opportunities
(starvation, premature mortality). Freedom is connected to another important
concept, well-being, which Sen uses in his notion of development.
Well-being is an important concept in the capability approach.
Consistent with his critique of the overemphasis in the literature of the study
of economics with commodities and personal wealth Sen claims that
well-being cannot be effectively evaluated without considering at least five
personal and social factors. The five circumstances are personal
heterogeneities (different physical attributes like gender and abilities),
environmental diversities (climate changes that can contribute to illnesses),
variations in social climate (education, crime and violence), differences in
relational perspectives (poor persons in rich communities requires more to
be accepted and for fulfilment of self-respect) and distribution within the
family (achievements depends on how the income is used and distributed
amongst the members) (Sen 1999:70-72).
These personal and social factors can also not be limited to primary
goods as in the case with Rawls’s liberty theory. Primary goods are not an
adequate valuation of well-being, because primary goods depend on how
commodities are valuated between two or more persons. It also depends on
the value that one give to a product compared to another. Capabilities have
to do with actual real living or freedoms to be achieved. Well-being is
directly related to the actual living of a person (Sen 1999:72-73).
Sen’s approach is more about well-being and advantage than the
narrow commodity approach. Well-being has to do with a person’s
achievements and advantage with the real opportunities compared with
other possibilities. The use of opportunities must not be limited to its narrow
sense of for example giving a disabled person the opportunity to attend a
school that does not provide the necessary facilities for the person to
function with real freedom.
Well-being is also closely associated with agency. Agency is different
from well-being, though not completely independent, in respect to, “The
former covers the person’s achievements and opportunities in the context of
his or her personal advantage, whereas the latter goes further and examines
achievements and opportunities in terms of other objectives and values as

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76 Klaasen
well, possibly going well beyond the pursuit of one’s own well-being” (Sen
1987:58-59). Agency is the person as doer of that which is beyond
self-interest. An agent is actively involved in development of self, but also
beyond the self. Whereas well-being deals with the self, agency can be
fulfilled when the person contributed to the happiness of others.
Agency also has “effective power” to change circumstances and is therefore
important for understanding the obligations of persons (Sen 2009:271).
Functioning is the fourth important part of the capability approach.
Function is a means of valuing the well-being of a person. How well a
person is, is reflected in the kind of life a person lives. Functioning takes in
consideration the “doings” and “beings” of a person (1999a:19). It has to do
with the actual activities that a person is able to do. It is not restricted to
what the person knows of something but the capability to choose according
to the value attached to the object. It is more about doing than knowing. In
this sense it is about what is available to me and not necessarily what I
make available to me.
Functioning moves beyond the possession of a commodity and has to do
with what the person can do with the commodity. It answers the question, to
what extend can the commodity be used by the person. “A functioning is an
achievement of a person: what he or she manages to do or to be. It reflects, as it
were, a part of the ‘state’ of that person. It has to be distinguished from the
commodities which are used to achieve those functionings” (Sen 1999a:7).
“The valued functionings may vary from such elementary ones as being
adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to very complex
activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of the
community and having self-respect” (Sen 2008:199).
These four concepts as used in Sen’s notion of development give us
glimpses of the role of personhood in development. Freedom, well-being
and to a lesser extend agency and functioning is about the nature of the
person. A person is here referred to as an autonomous individual. This is
implicit in the close connection between Sen’s view of freedom and the
right to choose what is of value. This explains the emphasis of the person to
the external factors such as institutions, policies and communities that
provide or neglect that which is necessary for freedom and well-being. The
relationship is of an I-it nature. The person does not have an interdependent
relationship with the external factors. These factors only serve to increase
the choices. Increase in choices also does not necessarily translate into
well-being. At this stage personhood has little role in development because
of the overemphasis of the external factors that influences the person.
In the conceptualization of the individual Sen attempts to keep the
tension between individual and society. Deneulin maintains that this
tension, while possible on a theoretical level, is not sustainable for
development practice. The reasons for this assertion is that there is a strong

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Towards an approach to development as mission 77
rational for the evaluative space to be extended beyond the self, because the
individual depend on a collective framework for its authority, assessment
development demands consideration beyond the individual and thirdly
socio-historical contexts are important for individual agency (2008:107).
Whereas development in the conceptualisation stage has been largely
discussed as the individual and her own development, I now move to the
individual and the responsibility she has towards society through rational
behaviour. To some extent Sen deals with Deneulin’s critiques.
Sen claims that the use of reason can
promote better societies.
In order to substantiate his claim about the use of reason for better societies he
points out three arguments against reason as an evaluative framework and then
presents counter arguments. Firstly considering the heterogeneity of values and
preferences of people, a coherent framework for reasoned social assessment is
impossible. To counter this claim Sen argues that information other than rules
form specific circumstances. In other words more information is needed.
Sensitivity to individual development is also needed. The second argument
against reason, concerns our ability to have what we intend to have is always in
tension with the more frequent and common “unintended consequences”. Sen
argues that unintended consequences should not be viewed as negative, but
reasoned intended assessment brings better results. Adam Smith, Karl Menger
and Friedrich Hayek are proponents of unintended consequences. Unintended
causes may not be unpredictable. Thirdly can our modes of behaviour go
beyond self-interest? Sen says justice and values can also move people
(1999:249-250).
Sen furthermore claims that even in self-interest there is a concern
beyond the individual. For example imagine you are confronted with a
malnourished person. If you respond because the person makes you
unhappy and by helping the person you will feel happy, that is sympathy.
But if you respond because you are using more information than that which
relates to your happiness, say for example justice, then your response is
related to a sense of injustice. This is not sympathy, but commitment. In
both responses there is a strong sense of the person self. Sympathy is an
action that is about self-interest and commitment and although it has not
directly to do with self-interest, it has to do with the self, because the
commitment is one’s own. Both responses are also rational choices
(1999:270).
We must tread with caution because here it seems that sympathy and
commitment is so far removed from each that the one is in opposition or
contrary to the other. This is the case with Sen’s treatment of the two
concepts. It has a bearing on our conceptualisation of personhood. As

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78 Klaasen
Bronowski rightly puts it, “There is, as it were, the commitment at my end:
the sense of devotion. And coupled with it there is what moves and directs
my devotion, what my devotion finds: sympathy for you” (1965:97). There
is a reciprocal process that combines the other with the self that make the
self, complete. The other is also complete with the action of the self that is
characterised by tolerance and trust. Tolerance for any possible difference
and trust that the reception of the gift is with gratitude and graciousness.
Commitment to a humanitarian course for example does not guarantee
success although it may satisfy self-interest. But if sympathy guides
commitment then the outcome will be beyond self-gratification or self-interest
that denies the selfhood of another. When sympathy is attached with
commitment in this way then the self develops in relation with the other without
selfishness but out of collegiality or the prosperity of common humanity.
Sen rightly argues that freedom plays an important role in the connection
between the individual and social commitment. Perhaps the most explicit
evidence of Sen’s notion of personhood lies in the following provocative claim,
“It is not so much a matter of having exact rules about how precisely we ought
to behave, as of recognizing the relevance of our shared humanity in making the
choices we face” (1999:283). Here we find a shift from the individualism that
has been evident in the conceptualisation of the approach by Sen to the
individual having commonality with other human beings. We also find here an
attempt to counter the criticisms of Deneulin.
It is the responsibility of people to develop and change the world. An
individual makes choices that will effect herself, but not without consequences
for others and considerations of the institutions that create the freedoms that
individuals value. Right and exact rules about how to behave is important, yet
rules cannot replace our shared humanity. Here seems to be a tension between
the individual and her interest and society and its needs. The tension has to do
with the responsibility of the individual and that of the society.
This clearly raises the question of the use of reason as ontology for
humanity. In other words how is reason used in order to understand
personhood as creative tension between the individual and the collective?
Reason is not an abstract activity because persons are not abstract atomic.
Reason is both an independent and dependent variable, it is formed and
informed. By implication the self is not in isolation, but is formed, informed
and transformed through critical engaged reasoning (Klaasen 2012:113).
Interdependence between freedom and
responsibility
Social responsibility does not replace individual responsibility. This
approach by Sen is precisely about the individual taking responsibility for
her development, but not without substantive freedoms. In other words

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Towards an approach to development as mission 79
responsibility can only be taken for development if social and
environmental circumstances are taken in consideration together with
personal circumstances. It is important here to guard against what is called
the “nanny state”, enforcing choices upon the individual through coercion.
The idea is that individual responsibility should be supported by the state
and other institutions (1999:284).
Again freedom also applies to our treatment of others, whether we
want to develop with all good intentions or whether it is out of commitment.
Freedom also influences our view of the other. How do we view those who
are different than us or those who hold values that contradict our values?
“Freedom is valued in a culture that wants to encourage dissent and to
stimulate originality and independence. It belongs to a society which is open
to change, and which esteems the agent of change, the individual, above its
own peace of mind” (Bronowski 1965:101).
Human capital and human capability
Sen gives us another glimpse into his notion of humanity when he makes
the difference between human capital and human capabilities. Although the
two is not mutually exclusive human capital enhances production while
human capabilities concentrate on the abilities of people to lead the lives
they value and enhance their choices. Both have to do with the role of
human beings, although they assess different achievements. While human
capital assesses indirect value, how does this add to production, human
capability assesses both the indirect and direct value (1999:293).
Sen uses Adam Smith’s pioneering work Wealth of nations and The
theory of moral sentiments that stresses the point that education and
learning is primary to production possibilities. Instead of promoting nature,
he is a strong proponent of nurture. Development has to do with formation
over a period of time and is influenced by many varied factors. In this sense
human beings are not the means to an end, for example greater markets or
more investments, but are also the end. To view humanity as means reduce
humanity to merely mean of production. In other words nothing more than a
commodity (1999: 296).
Sen gives a broader view of what it means to be a human being than
the approach of modern economics. A human being is much more than a
commodity or the total economic income accumulated. To be human is to
have well-being. Well-being refers to the possession of the characteristics of
goods and the capability to apply it so that it is of value to the person.
Functionings is a way of evaluating what the person is able to do with the
commodity or goods. In other words how best are the goods applied for the
enhancement of the life of the person? Coupled with this is the practical and
mental involvement of the person in the valuing of the commodity or goods.

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80 Klaasen
This is referred to as agency. The person is not a passive recipient, but an
active participant in the development process.
Sen views a human being in relation to what options the person has,
what the person values, who the person is and what the person can become.
“Sen presents in relation to his capabilities approach a very rich conception
of the individual that gives not only a view of what a person is and does or
could be and do but also of who the person is” (Teschl and Derobert
2008:126). Person is closely related to the individual with far less attention
to humanity. The difference is that a person is exclusively an individual who
is characterised by self-centredness and who has a relationship with
institutions, non-living and other living beings as a selfish activity. The
individual must be served in its quest for development.
Points of critique
The following points of critique can be raised in Sen’s view of personhood.
Firstly there is an overemphasis on individuality that limits the identity
aspect of what it means to be human. To this effect Teschl and Derobert
claim that “Sen presents a very rich view of the individual within the
capability approach, without, however, ever linking it specifically to any
concerns about identity” (2008:127). This assumption derives from the way
Sen views freedom and the relationship between personal identity and social
identity. Freedom is part of who the person is and development is
determined by whether the freedom is expanded. Freedom is integral to how
the individual view him/herself in relation to what she values for her life. In
this sense freedom is also associated with personal identity because the
person chooses that which is of value to her. Although there is a place for
social identity, the person does not value the consequences of her actions or
choices for the society more than the enhancement of her capabilities.
Secondly the overemphasis on individuality follows directly unto the
nature of the relationship that the individual has with others and
communities. The nature of the relationship is such that the others must
serve the interest of the individual. This kind of relationship gives the
individual independence from communities. Notwithstanding Sen’s claim
“of our shared humanity” (1999:283), the individual has a responsibility
towards him or herself. Because of the distance between the individual and
others, coupled with the evaluative and effectiveness aspects of freedom, a
person will choose what is of value for herself. This turns persons into
abstract individuals who have little regard for anything other than that
which benefits its self-interest. Communities are there for the benefit of the
individual and its value is determined not by its intrinsic value but by the
role it plays in the broadening of the choices of the individual.

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A third point of critique relates to the narrow view of the way agency is
appropriated by Sen. Sen give little power to institutions and social
arrangements in the capacity of the person. The agent is actively involved in
expanding freedoms in a one dimensional relationship between the
individual and institutions. Although institutions play a role in constructing
individual freedoms, like communities, its role is limited to the enhancing
of the freedom of the individual. Sen claims that, “Not only do institutions
contribute to our freedoms; their roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light
of their contributions to our freedoms” (1999:142).
Agency needs to take institutions seriously in its quest to expand the
capabilities that is of value to the individual. Institutions have a dual role. It has
value in relation to the agent and it has intrinsic value. Deneulin introduces the
notion of Paul Ricoeur, ‘structures of living together’ to clarify the seemingly
contradiction. “Structures of living together can be defined as structures which
belong to a particular historical community, which provide the conditions for
individual lives to flourish, and which are irreducible to interpersonal relations
and yet bound up with these” (2008:111).
When agency takes place within “structures of living” it does not
surrender autonomy, but it does take seriously the interconnectedness of the
different structures that impact the individual. Structures or institutions are a
living organism that gives life to agency and enhances not only the
capabilities, but also the freedom of the individual.
Sen’s use of personhood does not address the role of personhood in
taking responsibility for development beyond choosing what is available.
Personhood should play a role before the availability of capabilities. It is a
crucial sense of personhood that is lacking in Sen capability approach.
Christian mission, personhood and
development
My assumption is that one of the crucial factors that enables a person to develop
personal integrity and thus to accept responsibility is an understanding of what
being a human being entails. The category of personhood helps to describe such
an understanding of being human. This would include at least a notion of
human distinctiveness, of being related to others, of human dignity, respect for
the otherness of others and a sense of a common humanity (Ubuntu).
It is here that Christian theology and more specifically a Christian mission
approach makes a significant contribution to development. From a perspective
of mission, how do we understand personhood? A preliminary answer is that
“freedom and community as axle” serves as a metaphor to conceptualise
personhood. In both secular literature and theological literature “freedom and
community” form an important pillar to come to terms with the notion(s) of
personhood.

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82 Klaasen
Bosch uses this axle in two ways. Firstly, the two “freedom” and
“community” form the two central parts of the axle in Paul’s notion of the
church in the context of his missionary activities. Bosch claims that the
communities that Paul established through his missionary activities, is called
ecclesia, “commonly used in the Septuagint as translation for the Hebrew kahal.
In contemporary Greek, ecclesia normally referred to the town meeting of free
male citizens of a city of Greek constitution” (1991:165). The following can be
derived from this understanding of ecclesia. The freedom of the citizens is
closely connected to their status as found in the community. In the two letters to
the Corinthians this new identity is especially re-enforced when certain
members tried to assert their individual freedom to do as each of them pleases
(1991:166). Freedom is bound up in the relationships that one has with the
fellow members of the community. Freedom cannot be isolated from
membership of the community.
Freedom is not restricted to the ability to choose what is of value for
the self. To put it differently freedom is not thwarted when choice is for the
well-being of the self. Freedom is integrated with the person’s relationship
with other members of the community.
Secondly, the axle is also used in the way the church community
(ecclesia) relates to the world. The ecclesia is unique, distinct, new, and
different but not an enclave in its relationship with the world. Bosch affirms
that, “In Paul’s understanding, the church is ‘the world in obedience to
God’, the ‘redeemed...creation’ (Kasemann 1969b:134). Its primary mission
in the world is to be this new creation...Yet precisely this has an effect on
the ‘outsiders’. Through their conduct, believers attract outsiders or put
them off (cf Lippert 1968:166f)” (1991:168).
The members of the community do not withdraw from other
communities or do not put up barriers to prevent interaction, but they relate
to other communities with a renewed humility and generous spirit to share
their uniqueness and distinctiveness. “The church is that community of
people who are involved in creating new relationships among themselves
and in society at large and, in doing this, bearing witness to the lordship of
Christ. He is no private or individual Lord but always, as Lord of the
church, also Lord of the world” (Bosch 1991:169).
The ecclesia “is possessed by a vision of God and the created order as
open and engaged in a life-process. Unity is not to be equated with the denial of
difference or the reduction of them all to one, but speaks of the mutual
intercommunion and interpenetration of elements of difference” (Greenwood
1994:88). Even the differences is a result of our relations and its significance is
not to emphasise the independent, complete product, but to the person in
formation, through relation with other selves (Klaasen 2013:189).

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Towards an approach to development as mission 83
When the world is seen, heard, spoken to and acted upon, it is
experienced beyond the physical appearance. This kind of interaction
“evokes mystery, compassion, reciprocity, and obligation. It is as we look
into another person’s eyes and gaze upon the face of another person that we
see with the ‘eyes of the heart’ and stand in openness before her and his
ineffable and inexhaustible mystery” (Medley 2002:177 quotes La Cugna ).
Personhood cannot be limited to the autonomous individual or
collection of individuals that is bound together for the benefit of the
individual or common causes. The former denies the creativity of
relationships and the latter “reduces all members of human society to the
status of disposable cogs in the machine of a corporate enterprise”
(Greenwood 1994:89). Personhood on the other hand is about the creativity
to create space for open, trustworthy and loving relations. Like an axle that
binds two wheels, while the two wheels are independent, the one cannot
turn without the other.
During the medieval period when the church was preoccupied with
how humans differ from nature there was an awareness of the creative
tension. This was a preoccupation that was necessary for the church’s
consistent guard against any teachings that were contrary to; “the two
central doctrines of God as Triune (i.e., one divine nature possessed equally
by three distinct Persons, distinguished only by their relations of origin to
each other) and Christ as God-man (i.e., one divine Person possessing two
distinct natures, one divine, one human) (Clarke 1994:211).
Clarke however claims that Thomas Aquinas and other medieval
scholastics did develop a relational notion of the person. Clarke argues that
Aquinas’ notion of real being is about two sides of the same coin, one
intrinsically active and the other self-communicating. A being is an active
being that communicates about itself to others and by communicating is
communicated to. In a sense being is about active self-communication.
There are two reasons why persons pour forth natural activity: one because
it is poor and drawing from others as much as its nature allows towards
fulfilment and secondly because being is rich and naturally shares the
richness with others (Clarke 1994: 214).
This explanation of being as activity is demonstrable of the
relationality of persons that is inseparable from the substantiality. Clarke
concludes that “Therefore, all being is, by its very nature as being, dyadic,
with an “introverted,” or in itself dimension, as substance, and an
“extroverted”, or toward-others dimension, as relational trough action…
This dynamic polarity between substance and action-plus-relations was
submerged and almost forgotten in the post-medieval period from Descartes
on” (1994: 216-217).

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84 Klaasen
The Enlightenment scientific, technological and free individualism has
found renewed criticism from theologians. The Christian tradition finds
itself in a paradigm shift that questions the absolute autonomous individual
as the most objective and highest form of being. Being is not equivalent to
self-determination, but the extent to which one mirrors the likeness of God.
The likeness of God here refers to Trinitarian ontology of relation amongst
Father, Son and Holy Spirit (Klaasen 2013:88).
In Hebrew theology as in Ancient Israel humanity had an I-Thou
relationship with God. This relationship referred to each person created “in
the image of God”. This means that people are bound together in an
inescapable relationship of mutual growth. Martin Buber, Jewish scholar
reminds us that the “I-Thou” relationship is a very demanding one and
many times the “Thou” gets reduced to an “it” because of the intensity of
the “I-Thou” relationship on humans. The “it” is easier because it reduces
the person to an object that makes fewer or lesser demands on us. It reduces
the time, energy, giving of self and effort. De Gruchy reminds that this can
be dehumanizing abuse and manipulation of others (2006:43).
Personhood points beyond the individual and engages with others in a
reciprocal relationship that seeks to development both the self and the other.
The nature of personhood is such that taking responsibility for development
is not an activity that is undertaken for selfish reasons. It is undertaken for
the transformation of the self and the other. The other here is all those who
are in need of transformation in order to reach their full potential in a
mutually enriching process.
This is demonstrated in De Gruchy’s notion of personhood. De Gruchy finds
both a distinction and commonality in personhood. In describing a common
humanity he makes the distinction between individual, persons and human. The
individual is associated with post-Enlightenment and the emphasis on individual
human rights against the monarchical, authoritarian and totalitarian forces. While
such individualism is good for individual responsibility, the danger is that absolute
individualism has been responsible for gross human rights violations and
genocides in the last few decades (De Gruchy 2006:42-43).
Personal identity is more closely related to process. It is the
construction of each person as unique persons from our birth into teens,
middle age and old and finally death. The process is made up of particular
and specific factors such as our gender, our bodies, sexuality and culture.
Here, particularly the formulation of the Trinity is related to personal
identity by the distinct, yet not isolated from each other. In other words
personal is always interpersonal (2006:44).
Humaneness is about the sameness of humanity. The commonalities
might be expressed differently, for example to love can be done differently
by defend persons, yet love is common to all humans (De Gruchy 2006:46).

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Towards an approach to development as mission 85
These three individual, personal identity and being human is
interrelated and through a process common humanity at birth right develops
into human wellbeing. To this effect De Gruchy claims that, “If our
common humanity is something given, everyone’s birth right, becoming
more truly human is shaped by choices and responses we make, in which
we become more fully ourselves, more aware of our common humanity, and
when we nurture the humanity of others. The wonder in all of this is that as
people become more truly human, their different personalities are enhanced
in terms of their own capacities-they become distinctly themselves yet more
aware of their relationship to others” (2006:52)
Conclusion
Sen provides important glimpses into the role of personhood through the
conceptualisation of the key concepts of his capability approach. The capability
approach is a widely accepted one in secular and theological approaches to
development. His emphasis on the capability of the individual to choose what
the individual value for she does not adequately answer the question about the
role of personhood in development. This is no weakness of Sen because he
never claims to be doing so. However, in order to make choices for
development implies an understanding of the self or the person and the intrinsic
role that personhood plays in development. It is these implications of
understanding the self or the person that both give us glimpses of the role of
personhood and the imperative for a greater role of personhood in development
if space is created for such a role.
This article has attempted to highlight Sen’s use of personhood. I have also
given some critique to foster greater critical engagement with the approach of
Sen. Some of the critiques includes the overemphasis of the individual that
limits identity. The one dimensional nature of the relationship between the
individual and the other, including communities, leans towards sympathy and
self – interest and not a commitment towards other social identity. The narrow
view of the appropriation of agency excludes the role that structures and
institutions play in the formation of personhood.
By using the metaphor of the axle to begin to conceptualise personhood
one brings out some of the basic creative tensions that exist alongside each
other. Bosch’s use of the creative tension between the individual and
community and the ecclesia and the world is a starting point for further
development of the role of personhood in development.

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86 Klaasen
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