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Information and Architecture

Authors:
  • Stanford University and UC Riverside

Abstract

This paper is a continuation of [1] and builds on both the theory and the terminology of that earlier work. However, our treatment of reflexive content is different. Incremental information contasts with various sorts of reflexive information, which are relative to constraints, but not connecting facts. Suppose that in the physician's office thermometers are always shaken down after they are used and stored in a cool place until their next use. Then this somewhat stronger constraint is in force:
... Situations support (or fail to support) items of information. The theory is applicable to the analysis of information flows and information architecture, cooperative ac tion, and ICT-design (Israel and Perry, 1991;Devlin and Rosenberg, 2008). Situations can be associated with transactions in business processes and can be used to analyze records and the context(s) surrounding them; ...
Chapter
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In this part, I will extensively discuss the theoretical framework of the ‘Archive-as-Is’. I developed the theory as a pragmatic view on archives and records, their genesis, construction, use, and continuous management. The ‘Archive-as-Is’ is a declarative model for understanding the archive of an organization (or organizational chain), how it has been designed, created, processed, manipulated, and managed as a valuable business resource. This framework explains how the archive has ‘grown’ to be the archive that the organization or the person that generated it, wants it to be (in short: the ‘Archive-as-Is’). An overview of the conceptual background of the theoretical framework will follow this introduction. After that I will elaborate on the assumptions on which the theoretical framework is based, followed with a graphical model of the framework. The next part will be an in-depth discussion of all components of the framework. This part of the article will be concluded with several concluding remarks, and remarks about further research
Book
This book offers a novel perspective on abduction. It starts by discussing the major theories of abduction, focusing on the hybrid nature of abduction as both inference and intuition. It reports on the Peircean theory of abduction and discusses the more recent Magnani concept of animal abduction, connecting them to the work of medieval philosophers. Building on Magnani's manipulative abduction, the accompanying classification of abduction, and the hybrid concept of abduction as both inference and intuition, the book examines the problem of visual perception together with the related concepts of misrepresentation and semantic information. It presents the author's views on caricature and the caricature model of science, and then extends the scope of discussion by introducing some standard issues in the philosophy of science. By discussing the concept of ad hoc hypothesis generation as enthymeme resolution, it demonstrates how ubiquitous the problem of abduction is in all the different individual scientific disciplines. This comprehensive text provides philosophers, logicians and cognitive scientists with a historical, unified and authoritative perspective on abduction.
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If language is action (Austin, 1961; Grice, 1967), referring to things is not something that words do, but something that people do by uttering words. According to this pragmatic view, then, a theory of reference should be grounded on an account of our acts of referring; that is, the part of communicative acts that consists in referring to individual things. In our view, referential plans involve a structure of beliefs about an object the speaker intends to talk about and of Gricean intentions to achieve various effects on the listener, in virtue of the listener’s recogntion of them. Among these, we distinguish the grammatical, directing, target, path and auxiliary intentions, and call our analysis the GDTPA structure of referential plans. In this paper we develop the motives for the theory, explain how it works, and apply it to a number of examples. Communicative acts are explained in terms of the speaker’s intentions or, better said, in terms of the speaker’s communicative plan: a structure of her goals, beliefs and intentions that motivates her communicative behavior. As parts of communicative acts, referential acts are subject to the same sort of analysis.
Chapter
Despite the extensive research in logic, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, semiotics, and philosophy of science, there is no sure proof that we have better or deeper understanding of abduction than its modern founder, Charles S. Peirce. In this sense, one of the most important developments in recent studies on abduction is Lorenzo Magnani’s discovery of manipulative abduction.
Chapter
Recently, one can witness an increasing interest in Peirce’s distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning. The significant role of experimentation and manipulation on diagrams in theorematic reasoning has been extensively discussed by logicians and philosophers of science as well as Peirce scholars. It is notable, in particular, that the relationship between theorematic reasoning and abduction has drawn more serious attention.
Chapter
For reasons such as the influence of the computer revolution, we have witnessed a plethora of semantics emerging in the last few decades: possible-world semantics, game-theoretical semantics, dual aspect semantics, extentionalist semantics, conceptual role semantics, discourse representation theory, teleosemantics, and situation semantics, to name a few. Situation semantics, however, seems to have a prominent status among these rival theories.
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We can witness the recent surge of interest in classifying different patterns or types of abduction. Many philosophers, including Thagard, Magnani, Gabbay and Woods, Schurz, and Hoffmann, have suggested their own classifications emphasizing different aspects of abduction.
Chapter
In order to fathom Peirce’s mind, and thereby in order to do science and philosophy in Peircean way, vision seems to be a perfect point of departure. For vision allows us to rethink what true interdisciplinarity would be like in our research. In this article, I shall show the central importance of visual abduction and abductive vision in our future study of abduction as well as Peirce’s thought. As exemplified well in Magnani’s study of abduction, we have good reasons to go with and beyond Peirce. After briefly scheming Peirce’s view on perception as abduction, I shall report what has been done in recent years in the fields of visual abduction and abductive vision. The centrality of visual abduction in Magnani’s theory of manipulative abduction will be one focal point. Another will be an examination of Raftopoulos’ discussion of abduction in late vision.
Chapter
In Park (2014) I claimed that analogy between idealizations in science and caricatures in art might indicate a way toward a unified theory of representation. The basic idea for the analogy was secured by referring to Hopkins (1998) and Blumson (2009) who have discussed examples of pictorial misrepresentation by examples of caricatures and wanted-for posters of criminals.
Chapter
In Park (2014), I claimed that analogy between idealizations in science and caricatures in art might indicate a way toward a unified theory of representation. The basic idea for the analogy was secured by referring to Hopkins (1998) and Blumson (2009), who have discussed examples of pictorial misrepresentation by sharing caricatures and wanted-for posters of criminals. At least, this analogy may appease Hopkins’s worry about how it is possible to see in a caricature of Blair both Blair and an enormous-mouthed thing, or how to see one set of marks as resembling both. For, just as idealizations in science can misrepresent and represent at the same time, caricature of Blair can achieve misrepresentation (enormous-mouthed thing) and representation (Blair) at the same time. Surprisingly, Niiniluoto (1997, 1999) used precisely the same examples in his account of reference by truthlike scientific theories (see Niiniluoto 2014). Encouraged by all this, I shall try to fathom what a caricature model of science would be like. I shall discuss what Niiniluoto means by “caricature model (or theory) of reference”, and how this model (or theory) works within his theory of verisimilitude. In order to understand all this against a broader background, I shall also discuss both Goodman’s analogy between descriptions in science and pictorial representations and Tomas Kulka’s analogy between Popperian philosophy of science and quantitative model of aesthetic evaluation. Then, following the lead of Gombrich, I shall discuss some philosophical issues related to caricatures. Finally, by synthesizing all these discussions, I shall present the analogy between idealization and caricature in more detailed fashion.
Article
A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief’). Our information pickup systems are characterized in terms of the way they encode incoming information (perception) for further cognitive processing. Our perceptual experience is distinguished from our perceptual beliefs by the different way sensory information is encoded in these internal structures. Our ropositional attitudes – those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry
Article
An attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form (experience) for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theory of meaning (or belief content) by viewing meaning as a certain kind of information-carrying role.
\What is Information?
  • D J Israel
  • J Perry
D.J. Israel and J. Perry, \What is Information?", in Information, Language, and Cognition, ed. by P. hanson, University of British Columbia Press, 1990, pp. 1-19.
  • J Perry
J. Perry, Cognitive Signi cance and New Theories of Reference. Noûs 22. No. 2 (1988).