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Kant’s Moral Theory and Demandingness
Abstract
In this paper, I sketch a Kantian account of duties of rescue, which I take to be compatible with Kant’s theory. I argue that there is in fact no “trumping relation” between imperfect and perfect duties but merely that “latitude shrinks away” in certain circumstances. Against possible demandingness objections, I explain why Kant thought that imperfect duty must allow latitude for choice and argue that we must understand the necessary space for pursuing one’s own happiness as entailed by Kant’s justification of one’s duty to promote other’s happiness. Nevertheless, becoming worthy of happiness has always priority over one’s own happiness, even when circumstances are such that we cannot secure our own happiness without seriously neglecting more pressing needs of other persons. I conclude that Kant’s moral theory calls for complementation by the political and juridical domain. Implementing just political institutions and creating satisfactorily well-ordered societies create an external world which is friendlier to our attempts to reconcile moral integrity and a happy human life.
... There has been extensive discussion of the nature and demandingness of what Kant would call "imperfect duties", such as beneficence. Kant's conception of beneficence itself has been criticized as overdemanding Sticker, 2018), underdemanding (Hooker, 2000;Stohr, 2011), 1 and has been defended as just the right amount of demanding (Formosa & Sticker, 2019;Timmerman, 2018). 2 Alongside this, there is now also a growing literature concerning the potential overdemandingness of perfect duties, e.g., the duty not to lie or steal (Pinheiro Walla, 2015;van Ackeren and Sticker, 2015). ...
The Overdemandingness Objection maintains that an ethical theory or principle that demands too much should be rejected, or at least moderated. Traditionally, overdemandingness is considered primarily a problem for consequentialist ethical theories. Recently, Kant and Kantian ethics have also become part of the debate. This development helps us better understand both overdemandingness and problems with Kant's ethics. In this, the first of a pair of papers, we introduce the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties as well as a framework for understanding the overdemandingness objection that allows us to discuss overdemandingness across different ethical theories. We then consider two ways that Kantians have sought to avoid the implication that imperfect duties may be overly demanding: (1) via the latitude of imperfect duties, and (2) by the suggestion that the wider system of duties is self‐moderating. We conclude that it is unclear whether the two most prominent ways of addressing the overdemandingness objection work, challenging them on their own terms, and observing that they are inapplicable to potential demandingness concerns pertaining to perfect duties.
... The only exception is dry (-kavu) relative form and (-kausha) absolute form which is in the verb form as expected (though prefix ku is dropped due to the phonetic consideration) where there is both forms. Let's consider the AAs empty and full in (11) and (12). ...
In this contribution we will discuss the demandingness objection with regard to Kant's ethics. While in the literature there has been an emphasis on this issue with regard to imperfect duties, our main goal is to show Kantian ethics has resources to resort to in the case of the demandingness objection with regard to both perfect and imperfect duties. We consider different possible components of a moral theory which can lead to demandingness introduced by Scheffler. While we concur with Kantian critics that the stringent content of Kantian ethics may be a source of demandingness, we show that Kantian ethics has resources to respond to over demandingness objection arisen from other components. For this purpose we discuss Kant's notion of "Vorsatz" (intention), accompanied by the device of Flouting, introduced by Grice in his Conversational Implicatures.
... While the agents are obliged to adopt the maxim of beneficence, "they have considerable latitude in choosing the individual actions that manifest their commitment to the maxim" (Stohr 2011: 46). This implies that being, to some extent, negligent about others, neglacting some opportunities to help, does not make someone a vicious person, as long as one remains sincerely committed to the principle of beneficence as a maxim (Hill 2018;Pinheiro Walla 2015). However, as Herman (2001) holds, to "do something sometimes" is not enough. ...
This paper focuses on Kant’s moral theory and how it can guide our actions in
philanthropy. Philanthropy is usually defined as a voluntary action aimed at
relieving suffering and improving the quality of lives of others. It has
been argued that, within the framework of Kant’s theory, it is our duty to
be beneficent, sacrificing a part of our welfare for others. The duty of
beneficence is a wide one. Interpreters of Kant disagree on what the wide
duty of beneficence requires. While a few argue that it only requires that
we provide help sometimes, others hold that the duty of beneficence should
be seen as more demanding, particularly in cases of emergency when help is
urgently required. We are morally obliged to promote the happiness of
others, but the duty of beneficence does not tell us whose happiness and how
much of our resources to give. Other than emergency cases, in fulfilling the
duty of beneficence, we can prioritize the ends of those near and dear to us
who concern us more. Moreover, on condition that we are not indifferent to
others, it is morally permissible to prioritize our ends. Finally, the paper
argues that it is not always straightforward what kind of action is required
in helping someone in need, and that beneficence in Kantian terms is not
limited to the philanthropic sector.
... The next implication of the deontological approach is related to human behavior (individuals) and concerns what is called motivational rationalism (Cavallar, 2012;Walla, 2015). This context looks at how the actions of political actors carrying out populist strategies are a basic part of moral agency. ...
... Violetta Igneski (2008) argues that, due to Kant's focus on autonomy, agents must be allowed space to set and pursue personal ends. Likewise, both Alice Pinheiro Walla (2015) and Formosa, Sticker (2019) argue that Kantian beneficence comes with built-in limitations that restrict how much sacrifice for the well-being of others can reasonably be required. Importantly for my purpose, none of these thinkers see duties to self as substantially increasing the demandingness of Kant's ethics. ...
This paper contributes to the debate about how the overdemandingness objection applies to Kant's ethics. I first look at the versions of the overdemandingness objections Kant himself levels against other ethicists and ethical principles and I discuss in what sense he acknowledges overdemandingness as a problem. Then I argue that, according to Kant's own standards, introspection about the moral worthiness of one's actions can constitute forms of moral overdemandingness. Self‐scrutiny and Kant's well‐known claim that we can never be certain that we acted for the right reason jeopardize agents’ deserved happiness. Furthermore, self‐scrutiny can constitute an activity Kant himself criticizes under the labels of “micrology” and “fantastic virtue”. The demandingness of critical self‐scrutiny has not yet received due attention in the overdemandingness debate since this debate is focused on duties we have towards others.
... For exceptions see Ashford (2003aAshford ( , 2003bAshford ( and 2005 and Lichtenberg (2010). Outside the context of the global justice debate, however, some examples can be given, such as Ashford (2003) regarding contractualism, Swanton (2009) regarding virtue ethics and Walla (2015) and Ackeren and Sticker (2015) regarding Kants moral theory. It is, of course, tempting to mention institutional theorists that have socioeconomic human rights as the basis of their theories of global justice. ...
Within the global justice debate the demandingness objection is primarily aimed at utilitarian theorists who defend a version of the ‘optimizing principle of beneficence’ to deal with the problem of global poverty. The problem of demandingness, however, is hardly ever raised within the context of the dominant institutional theories of global justice that see severe poverty as a human rights violation. Nor are the fundamental underlying questions posed by most of these theorists. Which specific responsibilities do individual moral agents have regarding institutional and structural forms of injustice (1)? Which political spheres, organized public spaces, or political practices are necessary to create a setting in which these responsibilities can be discharged (2)? Does a ‘defensible and psychologically feasible conception of responsibility’ (Scheffler 2002, 62) exist that is restrictive – yet demanding – enough to deal with the complex challenges of our globalizing age (3). This paper addresses questions (1) and (3) on the basis of a critical analysis of Iris Marion Young’s social connection theory of responsibility.
... If autonomy 'is something we truly value then we should not be required to give it up ourselves' (Igneski 2008: 441). Pinheiro Walla (2015) argues that Kant's duty of beneficence has built-in limitations on how much is required of agents. Stohr (2011: 46) even goes so far as to claim that utilitarians could criticize Kant for being underdemanding or that 'Kantianism is not adequately demanding when it comes to beneficence '. 4 There are at least three reasons why a more in-depth discussion of Kant and (over)demandingness, as the authors in the present exchange provide it, is still a desideratum. ...
Kant and the Problem of Demandingness: Introduction - Volume 23 Issue 3 - Marcel van Ackeren, Martin Sticker
In this contribution we will discuss the demandingness objection with regard to Kant's ethics. While in the literature there has been an emphasis on this issue with regard to imperfect duties, our main goal is to show Kantian ethics has resources to resort to in the case of the demandingness objection in the class of perfect duties. For doing this, first we will discuss the inherent difference between imperfect and perfect duties while the duty of rescuing being a case in-between the two classes of duties through linguistic proof. Furthermore, we consider different possible components of a moral theory, introduced by Scheffler, which can lead to demandingness: (i) a required process of decision making, (ii) overridingness and (iii) the stringent content of demands. While we concur with Kantian critics that the stringent content of Kantian ethics may be a source of demandingness, we will show that Kantian ethics has resources to respond to demandingness arisen from other components. For this purpose we discuss Kant's notion of "Vorsatz" (intention), accompanied by the device of Flouting, introduced by Grice in his Conversational Implicatures. Résumé : Dans cette contribution, nous discuterons de l'objection d'exigence à l'égard de l'éthique kantienne. Alors que dans la littérature l'accent a été mis sur cette question à propos des devoirs imparfaits, notre objectif principal est de montrer que l'éthique kantienne dispose de ressources auxquelles recourir dans le cas de l'objection d'exigence dans la classe des devoirs parfaits. Pour ce faire, nous discuterons d'abord de la différence inhérente entre les devoirs imparfaits et parfaits, tandis que le devoir de sauvetage est un cas intermédiaire entre les deux classes de devoirs grâce à la preuve linguistique. Par ailleurs, nous considérons différentes composantes possibles d'une théorie morale, introduites par Scheffler, qui peuvent conduire à l'exigence : (i) un processus de prise de décision requis, (ii) le caractère prioritaire et (iii) le contenu strict des demandes. Tout en étant d'accord avec les critiques kantiennes selon lesquelles le contenu rigoureux de l'éthique kantienne peut être une source d'exigence, nous montrerons que l'éthique kantienne dispose de ressources pour répondre aux exigences émanant d'autres composantes. À cette fin, nous discutons de la notion kantienne de « Vorsatz » (intention), accompagnée du dispositif du Flouting, introduit par Grice dans ses Implicatures conversationnelles. Mots-clés: Kant ; objection d'exigence; devoir imparfait; devoir parfait; implicature.
In this article I argue that we should understand some forms of hypocritical behaviour in terms of epistemic injustice; a type of injustice in which a person is wronged in their capacity as a knower. If each of us has an interest in knowing what morality requires of us, this can be undermined when hypocritical behaviour distorts our perception of the moral landscape by misrepresenting the demandingness of putative moral obligations. This suggests that a complete theory of the wrongness of hypocrisy must account for hypocrisy as epistemic injustice.
I propose a novel way to understand the stringency of Kant’s conception of beneficence. This novel understanding can ground our intuition that we do not have to forego (almost) all pursuit of our personal ends. I argue that we should understand the application of imperfect duties to specific cases according to the framework set by the adoption and promotion of ends. Agents have other ends than obligatory ones and they must weigh obligatory ends against these other ends. Obligatory ends are special among ends only insofar as their adoption is not optional. My reading of the normative status of imperfect duties affords a way of thinking about beneficence modelled on the everyday ways in which agents pursue their personal projects and weigh different ends against each other. This establishes a middle-ground between an extremely demanding conception of beneficence and an overly latitudinarian one. Furthermore, it helps us understand why we do not have to be maximally beneficent and why there is a bias towards the near in our thinking about rescue cases.
Nas últimas décadas, a desconstrução do paradigma antropocêntrico colocou questões como a exploração animal no centro dos debates éticos e meta-éticos modernos. Este tema tem sido o foco de atenção também no âmbito dos estudos Kantianos. À luz das diferenças fundamentais entre seres humanos e animais e da impossibilidade posta pela teoria de Kant de atribuir deveres diretos aos animais, tornar sua filosofia prática útil para a defesa do bem-estar animal parece uma tarefa impossível. A esta dificuldade soma-se a crítica de que uma teoria baseada em princípios universais e deveres individuais pode ser inadequada para lidar com o bem-estar animal sob considerações culturais e situacionais. Ao abordar estes desafios, pretendo mostrar que a filosofia prática de Kant fornece recursos valiosos para a defesa do bem-estar animal. Neste espírito, eu sustento que, embora limitado, o tratamento de Kant acerca do auto-engano é uma forma promissora de fazer a ponte entre o bem-estar animal e o ethos da sua teoria moral.
Morality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority.
Kant's views about the nature and value of enlightenment have been discussed very much since 1784, and without ever losing any of their relevance and importance. I will discuss a topic that has not been discussed quite that extensively: Kant's conception of enlightenment as it relates to the idea of perfection (Vollkommenheit) in particular. Is the project of enlightenment also a project of perfection (and vice versa), and if yes, in what sense and to what degree? My aim is twofold here: not just to present a sketch of Kant's views but also to do so in the light of contemporary, systematic questions and ideas concerning the idea of perfection.
Kant was a keen psychological observer and theorist of the forms, mechanisms and sources of self-deception. In this Element, the author discusses the role of rationalizing/Vernünfteln for Kant's moral psychology, normative ethics and philosophical methodology. By drawing on the full breadth of examples of rationalizing Kant discusses, the author shows how rationalizing can extend to general features of morality and corrupt rational agents thoroughly (albeit not completely and not irreversibly). Furthermore, the author explains the often-overlooked roles common human reason, empirical practical reason and even pure practical reason play for rationalizing. Kant is aware that rationality is a double-edged sword; reason is the source of morality and of our dignity, but it also enables us to seemingly justify moral transgressions to ourselves, and it creates an interest in this justification in the first place. Finally, this Element discusses whether Kant's ethical theory itself can be criticised as a product of rationalizing.
In this paper, I argue that within Kantianism, widespread indifference of the global rich to the suffering of the global poor should be understood as resulting at least partly from vice. Kant had much more to say about vice than is often recognized, and it forms a crucial part of his moral anthropology. Kantians should thus attend to the ways in which vice functions as a practical obstacle to fulfilling duties of beneficence. In vice-fueled indifference, inclinations associated with self-love and self-conceit work their way into our wills, interfering with our moral commitments by impeding our ability to recognize moral requirements and our motivation to act on them. Vice distorts our reasoning in ways that promote self-deception and rationalization about the extent to which we are fulfilling moral demands. Kantian vice also has social dimensions. I argue that widespread indifference exacerbates our individual vices through social norms and practices that legitimize ignoring the needs of others. I conclude by offering some potential remedies to indifference within the Kantian framework.
I argue that, alongside the already well-established prohibition against treating persons as mere means, Kant’s Formula of Humanity requires a prohibition against treating persons as mere things. The former captures ethical violations due to someone’s (perceived) instrumental value, e.g. exploitation, the latter captures cases in which I mistreat others because they have no instrumental value to me. These are cases in which I am indifferent and complacent towards persons in need; forms of mistreatment frequently suffered by the world’s poorest. I explain why we need the category of treating others as mere things and what the prohibition against such treatment entails. Prohibitions against treating as mere means and as mere things are both essential for understanding the specific nature and extent of our duties to the world’s poorest.
The study aims to explain the essence of an alternative approach to the Old Fadama inevitable eviction and to justify the merits & feasibility of a land-sharing scheme to the community. Previous studies used principles to explain the feasibility of land-sharing, but the present study adopted both principles and theories. The injustice and social inequality from evictions are ironed out by applying Amartya Sen’s idea on justice that counters transcendentalism theory. The study answers three critical questions: why the community residents demand justice, how advantageous land-sharing is to other methods, and how feasible land-sharing is to the research area. A survey was done in the study area using structured questionnaires, interviews, and observations. A purposive sampling technique selected 600 affected community residents, 30 local government officials, and one coordinator from Amnesty International Ghana. Both qualitative and quantitative analytical methods were used to analyse the primary data. First of all, the study findings revealed four substantive claims for requesting justice from the local authorities; citizenship rights, property rights, temporal permit, and long-term stay. Secondly, land-sharing is preferred to relocation and cash compensation because it poses less risk than the other two. Finally, the study supported the feasibility of a land-sharing scheme to the Old Fadama based on Rabé’s (2005) principles. The study also concluded that information and compensation are critical to the resettlement process; hence, local authorities should manage it properly.
In the aftermath of Peter Singer’s ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’, the argument he put forward received significant criticism, largely on the grounds that it demanded too much of moral agents. Several attempts have been made since to formulate moral principles that adequately express the stringency of our duties of beneficence. Richard Miller proposed one such option, which has several advantages over Singer’s principle. In particular, because it concerns our dispositions rather than operating over every possible occasion for beneficence, it avoids problems of iterative demands. However, I argue that Miller’s principle is inadequate, because 1) it seems too weak, 2) it appears to be ambiguous and 3) it can give unduly harsh verdicts on unlucky moral agents.
I discuss the problem that Kant’s ethics seems to be incapable of capturing our strong intuition that emergencies create a context for actions that is very different from other cases of helping and from other opportunities to further obligatory ends. I argue that if we pay attention to how Kant grounds beneficence we see that distress and emergency function as constitutive concerns. They are vital to establishing the duty of beneficence in the first place, and they also guide the application of duties to specific cases. Kant’s conception of imperfect duties to others, when understood correctly, offers a way to understand why emergencies are morally important, but also why other factors have a place in our moral reasoning.
We discuss Kant's conception of beneficence against the background of the overdemandingness debate. We argue that Kant's conception of beneficence constitutes a sweet spot between overdemandingness and undemandingness. To this end, we defend four key claims that together constitute a novel interpretation of Kant's account of beneficence: (1) For the same reason that we are obligated to be beneficent to others, we are permitted to be beneficent to ourselves; (2) we can prioritise our own ends; (3) it is more virtuous to do more rather than less when it comes to helping others; and (4) indifference to others is vicious. Finally, we explain how this represents a system of duties that gives our personal ends a moral standing without unacceptably moralising them.
The standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by prohibiting actions that the agent wants to perform in order to promote his well-being, by limiting the development of future preferences and projects and also by making the society less open. The paper thus defends a new variant of the standard view by arguing that difficulty and restrictions of options can increase the demandingness of morality on grounds of being costly.
Demandingness objections to consequentialism often claim that consequentialism underestimates the moral significance of the stranger/special other distinction, mistakenly extending to strangers demands it is proper for special others to make on us, and concluding that strangers may properly demand anything of us if it increases aggregate goodness. This argument relies on false assumptions about our relations with special others. Boundaries between ourselves and special others are both a common and a good-making feature of our relations with them. Hence, demandingness objections that rely on the argument in question fail. But the same observations about our relations with special others show that there are many demands special others may not properly make, and since we cannot be more guilty of unjustified partiality in insisting on boundaries between ourselves and strangers than on boundaries between ourselves and special others, there are – as demandingness objections maintain – some demands strangers may not properly make on us.
Is Kant’s ethical theory too demanding? Do its commands ask too much of us, either by calling for self-sacrifice on particular occasions, or by pervading our lives to the extent that there is no room for permissible action? In this article, I argue that Kant’s ethics is very demanding, but not excessively so. The notion of ‘latitude’ (the idea that wide duty admits of ‘exceptions’) does not help. But we need to bear in mind (i) that moral laws are self-imposed and cannot be externally enforced; (ii) that ‘right action’ is not a category of Kantian ethics – there is a more and a less, and lack of perfection does not entail vice; and (iii) that only practice makes perfect, i.e. how much virtue can realistically be expected can vary from agent to agent. The principle that ‘ought’ is limited by ‘can’ is firmly entrenched in Kant’s ethical thought.
We discuss Kant’s conception of moral rationalism from the viewpoint of recent debates, which have distinguished different forms of moral rationalism. We argue that Kant’s version, ‘silencing’, is different and stronger than currently held versions of moral rationalism and that it also differs from versions of silencing that contemporary thinkers advocate. We then discuss Kant’s version of silencing in the context of the moral demandingness debate and argue that silencing can make a perfect duty very demanding. However, it is important that whilst in cases of conflict between duty and personal happiness the normative standing of the latter is silenced, silencing does not require that agents do all they can in the case of imperfect duties. We finally indicate the kind of latitude imperfect duties allow for, according to Kant’s strong form of moral rationalism.
This chapter starts by clarifying the central concepts of this book: rights, duties, justice and virtue. This exposition of the fundamental concepts is distinctly Kantian in nature. Furthermore, this chapter elucidates the relation between rights and duties, and argues that perfect duties of justice are not, as is so often erroneously held, more binding or of greater importance than imperfect duties of virtue. Finally, the case is made for a duties-based perspective on morality instead of the by far more common rights-based perspective. In doing so, I defend myself against critics who fear that a renewed focus on duties will necessarily be detrimental to our rights. I, therefore, explain that, rather than weakening or endangering human rights, a renewed emphasis on our duties will prove to strengthen human rights, particularly by preventing the proliferation of unclaimable rights. Starting from duties rather than rights, furthermore, will enable us to recognize the importance of duties of virtue, to which the perspective of rights must remain blind as the duties it recognizes are limited to rights-based duties, that is, duties of justice.
The essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and constructivist strategies of argument. The second part concerns issues regarding human welfare: the moral significance of altruistic sentiments, the source of other‐regarding and self‐regarding reasons, different conceptions of happiness and personal values, and interpretation of the duty of beneficence. The third part concerns the moral assessment of persons as guilty or innocent, deserving or undeserving, motivated in a worthy way or not. More specifically, these last essays compare Kant's conception of conscience with other conceptions, contrast his theory of punishment with utilitarian and deeply retributivist theories, and distinguish morally worthy from unworthy motivation by conscience and punishment. The final essay proposes a Kantian perspective on moral dilemmas, gaps in moral theory, and residual feelings of guilt and regret in cases of irresolvable moral conflicts. Although the essays are often critical of Kant's particular views, they show how many familiar objections miss the mark. They emphasize features of Kant's ethics that remain worthy of attention today. They attempt to develop these independently of Kant's more dubious beliefs, for example, his rigorism regarding particular substantive principles and his transcendental idealism. The essays often propose readings of specific controversial texts and challenge common interpretations, but they also explore ways that Kantian ethics can be valuable in addressing moral, social, and political problems.
The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is Kant's central contribution to moral philosophy, and has inspired controversy ever since it was first published in 1785. Kant champions the insights of ‘common human understanding’ against what he sees as the dangerous perversions of ethical theory. Morality is revealed to be a matter of human autonomy: Kant locates the source of the ‘categorical imperative’ within each and every human will. However, he also portrays everyday morality in a way that many readers find difficult to accept. The Groundwork is a short book, but its argument is dense, intricate and at times treacherous. This commentary explains Kant's arguments paragraph by paragraph, and also contains an introduction, a synopsis of the argument, six short interpretative essays on key topics of the Groundwork, and a glossary of key terms. It will be an indispensable tool for anyone wishing to study the Groundwork in detail.
There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an ethical system .rmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classi.cation of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited, which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-.own emotional nonsense. Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not required must be re-classi.ed as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant's writings presenting strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill's suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions classi.ed as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that,contraHill, there are no actions of wide duty that can be so characterized in any signi.cant sense; and (3) a .nal discussion of the problem of how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.
Against supererogation”
- S Hale
Who needs imperfect duties”?
- D Statman
Kant on imperfect duty and supererogation
- Te Hill
Wide duties of virtue and prudence in a footnote of the doctrine of virtue (VI: 433n.)” Annual Review of Law and Ethics / Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik
- A P Walla
Meeting needs and doing favours” in: human welfare and moral worth, Kantian perspectives
- Te Hill