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(ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT)
This is the Author's Original Manuscript in its final and definitive form. The Version of
Record can be found via the following reference:
Brannagan, P.M. and Giulianotti, R. (2014) Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar,
Global Sport and football’s 2022 World Cup finals, Leisure Studies [online]. DOI:
10.1080/02614367.2014.964291. Available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02614367.2014.964291#.VImszjGsV8E
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Paul Michael Brannagan is a Doctoral Researcher of Sociology within Loughborough
University’s School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, and a Teaching Fellow in
Sport Policy and Politics at the University of Birmingham’s School of Sport, Exercise
and Rehabilitation Sciences. Paul is one of the few scholars focusing on the
contemporary influence of modern sport in the Middle East. His research to date has
concentrated specifically on the impact of global sport in Qatar, with a particular
emphasis on the state’s acquisition of the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals. Through this,
Paul has uncovered the crucial role sport is playing in Qatar’s wider socio-political
objectives through frequent academic and online publications, as well as numerous
conference presentations across the United Kingdom, Europe and the Persian Gulf.
Richard Giulianotti is Professor of Sociology at Loughborough University, UK, and
Professor II at Telemark University College, Norway. His main research interests are in
the fields of sport, globalization, development and peace, sport mega-events, crime and
deviance, cultural identities, and qualitative methods. He is author of the books
Football: A Sociology of the Global Game (Polity 1999); Sport: A Critical Sociology
(Polity 2005); Ethics, Money and Sport (with Adrian Walsh; Routledge 2007); and,
Globalization and Football (with Roland Robertson; Sage 2009). He has also published
numerous articles in international journals and edited books; and, his work has been
translated and published in eleven languages. In 2014, with Dr Simon Darnell and Dr
David Howe, he will begin a major two-year research project, funded by the UK
Economic and Social Research Council, which will investigate the ‘Sport for
Development and Peace’ sector.
Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment: Qatar, Global Sport and football’s 2022
World Cup finals
Paul Michael Brannagan
1
and Richard Giulianotti
School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, UK
This paper examines the critical role of global sport within Qatar’s
international strategy, most notably through the successful bid to stage the
2022 football World Cup finals. Our discussion draws particularly on
interviews with key stakeholders in the Qatari sport system, as well as
fieldwork in Qatar, and analysis of relevant documents and secondary
materials. The paper is separated into five main parts. First, we set out our
theoretical framework, which draws on the concepts of globalization and soft
power; to assist analysis of Qatar’s engagement with global sport we introduce
the two further concepts of ‘glocal consciousness’ and ‘soft disempowerment’.
Second, we provide the reader with background information on Qatar and
Qatari sport. Third, we discuss three key themes that emerged mainly from
our interviews on Qatar and global sport: exhibiting Qatar’s supremacies as a
microstate; the pursuit of peace, security and integrity; and confronting
national health crises. Fourth, we explore issues of soft disempowerment and
reputational risk with regard to these three themes and in particular critical
international comment surrounding Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 World Cup.
Fifth, we conclude by arguing that Qatar’s soft disempowerment, although
damaging in the short-term, leaves the door open for the state to respond in a
positive manner, regenerating its soft power capabilities in the process.
Keywords: Qatar; football; globalization; sport mega-events; soft power; soft
disempowerment; glocal consciousness.
1
Corresponding author:
Paul Michael Brannagan, School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University,
Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK
Email: p.brannagan@lboro.ac.uk
Introduction
On 2 December 2010, football’s global governing body, FIFA, awarded the small Persian Gulf
state of Qatar the right to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup finals. Numerous observers viewed
the decision with much scepticism, given that Qatar is one of the world’s smallest states, has little
football history, and regularly exhibits searing climates. Yet, to Qatari authorities, the tournament
epitomized the state’s desire to been seen as a truly global sporting destination, a fundamental
driver of Qatar’s wider international strategy. Indeed, the acquisition of the 2022 finals – one of
the globe’s premier sporting events - significantly added to the state’s continuous development
of elite-level sport, both at home and abroad, all financed by Qatar’s abundant wealth from oil
and natural gas.
In this paper, we seek to fill a significant gap in regard to social scientific discussions of Qatar’s
engagement with global sport. Prior work in this area has been particularly scarce, with only a
handful of scholars focused on Qatar’s objectives vis-à-vis global sport: notable works include
Amara’s (2005) insightful study of political discourses surrounding Qatar’s hosting of the 2006
Asian Games, drawing particularly on documentary analysis; Campbell (2010) on Qatar and the
importing and naturalization of foreign athletes, drawing mainly on secondary sources; and,
Dorsey’s regular analyses of national, regional and global politics and policy with regard to Qatar,
published particularly in blog articles (Dorsey, 2013a; 2013b). Our contribution here, as part of a
wider project on Qatar’s sporting intentions, offers a significant advance on these prior works,
providing the first detailed academic discussion of Qatari sport with significant reference to the
securing of the 2022 World Cup finals, and the first to draw directly on primary research with
leading decision-makers and stakeholders within the Qatari sport system.
Our discussion is divided into five main parts. First, we set out our theoretical framework,
drawing on the concepts of globalization and soft power, and introducing the new keywords
‘glocal consciousness’ and ‘soft disempowerment’. Second, we provide key background
information on Qatar itself and on the state’s pursuits with global sporting forms, detailing our
data collection strategy in the process. Third, we uncover and discuss our interview data with
reference to three main emerging themes: exhibiting Qatar’s supremacies as a microstate; Qatar’s
contribution to peace, security and integrity; and, the national health crises. Fourth, we explore the
possibilities of ‘soft disempowerment’, with reference to the potential risks surrounding the three
themes outlined earlier, and more significantly in regard to critical international discussion of
Qatar and the hosting of the 2022 World Cup finals. We conclude by arguing that Qatar now has
the opportunity to respond in a positive manner to some of its international fallacies, and, in
doing so, has the potential to reconstruct its soft power strategy.
Theoretical Framework: Globalization/Glocal Consciousness and Soft Power/Soft
Disempowerment
Our analysis of Qatar’s engagement with global sport is premised on two interrelated theoretical
fields, relating to globalization and soft power.
Globalization and Glocalization
First, by way of definition, we understand globalization as featuring two main processes:
increasing levels of interconnectedness across nations and regions, as illustrated by contemporary
social media, the world financial system, the growth of international governmental organizations,
and global cultural events such as sport tournaments; and also, increasing levels of social
consciousness of the world as a single place, as illustrated by international political diplomacy, or
by the transnational environmental movement (cf. Robertson 1992: 8). In addition, global
processes have been marked by more intense and complex interrelations between the local and
the global; Robertson’s (1992) concept of glocalization serves to capture this interpenetration. A
pivotal point here is that ‘the local’ and ‘the national’ should not simply be seen as set for
obliteration by ‘global forces’. Instead, local and national societies or nation-states, through their
transnational connections, have substantial scope to adapt, innovate and manoeuvre, and to
differentiate themselves from each other, within this ‘glocalized’ world (Robertson 1992; Ritzer,
2011). Thus, for example, most nation-states engage in nation-branding before worldwide
audiences, such as by harnessing global communications and technology to define and to market
themselves in specific ways, usually with the aim of attracting various forms of trade and
investment (cf. Anholt, 2007).
We introduce the concept of glocal consciousness to refer to how nation-states imagine themselves
within the global context, and position themselves vis-à-vis processes of globalization. Glocal
consciousness underpins, for example, how national governments engage with global sport, most
obviously when bidding to host sport mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup or Olympic
Games. Such events provide host cities and nations with exceptional opportunities to construct
new, authorized, brand identities before both their own citizens and global audiences (Roche,
2000; Chalip and Costa, 2005). In different circumstances, host nations may use these events to
change their international image (Preuss and Alfs 2011: 66); to signal their ‘graduation’ or ‘arrival’
on the global stage (Black and Van der Westhuizen 2004; Horne and Manzenreiter 2006); or, to
achieve certain domestic or foreign policy objectives (Black and Van der Westhuizen, 2004). For
example, in hosting the 2006 World Cup finals, Germany sought to project itself ‘as a nice and
friendly country to visit’, challenging wider international stereotypes that touch on the Second
World War and Nazism, or notions of a ‘dominant’, ‘arrogant’ and ‘dull’ people (Grix & Lacroix,
2006: 383). For the 2010 South Africa World Cup finals, the hosts portrayed the tournament as
an ‘African showpiece’ – a force for continental unity, solidarity and peace (Cornelissen 2004;
Pillay and Bass, 2008). And in Dubai, major developments in the field of sport look to be used
for foreign policy goals, most decisively for inward investment, and, in the words of the state’s
ruler, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rahid al-Maktoum, as part of an international, multi-billion dollar
‘charm offensive’ (in Jackson and Haigh, 2008: 351).
For Qatar, the hosting of the 2006 Asian Games provided a further demonstration of glocal
consciousness. Amara (2005) argues that, in staging this event, Qatari authorities sought to
celebrate their national culture, environment, and Asian identity, and to demonstrate their
national creativity and modernity. Moreover, Amara’s analysis draws on Edward Said’s (1978)
theory of Orientalism, which explains how powerful Western discourses have represented ‘the
Orient’ (Eastern societies and cultures) in systematically negative ways. Thus, Qatar’s hosting of
the Asian Games was intended in part to challenge Orientalist stereo-types of Arab peoples as
irresponsible, backward, irrational, and lazy. In broader terms, we may say that part of Qatar’s
glocal consciousness involves a commitment to rebut Orientalist images of the nation, the
Persian Gulf and Arab peoples more generally.
Soft Power and Soft Disempowerment
The second strand of our theoretical framework centres on the concept of soft power, and the
binary opposite term that we introduce, soft disempowerment. According to the American political
scientist, Joseph Nye (2004a: 256), soft power is defined as ‘the ability to get what you want
through attraction rather than coercion or payments’; thus, soft power stands in marked contrast
to ‘hard power’, such as military action or economic incentives. The underlying goal, here, Nye
suggests, is the ability to set the political agenda in such a way that the power preferences of
others become shaped by their desire to duplicate your ‘soft power resources’: an attractive
culture, desirable ideologies, and credible, innovative and forward-thinking institutions and
policies (Nye, 2002; 2008). Soft power is understood here as increasingly important within the
global context; and, culture represents a key field for the pursuit and exercise of soft power,
notably through sport, the arts, education, and media.
The hosting of sports mega-events appears to provide national governments with significant
opportunities to increase their soft power, notably through cultural showcasing on global
television, ‘attracting’ tourists, and augmenting national pride (Manzenreiter, 2010; Grix &
Houlihan 2013). For example, the 2008 Beijing Olympics were viewed as increasing China’s soft
power, through successfully hosting the event, advancing messages on ancient Chinese culture
and civilization, and gaining prestige from topping the medals table (Zhongying, 2008).
2
However, we should recognize that, wherever there is the attempt to accumulate soft power
there is always the possibility of soft disempowerment. We introduce the concept of soft
disempowerment to refer to those occasions in which you may upset, offend or alienate others,
leading to a loss of attractiveness or influence. The concept of soft disempowerment ensures that
we should move beyond thinking only of how soft power is positively accumulated; instead, this
term enables us to examine how social actions may have positive and negative outcomes that are
empowering and disempowering respectively.
The staging of sport mega-events carries inevitable reputational risks, and thus may be
accompanied by forms of soft disempowerment. Host nations may be unprepared for the
subsequent high levels of attention and critical scrutiny from international media, human rights,
2
One aspect of soft power which we do not have space to explore here relates to domestic soft power: that is, how
powerful forces within a nation-state make themselves more attractive and influential among citizens at home.
governmental, sport and other organizations (Chalip, 2005). For example, the Beijing 2008
Olympics also placed China in the critical spotlight in regard to the occupation of Tibet, the
treatment of minorities such as the Uyghur peoples, high pollution levels, human rights, and
democracy (cf. Nye 2004b). As Higham (1999: 84) observes, this potential for negative publicity
and loss of attraction can lead host nations ‘to lose more than they can gain in terms of
destination image’.
In sum, in understanding globalization as the heightened interrelationship of the local and the
global, we see how national governments come to imagine themselves within the global context,
and, subsequently, exhibit glocal consciousness through engaging in global sport in order to
achieve desired outcomes. Most specifically here, we see how global sporting forms act as
vehicles for nation-states to construct or reshape specific brand identities and achieve certain
foreign policy objectives. Through this, national authorities draw on sporting mega-events to
achieve precise state-led soft power goals, mainly via signalling particular messages to external
audiences, successfully hosting such events, and through demonstrating one’s sporting ability on
the world stage. However, as we have introduced here, with any soft power strategy there is
always the risk of soft disempowerment, most specifically when host nations are either
unprepared for the level of attention that accompanies such events or exhibit undesirable values
in the eyes of others.
In the next section, we turn to outline the key features of the State of Qatar, and how we
collected data on Qatar’s pursuit of global sport.
The State of Qatar
The State of Qatar is a sovereign Arab state, situated on the Persian peninsula of the Arabian
Gulf. Whilst gaining full independence from the UK in 1971, Qatar has continued to be ruled as
an absolute monarchy since the mid-19th century. Qatar is both one of the world’s smallest states,
and one of its richest. The total population stands at just over 250,000 Qatari citizens, plus some
1.5 million foreign occupants who are employed principally in the state’s thriving oil and
construction industries. Qatar is also the world’s third largest oil producer and the principal
supplier of liquefied natural gas (Dargin, 2007). Consequently, Qatar has extraordinary levels of
annual income: in 2014, national GDP per capita (citizens) in Qatar is projected to be almost
double that for the United States (US$106,110, compared to roughly US$54,609) (International
Monetary Fund, 2014). Moreover, vast oil wealth has fuelled the very rapid development of
Qatar’s capital, Doha, into a global city in little over a decade, in ways that combine ‘instant
urbanism’ and ‘Dubaification’ (Bagaeen’s 2007: 174; Adham 2008: 247).
Alongside the neighbouring city-states of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exceptional wealth has enabled
Qatar to realize far greater levels of global integration than most Middle Eastern countries; a
process that began in 1995 when the previous Emir, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, seized
power in a peaceful coup d’état against his father (Kamrava, 2009). In turn, Qatar’s long-term
strategic plan – the ‘2030 National Vision’ – came to set out the national commitment ‘to
enhance competitiveness and attract investment [that] will be needed in a dynamic and
increasingly borderless international economy’ (General Secretariat for Development and
Planning, 2008: 25). The resulting global integration of Qatar has been led socially, by investment
in education and healthcare; politically, via becoming a centre for international dialogue and
peace-building; in global communications, through the global spread of the Doha-based media
network, Al Jazeera; and in particular financially, through the state-run ‘Qatar Investment
Authority’, which has acquired major stakes in prestigious global corporations such as Barclays
Bank, Credit Suisse and Harrods.
Sport has provided arguably the most prominent field of activity for Qatar’s global engagement.
The state-owned ‘Qatari Diar’, along with the UK private company, Delancey, has acquired
major shares in the 2012 Olympic Athletes’ Village, and the state-funded ‘Qatar Sports
Investment’ group (QSI) has, of course, made a significant purchase in European football club,
Paris Saint-Germain; and, help secure the original €150 million sponsorship deal with FC
Barcelona for the Qatar Foundation (now Qatar Airways) – the first ever commercial sponsor of
the FC Barcelona shirt. Qatar also has hosted a plethora of major international sporting
tournaments, notably: the Qatar Open Tennis Tournament, the Qatar Open Golf Masters, the
2006 Asian Games, and the 2011 Asian Cup football tournament. Qatar will host the 2015
Handball World Cup, and of course the 2022 football World Cup finals; rare failures in global
sport have included two failed bids by Doha to host the 2016 and 2020 Olympic Games. In
addition, Qatar stages several major international sports conferences, such as the annual Doha
Gathering Of All Leaders in Sport (Doha GOALS), and the ‘Securing Sport’ symposium that is
convened by the Qatar-based International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS).
In looking to shed light on Qatar’s extensive engagement with these global sporting forms, we
conducted in-depth interviews with seven leading sport officials in Qatar, chosen as a result of
their accessibility and availability, expertise, and high-level position within their respective
organizations: two Supreme Committee members from the Qatar 2022 Committee, who played
leading roles in the successful acquisition of the World Cup itself; two Senior Public Relations
Managers and one Senior Media Manager from the Aspire Academy of Sports Excellence, the
‘Sports City’ of Qatar; and, two Managers from the Research and Knowledge Gathering
Department at the International Centre for Sports Security, based in Doha. Fieldwork was also
undertaken through three visits to Qatar in May 2012, March 2013, and December 2013, during
which we attended conferences, sport and cultural events, and conducted informal interviews
with local citizens, migrant workers, and visitors. Additional research included the analysis of key
documents, most notably Qatar’s 2030 National Vision, the state’s National Development
Strategy, and the National Health Strategy, as well as related FIFA reports; and, the collection
and analysis of international media articles surrounding Qatar’s engagement with global sport.
Our research data – in particular interview transcripts, along with field-notes, key documents,
and media reports – was subjected to thematic analysis. The emerging themes from this analysis
form the basis of our discussion in our next section.
Qatar’s Engagement with Global Sport: Three Key Themes
Thematic analysis of our data indicated that Qatar’s engagement with global sport centres on
three key themes: exhibiting Qatar’s supremacies as a microstate; projecting notions of peace, security and
integrity, and, confronting national health crises. Each of these themes is underpinned by a glocal
consciousness and by the pursuit of soft power.
Exhibiting Qatar’s Supremacies as a Microstate
The first major theme to emerge here centres on Qatar’s influence and effectiveness as a global
microstate. To begin with, a key component of this strategy concerns the endeavour to debunk
negative, ‘Orientalist’ images of Qatar and the wider ‘East’ (cf. Said, 1978). This focus reflects
Qatar’s glocal consciousness, in recognizing how the nation-state, and the wider region tends to
be portrayed or viewed in a global context; and also Qatar’s pursuit of soft power, in terms of
seeking to strengthen its reputation and attractiveness across international society (cf. General
Secretariat for Development and Planning, 2008). For Qatari authorities, successful engagement
with, and leadership of, global sport is one of the most effective mechanisms for promoting
better understandings of Arab and Eastern cultures, and for demonstrating what ‘Oriental’
societies have to offer in socio-political terms. These motives were highlighted by interviewees in
regard to Qatar’s bid to host the 2022 World Cup finals (2022WC), as Interviewee 3 explains:
‘So one of our main goals when we were bidding…was to try and create better
understandings between the East and the West…just like the prejudice and
misconception from the West about the Middle East, there is also some
misconceptions and prejudice I think to a lesser extent from the Middle East
to the West. But there is a lot more influence from the West to East…we
watch American movies from Hollywood…you know people travel a lot to
England, to France, the U.S….there is also substantial amounts of people
from the West who come and live and travel here. But I think to a lesser
extent if you take the sheer number of people in the West and Europe who
haven’t really experienced the Middle East or the Region [Persian
Gulf)…those are the ones we’re trying to target here.’
The hosting of such an event is perceived by Qatari authorities as, in effect, increasing the
nation’s soft power, in terms of highlighting Qatar’s professionalism and responsibility, as both
an Eastern nation, and also as a micro-state that is able to deliver on its goals. As Interviewee 2
stated:
‘It is important for people to realize that football is a global game…and for a
country this size, [that we] are able…which we’re confident of doing...to host
a World Cup that opens the horizons for countries who are of a similar nature
in terms of size…or maybe even a little bigger…but to say, ‘Hey, if Qatar are
able to do it then we can do it as well. Our size is not an impediment!’ ‘You
know…we want to show people that we are…and that the region [Persian
Gulf] in general…is capable of handling such a massive responsibility.’
The 2022WC is also intended to spotlight Qatar’s innovative modern culture and state-of-the-art
technology and development. While these qualities may be seen as enhancing the nation’s soft
power, they also reflect Qatar’s glocal consciousness, in terms of capturing how Qatari culture
engages creatively and critically with global processes. In this respect, several interviewees
referred to the design and technology behind the architecture of Qatar’s World Cup stadiums.
For example, the ‘Al-Wakrah Stadium’, one of Qatar’s leading venues for the 2022WC, has been
designed by Aecom in part to symbolize the nation’s past and progressive future vision.
Additionally, the Aspire Dome, designed by Roger Taillibert, is the ‘world’s largest indoor sports
facility’ (ALCOA: Aspire Dome), and exhibits what can be described as ‘state-of-the-art
architectural grandiose and wonder’ (Field-notes, 2013), encapsulating, in the process, Qatar’s
‘project for modernity’ (Amara, 2005: 503). Sporting architecture such as this represents a
‘dramatic symbol of change’ for Qatar, capturing notions of modernism and national ambition in
similar ways to Asian cities that have undergone rapid development, such as Kuala Lumpur,
Dubai and Singapore (cf. Mangan, 2011: 2232).
The suitability of Qatar’s climate for elite sport competition has been a recurring focus of
international controversy following the award of the 2022WC, as summer temperatures can
reach up to fifty degrees Centigrade (Pattisson, 2013). However, the Qatari response has been to
highlight the nation’s technological expertise and international leadership, in dealing effectively
with adversity. Hence, Qatari authorities have highlighted the technological measures within
stadiums that would seek to reduce or eliminate the impact of a hot climate on these fixtures.
The aim here is to pioneer the use of high-tech, carbon-neutral, environmentally-friendly cooling
systems to drastically reduce stadium and training venues (FIFA, 2010), which then may be used
at other tournaments – again reflecting both a glocal consciousness and the pursuit of soft power
through staging the event. As interviewee 2 explained:
‘We do see this technology as innovative…I mean it has always been part of
our desire to achieve this; but, you know, it was always going to be a challenge,
but it’s one we believe we’ve looked to overcome…The technology itself is
state-of-the-art and we hope it paves the way for others with a similar climate
to host future events.’
A further aspect of Qatar’s glocal consciousness and pursuit of soft power centres on the
proposed use of stadiums after the World Cup finals. Most sport mega-events generate ‘white
elephant’ facilities that are under-used afterwards (Rose and Spiegel, 2011); Qatar, with a total of
nine new stadiums to be constructed for less than two million people who fail to exhibit a strong
sense of football culture, would be particularly exposed to this danger – highlighted most
explicitly during fieldwork in December 2013 when we witnessed a mere 150 supporters attend a
Qatar Stars League match in a stadium capable of accommodating over 18,000 people. To tackle
this inevitable problem, and to enhance the nation’s soft power, the Qatari authorities are
committed to the modular construction of stadiums so that they might be disassembled and
‘given away’ to developing African nations (FIFA, 2010). As interviewee 3 explained:
‘Look, we don’t need such big stadiums for our requirements here. So one way
for us to avoid having ‘white elephants’…is thinking about modular
technology for building the stadiums which we can then contribute to
developing countries in order to develop their sports infrastructure, whether
its football or not - you can use them for football fields in places like Africa,
South America…countries even in the Arab world who want to develop their
sports infrastructure, so why not? We’re benefiting from the World Cup, why
not have the world also benefit from our World Cup?’
This pursuit of soft power among developing nations is reflected in Aspire’s elite football
development programme, wherein annually over 600,000 boys from across the world,
particularly developing nations, undergo preliminary trials, with the best candidates being invited
back to Doha for expert training; the Academy sends monies back to candidates’ families, and in
some cases installs new sport and community facilities in their hometowns (Interviewee 1).
Although we may view this as one way for the Academy to hand-pick the best foreign talent for
its national teams, Interviewee 1 insisted that ‘none of them [the boys from the programme] have
played for any of Qatar’s national teams…’ and ‘we’ve supported them to go and play for their
own youth national teams’ – which the majority, we were told, have already done so.
Overall, Qatar’s endeavour to highlight its significance as a microstate via the leveraging of
global sport is underpinned by a glocal consciousness and pursuit of soft power in a variety of
ways. Core concepts and images emerge here, of competence, professionalism, technological
sophistication, and international benevolence, as the basis for Qatar’s soft power strategy
through sport, and also reflecting how the Qatari authorities position themselves vis-à-vis
globalization processes, and in opposition to highly simplified, Orientalist images of Eastern
societies. However, as we note in the next section, these aspects of Qatar’s engagement with
global sport inevitably carry the potential for ‘soft disempowerment’.
Projecting Peace, Security and Integrity
The second theme emerging from Qatar’s involvement in global sport centres on peace, integrity
and security. The context for this theme centres on Qatari foreign policy. In terms of ‘hard
power’, although Qatar benefits greatly from its economic muscle, its military influence is very
limited, and would have little prospect of repelling a significant invading force. Diplomatically,
Qatar’s security strategy has involved cultivating the United States as a close ally, particularly
through provision of natural resources and a site for US Middle Eastern military headquarters
(Sakmar, 2007). Yet, more broadly, Qatar’s security policy is by necessity centred on the exercise
of soft power through peaceful international cooperation, and association with the values of
peace, security and integrity (Sajedi, 2009). Part of this strategy has involved Qatar embedding
itself within international society, as a key centre for dialogue on global issues and peace-building.
For example, Qatar has hosted major UN and other conferences on climate change and the
environment; and, acted as mediator and ‘reliable peace broker’ in Middle East conflicts
(Kamrava, 2011: 540). Such initiatives are considered to position Qatar as a constructive and
valued contributor to international affairs, and to reduce the prospect of ‘hard power’
engagement with larger rivals. These activities are also underpinned by Qatar’s glocal
consciousness, in terms of identifying an appropriate and engaged national role within the
context of political and economic globalization.
Given its position within the Middle East, part of that soft power internationalism involves
Qatar leveraging global sport to educate international society on the socio-political differences
between this microstate and more conflict-affected parts of the region. Again, this reflects
Qatar’s glocal consciousness, in terms of recognizing how it may be viewed in the global context;
and also its endeavour to turn these disempowering aspects into something more positive. A
particular focus here is on reaching Western nations as, according to interviewee 2, many
Westerners:
‘…only experience what they see on the news, and it’s always the really
unfortunate incidents that make the news, and it’s usually magnified or
sensationalized. They see what’s happening on the roads of Gaza or Baghdad
and they think this is the Middle East. They don’t know how to differentiate.
The situation in Qatar is very different from that of Afghanistan. A lot of
people think that’s it’s all the same thing…so it’s unfortunate because you
have a lot of movies that portray the Middle East like that and all the news
that comes out of the region: wars, civil strife, civil wars…’
Consequently, for Qatari authorities, the hosting of a sport mega-event provides a
communication platform for reaching a global audience, as interviewee 3 went onto explain:
‘We felt that this [hosting the 2022WC] was an opportunity for a lot of people
who are going to be visiting here, where the spotlight is going to be shown on
us, that we say that the Middle East is nothing like some places you would see
on the news. Yes, we do have our problems, some countries more than others,
but at the end of the day it’s not what people make us out to be. So that was
one of our main goals when bidding for this kind of global event.’
Qatar’s endeavour to reshape international understanding of the nation and the region as a
peaceful environment relates strongly to the state’s further aim: to leverage the tournament in
order to develop a powerful tourism industry. In 2011, Qatar welcomed 2,905,300 tourists
(Qatar Statistics Authority, 2012: 38); however, the great majority of this number travelled to
Qatar for short-term conferences and business seminars (Hazime, 2011). Consequently, one of
the main objectives for Qatari authorities is to reshape its role as longer-term holiday destination
(Qatar General Secretariat, 2011). In order for this aim to be realized, Qatar needs to present
itself, in soft power terms, as attractive and appealing to international audiences at everyday level;
and also, to establish a substantial presence within the global tourism marketplace. Hosting the
2022WC was considered by our interviewees as critical in promoting that aim (cf. ibid.: 53; 202);
as interviewee 3 puts it, the successful event bid has ‘catapulted us maybe 100 years in terms of
profile, in terms of [the wider world] knowing who Qatar is, in terms of knowing where Qatar is’.
A further means through which Qatar leverages global sport, in order to advance its national
association with themes of peace, security and integrity before international audiences, centres on
the Doha-based International Centre for Sport Security (ICSS). Again, the organization reflects
Qatari authorities’ glocal consciousness, and their endeavour to be identified with empowering
internationalist values. Founded in 2010, the government-funded ICSS’s stated mission is to
‘help organisers stage safer world-class sporting events’ (ICSS: FAQ). According to interviewee 4,
the ICSS is driven by an internationalist sport agenda:
‘The Qatari government want the ICSS as an organization to help to promote
safety, security and integrity in sport for the benefit of all humankind…it’s not
just for the benefit of Qatar…you know...it is the benefit for humankind! So
the objective of the organization is really to become a global and international
centre for sport security.’
Consequently, through employing and working with leading stakeholders in sport and security
from across the world, conducting research, recommending ‘best-practice’ initiatives, and hosting
annual conferences, the ICSS is presented as a vehicle for demonstrating Qatar’s commitment to
the universal values of peace, integrity and security. Moreover, the desire to benefit ‘all
humankind’ was echoed in all interviews with Qatar officials on different aspects of the state’s
engagement with global sport.
Overall, Qatar’s leveraging of global sport, in order to demonstrate a national commitment to
peace, security and integrity, is underpinned by a glocal consciousness and soft power strategy.
The overarching aim here is to present Qatar before international society, as friendly, cooperative,
and credible, an attractive nation to visit and to do business with, and one that is committed to
acting to the benefit of humankind. Again, these aspirations carry inevitable risks of soft
disempowerment, as we discuss more fully in the next section.
Confronting National Health Crises
According to some international measures, Qatar has some of the world’s worst levels of health
and well-being. Currently 71% of Qatari nationals are ‘overweight’, with 32% considered to be
either ‘obese’ or ‘morbidly obese’ (Qatar National Health Strategy, 2013a); with 20% of nationals
also suffering with diabetes (Qatar National Health Strategy, 2013b). This critical public health
issue can be associated with a failure to confront some of the negative socio-cultural
consequences of rapid modern development and wealth creation, with Qataris combining high
levels of fast-food consumption and low levels of physical activity (Brannagan and Giulianotti, in
Grix, 2014).
All of our interviewees emphasized that the Qatari state was committed to confronting the
perceived national health crises in obesity and diabetes. One aspect of the state’s health strategy
engages with sport and physical activity, which are viewed as ‘the perfect investment into
creating a healthier country’ (Interviewee 1); the long-term aim is to engrain such activity within
everyday Qatari society (National Health Strategy, 2013a).
Hence, in broad terms, our interviewees indicated that Qatar was aware of its very poor health
position in a global context, thus reflecting a glocal consciousness. Moreover, these interviewees
indicated that a successful response to these health problems would in part increase the nation’s
soft power, in terms of becoming a role model for other nations, and in terms of showing how
sport should be leveraged to confront these challenges. A related benefit, in regard to advancing
soft power, centred on the attempt to develop world-leading sport science and training facilities
that would have positive health impacts.
A key institutional focus for these aspirations is the state-funded Aspire Zone. Aspire’s facilities
include a 50,000 seat stadium, Olympic swimming pool, and many football pitches, tennis and
squash courts, sport science laboratories, and the only FIFA medical centre of excellence in the
Middle East. At everyday level, Aspire runs various health and fitness programmes for citizens,
particularly children. Moreover, while seeking to inspire Qatar’s youth into sport and physical
activity, Aspire acts as a vehicle for identifying and recruiting talented young athletes into its
academy system, to ‘produce future sporting champions that will become role models for the
rest of the country for generations to come’ (Interviewee 1). The example cited here is the high-
jumper Mutaz Barshim, an Aspire graduate, who won gold medals at the 2011 Asian Athletic
Championships and 2011 Military World Games, and bronze at the London 2012 Olympics.
The state views such strong performances at elite sporting level as a means both of promoting
sport and physical activity within its citizenry, and of challenging the nation’s embarrassing global
association with major health issues. As interviewee 5 explained:
‘When you get evaluated as the unhealthiest place in the world… they [the
Qatari government] have to do things to inspire people into change and build
a sporting culture that overlays the embarrassment of issues such as people
being unhealthy and being a country that is known for being unhealthy! But
there’s a lot of pride in international sport…I mean their hosting of the World
Cup in 2022…they want to put in a good performance on the field. So these
are the things which are of importance leading up to 2022…producing
champions that can inspire society and do the state proud at the same time.’
Thus, implementing a sporting culture at everyday level is intended to challenge Qatar’s obesity
and diabetes issues, and also to raise its international profile and status in this field; that is, as
interviewee 7 put it, to develop ‘a leading centre that becomes known for its innovative and
inspiring drive for sports excellence over other things such as health, for example.’
Finally, Aspire is also committed to gaining international recognition. Indicatively, in recent years,
Aspire training facilities have attracted leading athletes such as Rafael Nadal and clubs such as
Manchester United and Bayern Munich. As interviewee 6 stated:
‘I’ve been to the AIS in Australia many times….those are the kind of places
which people talk about in those regions of the world to say ‘that’s the elite
training place, that’s where you want to be’. And so we really want Aspire to
eventually become that place…to become a recognizable centre like that…’
Thus, Aspire reflects in part Qatar’s wider pursuit of soft power through sport and science and
health: at elite level, with the aim of being the world-leading centre for sport science and talent
development; at everyday level, as a key driver for the transformation of Qatari health. In ideal
terms, the overall aim is to establish a set of successful sport policies, institutions and cultures
that enhance the state’s international reputation. In regard to health, if levels of obesity and
diabetes are reduced then Qatar would become one of the few Gulf States to overcome this
challenge. Such an outcome would represent a significant policy coup for Qatar in the
international context although, as we note in the subsequent section, this aim does carry
significant reputational risks, or potential for ‘soft disempowerment’.
Soft Disempowerment
As mentioned, the concept of soft disempowerment locates the other side of soft power,
referring to those occasions in which a given state may upset, offend or alienate others, leading
to a loss of attractiveness or influence. In the case of Qatar, we may point here to five sport-
related issues which, we would argue, have been most damaging to the state’s soft power.
First are the undercover reports that surfaced in May 2011 claiming the Qatari’s had paid in
excess of $1 million to African FIFA Committee members in exchange for World Cup votes
(The Guardian, 10th May 2011); this situation worsened a few months later when Mohamed bin
Hamman, a FIFA executive committee member from Qatar, was given a life ban from football
after allegedly personally handing more than $1 million over in bribes (The Sunday Times, 24th July
2011). Further corruption allegations then followed, concerning alleged payments to former
FIFA vice-president, Jack Warner, leading to an official investigation of the 2018 and 2022
World Cup bidding process by FIFA’s ethics committee (The Telegraph, 21st March 2014). Most
recently, after obtaining millions of leaked documents, The Sunday Times published several
extensive reports on bribery and corruption surrounding the World Cup 2022 award, leading to
five FIFA ‘partner’ sponsors – Hyundai, Sony, Adidas, Coca-Cola and Visa – expressing their
concerns and unease (The Sunday Times, 1st, 8th June 2014; The Independent, 9th June 2014).
Second are the numerous sexual-minority activist groups which have called for FIFA and the
IOC to halt any sports-related tournaments to countries who embrace any form of
discrimination (The Independent, 18th August 2013). Consequently, FIFA’s Anti-Discrimination
Taskforce is to urge football’s governing body to put pressure on Qatar to relax its anti-gay
legislation (The Guardian, 8th September 2013).
Third is the general consensus which has emerged amongst UEFA’s 54 member countries who
suggest that the 2022WC should not be played in Qatar as the weather in the summer months is
simply too hot. Most worrying for European members is the likely switch to holding the
tournament in early winter, claiming that such a move would amount to a crucial issue in the
scheduling of domestic leagues (The Independent, 10th December 2013).
Fourth relates to the public perception of the 2011 Qatar Sports Investment Authority’s
acquisition of European football club, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG). Most significantly here is the
recently-announced sponsorship deal between PSG and the Qatar Tourism Authority – a deal
which will ensure PSG earn up to €200 million a year for a total of four years (The Telegraph, 12th
November 2013). Alongside the current Qatar National Bank sponsorship, the Qatar Tourism
Authority’s involvement in PSG has raised serious questions from the European community as
to whether such a relationship looks to find a loophole in UEFA’s Financial Fair Play regulations
(ibid.); this situation was arguably worsened when, three weeks after the Qatari-PSG acquisition,
Al Jazeera secured the domestic broadcasting rights to the French football league (The Guardian,
22nd November 2011).
Fifth, and perhaps most significantly, we can point here to how the hosting of the 2022 finals has
increased global awareness towards the state’s issues with human rights. Projected to the world
in September 2013 through a report conducted by the Guardian, it was revealed that thousands of
Nepalese workers had died in Qatar as a result of ‘forced labour’ in connection with 2022WC
projects. The report enlightened the world to the appalling conditions South Asian expatriates
face on a daily basis, documenting examples of exploitation, abuse, lack of pay, lack of access to
food and free drinking water, and the confiscation of passports, equating, consequently, to forms
of ‘modern-day slavery’ (Pattison, 2013). The report stated that such a situation clear example of
‘one of the richest nations exploiting one of the poorest to get ready for the world’s most
popular sporting tournament’ (ibid.).
Taking the above into consideration, we suggest that, whilst Qatari authorities look to cultivate
soft power through global sporting practices, at the same time, said strategy has, in-fact, led to
forms of soft disempowerment. In opposition to Qatari soft power objectives, forms of soft
disempowerment through global sport have enlightened the international community towards
those instances when Qatar has exhibited a lack of integrity, foul play, discrimination,
unfriendliness, and a dearth of accountability. The has resulted in serious questions being asked
not only in regard to Qatar’s ability and right to host the 2022WC, but, perhaps most
significantly, led to concerns and doubts over the state’s readiness to fully-join the international
community.
Looking to the future, we would argue that Qatar will have to deal with the ‘snowballing’ effect
of soft disempowerment, whereby more of the spotlight will be shone of the state’s fallacies
leading up to the 2022WC. Qatar’s soft power success will arguably depend on how it looks to
overcome such issues; what this demonstrates, however, is that with any soft disempowerment
situation comes the opportunity for ‘soft power regeneration’ via responding to one’s mistakes in a
positive manner. Qatar’s desire to confront its national health crises is a case in point here;
however, although the desire may be there, we must be sceptical of the fact that there is little
evidence to suggest any correlation between hosting sport mega-events and significant long-term
rises in physical activity participation (cf. Murphy & Bauman 2007).
Conclusion
We have endeavoured here to fill a significant gap in discussions of Qatar’s engagement with
global sport. In doing so, and in locating the ‘glocal’ nature of globalization, we have detailed
how, through the pursuit of global sporting forms, Qatar has exhibited its glocal consciousness –
referring to how nation-states both imagine themselves within the global context, and position
themselves vis-à-vis processes of globalization.
In locating Qatar’s evidential glocal consciousness, we have focused here on how the state looks
to draw most prominently on global sport for the purposes of a soft power strategy. Through
interviews with key stakeholders within Qatar’s sport system, fieldwork, and the analysis of key
documents and secondary materials, we have uncovered that the use of global sport to Qatari
authorities revolves predominantly around three key themes: exhibiting Qatar’s supremacies as a
microstate; the pursuit of peace, security and integrity; and confronting national health crises.
In leveraging global sport to this effect, we have argued here that Qatari authorities seek to
strengthen their reputation and attractiveness within international society by advocating notions
of professionalism and responsibility, innovation and sophistication, modernism, competence,
international benevolence, cooperation, security, peace and integrity, and successful leadership
(both sporting and otherwise). The underlying foundation for looking to exhibit such qualities
revolves around Qatar’s glocal consciousness of the lack of understandings between Western and
Eastern cultures - specifically what ‘Oriental’, microstate societies have to offer of the socio-
political front - the state’s limit hard power capabilities, the need to engage with greater levels of
foreign investment and tourism, and its issues with national health in comparison to the majority
of global society.
Nonetheless, we have also advocated the need here to focus on the other side of soft power: that
of soft disempowerment. In doing so, we can locate that although Qatar has an underlying soft
power strategy through global sport, since its acquisition of the 2022WC numerous
commentators have highlighted the state’s fallacies, leading to a loss of international attraction.
Most significantly here has been discussions within the international community of bribes
surrounding the acquisition of the tournament itself, the state’s controversial laws surrounding
gay rights, concern by the European community of the potential of a winter World Cup, the role
of Qatari institutions in the French domestic first division, and finally, and most significantly,
Qatar’s severe lack of human rights for its migrant workers.
Consequently, the current position that Qatari authorities find themselves is, on the one hand,
with a soft power strategy that looks to paint the picture of an attractive and well-managed,
modern nation-state; and on the other, the international reputation of a citizenry that lacks
integrity, honesty, friendliness and compassion towards citizens of other nations – even those
working within Qatari borders. Although there have been signs that Qatari authorities are aware
of some of their fallacies – particularly their abysmal human rights record – how far they are
willing to go to rectify the current soft disempowerment situation they find themselves in
remains to be seen. Nonetheless, we would argue that said forms of soft disempowerment need
to be addressed swiftly if Qatar is to maintain its international credibility; of course, in achieving
this, Qatar’s soft power could also benefit via the state proving to the community of nation-
states that it is capable of, firstly, owning up to its limitations and, secondly, reflecting its
commitments to overcome these weaknesses.
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