Conference PaperPDF Available

Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue: Transformation of Self-Interest Required

November 2011

Conference: Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue: Transformation of Self-Interest Required

Authors:

Democracy for Development (D4D) Institute

The process descended from practical talks to a trade row and to an open dispute. Each side still believes that its gain can only come at the loss of the other. The national interest is short-sightedly defined as undermining of the other side’s national interest. The goal of this analysis by the New Policy Center (NPC) from Belgrade and the Project on Ethnic Relations Kosovo (PER-K) from Prishtina is to prove that both countries must realize their interest in helping each other to become functional.

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BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE:

TRANSFORMATION OF SELF-INTEREST REQUIRED

Vladimir Todoric

Leon Malazogu

Prishtina, Belgrade

November 2011

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................. 3

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................... 4

Terminology ........................................................................................................................................ 4

Chronology of the Technical Dialogue .................................................................................................... 5

Aim of the Paper: From Zero-Sum to Cooperation ................................................................................. 6

Political Implications and Motives for Dialogue ................................................................................... 11

Fears and Perceptions of Dialogue in Serbia and Kosovo ..................................................................... 13

Issues of Discussion ............................................................................................................................... 14

Freedom of Movement ..................................................................................................................... 14

ID Cards and License Plates ............................................................................................................... 15

University Diplomas .......................................................................................................................... 16

Civil Registry ...................................................................................................................................... 16

Customs and Cadastre ...................................................................................................................... 17

Free Trade and the Customs Stamps ................................................................................................ 17

From Trade Row to Barricades ............................................................................................................. 19

Analysis of Gains and Losses from the First Agreement ....................................................................... 21

What is ‘Normalization’?....................................................................................................................... 26

Bilateral Conditioning ........................................................................................................................... 28

Risks Looming Ahead ............................................................................................................................ 31

What may still disrupt the Dialogue in the future? .......................................................................... 31

The Battle for a Beauty Contest: Beauty Is in the Eye of the EU Beholder ........................................... 32

Mutual Trust & Credibility .................................................................................................................... 34

Keeping Up the Pace ......................................................................................................................... 35

Transformation of Self-Interest: From Zero-Sum Enmity to Mutual Cooperation ............................... 35

Scenarios ............................................................................................................................................... 36

Recommendations ................................................................................................................................ 38

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Executive Summary

While Kosovo and Serbia had talks many times in the past, this is the first time that they agree on

something directly (five agreements have already been reached). Despite the flaws and

dissatisfaction, if it bears to fruition, these first agreements will make this process historic. Whether

the talks yield lasting results, will depend on the final mile and whether both sides can claim to have

served their self-interest and cooperated with each other at the same time.

The process descended from practical talks to a trade row and to an open dispute. Each side still

believes that its gain can only come at the loss of the other. The national interest is short-sightedly

defined as undermining of the other side’s national interest. The goal of this analysis by the New

Policy Center (NPC) from Belgrade and the Project on Ethnic Relations Kosovo (PER-K) from Prishtina

is to prove that both countries must realize their interest in helping each other to become

functional. Although highly unpopular, we believe that the two sides are in the same boat (of shared

problems), but are yet to realize this.

Dialogue is usually about seizing the right moment. Time is never fully ripe and the moment is

usually about capturing a narrow window of opportunity. The window that brought Serbia and

Kosovo closer together is fast shutting, under a range of looming risk factors lined up in the horizon

that may harm rapprochement: (a) the possibility that Serbia organizes elections in the north, (b)

EU’s lack of unity, (c) lack of implementation of the current agreement and the non-inclusion of

more items (regional cooperation, telecommunications, energy, integrated border/boundary

management), (d) lowering of bilateral conditionality, or (e) if the EU carrots are seen as rewarding

the sides asymmetrically to their performance.

The Dialogue has all the hallmarks of a beauty contest. Negotiators do not genuinely engage in

dialogue but appeal to EU sympathies and respond to pressure. Kosovo and Serbia publicly present

as if they are continuing century-old battles but this time with diplomatic finesse. Inside and outside

the negotiation room the talks resemble a beauty contest, attempting to influence the external

mediator’s assessment that has been more ‘constructive’. Populist tendencies portray the dialogue

as a victorious feat of out-smarting the other side, which may improve the standing of individual

politicians, but will harm their credibility and make it more difficult to agree in subsequent rounds. It

is important not to lose momentum – despite the setbacks, it is after all better to have insincere

cooperation than sincere conflict.

It was important to examine the gains and losses for the main stakeholders in detail. Currently on

paper, the calculated gains are higher than the losses. This Dialogue has induced Kosovo and Serbia

to say the right things, appear pro dialogue, but Serbia and Kosovo still perceive that it is in their self-

interest to see each other as weak as possible. For as long as Serbia is perceived as a threat to

Kosovo and vice versa, the two sides will see their strengthening only in respect to the weakness of

‘the enemy’. Such a view will not only expend valuable resources inefficiently, but will also prevent

the reforms and transformation of societies towards European values.

Serbia will not be granted a EU candidate status unless its starts dismantling some of the ‘parallel

institutions’ in the north of Kosovo and to normalize relations with Kosovo. If these conditions are

met, the two countries can unlock their European future. If ‘normalization’ is accomplished in the

last weeks before Dec 9th, Serbia may be granted candidacy while Kosovo may be granted visa

liberalization and contractual relations with the EU. Kosovo has nothing to gain if Serbia is stopped in

its European integration, but stands to lose if Serbia loses interest to deliver on ‘normalization’.

Unfortunately, normalization does not come by itself but it depends on strong conditionality by

member states.

Asymmetric progress can threaten both countries, for the ‘same boat’ concept would cease to apply.

It is essential that through external policy the EU deepens the understanding that the two sides are

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in the same boat; hence digging holes for the other side will sink both. For this message to be

effective, EU assessments must be consistent.

The closed nature of the process has produced minimum consensus-building and a “bunker-

mentality” with resistance to implement the agreements that were closed. The current dialogue

should address relations between Prishtina and Belgrade, while Prishtina should open up a channel

of communication with northern Kosovo Serbs.

Acknowledgments

The New Policy Center (NPC) and the Project on Ethnic Relations – Kosovo (PER-K) would like to

thank the British embassies in Belgrade and Prishtina, as well as the heads of both negotiation teams

for their forthcoming approach to this paper. A number of additional analysts are also appreciated

for their participation in several brainstorming sessions and reviewing earlier drafts of this paper.

We would especially like to thank Alex Grigorev (President of the Council for Inclusive Governance),

Engjëllushe Morina (Executive Director of the Kosovo Stability Initiative), Agron Bajrami (Editor-in-

Chief of Koha Ditore, Prishtina’s main daily newspaper), Bosko Jaksic (Editor of the foreign policy

section at Belgrade's daily newspaper Politika) and Vladimir Pavicevic (Professor at Faculty of

Political Science in Belgrade). The authors bear full responsibility for this paper.

Terminology

The paper avoids the use of Kosova or Kosmet, but settles for the widely accepted English version of

Kosovo. The paper uses Kosovar as a generic word for all inhabitants of Kosovo, Albanian or Serb,

while it distinguishes the two communities with Kosovo Albanians or Kosovo Serbs. When referring

to Kosovo Serbs as distinguished by locality, we use “northern Serbs” for those living in the four

Serb-majority localities in the north, and “central Serbs” for the Serbs in the rest of Kosovo. The

word Serb is usually used to denote an inhabitant of Serbia, while Serbian is used as an adjective to

something belonging to the Republic of Serbia. The paper occasionally uses the word “parallel

institutions” to denote Serbian institutions operating within Kosovo not to confuse them with

institutions in Serbia. We have used capital D for this Dialogue to distinguish it from the generic label

for any dialogue process. NPC and PER-K also decided to use Prishtina and avoid the Albanian

spelling of Prishtinë or the Serb spelling for Priština. For faithful translation of this paper into Serbian

and Albanian, responsibility lies with respective partners. In case of mismatch of translations with

the original, the English version prevails.

The project was supported by the British Embassy in Prishtina and

Prepared by: Vladimir Todoric and Leon Malazogu

Belgrade.

Kosovo.

The views expressed in the paper do not necessarily represent the views of the donor.

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Chronology of the Technical Dialogue

- September 2010 – Ashton – Tadic meeting in New York led to joint Serbia-EU UN GA Resolution

adopted which foreseen the Dialogue facilitated by EU

- October 2010 – Kosovo enters institutional crisis - elections are called

- December 20101 – Kosovo parliamentary elections

- February 23rd – Kosovo government is formed

- March 8th – Dialogue starts

- May 12th – Borislav Stefanovic makes first visit to Prishtina and talks to Prishtina officials

- July 2nd – first three agreements reached between Belgrade and Prishtina on free movement of

persons and vehicle license plates, civil registry, university diplomas

- July 15th – further talks on second Dialogue round postponed till September

- July 20th – Prishtina imposes reciprocity on Serbia’s three years embargo on goods from Kosovo as

Belgrade did not recognize the Kosovo custom stamp

- July 25th – Prishtina sends its police units to Gates 1 and 31 (Jarinje and Brnjak customs posts) to

enforce reciprocity measures. One policeman was shot dead. Belgrade sends its chief negotiator

Borislav Stefanovic to north of Kosovo who negotiates with KFOR on behalf of Kosovo Serbs.

- July 27th – Kosovo Customs posts set on fire by Serb protesters

- July 29th Borislav Stefanovic and KFOR commander Erhard Buhler reached a preliminary agreement

valid until September 15th on customs posts and border crossings

- September 2nd – starts a new round of Dialogue. Immediately an agreement on the custom stamp

and cadastral issues is reached. New round scheduled for September 28th

- September 16th – Kosovo Government sends its custom officers to Gates 1 and 31 with an assistance

of EULEX and KFOR. Local Serbs react by barricading the roads in the north of Kosovo

- September 27th – incident involving shooting happens on Jarinje customs post between local Serbs

and KFOR. Eleven persons injured, seven Serbs, four KFOR soldiers.

- September 28th – new round of Dialogue was about to take place. Serbian side demanded talks on

customs posts which were refused by Prishtina and EU negotiator Robert Cooper. Belgrade refused

to talk about other issues noting incidents on Jarinje as a priority. Dialogue was stopped and the

meeting was not held

- October 7th and 8th – EU negotiator Robert Cooper visits Belgrade and Prishtina trying to reach a

compromise for continuation of the Dialogue. No deal was reached as Belgrade, again, demanded

talks on customs posts while Prishtina refused to talk about internal affairs

- EC published an Opinion on Serbia’s EU Candidacy Bid and announced roadmap for Kosovo visa

liberalization. EU insists on Serbia’s re-engagement in Dialogue as a condition for candidacy

- October 19th – heads of Serbian municipalities jointly refuse to further implement any agreements

that Belgrade reaches in the Dialogue with Prishtina. Furthermore, they refused to cooperate with

EULEX and insisted on UNMIK’s reemployment. Barricades remain.

- October 27th – barricades have been partially removed. Kosovo Serbs have removed barricades

selectively so that only KFOR can move freely throughout northern Kosovo, but not EULEX.

- November 21st and 22nd – new round of Dialogue. Agreement reached on recognition of university

diplomas. Talks were also held on integrated border management but without results.

- November 29th – President Boris Tadic call on Kosovo Serbs to remove barricades.

Expected:

- January-April – election campaign in Serbia. Some dialogue process may continue but no agreements

can be expected

- May-June – elections and establishing of new government

- September – full normalization demands are conditioned by European Commission’s Opinion for

Serbia’s EU Candidacy Bid

- Each small step of Serbia will be conditioned for more steps of normalization with Kosovo, and similar

incentive structure will be applied with Kosovo

- Shuttle Diplomacy will continuously work on the thorniest of issues

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Aim of the Paper: From Zero-Sum to Cooperation

The paper first reviews the short record of the Dialogue so far, examines the real gains and losses of

all stakeholders and attempts to discern what EU demands for ‘normalization’ mean. Fears and

public resistance to the Dialogue is analyzed in order to determine the degree of rationality of the

fears. After an analytical description of the process, the paper assesses what has happened to the

mutual trust and credibility, and lists four scenarios. Above all, the paper attempts to assess to what

degree the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is indeed a zero-sum game and suggests a number of

recommendations how to move to a win-win outcome, which is the

main objective of the analysis.

Each side still has a perception that its gain can only come at the loss

of the other side. The national interest is short-sightedly defined as

undermining of the other side’s national interest. The goal of this

analysis by New Policy Center (NPC) from Belgrade and Project on

Ethnic Relations Kosovo (PER-K) from Prishtina is to prove that this claim is profoundly false and that

both countries must realize their interest in helping each other to become functional. Although

highly unpopular, we believe that the two sides are in the same boat, but are yet to realize this. This

paper focuses entirely on the future, delineates scenarios, and recommends how they can ensure

that this transformation indeed occurs.

The paper was driven by the following research question: What type of process is this Dialogue, and

can it deliver an outcome that both sides will ultimately cherish? It is not the first time that a conflict

seems intractable, but history indicates that many countries that underwent vicious wars are now

strongest allies and lead others into cooperation and prosperity.

How Do We Know We Have Succeeded? Can Talks ‘Empty’ the Status Dispute?

It is often said that success will be measured by the extent to which both sides are able to claim to

their respective public that they have won. However, PER-K

and NPC believe that it is not nebuluous outcomes that should

enjoy the trust of both sides, if the cost of such claims implies

hiding important details from the public. Mediation should not

only be an exercise in public relations but assistance to an

essential transformation whereby Serbia and Kosovo gradually

to start to believe in a mutually beneficial relations.

The paper concludes that talks are required, and they should

continue with technical (non-status) issues as planned. More efforts are needed to make the best of

what is possible. To have a high effect, PER-K and NPC suggest continuing with the list of technical

topics. Given careful consideration and the right context, cooperation should be possible in a wider

array of issues that so far have been considered.

Current Limits

Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and it is of no use to believe that this can change soon. At the

same time, Kosovo has announced its independence and has no intentions to abandon state

consolidation. The current Dialogue could not aim more than to ameliorate the situation and bring

Belgrade and Kosovo to realize their mutual interest within the given limitations. The only possible

approach was to accept the limitations of both parties (Serbia’s inability to recognize Kosovo and

Kosovo’s determination for sovereignty) and make the best of the “space in-between”. The essential

question that the paper tries to answer is: What progress can be done without asking Serbia to

recognize Kosovo and without asking Kosovo to step back from its status consolidation?

Creative solutions must be sought to improve the lives. Some of the initial criticism of the process

was its lack of contribution towards status. But there is no reason why this Dialogue should not take

Mediation should not only be

an exercise in public relations

but assistance to an essential

transformation whereby Serbia

and Kosovo gradually start to

believe in mutually beneficial

relations.

Although highly

unpopular, we believe

that the two sides are in

the same boat, but are

yet to realize this.

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place, for the sole purpose that it does not tackle the issue of status. It does not make Kosovo’s

independence weaker, although it may not necessarily make it stronger.

The Lure of the Greater European Pie

Serbia and Kosovo may have different interpretation of mutual history; diverging claims on same

rights or territory; and to this day, they continue to differ and nurture conflict over respective short-

term interests. It may not be very apparent to many in Serbia and Kosovo, but they share one

common goal that should supersede all the others. The European future seems often a cliché or a

distant goal, but it has proved to have the power to transform self-interest and increase ‘the pie’ in

order to make today’s disputes seem minor in retrospective tomorrow.

The European perspective has the power for comprehensive political, economic and social reforms,

leave alone for overcoming disputes with one’s neighbors. The long-term approach towards

resolution of disputes between Serbia and Kosovo is in fact a

two-pronged one; it tackles both long-term societal priorities as

well as specific disputes that mark the relations between the

two. Ultimately, the appeal of European integration should

mobilize the working middle class, the leading proponent of

reforms, peace and democracy.

The Dialogue process is a historical chance for Belgrade and Prishtina to make a step forward in

cooperation. It may be wishful thinking, but the Dialogue is “doomed to succeed” since the

international community seems to be ever more determined to force them into cooperation.

Although with numerous challenges, the current Dialogue has the power, and has already begun to

see European leverage used to gradually transform how Belgrade and Prishtina treat each other and

reframe their perceptions of self-interest and make cooperation worthwhile. After the botched

agreement on education mediated by St. Egidio, an Italian NGO, Kosovo and Serbia have not striken

any agreements since.

How Far Can This Dialogue Take Us?

It is often said that time creates friendships but time alone may take longer than most Kosovars and

Serbs are willing to wait. Time is only important given the active presence of catalysts to speed up

the transformation of self-interest. Most Serbs and Kosovars feel the conflict has frozen their future

and set their eyes towards Europe. Many say that the time is not ripe, that it is too early to bridge

the divide. But any chemist will suggest that time can be sped up given the right catalysts.

International mediators are the current catalysts that quicken the period of the transformation.

There is fear that the current Dialogue may not yield sufficient progress to mobilize the public for

cooperation. Some delays in its implementation, haggling over details, and undermining the other

side may reduce the potential of Dialogue. It is essential to help both sides realize the potential

benefits and the costs of inaction.

More Inclusivity For Longer Effects

Greater inclusion may seem currently challenging and it may indeed delay the agreement on each

issue. However, inclusive agreements tend to stick longer. To this effect, the paper argues that the

civil society and the Parliaments in both capitals should be involved. This cooperation and inclusivity

may become more fruitful once the results of the first agreements start to become visible. If

properly implemented, the free movement of goods and people will have a positive effect on the

public opinion. It is especially important not to abuse the Dialogue for short-term political gains.

The positive benefits can also become infectious and spread fast among elites, intellectuals,

politicians, youth and in sports. Once seen as ‘cool’, cooperation will spread like wildfire and become

the norm as it is across the democratic world. Agreements may look wonderful but progress is

What progress can be done

without asking Serbia to

recognize Kosovo and without

asking Kosovo to step back

from its status consolidation?

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If properly implemented, the

free movement of goods and

people will have a positive

effect on the public opinion,

especially if it is not used for

short-term political gains.

impossible if cooperation labels one as a traitor. The challenge is nothing less than a change of

paradigm, for which to occur, the process must assure people that the Dialogue is no threat to either

country. For example, Kosovars widely fear that their cooperation may help Serbia to acquire

candidate status, delivering little benefit to Kosovo itself. Indeed, such an imbalanced outcome,

would remove the ‘same boat’ context, and Serbia could continue to harm Kosovo’s progress while

pursuing European integration itself. An asymmetric situation would evolve along lower EU leverage.

Context

The European Union has initiated the process of Dialogue in late

2010 which started in March 2011 between the governments of

Serbia and Kosovo. The talks aimed to normalize a difficult

situation created by the stand-off that lasted from the

Declaration of Independence in February 2008. During this time,

Serbia pursued a policy of blocking Kosovo’s membership in

international organizations and maintained a presence in the north of Kosovo. Conditionality from

Serbia and several Security Council members prevents Kosovo from gaining wide recognition, and

UN membership. EU and bilateral conditioning prevent Serbia from gaining EU candidacy.

Some countries do not recognize Kosovo due to their support for Serbia and others due to internal

considerations. The non-recognition by five EU members has prevented the EU from offering Kosovo

tangible perspective for visa liberalization or Stabilization and Association Agreement. Kosovo’s

continued isolation can result in political radicalization which would have adverse consequences on

relations with Serbia, Serbian community in Kosovo and regional relations.

Serbia is undoubtedly blocked in its EU prospect, both in the sense that its formal progress is

conditioned by “normalization of relations” with Kosovo and the fact that its internal reforms are

limited by the political and economic energy which is focused on Kosovo issue. While Serbia used the

period from February 2008 to pursue its “Both EU and Kosovo” policy, the government in Belgrade

was faced with a clear message from Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and EU officials from the

EC Opinion on Candidacy Bid that Serbia will not be granted a candidate status unless it starts

dismantling “parallel institutions” in the north of Kosovo, and normalize relations with Kosovo.

Recent History of Dialogue

After Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008 Serbia entered into a series of disputes

with the countries which support Kosovo’s independence. Soon after Kosovo’s independence, the

DS-DSS coalition (Tadic – Kostunica) saw the major rifts emerge. The differences centered on Serbia’s

response measures towards recognitions of Kosovo and whether Serbia would stop its European

integration.

“Light” versions of standing up against Kosovo’s independence were calling Serbian ambassadors

back to Belgrade for an indefinite period of consultations and initiating UN mechanism to seek an

opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s independence from the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The

more serious measures backed by the DSS were to call off diplomatic relations with countries that

recognized Kosovo and sue them before the ICJ.

The collapse of the government in March 2008 was followed by strong EU support to the Democratic

Party and Boris Tadic, which led to signing of SAA in April 2008 and informal help during the

establishing of the new government in June. After that, the new Serbian government initiated a so-

called “soft-landing” phase which was steered by policy “Both EU & Kosovo”. This policy meant that

Serbia is fully to normalize diplomatic relations with the countries that recognized Kosovo, although

frictions resurfaced with each subsequent recognition.

Serbia established formal relations with EULEX, but at the same time managed to block the

implementation of the Comprehensive Status Proposal (frequently referred to as the Ahtisaari

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International officials do not

insist for Belgrade to formally

recognize Kosovo, but it is

expected to dismantle its

parallel structures in northern

Kosovo and ‘normalize’

relations with Prishtina.

package) in the north of Kosovo. Serbia made everything possible to obstruct Kosovo’s membership

in various international organizations such as UN, OSCE, CoE and many other non-political bodies

(ITU, FIFA, etc.). This policy was tolerated by the EU from June 2008 up to July 2011 when the last

ICTY fugitive was arrested by Serbian authorities and transferred to The Hague while the Kosovo

issue remained the only obstacle on Belgrade road to further EU integrations.

During this period, Serbia managed to initiate the opinion procedure before the ICJ on the legality of

Kosovo’s independence which lasted for almost two years (from September 2008-July 2010), and

which prevented larger number of countries to recognize Kosovo. However, even after the ICJ gave

its positive opinion for Kosovo, other obstacles prevented Prishtina from making formal steps to EU,

such as visa liberalization or SAA negotiations.

Belgrade’s expectations were not met with the opinion, but it did not pave the way for a new wave

of recognitions either. Belgrade initially tried to pass a UN Resolution which would diminish the

effect of such ICJ Opinion but was faced with a very robust message from several influential EU

members, such as Great Britain1 and Germany2

The ICJ Opinion led to a major turning point at the United Nations General Assembly in September

2010 when Serbia changed its first draft of resolution to drafting a joint one with the EU HRFASP

. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries paid

unexpected visits to Belgrade in August 2010 and publicly said that if Belgrade tries to pursue

disputed draft of resolution, the whole process of Serbia’s EU integrations would be blocked. This

moment marks the first tacit split of Western powers with Belgrade’s “Both EU & Kosovo” policy.

A renewed round of stern messages came to Serbia around the same time in 2011, this time by the

German Chancellor, Angela Merkel and President of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy.

International officials do not insist for Belgrade to formally recognize Kosovo, but it is expected to

start dismantling some of its parallel structures in northern Kosovo and ‘normalize’ relations with

Prishtina.

Catherine Ashton. This has often been quoted as a turning point in Serbia’s policy towards Kosovo,

since it heralded a dialogue process between Belgrade and

Prishtina. Serbia’s defeat at the ICJ and the stern messages

pushed to a change of approach and policy. The joint UN

Resolution put forward jointly by the EU and Serbia in effect

enabled the political transfer of “dispute settlement” from UN

bodies (Security Council, General Assembly, and ICJ) to the

institutions of European Union.

After the ICJ Opinion and UN Resolution in Aug-Sept 2010, it was no longer possible to argue that the

European integration process and the Kosovo policy were on separate tracks. They were able to do

that before, since EU countries accepted that pro-EU forces in Serbia needed time to consolidate

after the elections in May 2008 – a “grace period”, which ended when Serbia refused to accept ICJ

Opinion and went for an UN General Assembly Resolution. This was regarded almost as a hostile act

by some highly influential EU members.

Prishtina was caught off-guard during the ICJ Opinion, and within months, the coalition government

fell apart, paving the way for early elections. After nearly six months of a difficult electoral process

and political deadlock (lasting from mid-October until end of March), Kosovo finally got a new

1 B92. 1 September 2011. What Are William Hague's Messages.

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=09&dd=01&nav_id=455562.

2 B92 Westerwelle: Map Permanently Changed.

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=08&dd=26&nav_id=454255.

3 High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

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coalition government led by incumbent Hashim Thaci. He managed to enter into a coalition

agreement with the controversial businessman, Behgjet Pacolli, and all minority communities in

order to secure his second term in office. During this period, a report drafted by Council of Europe

Rapporteur Dick Marty suggested that former leaders of Kosovo Albanian rebels, including Thaci,

had been involved in human organs and weapons trafficking and other illegal activities during and

after the Kosovo conflict. The notorious Ahtisaari Report was published during this period, as the

expectation mounted over the arrest of PDK’s second in command, Fatmir Limaj.

The Constitutional Court concluded last year that the then President, Fatmir Sejdiu, had violated the

constitution by holding the leadership of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) simultaneously.

The ruling triggered Sejdiu's resignation that was followed by his party's decision to leave the

Government and thus provoked early elections. Pacolli's party decided to back Hashim Thaci in an

exchange of a presidential seat for its leader. Pacolli was elected president only in the third round of

voting in Parliament with simple majority after he failed to receive the necessary two-thirds of the

votes in the previous rounds. Pacolli’s election for President was pronounced illegal by the

Constitutional Court, and he had to step down.

This thin coalition majority left three major Kosovo-Albanian groups in the opposition. The other

main parties represented in the Parliament refused to cooperate with PDK, accusing its leader of

corruption and bad management. The electoral process saw an unprecedented level of violations,

while the international representatives in Prishtina repeatedly called for "clean-hands" government.

Despite the tumultuous period inside Kosovo, most statements from the EU focused on the dialogue,

which Kosovars perceived as choosing the most auspicious time to pressure Prishtina into a

damaging process. Kosovo’s ability to counteract or

engage with the process was seriously hampered by the

lack of legitimate representatives and by their damaged

credibility internationally. The whole period passed

under the shadow of Serbia’s aggressive diplomacy and

Lady Ashton’s challenge with the first major project since

the establishment of her office.

The Dialogue process faced serious problems long before

it started. As the agreement on the Dialogue came out

from the exchanges between Serbia and EU (Tadic -

Ashton meeting), it was visible that Kosovo was not involved from the beginning. Reactions from

Prishtina ranged from negative to mixed due to its lack of ownership of the process, but also due to

its perceived risky exercise and the lack of incentives.

Belgrade’s position continued to be ambiguous. Belgrade maintained the position that it would not

recognize Kosovo in any way, explicitly or implicitly even after September 2010, and that the

Dialogue was not about status but only about “improving of the conditions of the daily life of the

ordinary people in Kosovo”. At the same time, Belgrade kept insisting that “it is inevitable to talk

about the status issue, as it surrounds all other issues”.

If Prishtina was not able to get any concessions from Belgrade on the status issue, it was only

possible that EU would offer incentives by “enlarging the box of carrots”. The first carrot was the

long awaited visa liberalization which has yet to materialize. Kosovo is among the most isolated

countries in the world,4

4 ESI. 22 November 2010. Isolation Confirmed. How the EU is undermining its interests in Kosovo.

while the distance with other countries of the Western Balkans grows as

most of them accede to the White Schengen list. Kosovo was unable to enter into negotiations on

readmission as well as SAA negotiations due to its inability to enter contractual relations with the EU

Serbia’s chief negotiator often

invoked the ‘humanitarian’ pattern by

which the Dialogue serves the interest

of ordinary people, then combines it

with the Serbia’s interest for European

integrations and then in the end uses

the argument that the Dialogue will

also be a channel for amendment of

status issues.

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because of the five non-recognizing countries (Spain, Slovakia, Greece, Cyprus and Romania). EU’s

position ‘vis-à-vis Kosovo’ clearly lacked leverage, which hampered its diplomatic and mediation

efforts.

Mapping out incentives for Kosovo in the Dialogue was one of the main tasks for Robert Cooper, the

main facilitator and an adviser to Catherine Ashton on Balkans and the Middle East. The leverage for

Belgrade was rather straightforward as it craved for candidate status and a date for the start of

negotiations. The dilemmas, whether these demands were real or a tactical move to settle for less,

were of little importance after Merkel’s visit on August 22nd, 2011.

The lack of readiness to bridge status-related differences left less political issues as the only ones

possible to make progress with. With two sides as far opposite from each other, difficult topics

would have sapped the potential, hence the choice of easier ‘appetizers’ to show the potential for

dialogue at its very beginning.

Although the Dialogue was to start by the end of 2010, it was delayed by the above-mentioned

issues of the political crisis and elections in Kosovo. The first round officially started in March 2011

and was finished in July with an ‘agreement’ (referred to as ‘conclusions’) on the freedom of

movement, civil registries and university diplomas. The word ‘agreement’ is under quotations

because of the manner on which they were reached (as unilateral commitments) as nothing was

signed due to the fact that Belgrade would consider that as a sign of recognition.5

The mediators clearly perceived that the public opinion ought not to be involved too much, at least

not at the first sensitive stage. Written copies of agreements were rarely made public. Such level of

caution may be dubious from the point of legitimacy, but it may well be necessary to allow confident

exchange to bring some initial agreement. The first rounds of the Dialogue were essentially exercises

of trust-building that ultimately are to depend on the level of implementation of the agreements

reached thus far.

Political Implications and Motives for Dialogue

European integration is clearly the main motive for Belgrade to enter the Dialogue. The rhetoric of

settlement with Albanians does not sound genuine, but it coincides with EU conditions. It is

interesting to observe that Belgrade was insisting on technical dialogue when Prishtina was fearful of

any dialogue. Once the technical dialogue started, Belgrade clearly intended to push it into more

political topics which Prishtina has adamantly avoided.

While most analysts blamed Prishtina for entering what they expected to be an unpredictable

process, other analysts supported it for its non-participation, which would mean that Serbia may in

fact receive candidate status without making any concessions to Prishtina whatsoever. New Prishtina

dilemmas have materialized after refusal of the customs stamps (the same stamps that were

recognized by Belgrade before 2008) and the ensuing attempt to cement the control over the north.

Prishtina saw political ambitions emanating from this process which prompted more pundits to

argue that for as long as the status was seen as open for discussion by Belgrade, technical talks did

not make sense. In an op-ed to Vijesti, Agron Bajrami argued that for “as long as Belgrade harbors

5 European Commission uses the term “agreements” in their Opinion on Serbia’s Candidacy Bid and Kosovo

Progress Report for 2011 but one cannot be sure if they fulfill the legal definition of “agreement”. As they are

more of “mutual understandings” or “verbal agreements”, their implementation will depend on the

authoritative interpretation of EU as there cannot be any kind of objective legal interpretation.

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nasty ambitious on the north, there should be no dialogue”.6

In short, Serbia entered the Dialogue to, as follows:

However, numerous EU members are

ready to support Belgrade’s candidacy and indirectly its ambitions in northern Kosovo. Indirectly

speaking to various EU countries, Belgrade continuously declared public offers to Prishtina about a

potential agreement in the north.

a) Win EU appeal

b) Position better and attempt to change the Dialogue from technical to political focus

c) In return, give away some small concessions

Kosovo entered dialogue because of, as follows:

a) Win EU appeal

b) Get some small concessions

c) in return to risk Serbia improving its bargaining policy

If the Dialogue was indeed perceived as purely technical, it would not have raised this level of

interest. The Belgrade team did not hide its preference to move to political dialogue and open issues

pertaining to the north. The Six Point Plan was even called for by allied Kosovo Serbs NGOs - the

KPAN network.7 That even the technical talks were seen as political proves a statement by Xhavit

Haliti, Deputy Speaker of the Kosovo Assembly, who said that no talks can be purely technical with

Serbia.8

Two conflicting policies are prima facie irreconcilable since

Belgrade will not formally recognize Kosovo and Prishtina will not

enter into discussion on its territorial integrity. But Belgrade has

managed to put its foot at the door of Prishtina’s membership into

certain international organizations and has maintained a presence

in municipalities in north Kosovo, supporting them financially,

logistically and in human resources. Serbia’s health system, education, post and even bank system

operate in Serb-majority municipalities in the north, but also in central Kosovo. International

missions in Kosovo from 1999 (UNMIK & EULEX) have also tolerated the Serbian elections being

organized in this part of Kosovo. Prishtina has entered the Dialogue to either regulate the Serbian

influence to the degree allowed by the Ahtisaari Proposal, or to put an end to them.

The EU has entered into talks to ‘improve the lives of people, and promote regional cooperation and

EU integration’. As the High Representative Ashton believes,

now is the right time to begin and she is confident that both Belgrade and Prishtina

can find practical ways to make sure that ordinary life can go on more smoothly.

Solving problems by dialogue is the European way and the objective of the talks is to

promote co-operation and bring both Prishtina and Belgrade closer to the EU.9

6 Bajrami, Agron. 06.10.2011. North rules. Vijesti, available at:

http://www.vijesti.me/kolumne/sjever-vlada-

kolumna-41125.

7 Kosovo Policy Action Network. 21 September 2011. Why the Six-point plan isn’t being enforced? Statement

issued by KPAN, a network of Kosovo Serbs NGOs.

8 RTK. 28 September 2011.

9 EU Delegation in Serbia, 8 March 2011, http://www.europa.rs/en/mediji/najnovije-

vesti/872/Statement+by+the+spokesperson+of+Catherine+Ashton,+EU+High+Representative+on+the+start+of

+the+Belgrade+-+Pristina+dialogue.html

Prishtina has entered the

dialogue to either regulate

the Serbian influence to the

degree allowed by the

Ahtisaari Proposal, or to

put an end to them.

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Fears and Perceptions of Dialogue in Serbia and Kosovo

Any mapping on conflict resolution ought to start from the fears, and only then move to interests

and positions. The main fear that both sides share is incidents in northern Kosovo, which remains

likely. Serbia is worried that incidents in the north may lead to a renewed wave of refugees,

although this may also be beneficial for Serbia to portray Prishtina as aggressive. Kosovo worries that

tension may lead to radicalization which would make the integration of north into Kosovo even more

difficult.

Fears and Concerns in Serbia:

 The EU will pressure Serbia until it will practically recognize Kosovo;10

 Serbia will lose the support of the countries that have not recognized Kosovo (as quoted in a

statement by Russia’s MFA: “we can’t be bigger Serbs than Serbs themselves”);

 Serbia’s EU consensus may lose the support, paving the way for political radicalization;

 Losing the trust of the Kosovo Serbs and be seen as having betrayed their interest, in turn

this can also lead to a loss of democrats in the upcoming elections in Serbia;

 Status of the most important religious sites.

The public discourse evoked by Borislav Stefanovic, Serbia’s chief negotiator, often invokes the

‘humanitarian’ pattern by which the Dialogue serves the interest of ordinary people, then combines

it with the Serbia’s interest for European integrations and then, in the end, uses the argument that

the Dialogue will also be a channel for amendment of status issues11

Fears and Concerns in Kosovo

. All of these reasons might

prove to be right, but it also shows the complexity of situation in Serbian political scene and the

weight Kosovo carries in it.

Kosovo’s fear from Dialogue was multi-faceted. Some feared that Kosovo was not ready and that

Serbia was much better prepared, but this diagnosis was shared also by many who supported the

Dialogue. This criticism expressed the fear that the EU had largely decided to support Serbia’s

candidacy, and that Prishtina’s boycott would only enable this outcome without any concessions.

The demand for normalization of relations with Kosovo was lukewarm and this can especially be

noticed when the EU confronts the outcome of Democrats losing elections in Serbia. The fears are as

follows:

 Inability to enforce reciprocity with serious damages to the economy;

 Prolonging the Dialogue for too long, thus making it more difficult to seek recognition from

countries that are waiting for its conclusion to make their mind;

 Extending the isolation and not being able to participate in international clubs, get visa

liberalization, charge for transit electricity and for the use of its air space, etc.;

 That Serbia will be on its EU path much before Kosovo, able to block subsequent Kosovo’s

integration, or to break away from conditioning leading to asymmetric conditionality similar

to Cyprus;

 Fear of sliding in political dialogue about northern Kosovo, hence opens Kosovo’s

sovereignty to bargain and render the state dysfunctional;

 Stopping the technical talks for political purposes means that Serbia still threatens to

sabotage Kosovo.

10 Danas. 2nd September 2011. Dacic: Hypocritical slogans about Kosovo. Autor: P.D.

http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/politika/dacic_licemerne_parole_o_kosovu.56.html?news_id=222821.

11 Tanjug. 8 March 2011, http://www.tanjug.rs/videodet.aspx?galID=41047&videoID=118541.

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Kosovo’s fears can be explained by degree the current technical status actually influences the

developments in the north, and the degree to which they freeze recognitions and economic

development.

Fears of Kosovo Serbs

Kosovo Serbs, north and south, are most affected and least consulted in the process. The main fears

that have been identified are as follows:

 Security for Serbs living in central Kosovo and in enclaves;

 Institutional and rule of law vacuum in northern Kosovo;

 Serbs employed in the parallel structures fear of losing their jobs or seeing their salaries

reduced;

 The atmosphere in the Parliament of Kosovo deteriorates steadily;

 Fear shared in the north over the potential revenge of Kosovo Albanians if they take control

of the north;

 If there is an arrangement for the north outside of Ahtisaari, there is a fear among Serbs in

the south that some of their Ahtisaari provided powers will be taken away.

It is essential that the Dialogue first addresses fears, or at least it does not exacerbate them, as it

resolves other issues. An analysis of the fears mentioned above indicates that most of them are

over-blown and irrational. For example, fears of how would Kosovo Albanians react in the north if it

was controlled by Prishtina are clearly fuelled by the lack of interaction. Real or perceptual, fears are

there, and the closed Dialogue process such as this one does not contribute to allaying them.

Issues of Discussion

This section looks at the issues discussed until October 2011 which are shortly discussed in the text

below, one by one. This section is followed by an analysis of the trade-offs of each side for each item

under discussion and overall. Issues are discussed in the order how they were opened (and some of

them closed) in the technical talks.

The first round of the Dialogue did not generate as much public attention in Belgrade as one could

imagine, or at least as much it did in the other capital, in Prishtina. Basically, there was little novelty

besides a fact that this was the first time that Prishtina and Belgrade sat around the same table after

a long period. There were no negative reactions even after the first round of the Dialogue was

finished on the freedom of movement, civil registries and university diplomas. Dissatisfaction in

Serbia started to rise afterwards, among northern Serb leaders saying that it is not Prishtina who is

making concessions but Serbia only, and that the Dialogue is against the interests of Serbian

community in Kosovo. This is a very important moment for the policy gap between the two which

has kept widening ever since, harming Belgrade’s ability to implement the agreements from the

latter rounds of the Dialogue.

Freedom of Movement

Traveling between Kosovo and Serbia is difficult for Serbs and

practically impossible for Kosovars, who do not have Serbian

personal and travel documents. Ordinary people found

themselves in a middle of a political tussle, which they cannot change and which limits their daily

lives in every possible way. Serbia did not accept Kosovo’s passports nor vehicle license plates, while

Kosovo started not to accept the new Serbian vehicle license plates issued by Serbia’s parallel

municipalities in Kosovo (KM, GL, PR, PZ, DJ, PE, and UR) as well as corresponding ID cards. Kosovars

cannot travel in or through Serbia, which makes their trips more burdensome and costly. Kosovo

Serbs face occasional hassles with their parallel Serbian vehicle license plates through Kosovo and

Despite of the fact that free

travel was agreed upon in

spring, its implementation was

still disputable in the late fall.

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yet some refuse, for political reasons, to accept new Kosovo vehicle license plates (as well as costs

for they need to purchase double insurance, pay double road taxes, and other duties to both

countries).

The two types of biometric Serbian passports have replaced the older non-biometric passports.

Some Kosovars also use Serbian passports, but most of them use the newly-issued Kosovo ones.

UNMIK passports were in circulation until recently. The chaotic presence of over four types of

passports is matched by a variety of four sets of vehicle license plates. Serbia issues not only plates

for Serbian towns, but also plates for Kosovo towns. Kosovo has started to issue new RKS plates, but

thousands of UNMIK-designed KS plates are still in circulation. Despite the multitude of plates and

passports, crossing the border between Kosovo and Serbia is difficult, so enabling travel rightfully

became one of the first items for discussion.

When Serbia received its visa liberalization, the EU required a distinction between passports issued

to residents of Kosovo from those of Serbia, with Kosovo Serbs left under a visa regime with the rest

of Kosovars. Overall, due to passports, plates, and insurance, travelling to Serbia, through Serbia or

around it incurs prohibitively high expenses for Kosovar traders and so contributing to Kosovo’s

under-development. Despite of the fact that this issue was agreed upon in spring, its

implementation was still disputable in late fall.

ID Cards and License Plates

The current chaos was replaced with less or more chaos depending on interpretation, but may bring

more mobility for Kosovars. If they get started, the new arrangements will allow greater, safer and

cheaper traveling which should boost human interaction across the ethnic divide. Serbia did not

accept Kosovo’s passports, but they will not be required (or accepted) for Kosovars in order to travel

to Serbia. This arrangement, which was to enter into force on November 1st 2011, will require IDs

issued by the Kosovo authorities. This was a breakthrough and it showed that what was considered

as an issue of sovereignty does not have to be such, given careful packaging. Progress can be made

without tackling serious issues by rebranding them as not

related to status. It may be useful to recall that Kosovo Serbs

used to boycott electricity bills since ‘this meant recognition

of Kosovo’ but few hark back to this issue now. Belgrade also

accepted Kosovo drivers’ licenses under the clause that their

‘acceptance does not imply recognition of Kosovo’.

A more modest agreement was reached on vehicle license plates and insurance. Kosovo drivers will

be able to use old UNMIK vehicle license plates on Serbian territory, or to acquire “PROBA” plates to

replace RKS (the second has been in effect until now). The problem is that the privilege for Serbs

gives them an incentive to keep the older KS plates (which seems to be Belgrade’s obvious goal), but

it may also distinguish them from the rest. While there are no security threats for Kosovo Serbs,

distinguishing them is a violation of human rights, and is exactly what the plate designs in mixed

countries try to avoid (Bosnia, Kosovo during and after UNMIK). There is an incentive for Kosovo

Serbs not to take RKS, because this implies acquiring PROBA plates when crossing into Serbia, which

then makes them look Albanian in Serbia. At least, the parallel plates of Kosovo towns will stop being

used, including in the north.

The main advantage for all will be the absence of uninsured vehicles in Kosovo’s roads. All Serbian

cars will need to purchase insurance when crossing into Kosovo and vice-versa, or insurance will be

mutually recognized (or via a third country). Several millions Euros of loss incurred for Kosovo’s

taxpayers will be saved and safety on its roads will improve.

If they get started, the new

arrangements will allow greater,

safer and cheaper travel that

should boost human interaction

across the ethnic divide.

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University Diplomas

Serbia’s policy of non-recognition of Kosovo’s documents applies to other types of documents, and

among them, also are the university diplomas. This mostly affects the Albanian-speaking population

from Presevo and Bujanovac in southern Serbia. This region is already hit by poverty and

unemployment and further administrative barriers will contribute to massive migration. Due to a

scant private sector, one of the few options for employment in the Presevo Valley is to find a job in

the public sector which is impossible to do with a diploma issued in Prishtina, where most of the

youth from this area study. The non-recognition of diplomas is only one of the reasons why the

ethnic Albanian community, which constitutes the majority in this region, is underrepresented in the

judiciary, police and state administration. Kosovo recognizes the credentials of most Kosovo Serbs,

but sometimes not the diplomas issued by the dislocated University of ‘Pristina’ in Mitrovica run by

Serbia’s Ministry of Education.

Diplomas constituted an early topic and an agreement in principle was announced in spring. The

principle is that Belgrade will not directly recognize (validate) Kosovo diplomas but through an

intermediary. In fact, this solution was found first by numerous students who did the same

individually through Skopje or Tetovo. With both universities using transferrable ECTS credits

(European Credit Transfer System), students transferred courses to Macedonia, completed any

additional courses to fulfill the requirements, and were issued with a diploma from Macedonia

which was valid. With an additional cost of several thousands of Euros, those who were sufficiently

desperate led the way.

The agreement provides that such an intermediary would be either an international organization or

some university from a third country (most likely Macedonia or Montenegro). This can hardly be

called an agreement, but it may regulate and enable the Presevo Valley students to get employed at

home. However, this may force students in Mitrovica to seek solutions outside their framework,

since Prishtina will hardly recognize what is considered a Prishtina’s parallel university. The issue was

ultimately agreed upon in late November, but implementation teams are yet to go through the

details.

Civil Registry

Upon departure, the Serbian administration took away civil registry books of Kosovo municipalities,

placing them in ‘parallel’ municipalities around Serbia (e.g. Municipality of Peja/Pec operated out of

Kragujevac, Prishtina/Prishtina out of Nis, etc.). Kosovo Serbs residing in Serbia made use of them,

but also Albanians who needed such documents for various purposes, often paying high sums of

money to access them.

The inability to issue original documents for a number of years created large space for manipulation.

This legal vacuum was abused by nationals of various countries claiming they were Kosovars who

were stripped of their documents, and many sought refuge around Europe. There are officially

around 14,000 Kosovars, who sought refugee status in EU countries in 2010, but this is hardly

realistic and evidence suggests that most likely this figure hides numerous individuals from other

countries.

Kosovo has long faced a challenge that it could not complete its civil registry. For the past 12 years,

Kosovo had introduced very cumbersome procedures for issuing of birth certificates (and other

personal documents), requiring electricity bills dating prior to January 1st 1998, or two witnesses and

additional procedures.

While this situation lasted for over 12 years, now it has become a high priority in order to fulfill

conditions for visa liberalization. Kosovo needs to ensure high level of security while it issues birth

certificates and other related documents. Kosovo’s civil registry is inadequate, making it difficult to

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issue personal documents to members of the Diaspora, to displaced Serbs, and at the same time it

prevents Kosovo from updating its voters list.

Both Serbia and Kosovo treat civil registry documents as symbols of status, although these are more

related to municipalities than to country identities. The end of the first round of the Dialogue

invented another “fig leaf” – Serbia is to submit only verified copies of civil registry books through

EULEX. Symbolism is, maybe, the most important aspect of the agenda, so this also adds to the

argument that both sides are treating the Dialogue as a PR exercise.

While it has been politically sensitive, copies of civil registry are principally useful to Kosovo in order

to complete its civil registry, which would resolve a number of practical problems. While the

tentative agreement with Serbia does not address Prishtina’s quest for a symbol of status, the copies

address the practical need to complete the data. Prishtina has successfully argued the practical

aspect use of the matter, but it nevertheless came under accusations from the opposition. Given its

implementation, albeit with copies, a milestone will be accomplished and Kosovo will collect its

documentation and mark a small tick in its long European trajectory.

The civil registry marks the conclusion of the first round of talks that were in principle agreed upon

in the early July. Its implementation has not begun yet and this will be the biggest initial test of the

political will and the readiness of both Serbia and Kosovo to fulfill their commitments. For Serbia it

will be necessary to amend the Personal Data Protection Law, i.e. to eliminate legal obstacles in

order to hand over the copies of registries to Kosovo.

Customs and Cadastre

The agreement on the customs was the first that reached the media in full text albeit 20 days later

and after the agreement was supposed to become effective. The published conclusions on the

agreements that were reached the recognition of customs stamp, free trade and agreement on

return of cadastral records. Those nebulous solutions were sought as illustrated by the following

article which indicates that the dispute was entirely about the border crossings and not about the

customs stamps:

Kosovo customs officials and Kosovo police will not control administrative crossings in

northern Kosovo from Friday 16 September, as Prishtina authorities had earlier announced.

Instead of them, representatives of EULEX will perform that duty, confirmed diplomatic

sources in Brussels and Prishtina to Danas. Our sources indicate that, however, that does not

mean that the customs officers and policemen of the EU mission ‘will forever control the

border, but only that Prishtina will gradually establish authority in the north of Kosovo, and

that process can last for years.’12

Violent protests and putting of barricades ensued with a mixed role by Belgrade. Belgrade openly

supported the barricades, but it tried to disassociate itself from the more violent elements.

Alternative views argue that the problem in the north is the same as throughout Serbia, the threat of

parallel security forces.

Free Trade and the Customs Stamps

Perhaps the greatest imbalance between Serbia and Kosovo has been the trade. Serbia annually

exports to Kosovo goods in value over 300 million Euros, while Kosovo exports less than 5% of its

imports, arriving in Serbia either through smuggling or with documents issued by parallel

institutions. Such huge trade imbalance would send any developed country straight into panic, and it

12 Danas. 14 September 2011. Prishtina will gradually take control of the north.

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has gradually alarmed most Kosovars, too. Seeking reciprocity, Kosovo’s patience started to run thin

and finally a deadline was declared first for June and then ultimately for the 20th July 2011.

The Dialogue hit a major obstacle after the first round, when it broached the issues of free trade and

customs stamps, which were postponed from July to September. Despite the fact that Kosovo’s

stamps did not have the word ‘republic’ in them, the Head of the Belgrade negotiation team

persisted that no stamps with Kosovo’s state symbols would be accepted. The seemingly irrational

dispute was slowly clarified when Prishtina saw through Belgrade’s agenda for partition. The round

on customs stamps in July was rejected due to Belgrade’s ostensible calculation that Prishtina would

not be able to reinforce a reciprocity treatment in practice; at least not in its northern

border/boundary. Belgrade expected that Prishtina would have to be satisfied with the enforcement

of reciprocity measures along the Ibar River, reasoning it was not a small feat to deprive Belgrade

95% of Kosovo’s market.

Putting customs officers at the Ibër/Ibar River would certainly be used by Belgrade as a move to

cement and legalize its control of northern Kosovo. Kosovo’s action on 25th July changed the

situation. First alone and then with open international support, Prishtina sought to enforce both

reciprocity as well as to assert its control over the north. Tension went high, but generally under

control. Announcements that northern mayors and various political criminals are to be arrested have

also raised internal accusations between Belgrade and the northern leaders. Despite its initial role in

setting up the barricades, Belgrade now disassociated itself from the barricades, while northern

leaders pressured Belgrade to openly state whose side it is on.

Belgrade retreated from the Dialogue on 28th September, citing difficulty to “continue talks while

there was shooting” in Jarinje (Kosovo’s most northern

customs post). If Belgrade continued talks it would

threaten its ties with Kosovo Serbs in the north. That

this “crack in the wall” was not going to be bridged

became apparent after the European Commission

published its Opinion on application for membership

status on 12th October. The opinion was essentially

positive, but under certain conditions. European

Commission recommended that Council of Ministers

grant a candidate status to Serbia, “taking into account

progress achieved so far and on the understanding that Serbia reengages in the dialogue with

Kosovo and is moving swiftly to the implementation in good faith of agreements reached to date.”13

EU’s unprecedented unity for such a condition meant that Belgrade had to accept customs posts on

Gates 1 and 31 without reentering them as issues in the Dialogue and to allow operation by EULEX

throughout Kosovo. Only the following items were acceptable: recognition of university diplomas,

inclusive regional cooperation, telecommunications and energy. Kosovo Serbs were first to react and

issued a joint statement on 19th October, whereby they have refused to implement any agreement

Belgrade reached or will reach with Prishtina in the Dialogue.

The EC Opinion was less positive about Kosovo and the roadmap for visa liberalization, for which

Kosovo has anyway fulfilled the terms (for the roadmap, not the liberalization itself), and is hardly a

carrot. Finding a way to enter into contractual relations with the EU would have been a gain more

comparable with Belgrade’s. Nevertheless, the prospect of visa liberalization would be a huge

13 European Commission. 12 October 2011. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament

and the Council." Brussels, 12.10.2011, COM (2011) 668 final, SEC (2011) 1208 final, p. 12,

http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2011/package/sr_rapport_2011_en.pdf.

European Commission

recommendation to grant a candidate

status to Serbia, “taking into account

progress achieved so far and on the

understanding that Serbia reengages in

the dialogue with Kosovo and is moving

swiftly to the implementation in good

faith of agreements reached to date.

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political gain for any government in Prishtina, in the same way as it was for the rest of the Western

Balkans as they made it to the “White Schengen List”.

The dispute mostly took the shape of admission of customs stamps that Kosovo uses, clearly the

most disruptive issue discussed so far. Before Kosovo’s declaration of independence, it was agreed

that in order to ensure smooth transition to CEFTA, Kosovo was not to change its stamps and it kept

the same wording “Kosovo Customs” without any explicit reference to its statehood.

The whole stand-off situation created an unacceptable grey zone in the trade between Serbia and

Kosovo. Although Serbia does not recognize Kosovo and exports the goods in value of 300 million

Euros annually, it uses the term ‘shipment’ (shipping/delivery). Furthermore, the customs points

were ran by KPS Police which were composed of the local Serbs from Kosovo’s northern

municipalities in order to make Kosovo’s institutions more acceptable to the local Serbs.

The dispute centered around the text on the stamp, whereas Belgrade rejected any “attributes of

statehood” which later came to mean the ‘lack of the word Republic’ (which never was in the stamp

in the first place). The Government of Serbia insisted through this to implement the so-called UN

Secretary General “Six Point Plan”14

From Trade Row to Barricades

which is very unpopular in Kosovo.

Fearing partition fait accompli, Prishtina embarked on a risky endeavour, to unilaterally put customs

officers and police in the two northern crossings and managed to prevent Serbia’s partition strategy.

Without logistical support and facing blocked roads, the lack of logistical preparation forced the

police into retreat with several months of continued tension:

It was a small demonstration of sovereignty that was grudgingly but firmly accepted by the

internationals in Kosovo. Moreover, despite Kosovo’s action the two parties finally reached

an agreement that permits the wording of customs stamps to be accepted by Serbian

customs officials facilitating trade between the two countries.15

With the sovereignty issue temporarily frozen, a trade debate ensued. Kosovo’s domestic producers

were satisfied. The prices did not increase as predicted, and Kosovo’s trade balance for August was

better than any other time in its history. Serbia’s low prices of exports benefit from the lack of taxes

since they entered through the north. Moreover, Kosovo had a growing suspicion that Serbia also

had politically-motivated dumping policy.

In any case, the Dialogue continued and on 3rd September 2011 the two parties agreed on customs

stamps which would just say “Kosovo Customs”. Both sides claimed victory, but after it all, there was

a feeling that EU did not handle the situation as it should from July to September. The pause enabled

two sides to reflect. Belgrade expected to use Prishtina’s inability to cement its control of the north

which would give it the upper hand to broach the north in the new rounds of the Dialogue.

Prishtina’s unilateral dispatch of police could change the situation on the ground and improve its

bargaining position. This situation remained tense until mid-September, when KFOR attempted

again to give the issue back to civilian control. A mixture of KFOR, EULEX and Kosovo authority

officials were transported to the north.

The issue of the north and the Six Points Plan were tried to be introduced to the Dialogue table.

Belgrade's lead negotiator in the Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue, Borislav Stefanovic, said that the 2nd

14 Foniqi-Kabashi, Blerta. 27 November 2008. UN Security Council approves Ban’s six-point plan.

http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2008/11/27/feature-02.

15 Abramowitz, Morton and James Hooper. 20 September 2011. Serbia’s EU Ultimatum. PILPG Update

published in The National Interest. Basically, the intervention brought a new reality.

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Conclusions on recognition of customs stamps are

specified into three points, and everything that

agreement contains is as follows:

1. Parties will make all possible efforts to secure the free

movement of goods in line with CEFTA;

2. Customs stamps with the insignia “Kosovo Customs”

as confirmed by all parties in CEFTA, will be accepted

3. All documents and communications will reflect this

formulation/usage.

Conclusions agreed upon on September 2nd on

cadastral documents, are as follows:

1. With the aim of protecting the rights of people with

legitimate property claims, parties will make all efforts

to establish a fully reliable cadastre in Kosovo

A tripartite implementation group, consisting of

cadastral experts from both parties and chaired by the

EU, will monitor the work of a technical agency

(selected after consultations with both parties), whose

role will be to identify gaps in the original pre-1999

cadastral records.

3. The Special Representative of the European Union

(EUSR) will receive scanned copies of all original (pre-

1999 cadastral) records removed from Kosovo. Upon

request, the EUSR will provide specific information

from Kosovo;

The technical agency, mentioned in point 2, will

compare all copies of original cadastral notes of private

properties before 1999 with the reconstructed cadastre

in Kosovo. Cases where the comparison indicates

mismatch will be followed by the tripartite group to a

judicial mechanism in Kosovo. This adjudicating

mechanism will decide which cadastral notes are

accurate.

5. The first level of the judicial mechanism will be

exercised by a commission of international and

Kosovar cadastral and property experts. The majority

of experts will be appointed by the EUSR with respect

to the interests of all communities.

6. The Supreme Court of Kosovo will serve as a second

level of appeals of the judicial mechanism. The

decision of the Supreme Court of Kosovo will be

reached by a college where the majority will be held by

international judges and they will be final decisions

without the right of appeal.

Decisions made by the judicial mechanism will be

announced to all stakeholders. The Kosovo Cadastral

Agency will implement the final decisions of the judicial

mechanism by making the necessary amendments in

the Kosovo cadastre.

8. The tripartite group will monitor the implementation and

functioning of abovementioned arrangements and will

regularly brief the

Dialogue about the progress

achieved.

September talks in Brussels had only

dealt with the customs stamps and the

supporting documents whereas the

administrative crossings had not even

been touched on. He said that the

northern crossings were not discussed,

and warned Prishtina of renewed

unilateral actions. Hashim Thaci

accepted the suggestion from the

Western powers not to consider

additional actions, but a multilateral

engagement of KFOR and EULEX to

ensue.

New events took place on 16th

September when EULEX and KFOR

assisted Kosovo Customs to take hold

of two disputed customs posts, Jarinje

and Brnjak. Kosovo Serbs reacted by

blocking all roads in the north of

Kosovo, and the stand-off continued

followed by controversial statements

from all sides involved. Belgrade

officials claimed that the Agreement

on Customs Stamps from 2nd of

September did not specify anything on

customs posts and that it was yet to

be discussed. On the other hand, EU’s

Ambassador in Serbia and Lady

Ashton’s spokesperson treated the

take-over of the customs posts as

being in line with the implementation

of the said Agreement.16

The rationale behind Belgrade’s

refusal to accept the presence of

Kosovo Customs’ officers is difficult to

understand, having in mind the

acceptance of the “Kosovo Customs”

stamps. Moreover, these stamps were

explicitly recognized by UNMIK as

being in line with Resolution 1244 and

This is a clear

example where the non-transparency

of the Dialogue takes its toll without

the benefits of the creative confusion.

The true text of the agreement is

confidential, even though its

implementation affects everyone.

16 BETA. 16 September 2011. EU: Kosovo as one customs area.

http://www.beta.rs/?tip=article&kategorija=vestidana&ida=2571678&id=&ime=.

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EULEX, as UNMIK, continues to treat Kosovo as a separate customs zone. Belgrade also recognized

Kosovo as such zone, but only since Kosovo’s declaration has ceased to treat it as such. The only

explanation is the attempts to treat the north as different to create a precedent.

The persistence of barricades has worsened the situation tremendously. Mr. Stefanovic said that any

violent efforts for removing the barricades in northern Kosovo would be bad for security and could

worsen the situation which is already unstable, which some can read as a threat. President Tadic

reiterated:

We are warning all the time the international community that such a thing should

not happen, about the dangers arising from unilateral and violent moves by

Prishtina. If that someone actually thought of that, if someone risked war in this part

of Europe, they would assume responsibility for all consequences. Serbia does not

want war. Serbia does not want any violence and peace is our policy and is aimed at

establishing lasting peace in the Balkans. If Prishtina takes such actions it would bear

full responsibility for the consequences.17

Despite warnings against Prishtina, progress in the north seems likely to continue with the support

of the international community. Serbia will support the north directly but will present a friendly

posture to the outside and this will increase its chances to lobby for an advanced status of northern

Kosovo as well as to progress on its European path as compensation for the loss of the north. In a

statement he gave to the media after his talk with Merkel, Serbian President Boris Tadic said:

I have to tell you that the discussion with the German Chancellor was not how to

close doors but how to open them. We concluded that we need to try to once more

seek a creative and sustainable solution that satisfies both sides.18

Their degree of unison is clearly overstated, for the press conference showed more divisions than

agreement. That Serbia will try to play by European rules, Tadic indicates by saying:

Here is how Serbia complies with European rules: it is our view that we need to find

a sustainable solution for the dialogue, to find a solution that is mutually acceptable,

to find a solution which will not expel the Serbian people from the area in which

they have been living for centuries, that will not erase any culture from that part of

the continent, which will not produce new security risks, which would establish

lasting peace, and therefore be beneficial for all of Europe.19

Dialogue has the potential to unfreeze the situation in the north, but this tumultuous period

may have deep frozen it in the mean-time.

Analysis of Gains and Losses from the First Agreement

The potential of further dialogue should be examined by reviewing the results of the first set of

agreements. The likelihood of subsequent rounds is a function of the effects of the first and second

round of agreements and the public support it elicits in the meantime. That the implementation was

hamstrung by ‘details’ is an omen of what is to come and indicates either a lack of political will and

consensus or weak capacities for implementation. Hence, the analysis of gains and losses can only be

17 Bujosevic, Dragan, 28 August 2011. Interview of the Week: Boris Tadic, President of Serbia (part 2: I Accept

Risk of Delay in Obtaining Candidate Status) http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Prihvatam-rizik-odlaganja-

dobijanja-statusa-kandidata.lt.html.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.

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done considering what was agreed upon, preparations and statements on what is to come.

However, even as late as the end of November not all the details had been hammered out.

Reactions may also be politically motivated, so an examination of real gains and losses is also

important. Along with a discussion of reactions, this paper looks at a trade-off of gains and losses,

without neglecting the fact that quite a few additional complications during its implementation can

put this process off.

An analysis of gains and losses is not in fact possible without a

review of expectations. Many in Kosovo were led to believe that

Serbia would practically concede to Kosovo’s existence as a state.

In Serbia, initial expectations were that this dialogue would lead to

a ‘historic compromise’ on status. Expectations were more recently

revised whereby Kosovars see few benefits and a growing fear that

the bar has been lowered for Serbia and far less than full normalization will be requested from

Serbia in return for its candidacy. Kosovo Serbs expected simple solutions to their daily problems

and are yet to see any improvement in their lives. Regardless of the real outcome, expectations were

not managed properly and part of the disappointment should be sought there.

Reactions in Kosovo

Most of the reactions in Kosovo were not about the substance of the first rounds, but about form

and likely continuation. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kosovo, Skender Hyseni, criticized

the fact that these are not agreements but only conclusions. The deputy chairman of the Alliance for

the Future of Kosovo (AAK) Ahmet Isufi said that the Government disregarded the Assembly during

the Dialogue process. The Foreign Policy Club announced that the Kosovo Assembly should hold an

extraordinary session where the Government should report on the agreements reached in Brussels.

Few expressed any level of satisfaction with the impending ability to travel through Serbia, mostly

because of the half-hearted solution that was accomplished. The Self-Determination (Vetëvendosje)

movement went as far as to call the Dialogue a sell-out.

MPs from the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK)

said the Dialogue failed at the beginning. “Serbia had clear objectives and reached them,” said

Skender Hyseni from LDK. “But Kosovo did not achieve

anything and did not benefit in any way from the Dialogue,”

said Burim Ramadani of AAK, who called for an end to the

Dialogue since it has not brought Kosovo any gain so far.

Opposition MPs are convinced that if the Dialogue continues

the same way, Kosovo will have to remain satisfied with the

Dialogue on visa liberalisation while Serbia will be able to join

the EU very quickly.

Given a successful implementation of the talks so far, and given a number of other issues that are to

be addressed as announced, Kosovo is set to win some and lose some.

What Kosovo Loses

A clear loss that was certain was the slower pace of recognition. A number of countries have

declared that they will not recognize Kosovo until the dialogue produces results. Clearly, several

countries may decide never to recognize Kosovo if it abandoned dialogue, while a number of others

probably would recognize it without waiting endlessly. This loss is not associated with dialogue per

se, but with a protracted process. For those who see a zero-sum game with Serbia, Kosovo is to

receive less of a reward by the European Union in its integration process, and Serbia’s rapidly

improving situation may create greater imbalance in respective bargaining positions.

Regardless of the real

outcome, expectations were

not managed properly and

part of the disappointment

should be sought in the

mismatch of expectations.

Opposition MPs in Kosovo are

convinced that if the Dialogue

continues with the same system,

Kosovo will be self-satisfied with

the Dialogue on visa

liberalisation while Serbia will be

able to join the EU very quickly.

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What Kosovo Gains

Kosovo gets a number of benefits in return. Few travel to Serbia, but thousands would travel transit

to Western Europe. Anyone who has gone to Croatia in

mid-summer can testify that most Deutschland plates

passing through Dubrovnik are not tourists visiting

Montenegro, but Kosovar gastarbeiters heading home

through in a roundabout route, unable to drive through

Romania, Serbia or Bosnia.

The ability to travel through Serbia would benefit

thousands of Kosovars, most of who would travel in transit

to third countries for a fraction of the price they pay for the expensive airfare they currently take.

Unfortunately, such free travel will only partly extend to those who plan to take their vehicles to

Serbia or abroad. Travelling with RKS plates to Serbia will require receiving temporary plates which

will be costly and will make Kosovar Albanians clear targets. Acquiring KS plates will obviously be

made very difficult for Kosovo Albanians, so few may benefit from this option.

It is no small feat that license plates issued by parallel municipal administrations in Serbia will

disappear. The uniformity of plates will create the greatest unification factor of the north since the

cessation of hostilities in 1999. The fact that northern Kosovo will get to put KS plates with

Belgrade’s blessing is a clear improvement, a marked progress from the KM or the current lack of car

plates altogether. Prishtina would also get to cash in insurance from thousands more vehicles as well

as avoid paying millions of damages that Kosovo incurred from accidents caused by uninsured cars.

The agreement does not amount to full reciprocity with Serbia (whose vehicles will come to Kosovo

without paying additional insurance) but it is a more equal relationship than today.

Albeit with copies, which was a difficult compromise, Kosovo will be

able to complete its civil registry, which would also have positive

effects on other processes such as visa liberalization criteria, voters’

lists, etc. Kosovo’s economy would also receive a small boost as more

money will be spent that is saved from airfare, and insurance fees will

bring several additional million Euros too.

The reciprocity will raise the costs of Serbian imports by removing the preferential treatment,

improve the budget, and give a (mild) boost to local producers. Kosovo’s products will be easier to

export through Serbia (probably not to Serbia itself), which will enable some export champions to

start to emerge.

Reactions in Serbia

Reactions in Belgrade from the officials and the opposition were mostly positive regarding the

agreement reached on July 2nd. It is hardly surprising that the statements from all of the parties

within the Government’s coalition were affirmative, but the main opposition party SNS (Serbian

Progressive Party) was also supportive of the first breakthrough and said that the talks must

continue as “they are in the interest of the citizens”.20

20 Politika. 28 October 2011. Agreement Causes Different Assessments, Reactions.

Since SNS is the biggest opposition party, this

was a sign of a new broad political consensus emerging in favor of the policy towards Kosovo. The

first broad consensus was over EU integration, which was made in 2008 after the breakup in SRS

(Serbian Radical Party).

http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Sporazum-izazvao-oprecne-ocene-i-reakcije.lt.html

Most Deutschland plates passing

through Dubrovnik are not tourists

visiting Montenegro, but Kosovar

gastarbeiters heading home

through a roundabout route,

unable to drive through Romania,

Serbia or Bosnia.

The agreement does not

amount to full reciprocity

with Serbia but it is a

more equal relationship

than before.

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While many Serbs see conditions

related to Kosovo as having

increased over time, many Kosovars

see criteria being decreased for

Serbia, by the virtue of the fact that

‘normalization’ has virtually been

dropped as a request.

Only two parties voiced their dissatisfaction with the very fact that any agreement with Prishtina was

made – those were Kostunica’s DSS and Seselj’s SRS. They regarded the agreement as another step

of “creeping recognition” of Kosovo’s independence. There were some rare opportunities to see

representatives of Kosovo Serbs from both the south and the north exchanging views with the

officials in Belgrade.21

What Belgrade Loses

It was clear that the interests between the north and south had diverged, with

the Serbs from the north feeling that the Dialogue was not to their benefit. In fact, this was also the

first serious divergence between northern Kosovo Serbs and the Belgrade authorities.

Some of the compromise may be difficult to argue, so many may perceive that Serbia has traded

Kosovo for the EU. Despite the lack of public popularity, Serbia is able to sell the compromise as

reasonable without having sold its national interest.

What Belgrade Gains

The only true incentive for Belgrade is the candidacy status and the opening of negotiations with the

EU. One can say that it is in Belgrade’s interest to solve some of the day-to-day problems of the

Serbs in Kosovo and improve relations with its southern

neighbor regardless of the territorial spat. However,

Belgrade was more satisfied with the situation on the

ground than Prishtina before the Dialogue. Belgrade’s

additional motivation could be that it thinks it would be

able to cement the exclusion of Kosovo from international

mainstream by not crossing its ‘red line’. While many

Serbs see conditions related to Kosovo as having

increased over time, many Kosovars see criteria being

decreased for Serbia, by the virtue of the fact that ‘normalization’ has virtually been dropped as a

request. Serbia is also to gain some additional financial resources from thousands who will flock for

trade or will stop for gas refills on its highways.

Reactions of Kosovo Serbs

Most Serb representatives from the four northern municipalities reacted negatively to the

agreement. While more extremist ones described it as a sell-out, most complained they would not

be able to use old UNMIK car plates as they would be visible as Serbs in the rest of Kosovo. They also

claimed that they were not consulted and informed about the state’s policy during the Dialogue. The

situation was exacerbated after events at the end of July 2011, which led to the agreement between

Borislav Stefanovic and KFOR Commander Erhard Buehler22 related to the customs posts. Four heads

of municipalities even asked for the removal of Borislav Stefanovic from the post of chief negotiator

as he “has damaged the interests of Kosovo Serbs”,23

Belgrade does not have too many options since it cannot admit the existence of the gap between

the Serbian leadership and the north of Kosovo. Belgrade cannot leave Kosovo Serbs without

financial assistance, as the public sector and the informal economy are the only sources of income.

Belgrade funds Serbian institutions in the north and south, largely hospitals and teachers’ salaries,

but also local self-government, the Serbian Post, University, court, and various deconcentrated

and some even physically threatened him.

21 B92. 3 July 2011. Impression of the Week, part 1.

http://www.b92.net/video/video.php?nav_category=907&nav_id=523143

22 Mondo. 17 August 2011. Buehler: Agreement Is Valid Until Dialogue Resumes.

http://www.mondo.rs/s215009/Info/Srbija/Biler-_Sporazum_vazi_do_nastavka_dijaloga.html.

23 RTS. 5 September 2011. Demand for Dismissal - Emotional Criticisms.

http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/sr/story/9/Politika/951198/Zahtev+za+smenu+-+emotivne+kritike.html

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offices of various ministries. However, Belgrade cannot adequately monitor and control the

spending of those funds because of the lack of tax, prosecutorial and judicial instruments. When the

customs checkpoint in Jarinje was set on fire on July 27th, Belgrade’s condemnation of “hooligans”

sent the message that it is unable to control the reactions in the north of Kosovo. In Belgrade,

rumors spread that the riots were organized by a smuggler from Mitrovica.

Serbs from other parts of Kosovo stand more to gain from the Dialogue and they have been more

supportive. Unrest in the north, such as in July and September 2011, made central and southern

Serbs fear that they would bear the consequence of the actions of their northern compatriots. There

is also fear that Serbia is in reality pushing for a division of Kosovo that would render Ahtisaari’s

Proposal invalid and leave them with no political guarantees. Many Serbs from the south say that

they feel like “hostages of the north”. This is a very important moment, as it is highlighted by the fact

that the Serbs from south are more integrated into Kosovo’s political system and de facto approve of

the Ahtisaari package.24

The events in the north since July 25 have deepened the divide between the Kosovo Serbs in the

north and the south. One can no longer talk about a single political community of the Kosovo Serbs.

Now there are two with very different political interests, aspirations and politics. It is to be expected

that, unless Serbia changes its position, the discrepancy between the Serbs from the north and the

south will increase during the Dialogue, as will the distance between the north and Belgrade. This of

course, depends on whether and for how long the Dialogue will continue, but given a change in

Belgrade, the southern Serbs and Belgrade may see greater incentives for cooperation.

At the same time, when the northern Serbs blocked the roads once again as

of September 16th, the State Secretary in the Serbian Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija, Oliver

Ivanovic, called the southern Serbs “inexplicably passive”, and urged them to support their kin in the

north. This statement was publicly condemned by the heads of Serbian municipalities from the

south.

Gains and losses for the Serb community are more complicated to assess. First, the Serbs in the

south and those in the north have grown to perceive a different set of interests. The Serbs in the

north see the option of remaining with Serbia as more realistic and see the trade-offs from this

perspective. This is the result of their living more in the legal-economic system of Serbia than in

Kosovo over the past 12 years, which was more or less tolerated by the international community.

The Serbs in the south have largely given up hope of belonging to Serbia and see the trade-offs from

two other perspectives: (a) from the current situation to maximize the benefits they stand to gain,

and (b) those who realize that the current benefits are temporary, so legalizing them is in fact a real

gain.

A more detailed scrutiny of the expected changes is necessary to examine the exact trade-off. Serbs

in the south will no longer need to change license plates, and will travel in insured cars, thereby

avoiding potential spats. For the first time they will be able to travel to Serbia without changing

plates, but many may still choose to do so since it is cheaper. Most Serbs now realize that KS plates

will make them noticeable as Serbs. While the security situation has improved tremendously, most

would rather take RKS plates if crossing into Serbia was not so expensive. Leaving the old plates is

mainly an emotional trade-off, but also financial, because for the past decade most Serbs have not

registered their vehicles and spend several hundred Euros less on insurance, road taxes and other

duties. Thanks to the details discussed, Serbs will avoid double taxation or import duties on the

vehicles they currently drive. They get to avoid hassles with Kosovo institutions.

24 Gashi, Krenar. July 2010. Review of Decentralization – Functioning of Serb Majority Municipalities. Kosovar

Institute for Policy Research and Development. Policy Brief 2010/5.

http://www.kipred.net/web/upload/Review_of_Decentralization.pdf.

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The KS plates will make it easier for the Serbs from the north to travel throughout Kosovo. More rule

of law will be introduced Kosovo-wide, but this will most notably be observed in the north. However,

northern Serb leaders hesitate to see any change for fear that resolving the situation will erode the

special situation and risks making the north a backwater, be it of Serbia or Kosovo. They may also

lose massive financial benefits from Serbia. Few Serbs are willing to trade Serbian salaries for those

of Kosovo, which are several times lower. All Serbs who need Kosovo documents will be able to

prove their citizenship eligibility thanks to copies of the civil registry.

Serbs from the “south” have more or less accepted the Ahtisaari. Political representatives of the

“southern Kosovo” Serbs are either in the Kosovo Parliament or in the Kosovo government while the

whole local self-government functions according to the Ahtisaari plan. Except for the practical

benefits, they are also supportive of the Dialogue, because they are hoping an improvement of

relations between Belgrade and Prishtina would strengthen their position too. Despite numerous

personal contacts with influential Serbian leaders, representatives of SLS (Samostalna Liberalna

Stranka - Independent Liberal Party) who are in the Kosovo government are not officially recognized

by the Serbian government as representatives of the Kosovo Serbs and Belgrade’s press too often

labels them “Thaci’s Serbs”.

Overall, Kosovo Serbs stand to gain the most from the Dialogue, but are least involved and fear that

the EU is primarily considering the preferences of Prishtina and Belgrade above those of the Kosovo

Serbs. Ultimately, all stand to benefit from normalization, but it remains unclear what this entails.

What is ‘Normalization’?

One of the main tasks for the dialogue, and pressure on both sides is to normalize their relations.

What does this really mean in practice? Normalisation could mean finding a modus vivendi for

relations between Kosovo and Serbia short of recognition, from travel and trade, to

telecommunications, postal services, border/boundary control, railway transport,

culture, sports, energy, etc. Examples abound about entities that cooperated with

each other short of recognition. The initial idea, as it can be conjectured, is that

‘normalization’ was what we call ‘emptying’ the status bucket. A number of issues that used to be

interpreted as status-related have long ago been depoliticized, with more also likely to undergo the

same treatment.

The first box (see the first column in the figure in the next page) lists examples of issues that were

depoliticized in the past and settled. The current dialogue has already managed to somehow

depoliticize and get agreement on several issues, termed as being in the process of decoupling from

status (second column). A number of additional issues are currently linked to status, but they do not

have to be. We argue that they could be treated as non-status to lead to normalization (third

column). There are other strictly political issues that may not be ready for depoliticization yet, such

as border demarcation, recognition, air space, etc.

The figure below illustrates the evolution of issues from the early stages after the conflict (for the

first list), when everything was political to gradual depoliticization. For example, the issue of missing

persons was very politicized and used and abused for years, however, it is now treated as purely

humanitarian. Kosovo had long faced difficulties arguing that a police

service was adequate. It was ironic that Kosovo as a province in the

1980s had its own police force, but today Serbia does not dispute

Kosovo’s right to have its own police and no longer discourages Serbs

from joining its ranks. It is no longer seen as status-related for Kosovo

Serbs to pay electricity or obtain personal documents with Kosovo

insignia.

‘Emptying’

the status

bucket.

Normalisation should

empty the status-

related bucket and

addressing status later

will be easier, as it will

be about emotions

only.

Decoupling from Status

In Process of Decoupling from Status

Cadastral records

Civil registry records

Customs stamps

Mutual acceptance of ID cards and license plates

Mutual acceptance of insurance

Mutual acceptance of university degrees

Telecommunications

Energy

Kosovo’s Regional Representation

Already Depoliticized

Missing Persons

Serbs in the Kosovo

Police

Electricity payment by

Serbs in Kosovo

Acceptance of

decentralization and

municipalities by the

Serbs in the south

Obtaining of personal

documents issued by

Kosovo institutions.

Acceptance of funding

for projects and

administration by

Kosovo institutions.

Yet to Be Decoupled from Status

Sports. The precedent of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland

and other parts can serve to persuade Serbia to allow Kosovo

to compete in international sporting event.

Mail and postal services

Practical Cooperation. Regular contacts and cooperation on

issues of mutual concern and among institutions that does not

relate to status: police, courts, public health, water or

environmental degradation

Infrastructure. Kosovo and Serbia to make the roads that lead

to each as priority;

Cultural exchanges

Railway transport

Airline transport (excluding air space)

Cultural heritage

Kosovo’s membership in various international institutions.

Decentralization of Kosovo in the north

This move of issues from the ‘status category’ to a ‘practical category’ has occurred painstakingly

slowly, and the new list under discussion is not going fast either. The main threat is that it might

stop, hence the need to ensure that the process provides sufficient incentives for both sides to keep

the momentum going and to bring their public opinion along.

It does not take too much imagination to see the third list as purely technical. Few issues will remain

in the strictly status-related category, and they may be left for a time when more forward-looking

Kosovo and Serbia are better equipped to engage with each other. In the long run, normalization

may empty the whole status-related category, and addressing it may leave only the emotional issue

in an empty shell. To ensure that this momentum continues, strict conditionality of carrots and sticks

is required.

Bilateral Conditioning

This process would not have worked had the EU and the US not increased the incentive scheme of

rewards and served as guarantors. They have in fact gone several steps beyond, reportedly often

virtually threatening the sides with the destruction of their political careers if they do not move

sufficiently forward. The dialogue has clearly become part of the progress reports, which all Balkan

countries use as the main barometer of a government’s performance.

When the dialogue was failing in mid-September, Robert Cooper, the EU facilitator of talks between

Prishtina and Belgrade, has called on Kosovo institutions to show understanding of the fact that

Belgrade is failing to implement agreements and wait until the European Union assesses Serbia’s

performance in the process. Cooper congratulated Kosovo on the correct implementation of the

stamps agreement and expressed concern that Serbia had yet to start implementation. He called on

Kosovo to show understanding for several more days until the EU evaluates Serbia’s performance on

the matter.25

One outcome that Prishtina has coveted for a long time was visa liberalization, and its appeal has

increased even more after all the neighboring countries received the same. Primarily due to non-

recognition by five EU members, Kosovo was not even given a roadmap. However, most Kosovars

believe that the true reason Kosovo was not given the roadmap was the choice to use it as leverage

to push Kosovo into dialogue. The fact that Kosovo had fulfilled the criteria was confirmed by the

statement of German Ambassador to Kosovo Ernst Reichel: “Germany has concluded that Kosovo

has fulfilled all the conditions to start the Dialogue on visa liberalization with the EU. Germany will

put this stance forward to the EU as well.”

Germany insists that the European Commission lay out strict conditions for Serbia’s relationship with

Kosovo in exchange for receiving candidate status.

She [Angela Merkel] marched into the office of Serbian President Boris Tadic and in unlikely

EU talk made clear to him the Serb political game in Kosovo was over. Kosovo would not be

partitioned; the area inhabited by Serbs north of the Ibar River was Kosovo territory. Serbia

has to stop running that area. The Kosovo issue had to be resolved before Serbia could enter

the EU.27

25 Express. 26 September 2011. Cooper: Be a Little More Patient.

26 24 September 2011,

http://newsmonitors.org/mon/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=596:saturday-report-24-09-

2011&catid=37:saturday.

27 Abramowitz, Morton and James Hooper. 20 September 2011. Serbia’s EU Ultimatum. PILPG Update

published in The National Interest.

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Diplomatic sources cited in the Blic newspaper, said that Serbia was asked to continue the dialogue

with Kosovo on the issues of:

1. Unconditional continuation of dialogue;

2. Regional presentation of Kosovo;

3. Telecommunications and electricity;

4. Dissolving parallel institutions in Kosovo, which more specifically came to mean that Prishtina

should take over the court in the north and start to dismantle the parallel structures.

While the conditionality put briskly by the German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, it reveals a

markedly smaller set than any level of ‘normalization’ would entail, possibly due to the short

timeframe given to Serbia until December 9th. The degree of support by other countries to

Germany’s position is unclear except for Britain and the Netherlands. Another report put three

conditions which determine the outcome of the ministerial discussions: renewal of dialogue,

handing over of the court in northern Mitrovica and abolition of institutions in the north. Not all

countries insist on the same. Italy hopes that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo will resume.

That is not a condition for candidacy, but could improve the atmosphere”.28 Other countries are

often even friendlier to Belgrade. "The Belgrade authorities have very limited impact on events in

the North," Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt said in Luxembourg ahead of meetings of EU

ministers.29 Paris reportedly requires little more than a return to the negotiating table.30

In order to get candidate status, the Serbian government should clearly call for the removal of

barricades in the north, because without this there is no application of the agreement on customs

stamps, warned Jelko Kacin, Special Rapporteur of the European Parliament for Serbia. Kacin also

said that Germany only insists on formulating what is, at least, the opinion of 22 member states that

have recognized Kosovo.

“EC recommendations for Serbia are only recommendations. Germany’s stance is clear. It

was expressed by (Angela) Merkel in Belgrade. But, this does not mean that all EC

recommendations should be met. Nonetheless, we will express our official stance in

December if we are in favour or against candidate status for Serbia.”

To indicate that the conditionality has not been dropped after milder EU

language in the Progress Report, the German ambassador to Kosovo recalled that:

The amount of what Serbia has to deliver to satisfy Germany remained for closed-door exchanges

between the two administrations until early December. Obrad Kesic believes that Britain and

Germany are in the minority among the EU member states, where the majority do not even

understand why an escalation of the crisis in northern Kosovo was necessary and would gladly

accept a solution which returns to the previous state-of-affairs, that is for Kosovo’s secession to be

strengthened via the Belgrade-Prishtina negotiations, and not by use of force.

33 Among all divisions,

it seems the most serious one is that between the U.S. and the EU, whose many members were

surprised with the timing of everything that has happened with regards to the destabilization of

northern Kosovo.34

At the same time, it should be noted that due to such uncertainty regarding progress on the

European road, but also how it is interpreted in the country, intensified conditionality, Euro-

28 Deutsche Welle. 11 October 2011. Kosovo the “key” for Europe?

29 Vecernje Novosti. 11 October 2011. Bildt: Belgrade is Not Responsible for Problems in Northern Kosovo.

30 Vecernje Novosti. 12 October 2011. EU Conditions with Kosovo.

31 Danas. 17 October 2011. Germany Is Saying What 22 EU Members Are Thinking.

32 KTV. 13 October 2011. Foreign Ambassadors to Kosovo Comment on EC Progress Report.

33 Nikolic Djakovic, Tanja. 13 October 2011. Kosovo Scenarios: Freezing the Conflict. NIN.

http://www.nin.co.rs/pages/article.php?id=63747.

34 Ibid.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[30]

skepticism amongst citizens in Serbia is on the rise. It is assessed that due to numerous obstacles,

even the EU membership candidacy could get a lukewarm response in public. By the same token,

other analysts predict that this lukewarm approach also applies to the realization of the loss of

Kosovo, which would not be seen as very troublesome either.

Serbia is definitely encouraged by the Commission’s avis. The Serbian prime minister declared that

Serbia “has avoided impossible conditions over Kosovo”. Progress in the dialogue with Prishtina on

(for achieving candidate status, but also the beginning of negotiations) technical issues, which are

status neutral, is required. The abolition of the so-called parallel institutions is not required, and

neither are new local elections.35

We are not required to either directly or indirectly recognize Kosovo, but just to normalize

relations in regard to technical issues, such as telecommunications, energy supply and school

diplomas. If there is good will, it can be achieved.

Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic said that Serbia has

probably got the best possible opinion of the European Commission, and avoided conditions that are

in discord with the Serbian Constitution and the state policy on Kosovo. Djelic pointed that the fact

of 22 EU countries having recognized Kosovo’s independence cannot be without effect on Serbia’s

European integration.

One calculation is that Serbia intends to buy time,. This will mean that Serbia will not rush to meet

this condition, and considering the lack of appetite in the EU for integration, the EU will not put

much more pressure, but will wait for Serbia to deliver, tolerating considerable delays. The time-line

may be summer or fall next year. However, there is a possibility that Belgrade may want to push for

a date for negotiations with the EU and will consider some remaining parts of the Dialogue agenda

feasible, like the energy issue, telecommunications, etc. On the other hand, matters such as the

court in northern Mitrovica and the participation of Kosovo in regional institutional forums are the

least acceptable for Belgrade, and will take considerably more time. As Stefan Fuele said,

We consider that Serbia should make decisive efforts in order to achieve additional

significant results in the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue. This, as a priority, includes the

implementation of the already reached agreements. It is necessary to ensure the principle of

inclusive regional cooperation, while solutions need to be identified in line with the EU

heritage as far as the spheres of energy and telecommunications are concerned. Active

cooperation with EULEX will also be of key significance. That is the key to meet the

conditions from the Stabilization and Association process and finally to launch the pre-

accession negotiations with Serbia.”37

For further down the road, Fuele proposed the opening of pre-accession negotiations as soon as

Belgrade makes further progress in achieving a key priority, which is to take further steps to

normalize relations with Prishtina in accordance with the terms of the Stabilisation and Association

Process.

Recognition of Kosovo is not a formal condition for Serbia’s European integration process.

Solutions must be found in the foreseeable future for a number of open issues that continue

to prevent the normalization of relations.38

The most vocal opposition in Kosovo takes an issue with the decision having ignored the fact

that Serbia’s constitution still treats Kosovo as part of its territory.

35 Interview with Bozidar Djelic, Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration: We avoided Impossible

Conditions over Kosovo (Politika) 13 October 2011 Now What Is Required from Serbia in Dialogue with

Prishtina?

More events may take

36 Radio Serbia. 19 October. Djelic: Euro-integration Related to Kosovo Issue.

37 Vecernje Novosti. 14 October 2011. Fuele: Recognition of Kosovo Not a Condition.

38 Ibid.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[31]

place expectedly or unexpectedly that may change the dynamics. A number of them have

been identified that may throw the Dialogue off the course.

Risks Looming Ahead

Whether dialogue is successful will also depend on a number of external factors as well as events

(scheduled and unscheduled) that may shape the incentive structure of the actors involved. A

number of issues can be safely predicted. The doomsday scenarios that Prishtina will make another

unilateral intervention similar to Croatia’s operation Storm is highly unlikely as is an international

conference on the north, but this will probably be subject to many travels to the Balkans. It is

unclear to what extent Serbia will choose not to lobby against Prishtina’s participation in

international fora. We have attempted to foresee possible events below:

Two events that had the potential to disrupt the Dialogue were:

Organizing the population count in the north. The barricades came in as a handy justification for not

organizing the census in northern Kosovo. Conducting the population count would have sent the

wrong signal. Instead of various ideas given before for international organizations to organize a

belated census, we recommend that no census be carried out at all. The data and most information

needed for northern Kosovo by Kosovo or Serbia for international purposes is available.

Serbia’s integration opinion in early October was more positive than expected, increasing fears in

Prishtina that less will be required from Belgrade. The opinion has integrated expectations from

Serbia regarding what it has to do, and while the demands are lower than that of numerous member

states, they are officially expected by the EU institutions. The opinion on December 9th will impact

the Dialogue in a way that talks may continue afterwards but without any agreement until late

summer next year.

What may still disrupt the Dialogue in the future?

1. The lack of implementation of the agreements so far. It is often said that the devil lies in the

details, but the scale of disagreement that has bedeviled the process is very high. This may indicate a

range of causes from insincere intentions, very large differences, internal pressure, change of heart,

public disappointment, and lack of political will. This can erode mutual trust and make further

agreement less likely. The EU mediator and the US delegation must do everything possible to

persuade the two sides that it is in their interest to talk in good faith and to hurry with some

palpable results. Disagreement over ‘details’ would give an additional boost to a rise of opposition

criticism, with a high likelihood and high impact.

2. Delay of additional agreement on further issues such as telecommunications, energy and Kosovo’s

representation in regional mechanisms. Another agreement as well as a timely and full

implementation of what was agreed until now will keep the momentum, otherwise Kosovo and

Serbia will be worse off than when they started and the public will militate against that outcome.

3. The official ruling on Serbia’s candidacy is to be published in early December and may mark the

end of the process as we have it now. The EU will have to carefully think of the remaining carrots to

make Prishtina and Belgrade behave during this timeline. While talks may continue after December,

the next opportunity for any agreements will present itself 12 months later, around September 2012

after the formation of the new Government in Serbia, when the start date for EU accession

negotiations will be Serbia’s next milestone sought. The fear of an asymmetric outcome is best

39 Kurti, Albin. 27 October 2011. Shqetësim me konkluzionet dhe rekomandimet. Koha Ditore. p. 10.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[32]

illustrated by Koha Ditore, an op-ed of which said that Belgrade holds Kosovo’s European Union fate

in its hands. He says that the message from Brussels is clear: Serbia does not have to recognize

Kosovo to become an EU member, while Kosovo cannot become an EU member without recognition

from Serbia and five other member countries. Kelmendi considers that this is a hopeless situation for

Kosovo, while the Government is hiding the truth, bragging about the possibility of the lifting of

travel visas.40

4. Holding Serbian elections in northern Kosovo. Elections in Serbia are approaching and holding

them in northern Kosovo will destroy all the progress made so far. Serbia may try to organize them

to provoke Kosovo into over-reacting, but not holding them may erode the popularity of the

government. It is also possible that elections might be held ahead of schedule, although this is

unlikely. If local elections are held in northern Kosovo in spring, this will result in the strengthening

of Serbia’s institutions in northern Kosovo.

5. Not meeting the conditions for ‘normalization’. If bilateral conditionality remains as has currently

been placed, Belgrade will need to dissolve the court in the north before December. The court is

unlikely to be taken by force. A violent scenario has been trumpeted by various politicians in Serbia

who predicted a Kosovar storm-like operation, but Kosovar pundits are worried that it is precisely

that kind of reaction that may contribute to a higher degree of autonomy for the north.

To avoid such a scenario, it is essential that the parallel

structures are dissolved through an agreement, which will also excuse Belgrade for not holding

elections in the north.

6. Potential institutional instability in Kosovo. The budgetary shortfall may cause a major crisis that

could provoke public outcry. This may happen anytime, but its likelihood increases the later we go

into the year and well into the next one, especially if the privatization of PTK is postponed along the

project of New Kosova.

While

conditionality is suitable for delivering certain results, it can also instigate a backlash and undermine

some of the achievements made.

7. The most dangerous period comes in after early December. The temptation to engage in populist

politics in Serbia will be high due to the election period, while Prishtina will be very disappointed by

not having received contractual relations. The election results in Belgrade will influence the talks, but

not that much. Even an SNS (Srpska napredna stranka - Serbian Progressive Party) government

probably would not ditch dialogue.

8. Destabilization and tit-for-tat in the north has a medium likelihood and a high impact. Tit-for-tat

policies can follow and possibly Serbs disconnecting Albanian villages from electricity or pressuring

them, while incidents may occur in southern Kosovo. Serbia’s sabotage of Kosovo’s international

participation in various forums will continue to irritate and Prishtina will see a two-faced Belgrade

with all the credibility problems that go with this.

The Battle for a Beauty Contest: Beauty Is in the Eye of the EU

Beholder

40 Kelmendi, Adriatik. 20 October 2011. Koha Ditore.

41 Politika. 14 October 2011. Interview: Laslo Varga, Chairman of the Committee for European Integration: The

Two Conditions of the European Commission Are Not Status-Neutral.

42 Politika. 23 September 2011. Mayors Governing Municipalities in Northern Kosovo Predict Provocations

from Prishtina.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[33]

Besides Serbia and Kosovo, there are other participants in the Dialogue process, primarily the EU and

the US, the former also has a lead in the process as it is an official “facilitator”. Because of the key

role that the EU plays, all the EU member states influence the talks, circumventing the high

representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy, effectively turning the dialogue

into bargaining between many more than just two actors. The US State Department is closely

involved in the Dialogue and their representative is always included in the meetings in Brussels, but

with an advisory role. The presence of these two creates a situation where Kosovo and Serbia cannot

possibly decline to engage in discussion. Expecting that the other

side will not make substantial concessions, their strategies have

been to appeal to the beholders and find ways to portray

themselves as ‘constructive European-style negotiators’. Both

parties believe that the ‘winner of the Dialogue’ is the side that

sounds most ‘European’, in the PR sense of the word. Doris Pack,

Head of EP Committee on Southeastern Europe, referred to that

when she said that the “Dialogue between Belgrade and Prishtina

should not be just a show”.43

The influence of the EU and the US is a pre-condition for the Dialogue taking place at all. The US has

more leverage over Kosovo but less over Serbia. Basically, both parties could not care less for the

well-being of their counterpart, but the real motivation is the “political reward” from either the EU

or the US. The danger is that one party will try to initiate the “blame game,” whereby it tries to

provoke the other one with unilateral measures so that the other party leaves the Dialogue in

protest. The other party might not leave the table but may try to respond with unilateral measures

of its own. In that way, the Dialogue would be stripped of its substance and the EU appeal would

look like a house of cards.

The EU and USA need to be more adamant in the protection of the

Dialogue and more vigorous in their insistence to move forward.

However, Kosovo and the Western Balkans are hardly a top priority for

the US, and the EU’s disunity and crisis impair its ability to project

influence. The financial crisis and European public debt, war in Libya,

“Arab spring”, UN resolution for Palestine etc., have significantly

diminished interest in the Western Balkans as a whole. The visit of

Angela Merkel and her robust message to Belgrade has sparked

arguments that the US has given the lead on Kosovo to Germany and

that is why we can see the acceleration of events in recent months.

Much about the behaviour of both sides is about appealing to the EU mediator (the beauty

beholder). It is interesting to see that regardless of real preferences, politicians often say that

‘dialogue is the only solution’, even when they are at odds about what type of dialogue they are

talking about. When the dialogue stopped, Belgrade and Prishtina did their best to communicate

their story to the EU that they were for dialogue but it was the other side that had stopped it.

After all, short of real incentives, the beauty contest may serve well in the meantime. It is better to

have insincere cooperation than sincere warfare. Time will have its effect and the relations between

Serbia and Kosovo will gradually pick up. Let’s fake it until we make it!

43 Danas. 25 August 2011. Interview with Doris Pack.

http://www.dorispack.de/interviews_1.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=521&tx_ttnews[backPid]=39

&cHash=d81f0e5c12.

When the dialogue stopped,

Belgrade and Prishtina did

their best to communicate

their story to the EU that

they were for dialogue but it

was the other side who had

stopped it.

It may be better to have

insincere cooperation

than sincere warfare.

Time will pass and

relations between Serbia

and Kosovo may

gradually improve. Let’s

fake it until we make it!

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[34]

Mutual Trust & Credibility

The two bargaining sides ought to be advised to think carefully about their credibility vis-à-vis not

only their voters, but also towards the other side. Negotiators sometimes portray their

accomplishments as major victories and boast about their masterful skills of outsmarting the other

side.

In the age of globalization, messages are carried out by various media to diverse audiences almost

instantly. As ‘internal betrayal’ is a major problem to the doubtful publics and bloodthirsty

opposition, it is only natural that negotiators need to visibly avoid being accused of betraying the

national interest. Their credibility vis-à-vis the other side appears to be a very low priority. But

conflict resolution experience indicates that this must be one of the highest considerations,

especially in a closed process such as this one that insulates the teams from their respective publics.

How can the two sides transform the perception of self-interest,

if they are packaging their engagement as an attempt to

subjugate, beat and deceive the other side? Unless the

credibility is guaranteed by EU pressure (few fully trust EU’s

consistence) appearing quasi-patriotic to the public in order to

avoid closer public scrutiny and pressure becomes the strategy.

If this dialogue is too soon, at least it should enable the discourse of enmity to start to disappear.

The fact that the discourse of enmity continues, and great patriotism is interpreted as ways to

deceive the other side, may be a natural tendency after all that has happened. However, the costs of

failure are too high. It is clear that the trust has been completely lost, while the two sides have

engaged in a dialogue entrusting the credibility of the process to the external mediator (the EU even

takes responsibility for the parts of the agreements that have not been put on paper). In public,

Kosovo and Serbia make it seem as if they are continuing the centuries-old battles with diplomatic

finesse, while inside the negotiating room the two sides resemble participants in a beauty contest,

where the external mediator carefully measures which side has been more constructive in its

approach.

Trust and credibility depend to a high extent on the image of

Kosovo and Serbia in respective publics. The image of Serbia

initially started to improve, but its credibility in the Kosovo public

is the worst in a long period since it tried to use the technical

dialogue for its attempts to annex northern Kosovo. The good

cop act played by Stefanovic in the early stages of the Dialogue

and the bad cop role played by Jeremic has been replaced by an

open agenda to forcefully integrate the north into Serbia.

It is clear the feeling is mutual, at least this is what Borislav Stefanovic said on 5 July 2011: “I had the

impression sometimes that I was talking with people who are not from the same planet as we are.

The talks were terribly difficult because every sentence and paragraph we presented were in

contrast with the Albanians.”44

Kosovo Serbs find themselves in the middle and have seen their trust in Belgrade eroded, but their

trust in Prishtina has not filled the emerging gap. There is growing suspicion that Prishtina and

But the same opinion is clearly not shared by the Serbian public, for

most of whom Kosovo is a closed chapter.

44 Stefanovic, Borislav. 5 July 2011.

http://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2011&mm=07&dd=05&nav_id=523248

How can the two sides

transform the perception of

self-interest, if they are

packaging their engagement as

an attempt to subjugate, beat

and deceive the other side?

Negotiators often portray their

accomplishments as major

victories and boast about their

masterful skills of out-

smarting the other side.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[35]

Belgrade will agree above their heads, and there is growing mistrust between southern and northern

Serbs, who see less solidarity for their opposition outlooks.

Not implementing the first agreement in good faith has contributed to a loss of faith on the other

side. When Kosovo trucks could not drive to Serbia after the agreement, tens of articles wrote about

the deception that the Kosovo side suffered from Serbia.45 A growing proportion of Kosovars view

Serbia as using economic domination as a political tool. Continuing talks has become an uphill

struggle and, next time around, entering into talks may present a higher hurdle than it did in March

this year. Serbia’s beginning of collecting VAT in northern Kosovo46

The decision by the Serbian authorities to return northern Kosovo into its tax system and

reintroduce the Value Added Tax (VAT) has not been met in the EU with approval. This was seen as

Belgrade’s unilateral move and as a precursor to an opinion that Belgrade was not sincere in its

negotiations with Prishtina.

and Prishtina’s intervention are

examples cited in respective capitals as change of tack and unfaithful acts during the technical

dialogue.

Keeping Up the Pace

Any attempt by Belgrade to establish control, directly or indirectly, in

northern Kosovo leads to the affirmation of the story on partition of Kosovo, which is absolutely

unacceptable for Brussels,” Blic quoted an EU source stressing that any kind of affirmation of Serbian

sovereignty in the north does not exist as an option. The same source claims that the rash reaction

by the Serbian government is an indicator that the issues are political and not economic.

Ashton expressed expectation that the agreements will be put in practice in the shortest possible

period, and that the Dialogue will yield results in the fields that have not been discussed so far, such

as telecommunications, cadastre, customs stamp and energy. There is fear that the hiatus in

dialogue indicates a lack of will for further dialogue. However, a successful conclusion of these talks

is essential for any further engagement. It is essential that after the next elections in Serbia, both

countries are still able to take pro-dialogue positions, without the necessity of pressure by the

international community, driven by the carrots from the EU integration process and the practical

benefits of the current bout of dialogue.

It is also essential that both sides perceive that they received adequate rewards by the EU. What will

be received and how will it be perceived? By the end of December, both Kosovo and Serbia should

ideally be at:

Kosovo

Serbia

Contractual Relations with the EU and Visa Liberalization Roadmap

Some practical benefits

Candidate Status

Some practical benefit

Given a successful period now, this can lead to a process where Serbia and Kosovo see a true

transformation of their self-interest to induce cooperation with their neighbors.

Transformation of Self-Interest: From Zero-Sum Enmity to Mutual

Cooperation

Perhaps by force, but Prishtina and Belgrade have made some progress to rapprochement. A

tumultuous process with multiple attempts to defeat the other side, and not treat it as a partner,

45 Express. 23 September 2011. This Is Not Reciprocity.

46 B92. 19 September 2011. VAT Collection in Northern Kosovo.

47 Blic. 21 Sept 2011.

Are both Serbia and

Kosovo in the same

boat? Still a Zero-

Sum Game? Yes

and No.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[36]

has nevertheless produced a situation where they have agreed and they face some punishment if

they choose to change terms. However, the terms are clearly changeable so the sides keep lobbying

to this effect bilaterally. It is interesting to conclude that once this forced cooperation indeed takes

place, benefits will abound and one’s perception of self-interest may change. Through carrots and

sticks, Serbia and Kosovo are gradually forced to move from a zero-sum logic to mutual interest. In

any case, as we indicated earlier, this interest has already transformed in the past. Prishtina initially

saw decentralization as a Trojan horse, but these fears have subsided. Serbs saw paying electricity as

a sell-out. It is a safe bet to predict that Serbia will also think the same. The two sides were from the

beginning haunted by the very image of the word ‘negotiations’, and switched to ‘talks’ instead,

although they amount to the same process.

The real test is whether we have managed to transform Serbia’s and Kosovo’s perception of self-

interest and if they now realize more that their interest depends on the well-being of the other side.

There is progress on the other side, but grudgingly so, and there is still fierce lobbying for

disentanglement from mutual interdependence. Are both Serbia and Kosovo in the same boat? Still

a Zero-Sum Game? Yes and No. Given an open dispute, it will indeed be very difficult to instill a non-

zero-sum approach. Once the territorial spat of northern Kosovo is closed as an option, its regulation

will present an opportunity for creative realization of joint interest. Moreover, given the multilateral

decision-making in the European Union, there is a tendency to lobby various countries against each

other, which complicates and reduces the leverage that Lady Ashton’s office can have over the two

talking sides.

It is natural that Serbia intends to move faster towards the EU, however, there is a perception in

Prishtina that Belgrade is doing less than the necessary minimum and that Serbia’s enhanced

position in its EU integration process will give it undue benefit. Serbia should also be asked to pledge

not to use any advantage in going faster in the EU against Kosovo’s statehood and accession. For

some time now, Serbia has dropped the line that Kosovo and EU integration are two separate

processes.

This process should be used to persuade Kosovo that Serbia’s EU accession is good for the whole

region, and to persuade Belgrade that similar success for Kosovo is in its interest. These arguments

currently have no effect, because most politicians are looking for victory and not rapprochement.

The conditionality employed either by the EU or bilaterally is likely to produce the same boat

approach and provide inducements for engagement with each other, even if short-sighted politicians

are against the idea.

Various events that can take place in the near future could hamper the dialogue and if the negative

outcomes can be predicted, we stand a better chance of avoiding them.

Scenarios

The Dialogue touches upon all areas, from economy & trade, free movement of persons,

employment and social policy, EU prospect, the fight against organized crime and corruption,

cooperation with civil society, cultural exchanges or regional political stability. Many areas were not

touched upon earlier in the paper, and they carry four possible outcomes that the Dialogue can bring

Kosovo and Serbia in the next period:

1. Optimistic Scenario

Serbia and Kosovo agree on all the issues that they have opened and several more that have been

muted. An agreement on free movement, free trade and IBM is operational, barricades are removed

willfully by local Serbs in the north, and agreements are struck also on telecommunications, energy,

and regional cooperation (Kosovo’s representation in regional fora). EULEX is functional across

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[37]

Kosovo but probably with the exception of the court, while it handles the civil registry and cadastral

records exchange between Belgrade and Prishtina.

Given the removal of barricades and implementation of other points by December 9th, Serbia can

expect to receive candidacy and promises for the start of negotiations with the EU given an

additional set of agreements until March. Prishtina is granted dialogue on liberalization of visa and

contractual relations. Talks will continue in the coming months and positions will be approximated,

although their publication may wait until after the Serbian elections.

2. Positive Realistic Scenario

While the scenario above may be too ambitious, cautious optimists can expect the agreement to

hold, most points of the first agreements to be implemented, and only one of the four additional

issues to be opened to get a green light (telecommunications or energy, but probably not Kosovo’s

participation in regional fora). Tensions in the north will subside and the barricades will be taken

down. The fear of new barricades would linger, due to high tension likely to remain throughout the

period. If in any case the barricades are removed, it is likely that Serbia will get its candidacy. Kosovo

will launch talks on visa liberalization and will receive promises to enter contractual relations once

the last resisting states in the EU concede to this. The citizens of both countries will get more of a

sense that the country is headed in the right direction, which is very important for the post-Dialogue

phase. Talks will continue in the following months, but no agreements will be publicized.

3. Negative Realistic Scenario

The situation with barricades prevails and a stand-off continues. The rift between Belgrade’s

negotiating team and the Kosovo Serbs deepens. Belgrade panders to nationalistic sentiment and

foregoes candidate status. Prishtina may start the visa liberalization process, and Belgrade may

receive an additional deadline. In case the “no” to Belgrade is made conditionally, Belgrade will face

two options – first is that it will try to make amends with the Kosovo Serbs and for that they will

have some conditions regarding cooperation (most probably about the structure and the

methodology of the negotiating team). The other, less likely option, is that Belgrade will give up on

the fight for candidacy and push for more nationalistic election rhetoric. Prishtina’s position will

harden and it will attempt to implement its strategy in the north.

4. Pessimistic Scenario:

There is low likelihood, but it is nevertheless possible that the situation will spiral out of control and

result in the persistence of barricades and possible spill-over effects in the south and radicalization

of Serbian politics. Some leaders of Kosovo Serbs from the north have announced that the north will

proclaim its independence from Kosovo, although this bluff is unlikely to turn into action. If declared,

it will raise the stakes and will require heavier involvement from Serbia, Kosovo and the

international community.

It will most likely bring all efforts to further Serbia’s EU integration to a standstill and probably lead

Belgrade into an open conflict with the Kosovo Serbs in the same way as Milosevic clashed with the

leaders of Bosnian Serbs in 1994. It will undoubtedly have a spill-over effect on Kosovo Serb

municipalities in the south of Kosovo. This could hamper the EU enlargement process of the whole

region.

The crucial question is how to include Kosovo Serbs from the north into the process, under what

conditions and through what channels. Since the possibility of opening up a new political channel

after the ‘technical dialogue’ exhausts itself. Ways should be found to consult with Kosovo Serbs in

the north and the rest of Kosovo. At the same time, they have to be more cooperative and stop

obstructing the entire process.

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[38]

Recommendations

A number of recommendations emanate from the analysis above. Both governments should treat

the current dialogue as a historic process that is worth in its own right and not only in the function of

EU integration. Even if it does not address status, it can improve the trust among two opposite sides,

which is necessary before Serbia and Kosovo can address all their differences. Other

recommendations are presented below, divided by the institutions they target:

The European Union should:

1. Use auspicious time to exert its highest influence. The international community should use its

influence more vigorously to help the two sides reframe self-interest and make cooperation pay

off. Both sides should have a clear and predictable picture of the carrots and sticks awaiting

them, depending on the policies they choose. A more consistent EU approach run by the Office

of High Representative for Foreign Affairs Catherine Ashton is essential. Messages that the

current situation is not sustainable should be clearly delivered. The EU must follow closely the

performance of both sides, especially in their implementation, and design the carrot-and-stick

scheme accordingly.

2. Make the whole Dialogue agreement transparent and inclusive. No negotiations are fully

transparent and a degree of secrecy is necessary, the aura of secrecy around the dialogue has

made the public in Serbia and Kosovo more wary and fearful. Ultimately, it hampers consensus-

building. Making the texts of dialogue agreements public has the benefits of injecting more

transparency into the process, but it could also make it more difficult to reach agreements and

eliminate some of the “creative ambiguity” that all sides have tried to use to move the process

forward. However, the benefits drawn by avoiding arbitrary interpretations and expanding the

circles of disciples outweighs the difficulties. More transparency may lengthen the time required

for an agreement, but it would make for more long-lasting solutions. Civil society and respective

parliaments should be included and especially the Kosovo Serbs must be involved more.

3. Continue the Dialogue after December 9th. Despite the electoral period, talks should continue,

even if no agreements are made or if they are not made public. Renewed efforts should utilize

the window of opportunity after the elections to address all the remaining issues towards full

normalization between Kosovo and Serbia.

4. Identify mechanisms to prevent asymmetric outcome whereby Serbia can block Kosovo’s

progress. The EU will have to devise some mechanism to prevent Serbia from blocking Kosovo’s

EU progress. The EU might not currently insist that Serbia formally recognize Kosovo, but it will

almost certainly insist on mechanisms that will prevent Serbia from influencing Kosovo’s fate in

international fora, regional clubs and initiatives.

5. The EU should find ways to consult the Kosovo Serb community. For a successful

implementation of the Dialogue agreements, it is necessary to hear the voice of the Kosovo

Serbs in the process. The chief EU facilitator should meet and discuss the issues of Serbs across

Kosovo.

The Kosovo government should:

6. Present the plan for the phased implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan in the north of Kosovo.

Initiate direct talks with the representatives of Kosovo Serbs. The Serbian government should

send the message that this is in the interest of all Kosovo Serbs.

7. Establish a channel of communication with northern Serb political stakeholders. A parallel

communication channel to the Dialogue should be for Prishtina to improve relations with

BELGRADE – PRISHTINA DIALOGUE: HARMONIZATION OF INTERESTS

[39]

northern Serb leaders. This exchange should discuss and deliberate about the situation, ensure

that security does not deteriorate and to establish a minimum of trust for engagement.

8. Prioritize inter-ethnic court cases and ensure maximum success from decentralization. Kosovo

should more vigorously process and try all cases of inter-ethnic nature, and should ensure that

the lessons learned from decentralization in the south are positive to illustrate their potential in

the north.

The Serbian government should:

9. Implement agreements on items that have been agreed upon in previous rounds. The

government should speed up their implementation and agree on as many additional items as

possible before it enters into an electoral period.

10. Meet all the conditions required by the EU and conditions posed bilaterally. Some of the

Serbian structures in the north should be dissolved and this may also excuse Belgrade for not

holding elections in the north.

11. Improve relations between Belgrade and Kosovo Serbs from the north, and establish ties with

political representatives of Kosovo Serbs from the south.

Kosovo's Membership and Representation in Regional Security Initiatives

Conference Paper

Full-text available

Sep 2014

Donika Emini

In recent years, a number of regional initiatives have been introduced in South East Europe, mainly supported by the European Union (EU) institutions, the EU Member States and the United States of America (USA). After the declaration of its independence, Kosovo has constantly shown readiness and has taken actions in joining regional security initiatives. There are currently around 40 regional initiatives that deal with a wide range of sectors/issues namely in police cooperation, judicial sector, military, and emergency. Some of these are already part of the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), but Kosovo, is part of only a few, either directly through representatives of state institutions or international presence. In particular, the challenges are present with respect to Kosovo’s access to defense related regional initiatives. While Kosovo’s recent membership in the RCC is expected to open the doors for representation and access to other regional security initiatives, the findings in this paper show that the progress is limited and accompanied by a wide variety of challenges. By not being fully-fledged member, Kosovo is constrained in benefiting from joint operations and activities in the field of rule of law, justice and security. Consequently, the political agreements reached in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and the concept of introducing regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, are seriously challenged.

EU Conditions with Kosovo. 31 Danas

Nov 2011

Vecernje Novosti

Vecernje Novosti. 12 October 2011. EU Conditions with Kosovo. 31 Danas. 17 October 2011. Germany Is Saying What 22 EU Members Are Thinking. 32 KTV. 13 October 2011. Foreign Ambassadors to Kosovo Comment on EC Progress Report. 33

Kosovo Scenarios: Freezing the Conflict

Nov 2011

Nikolic Djakovic

Nikolic Djakovic, Tanja. 13 October 2011. Kosovo Scenarios: Freezing the Conflict. NIN. http://www.nin.co.rs/pages/article.php?id=63747. 34 Ibid.

Belgrade-Prishtina Dialogue: Transformation of Self-Interest Required

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