Article

August 31, 1994

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Abstract

this paper I will take Searle's arguments to pose a serious challenge for anyone seeking to provide a computational account of consciousness and sketch ways in which computationalist might counter his arguments. The first step is to overcome the assumption that consciousness is a single, holistic phenomenon that is either present or not. This sense lies behind not only Searle's arguments but many attempts to argue that consciousness is a special property that we cannot hope to explain. It lies behind the claim that what differentiates AI systems, robots, or zombies from us is that in the first three cases there is no one home, while in our case there is a someone who is home. If conscious were such a phenomenon that it is Consciousness: Perspectives from Symbolic and Connectionist AI Page 12

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