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The role of cognitive abilities in decisions from experience: Age differences emerge as a function of choice set size
Abstract
People seldom enjoy access to summarized information about risky options before making a decision. Instead, they may search for information and learn about environmental contingencies-thus making decisions from experience. Aging is associated with notable deficits in learning and memory-but do these translate into poorer decisions from experience? We report three studies that used a sampling paradigm to investigate younger (M=24years) and older (M=71years) adults' decisions from experience. In Study 1 (N=121) participants made 12 decisions between pairs of payoff distributions in the lab. Study 2 (N=70) implemented the same paradigm using portable devices, collecting 84 decisions per individual over a week. Study 3 (N=84) extended the sampling paradigm by asking participants to make 12 decisions between two, four, and eight payoff distributions (in the lab). Overall, the behavioral results suggest that younger and older adults are relatively similar in how they search and what they choose when facing two payoff distributions (Studies 1 and 2). With an increasing number of payoff distributions, however, age differences emerged (Study 3). A modeling analysis on the level of individual participants showed that a simple delta-learning rule model best described the learning processes of most participants. To the extent that ongoing updating processes unfold relatively automatically and effortlessly, older adults may be liberated from the detrimental consequences of cognitive aging in the case of decisions from experience with few decision options. We discuss implications for research on decisions from experience and choice performance over the lifespan.
Copyright © 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
... Past research on such decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004;Hertwig, 2015) has focused on how peo-ple search and choose in isolation, investigating how predecisional search is influenced by various task characteristics such as the magnitude of incentives (Hau et al., 2008), the role of gains versus losses (Lejarraga et al., 2012), the variability of payoffs (Lejarraga et al., 2012;Mehlhorn et al., 2014), or choice set size (Hills et al., 2013;Frey et al., 2015a). Similarly, past research has also investigated the role of various person characteristics such as emotional states (Frey et al., 2014b), cognitive abilities (Rakow et al., 2010;Frey et al., 2015a), or age (Frey et al., 2015a;Spaniol & Wegier, 2012). ...
... Past research on such decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004;Hertwig, 2015) has focused on how peo-ple search and choose in isolation, investigating how predecisional search is influenced by various task characteristics such as the magnitude of incentives (Hau et al., 2008), the role of gains versus losses (Lejarraga et al., 2012), the variability of payoffs (Lejarraga et al., 2012;Mehlhorn et al., 2014), or choice set size (Hills et al., 2013;Frey et al., 2015a). Similarly, past research has also investigated the role of various person characteristics such as emotional states (Frey et al., 2014b), cognitive abilities (Rakow et al., 2010;Frey et al., 2015a), or age (Frey et al., 2015a;Spaniol & Wegier, 2012). ...
... Past research on such decisions from experience (Hertwig et al., 2004;Hertwig, 2015) has focused on how peo-ple search and choose in isolation, investigating how predecisional search is influenced by various task characteristics such as the magnitude of incentives (Hau et al., 2008), the role of gains versus losses (Lejarraga et al., 2012), the variability of payoffs (Lejarraga et al., 2012;Mehlhorn et al., 2014), or choice set size (Hills et al., 2013;Frey et al., 2015a). Similarly, past research has also investigated the role of various person characteristics such as emotional states (Frey et al., 2014b), cognitive abilities (Rakow et al., 2010;Frey et al., 2015a), or age (Frey et al., 2015a;Spaniol & Wegier, 2012). ...
Information search is key to making decision from experience: exploration permits people to learn about the statistical properties of choice options and thus to become aware of rare but potentially momentous decision consequences. This registered report investigates whether and how people differ when making decisions from experience in isolation versus under competitive pressure , which may have important implications for choice performance in different types of choice environments: in “kind” environments without any rare and extreme events, frugal search is sufficient to identify advantageous options. Conversely, in “wicked” environments with skewed outcome distributions, rare but important events will tend to be missed in frugal search. One theoretical view is that competitive pressure encourages efficiency and may thereby boost adaptive search in different environments. An alternative and more pessimistic view is that competitive pressure triggers agency-related concerns, leading to minimal search irrespective of the choice environment, and hence to inferior choice performance. Using a sampling game, the present study ( N = 277) found that solitary search was not adaptive to different choice environments ( M = 14 samples), leading to a high choice performance in a kind and in a moderately wicked environment, but somewhat lower performance in an extremely wicked environment. Competitive pressure substantially reduced search irrespective of the choice environment ( M = 4 samples), thus negatively affecting overall choice performance. Yet, from the perspective of a cost-benefit framework, frugal search may be efficient under competitive pressure. In sum, this report extends research on decisions from experience by adopting an ecological perspective (i.e., systematically varying different choice environments) and by introducing a cost-benefit framework to evaluate solitary and competitive search — with the latter constituting a challenging problem for people in an increasingly connected world.
... Likewise, not only does the privacy self-management model in Android ignore the privacy protection needs of potentially vulnerable communities, it increases their cognitive loads. This model requires them to weigh the costs and benefits of the collection, use, and disclosure of their information and decide whether to hold their data or avail the services offered by these App-providers in exchange for their data [18][19][20]. Moreover, the privacy protection mechanisms in Android do not meet the requirements of AIbased applications [21]. ...
... Alternatively, they can use the Settings App to configure these settings that require due expertise. A large number of Apps in smartphones, the impact of aging on decision-making ability, lack of awareness of risks of the modern technologies, and cognitive and memory disorders make performing these tasks impossible for AAL users [18,19,[23][24][25]. Finally, the extensive attention needed for performing such complicated tasks increases the cognitive loads of users [26]. ...
... Such problems increase the cognitive load of decision-makers [26]. Older adults, living in AAL spaces in smart cities, can suffer from different cognitive impairments [19,18]. Not only can such decision-making requirements result in errors leading to the sub-optimal configuration of privacy settings, but they can affect the mental well-being of these users. ...
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning based Ambient Assisted Living systems play an important role in smart cities by improving the quality of life of the elderly population. Many Ambient Assisted Living systems are coupled with Android Apps for command-and-control purposes. Consequently, the privacy and security of Ambient Assisted Living systems depend on the privacy and security of the corresponding Android Apps, which follow a privacy self-management model. Unfortunately, the privacy self-management model ignores the decision-making abilities of the elderly and increases their cognitive loads, which put their privacy protection and wellbeing at stake. In this paper, we follow a Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence inspired approach for addressing these issues. This approach uses privacy as a shared responsibility model instead of the privacy self-management model. We have proposed two algorithms, the participatory privacy protection algorithm-I, and participatory privacy protection algorithm-II, for determining optimal privacy settings of an Ambient Assisted Living App and handling its runtime Permission requests, respectively. We demonstrated the working of these algorithms using a case study. We have also compared the proposed approach with state-of-the-art privacy management schemes for Android Apps. The proposed algorithms can improve the privacy protection of Ambient Assisted Living App users in smart cities and relieve them through cognitive offloading.
... This seems plausible given age-related declines in fluid intelligence (Craik & Bialystok, 2006;Horn & Cattell, 1967;Zaval, Li, Johnson, & Weber, 2015), which have been suggested to explain age differences in several dimensions of decision making (e.g., choice, information search), especially in complex and demanding tasks (cf. Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015;Mamerow, Frey, & Mata, 2016;Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007;Zaval et al., 2015). On a neurobiological level, these impairments in information processing have been linked to changes in dopaminergic neuromodulation, affecting, for instance, the signal-to-noise ratio of neural processing (Li, Lindenberger, & Sikström, 2001). ...
... Moreover, a meta-analysis on predecisional information search concluded that older adults search for less information before choosing, especially when options are characterized by a greater number of attributes (Mata & Nunes, 2010). Similarly, Frey et al. (2015) investigated the effect of choice set size (two, four, or eight options) on age differences in behavior in decisions from experience, where partici-pants learn about options by sampling their payoff distributions. The authors found age differences in the effect of a higher set size on search effort (older adults sampled less per option than younger adults under high set size) but not in choice behavior. ...
... The authors found age differences in the effect of a higher set size on search effort (older adults sampled less per option than younger adults under high set size) but not in choice behavior. This may be due to a subtle but important difference to our study: In contrast to our experiment, where the options within a choice problem differed in complexity, Frey et al. (2015) manipulated the complexity of choice problems as a whole. Taken together, different facets of complexity in risky choice tasks may impact behavior-and age differences therein-in different ways. ...
The canonical conclusion from research on age differences in risky choice is that older adults are more risk averse than younger adults, at least in choices involving gains. Most of the evidence for this conclusion derives from studies that used a specific type of choice problem: choices between a safe and a risky option. However, safe and risky options differ not only in the degree of risk but also in the amount of information to be processed—that is, in their complexity. In both an online and a lab experiment, we demonstrate that differences in option complexity can be a key driver of age differences in risk attitude. When the complexity of the safe option is increased, older adults no longer seem more risk averse than younger adults (in gains). Using computational modeling, we test mechanisms that potentially underlie the effect of option complexity. The results show that participants are not simply averse to complexity, and that increasing the complexity of safe options does more than simply make responses more noisy. Rather, differences in option complexity affect the processing of attribute information: whereas the availability of a simple safe option is associated with the distortion of probability weighting and lower outcome sensitivity, these effects are attenuated when both options are more similar in complexity. We also dissociate the effect of option complexity from an effect of certainty on risky choice. Our findings may also have implications for age differences in other decision phenomena (e.g., framing effect, loss aversion, immediacy effect).
... وي من كل رى (Moro and Esmerado, 2020;Kwon et al., 2021 (Zhao et al., 2015;Gavilan et al., 2018;Rustemi and Jashari, 2018 Jeong and Jang, 2011;Abubakar and Ilkan, 2016;Lemon and Verhoef, 2016;Wu et al., 2016;Usui et al., 2018;Yen and (Zhao et al., 2015;Kim and Park, 2017;Maslowska et al., 2017;Tseng, 2017;von Helversen et al., 2018;Gavilan et al., 2018;Rustemi and Jashari, 2018;Thoo et al., 2018;Filieri et al., 2019;Grewal and Stephen, 2019;Huang et al., 2020;Milman et al., 2020;Santini et al., 2020;Thomas and Saenger, 2020 (Zhou, 2016;Huang et al., 2017;Rinka and Pratt, 2018;Filieri et al., 2019;Changchit and Klaus, 2020;Chatzigeorgiou and Christou, 2020;Kang et al., 2020;Chen and Ku, 2021;Ran et al., 2021; (Zhang et al., 2014;Luan et al., 2016;Shan, 2016;Chan et al., 2017;Hong et al., 2017;Karimi and Wang, 2017;Craciun and (Depping and Freund, 2011;Ma et al., 2012;Mata et al., 2012;Salthouse, 2012;Eppinger et al., 2013;Reed et al., 2014;Frey et al., 2015;Shan, 2016;Chan et al., 2017;Kopeć et al., 2017a;Kopeć et al., 2017b; With the growth of e-commerce in recent years, customers attachment to online shopping has increased. This form of electronic commerce is associated with various phenomena and practices. ...
... من أكبر بشكل اجعات المر و بالتقييمات لمتأثر فرضي من الثامنة الفرضية صياغة تم سبق، ما إلى ً استنادا و كالتالي: اسة الدر ات H 8 : لممطاعم العمالء ات اختيار توجيه في اجعات المر و التقييمات دور يختمف باختالف الجنس. العميل لها ينتمي التي العمرية الفئة تأثير تفاوت إلى األدبيات أشارت حيث وحده، الجنس عمى اء الشر ايا نو في ة المؤثر اجع المر خصائص تقتصر ال اجع لممر ية العمر الفئة بتفاوت اجعات المر(Salthouse, 2012;Eppinger et al., 2013;Frey et al., 2015) ، من كل وجد حيث(Ma et al., 2012;Mata et al., 2012) الفئ أن التقييمات في ً ا كثير تثق ال األكبر ية العمر ات لمفئات ائي الشر السموك في التأثير في التقييمات و اجعات المر تمك تأثير ينخفض وبالتالي العمالء، يتركيا التي اجعات المر و األكبر ية العمر (Kopeć et al., 2017) . من كل وجد كما (Depping and Freund, 2011; Reed et al., 2014) من كل ويؤكد األصغر. ...
... To accomplish this goal, we will demonstrate the importance of DfE independently from DfD and highlight the relevance of DfE for real-life decision-making. For example, studies using the DfE methodology and tasks have examined real-world problems, including terrorist attacks (Yechiam, Barron, & Erev, 2005); emotional states (Frey et al., 2014); taxation, punishment, law enforcement, and safety enhancement (Spektor & Wulff, 2021;Teodorescu et al., 2021;Yakobi et al., 2020); pandemics and COVID-19 Plonsky et al., 2021); aging (Frey et al., 2015); and clinical settings and populations (Teodorescu & Erev, 2014;. ...
... Further research has shown that descriptive information can have an impact on choice, but mostly at the early stages of the task, when there is little experience and descriptive summaries offer valuable information about the choice options; as more experience is accumulated, this influence of description diminishes (Weiss-Cohen et al., 2016). Another factor is a high number of available choice options, which makes learning from experiences harder (Ashby et al., 2017;Frey et al., 2015;Konstantinidis et al., 2015). Thus, when choice options increase, descriptive information can help participants to maximize rewards, but an even higher number of choice options can make participants neglect descriptive information because of information overload ( Jacoby et al., 1974;Weiss-Cohen et al., 2018). ...
In many important real-world decision domains, such as finance, the environment, and health, behavior is strongly influenced by experience. Renewed interest in studying this influence led to important advancements in the understanding of these decisions from experience (DfE) in the last 20 years. Building on this literature, we suggest ways the standard experimental design should be extended to better approach important real-world DfE. These extensions include, for example, introducing more complex choice situations, delaying feedback, and including social interactions. When acting upon experiences in these richer and more complicated environments, extensive cognitive processes go into making a decision. Therefore, we argue for integrating cognitive processes more explicitly into experimental research in DfE. These cognitive processes include attention to and perception of numeric and nonnumeric experiences, the influence of episodic and semantic memory, and the mental models involved in learning processes. Understanding these basic cognitive processes can advance the modeling, understanding and prediction of DfE in the laboratory and in the real world. We highlight the potential of experimental research in DfE for theory integration across the behavioral, decision, and cognitive sciences. Furthermore, this research could lead to new methodology that better informs decision-making and policy interventions.
... However, in some cases, participants need to learn about options and probabilities over time, which leads to a continuum between risk and ambiguity, because the representation of ambiguity can change into a representation of risk as a function of each individual's learning experience. Importantly, some researchers have proposed that age differences in learning can partly account for age patterns in dealing with decision-making under uncertainty in such scenarios, making it particularly interesting to examine paradigms involving such components in order to understand age differences in dealing with uncertainty (Frey et al., 2015;Henninger et al., 2010). ...
... Overall, self-report measures suggest agerelated declines in the propensity to take risks (König, 2021) but task-based results are more heterogeneous, with meta-analyses suggesting decreased risk taking with age for gains but not losses (Best & Charness, 2015). There is overall less work on situations involving ambiguity, when the probability of options is not described (Tymula et al., 2013) or needs to be learned from experience (Frey et al., 2015;Frey et al., 2021;Mata et al., 2011). One paradigm that has received considerable attention is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al. 2002) but the results concerning age differences are also mixed: Although some studies find older adults less risk-seeking relative to younger adults (Grover, 2021;Henninger et al., 2010;Koscielniak et al., 2016;Rolison et al., 2012;Sproten et al., 2018;Wilson et al., 2021), a number of studies find this result in only some conditions Schulman et al., 2021), report no evidence of behavioral effects of age (Kim et al., 2022;McCleskey, 2021;Yu et al., 2016), or find that older-adults are more risk-seeking relative to younger adults (Cavanagh et al., 2012). ...
Humans globally are reaping the benefits of longer lives. Yet, longer life spans also require engaging with consequential but often uncertain decisions well into old age. Previous research has yielded mixed findings with regards to life span differences in how individuals make decisions under uncertainty. One factor contributing to the heterogeneity of findings is the diversity of paradigms that cover different aspects of uncertainty and tap into different cognitive and affective mechanisms. In this study, 175 participants (53.14% females, mean age = 44.9 years, SD = 19.0, age range = 16 to 81) completed functional neuroimaging versions of two prominent paradigms in this area, the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and the Delay Discounting Task. Guided by neurobiological accounts of age-related changes in decision-making under uncertainty, we examined age effects on neural activation differences in decision-relevant brain structures, and compared these across multiple contrasts for the two paradigms using specification curve analysis. In line with theoretical predictions, we find age differences in nucleus accumbens, anterior insula, and medial prefrontal cortex, but the results vary across paradigm and contrasts. Our results are in line with existing theories of age differences in decision making and their neural substrates, yet also suggest the need for a broader research agenda that considers how both individual and task characteristics determine the way humans deal with uncertainty.
... This is particularly applicable to risk and time preference tasks, in which researchers have shown that estimates for risk preference and temporal discounting can appear to increase or decrease as a function of task demands or analytic confounds (cf. Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015;Olschewski et al., 2018). ...
... We propose that future theorizing should focus more specifically on the mechanisms thought to underlie age differences (e.g., dopaminergic function, time horizon) and empirical work should aim to provide critical tests of the role of such mechanisms (cf. Frey et al., 2015;Zilker & Pachur, 2021) rather than simply assess a directional effect of age. It may also be important to distinguish critical claims of theories, such as the age trends associated with specific mechanisms, and auxiliary assumptions, such as the role of task or measurement characteristics (e.g., role of incentivization, task complexity). ...
Objectives:
Several theories predict changes in individuals' economic preferences across the life span. To test these theories and provide an historical overview of this literature, we conducted meta-analyses on age differences in risk, time, social, and effort preferences as assessed by behavioral measures.
Methods:
We conducted separate meta-analyses and cumulative meta-analyses on the association between age and risk, time, social, and effort preferences. We also conducted analyses of historical trends in sample sizes and citations patterns for each economic preference.
Results:
The meta-analyses identified overall no significant effects of age for risk (r = -0.02, 95%CI[-0.06, 0.02], n = 39,832), and effort preferences (r = 0.24, 95%CI[-0.05, 0.52], n = 571), but significant effects of age for time (r = -0.04, 95%CI[-0.07, -0.01], n = 115,496) and social preferences (r = 0.11, 95%CI[0.01, 0.21], n = 2,997), suggesting increased patience and altruism with age, respectively. Equivalence tests, that compare these effects to practically important ones (i.e., r = |.1|), however, suggest that all effects are of trivial significance. The analyses of temporal trends suggest that the magnitude of effects and sample sizes have not changed significantly over time, nor do they dramatically affect the extent that articles are cited.
Discussion:
Overall, our results contrast with theories of aging that propose general age effects for risk, and effort preferences, yet provide some but tenuous support for those suggesting age-related changes in time and social preferences. We discuss implications for theory development as well as future empirical work on economic preferences.
... Previous studies were unable to find age-related differences in decision making process, while others reported differences related to age. [5][6][7][8][9][10][11] Gender studies also reported contradicting results on decision-making processes and styles. While some researchers reported no differences among genders, some detected these differences in subscale levels. ...
... [5][6][7][8] On the other hand, other researchers reported differences related to age suggesting that age may have an positive effect on different domains of decision-making processes. [9][10][11] Considering the results in the related literature, it can be assumed that participants in this study tend to employ intuitive decision-making styles if the situation is familiar. Also, the increasing number of accurate results with age can be explained with the increased knowledge. ...
... In the current study, we aimed to evaluate if young and older adults could make better decisions when less information was presented by manipulating the amount of information available for decision making across simple and complex trials. We are only aware of five aging studies with such a manipulation, three which showed that age deficits increased with complexity (larger age deficits for more complex trials, Besedeš et al., 2012;Frey et al., 2015;Hanoch et al., 2011) and two that did not (Finucane et al., 2005;Queen et al., 2012). ...
... The study by Queen et al. (2012) had participants base their decisions on their own preferences which would have reduced memory requirement, nonetheless their simpler trials still involved five options, each with five attributes and the attributes were only visible one at a time (requiring additional mental retention). Finally, the study by Frey et al. (2015) had just two options in their simple trials but participants made their decisions after sampling multiple pieces of numerical information which was allowed to vary between young and older adults (their study was more focused on strategy use than complexity). In the current study, decisions involved just two options with simple trials consisting of one to three attributes based on participants' real-life preferences. ...
Leading theory hypothesizes that age deficits in decision making may rise as the complexity of decision-related information increases. This suggests that older adults would benefit relative to young adults from simplification of information used to inform decision making. Participants indicated political, nutritional and medical preferences and then chose between politicians, foods and medicines. The amount of information presented was systematically varied but age differences were largely similar for simple and complex trials. Paradoxically, the data showed that decisions based on simpler information could be less aligned with participant's preferences than decisions based on more complex information. Further analyses suggested that participants may have been responding purely on the basis of their most valued preferences and that when information about those preferences was not presented, decision making became poorer. Contrary to our expectations, simplification of information by exclusion may therefore hinder decision making and may not particularly help older adults.
... In a recent meta-analysis of research on description-and experience-based choices between risky lotteries (using the sampling paradigm), a median of 55% of decisions from description maximized expected value, whereas 66% of decisions from experience maximized the experienced mean returns when the sampling sequence included all possible outcomes, including the rare one, relative to 89% when it did not (Wulff et al., 2018). Moreover, ongoing updating processes can alleviate the burden of storing all experienced outcomes (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015); experiential approaches may therefore become more important as decision problems become more complex Lejarraga, 2010). ...
... The cognitive demands of experiential formats may also affect decision making in older age. In complex choice environments (e.g., with numerous options), older adults (mean age = 71 years) explored substantially less than younger adults (mean age = 24 years) did, and their lower sampling effort was correlated with declines in measures of fluid intelligence (Frey et al., 2015). Moreover, there may be age-related differences in the affective processes triggered by immediate outcome experience, causing adolescents to take more risks than adults in, for instance, description-based dynamic choice tasks with immediate outcome feedback (Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening, & Weber, 2009). ...
Comparison of different lines of research on statistical intuitions and probabilistic reasoning reveals several puzzling contradictions. Whereas babies seem to be intuitive statisticians, surprisingly capable of statistical learning and inference, adults' statistical inferences have been found to be inconsistent with the rules of probability theory and statistics. Whereas researchers in the 1960s concluded that people's probability updating is "conservatively" proportional to normative predictions, probability updating research in the 1970s suggested that people are incapable of following Bayes's rule. And whereas animals appear to be strikingly risk savvy, humans often seem "irrational" when dealing with probabilistic information. Drawing on research on the description-experience gap in risky choice, we integrate and systematize these findings from disparate fields of inquiry that have, to date, operated largely in parallel. Our synthesis shows that a key factor in understanding inconsistencies in statistical intuitions research is whether probabilistic inferences are based on symbolic, abstract descriptions or on the direct experience of statistical information. We delineate this view from other conceptual accounts, consider potential mechanisms by which attributes of first-hand experience can facilitate appropriate statistical inference, and identify conditions under which they improve or impair probabilistic reasoning. To capture the full scope of human statistical intuition, we conclude, research on probabilistic reasoning across the lifespan, across species, and across research traditions must bear in mind that experience and symbolic description of the world may engage systematically distinct cognitive processes.
... Age-related decline in specific cognitive tasks such as working memory, processing speed, perception, executive function, language, and visuospatial functions is a part of the normal aging process (Harada et al., 2013). In line with this, older people may have difficulty in searching and learning new methods (Frey et al., 2015). Cognitive aging may also impair the ability to make intelligent decisions (Frey et al., 2015). ...
... In line with this, older people may have difficulty in searching and learning new methods (Frey et al., 2015). Cognitive aging may also impair the ability to make intelligent decisions (Frey et al., 2015). These may partly explain why many older individuals remained less responsive to action calls and campaigns in Turkey and other countries during the early period of the pandemic. ...
Coronavirus 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak and geropsychiatric care for older adults: a view from Turkey - Mehmet Ilkin Naharci, Bilal Katipoglu, Ilker Tasci
... performance appears for older adults, as compared to younger adults, as the number of choice options in a choice set increases (Besedeš et al., 2012;Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). Frey et al. (2015) interpret this decrease as a cognitive limitation in information processing in older adults, i.e., the amount of information that must be processed becomes too great to handle, leading older adults to choose the sub-optimal option. ...
... performance appears for older adults, as compared to younger adults, as the number of choice options in a choice set increases (Besedeš et al., 2012;Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). Frey et al. (2015) interpret this decrease as a cognitive limitation in information processing in older adults, i.e., the amount of information that must be processed becomes too great to handle, leading older adults to choose the sub-optimal option. Frey et al. also found that older adults tend to spend less time investigating their options before making a decision, perhaps due to the increased demand on cognitive load (see also Berg, Meegan, andKlaczynski, 1999, andMcGillivray, Friedman, andCastel, 2012). ...
We investigated whether older adults are more likely than younger adults to violate a foundational property of rational decision making, the axiom of transitive preference. Our experiment consisted of two groups, older (ages 60-75; 21 participants) and younger (ages 18-30; 20 participants) adults. We used Bayesian model selection to investigate whether individuals were better described via (transitive) weak order-based decision strategies or (possibly intransitive) lexicographic semiorder decision strategies. We found weak evidence for the hypothesis that older adults violate transitivity at a higher rate than younger adults. At the same time, a hierarchical Bayesian analysis suggests that, in this study, the distribution of decision strategies across individuals is similar for both older and younger adults.
... Each panel presents a specific indirect effect (in black) within the working memory partial-mediation model, its estimated standardized effect, and the respective 95% confidence interval as computed from 2000 bootstrap cycles with the percentile method Our working memory findings may also have implications for learning in decision making. Indeed, age-related declines in working memory and fluid abilities are more likely to affect tasks requiring explicit learning of complex rules or intensive monitoring and effortful learning of many options as compared with tasks relying more on implicit or low-effort learning processes (Del Missier et al., 2015;Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015;Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin & Hertwig, 2011). ...
... However, this may turn out to be a very problematic enterprise, considering the still-debated theoretical status of the inhibition construct (e.g., Friedman et al., 2008;Friedman & Miyake, 2004) and the known problems in measuring individual differences in inhibition (e.g., Del Missier et al., 2012;Friedman et al., 2008;Huizinga, Dolan & van der Molen, 2006;van der Sluis et al., 2007). It would also be worthwhile to use decision-making tasks varying systematically in their complexity (also Frey et al. 2015). ...
... W przeciwieństwie do konsensusu co do wpływu starzenia na zmiany biologiczne człowieka, dyskusja dotycząca zmian poznawczych na skutek upływu wieku ciągle trwa, a jej konkluzje są niejednoznaczne. Ze jednej strony upływ czasu determinuje wzrost skuteczności ludzi starszych w podejmowaniu decyzji dzięki zwiększeniu się zdolności do rozpoznawania wzorców (dzięki doświadczeniu), z drugiej zaś obserwuje się u nich duży spadek w racjonalnym podejmowaniu decyzji (Frey, Mata i Hertwig, 2015). W najnowszym podejściu podkreśla się, że wydajność decyzyjna młodych i starszych konsumentów jest porównywalna, a decyzje starszych mogą być mniej emocjonalne niż młodych (bardziej przemyślane, oparte na racjonalnych przesłankach) (Kovalchik, Camerer, Grether, Plott i Allman, 2005). ...
Starzenie się ludności postępuje, a skutki wywołane tym procesem stają się coraz bardziej dostrzegalne. Wraz z procesem starzenia się człowieka zachodzą w jego organizmie ogólne zmiany o charakterze fizycznym, fizjologicznym i psychicznym, modyfikując zachowania rynkowe. W sferze ekonomicznej zwiększająca się liczba seniorów wpływa na strukturę produkcji, podziału, wymiany i konsumpcji środków zaspokajających potrzeby ludzkie. Zachowania konsumentów seniorów w ostatnich latach stały się przedmiotem badań wielu dziedzin nauki; kwerenda bibliograficzna wykazała jednak, że obszar innowacyjności zachowań ludzi starszych nie cieszył się zainteresowaniem badaczy. Zapewne wynika to z często prezentowanego w mediach stereotypu ludzi starszych jako niedostosowanych do zmian otoczenia, zamkniętych na nowości rynkowe. Jako główny cel monografii przyjęto określenie determinant zakupu i akceptacji przez konsumentów seniorów innowacji produktowych wybranych kategorii dóbr materialnych FMCG (fast-moving consumer goods). Przeprowadzono trzyetapową sekwencję badań wśród osób po 60. roku życia na terenie Wielkopolski, wykorzystując metodę wywiadu osobistego. Efektem analiz jest określenie modelu postaw seniorów wobec innowacji oraz zbudowanie modelu zakupu i akceptacji przez seniorów innowacji produktowych na rynku FMCG. Dodatkowo zaproponowano segmentację konsumentów seniorów według kryterium zdefiniowanej innowacyjności konsumenckiej, która pozwoliła na wyodrębnienie pięciu typów: niechętnych konserwatywnych, zorientowanych tradycjonalistów, aspirujących wycofanych, nieświadomych praktycznych oraz racjonalnych innowatorów. Zgromadzony materiał teoretyczno-empiryczny może znaleźć zastosowanie w procesie zarządzania portfelem produktów zarówno na etapie inicjowania i wprowadzania innowacji produktowych na rynek, jak i na etapie modyfikacji produktów już istniejących w celu uzyskania akceptacji konsumentów seniorów.
... In this view, aging might take its toll even for more skilled individuals when dealing with reasoning and information processing-related tasks rather than when dealing with knowledge-related tasks. This outcome corroborates the worse performance of older compared with younger adults in tasks implying accurate and fast information processing (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2012;Frey et al., 2015). A similar trend was observed for the global task in SAT performance, which showed the larger negative association with age (β = À.55, p < .001), ...
Individual differences in cognitive performance depend on age, skill, and type of task. Nonetheless, whether performance is measured with accuracy (ACC) or with the trade‐off between responding speed and accuracy (SAT) could render subtle different relationships. Age and skill might associate more strongly with SAT performance in reasoning tasks, whereas they might relate more similarly with either ACC or SAT in knowledge tasks. These expectations were evaluated here with data from the cognitively taxing domain of chess ( n = 259). Age was associated more strongly with the SAT than with the ACC measures in reasoning tasks. In contrast, skill related more robustly with the ACC than with the SAT measures in knowledge tasks. The main findings suggest that the associations of age and skill with performance vary depending on the type of task, but also on whether considering accuracy or speed‐accuracy measures of cognitive performance.
... Several factors have been demonstrated to contribute to the description-experience gap in risky choice, such as reliance on small samples and the resultant sampling errors (e.g., Fox & Hadar, 2006;Hau et al., 2008) and differential probability weighting patterns between the two learning modes (e.g., Frey et al., 2015;Kellen et al., 2016). Although these findings have substantially improved our understanding of how people make risky choices from experience and why such choices could differ from those from description, the puzzle has not been fully solved. ...
Previous research has demonstrated systematic discrepancies between description- and experience-based risky choices. This description-experience gap has been attributed to several factors such as reliance on small samples and differential probability weighting patterns. Because context-dependent outcome expectation regarding safe options might influence experience-based risky choices, it constitutes another potential contributor to the gap. Using a free-sampling paradigm and risky options with rare outcomes that were either attractive or unattractive relative to the frequent ones, two experiments examined the existence and impact of such outcome expectation in experience-based risky choices. Both experiments had two information conditions: hint information meant to eliminate outcome expectation was provided in one condition but not the other. Experiment 1, which indicated the numbers of possible outcomes regarding both safe and risky options under the hint condition, revealed different choice behaviors regarding risky-safe trials between the two information conditions, no matter whether the rare outcome of the risky option in such a trial (i.e., the local context) was attractive or unattractive. However, this result provided only indirect evidence for the role of outcome expectation because it was unclear whether the hint information affected only the outcome expectation and thus evaluation of safe options or the evaluations of both safe and risky ones. With refined hint information arguably removing potential impacts on the evaluation of risky options, Experiment 2 showed that expectation of a non-existent rare outcome of safe options did contribute to experience-based risky choices. In addition, it appeared that the rare outcomes of the risky options in other decision problems presented in the same experiment (i.e., the global context) also affected outcome expectation. Future research could investigate how the interaction between local and global contexts determines outcome expectation to deepen our understanding of its contribution to experience-based risky choice and the description-experience gap.
... In both our and extant data, participants in Described-Probabilities treatments overweight small probabilities, while those in Experienced-Samples treatments underweight. The estimates are in line with those reported elsewhere (e.g., Ungemach et al., 2009;Abdellaoui et al., 2011;Camilleri & Newell, 2011b;Frey et al., 2015;Glöckner et al., 2016;Kellen et al., 2016;Lejarraga et al., 2016). As per our expectation, the probability weights of participants in the Described-Samples treatments lie between those of their counterparts in the Described-Probabilities and Experienced-Samples treatments. ...
Decision makers weight small probabilities differently when sampling them and when seeing them stated. We disentangle to what extent the gap is due to how decision makers receive information (through description or experience), the literature’s prevailing focus, and what information they receive (population probabilities or sample frequencies), our novel explanation. The latter determines statistical confidence, the extent to which one can know that a choice is superior in expectation. Two lab studies, as well as a review of prior work, reveal sample decisions to respond to statistical confidence. More strongly, in fact, than decisions based on population probabilities, leading to higher payoffs in expectation. Our research thus not only offers a more robust method for identifying description-experience gaps. It also reveals how probability weighting in decisions based on samples — the typical format of real-world decisions — may actually come closer to an unbiased ideal than decisions based on fully specified probabilities — the format frequently used in decision science.
... While the possible role of imperfect memory in the DE gap has been noted in previous literature (e.g. Rakow et al., 2008;Frey et al., 2015) its actual role is hard to assess based on existing evidence (see (Wulff et al., 2018) p.156, for a relevant discussion). ...
The Description-Experience gap (DE gap) is widely thought of as a tendency for people to act as if overweighting rare events when information about those events is derived from descriptions but as if underweighting rare events when they experience them through a sampling process. While there is now clear evidence that some form of DE gap exists, its causes, exact nature, and implications for decision theory remain unclear. We present a new experiment which examines in a unified design four distinct causal mechanisms that might drive the DE gap, attributing it respectively to information differences (sampling bias), to a feature of preferences (ambiguity sensitivity), or to aspects of cognition (likelihood representation and memory). Using a model-free approach, we elicit a DE gap similar in direction and size to the literature’s average and find that when each factor is considered in isolation, sampling bias stemming from under-represented rare events is the only significant driver of the gap. Yet, model-mediated analysis reveals the possibility of a smaller DE gap, existing even without information differences. Moreover, this form of analysis of our data indicates that even when information about them is obtained by sampling, rare events are generally overweighted.
... The lack of age-related differences in risk taking in the present study is consistent with the notion that people's risk preferences depend strongly on the specific task and situation (Figner & Weber, 2011;Frey et al., 2015;Rolison et al., 2014). For instance, age differences in risk taking appear to emerge in some tasks involving decisions from experience (when outcomes and their frequencies must be learned; Hertwig et al., 2004). ...
Objectives This research addresses how younger and older adults' decisions and evaluations of gains and losses are affected by the way in which monetary incentives are provided. We compared two common incentive schemes in decision making: pay one (only a single decision is incentivized) and pay all (incentives across all decisions are accumulated). Method Younger adults (18-36 years; n = 147) and older adults (60-89 years; n = 139) participated in either a pay-one or pay-all condition and made binary choices between two-outcome monetary lotteries in gain, loss, and mixed domains. We analyzed participants' decision quality, risk taking, and psychometric tests scores. Computational modeling of cumulative prospect theory served to measure sensitivity to outcomes and probabilities, loss aversion, and choice sensitivity. Results Decision quality and risk aversion were higher in the gain than mixed or loss domain, but unaffected by age. Loss aversion was higher and choice sensitivity was lower in older than younger adults. In the pay-one condition, the value functions were more strongly curved and choice sensitivity was higher than in the pay-all condition. Discussion An opportunity of accumulating incentives has similar portfolio effects on younger and older adults' decisions. In general, people appear to decide less cautiously in pay-all than pay-one scenarios. The impact of different incentive schemes should be carefully considered in aging and decision research.
... Reduced decision-making efficiency has been attributed to cognitive limitations in information processing in older people [9] who have also been shown to be less consistent in their choices [10]. Biologically, these effects have been explained by the loss of neocortical neurons, with the most pronounced atrophic changes observed in the prefrontal cortex. ...
Cognitive abilities decline with age, constituting a major manifestation of aging. The quantitative biomarkers of this process, as well as the correspondence to different biological clocks, remain largely an open problem. In this paper we employ the following cognitive tests: 1. differentiation of shades (campimetry); 2. evaluation of the arithmetic correctness and 3. detection of reversed letters and identify the most significant age-related cognitive indices. Based on their subsets we construct a machine learning-based Cognitive Clock that predicts chronological age with a mean absolute error of 8.62 years. Remarkably, epigenetic and phenotypic ages are predicted by Cognitive Clock with an even better accuracy. We also demonstrate the presence of correlations between cognitive, phenotypic and epigenetic age accelerations that suggests a deep connection between cognitive performance and aging status of an individual.
... In stable environments, higher memory capacity should facilitate the selection of better choice options, because future selections can rely on a larger set of past experiences. Indeed, studies in experiential decision-making have found that higher memory capacity and cognitive resources are good predictors of better performance in static environments (e.g., Fiedler, 2000;Frey et al., 2015;Rakow et al., 2010). Rakow et al. (2008) observed that the amount of exploration devoted to each alternative (that is, choosing and alternating between options to learn more about their value) was positively correlated with working memory capacity, suggesting that participants would search for more information and are expected to make better choices when they have better memory. ...
An important aspect of making good decisions is the ability to adapt to changes in the values of available choice options, and research suggests that we are poor at changing behavior and adapting our choices successfully. The current paper contributes to clarifying the role of memory on learning and successful adaptation to changing decision environments. We test two aspects of changing decision environments: the direction of change and the type of feedback. The direction of change refers to how options become more or less rewarding compared to other options, over time. Feedback refers to whether full or partial information about decision outcomes is received. Results from behavioral experiments revealed a robust effect of the direction of change: risk that becomes more rewarding over time is harder to detect than risk that becomes less rewarding over time; even with full feedback. We rely on three distinct computational models to interpret the role of memory on learning and adaptation. The distributions of individual model parameters were analyzed in relation to participants’ ability to successfully adapt to the changing conditions of the various decision environments. Consistent across the three models and two distinct data sets, results revealed the importance of recency as an individual memory component for choice adaptation. Individuals relying more on recent experiences were more successful at adapting to change, regardless of its direction. We explain the value and limitations of these findings as well as opportunities for future research.
... Another popular approach to explain behavior in the sampling paradigm relies on reinforcement learning models (e.g., a value updating rule, see Frey et al., 2015). These models typically assume that valuation of each option is updated after each sample is drawn. ...
Many real-life choices are based on previous experiences. Research devoted to these decisions from experience has typically employed static settings, where the probability of a given outcome is constant across trials. However, recent studies of repeated choice suggest that people tend to follow perceived patterns of outcomes even when true patterns do not exist (i.e., in static settings). Here we examine whether the tendency to follow perceived patterns above and beyond external incentives also characterize decisions from sampling. To this aim, we modified the static sampling paradigm to include a conspicuous sequence of outcomes while the incentive dictated disregarding the sequence. In two studies we found a strong tendency to follow the fixed pattern of outcomes. This tendency was evident not only in sampling choices where following the pattern required additional effort and did not provide additional information: The same tendency was observed on participant’s final consequential choices, where following the pattern impaired financial returns. We replicated these results even after ensuring comprehension of the task, doubling the expected payoffs and also under partial feedback design. Overall, our results suggest that decisions from sampling, like repeated consequential choice, reflect a strong tendency to follow perceived environmental regularities. Our results are consistent with the assumption that during free sampling and during consequential choice, most participants respond to when (i.e., on which specific trials) each of the options is better rather than to which option is better overall (i.e., the option that implies a more attractive distribution of outcomes).
... So, how do participants decide when to stop sampling? There is some evidence that sample space cardinality has an effect: When participants are given information about the variety and number of states, a larger number of states motivates taking larger samples (Frey et al., 2015;Hills et al., 2013;Noguchi & Hills, 2016). However, other influences on participants' sample sizes have little or no connection with sample space cardinality. ...
Many real-world decisions must be made when we do not know all of the possible relevant states beforehand, that is, the “sample space” (Ω). Standard probability theory takes Ω for granted. Moreover, there is scant psychological research on how people construct Ω. We report four exploratory experimental studies investigating the impact of sample information on judgments about the nature of Ω, borrowing ideas from the literatures on probability judgment, sampling models, and biological diversity estimation. Study 1 demonstrates that laypeople may use reasonable heuristics for assessing the size of Ω when given capture–recapture sample information. Studies 2–4 show that the biologists’ intuition that a larger number of unique states in a sample (numerical diversity) implies a larger Ω also applies to many laypeople, but this can be overridden by prior beliefs about Ω. Study 3 demonstrates that greater qualitative diversity in a sample also magnifies assessments of the size of Ω. Finally, Study 4, in line with the literature on natural sample spaces and knowledge-partitioning, shows that estimates of the size of Ω can be altered by directing people’s memory to retrieving different subsets of Ω. Implications and future directions for research in this area are discussed in the conclusion.
... For instance, age differences in risk taking emerge in some tasks involving decisions from experience (when outcomes and their frequencies must be learned), whereas younger and older adults often show similar risk taking in decisions from description (when outcomes and probabilities are described, e.g., in monetary lotteries) (Mamerow et al., 2016;Mata et al., 2011). Other task characteristics likely affect the size of age differences as well (e.g., the number of options in the choice set: Frey et al., 2015; whether one of the options provides a certain outcome: Kellen et al., 2017;Zilker et al., 2020). ...
Age differences in monetary decisions may emerge because younger and older adults perceive the value of outcomes differently. Yet, age‐differential effects of monetary rewards on decisions are not well understood. Most laboratory studies on aging and decision making have used scenarios in which rewards were merely hypothetical (decisions did not have any real consequences) or in which only small amounts of money were at stake. In the current study, we compared younger adults' (20–29 years) and older adults' (61–82 years) decisions in probabilistic choice problems with real or hypothetical rewards. Decision‐contingent rewards were in a typical range of previous studies (gains of up to ~4.25 USD) or substantially scaled up (gains of up to ~85 USD per participant). Reward type (real vs. hypothetical) affected decision quality, including value maximization, switching between options, and dominance violations (choices of an option that was inferior to another option in all respects). Decision quality was markedly better with real than hypothetical rewards in older adults and correlated with numeracy in both age groups. However, we found no evidence that reward type affected people's risk preferences. Overall, the findings portray a fairly positive picture regarding the use of hypothetical scenarios to assess preferences: With carefully prepared instructions, people from different age groups indicate preferences in hypothetical scenarios that match their decisions with real and much higher rewards. One advantage of using real rewards is that they help to reduce decision noise.
... External information sampling (i.e., Brunswikian sampling; Fiedler & Juslin, 2005;Juslin & Olsson, 1997) has been extensively studied, often with the finding that observed samples predict people's choices and behaviors well (e.g., Fiedler et al., 2010;Hertwig et al., 2006;Lindskog et al., 2013). In these investigations, computational models constitute a tool to systematically study the links between the external samples that participants observed and their choices or judgments-by formalizing the cognitive processes involved in information use and integration (e.g., Frey, Mata, et al., 2015;Frey, Rieskamp, et al., 2015;Kellen et al., 2016;Yechiam & Busemeyer, 2005). ...
A person’s risk preference may determine significant life outcomes (e.g., in finance or health), and people are therefore routinely asked to report their risk preferences in various scientific and applied contexts. Yet, still little is known concerning the cognitive underpinnings of this judgment-formation process. We ran two studies (N = 250, and N = 150 in a retest) implementing the process-tracing method of aspect listing, to investigate the information-integration processes underlying people’s self-reports by means of cognitive modeling (RQ1), as well as to examine people’s cognitive representations of their risk preferences (RQ2). Our analyses indicate that interindividual differences in self-reported risk preferences can be modeled well based on the listed aspects’ properties of evidence and substantially better than using sociodemographic variables as predictors. Specifically, to render self-reports people appear to integrate the strength of evidence of multiple aspects sampled from memory. These aspects further revealed that people’s cognitive representation of their risk preferences mostly relates to the magnitudes of outcomes and often to explicit trade-offs between positive and negative outcomes, in line with a risk-return perspective. Crucially, within participants the strength of evidence of the listed aspects remained highly stable across the two studies (RQ3), and changes therein were closely related to changes in self-reported risk preference (RQ4). In sum, our findings provide insight into the cognitive processes of how people render self-reports of their risk preferences, suggest an explanation for the well-documented temporal stability thereof, and thus corroborate the internal validity of this measurement approach. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved)
... Other measures of cognitive ability may be more important to understanding individual differences in DFE. Given the memory component present in DFE, a plausible candidate could be working memory capacity, that is, the ability to store and manipulate items in short-term memory (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). ...
The processing of sequentially presented numerical information is a prerequisite for decisions from experience, where people learn about potential outcomes and their associated probabilities and then make choices between gambles. Little is known, however, about how people's preference for choosing a gamble is affected by how they perceive and process numerical information. To address this, we conducted a series of experiments wherein participants repeatedly sampled numbers from continuous outcome distributions. They were incentivized either to estimate the means of the numbers or to state their minimum selling prices to forgo a consequential draw from the distributions (i.e., the certainty equivalents or valuations). We found that participants valued distributions below their means, valued high‐variance sequences lower than low‐variance sequences, and valued left‐skewed sequences lower than right‐skewed sequences. Though less pronounced, similar patterns occurred in the mean estimation task where preferences should not play a role. These results are not consistent with prior findings in decision from experience such as the overweighting of high numbers and the underweighting of rare events. Rather, the qualitative effects, as well as the similarity of effects in valuation and estimation, are consistent with the assumption that people process numbers on a compressed mental number line in valuations from experience.
... Although such ambiguity, description, and experience-based risk-taking measures, respectively, share central characteristics (e.g., the presence of uncertainty, integration of available information into a subjective value signal), they differ in the involvement of further requisite or incidental processes, including learning, attention, affect, and memory (Figner et al., 2009;Hertwig and Erev, 2009;Rosenbaum et al., 2018). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the heterogeneous trajectories found for risk taking across the life span are, in parts, reflective of the way in which risk is encountered and how the relative cognitive (and affective) demands of the measures used to operationalize risk interact with age (Mata et al., 2011;Tymula et al., 2012Tymula et al., , 2013Li et al., 2013;Frey et al., 2015a;Mamerow et al., 2016;Rosenbaum et al., 2018). ...
Maladaptive risk taking can have severe individual and societal consequences; thus, individual differences are prominent targets for intervention and prevention. Although brain activation has been shown to be associated with individual differences in risk taking, the directionality of the reported brain–behavior associations is less clear. Here, we argue that one aspect contributing to the mixed results is the low convergence between risk-taking measures, especially between the behavioral tasks used to elicit neural functional markers. To address this question, we analyzed within-participant neuroimaging data for two widely used risk-taking tasks collected from the imaging subsample of the Basel–Berlin Risk Study (N = 116 young human adults). Focusing on core brain regions implicated in risk taking (nucleus accumbens, anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex), for the two tasks, we examined group-level activation for risky versus safe choices, as well as associations between local functional markers and various risk-related outcomes, including psychometrically derived risk preference factors. While we observed common group-level activation in the two tasks (notably increased nucleus accumbens activation), individual differences analyses support the idea that the presence and directionality of associations between brain activation and risk taking varies as a function of the risk-taking measures used to capture individual differences. Our results have methodological implications for the use of brain markers for intervention or prevention.
... Older adults are known to suffer from losses in fluid cognitive skills (Craik & Bialystok, 2006;Horn & Cattell, 1967;Zaval, Li, Johnson, & Weber, 2015). Moreover, differences between younger and older adults are often observed especially in cognitively demanding tasks (e.g., Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015), and it has been proposed that older adults are more selective than younger adults in their engagement of cognitive resources in such tasks (Hess, 2014). It is therefore plausible that differences in option complexity have a particularly strong effect in older adults (a similar possibility was also explored by Mather et al., 2012). ...
Recent findings suggest that the commonly observed preference for a safe over a risky option, which is more pronounced in older than in younger adults, is largely driven by differences in the complexity of those options. Here we examine whether option complexity also contributes to the emergence of the framing effect and loss aversion in risky choice as well as to delay discounting in intertemporal choice. All of these phenomena tend to be measured with choice problems that involve options differing in complexity. We also examine whether option complexity contributes to potential age differences in these phenomena. In each paradigm, we experimentally increased the complexity of the simpler option, thus reducing differences in the complexity of the options. We found no evidence for an effect of this manipulation on the framing effect nor on participants' preferences in the loss aversion task. On average, participants did not show loss aversion. Increasing the complexity of the option with an immediate reward in the intertemporal choice task made younger, but unexpectedly not older, adults less likely to choose this option. Our results thus indicate that preferences in tasks typically used to measure the framing effect, loss aversion, and delay discounting are only little affected by differences in option complexity.
... When asked to choose a prescription drug plan, the association between older age and making worse choices was more pronounced when there were nine versus only three options (Hanoch et al. 2011). When given an opportunity to learn about two options, older and younger adults both chose the option with the higher expected value, but as the number of options increased, older adults performed worse than younger adults (Frey et al. 2015). ...
This review summarizes research and theory on aging and decision making. We trace the conceptual and historical origins of using behavioral decision-making tasks to identify age differences in decision-making competence. We review cross-sectional and longitudinal studies that suggest that some facets of decision-making competence remain relatively stable across adulthood. We describe how older adults’ decision-making competence may be challenged by complex decisions that tax their fluid cognitive abilities, especially when decisions are not seen as personally relevant. We discuss how relying on life experience can offset declines in fluid reasoning skills and how age-related shifts in motivation and improvements in emotion regulation provide an advantage when decisions involve losses and missed opportunities. We discuss how existing knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the aging decision maker might be applied to improve decision-making competence and outline next steps for advancing understanding of decision making across adulthood.
Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Developmental Psychology, Volume 2 is December 15, 2020. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.
... Older adults' lower fluid cognition and numeracy contributed to their selecting monetary lotteries with relatively lower expected values in gambles involving losses (Pachur, Mata, & Hertwig, 2017). Increasing the cognitive load of a decision by adding more options decreased older adults' performance relative to that of younger adults, whereas both older and younger adults chose the option with the greater expected value when there were only two options (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015). Similarly, age differences were accentuated for risky decisions that required learning in new environment (Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011). ...
In the first half of the chapter, we review research on financial decision making and age-related differences in cognitive abilities, experience-based knowledge, emotional processes, and motivation. We discuss findings showing that age-related declines in cognitive abilities may yield suboptimal decisions, especially when decisions are complex or decision makers lack motivation to deploy cognitive resources. We highlight research showing that experience and training in financial principles can attenuate challenges posed by age-related cognitive declines. We then summarize research showing that age-related shifts in motivation and improvements in emotion regulation have consequences for financial decision making. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of positive emotions on older adults’ decision making. In the second half of the chapter, we draw from the literature on aging and financial decision making to consider developmentally appropriate interventions to promote sound financial decision making. We note that “nudges” that capitalize on habitual thinking styles might benefit from considering older adults’ limited future time perspective and habitual orientation towards the present. We discuss ways to increase older adults’ willingness to use decision aids, for example, by highlighting the emotional relevance of information and reducing demands on numerical skills. We note that providing training in financial principles early in life may help to delay the onset of negative consequences of cognitive declines on financial decisions by promoting experience. We conclude by discussing limitations of current knowledge and recommending topics for further research.
... e. deficit in reward learning). In both conditions, diminished neural processing in certain brain regions can be observed [30][31][32][33]. ...
During aging cognitive functions change differently from others. Unlike most of the body systems, there is no clear decline pattern in cognitive processes. One of the most significant cognitive processes is decision-making, which defines social interactions, economical relationships, and risky behavior. Among factors influence decisionmaking process, individual lifelong experience is considered to be an important one. Obviously, older adults have more life experience, than the younger groups. However, the former often do not tend to rational choices and beneficial strategies. In this case it is important to assess how aging processes in brain contribute into searching for the most beneficial option during decision-making. On the basis of today’s studies about risky behavior, judgement of fairness, financial games, and modern neuroimaging data this review will observe and discuss age-related differences in decision-making. Thus, a correct cognitive profile of older adult in decision-making context can be determined.
... The broader literature demonstrating asymmetries in deliberative versus affective processing abilities suggests that age-related declines in information use (e.g., EV) will be attenuated as decisions become more experienced-based versus more descriptive (Huang, Wood, Berger, & Hanoch, 2013, 2015. This might especially be the case when choice options are limited, minimizing the need for information search processes (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015;Mata & Nunes, 2010). Further, decrements in description-based decision making quality may be further compromised by age-related declines in neurocognitive abilities related to executive function. ...
The current study focused on the degree to which decision context (deliberative vs. affective) differentially impacted the use of available information about uncertainty (i.e., probability, positive and negative outcome magnitudes, expected value, and variance/risk) when older adults were faced with decisions under risk. In addition, we examined whether individual differences in general mental ability and executive function moderated the associations between age and information use. Participants (N = 96) completed a neuropsychological assessment and the hot (affective) and cold (deliberative) versions of an explicit risk task. Our results did not find a significant Age × Hot/Cold Condition interaction on overall risk-taking. However, we found that older adults were less likely to use the full decision information available regardless of the decision context. This finding suggested more global age differences in information use. Moreover, older adults were less likely to make expected-value sensitive decisions, regardless of the hot/cold context. Finally, we found that low performance on measures of executive functioning, but not general mental ability, appears to be a risk factor for lower information use. This pattern appears in middle age and progressively becomes stronger in older age. The current work provides evidence that common underlying decision processes may operate in risk tasks deemed either affective or deliberative. It further suggests that underlying mechanisms such as information use may be paramount, relative to differences in the affective context. Additionally, individual differences in neuropsychological function may act as a moderator in the tendency to use available information across affective context.
... It is important that an older person has the ability to function independently in their own home, but findings [14] show that older people living in social care institutions have lower functional abilities in comparison with those living at home. Life satisfaction in older age is influenced by the functional ability of older people [15] and their cognitive abilities [16], both of which play an important role in performing everyday activities. ...
Background: The physical factor (health literacy, health status, functional ability to perform daily basic and instrumental activities and risk factors) is linked to life satisfaction in older age. The aim of this study is to establish the correlation between the physical holistic factor and life satisfaction in older age.
Material and Methods: The quantitative research method was used. In order to sample the data, the authors chose a simple random sample. The designed questionnaire was filled in by 1064 older persons aged ≥ 65 years, living in social care institutions/nursing homes for older persons or in the home environment. The number of correctly completed survey questionnaires was 656. In order to measure life satisfaction, the Satisfaction with Life Scale was used. Within the physical factor, 4 indexes were formed. In order to be able to show the desired influences or links between the physical factor and life satisfaction, the authors used propensity score methods.
Results: The individual indexes within the physical factor are linked to life satisfaction to a varying degree: health literacy (R2 = 0.137), health status (R2 = 0.047), the functional ability to perform daily basic and instrumental activities (R2 = 0.015), and risk factors (R2 = 0.001). The physical holistic factor is linked to life satisfaction in older age (R2 = 0.05).
Conclusions: With this research, the authors have proven that the older persons with high levels of health literacy, a good health status without chronic diseases, who are independent in performing daily basic and instrumental activities, and do not have any risk factors present, are more satisfied with their lives. Med Pr. 2019;70(5)
... Specifically, older adults tend to search for less information (Yoon et al., 2009;Mata et al., 2007) and have slower processing speed (Mata et al., 2007). In addition, age-based differences have also been found with respect to the selection and employment of decision strategies (Frey, Mata, & Hertwig, 2015;Mata et al., 2007;Pachur et al., 2009). Studies have shown that older adults less often suspended the employment of a heuristic when it was required (Pachur et al., 2009) and used decision strategies that were simpler and less cognitively difficult to employ (Mata et al., 2007). ...
Bringing together probabilistic persuasion theory and semantic network models, past research introduced the number and strength of direct connections in a semantic network as a theory-based criterion of argument quality. In two experiments, the present research provides evidence that this argument quality criterion also increases persuasion in decision-making contexts. Experiment 1 revealed that highly central attributes—embedded in advertising arguments advocating for choice of a focal product—were more persuasive, increased choice confidence, and were perceived as better arguments than attributes low in centrality. Experiment 2 nearly mirrored Experiment 1 by revealing main effects of attribute centrality on respondent choice behavior and perceived argument quality. In addition, an interaction effect of centrality and age on participant choice latencies was observed. In comparison to other age brackets, young adult participants had significantly lower choice latencies when choices were based on highly central attributes as opposed to lowly central attributes.
Given the ubiquity of exploration in everyday life, researchers from many disciplines have developed methods to measure exploratory behaviour. There are therefore many ways to quantify and measure exploration. However, it remains unclear whether the different measures (i) have convergent validity relative to one another, (ii) capture a domain general tendency, and (iii) capture a tendency that is stable across time. In a sample of 678 participants, we found very little evidence of convergent validity for the behavioural measures (Hypothesis 1); most of the behavioural measures lacked sufficient convergent validity with one another or with the self-reports. In psychometric modelling analyses, we could not identify a good fitting model with an assumed general tendency to explore (Hypothesis 2); the best fitting model suggested that the different behavioural measures capture behaviours that are specific to the tasks. In a subsample of 254 participants who completed the study a second time, we found that the measures had stability across an 1 month timespan (Hypothesis 3). Therefore, although there were stable individual differences in how people approached each task across time, there was no generalizability across tasks, and drawing broad conclusions about exploratory behaviour from studies using these tasks may be problematic. The Stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 2nd December 2022 https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.21717407.v1. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/64QJU.
The notion of notable anatomical, biochemical, and behavioral distinctions within male and female brains has been a contentious topic of interest within the scientific community over several decades. Advancements in neuroimaging and molecular biological techniques have increasingly elucidated common mechanisms characterizing brain aging while also revealing disparities between sexes in these processes. Variations in cognitive functions; susceptibility to and progression of neurodegenerative conditions, notably Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases; and notable disparities in life expectancy between sexes, underscore the significance of evaluating aging within the framework of gender differences. This comprehensive review surveys contemporary literature on the restructuring of brain structures and fundamental processes unfolding in the aging brain at cellular and molecular levels, with a focus on gender distinctions. Additionally, the review delves into age-related cognitive alterations, exploring factors influencing the acceleration or deceleration of aging, with particular attention to estrogen’s hormonal support of the central nervous system.
Within just 7 years, behavioral decision research in psychology underwent a dramatic change: In 1967, Peterson and Beach (1967) reviewed more than 160 experiments concerned with people's statistical intuitions. Invoking the metaphor of the mind as an intuitive statistician, they concluded that "probability theory and statistics can be used as the basis for psychological models that integrate and account for human performance in a wide range of inferential tasks" (p. 29). Yet in a 1974 Science article, Tversky and Kahneman rejected this conclusion, arguing that "people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simple judgmental operations" (p. 1124). With that, they introduced the heuristics-and-biases research program, which has profoundly altered how psychology, and the behavioral sciences more generally, view the mind's competences and rationality. How was this radical transformation possible? We examine a previously neglected driver: The heuristics-and-biases program established an experimental protocol in behavioral decision research that relied on described scenarios rather than learning and experience. We demonstrate this shift with an analysis of 604 experiments, which shows that the descriptive protocol has dominated post-1974 research. Specifically, we examine two lines of research addressed in the intuitive-statistician program (Bayesian reasoning and judgments of compound events) and two lines of research spurred by the heuristics-and-biases program (framing and anchoring and adjustment). We conclude that the focus on description at the expense of learning has profoundly shaped the influential view of the error-proneness of human cognition. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).
Changes in cognition, affect, and brain function combine to promote a shift in the nature of mentation in older adulthood, favoring exploitation of prior knowledge over exploratory search as the starting point for thought and action. Age-related exploitation biases result from the accumulation of prior knowledge, reduced cognitive control, and a shift toward affective goals. These are accompanied by changes in cortical networks, as well as attention and reward circuits. By incorporating these factors into a unified account, the exploration-to-exploitation shift offers an integrative model of cognitive, affective, and brain aging. Here, we review evidence for this model, identify determinants and consequences, and survey the challenges and opportunities posed by an exploitation-biased mental mode in later life.
Background
Older adults in communities make daily decisions about how to meet their transportation needs so they can access services and stay socially connected. With the aging of populations in developed countries, the travel decisions of older adults will have increasing impacts. Research studies have identified different sets of factors that contribute to certain travel decisions, but little research has been directed towards understanding how individuals select information from all available factors, what information they include in their decisions under different circumstances, and the processes they use in making their transportation decisions.
Methods
This exploratory study involved 20 men and 17 women, mean age 78.6 years (range 70–96), who drove weekly. All participants were involved in each phase of the 3-phase study. In Phase 1, a review of the literature and interviews with the participants was used to collect information, and inductive thematic analysis was employed to construct a draft conceptual model of older driver decision-making. In Phase 2, participants completed a stated preference task of written scenarios to demonstrate their decision-making strategies. Results were tabulated and used to refine a final Daily Driving Decisions model. In Phase 3, a card sorting decision task was used to test the model with participants.
Results
The final dynamic Daily Driving Decisions Model was confirmed to describe decision processes used by the participants in making decisions about how they would meet their transportation needs. The model describes three categories of factors used in decisions, labelled Motivators, Constraint/Enablers and Context, each containing four attribute themes. A significant finding was the variable use of the same item to either constrain or enable the decision to drive depending on the variation of other factors in the scenario. Participants demonstrated use of compensatory and noncompensatory (heuristic, habitual) decision processes that were accommodated by the model.
Conclusion
The proposed Daily Driving Decisions Model addresses a gap in our understanding of how older drivers make their decisions about meeting their transportation needs. The model presents a template for classifying the types of information used, ignored or discarded by older adults, and the pathways that they take to arrive at their decisions. The model provides opportunities for further research in testing the influence of other factors such as urban/rural residence, income, health status and culture on driving decisions. Further, the model can be used by practitioners to gain insight into the decision-making behaviours of individuals and to develop interventions to enhance their decision-making skills.
Higher arousal is linked to simple decision strategies and an increased preference for immediate rewards in younger adults, but little is known about the influence of arousal on decision making in older adults. In light of age-related locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system declines, we predicted a reduced association between arousal and decision behavior in older adults. Younger and older participants made a series of choices between smaller, higher-probability and larger, lower-probability financial gains. Each choice was preceded by the presentation of a high-arousal or low-arousal sound. Pupil dilation was continuously recorded as an index of task-evoked arousal. Both age groups showed significant modulation of pupil dilation as a function of arousal condition. Higher-arousal sounds were associated with shorter response times, particularly in younger adults. Furthermore, higher-arousal sounds were associated with greater risk aversion in younger adults and greater risk seeking in older adults, in line with an arousal-related amplification of baseline preferences in both age groups. Jointly, these findings help inform current theories of the effects of arousal on information processing in younger and older adults.
Out-of-home catering services frequently offer consumers the opportunity to choose their foods from among different proposals and/or provide consumers with a variety of food. The present thesis aimed at investigating the effect of providing choice of equally-liked foods during a meal on food liking and food intake in healthy, normal-weight adults. The first part focused on two characteristics of a food product assortment (desserts) as modulator factors of the choice effect: (i) the degree of similarities between desserts and (ii) the level of pleasantness of desserts. Two independent behavioral studies using the same paradigm were carried out in adults (n=80 for each experiment) who participated in a choice and a no-choice session. Providing choice enhanced food liking no matter the degree of similarity between the desserts, but enhanced food intake only when products were sufficiently dissimilar. The choice effect on food liking and food intake was not modulated by the level of pleasantness of alternatives. The second part of the thesis assessed the impact of choice and/or variety on food liking and food intake. Fifty-nine adults participated in a 4-session study where they consumed vegetable dishes under the four following conditions: (i) being served one dish (no-choice/no-variety); (ii) being served the three dishes (no-choice/variety); (iii) choosing one dish from among three (choice/no-variety) and (iv) choosing as many dishes as wanted (choice/variety). Providing choice increased vegetable liking and vegetable intake, while offering a variety of vegetables only increased their liking. No synergy effect between choice and variety was observed on vegetable liking and vegetable intake (i.e. the effect in the choice/variety condition was not significantly higher than the effects in the no-choice/variety and choice/no-variety conditions). It may be then concluded that providing choice of food to adults increases food liking even when choice is made among similarly-liked foods. Regarding choice and variety effects, however, their impacts on food intake appear to be vulnerable to contextual factors, and especially, the degree of similarity between food options.
People's risk preferences are thought to be central to many consequential real-life decisions, making it important to identify robust correlates of this construct. Various psychological theories have put forth a series of candidate correlates, yet the strength and robustness of their associations remain unclear because of disparate operationalizations of risk preference and analytic limitations in past research. We addressed these issues with a study involving several operationalizations of risk preference (all collected from each participant in a diverse sample of the German population; N = 916), and by adopting an exhaustive modeling approach-specification curve analysis. Our analyses of 6 candidate correlates (household income, sex, age, fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, years of education) suggest that sex and age have robust and consistent associations with risk preference, whereas the other candidate correlates show weaker and more (domain-) specific associations (except for crystallized intelligence, for which there were no robust associations). The results further demonstrate the important role of construct operationalization when assessing people's risk preferences: Self-reported propensity measures picked up various associations with the proposed correlates, but (incentivized) behavioral measures largely failed to do so. In short, the associations between the 6 candidate correlates and risk preference depend mostly on how risk preference is measured, rather than whether and which control variables are included in the model specifications. The present findings inform several theories that have suggested candidate correlates of risk preference, and illustrate how personality research may profit from exhaustive modeling techniques to improve theory and measurement of essential constructs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).
This chapter acts as a primer on behavioural economics and ageing: it introduces the basic concepts studied in behavioural economics, including the anomalies and departures from the rational choice framework, along with a discussion of the main empirical findings.
Objectives:
Across the lifespan, deficits in executive functioning (EF) are associated with poor behavioral control and failure to achieve goals. Though EF is often discussed as one broad construct, a prominent model of EF suggests that it is composed of three subdomains: inhibition, set shifting, and updating. These subdomains are seen in both young (YA) and older adults (OA), with performance deficits across subdomains in OA. Therefore, our goal was to investigate whether subdomains of EF might be differentially impacted by age, and how these differences may relate to broader global age differences in EF.
Methods:
To assess these age differences, we conducted a meta-analysis at multiple levels, including task level, subdomain level, and of global EF. Based on previous work, we hypothesized that there would be overall differences in EF in OA.
Results:
Using 1,268 effect sizes from 401 articles, we found overall differences in EF with age. Results suggested that differences in performance are not uniform, such that variability in age effects emerged at the task level, and updating was not as affected by age as other subdomains.
Discussion:
These findings advance our understanding of age differences in EF, and stand to inform early detection of EF decline.
Now days, understanding how people make purchasing decisions in digital era are of growing importance for researchers and marketers. Customer's reviews and ratings are important for better understanding of customers and improving services. Whereas, Consumer's reviews and ratings are available online for wide range of products and services. This Study investigated how average consumer ratings, product attributes, and consumer reviews influenced on the online purchasing decisions of buyers. In line with previous research, study found that buyers use all types of information on online purchasing; they clearly preferred products with better attributes and with higher average consumer ratings. It has been found that the buyer preferences can be changed for the higher-rated products, if the product is overridden by a rich negative or positive review.
Z znanstvenim pristopom smo proučili povezanost fizičnega, psihičnega, socialnega in duhovnega dejavnika z zadovoljstvom z življenjem v starosti s ciljem, da bi na osnovi dobljenih rezultatov raziskave oblikovali holistični model za zagotavljanje zadovoljstva z življenjem v starosti. Oblikovali smo naslednje raziskovalno vprašanje: Kakšna je povezanost fizičnega, psihičnega, socialnega in duhovnega dejavnika v holističnem modelu za zagotavljanje zadovoljstva z življenjem v starosti?
Za potrebe raziskovalnega dela smo uporabili kvantitativni raziskovalni pristop ter zaradi kompleksnosti raziskovalnega problema več metod: deduktivno metodo, kavzalno-neeksperimentalno metodo, metodo deskripcije, metodo analize, metodo sinteze in komparativno metodo. Iz statistične množice je bil izbran enostavni slučajnostni vzorec. Na podlagi pridobljenih podatkov s strani Statističnega urada Republike Slovenije (2012) smo se odločili za stratificirano vzorčenje po regijah. V raziskavo smo zajeli 1064 starih ljudi (65 let in več) v desetih statističnih regijah, ki bivajo v domačem (n = 532) in institucionalnem okolju (n = 532). Pravilno izpolnjenih anketnih vprašalnikov je bilo 656, kar pomeni, da je bila realizacija vzorca 61,6-odstotna. Glede na demografske podatke je v raziskavi sodelovalo 470 (71,6 %) žensk in 186 (28,4 %) moških. Povprečna starost anketiranca je znašala 78,2 leti (razpon od 65 do 98 let). Podatke smo analizirali s programom SPSS 22.0 in R-paketom MICE. Za prikaz želenih povezav smo uporabili napredne statistične metode za analizo vzročnih učinkov in pogojnih asociacij, t.i. metode nagnjenja. Za pridobivanje podatkov smo uporabili strukturirani merski instrument v obliki anketnega vprašalnika. Vprašalnik je meril različne gradnike zadovoljstva z življenjem v starosti, ki vplivajo na kakovost življenja v starosti. Zanesljivost vprašalnika smo ugotavljali z metodo analize notranje konsistentnosti. Cronbachov koeficient alfa je po sklopih znašal od 0,765 do 0,953, kar kaže na zanesljivost vprašalnika.
Z raziskovanjem smo pridobili rezultate, ki implicirajo znanstveni prispevek na področju menedžmenta kakovosti življenja starih ljudi. Na osnovi statističnih izračunov smo potrdili zastavljene hipoteze in s tem dokazali, da je psihični (R2 = 0,21), fizični (R2 = 0,05), socialni (R2 = 0,19) in duhovni dejavnik (R2 = 0,37) povezan z zadovoljstvom z življenjem v starosti. Moč povezave med dejavniki je različna. Najmočneje je z zadovoljstvom z življenjem povezan duhovni dejavnik (R2 = 0,37) in najmanj fizični dejavnik (R2 = 0,05).
Fizični, psihični, socialni in duhovni dejavniki so povezani z zadovoljstvom z življenjem, vendar je moč povezave različna. Dejavniki se med seboj prepletajo in vplivajo na kakovost življenja starega človeka. Izdelali smo holistični model za zagotavljanje zadovoljstva z življenjem v starosti, ki potrjuje, da je treba starega človeka obravnavati holistično, glede na njegove biopsihosocialne potrebe, pri čemer je pomembno njegovo simbolno okolje, ki ga predstavlja duhovni dejavnik. Z modelom dokazujemo, da bo treba več pozornosti nameniti celostni obravnavi starih ljudi, saj staranje in starost doživljamo različno.
Ključne besede: kakovost življenja, zadovoljstvo z življenjem, star človek, fizični dejavnik, psihični dejavnik, socialni dejavnik, duhovni dejavnik, holistični model.
Humans and other primates share many decision biases, among them our subjective distortion of objective probabilities. When making choices between uncertain rewards we typically treat probabilities nonlinearly: overvaluing low probabilities of reward and undervaluing high ones. A growing body of evidence, however, points to a more flexible pattern of distortion than the classical inverse-S one, highlighting the effect of experimental conditions in shifting the weight assigned to probabilities, such as task feedback, learning, and attention. Here we investigated the role of sequence structure (the order in which gambles are presented in a choice task) in shaping the probability distortion patterns of rhesus macaques: we presented 2 male monkeys with binary choice sequences of MIXED or REPEATED gambles against safe rewards. Parametric modeling revealed that choices in each sequence type were guided by significantly different patterns of probability distortion: whereas we elicited the classical inverse-S-shaped probability distortion in pseudorandomly MIXED trial sequences of gamble-safe choices, we found the opposite pattern consisting of S-shaped distortion, with REPEATED sequences. We extended these results to binary choices between two gambles, without a safe option, and confirmed the unique influence of the sequence structure in which the animals make choices. Finally, we showed that the value of gambles experienced in the past had a significant impact on the subjective value of future ones, shaping probability distortion on a trial-by-trial basis. Together, our results suggest that differences in choice sequence are sufficient to reverse the direction of probability distortion.
SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT Our lives are peppered with uncertain, probabilistic choices. Recent studies showed how such probabilities are subjectively distorted. In the present study, we show that probability distortions in macaque monkeys differ significantly between sequences in which single gambles are repeated (S-shaped distortion), as opposed to being pseudorandomly intermixed with other gambles (inverse-S-shaped distortion). Our findings challenge the idea of fixed probability distortions resulting from inflexible computations, and points to a more instantaneous evaluation of probabilistic information. Past trial outcomes appeared to drive the “gap” between probability distortions in different conditions. Our data suggest that, as in most adaptive systems, probability values are slowly but constantly updated from prior experience, driving measures of probability distortion to either side of the S/inverse-S debate.
Competitive pressure affects a wide spectrum of decisions under uncertainty. It forces the individual to balance the value of gathering more information about the quality of potential choice alternatives against the risk that competitors will act first and claim the best options. Although this tradeoff between competition and exploration has long been recognized, little is known about how people adapt their exploration of uncertain options when facing competitive pressure. We examined how competitive pressure affects exploration in the “rivals-in-the-dark” game. Two players simultaneously learn about a set of choice options and compete to claim the best one. Across three studies, we show that people adapt their exploration in response to the structure of the choice environment (including the option set size and the relative number of gains and losses) and in response to repeated competition with the same opponent. Furthermore, we present a model-based analysis showing that their behavior is best described by a compensatory strategy under which the value of further exploration is weighed against the cost of being beaten to the punch by an opponent. The results point to a process of local adaptation whereby people learn to “act fast” based on their experience in a novel competitive environment.
Significance
Although largely unstudied, behavioral changes in decision making across the life span have implications for problems associated with poor decision making at different life stages, such as careless driving in adolescents and disadvantageous medical or financial decision making in older adults. We examine age-based differences in individual decision-making characteristics—choice consistency, rationality, and preferences for known and unknown risks—in 12- to 90-y-olds. We found that even the healthiest of elders show profoundly compromised decision making, and that risk attitudes show systematic changes across the life span that have important policy implications.
Fluid intelligence decreases with age, yet evidence about age declines in decision-making quality is mixed: Depending on the study, older adults make worse, equally good, or even better decisions than younger adults. We propose a potential explanation for this puzzle, namely that age differences in decision performance result from the interplay between two sets of cognitive capabilities that impact decision making, one in which older adults fare worse (i.e., fluid intelligence) and one in which they fare better (i.e., crystallized intelligence). Specifically, we hypothesized that older adults' higher levels of crystallized intelligence can provide an alternate pathway to good decisions when the fluid intelligence pathway declines. The performance of older adults relative to younger adults therefore depends on the relative importance of each type of intelligence for the decision at hand. We tested this complementary capabilities hypothesis in a broad sample of younger and older adults, collecting a battery of standard cognitive measures and measures of economically important decision-making "traits"-including temporal discounting, loss aversion, financial literacy, and debt literacy. We found that older participants performed as well as or better than younger participants on these four decision-making measures. Structural equation modeling verified our hypothesis: Older participants' greater crystallized intelligence offset their lower levels of fluid intelligence for temporal discounting, financial literacy, and debt literacy, but not for loss aversion. These results have important implications for public policy and for the design of effective decision environments for older adults. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
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Age differences in affective/experiential and deliberative processes have important theoretical implications for judgment and decision theory and important pragmatic implications for older-adult decision making. Age-related declines in the efficiency of deliberative processes predict poorer-quality decisions as we age. However, age-related adaptive processes, including motivated selectivity in the use of deliberative capacity, an increased focus on emotional goals, and greater experience, predict better or worse decisions for older adults depending on the situation. The aim of the current review is to examine adult age differences in affective and deliberative information processes in order to understand their potential impact on judgments and decisions. We review evidence for the role of these dual processes in judgment and decision making and then review two representative life-span perspectives (based on aging-related changes to cognitive or motivational processes) on the interplay between these processes. We present relevant predictions for older-adult decisions and make note of contradictions and gaps that currently exist in the literature. Finally, we review the sparse evidence about age differences in decision making and how theories and findings regarding dual processes could be applied to decision theory and decision aiding. In particular, we focus on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and how prospect theory and theories regarding age differences in information processing can inform one another.
© 2007 Association for Psychological Science.
Several judgment and decision-making tasks are assumed to involve memory functions, but significant knowledge gaps on the memory processes underlying these tasks remain. In a study on 568 adults between 25 and 80 years of age, hypotheses were tested on the specific relationships between individual differences in working memory, episodic memory, and semantic memory, respectively, and 6 main components of decision-making competence. In line with the hypotheses, working memory was positively related with the more cognitively demanding tasks (Resistance to Framing, Applying Decision Rules, and Under/Overconfidence), whereas episodic memory was positively associated with a more experience-based judgment task (Recognizing Social Norms). Furthermore, semantic memory was positively related with 2 more knowledge-based decision-making tasks (Consistency in Risk Perception and Resistance to Sunk Costs). Finally, the age-related decline observed in some of the decision-making tasks was (partially or totally) mediated by the age-related decline in working memory or episodic memory. These findings are discussed in relation to the functional roles fulfilled by different memory processes in judgment and decision-making tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).
How do changes in choice-set size influence information search and subsequent decisions? Moreover, does information overload influence information processing with larger choice sets? We investigated these questions by letting people freely explore sets of gambles before choosing one of them, with the choice sets either increasing or decreasing in number for each participant (from two to 32 gambles). Set size influenced information search, with participants taking more samples overall, but sampling a smaller proportion of gambles and taking fewer samples per gamble, when set sizes were larger. The order of choice sets also influenced search, with participants sampling from more gambles and taking more samples overall if they started with smaller as opposed to larger choice sets. Inconsistent with information overload, information processing appeared consistent across set sizes and choice order conditions, reliably favoring gambles with higher sample means. Despite the lack of evidence for information overload, changes in information search did lead to systematic changes in choice: People who started with smaller choice sets were more likely to choose gambles with the highest expected values, but only for small set sizes. For large set sizes, the increase in total samples increased the likelihood of encountering rare events at the same time that the reduction in samples per gamble amplified the effect of these rare events when they occurred-what we call search-amplified risk. This led to riskier choices for individuals whose choices most closely followed the sample mean.
(
This partially reprinted article originally appeared in Psychological Review,
1950, Vol 57, 94–207. The following abstract of the original article appeared in PA, Vol 24:5093.) An attempt has been made to clarify some issues in current learning theory by giving a statistical interpretation to the concepts of stimulus and response and by deriving quantitative laws that govern simple behavior systems. Dependent variables, in this formulation, are classes of behavior samples with common quantitative properties; independent variables are statistical distributions of environmental events. Laws of the theory state probability relations between momentary changes in behavioral and environmental variables. From this point of view it has been possible to derive simple relations between probability of response and several commonly used measures of learning, and to develop mathematical expressions describing learning in both classical conditioning and instrumental learning situations under simplified conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Describes a general model of decision rule learning, the rule competition model, composed of 2 parts: an adaptive network model that describes how individuals learn to predict the payoffs produced by applying each decision rule for any given situation and a hill-climbing model that describes how individuals learn to fine tune each rule by adjusting its parameters. The model was tested and compared with other models in 3 experiments on probabilistic categorization. The 1st experiment was designed to test the adaptive network model using a probability learning task, the 2nd was designed to test the parameter search process using a criterion learning task, and the 3rd was designed to test both parts of the model simultaneously by using a task that required learning both category and cutoff criteria. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Experimental learning that conforms to standard learning models is shown to lead learners to favor less risky alternatives when possible outcomes are positive. This learning disadvantage for risky alternatives is likely to be quite substantial and persistent, particularly among relatively fast learners. Learning to choose among alternatives whose outcomes lie in the negative domain, on the other hand, leads to favoring more risky alternatives in the short run but tends to become risk neutral in the long run. Thus, the fact that human beings exhibit greater risk aversion for gains than for losses in a wide variety of situations may reflect accumulated learning rather than inexplicable human traits or utility functions. Some implications of an experiential learning interpretation of risk preferences are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Clinical psychologists, physicians, and other professionals are typically called upon to combine cues to arrive at some diagnostic or prognostic decision. Mathematical representations of such clinical judges can often be constructed to capture critical aspects of their judgmental strategies. An analysis of the characteristics of such models permits a specification of the conditions under which the model itself will be a more valid predictor than will the man from whom it was derived. To ascertain whether such conditions are met in natural clinical decision making, data were reanalyzed from P. E. Meehl's (see 34:3) study of the judgments of 29 clinical psychologists attempting to differentiate psychotic from neurotic patients on the basis of their MMPI profiles. Results of these analyses indicate that for this diagnostic task models of the men are generally more valid than the men themselves. Moreover, the finding occurred even when the models were constructed on a small set of cases, and then man and model competed on a completely new set. (29 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Bayesian estimation for 2 groups provides complete distributions of credible values for the effect size, group means and their difference, standard deviations and their difference, and the normality of the data. The method handles outliers. The decision rule can accept the null value (unlike traditional t tests) when certainty in the estimate is high (unlike Bayesian model comparison using Bayes factors). The method also yields precise estimates of statistical power for various research goals. The software and programs are free and run on Macintosh, Windows, and Linux platforms. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
We introduce MCMCpack, an R package that contains functions to perform Bayesian inference using posterior simulation for a number of statistical models. In addition to code that can be used to fit commonly used models, MCMCpack also contains some useful utility functions, including some additional density functions and pseudo-random number generators for statistical distributions, a general purpose Metropolis sampling algorithm, and tools for visualization.
The impact of task complexity on information search strategy and decision quality was examined in a sample of 135 young, middle-aged, and older adults. We were particularly interested in the competing roles of fluid cognitive ability and domain knowledge and experience, with the former being a negative influence and the latter being a positive influence on older adults' performance. Participants utilized 2 decision matrices, which varied in complexity, regarding a consumer purchase. Using process tracing software and an algorithm developed to assess decision strategy, we recorded search behavior, strategy selection, and final decision. Contrary to expectations, older adults were not more likely than the younger age groups to engage in information-minimizing search behaviors in response to increases in task complexity. Similarly, adults of all ages used comparable decision strategies and adapted their strategies to the demands of the task. We also examined decision outcomes in relation to participants' preferences. Overall, it seems that older adults utilize simpler sets of information primarily reflecting the most valued attributes in making their choice. The results of this study suggest that older adults are adaptive in their approach to decision making and that this ability may benefit from accrued knowledge and experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).
In real-world decision making, choice outcomes, and their probabilities are often not known a priori but must be learned from experience. The dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging predicts that component processes of experience-based decision making (information search and stimulus–reward association learning) decline with age. Many existing studies in this domain have used complex neuropsychological tasks that are not optimal for testing predictions about specific cognitive processes. Here we used an experimental sampling paradigm with real monetary payoffs that provided separate measures of information search and choice for gains and losses. Compared with younger adults, older adults sought less information about uncertain risky options. However, like younger adults, older participants also showed evidence of adaptive decision making. When the desirable outcome of the risky option was rare (p = 0.10 or 0.20), both age groups engaged in more information search and made fewer risky choices, compared with when the desirable outcome of the risky option was frequent (p = 0.80 or 0.90). Furthermore, loss options elicited more sampling and greater modulation of risk taking, compared with gain options. Overall, these findings support predictions of the dopamine hypothesis of cognitive aging, but they also highlight the need for additional research into the interaction of age and valence (gain vs. loss) on experience-based choice.
The notion of ecological rationality sees human rationality as the result of the adaptive fit between the human mind and the environment. Ecological rationality focuses the study of decision making on two key questions: First, what are the environmental regularities to which people’s decision strategies are matched, and how frequently do these regularities occur in natural environments? Second, how well can people adapt their use of specific strategies to particular environmental regularities? Research on aging suggests a number of changes in cognitive function, for instance, deficits in learning and memory that may impact decision-making skills. However, it has been shown that simple strategies can work well in many natural environments, which suggests that age-related deficits in strategy use may not necessarily translate into reduced decision quality. Consequently, we argue that predictions about the impact of aging on decision performance depend not only on how aging affects decision-relevant capacities but also on the decision environment in which decisions are made. In sum, we propose that the concept of the ecological rationality is crucial to understanding and aiding the aging decision maker.
Earlier we said that the use of professional judgment will influence the decision-making process when the application of decision-making rules does not point to a correct alternative. When the evidence is not clear-cut, the exercise of judgment can be critical in selecting a final option.
Experimental learning that conforms to standard learning models is shown to lead learners to favor less risky alternatives when possible outcomes are positive. This learning disadvantage for risky alternatives is likely to be quite substantial and persistent, particularly among relatively fast learners. Learning to choose among alternatives whose outcomes lie in the negative domain, on the other hand, leads to favoring more risky alternatives in the short run but tends to become risk neutral in the long run. Thus, the fact that human beings exhibit greater risk aversion for gains than for losses in a wide variety of situations may reflect accumulated learning rather than inexplicable human traits or utility functions. Some implications of an experiential learning interpretation of risk preferences are discussed.
Background: Cross-sectional studies of samples varying widely in age have found moderate to high levels of shared age-related variance among measures of cognitive and physiological capabilities, leading researchers to posit common factors or common causal influences for diverse age-related phenomenon. Objective: The influence of population average changes with age on cross-sectional estimates of association has not been widely appreciated in developmental and ageing research. Covariances among age-related variables in cross-sectional studies are highly confounded in regards to inferences about associations among rates of change within individuals since covariances can result from a number of sources including average population age-related differences (fixed age effects) in addition to initial individual differences and individual differences in rates of ageing (random age effects). Analysis of narrow age-cohort samples may provide a superior analytical basis for testing hypotheses regarding associations between rates of change in cross-sectional studies. Conclusions: The use of age-heterogeneous cross-sectional designs for evaluating interdependence of ageing-related processes is discouraged since associations will not necessarily reflect individual-level correlated rates of change. Typical cross-sectional studies do not provide sufficient evidence for the interdependence of ageing-related changes and should not serve as the basis for theories and hypotheses of ageing. Reanalyzing existing cross-sectional studies using a sequential narrow-age cohort approach provides a useful alternative for evaluating associations between ageing-related changes. Longitudinal designs, however, provide a much stronger basis for inference regarding associations between rates of ageing within individuals.
This article describes the Betula Study with respect to objectives, design, participants, and assessment instruments for health and cognition. Three waves of data collection have been completed in 5-year intervals since 1988–1990. A fourth wave started in 2003 and will be completed in 2005. An overview of Betula research is presented under the headings of memory and cognition and cognitive neuroscience. Health-related issues and sex differences as well as comparisons between cross-sectional and longitudinal studies are discussed in the first section. The influence of different genes and of some brain abnormalities for memory functioning in adulthood and old age constitute main topics in the second section. New data are presented on the association between blood pressure and dementia. We demonstrated that a demented group of participants had higher levels of systolic blood pressure and pulse pressure than non-dementia controls 10 years before diagnosis. The new fourth wave of data collection will, in addition to enriching the Betula database, permit revisiting and reanalyzing the existing data from new perspectives.
Psychologists have been trained to do data analysis by asking whether null values can be rejected. Is the difference between groups nonzero? Is choice accuracy not at chance level? These questions have been traditionally addressed by null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). NHST has deep problems that are solved by Bayesian data analysis. As psychologists transition to Bayesian data analysis, it is natural to ask how Bayesian analysis assesses null values. The article explains and evaluates two different Bayesian approaches. One method involves Bayesian model comparison (and uses Bayes factors). The second method involves Bayesian parameter estimation and assesses whether the null value falls among the most credible values. Which method to use depends on the specific question that the analyst wants to answer, but typically the estimation approach (not using Bayes factors) provides richer information than the model comparison approach.
© The Author(s) 2011.
An accessible introduction to the principles of computational and mathematical modeling in psychology and cognitive science This practical and readable work provides students and researchers, who are new to cognitive modeling, with the background and core knowledge they need to interpret published reports, and develop and apply models of their own. The book is structured to help readers understand the logic of individual component techniques and their relationships to each other.
It is argued that P-values and the tests based upon them give unsatisfactory results, especially in large samples. It is shown that, in regression, when there are many candidate independent variables, standard variable selection procedures can give very misleading results. Also, by selecting a single model, they ignore model uncertainty and so underestimate the uncertainty about quantities of interest. The Bayesian approach to hypothesis testing, model selection, and accounting for model uncertainty is presented. Implementing this is straightforward through the use of the simple and accurate BIC approximation, and it can be done using the output from standard software. Specific results are presented for most of the types of model commonly used in sociology. It is shown that this approach overcomes the difficulties with P-values and standard model selection procedures based on them. It also allows easy comparison of nonnested models, and permits the quantification of the evidence for a null hypothesis of interest, such as a convergence theory or a hypothesis about societal norms.
The present paper explores situations in which the information available to decision makers is limited to feedback concerning the outcomes of their previous decisions. The results reveal that experience in these situations can lead to deviations from max- imization in the opposite direction of the deviations observed when the decisions are made based on a description of the choice problem. Experience was found to lead to a reversed common ratio/certainty effect, more risk seeking in the gain than in the loss domain, and to an underweighting of small probabilities. Only one of the examined properties of description-based decisions, loss aversion, seems to emerge robustly in these 'feedback-based' decisions. These results are summarized with a simple model that illustrates that all the unique properties of feedback-based decisions can be a product of a tendency to rely on recent outcomes. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
"An attempt has been made to clarify some issues in current learning theory by giving a statistical interpretation to the concepts of stimulus and response and by deriving quantitative laws that govern simple behavior systems. Dependent variables, in this formulation, are classes of behavior samples with common quantitative properties; independent variables are statistical distributions of environmental events. Laws of the theory state probability relations between momentary changes in behavioral and environmental variables. From this point of view it has been possible to derive simple relations between probability of response and several commonly used measures of learning, and to develop mathematical expressions describing learning in both classical conditioning and instrumental learning situations under simplified conditions." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Much literature attests to the existence of order effects in the updating of beliefs. However, under what conditions do primacy, recency, or no order effects occur? This paper presents a theory of belief updating that explicitly accounts for order-effect phenomena as arising from the interaction of information-processing strategies and task characteristics. Key task variables identified are complexity of the stimuli, length of the series of evidence items, and response mode (Step-by-Step or End-of-Sequence). A general anchoring-and-adjustment model of belief updating is proposed. This has two forms depending on whether information is processed in a Step-by-Step or End-of-Sequence manner. In addition, the model specifies that evidence can be encoded in two ways, either as a deviation relative to the size of the preceding anchor or as positive or negative vis-à-vis the hypothesis under consideration. Whereas the former (labeled estimation mode) results in data consistent with averaging models of judgment, the latter (labeled evaluation mode) implies adding models. Conditions are specified under which (a) evidence is encoded in estimation or evaluation modes and (b) use is made of the Step-by-Step or End-of-Sequence processing strategies. The theory is shown both to account for much existing data and to make novel predictions for combinations of task characteristics where current data are sparse. Some of these predictions are examined and validated in a series of five experiments. Finally, both the theory and the experimental results are discussed with respect to the structure of models of updating processes, limitations and extensions of the present work, and the importance of developing a procedural theory of judgment.
Research into human decision-making has often sidestepped the question of search despite its importance across a wide range of domains such as search for food, mates, allies, visual targets or information. Recently, research on decisions from experience has made progress in finding out how individual characteristics shape search for information. Surprisingly little is known, however, about how the properties of the choice ecology shape people's search. To fill this void, we analyzed how two key ecological properties influence search effort: domain of choice (gains vs. losses) and experienced variance (variance vs. no variance). Many people search longer when facing the prospect of losses relative to gains. Moreover, most people search more in options in which they experience variance relative to options they experience as invariant. We conclude that two factors that have been identified as important determinants of choice also influence search of information.
Erev, Ert, and Roth organized three choice prediction competitions focused on three related choice tasks: One shot decisions from description (decisions under risk), one shot decisions from experience, and repeated decisions from experience. Each competition was based on two experimental datasets: An estimation dataset, and a competition dataset. The studies that generated the two datasets used the same methods and subject pool, and examined decision problems randomly selected from the same distribution. After collecting the experimental data to be used for estimation, the organizers posted them on the Web, together with their fit with several baseline models, and challenged other researchers to compete to predict the results of the second (competition) set of experimental sessions. Fourteen teams responded to the challenge: The last seven authors of this paper are members of the winning teams. The results highlight the robustness of the difference between decisions from description and decisions from experience. The best predictions of decisions from descriptions were obtained with a stochastic variant of prospect theory assuming that the sensitivity to the weighted values decreases with the distance between the cumulative payoff functions. The best predictions of decisions from experience were obtained with models that assume reliance on small samples. Merits and limitations of the competition method are discussed. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bayesian methods have garnered huge interest in cognitive science as an approach to models of cognition and perception. On the other hand, Bayesian methods for data analysis have not yet made much headway in cognitive science against the institutionalized inertia of 20th century null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Ironically, specific Bayesian models of cognition and perception may not long endure the ravages of empirical verification, but generic Bayesian methods for data analysis will eventually dominate. It is time that Bayesian data analysis became the norm for empirical methods in cognitive science. This article reviews a fatal flaw of NHST and introduces the reader to some benefits of Bayesian data analysis. The article presents illustrative examples of multiple comparisons in Bayesian analysis of variance and Bayesian approaches to statistical power. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Risky prospects come in different forms. Sometimes options are presented with convenient descriptions summarizing outcomes and their respective likelihoods. People can thus make decisions from description. In other cases people must call on their encounters with such prospects, making decisions from experience. Recent studies report a systematic and large description–experience gap. One key determinant of this gap is people's tendency to rely on small samples resulting in substantial sampling error. Here we examine whether this gap exists even when people draw on large samples. Although smaller, the gap persists. We use the choices of the present and previous studies to test a large set of candidate strategies that model decisions from experience, including 12 heuristics, two associative-learning models and the two-stage model of cumulative prospect theory. This model analysis suggests—as one explanation for the remaining description–experience gap in large samples—that people treat probabilities differently in both types of decisions. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Herbivore damage is generally detrimental to plant fitness, and the evolu- tionary response of plant populations to damage can involve either increased resistance or increased tolerance. While characters that contribute to resistance, such as secondary chem- icals and trichomes, are relatively well understood, characters that contribute to a plant's ability to tolerate damage have received much less attention. Using Helianthus annuus (wild sunflower) and simulated damage of Haplorhynchites aeneus (head-clipping weevil) as a model system, we examined morphological characters and developmental processes that contribute to compensatory ability. We performed a factorial experiment that included three levels of damage (none, the first two, or the first four inflorescences were clipped with scissors) and eight sires each mated to four dams. We found that plants compensated fully for simulated head-clipper damage and that there was no variation among plant families in compensatory ability: seed production and mean seed mass did not vary among treat- ments, and sire X treatment interactions were not significant. Plants used four mechanisms to compensate for damage: (1) Clipped plants produced significantly more inflorescences than unclipped plants. Plants produced these additional inflorescences on higher order branches at the end of the flowering season. (2) Clipped plants filled significantly more seeds in their remaining heads than did unclipped plants. (3) Clipped plants, because they effectively flowered later than unclipped plants, were less susceptible to damage by seed- feeding herbivores other than Haplorhynchites. (4) In later heads, seed size was greater on clipped plants, which allowed mean seed size to be maintained in clipped plants. Although there was genetic variation among the families used in this experiment for most of the characters associated with compensation for damage (seed number, mean seed size, mean flowering date, length of the flowering period, and branching morphology), in analyses of these characters, no sire X treatment interactions were significant indicating that all of the families relied on similar mechanisms to compensate for damage.