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Far Right Preference in Europe: the Importance to Distinguish Perceived Cultural and Economic Ethnic Threats
Abstract
In this study we explain differences in far right preference between social groups and European countries by analysing the relevance of perceived economic versus cultural ethnic threats. We can statistically distinguish economic from cultural ethnic threats in most countries. The study reveals that cultural ethnic threats are a much stronger predictor of far right preferences than economic ethnic threats. This cultural versus economic distinction is also depicted in social class differences in far right preference. These are especially evident between socio-cultural specialists and technocrats, as anticipated by the new social class scheme. Socio-cultural specialists perceive especially less cultural ethnic threats compared to technocrats and consequently have a smaller likelihood to prefer the far right. However, when socio-cultural specialists perceive cultural ethnic threats, they are more likely to translate this into a far right preference than other social classes do. On the contextual level we find - contrary to our expectations – that higher levels of GDP in a country result in more far right preference, whereas higher levels of GDP do result in lower levels of ethnic threats. The effect of proportion of Muslims on far right preference is non-significant. This study contributes to existing research in three ways. First, this research demonstrates more detailed than previously that differentiating between economic and cultural ethnic threats contributes to the existing far right literature. Second, it shows that the new social class scheme proves its cross-national value and last, it reveals the effect that single countries can have on the results in cross-national research.
... Analytically, these structures can be situated at any and all levels of political systems (international, regional, national, sub-national). In terms of the demand-side factors, research particularly cites economic and cultural developments as drivers of populist success, due to their potential to change the minds of citizens who might then speak out, express their views in polls, and vote differently (e.g., Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012;van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018;van Kessel, 2013). Demand-side factors are often conceptualized at the contextual macro-level, since they influence societies as a whole. ...
This volume assembles a wide range of perspectives on populism and the media, bringing together various disciplinary and theoretical approaches, authors and examples from different continents and a wide range of topical issues. The chapters discuss the contexts of populist communication, communication by populist actors, different types of populist messages (populist communication in traditional and new media, populist criticism of the media, populist discourses related to different topics, etc.), the effects and consequences of populist communication, populist media policy and anti-populist discourses. The contributions synthesise existing research on this subject, propose new approaches to it or present new findings on the relationship between populism and the media. With contibutions by Caroline Avila, Eleonora Benecchi, Florin Büchel, Donatella Campus, María Esperanza Casullo, Nicoleta Corbu, Ann Crigler, Benjamin De Cleen, Sven Engesser, Nicole Ernst, Frank Esser, Nayla Fawzi, Jana Goyvaerts, André Haller, Kristoffer Holt, Christina Holtz-Bacha, Marion Just, Philip Kitzberger, Magdalena Klingler, Benjamin Krämer, Katharina Lobinger, Philipp Müller, Elena Negrea-Busuioc, Carsten Reinemann, Christian Schemer, Anne Schulz, Christian Schwarzenegger, Torgeir Uberg Nærland, Rebecca Venema, Anna Wagner, Martin Wettstein, Werner Wirth, Dominique Stefanie Wirz
... The journalists interviewed identifi ed a number of reasons for the rise of populism. Interestingly, these causes more or less refl ect the fi ndings of the scholarly literature (e.g., Guiso, Herrera, Morelli, & Sonno, 2017 ;Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012 ;van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018 ). The demand-side drivers most often mentioned were real-world, macro-level developments connected to immigration and economic issues , although they were attributed varying signifi cance in diff erent countries (e.g., fi nancial crisis, infl ux of refugees). ...
This book started from several assumptions, the key one being that although the rise of populism can be regarded as an international trend, it may take different forms when investigated in an internationally comparative manner. This book set out to look systematically for both similarities and differences in populist political communication processes in a variety of European nations. The previous chapters presented findings from several large-scale and comparative studies of populist communication. They examined how politicians and journalists perceive populism and the role of the media and communication (Part I); populist elements in media coverage and the factors explaining their prevalenc (Part II); and cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral effects of populist communication, using cross-national survey embedded experiments (Part III). The purpose of this concluding chapter is two-fold. On the one hand, we want to tease out and summarize the key findings of the different chapters. What do these studies tell us, collectively? On the other hand, we want to extrapolate from these findings and the current literature to offer concrete stakeholder advice to politicians, journalists, and citizens who are all confronted with the challenge of populist politics and populist messages. For discussions of the limitations of this research and future research directions, we refer the reader back to the conclusions of the individual chapters where these are discussed in detail.
... Demand for populist politics among citizens is often considered to be triggered by rapid and far-reaching social change or situations of crisis that lead to feelings of anxiety and perceptions of deprivation and social injustice. Research particularly points towards economic and cultural developments that have in the past been successfully targeted, fueled, and instrumentalized by populists (e.g., Inglehart & Norris, 2016 ;Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012 ;van Hauwaert & van Kessel, 2018 ). On the one hand, economic or fi nancial downfall and crisis can contribute to economic insecurity or suff ering among the population who are then attracted to a 'unifi ed nativist', protectionist, or isolationist response presented by populists as a solution to those problems (e.g., Becker, Fetzer, & Novy, 2016 ;Otjes, Ivaldi, Jupskas, & Mazzoleni, 2018 ). ...
This chapter provides the theoretical background and context for the chapters in the book. It explains the framework behind the research, the countries involved, how the research was funded, and how work was organized. The studies in the book were conducted in the context of a research network that was funded by the European Union framework program ‘Cooperation in Science and Technology’ (COST). The structure and purpose of the COST scheme and network had an impact upon which countries could be involved. The projects had to rely on the voluntary participation of country experts present in the network. A total of 31 European countries joined the network with 22 participating in this book.
... Yet, the main body of empirical research predominately points to the key role of education (Ivarsflaten, 2005;Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012;Norris, 2005;Schmuck & Matthes, 2015, 2017. Specifically, lower educated citizens are often most susceptible to the effects of populist messages, although the relative importance of this factor may differ between countries (e.g., Aalberg et al., 2017). ...
In the midst of the alleged global rise of populist ideas in politics, media,
and society, a growing body of literature has argued that populist communication has important effects on citizens’ opinions, emotions, and behaviors. Some scholars even argue that the media’s attention to populist politicians, and the actual use of populist ideas by the media, can be regarded as one of the central causes of populism’s electoral success. For this reason, it is no wonder that the field of populist communication research has gained in prominence and scope. Despite the growing interest by stakeholders and scholars, the psychological underpinnings of populist communication’s
effects remain under-theorized and under-studied, which has important ramifications for future empirical work that aims to dissect the persuasive elements of populist communication. Against this backdrop, this chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of (1) important individual and context-level factors that determine the audience’s resistance or persuasion to populist communication; (2) the mechanisms by which populist communication affects receivers; (3) citizens’ cognitive, attitudinal, emotional, and behavioral responses to populist political communication; and
(4) long-term political consequences of exposure to populist communication.
... Politicians often rely on this connection and use the concept of ethnic citizenship or some variation of it to promote anti-immigrant policies. This has been the case with most European right-wing populist parties that built their support by presenting immigrants as an ethnic threat (see Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012), but perhaps a better-known example is the anti-immigrant rhetoric used by Trump's 2016 presidential campaign focusing on American national identity (see Knowles and Tropp, 2018). ...
Europe has witnessed a polarization of intergroup attitudes and action tendencies in the context of the refugee crisis of 2015 and the rise of right-wing populism. Participation in both pro-minority collective action and right-wing nationalist movements has increased among members of ethnic majority groups. We analyzed these collective action intentions toward Roma people and Muslim immigrants in Hungary related to concepts of citizenship. In an online survey relying on a probabilistic sample that is demographically similar to the Hungarian population (N = 1069), we tested whether relying on the concept of ethnic citizenship predicted higher intentions to engage in pro-majority collective action, and lower intentions to engage in pro-minority collective action, and whether the connection was mediated by fear and empathy. We expected that the connections would be the opposite for civic citizenship. Our results supported the hypotheses, but we found that the ethnic definition was a stronger predictor of intergroup action intentions toward the immigrant group, and the civic definition a stronger predictor in case of the Roma minority group. In a second study (N = 320) we collected experimental evidence to show that civic and ethnic citizenship affected both types of collective action tendencies. We found that the manipulation had an effect on the concept of citizenship only in the ethnic dimension. Nevertheless, it influenced pro-minority collective action intentions especially in the presence of high empathy and low fear in the expected direction, that is, pro-minority collective action intentions were higher in the civic citizenship condition than in the ethnic citizenship condition. The effect was not found with regard to pro-majority collective action intentions. These findings highlight the potential consequences of nationalist rhetoric on intergroup action intentions and point out both the scope and the limits of influencing its effect.
... In the light of the findings of the present study, the combination of rightwing socio-cultural views with welfare chauvinism should be particularly appealing to voters high in RWA and low in political sophistication. In fact, research indicates that these parties obtain substantial support from segments of the population that feel alienated from and cynic about traditional political parties and the mainstream political discourse and are rather low in education (e.g., Arzheimer, 2009;Lucassen & Lubbers, 2011). ...
Using data from the Austrian National Election Study (Study 1) and the American National Election Study (Study 2), this research investigated the role of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA) in shaping attitudes toward governmental action related to the redistribution of wealth. We show that RWA is a relevant variable in explaining attitudes toward redistribution policies, and that the association between RWA and redistribution attitudes is moderated by political sophistication. RWA was associated with opposition to redistribution policies among individuals high in political sophistication, while among individuals low in political sophistication, RWA was either associated with support for redistribution policies (Study 1) or unrelated to redistribution attitudes (Study 2). Results suggest that exposure to the political discourse in a society affects how psychological needs and motives are related to preferences regarding the redistribution of wealth through the government.
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